Report No. 173
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REPORT NO. 173 HISTORICAL OFFICER CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS 25 Mar 47 THE WATCH ON THE MAAS 9 NOV 44 - 8 FEB 45 CONTENTS PAGE ALLIED AND ENEMY DISPOSITIONS ....................... 1 FIRST CDN ARMY AREA ........................... 4 REGROUPING AND FUTURE PLANS ........................ 8 1 BRIT CORPS FRONT ............................15 CHANGES IN ENEMY DISPOSITIONS, 9-30 NOV 44 ................18 "OFFENSIVE DEFENCE" ............................25 FOUNDATIONS FOR OPERATION "VERITABLE" ..................29 THE ENEMY HITS BACK ...........................46 THE FIRST CDN ARMY FRONT, 1-7 JAN 45 ...................46 THE LEFT FLANK: 2 CDN CORPS, 8-14 JAN ..................52 THE RIGHT FLANK: 2 CDN CORPS, 8-14 JAN .................54 THE LARGER PICTURE ............................56 INTENSIVE PATROLLING AND SMALL-SCALE ACTION, 15-21 JAN ..........59 APPRECIATION AND PLANS ..........................62 THE ATTACK ON KAPELSCHEVEER .......................67 1 Report No. 173 ACTIVITIES OF 2 CDN CORPS, 22 JAN - 4 FEB ................71 "VERITABLE" ON THE WAY ..........................72 APPENDICES "A" 2 CDN CORPS OPERATION ORDER, 22 NOV 44 "B" MAP - ALLIED AND ENEMY DISPOSITIONS (NORTHERN SECTOR) 0600 HRS 9 NOV 44 "C" MAP - DISPOSITIONS OF FIRST CDN ARMY, 0600 HRS 1 JAN 45 "D" MAP - THE BATTLE FOR KAPELSCHEVEER, 26-31 JAN 45 "E" MAP - DISPOSITIONS OF FIRST CDN ARMY, 1200 HRS 1 FEB 45 2 Report No. 173 REPORT NO. 173 HISTORICAL OFFICER CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS 25 Mar 47 THE WATCH ON THE MAAS 9 NOV 44 - 8 FEB 45 1. The present report is a detailed account of the operations of Canadian Forces in North-West Europe from 9 Nov 44 to 8 Feb 45. During this period First Cdn Army, deployed on the left flank of 21 Army Group, was charged with the responsibility for the security of two vitally important sectors of the Allied Front: the NIJMEGEN bridgehead and the long line of the River Maas from Middelaar to the sea. In these positions it was committed to a defence which, in the definition of the Army Commander, was to be "temporary", "aggressive", and a "prelude to offensive action". (W.D., G.O.C.-in-C., First Cdn Army, January 1945: Appx 1, Gen Crerar's Despatch, 31 Jan 45). "Offensive-defence" is thus the principal theme of this report. The narrator has followed the course of events from 9 Nov 44, when the operations which resulted in the clearing of the Scheldt Estuary and the north-eastern approaches to Antwerp (Preliminary Report No. 154) came to, an end, to the beginning of Operation. "VERITABLE" (Preliminary Report No. 155) on 8 Feb 45. 2. The primary source material from which this report has been compiled will be found in the Directives of the C.-in-C., 21 Army Group, the Despatches and Directives of the G.O.C.-in-C., First Cdn Army, the War Diaries of Main 3 Report No. 173 H.Q. First Cdn Army, and of 1 Brit and 2 Cdn Corps. The war diaries of lower formation and units have also been consulted, but solely for the purpose of obtaining detailed accounts of specific actions. ALLIED AND ENEMY DISPOSITIONS, 9 NOV 44 3. By 9 Nov 44 the Allied Armies in the West were deployed along a front which, from the Swiss frontier in the south, extended north through the western foothills of the Vosge, along the valley of the Moselle between the enemy-held fortress cities of Metz and Trier, thence along the eastern frontiers of Luxembourg and Belgium, through the Dutch provinces of Limburg and North Brabant to Arnhem on the Neder-Rijn, and west from Arnhem along the Waal and the main course of the Maas to the port of Westkapelle on the north- west coast of Walcheren. The southern sector of this tremendous front was held by 6 Army Group with First French Army on the right, at the entrance to the Belfort Gap, and Seventh U.S. Army on the left, based on St Die and Luneville. In the centre, 12 Army Group was responsible for a great segment of the front extending from north of Luneville in the south to the upper reaches of the Maas in the north. Within 12 Army Group, Third U.S. Army was deployed in the right flank sector, between Nancy and Thionville, First U.S. Army in the sector, between Nancy and Thionville, First U.S. Army in the centre, in the eastern Ardennes, and Ninth U.S. Army on the left, in the Aachen sector and salient. The long left flank of the Allied Armies was held by 21 Army Group, in which both Second Brit and First Cdn Armies were then in the process of re-grouping.(See Map at Appx "B"). 4 Report No. 173 4. In the central sector of the front, the Third U.S. Army was to open a new phase of Allied operations on 8 Nov with the launching of a major attack against the Metz salient. Within nine days five additional Allied armies were also to take the offensive. Thus, by 17 Nov, six of the seven Allied armies were to be committed to battle in a concerted effort to win a decision in the west before the final onset of winter. (War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Committee Weekly Resumé, Nos., 271-273, November 1944). 5. Against the tremendous weight of this attack, and against the possible eruption of the Allied left flank along the Maas, the German C.-in-C. West, Field-Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, had marshalled a nominal 64 divisions in two army groups. In the south, Army Group "G" had deployed Nineteenth Army and Fifth Panzer Army along the line of the Vosges, and First Army in the Saarland forward of the Siegfried Line. To the north, Army Group "B" controlled the Seventh Army, First Para Army, and the Fifteenth Army. The latter, severely mauled in the fighting for the approaches to Antwerp, was in the process of re-organizing following its withdrawal across the Hollandsch Diep. Seventh Army and First Para Army, holding the sector between Luxembourg and Nijmegen, were jointly responsible for the defence of the approaches to the Ruhr. In this sector, Seventh Army, on the left, maintained its defence line well to the west of the Siegfried defences, in the plateaux of the Hunsruck and Eiffel. On the right, First Para Army defended the upper reaches of the Maas, the Reichwald area with its northern extension of the Siegfried Line, and was, in addition, responsible for containing the Arnhem - Nijmegen bridgehead. (S.H.A.E.D.F. Weekly Intelligence Summary Nos. 34-35, November 1944). 5 Report No. 173 6. The re-grouping of 21 Army Group at this juncture was designed to provide for the extension of the offensive front opened by the Third U.S. Army attack on 8 Nov to the eastern face of the Allied left flank. The method to be employed was a. by assuming responsibility for an important segment of the Ninth Army front, to enable 12 Army Group to concentrate its forces for an offensive in the AACHEN area, and b. by concentrating the weight of Second Brit and First Cdn Armies along the upper reaches of the MAAS in the NIJMEGEN bridgehead, to develop offensive operations to conform with the eastward advance of 12 Army Group. (G.O.C.-in-C., First Cdn Army, file l-O: Directive M-534, from C-in-C., 21 Army Gp, 2 Nov 44). The immediate objective of both Allied formations was the west bank of the Rhine, the possession of which was essential to a larger purpose envisaged by Field-Marshal Montgomery in September: "The objective and the prize", he stated, "is the Ruhr; its capture will mean the beginning of the end for Germany". (Ibid. Directive M-527, 27 Sep 44). 7. The detailed plan for this operation was laid down by the C.-in-C., 21 Army Group, on 2 Nov 44, as follows: a. Second British Army to release 7 U.S. Armd Div to Ninth U.S. Army by 10 Nov, and by 112 Nov to open an attack against the enemy pocket 6 Report No. 173 west of the Maas in the area of VENLO; by 15 Nov to take over the left flank sector of Ninth U.S. Army as far south as excl GEILINKIRCHEN, and from that date to be prepared to develop offensive operations to conform with the eastward advance of Ninth U.S. Army; b. First Cdn Army, to release 104 U.S. Div to 12 Army Group on 5 Nov and (1) with 1 Brit Corps to hold the line of the MAAS from MAREN to the sea "with the minimum strength necessary" while "maintaining a reserve of mobile and armoured troops in suitable positions to deal with any enemy attempt to cross the river", and, by 10 Nov, (2) with 2 Cdn Corps to relieve 30 Corps of Second British Army in the NIJMEGEN bridgehead and on the upper line of the MAAS from MIDDELAAR to MAREN, and (3) to be prepared to release 82 and 101 U.S. Airborne Divs to the Allied Airborne Army during the period 15 to 25 Nov. (Ibid, Directive M-534). In addition to the tasks assigned to Second Brit Army, both Army H.Q. were also "to study the possibilities of, and to prepare plans for, offensive operations: 7 Report No. 173 a. south-eastward from the NIJMEGEN area, between the RHINE and the MEUSE, (and) b. northwards across the NEDER RIJN, to secure the high ground between ARNHEM and APELDOORN with a bridgehead over the IJSSEL RIVER", either of which "might become a sound proposition at short notice..." For the present, however, the first task of the Army Group was "to complete the operations designed to open the port of ANTWERP and to drive the enemy to the north of the River MAAS in south-west HOLLAND".