Experimental Study on the Penetration Effect of Shotgun Pellet on Soap Ma Yongzhong Engineering University of Armed Police Force, Xi,An 710086, China [email protected]
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Less Than Lethal Weapons
PUBLIC ORDER MANAGEMENT Less Than Lethal Weapons UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards for Formed Police Units 1st edition 2015 Public Order Management 1 Less Than Lethal Weapons Background Before the inception of UN Peacekeeping mission, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations requests TCC/PCC to contribute with their forces to the strength of the mission. The UN Police component is composed by Individual Police Officers (IPO) and Formed Police Units (FPU). The deployment of FPU is subject to a Memorandum of Understanding between the UN and the contributing country and the compliance with the force requirements of the mission. The force requirement lists the equipment and the weapons that the FPU has to deploy with. Despite the fact ‘Guidelines on the Use of Force by Law Enforcement Agencies’ recommends the development and the deployment of less than lethal weapons and ammunitions, FPUs usually do not possess this type of equipment. Until the development of less-lethal weapons, police officers around the world had few if any less-lethal options for riot control. Common tactics used by police that were intended to be non-lethal or less than lethal included a slowly advancing wall of men with batons. Considering the tasks the FPUs are demanded to carry out, those weapons should be mandatory as part of their equipment. The more equipped with these weapons FPUs are, the more they will be able to efficiently respond to the different type of threats and situation. Non-lethal weapons, also called less-lethal weapons, less-than-lethal weapons, non- deadly weapons, compliance weapons, or pain-inducing weapons are weapons intended to be used in the scale of Use of Force before using any lethal weapon. -
Out of Control Special Seattle’S Flawed Response to Protests Report Against the World Trade Organization
A Out of Control Special Seattle’s Flawed Response to Protests Report Against the World Trade Organization June 2000 American Civil Liberties Union of Washington 705 Second Ave., Suite 300 Seattle, WA 98104-1799 (206) 624-2184 www.aclu-wa.org Table of Contents Introduction .......................................................................................................... 3 Executive Summary.......................................................................................... 5 Recommendations ............................................................................................. 11 I. BY CREATING A “NO PROTEST ZONE,” THE CITY NEEDLESSLY VIOLATED RIGHTS TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY Setting the Stage: Failure to Protect Delegates’ Rights to Assembly.......................... 15 Proper Security Measures: How to Protect Everyone’s Rights ................................... 16 The “No Protest Zone:” A Militarized Zone That Suspended Civil Liberties .......... 18 “No Protest Zone” Not Designed for Security .............................................................. 22 “No Protest Zone” Not Needed to Protect Property.................................................... 22 Ratification Process for Emergency Orders Flawed ..................................................... 23 Failure to Plan.................................................................................................................... 24 Lack of Information Not a Problem ............................................................................... -
Less Lethal Force
LESS LETHAL FORCE Proposed Standards for Massachusetts Law Enforcement Agencies Table of Contents Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................... i I. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 II. Less Lethal Weapons ......................................................................................................... 2 A. Types of Less Lethal Weapons .............................................................................. 2 1. Chemical Sprays ........................................................................................ 2 2. Pepper Spray .............................................................................................. 3 3. Impact Projectiles ....................................................................................... 4 a. Bean Bag Rounds ........................................................................... 4 b. Rubber Bullets ............................................................................... 4 c. Pepper Spray Projectiles ................................................................ 5 d. Wooden Bullet Projectiles ............................................................. 5 4. Electroshock Weapons ............................................................................... 5 5. Other Devices ............................................................................................. 6 -
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Case 2:20-cv-11147 Document 1 Filed 12/09/20 Page 1 of 38 Page ID #:1 1 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP LAUREN M. BLAS, SBN 296823 ORIN SNYDER (pro hac vice forthcoming) [email protected] 2 [email protected] COURTNEY M. JOHNSON, SBN 324331 MYLAN L. DENERSTEIN (pro hac vice [email protected] 3 forthcoming) LENORE H. ACKERMAN, SBN 324995 [email protected] [email protected] 4 KATHERINE MARQUART, SBN 248043 MACKENZIE A. MCCULLOUGH, [email protected] SBN 324343 5 KARIN PORTLOCK (pro hac vice [email protected] forthcoming) 333 South Grand Avenue, Suite 4600 6 [email protected] Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197 LEE R. CRAIN (pro hac vice forthcoming) Tel.: 213.229.7000 7 [email protected] Fax: 213.229.7520 CASSARAH M. CHU (pro hac vice 8 forthcoming) MATTHEW S. KAHN, SBN 261679 [email protected] [email protected] 9 200 Park Avenue LAUREN D. DANSEY, SBN 311886 New York, NY 10166-0193 [email protected] 10 Tel.: 212.351.4000 555 Mission Street, Suite 3000 Fax: 212.351.4035 San Francisco, CA 94105-0921 11 Tel.: 415.393.8200 GRETA WILLIAMS, SBN 267695 Fax: 415.393.8306 12 [email protected] 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. 13 Washington, DC 20036-5306 Tel.: 202.955.8500 14 Fax: 202.467.0539 15 Attorneys for Plaintiff Deon Jones 16 17 18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 19 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 20 DEON JONES, an individual, 21 CASE NO. 2:20-cv-11147 Plaintiff, 22 v. COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE 23 RELIEF AND DAMAGES CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a municipal 24 entity, CHIEF MICHEL MOORE, in DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL his official capacity as Chief of the Los 25 Angeles Police Department, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, a 26 municipal entity, DOE 1, and DOES 2- 10 inclusive, 27 Defendants. -
Plastic Justice a Report on the Use of Plastic and Rubber Bullets in Ireland
Plastic Justice A Report on the use of Plastic and Rubber Bullets in Ireland FRANCIS ROWNTREE JULIE LIVINGSTONE MICHAEL DONNELLY TOBIAS MOLLOY THOMAS FRIEL STEPHEN GEDDIS BRIAN STEWART PAUL WHITTERS CAROL ANN KELLY HARRY DUFFY NORA MCCABE PETER DOHERTY PETER MCGUINESS STEPHEN MCCONOMY JOHN DOWNES KEITH WHITE SEAMUS DUFFY FRANCIS ROWNTREE JULIE LIVINGSTONE MICHAEL DONNELLY TOBIAS MOLLOY THOMAS FRIEL STEPHEN GEDDIS BRIAN STEWART PAUL WHITTERS CAROL ANN KELLY HARRY DUFFY NORA MCCABE PETER DOHERTY PETER MCGUINESS STEPHEN MCCONOMY JOHN DOWNES KEITH WHITE SEAMUS DUFFY FRANCIS ROWNTREE JULIE LIVINGSTONE MICHAEL DONNELLY TOBIAS MOLLOY THOMAS FRIEL STEPHEN GEDDIS BRIAN STEWART PAUL WHITTERS CAROL ANN KELLY HARRY DUFFY NORA MCCABE PETER DOHERTY PETER MCGUINESS STEPHEN MCCONOMY JOHN DOWNES KEITH WHITE SEAMUS DUFFY FRANCIS ROWNTREE JULIE LIVINGSTONE MICHAEL DONNELLY TOBIAS MOLLOY THOMAS FRIEL STEPHEN GEDDIS BRIAN STEWART PAUL WHITTERS CAROL ANN KELLY HARRY DUFFY NORA MCCABE PETER DOHERTY PETER MCGUINESS STEPHEN MCCONOMY JOHN DOWNES KEITH WHITE SEAMUS DUFFY The untold stories of Relatives, Victims and Survivors PLASTIC JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE USE OF PLASTIC AND RUBBER BULLETS IN IRELAND Plastic Justice A Report on the use of Plastic and Rubber Bullets 1 in Ireland FraNCIS ROWNTREE JULIE LIVINGSTONE MICHAEL DONNELLY TOBIAS MOLLOY THOmaS FRIEL STEPHEN GEDDIS BRIAN STEWART PaUL WHITTERS CarOL ANN KELLY HARRY DUFFY NOra MCCaBE PETER DOHERTY PETER MCGUINESS STEPHEN MCCONOMY JOHN DOWNES KEITH WHITE SEamUS DUFFY FraNCIS ROWNTREE JULIE LIVINGSTONE MICHAEL -
So When Did Public Order Start
SO WHEN DID PUBLIC ORDER START TRUMPING FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS? RETHINKING THE MODERN INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE AND THE ROLE POLICE SHOULD PLAY IN PROTECTING THAT RIGHT Jesse D. Proctor ** ABSTRACT The Assembly Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Con- stitution was created to protect what early Americans saw as a fundamen- tal right at the heart of what it meant to be a free and democratic society. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, public assemblies played an integral part in American politics and society. These assemblies varied between planned and organic, controlled and chaotic. Whatever characteristics could be attributed to any particular assembly, they were all protected by the Assembly Clause, both in the eyes of law enforcement and the judiciary. Over the last century, however, the right of assembly has tak- en a back seat to safety concerns and a desire to maintain the status quo. The militarization of America’s local police departments throughout the country has exacerbated this phenomenon. This Note contends that the militarization of police has created an at- mosphere that is inherently at odds with the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. To rectify the mistakes of the past, the Note advocates for three different approaches to the problem. First, it advocates for judicial re- view of the constitutionality of the current model of police-protester inter- action during public assemblies and the modern judicial interpretation of the Assembly Clause. Second, it advocates for an introduction of legislation that would first cease the flow of weapons and training from the military to local police forces and then reverse this failed experiment altogether. -
Bloody Sunday, Ireland, 1972
Learning Curve Learning Curve Education Service Workshops Key Stage 4 Bloody Sunday Ireland, 1972 – Two Sides, Two Stories Contents Teacher’s Notes 2 Document 1: 4 Transcript of “This Week,” 1972, ref: CJ 4/252 Document 2: 13 Map of Derry, ref: CJ 4/258 Learning Curve Education Service workshops Bloody Sunday – Ireland, 1972 – Two Sides, Two Stories Teacher’s notes Aims of the workshop This workshop aims to help students investigate and understand the events of Bloody Sunday, and the different interpretations regarding what happened and who was responsible, through the study of original documents held at the National Archives. Documents • Document 1: Reference: CJ 4/252 A transcript of the ITV ‘This Week’ programme, 3 February 1972 • Document 2: Reference: CJ 4/258 Map showing the area, and the movements of the paratroopers and marchers on Bloody Sunday, 1972 Activity This exercise is based on a transcript of the ITV ‘‘This Week’ programme about the events of Bloody Sunday, broadcast on 3 February 1972. Choose one student to read each part out, and give them time to familiarise themselves with their part before asking them to act out the TV programme in front of the class. Give the rest of the class a copy of the map of the area to look at as they listen to the ‘programme,’ so they can follow what happened, according to the witnesses, and plot the course of events. The TV programme presents two very different interpretations about what happened, and why, on Bloody Sunday. When the students have finished reading the script through, clarify through discussion with the whole class what the ‘two sides and the two stories’ are: see if they can decide, or think it is possible to decide, which side is telling the truth. -
The Use of Firearms in Wildlife Damage Management
Human Health and Ecological Risk Assessment for the Use of Wildlife Damage Management Methods by USDA-APHIS-Wildlife Services Chapter VI THE USE OF FIREARMS IN WILDLIFE DAMAGE MANAGEMENT MAY 2017 Peer Reviewed Final September 2019 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The USDA-APHIS-Wildlife Services (WS) Program uses firearms to kill, capture, and disperse animals for specific wildlife management projects, mostly where a need exists to resolve a wildlife damage situation. Wildlife can cause damage to property, agriculture, and natural resources or cause human health and safety concerns; for example, firearms are used to reduce wildlife hazards at airports or collect wildlife for disease surveillance. WS uses firearms frequently for wildlife damage management operations. Firearms are used in all types of settings, including urban and rural areas, by employees who are trained and certified in the safe use of firearms in accordance with WS Directive 2.615. Potential human health and environmental risks from the proposed use of all types of firearms, including rifles, handguns, shotguns, and other firearm-like and ancillary devices, by WS has been evaluated by APHIS and determined that the risks to human health and the environment are negligible. Shooting is a target specific method and only has a minimal risk to people, pets, and nontarget species. WS personnel are trained and certified to use firearms to ensure operations are conducted safely. To ensure safe firearm use and awareness, WS employees who use firearms to conduct official duties are required to attend an approved firearms safety training, currently the National Rifle Association curriculum for basic pistol, rifle, or shotgun certification, before they can use firearms or firearm- like devices in their jobs; additionally, refresher training is required, thereafter (WS Firearms Manual and WS Directive 2.615). -
"Death Foretold: Firing of "Rubber" Bullets to Disperse
מרכז המידע הישראלי לזכויות האדם בשטחים )ע.ר.( B’Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories Information Sheet, December 1998 DEATH FORETOLD Firing of "Rubber" Bullets to Disperse Demonstrations in the Occupied Territories Researched and written by Iris Giller Fieldwork by Fuad Abu-Hamed, and Bassem 'Eid Translated by Zvi Shulman Graphic design by Dina Sher Introduction The Israeli security forces' arsenal of means to disperse demonstrations in the Occupied Territories includes the use of "rubber" bullets. These bullets are steel covered with a thin rubber coat. Their use to disperse demonstrations is based on the perception held by security officials that "rubber" bullets are less lethal than live ammunition, and are, therefore, an appropriate means where security forces or other persons are not in life-threatening situations. Furthermore, the Open-Fire Regulations contain several rules restricting the use of rubber-coated steel bullets, the declared objective being to prevent unregulated firing at demonstrators, which is liable to cause serous bodily injury or death. According to B'Tselem's figures, from January 1988 to the end of November 1998, at least fifty-eight Palestinians were killed by rubber-coated steel bullets. This figure includes twenty-eight children under seventeen, of whom thirteen were under the age of thirteen. Since 13 September 1993, when Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization signed the Declaration of Principles, rubber ammunition has killed at least sixteen Palestinians, seven of them under the age of seventeen.1 This report will examine the Israeli security forces' use of "rubber" ammunition in the Occupied Territories in light of the high number of persons killed. -
Is Use of Rubber Bullets Justified? M Mir, U Malik, M Buch, H Wani
The Internet Journal of Surgery ISPUB.COM Volume 29 Number 1 Is Use Of Rubber Bullets Justified? M Mir, U Malik, M Buch, H Wani Citation M Mir, U Malik, M Buch, H Wani. Is Use Of Rubber Bullets Justified?. The Internet Journal of Surgery. 2013 Volume 29 Number 1. Abstract Background: The study has been conducted with the aim to assess the severity of trauma in patients injured with rubber bullets.Methods : This prospective study included 64 consecutive patients of rubber bullet injury who reported to the surgical department of this hospital over a period of three years. After detailed history and clinical examination, hemodynamically stable patients were subjected to investigations and unstable ones were operated. Data collected was tabulated and subjected to appropriate statistical analysis.Results: Urban male teenagers were the most common individuals injured by rubber bullets during the riots or protests in the Indian Administered Kashmir valley. The limbs were the most common and less severely injured sites (38 patients; 59.375%), while the head and neck region was least commonly and most severely injured (4 cases; 6.25%). The mortality observed was 1.563%, which was due to carotid artery injury. The colon and the small gut were the most common hollow viscera injured with 8 cases (12.5%) each and the kidneys and the liver were the most commonly injured solid viscera with 6 cases (9.375%) each.Conclusion: The use of rubber bullets is unjustified for controlling mobs or protestors and law enforcement authorities should use other less lethal means. INTRODUCTION (composition), ballistic properties (velocity) and size (cross- Currently, mob control is enforced by trained police or sectional area) in order to reduce the likelihood of skin military and paramilitary forces by using less lethal penetration. -
Baton Rounds
BATON ROUNDS A review of the human rights implications of the introduction and use of the L21A1 baton round in Northern Ireland and proposed alternatives to the baton round by the Omega Foundation ISBN: 1 903681 33 2 Published March 2003 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission Temple Court 39 North Street Belfast BT1 1NA Tel: 028 9024 3987 Fax: 028 9024 7844 Email: [email protected] Website: www.nihrc.org CONTENTS FOREWORD by Brice Dickson, Chief Commissioner ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS WHAT’S IN A NAME? - BATON ROUND OR PLASTIC BULLET EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Key Developments in Baton Round Technology 2. THE L21A1 BATON ROUND 2.1 Technical Briefing 2.1.1 What is a baton round? 2.1.2 The new baton round 2.1.3 Physical properties Table1: Comparison of physical properties of the new and old baton round 2.1.4 The weapon 2.1.5 Accuracy 2.2 Medical Briefing 2.2.1 Minimum firing distance 2.2.2 The danger of ricochets 2.3 Guidelines 2.4 Experiences of Use Table 2: Numbers of baton rounds fired 2000-2002 Table 3: Incidents of PSNI baton round discharge Table 4: Incidents of army baton round discharge 2.4.1 Injury Data Table 5: A survey of some injuries caused by the new baton round in Northern Ireland 2.5 Accountability 2.5.1 The firing of baton rounds by the army 2.5.2 The forensic trail 2.6 Policing without the Baton Round 3. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FRONT RUNNER ALTERNATIVES Table 6: Potential health and human rights impacts of alternative “less lethal” weapons 3.1 Impact Devices or Kinetic Energy Rounds 3.2 Long Range Chemical Delivery Devices 3.3 Water Cannon, both Vehicle Mounted and Portable 3.4 Electrical Devices 3.5 Distraction / Disorientation Devices 3.6 Further Less Lethal weapons 4. -
1 Report of Apologiya Protesta (Project of Agora International Human Rights Group) No Crowd Shall Pass: Riot Dispersal Machinery
Report of Apologiya Protesta (Project of Agora International Human Rights Group) No Crowd Shall Pass: Riot Dispersal Machinery in Russia Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………1 Global practice: the use of riot control weapons as protest dispersal tools…………………..…2 International standards addressing the use of non-lethal weapons during protest assemblies..4 The current situation in Russia: intolerance of protest…………………………………………..8 Overview of riot control equipment purchased by the Russian law enforcement authorities…12 The use of non-lethal weapons for protest dispersal in Russia…………………………………..25 Psychological consequences of the use of Russian non-lethal weapons………………………….27 Injury risk of non-lethal weapons…………………………………………………………………29 Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………………...……35 Recommendations……………………………………………………………………….……..….36 All over the world, people continue to regularly demonstrate to express discontent or to defend their rights. Protest actions face a variety of reactions from the government, but instead of peaceful and constructive dialogue with citizens the authorities often use force and non-lethal weapons - rubber truncheons, tear gas and water cannons. The use of force, and especially weapons, normally leads to the escalation of violence, especially in situations where the government actions are clearly unfounded. International standards require the state to establish rules for the use of police equipment and weapons. International standards focus on the need for the state to respect human rights and require the authorities to avoid the use of force when dispersing even illegal but peaceful demonstrations. The rules and standards of international law are, however, routinely ignored by the Russian authorities. In Russia, the government's intolerance of protest actions over the past few years has become obvious even to the citizens who do not demonstrate often or at all, and the measures which are taken to suppress the protest are extremely diverse.