Roberts V the Queen [2021] VSCA 28

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Roberts V the Queen [2021] VSCA 28 SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA COURT OF APPEAL S EAPCR 2020 0249 JASON JOSEPH ROBERTS Appellant v THE QUEEN Respondent --- JUDGES: MAXWELL P, NIALL and EMERTON JJA WHERE HELD: MELBOURNE DATE OF HEARING: 22 January 2021 DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26 February 2021 MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2021] VSCA 28 JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: [2020] VSC 793 (Beach JA) --- CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal – Bail – Murder – Miscarriage of justice – Retrial ordered after convictions quashed – Application for bail pending retrial – Bail refused – Appeal from refusal of bail – Whether exceptional circumstances exist that justify the grant of bail – Appellant in custody for 20 years before convictions quashed – Whether period of custody constitutes pre-trial delay – Reliance on injustice of corrupted trial and resulting hardship of incarceration – Whether continued incarceration unjust – Whether judge misconstrued applicable provisions – Whether refusal of bail unreasonable – No specific error – Refusal of bail reasonably open – Appeal dismissed – Bail Act 1977 ss 1B, 3AAA, 4A, 4E. WORDS AND PHRASES – ‘exceptional circumstances exist that justify the grant of bail’. --- APPEARANCES: Counsel Solicitors For the Appellant Mr P Matthews Stary Norton Halphen and Mr P Smallwood For the Respondent Mr B Ihle SC Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for with Mr G Hayward Public Prosecutions COURT OF APPEAL 459 Lonsdale Street, Melbourne, VIC 3000 MAXWELL P NIALL JA EMERTON JA: Summary 1 On 15 August 2000, the appellant was arrested and charged with murdering two police officers. On 31 December 2002, he was convicted of both charges of murder. On 24 February 2003, he was sentenced to life imprisonment, with a non- parole period of 35 years. Successive applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal and the High Court failed. 2 In 2019, the appellant commenced fresh proceedings in this Court under pt 6.4 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009, seeking leave to appeal on the ground that his trial had been vitiated by non-disclosure of relevant evidence. On 10 November 2020, the appeal against conviction was allowed. The Court quashed the murder convictions and ordered a retrial on both charges.1 3 The appellant then applied for bail pending the retrial. Because the appellant is charged with murder, the judge was obliged to refuse the application unless satisfied that ‘exceptional circumstances exist that justify the grant of bail’.2 The judge was not so satisfied and the application for bail was refused.3 4 The appellant now appeals from the decision refusing him bail. The decision to grant or refuse bail being discretionary, the appellant accepts that appellate intervention would only be warranted if he could show that the judge had made a specific error or else that it was not reasonably open to the judge in the circumstances of the case to refuse the application. 5 As to specific error, the appellant submits that the judge misconstrued the applicable provisions and, as a result, gave undue prominence to the seriousness of 1 Roberts v The Queen [2020] VSCA 277 (‘Roberts’). 2 Bail Act 1977 s 4A(1A) (‘Bail Act’). 3 Re Roberts [2020] VSC 793 (‘Reasons’). Roberts v The Queen 1 THE COURT the charges, the strength of the prosecution case and the likely sentence the appellant would face if convicted. By so doing, it was said, the judge effectively made it impossible for the appellant to obtain a grant of bail. 6 As to the complaint of unreasonableness, the appellant submitted that the only conclusion reasonably open was that these were exceptional circumstances which justified a grant of bail. Specific reliance was placed on: the ‘delay’ of more than 20 years between the appellant’s arrest and his likely retrial; the ‘considerable personal hardship’ which he has endured while in custody; the absence of any factors indicating that the appellant presents an unacceptable risk in any of the ways contemplated by the Bail Act; the fact that his convictions were quashed because police misconduct had ‘so corrupted the fairness of [his] trial as to poison it to its root’; and the existence of strong community support for the appellant, and the availability of a substantial surety. 7 For reasons which follow, the appeal must be dismissed. First, there was no specific error. His Honour’s construction and application of the relevant provisions was entirely orthodox, and consistent with the applicable authorities. Secondly, as to unreasonableness, the judge took into account all of the matters relied on by the appellant and it was, in our view, well open to his Honour to conclude that there did not exist ‘exceptional circumstances that justify the grant of bail’. 8 It is not in doubt that the circumstances giving rise to the quashing of the appellant’s convictions last November are quite exceptional. Fortunately, it is an extremely rare occurrence for convictions to be quashed on the ground that police Roberts v The Queen 2 THE COURT misconduct denied an accused person ‘a fair trial according to law’.4 The critical question, however, was whether those circumstances, and the fact that the appellant had spent more than 20 years in custody by virtue of those wrongful convictions, justified a grant of bail. The judge was not persuaded that they did and, in our respectful view, that conclusion is unimpeachable. 9 A review of bail decisions in ‘exceptional circumstances’ cases reveals certain types of circumstances which recur as justifications for bail in such cases: unreasonable delay before trial; unacceptable adverse impacts of continued pre-trial incarceration (whether on the accused person or on his/her dependants); and the likelihood that time spent on remand will exceed any term of imprisonment which would be imposed in the event of conviction. What these different kinds of circumstances appear to have in common is that they are capable of rendering continued pre-trial incarceration unjust, notwithstanding the statutory prohibition on bail which otherwise applies. 10 The informing principle seems to be clear: if continued incarceration before trial would be productive of injustice, then a grant of bail may be justified (subject always to the separate question of ‘unacceptable risk’). The bail decision maker is thus looking to the future, considering the likely consequences of the continued incarceration of the applicant for bail. Past events may be relevant to that consideration, as in the cases concerning pre-trial delay, but what justifies bail is the need to prevent or mitigate future injustice. 11 This analysis highlights the difficulty confronting the appellant, whose core argument rested on past injustice as enlivening his right to liberty. What was said to justify the grant of bail was the injustice constituted by the corruption of his trial, and the personal hardship which he is said to have experienced during the 20 years of custody which followed. According to the submission, the grant of bail should be responsive to and reflective of that past injustice and hardship. 4 Roberts [2020] VSCA 277, [257] (T Forrest and Osborn JJA, Taylor AJA). See Eastman v DPP [2014] ACTSCFC 3, [8] (Rares and Wigney JJ, Cowdroy AJ). Roberts v The Queen 3 THE COURT 12 In our view, it was well open to the judge to reject that submission. Those matters did not, as the appellant submitted, compel the conclusion that bail was justified. Understood by reference to the jurisprudence on ‘exceptional circumstances’, his Honour was not obliged to view the past events on which the appellant relies as making it unjust for his pre-trial incarceration to continue. 13 We note that the appellant has already pursued appropriate remedies for the injustice and hardship he has suffered. The remedy for the corruption of his trial was the one which he obtained in November 2020: the quashing of his convictions. And the personal hardship on which he relies was expressly accepted, and taken into account, by this Court in considering whether or not to order a retrial. The applicable provisions 14 The ‘exceptional circumstances’ test is set out in s 4A of the Bail Act, as follows: (1) This section applies if, under section 4AA(1) or (2), the step 1 — exceptional circumstances test applies to a decision of whether to grant bail. (1A) The bail decision maker must refuse bail unless satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist that justify the grant of bail. (2) The accused bears the burden of satisfying the bail decision maker as to the existence of exceptional circumstances. (3) In considering whether exceptional circumstances exist, the bail decision maker must take into account the surrounding circumstances. (4) If the bail decision maker is satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist that justify the grant of bail, the bail decision maker must then move to step 2—unacceptable risk test. 15 The ‘unacceptable risk’ test is set out in s 4E of the Bail Act, as follows: (1) A bail decision maker must refuse bail for a person accused of any offence if the bail decision maker is satisfied that— (a) there is a risk that the accused would, if released on bail— (i) endanger the safety or welfare of any person; or (ii) commit an offence while on bail; or Roberts v The Queen 4 THE COURT (iii) interfere with a witness or otherwise obstruct the course of justice in any matter; or (iv) fail to surrender into custody in accordance with the conditions of bail; and (b) the risk is an unacceptable risk. (2) The prosecutor bears the burden of satisfying the bail decision maker— (a) as to the existence of a risk of a kind mentioned in subsection (1)(a); and (b) that the risk is an unacceptable risk. (3) In considering whether a risk mentioned in subsection (1)(a) is an unacceptable risk, the bail decision maker must— (a) take into account the surrounding circumstances; and (b) consider whether there are any conditions of bail that may be imposed to mitigate the risk so that it is not an unacceptable risk.
Recommended publications
  • The Retributive Philosophies of Executive Clemency
    IS THERE JUSTICE IN MERCY? THE RETRIBUTIVE PHILOSOPHIES OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY Gina N. Gibbs Thesis Prepared for the Degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS May 2013 APPROVED: Peggy Tobolowsky, Co-Major Professor and Chair of the Department of Criminal Justice Chad. R. Trulson, Co-Major Professor Adam Trahan, Committee Member Thomas Evenson, Dean of the College of Public Affairs and Community Service Mark Wardell, Dean of the Toulouse Graduate School Gibbs, Gina N. Is There Justice in Mercy? The Retributive Philosophies of Executive Clemency. Master of Science (Criminal Justice), May 2013, 85 pp., 9 tables. Executive clemency is assumed to be a mechanism to correct miscarriages of justice brought about by the criminal justice system, yet little empirical research exists to confirm this assumption. This research study examined the types of rationales cited in 799 cases of executive clemency from six states from 2005 to 2012. Rationales based upon retributive philosophies, in which a miscarriage of justice was cited, were further analyzed. This analysis revealed that only seven percent of all clemency decisions from the examined states cited retributive rationales. Of the fifty-six grants of clemency that cited retributive rationales, most were granted in the forms of pardons. The analysis indicated that executive clemency is utilized as a mechanism to correct injustices, specifically in cases of innocence. This study concludes with a discussion of policy implications and the reliance on executive clemency as a fail-safe to the criminal justice system. Copyright 2013 by Gina N. Gibbs ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First and foremost, I would like to thank my mother and father.
    [Show full text]
  • Death-Penalty-Pakistan
    Report Mission of Investigation Slow march to the gallows Death penalty in Pakistan Executive Summary. 5 Foreword: Why mobilise against the death penalty . 8 Introduction and Background . 16 I. The legal framework . 21 II. A deeply flawed and discriminatory process, from arrest to trial to execution. 44 Conclusion and recommendations . 60 Annex: List of persons met by the delegation . 62 n° 464/2 - January 2007 Slow march to the gallows. Death penalty in Pakistan Table of contents Executive Summary. 5 Foreword: Why mobilise against the death penalty . 8 1. The absence of deterrence . 8 2. Arguments founded on human dignity and liberty. 8 3. Arguments from international human rights law . 10 Introduction and Background . 16 1. Introduction . 16 2. Overview of death penalty in Pakistan: expanding its scope, reducing the safeguards. 16 3. A widespread public support of death penalty . 19 I. The legal framework . 21 1. The international legal framework. 21 2. Crimes carrying the death penalty in Pakistan . 21 3. Facts and figures on death penalty in Pakistan. 26 3.1. Figures on executions . 26 3.2. Figures on condemned prisoners . 27 3.2.1. Punjab . 27 3.2.2. NWFP. 27 3.2.3. Balochistan . 28 3.2.4. Sindh . 29 4. The Pakistani legal system and procedure. 30 4.1. The intermingling of common law and Islamic Law . 30 4.2. A defendant's itinerary through the courts . 31 4.2.1. The trial . 31 4.2.2. Appeals . 31 4.2.3. Mercy petition . 31 4.2.4. Stays of execution . 33 4.3. The case law: gradually expanding the scope of death penalty .
    [Show full text]
  • 532 Administrative Law Iraq, 210–212, 399–417 Libya, 242–243 Morocco, 354–357 Oman, 298–299 Sudan, 252–253 Syri
    532 Index Administrative law Armed force Iraq, 210–212, 399–417 defence see Self-defence Libya, 242–243 implied authorisation, 18–20 Morocco, 354–357 Iraq see Iraq War Oman, 298–299 UN Charter, 5, 11–21 Sudan, 252–253 Aviation Syria, 202 final status agreement, 443 Afghanistan Lockerbie trial, 507–508 administration, 481–482 Axis of evil, 5 constitutional law, 457–485 fundamental rights, 461–466 Bahrain government, 470–471 commercial agents, 288 judiciary, 478–481 constitutional law, 288–289 Loya Jirga, 477 elections, 289 National Assembly, 471–477 employment, 285–287 president, 467–470 freedom of expression, 287 state of emergency, 482–483 legislation, 290–294 statehood, 458–460 media law, 287 transitional provisions, 485 Banking Al-Qa’eda Egypt, 192–193 Iraq, 10 governing law, 511, 522–525 Pakistan, 372, 373, 378 guarantees, 516–517, 525–526 Arab League Lebanon, 239–240 Beirut Summit, 430 murâbaha/Morabaha contracts, judicial cooperation, 86 509–526 Palestinian refugees, 115, 154–155 Oman, 300–301 Arab Peace Initiative, 449 Saudi Arabia, 73 Arbitration Shamil Bank case, 509–526 see also Dispute resolution shari’a, 509–526 Egypt, 182–183 shari’a board, 510 foreign arbitration, 81–83 Yemen, 335 ICSID Convention, 84–86, 262 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (1998), Lebanon, 235–236, 238 93 New York Convention, 81–83 Belgium, 95 OPIC Convention, 83–84 Bosnia Herzogovina, 91, 93–94, Saudi Arabia, 79–86 101–102, 106–107 shari’a, 79 Botanical products, 191 United Arab Emirates, 275 Index 533 Canada, 128, 160 Compensation Capital markets Dayton
    [Show full text]
  • Study of Victim Experiences of Wrongful Conviction
    The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice and prepared the following final report: Document Title: Study of Victim Experiences of Wrongful Conviction Author(s): Seri Irazola, Ph.D., Erin Williamson, Julie Stricker, Emily Niedzwiecki Document No.: 244084 Date Received: November 2013 Award Number: GS-23F-8182H This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally- funded grant report available electronically. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. Final Report Study of Victim Experiences of Wrongful Conviction Contract No. GS-23F-8182H September, 2013 Submitted to: National Institute of Justice Office of Justice Programs U.S. Department of Justice Submitted by: ICF Incorporated 9300 Lee Highway Fairfax, VA 22031 Final Report Study of Victim Experiences of Wrongful Conviction Contract No. GS-23F-8182H September, 2013 Submitted to: National Institute of Justice Office of Justice Programs U.S. Department of Justice Submitted by: ICF Incorporated 9300 Lee Highway Fairfax, VA 22031 Study of Victim Experiences of Wrongful Conviction Study of Victim Experiences of Wrongful Conviction Seri Irazola, Ph.D. Erin Williamson Julie Stricker Emily Niedzwiecki ICF International 9300 Lee Highway Fairfax, VA 22031-1207 This project was supported by Contract No. GS-23F-8182H, awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Evidence Destroyed, Innocence Lost: the Preservation of Biological Evidence Under Innocence Protection Statutes
    American University Washington College of Law Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals Scholarship & Research 2005 Evidence Destroyed, Innocence Lost: The Preservation of Biological Evidence under Innocence Protection Statutes Cynthia Jones American University Washington College of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Evidence Commons, and the Fourteenth Amendment Commons Recommended Citation Jones, Cynthia, "Evidence Destroyed, Innocence Lost: The Preservation of Biological Evidence under Innocence Protection Statutes" (2005). Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals. 1636. https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev/1636 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Scholarship & Research at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. EVIDENCE DESTROYED, INNOCENCE LOST: THE PRESERVATION OF BIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE UNDER INNOCENCE PROTECTION STATUTES Cynthia E. Jones* In 1997, Texas governor George W. Bush issued a pardon to Kevin Byrd, a man convicted of sexually assaulting a pregnant woman while her two-year old daughter lay asleep beside her.' As part of the original criminal investigation, a medical examination was performed on the victim and bodily fluids from the rapist were collected for forensic analysis in a "rape kit." At the time of Mr. Byrd's trial in 1985, DNA technology was not yet available for forensic analysis of biological evidence.2 In 1997, however, a comparison of Mr.
    [Show full text]
  • Miscarriages of Justice: What Can We Learn
    Poyser, Sam and Grieve, John D. (2018) Miscarriages of justice: what can we learn. In: Griffiths, Andy and Milne, Rebecca, (eds.) The Psychology of Criminal Investigation : from theory to practice. Routledge Downloaded from: http://ray.yorksj.ac.uk/id/eprint/3105/ The version presented here may differ from the published version or version of record. If you intend to cite from the work you are advised to consult the publisher's version: https://www.routledge.com/The-Psychology-of-Criminal-Investigation-From-Theory-to- Practice/Griffiths-Milne/p/book/9781138639416 Research at York St John (RaY) is an institutional repository. It supports the principles of open access by making the research outputs of the University available in digital form. Copyright of the items stored in RaY reside with the authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may access full text items free of charge, and may download a copy for private study or non-commercial research. For further reuse terms, see licence terms governing individual outputs. Institutional Repository Policy Statement RaY Research at the University of York St John For more information please contact RaY at [email protected] Miscarriages of justice: What can we learn? Sam Poyser and John D. Grieve Introduction “…you’ve had your whole life ripped to shreds and you have been hugely damaged…[these are] the ashes of what you had” (Barry George in BBC, 2015, n.p). This statement, made by a victim of wrongful conviction in the UK, highlights the devastating impact of miscarriages of justice upon individuals who suffer them. Put simply, miscarriages destroy people's lives, erode public support for the Criminal Justice System (CJS) and are inimical to wider society (Gardner, 2015).
    [Show full text]
  • Fourth Section the Facts
    FOURTH SECTION Application no. 25424/09 by Lorraine ALLEN against the United Kingdom lodged on 29 April 2009 STATEMENT OF FACTS THE FACTS 1. The applicant, Ms Lorraine Allen, is a British national who was born in 1969 and lives in Scarborough. She is represented before the Court by Mr M. Pemberton, a lawyer practising in Wigan. A. The circumstances of the case 2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 1. The applicant’s conviction and appeal 3. On 7 September 2000 the applicant was convicted by a jury at Nottingham Crown Court of the manslaughter of her four-month old son, Patrick. She was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. Evidence was given at her trial by expert medical witnesses who described how the injuries suffered by her son were consistent with shaking or an impact. The conviction was based on the accepted hypothesis concerning “shaken baby syndrome”, also knows as “non-accidental head injury” (“NAHI”), to the effect that the findings of a triad of intracranial injuries consisting of encephalopathy, subdural haemorrhages and retinal haemorrhages were either diagnostic of, or at least very strongly suggestive of, the use of 2 ALLEN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM – STATEMENT OF FACTS AND QUESTIONS unlawful force. All three were present in the case of the death of the applicant’s son. 4. Following a review of cases in which expert medical evidence had been relied upon, the applicant applied for, and was granted, leave to appeal out of time. The appeal was based on a challenge to the accepted hypothesis concerning NAHI on the basis that new medical evidence suggested that the triad of injuries could be attributed to a cause other than NAHI.
    [Show full text]
  • The Innocence Checklist
    THE INNOCENCE CHECKLIST Carrie Leonetti* ABSTRACT Because true innocence is unknowable, scholars who study wrongful convic- tions and advocates who seek to vindicate the innocent must use proxies for inno- cence. Court processes or of®cial recognition of innocence are the primary proxy for innocence in research databases of exonerees. This Article offers an innova- tive alternative to this process-based proxy: a substantive checklist of factors that indicates a likely wrongful conviction, derived from empirical and jurispru- dential sources. Notably, this checklist does not rely on of®cial recognition of innocence for its objectivity or validity. Instead the checklist aggregates myriad indicators of innocence: factors known to contribute to wrongful convictions; rules of professional conduct; innocence-project intake criteria; prosecutorial conviction-integrity standards; and jurisprudence governing when convictions must be overturned because of fresh evidence or constitutional violations. A checklist based on articulated, uniformly applicable criteria is preferable to the more subjective and less regulated decisionmaking of judges and prosecutors who determine innocence using an of®cial exoneration methodology. Only a con- ception of innocence independent of of®cial exoneration can provide the neces- sary support for reform of barriers to more fruitful postconviction review mechanisms. INTRODUCTION ............................................ 99 I. BACKGROUND: THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT .................... 100 A. Known Causes of Wrongful
    [Show full text]
  • Wrongful Convictions/Miscarriages of Justice, Law As a System, and the Story of the Little Girl
    University of Southampton Research Repository ePrints Soton Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder/s. The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", University of Southampton, name of the University School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination http://eprints.soton.ac.uk UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON FACULTY OF BUSINESS, LAW AND ART Wrongful Convictions/Miscarriages of Justice, Law as a System, and the story of the Little Girl by Ebenezer Laryea Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy April 2016 1 Academic Thesis: Declaration Of Authorship I, EBENEZER NINII LARYEA declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research. Title of thesis: WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS/MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE, LAW AS A SYSTEM, AND THE STORY OF THE LITTLE GIRL …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… I confirm that: 1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University; 2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated; 3.
    [Show full text]
  • Filed: 04/13/2015
    Case: 13-20208 Document: 00513002219 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/13/2015 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED No. 13-20208 April 13, 2015 Lyle W. Cayce UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk Plaintiff - Appellee v. FRANCISCO JAVIER RODRIGUEZ, also known as Silver Jesus Cundumi- Bonilla; EDWIN RIVERA-OTERO, also known as Luis Angel Maldonado Barroso, also known as Gary Charver Segura-Viveros, also known as Edwin Otero-Rivera; CARLOS MANUEL BORIA, also known as Luis German Rodriguez, also known as Victor; MARVIN CESAR CARABALI-DIAZ, also known as Alex Omar Aponte-Ortiz; ERIC ALBERTO LEWIS, Defendants - Appellants Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:11-CR-1-2 Before JOLLY and DENNIS, Circuit Judges, and REEVES*, District Judge. PER CURIAM:** These consolidated appeals arise out of the convictions and sentences of defendants Carlos Manuel Boria, Marvin Cesar Carabali-Diaz, Eric Alberto * District Judge of the Southern District of Mississippi, sitting by designation. ** Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. Case: 13-20208 Document: 00513002219 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/13/2015 No. 13-20208 Lewis, Edwin Rivera-Otero, and Francisco Javier Rodriguez. The offense conduct centered around a “reverse-sting” operation involving the defendants’ attempted armed robbery of a cocaine stash house. For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM.
    [Show full text]
  • Criminal Case Review Commission
    Criminal Case Review Commission CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION CHILD AND YOUTH LAW, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY COMMUNITY SECTIONS August 5, 2021 66 Slater St., Suite 1200, Ottawa, ON, Canada K1P 5H1 tel/tél. 613 237-2925 • tf/sans frais 1-800 267-8860 • fax/téléc. 613 237-0185 • cba.org • [email protected] PREFACE The Canadian Bar Association is a national association representing 36,000 jurists, including lawyers, notaries, law teachers and students across Canada. The Association's primary objectives include improvement in the law and in the administration of justice. This submission was prepared by the CBA Child and Youth Law, Criminal Justice, and Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Community Sections, with assistance from the Advocacy Department at the CBA office. The submission has been reviewed by the Law Reform Subcommittee and approved as a public statement of the CBA Child and Youth Law Criminal Justice and Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Community Sections. Copyright © 2021 Canadian Bar Association TABLE OF CONTENTS Criminal Case Review Commission I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................ 1 II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE COMMISSION ....................... 1 Question 1: Who Should the Commissioners Be? ........................................ 1 A. General Comments on the Structure of the CCRC..................... 2 B. Further Recommendations on Qualifications of Personnel ........ 3 C. Statutory Considerations ...........................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Handling Claims of Actual Innocence: Rejecting Federal Habeas Corpus As the Best Avenue for Addressing Claims of Innocence Based on DNA Evidence
    Catholic University Law Review Volume 56 Issue 1 Fall 2006 Article 8 2006 Handling Claims of Actual Innocence: Rejecting Federal Habeas Corpus as the Best Avenue for Addressing Claims of Innocence Based on DNA Evidence Matthew J. Mueller Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview Recommended Citation Matthew J. Mueller, Handling Claims of Actual Innocence: Rejecting Federal Habeas Corpus as the Best Avenue for Addressing Claims of Innocence Based on DNA Evidence, 56 Cath. U. L. Rev. 227 (2007). Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol56/iss1/8 This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HANDLING CLAIMS OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE: REJECTING FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS AS THE BEST AVENUE FOR ADDRESSING CLAIMS OF INNOCENCE BASED ON DNA EVIDENCE Matthew J. Mueller+ The development of fast, reliable, and affordable means of forensic DNA testing has revealed imperfections in our criminal justice system, especially in the prosecution of violent crimes at the state level. The In- nocence Project of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law alone has documented 183 DNA-based exonerations, including eighteen in 2005.' As a result, state prisoners have resorted to invoking the remedy of fed- eral habeas corpus, amongst other potential avenues. Habeas relief in such cases is a statutory means for collateral attack of state court judg- ments.2 The basis and procedure for the federal review of state convic- tions can only be properly understood as a legislatively and judicially defined writ that is distinct from the "Great Writ" as understood by the Framers.3 Although Congress and the Supreme Court expanded the use + J.D.
    [Show full text]