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Lifting Labor's Voice: a Principled Path Toward Greater Worker Voice The Center for Law and Economic Studies Columbia University School of Law 435 West 116th Street New York, NY 10027-7201 (212) 854-3739 Lifting Labor’s Voice: A Principled Path Toward Greater Worker Voice and Power Within American Corporate Governance Leo E. Strine, Jr. Aneil Kovvali Oluwatomi O. Williams Working Paper No. _____ February 24, 2021 Do not quote or cite without author’s permission. An index to the working papers in the Columbia Law School Working Paper Series is located at https://law-economic-studies.law.columbia.edu/content/working-papers University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School ILE INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS A Joint Research Center of the Law School, the Wharton School, and the Department of Economics in the School of Arts and Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania ______________________________________________________________________________ RESEARCH PAPER NO. 21-09 Lifting Labor’s Voice: A Principled Path Toward Greater Worker Voice and Power Within American Corporate Governance Leo E. Strine, Jr. UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA CAREY LAW SCHOOL COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW HARVARD PROGRAM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Aneil Kovvali UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL Oluwatomi O. Williams This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3792492 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL PROGRAM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Lifting Labor’s Voice: A Principled Path Toward Greater Worker Voice and Power Within American Corporate Governance Leo E. Strine, Jr. Aneil Kovvali Oluwatomi O. Williams Discussion Paper No. 2021-3 2/2021 Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138 This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3792492 LIFTING LABOR’S VOICE: A PRINCIPLED PATH TOWARD GREATER WORKER VOICE AND POWER WITHIN AMERICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Leo E. Strine, Jr.,* Aneil Kovvali** & Oluwatomi O. Williams*** In view of the decline in gain sharing by corporations with American workers over the last forty years, advocates for American workers have expressed growing interest in allowing workers to elect representatives to corporate boards. Board level representation rights have gained appeal because they are a highly visible part of codetermination regimes that operate in several successful European economies, including Germany’s, in which workers have fared better. But board-level representation is just one part of the comprehensive codetermination regulatory strategy as it is practiced abroad. Without a coherent supporting framework that includes representation from the ground up, as is provided for by works councils in the European Union, representation from the top down is unlikely to be successful. This Article begins the work of fleshing out a principled and contextually-fitting approach to reform that would allow for greater worker voice within the American corporate structure. After establishing the basics of how codetermination operates in the EU, the Article addresses the challenges facing even a minimal codetermination regime in the United States, tackling issues that reformers have not yet addressed. It then suggests a broader set of reforms that would increase worker voice and improve worker wellbeing now, while facilitating the eventual adoption of an effective and efficient system of board-level representation for American workers. * Ira M. Millstein Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Governance at Columbia Law School; Michael L. Wachter Distinguished Fellow in Law and Policy at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School; Senior Fellow at the Harvard Program on Corporate Governance; Of Counsel, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; former Chief Justice and Chancellor of the State of Delaware. ** Harry A. Bigelow Teaching Fellow & Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School. *** Associate, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. We thank Larry Beeferman, David Katz, Richard McAdams, and Peggy Pfeiffer for helpful comments. 2 LIFTING LABOR’S VOICE Introduction ................................................................................................................. 3 I. Congressional Proposals for Board Codetermination ...................................... 7 II. Codetermination in Practice .............................................................................. 9 A. Introduction ................................................................................................... 9 B. Establishment Level Codetermination ....................................................... 12 C. Board Codetermination .............................................................................. 18 1. Eligible Voters........................................................................................ 19 2. Making a Place for Middle Management ............................................. 22 3. Eligibility to Serve on the Board and Pipelines to the Board .............. 24 4. Worker Director Election Mechanics .................................................. 25 5. European Codetermination in Action .................................................. 27 D. The Ends of Corporate Governance and Their Consistency with the Philosophy of Codetermination ................................................................. 30 E. External Regulation and Context ................................................................ 33 III. A Minimalist Approach ................................................................................... 34 A. Who gets to vote? .................................................................................. 35 B. Who gets to serve and how much do they get paid? ................................. 38 C. How frequently are campaigns conducted, how are they conducted, and who pays for them? ..................................................................................... 41 D. How are elections administered? ............................................................... 45 E. How does the board operate? .................................................................... 48 IV. Toward An Effective U.S. System of Codetermination ................................. 50 A. Adopt a Requirement for Stakeholder Governance for All Systemically Important Companies Subject to the Board Codetermination Mandate . 51 B. Require Proper EESG Disclosure Requirements Addressing Stakeholder Concerns ..................................................................................................... 53 C. Turn the Compensation Committee into a Full Workforce Committee and Increase the Importance of the Board’s Role in Issues Important to Workers ...................................................................................................... 54 D. Use the Board’s Workforce Committee as a Trustworthy Foundation to Experiment with Greater Worker Voice. .................................................. 56 E. Restore the Promise of the New Deal to American Workers through Labor Law Reform ...................................................................................... 58 F. Align the Interests of Human Investors in Fair and Sustainable Capitalism with Corresponding Duties for Institutional Investors .............................. 61 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 63 LIFTING LABOR’S VOICE 3 INTRODUCTION The dramatic decline in corporate gain sharing with American workers over the last two generations has contributed to stagnating wages, soaring inequality, and economic insecurity. There are global causes of greater inequality and depressed pay that go beyond the decline in workers’ share. But many public policymakers and economists believe that the reduced share of corporate profits that American workers receive has been a major factor in the much larger increase in inequality that has occurred in the United States, compared to its market economy allies in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”). To some, the explanation for the change in the division of the corporate pie is simple. During this period, the power of the stock market over American companies has drastically increased, while the leverage of working people in the corporate power structure has drastically decreased, leading to stockholders grabbing much more of the pie, and leaving workers with crumbs.1 These concerns have been deepened by the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on working Americans, and the spotlight it has shined on the vast inequities in our capitalist system. In the wake of the pandemic, there will be more calls for giving employees more clout to advocate for better wages, safe working conditions, an inclusive workplace that is free from harassment and discrimination, and fair health and leave benefits. And leaders from both parties have come forward with proposed remedies.2 As one remedy, leading public officials concerned for working people have introduced legislation to provide workers with more voice within the corporate power 1 See, e.g., Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis: An Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the American Economy, Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research (May 2020) (decline in workers’ share of economic profits in the United States has been driven by decline in worker power at firms and the increase of firms’ responsiveness
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