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E:\Ghcstop\AESOP Ghcstop Doc\Kernel\Ramdisk Howto\060405-Aesop2440-Ramdisk-Howto.Txt 200 06-04-06, 12:43:53오후 Aesop 2440 Kernel 2.6.13 Ramdisk Howto

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파일: E:\ghcstop\AESOP_ghcstop_doc\kernel\ramdisk_howto\060405-aesop2440-ramdisk-howto.txt 200 06-04-06, 12:43:53오후 aesop 2440 kernel 2.6.13 ramdisk howto - 20060406(까먹고 민방위 못간날...^^) by godori 1. kernel설정을 다음과 같이 바꾼다. Device Drivers -> Block device쪽을 보시면.... Linux Kernel v2.6.13-h1940-aesop2440 Configuration qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq lqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq Block devices qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqk x Arrow keys navigate the menu. <Enter> selects submenus --->. x x Highlighted letters are hotkeys. Pressing <Y> includes, <N> excludes, x x <M> modularizes features. Press <Esc><Esc> to exit, <?> for Help, </> x x for Search. Legend: [*] built-in [ ] excluded <M> module < > module x x lqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqk x x x < > XT hard disk support x x x x <*> Loopback device support x x x x < > Cryptoloop Support x x x x <*> Network block device support x x x x < > Low Performance USB Block driver x x x x <*> RAM disk support x x x x (8) Default number of RAM disks x x x x (8192) Default RAM disk size (kbytes) x x x x [*] Initial RAM disk (initrd) support x x x x () Initramfs source file(s) x x x x < > Packet writing on CD/DVD media x x x x IO Schedulers ---> x x x x < > ATA over Ethernet support x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x mqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqj x tqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqu x <Select> < Exit > < Help > x mqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqj 여기서 8192 는 ramdisk size 입니다 . 만드는 ramdisk 크기에 맞게끔 바꿔주시고... File systems쪽에서 Linux Kernel v2.6.13-h1940-aesop2440 Configuration qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq lqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq File systems qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqk x Arrow keys navigate the menu. <Enter> selects submenus --->. x x Highlighted letters are hotkeys. Pressing <Y> includes, <N> excludes, x x <M> modularizes features. Press <Esc><Esc> to exit, <?> for Help, </> x x for Search. Legend: [*] built-in [ ] excluded <M> module < > module x x lqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqk x x x <*> Second extended fs support x x x x [*] Ext2 extended attributes x x x x [ ] Ext2 POSIX Access Control Lists x x x x [ ] Ext2 Security Labels x x x x [ ] Ext2 execute in place support x x x x < > Ext3 journalling file system support x x x x < > Reiserfs support x x x x < > JFS filesystem support x x x x XFS support ---> x x x x < > Minix fs support x x x x <M> ROM file system support x x x x [*] Inotify file change notification support x x x x [ ] Quota support x x x x <*> Kernel automounter support x x x x <*> Kernel automounter version 4 support (also supports v3) x x x x CD-ROM/DVD Filesystems ---> x x x x DOS/FAT/NT Filesystems ---> x x x mqqqqqv(+)qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqj x tqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqu x <Select> < Exit > < Help > x mqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqj 페이지: 1 파일: E:\ghcstop\AESOP_ghcstop_doc\kernel\ramdisk_howto\060405-aesop2440-ramdisk-howto.txt 200 06-04-06, 12:43:53오후 만드는 ramdisk 의 file system type 에 알맞게 체크를 해주시고... 2. ramdisk를 aesop 보드에 알맞게 세팅을 한다. ramdisk를 만들때 사용하는 script 이 스크립트 돌리기 전에 당연히 빈 ramdisk.image 가 있어야 하겠지용... - sh1 script #!/bin/sh echo "mount ramdisk to rd" mount -o loop -t ext2 ramdisk.image rd ramdisk를만든후 u-boot 용 image 를만드는 script - sh2 script #!/bin/sh umount rd dd if=ramdisk.image bs=1k | gzip -v9 > initrd.gz #echo "mkimage: add arm header" mkimage -n 'Ramdisk' -A arm -O linux -T ramdisk -C gzip -a 0x30800000 -e 0x30800000 -d initrd.gz rdaesop.img echo "cp initrd.gz /korea-dokdo/tftpboot" cp rdaesop.img /korea-dokdo/tftpboot 3. u-boot의 configuration 을 수정한다. u-boot-aesop/include/configs/aesop2440.h의 맽 밑줄에 다음과 같이 추가한다. /* ghcstop: tag setting is transfered to kernel */ #define CONFIG_CMDLINE_TAG #define CONFIG_SETUP_MEMORY_TAGS #define CONFIG_INITRD_TAG #define CONFIG_B2 /* 060406: ramdisk load address때문 */ 컴파일 한 후 보드에 업데이트 한다. 4. u-boot를 세팅한다.(ram disk 를 ram address 에 올려서 하는 경우) setenv bootargs root=/dev/ram0 rw rootfstype=ext2 mem=63M ip=172.16.1.101:172.16.1.200:172.16.1.1:255.255.255.0::eth0:off console=ttySAC0,115200n81 tftp 32000000 gk;tftp 31000000 rdaesop.img;bootm 32000000 31000000 이렇게 부팅하면 된다. 압축풀리고 init loading 하는 것까지 확인... 왜냐? ramdisk 가 2.4.20 용이기 때문에... ㅎㅎ 옛날거라... 5. u-boot를 세팅한다.(ram disk 를 nor flash 에 올려서 하는 경우) ramdisk image가 1M 정도니깐 .... flash 80000서부터 1effff 까지 write 를 하면 된다. setenv bootargs root=/dev/ram0 rw rootfstype=ext2 mem=63M ip=172.16.1.101:172.16.1.200:172.16.1.1:255.255.255.0::eth0:off console=ttySAC0,115200n81 tftp 32000000 aesopk tftp 31000000 rdaesop.img erase 80000 1effff cp.b 31000000 80000 $(filesize) bootm 32000000 80000 이렇게 부팅하면 된다. 페이지: 2 파일: E:\ghcstop\AESOP_ghcstop_doc\kernel\ramdisk_howto\060405-aesop2440-ramdisk-howto.txt 200 06-04-06, 12:43:53오후 압축풀리고 init loading 하는 것까지 확인... 왜냐? ramdisk 가 2.4.20 용이기 때문에... ㅎㅎ 옛날거라... 페이지: 3.
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