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Security Guarantees and Nuclear Non-Proliferation note n°14/11 BRUNO TERTRAIS Maître de Recherche à la Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique Security Guarantees and Nuclear Non-Proliferation The purpose of this paper is to discuss the value potentially involving the use of nuclear weapons of “security guarantees”, that is, positive security to protect an ally, have played a very important assurances that include a formal or informal de- role in preventing proliferation. They exist in fense commitment, in preventing nuclear prolif- various forms, from unilateral statements to for- eration. It will demonstrate that such guarantees mal alliances backed by permanent military de- have proven to be a very effective instrument in ployments 1. In many cases, during the Cold war, preventing States from going nuclear. It would security guarantees were made manifest and thus seem logical to reinforce or extend them. tangible by the presence of nuclear weapons. However, this path is fraught with obstacles and This was the case in NATO, but also for some dilemmas. time in Japan and Taiwan. Security Guarantees as a Critical The North Atlantic Organization Treaty (NATO) Non-proliferation Tool has played the role of a non-proliferation instru- ment. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (1949) Security guarantees by a nuclear-armed State, creates an obligation to assist any member State victim of an armed attack. This article has been Israel (total: 32). widely interpreted as implying the possible use of nuclear weapons by the United States, the United Kingdom and France in defense of their The importance of positive security assurances allies. NATO’s non-proliferation role is not lim- in preventing proliferation can be demonstrated ited to Article 5. Over years, the organization has a contrario. The lack of a strong security guaran- developed a web of collective defense coopera- tee, or doubts about the scope and value of an tion and consultation mechanisms, resulting in existing one, have been key drivers of nuclear the existence of what could be called a “security proliferation since 1945. blanket” making member States feel secure. Most importantly, it has developed a unique col- • China realized during the first Formosa lective system of nuclear planning. Starting in Straits crisis (1954-1955) that whereas Tai- the mid-1960s, through the Nuclear Planning wan was now under the protection of the Group (NPG), NATO developed a common United States (US-RoC Mutual Defense mechanism of consultations, planning and em- Pact, 1954), the Soviet Union could not be ployment doctrine, which has given all members counted on. Mao launched the country’s a nuclear culture and a say in the process of pos- nuclear program in 1956. The second crisis sible weapons use – including through a wide- (1957-1958) and the break-up with the So- spread presence of US nuclear weapons in viet Union in 1959 comforted China in its Europe, and the availability of large number of decision. these weapons in wartime to allied forces. The creation of the NPG was largely a quid pro quo for the abandonment of the Multi-Lateral Force, • Israel, which very survival had been put an ambitious scheme which would have given, at into question the day after the State was least in some early versions of the proposals, non born, was reluctant to count on any other -nuclear countries such as Germany a finger on country than itself. Ben Gurion stated in the button. Soviet opposition to the MLF played 1955 that “Our security problem could a significant part in the debate of the mid-1960s have two answers: if possible, political leading to the signing of the Nuclear Non- guarantees, but this is not up to us. But Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2. what depends on us, we must invest all 5 our power (..).” The decision to acquire nuclear weapons became even more im- The shadow of US nuclear weapons extended portant after the 1956 war. By the late even beyond NATO’s borders. One of the reasons 1960s, Ben Gurion had become convinced Sweden ended up renouncing to build nuclear that no Western power would give the weapons was that it believed that there was a de country such a guarantee 6. He continued facto nuclear umbrella covering its territory, be- trying and specifically asked the Kennedy cause of its geographical situation (see below). administration for a “bilateral security agreement”, even musing with member- 7 In the Asia-Pacific region too, continued US pro- ship of NATO . But Washington only tection of several key allies has almost certainly agreed to a general commitment to Israel’s prevented them from going nuclear. Japan is security and to an informal promise to protected by the Security Treaty between the support Israel in case of an Arab surprise United States and Japan (1951). South Korea is attack – whereas Tel-Aviv wanted a real 8 covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty between defense treaty . A recent, thorough study the United States and the Republic of Korea of the Israeli program suggests that “if the (1953) 3. Taiwan, though not benefitting from the United States had agreed to guarantee same security guarantee that it enjoyed until the Israel’s existence through a defense pact recognition of Beijing, was and is still indirectly (..), Ben-Gurion’s determination to ac- protected by the Taiwan Relations Act (1979) 4. quire the nuclear option might never have 9 Australia, for its part, is covered by the ANZUS been aroused”. treaty (1951). • France did not think that the US guarantee Some US reports have referred to “about 30 was credible. The United States did not countries” being covered by the American nu- come to help French forces at Dien Bien clear umbrella. This number suggests adding Phu (1954), nor did it support the Suez op- Japan, South Korea and Australia to the 27 non- eration (1956). The US push for a strategy US NATO members, and perhaps Taiwan and/or of flexible response after 1957 was seen as 2 a sign of US hesitancy to defend Europe. lamabad tried again to get Western or Chi- De Gaulle’s decision to “operationalize” the nese security guarantees, but to no avail 18 . French nuclear program when he returned The nuclear program then went into full to power in 1958 was in no small part gear. After the Soviet invasion of Afghani- based on his belief that “nobody in the stan, Carter reconfirmed the 1959 pledge world, in particular nobody in America, and asked the US Congress to reaffirm it 19 . can say whether, where, how, to what ex- Pakistan agreed that it was a step forward, tent US nuclear arms would be used to but it was not as good as a treaty commit- defend Europe.” 10 In fact, he did not be- ment 20 . (In addition, it would not neces- lieve in nuclear guarantees at all: one could sarily protect the country in case of a war not expect to be protected by a State which with India.) In 1998, after the Indian tests, would engage its very survival in doing Islamabad hesitated before doing the so 11 . same. Some in the Pakistani elite argued that the lack of security guarantees was in itself a reason to do it 21 . Prime Minister • India tried to get formal security guaran- Mian Nawaz Sharif did a last-minute at- tees from the United States in the early tempt to obtain US protection, but did not 1960s. Washington hesitated, in particular succeed 22 . after the 1962 India-China war 12 . There was a commitment in principle to assist New-Delhi against Beijing 13 . However, the • South Africa did not benefit from any se- United States did not want to find itself curity guarantee. In the early days of the embroiled in a war against the Sino-Soviet Cold war, the ruling Nationalist party bloc, and India did not want to commit it- sought to ally itself firmly with the West self to be alongside the United States in the but was rebuffed when it asked for mem- fight against communism 14 . New-Delhi jus- bership of NATO. In the 1970s, increasing tified its decision to not sign the NPT by Soviet influence and Cuban military pres- the absence of credible security guaran- ence in the region aggravated Pretoria’s tees. The 1971 treaty of friendship with the sense of isolation. However, at the same Soviet Union was seen as limited and in- time, the apartheid policy had become in- sufficient protection 15 . These factors also creasingly unpopular throughout the played a role in the second phase of India’s world, and congressional pressures forced nuclear program. In 1991, Mikhail Gorba- the United States to terminate its assis- chev refused to renew the friendship tance to the regime. As a consequence, “it treaty, and declined to take a stance about seemed apparent to the South African Moscow’s attitude in case of a conflict with leadership that some other means had to China. be applied to secure Western support in times of crisis”. Hence the operationaliza- tion of the program in 1977 and the adop- • Pakistan too sought security guarantees tion in 1978 of a strategy of “gradual reve- before going nuclear. There was a US- lation” of Pretoria’s capability if attacked, Pakistan Agreement of Cooperation (1959), in order to force Western intervention 23 . which committed Washington to the de- fense of its ally. But Islamabad did not trust the United States, for whom it the • North Korea’s historic leader, Kim Il-Sung, agreement was aimed at resisting Soviet had doubts as per the protection given by aggression. It noticed that Washington had the alliance treaties signed in 1961 with the supported India in 1962, and, most impor- Soviet Union and China 24 .
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