ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION: A CASE STUDY OF U.S. DENUCLEARIZATION AGREEMENTS WITH NORTH KOREA Naoko Aoki, Doctor of Philosophy, 2018 Dissertation directed by: Professor I.M. Destler, School of Public Policy Professor Nancy W. Gallagher, School of Public Policy The United States has employed a wide range of foreign policy tools to try to stop North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, including two cooperative agreements that ultimately failed to produce the desired outcome. The breakdown of the 1994 Agreed Framework and the Six Party Talks process in the 2000s has led many to conclude that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program cannot be constrained through cooperation. According to this view, Pyongyang violated its previous commitments once it received economic and political benefits and it will do so again in any future negotiations. The underlying assumption is that Washington was fully implementing its own commitments until Pyongyang broke the deal. Is this true, or did U.S. domestic politics complicate the implementation of the agreements? This dissertation explores this question through a four-part case study using three analytical lenses: a rational actor model, an institutional interests model, and an individual mindset model. It finds that the United States retreated from full cooperation with North Korea not just because of Pyongyang’s actions, but also due to domestic political considerations. Washington reduced its level of cooperation when tolerance for concessions weakened in the domestic system, sometimes because of institutional interests and sometimes due to political maneuvers by individuals who favored stronger coercive measures and more concessions from North Korea. The study shows that domestic politics impacts not only the negotiation and ratification of international cooperation agreements, but also their implementation. The findings also suggest it is incorrect to assume that past engagement efforts did not succeed solely due to North Korean actions. Whether a more fully implemented engagement policy would have led to North Korea’s denuclearization is beyond the scope of this study, but it indicates U.S. policy was not applied consistently to North Korea. Any future engagement strategy should aim at a more consistent approach for it to produce the desired results. THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION: A CASE STUDY OF U.S. DENUCLEARIZATION AGREEMENTS WITH NORTH KOREA By Naoko Aoki Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2018 Advisory Committee: Professor I.M. Destler, Co-Chair Professor Nancy W. Gallagher, Co-Chair Professor Christopher H. Foreman Dr. John Merrill Professor Margaret M. Pearson Copyright by Naoko Aoki 2018 Acknowledgements I am deeply grateful to the co-chairs of my committee I.M. “Mac” Destler and Nancy Gallagher for helping me organize my thoughts, sharpen my arguments and improve the presentation of this dissertation. Their support and encouragement guided me through this process. Thanks also go to Christopher Foreman, whose thoughts on the workings of the U.S. government proved invaluable to me; John Merrill, who was generous with his deep insights on North Korea; and Margaret Pearson, who took the time to advise a student outside of her department. I could not have completed this research without the current and former U.S. government officials who agreed to be interviewed, either in person, by telephone or e- mail. Special thanks go to those who agreed to be quoted by name. They are Richard Armitage, Paula DeSutter, Frank Jannuzi, Robert Gallucci, Christopher Hill, James Kelly, Aloysius O’Neill, William Perry, Charles “Jack” Pritchard and Lawrence Wilkerson. I would also like to thank the many others who provided me with insights but opted to remain anonymous. I also wish to thank the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland for the financial support for my research, as well as its former director, the late John Steinbruner, for the inspiration and the opportunity to conduct this research. John Burton edited the manuscript. He and others helped correct the text, but any errors that remain are my own. ii Finally, I am grateful to my friends and family for giving me encouragement and good cheer when I needed it. This project is dedicated to my husband Denny Lane, who was with me during the many ups and downs of this journey. iii Table of Contents Chapter 1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 1 1.1 Background .................................................................................................................1 1.2 Research question .......................................................................................................4 1.3 Variables .....................................................................................................................5 1.4 Methodology ...............................................................................................................6 1.5 Current understanding ............................................................................................. 15 1.6 Thesis ........................................................................................................................ 17 1.7 Contribution ............................................................................................................. 19 1.8 Organization of this dissertation ............................................................................... 20 Chapter 2 Framing the Question – Literature Review ......................................... 23 2.1 Overview ................................................................................................................... 23 2.2 Defining cooperation and coercion ............................................................................ 24 2.3 Bureaucratic politics ................................................................................................. 26 2.4 Domestic politics and institutional design .................................................................. 27 2.5 Interaction between the international and domestic levels ......................................... 29 2.6 Focus on interests ...................................................................................................... 30 2.7 Focus on ideas ........................................................................................................... 33 2.8 Implementation ......................................................................................................... 37 2.9 Framework for analysis............................................................................................. 38 Chapter 3 Understanding the Context – Background .......................................... 41 3.1 North Korea’s nuclear efforts.................................................................................... 41 3.2 The first crisis ........................................................................................................... 44 3.3 The Agreed Framework ............................................................................................ 48 3.4 The Agreed Framework - What the Americans implemented ................................... 50 3.5 The second crisis ....................................................................................................... 57 3.6 The Six Party Talks - President George W. Bush’s first term .................................... 59 3.7 The Six Party Talks – President George W. Bush’s second term ............................... 59 3.8 Conclusion................................................................................................................. 73 Chapter 4 Lifting of Sanctions Under the Agreed Framework (1995) ................. 74 4.1 The lifting of U.S. sanctions ....................................................................................... 74 iv 4.2 Why is this a subcase? ............................................................................................... 78 4.3 Domestic political context .......................................................................................... 79 4.4 International context ................................................................................................. 85 4.5 Explanation using the three models ........................................................................... 86 4.6 Conclusion................................................................................................................. 94 Chapter 5 The Highly Enriched Uranium Problem (2002) .................................. 96 5.1 The highly enriched uranium problem ...................................................................... 97 5.2 Why is this a subcase? ............................................................................................. 103 5.3 Domestic political context ........................................................................................ 104 5.4 International context ............................................................................................... 111 5.5 Analysis using the three models ............................................................................... 113 5.6 Conclusion..............................................................................................................