Dynamics and Challenges of the Juba Peace Talks With
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
The London School of Economics and Political Science Even Eating You Can Bite Your Tongue Dynamics and Challenges of the Juba Peace Talks with the Lord’s Resistance Army Mareike Schomerus A thesis submitted to the Department of International Development of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, September 2012. Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 108,097 words. Statement of use of third party for editorial help I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Merl Storr. page 2 Abstract This thesis offers an alternative narrative why the Juba Peace Talks between the Government of Uganda and the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and its political wing, the Lord’s Resistance Movement (LRM), did not produce a Final Peace Agreement. Widely considered the most promising peace effort in the history of a violent conflict that began in 1986, talks were mediated by the Government of Southern Sudan from 2006 to 2008. During this time, the parties signed five separate agreements on a range of issues, yet in 2008 the LRA’s leader, Joseph Kony, failed to endorse them through a final signature. An aerial attack on the LRA by the Ugandan army spelled the end of the Juba Talks. It is commonly argued that as the first peace talks conducted with people wanted by the International Criminal Court, the Juba Talks collapsed because the arrest warrants made a negotiated agreement impossible. Another widely accepted reason is that the LRA/M were not committed to peace. This thesis, however, argues that how the LRA/M experienced the muddled and convoluted peace talks was the crucial factor because the dynamics of the process confirmed existing power dynamics. Internally, the LRA/M’s dynamics were profoundly influenced by their perception of being trapped in an established hostile system, causing a struggle to transform their own dynamics constructively. Offering an analytical chronology of the Juba Talks with an empirical emphasis on the perspective of the LRA/M and an analysis of LRA/M structures and behavioural patterns that emerged in the process, this thesis further outlines that judging success or failure of a peace process on whether agreements have been signed is misplaced. Despite not producing a final agreement, the Juba Talks contributed to peace and change in Uganda. page 3 Acknowledgments In the years of work on this thesis, I have left a trail of people who have been either helpful, inspirational, supportive or critical along the way—or sometimes all at once. Some I encountered briefly or intermittently, others stuck with me over many years of an often difficult journey. I have many people to thank and the list here seems truncated, since I received so much encouragement, camaraderie, friendship, time, trust and help with transport, accommodation, food, or security. I have to thank all the people whose insights, opinions, experiences, hopes and frustrations this thesis hopes to represent. They gave me their time and in some cases graciously accepted my relentless questioning. I hope I have done justice to representing the many facets of their very complex experiences. Help and support came in many guises and it is impossible to express this in different levels of gratitude. However, I want to specifically thank those who took the time to read various stages of my draft and helped me improve it. Ron Atkinson was indefatigably constructive and supportive. Warner ten Kate fought his way through every page of an early version. Eddie Thomas, Katie McKenna, Rachel Flynn, and Regina Grafe all helped tremendously with later drafts. Others worked to give me space when it really mattered, namely Wendy Foulds, Anouk Rigterink, and Henry Radice, whose comments on a draft I also greatly appreciated. During years of fieldwork, many people lent a helping hand. My thanks go to Ann Lorschiedter, Anthony Labol, Anton Baare, Baker Abdu, Benson Moini, Bhandari Guruver, Captain Tap, Charles Taban, Emmanuel Gumbiri, First Lieutenant Lual, Gaelle Le Pottier, Ilkka Laukkanen, James Gony, James Miskin, John Chuol, John Mathiang, Joseph Angau Magai, Judy McCallum, Julie Brethfeld, Juergen Buesselberg, Kuai Deng Kuai, Lony Badeng, Marc Yapete, Marcus Culley, Marv Koop, Riek Machar Teny-Dhourgon, Stephen Dayak, Tim Hayden-Smith, Taban Alfred, Tushar Velve, and Wilson Deng. In trying to make sense of what I was observing and recording, discussions helped to clarify my thinking and analysis. Encouraging and insightful discussants were Adam O’Brien, Alex de Waal, Ana Bracic, Andrea Boehm, Andy Carl, Barney Afako, Betty Ogwaro, Caesar Poblicks, Cornelius Williams, Dirk Salomons, Frank Nyakairu, Jehanne Henry, Kennedy Tumutegyereize, Mahmood Mamdani, Skye Wheeler, Sverker Finnstroem, Tatiana Carayannis, and Wolfgang Zeller. page 4 Various people gave me a temporary home or moral support during the bouts of writing up, and for this I am particularly grateful to Amelia Brett, Anneliese Gorgieva, Merl Storr, Molly Thomas-Meyer, Susan Sparks, and Teddy Brett. Over the years, many people have helped me in different ways, ranging from general cheering to legal advice. For a range of reasons, I want to thank Ale Irigoin, Alicia Altorfer-Ong, Andrea Simpson, Anna Borzello, Bob Leitch, Carolyn Hodder, Claire Smith, Chris Blattmann, Christoph Luetgert, Craig Valters, Damien Lewis, Daniel Paul Simmons III, Danielle Stein, David Lewis, Dayak Biel, Denise Dunovant, Diederik van Hoogstraaten, Dietmar Schiffermueller, Ed Balke, Elliott Green, Emmi Antinoja, Eric Sarvan, Francoise Beukes, Hajo Schomerus, Hannah Lewis, Heiko Schomerus, Ivor Hanson, Jeannie Annan, Jens Meyer, Jochen Grabler, Jort Hemmer, Kathy Moir, Keith Mathieson, Lotje de Vries, Marion Grabler, Mary Kaldor, Matthew Green, Oender Ertuer, Raania Rizvi, Renate Schomerus, Richard Dowden, Salim Loxley, Silke Hellwig, Stephanie Davies, Suzie Butcher, Thomas Huesken, Tim Dyson, Tiob de Diran, Tom Rachman, Vesna Bojicic- Dzelilovic, Vannina Maestracci, and Wiebke Abraham. A grant from the University of London’s Central Research Fund helped in paying for fieldwork. The LSE’s Global Public Policy Network allowed me to spend time at Columbia University. The Department of International Development at the LSE has helped out with various student grants over the years. I have been fortunate to learn a great deal from two supervisors who brought very different perspectives and insights to my work. I am indebted to both Professor Tim Allen and Professor Koen Vlassenroot for their time, support, patience, and confidence in me over the course of many years. I thank Dr Cherry Leonardi and Dr Phil Clark for their insights, interest and very constructive comments during my thesis examination. Thank you, John, for solace and always keeping a good sense of humour. page 5 Table of Content Acronyms, Abbreviations and Protagonists .....................................................................8 1.Introduction .....................................................................................................................14 The Thesis in a Nutshell .........................................................................................................................................................................18 The Scholarship on Peace Negotiations ................................................................................22 Research Gaps on Peacemaking and the Juba Talks ............................................................28 A Comment on Methods ......................................................................................................32 2. Brief Histories of War, Peace and Information .........................................................48 War .........................................................................................................................................49 Peace .....................................................................................................................................57 Information ...........................................................................................................................78 3. 2006: “While talking, there is troop movement” .....................................................91 First on the Agenda: Ending Hostilities ................................................................................92 Talks Continue Amidst Confusion ......................................................................................106 Violations .............................................................................................................................116 Continued Violence .............................................................................................................121 Comprehensive Political Solutions ......................................................................................123