Puja Mody the Predictability of Chemical Weapons Use Robert Williams- School of International Service General University Honors Fall 2013

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Puja Mody the Predictability of Chemical Weapons Use Robert Williams- School of International Service General University Honors Fall 2013 Puja Mody The Predictability of Chemical Weapons Use Robert Williams- School of International Service General University Honors Fall 2013 ABSTRACT It is assessed that the use of chemical weapons by a state on its civilian population can result in important strategic gains for the leader during an ongoing conflict. This use, however, will also cause the state to eventually be forced to destroy their weapons stockpiles and facilities by the international community. In the cases of Iraq, Libya, and Syria, the support of a foreign power was instrumental in determining and catalyzing the use or nonuse of chemical weapons by the state on its internal civilian population. The two clearest indications that a state will launch a large-scale chemical attack are: the presence of an international patron supporting the state and prior reports of small-scale chemical attacks with little to no international response. The long term ramifications and implications of the use of chemical weapons can be speculated but cannot be definitively assessed or predicted. The Iraqi case can be used as an indication on how the current Syrian situation may play out and together both cases can be applied to future and past scenarios. It is assessed that based on the Iraq case, Syria will not reconstitute its chemical weapons stockpile in order to maintain support from the Russian government. 2 Bottom Line: We assess that the use of chemical weapons by a state on its civilian population can result in important strategic gains for the leader during an ongoing conflict. This use, however, will also cause the state to eventually be forced to destroy their weapons stockpiles and facilities by the international community. If a strong international patron supports the state, the leader will be more likely to take the risk associated with chemical weapons use and it can be expected that the consequences for said use in the immediate aftermath will be substantially mitigated as opposed to if no such support existed. Though there are only two cases of internal chemical weapons use (Iraq and Syria), they both offer signposts that could help predict future cases of use. KJA. It is assessed that in the case of Iraq, KJB: The case of Syria was both similar and there were a variety of circumstances that different to the case of Iraq. Members of the lead to Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical international community have chosen weapons most of which can be attributed to between the Assad Regime and the Syrian internal and external ethnic and religious Free Army. However, unlike in the case of divides and the culture of the Iraqi Regime at Iraq, the external pressures and climate have the time. The international atmosphere had a direct and monumental impact on the during the Cold War and following the fall of momentum of the internal conflict. the Shah of Iran also made for an environment where Saddam Hussein saw o B1: The rise of the Ba’ath Party in chemical weapons a necessary tool in order Syria and the stark divide between to achieve his goals and maintain power. the various religious factions created an air of turmoil and terror in Syria. o A1: The rise of the Ba’ath Party under As the internal situation in Syria has Saddam lead to increased worsened, a number of international discrimination towards the Shiites actors have exerted influence over the and increased tension with the Sunni conflict in order to further their minority. Fear of the spread of the interests. Islamic Revolution out of Iran lead to o B2: The Syrian Uprising, which vast amounts of international support gathered momentum from the for Iraq when Saddam invaded Iran in protests and demonstrations in 1980. Tunisia and Egypt began as o A2: The Iranians used the Kurdish movement aimed to get the Syrian insurgency in order to destabilize Iraq government to release political from within its borders. The historic prisoners. However, it soon disagreements between the Kurds transitioned into a nationwide civil and Saddam were re-formed during war to battle against the government the Iran- Iraq War and Saddam’s violence. In the process, over 100,000 brutality reflected his desire for people have died and nearly 2 million revenge against the Kurdish minority have been displaced. within Iraq. KJC: Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein employed chemical weapons in order 3 to gain an advantage in the war and create KJE: Though it is impossible with only 2 widespread fear. Not only did he use chemical cases of internal use to create an absolute weapons against the Iranians but he also used template for prediction if a country or leader them against his internal Kurdish population- will use chemical weapons on its civilian the most significant instance being in the population, there are characteristic village of Halabja in 1988. This widespread similarities that can be applied to other fear and lack of international response potential cases. The long term ramifications enabled Saddam to tip the balance of the war and implications of his use of chemical in his favor and forced Iran to agree to a weapons can be speculated but cannot be ceasefire. definitively assessed or predicted. The Iraqi o Iraq’s usage of chemical weapons case can be used as an indication on how the forced Iran to accept a ceasefire in current Syrian situation may play out and 1988. together both cases can be applied to both o In the immediate aftermaths of future and past cases. Saddam’s chemical weapons use, there was little to no response from o With Syria’s continued support the international community. from Russia, it is assessed with high However, following the Gulf War, Iraq confidence that Syria will maintain was forced to dismantle and destroy its alliance with Russia and will not their WMD program by the UN. reconstitute its chemical weapons stockpiles. KJD: Syria’s use of chemical weapons came after being engulfed in a bloody internal o Moammar Gaddafi, dictator of Libya conflict for over two years. Used on both a for over 40 years can only slightly civilian and rebel population by the Syrian be compared to the cases of Iraq government, the usage of chemical weapons and Syria. He possessed chemical resulted in widespread international outrage. weapons, however, when turmoil Assad has since become party to the Chemical and rebellion ensued his country, he Weapons Convention and allowed UN chose not to use his remaining inspectors into his country to destroy his chemical weapons stockpiles out of chemical weapons stockpile. fear of the international o Tactically, the Syrian usage of CW communities reaction. delivered a deadly blow to the morale of the Syrian opposition and bolstered KJF: The consequences and probability of use Assad’s image amongst his of chemical weapons by North Korea is supporters. currently unknown. However, at this stage o Unlike in the case of Iraq, there was there are several similarities between the an immediate international response incidents in Iraq and Syria and recent reports with Syria’s chemical weapons of CW use in North Korea. It is assessed with stockpile disarmed and destroyed moderate confidence that without further within 2 months of the attack. escalation of a major change to the status quo, there is a low probability of North Korea engaging in a large-scale chemical warfare 4 attack against its internal population. weapons on political prisoners for Nonetheless, It will be necessary and prudent experimentation purposes.1 Based on to continue to closely monitor this situation. the aforementioned cases (Iraq and Syria), it is possible to briefly assess o Recent reports have emerged that the prospect of large- scale CW use by North Korea has been using chemical North Korea. Signposts of Change Signposts of Change Iraq Syria Libya (E1) North Korea 1. Authoritarian Dictator Yes- Yes- Yes- Yes- who maintains a reign of Saddam Bashar al-Assad Moammer Gaddafi Kim Jong-un terror. Hussein 2. Chemical weapons Yes Yes Yes Yes possession/ capability. 3. Engaged in or losing an Yes: Iran- Yes- Syrian Yes- Libyan Civil No- but ongoing internal or Iraq War Civil War War continued external conflict tensions with S. Korea 4. International No No Yes N/A intervention in ongoing conflict 5. Small scale chemical Yes Yes No Yes- reported weapons use experimentation on political prisoners 6. Large scale chemical Yes Yes No No weapons use 7. Strong international Yes: US and Yes: Russia No Yes- China patron/ supporter USSR 8. CW program was Yes Yes N/A N/A dismantled and CW were destroyed by international community 9. Reconstitute CW NO Prediction= no N/A N/A program/ stockpile? 5 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIALLY LEFT BLANK 6 DISCUSSION KJA. It is assessed that in the case of Iraq, were curtailed. 3 Under Saddam, Iraq there were a variety of circumstances that was ruled by the secular Sunni Arab lead to Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical elite while the Shiite Arab majority weapons most of which can be attributed and Kurdish Minority were viciously to internal and external ethnic and suppressed.4 religious divides and the culture of the Iraqi Regime at the time. The international o Saddam Hussein can be atmosphere during the Cold War and characterized as a malignant following the fall of the Shah of Iran also narcissist who was psychologically made for an environment where Saddam unable to feel empathy for his Hussein saw chemical weapons a people. Anyone who was not necessary tool in order to achieve his completely loyal to him was branded goals and maintain power. a traitor and killed- a practice that was extremely common throughout Saddam’s regime.5 He fabricated A1: The rise of the Ba’ath Party under plots in order to attack and eliminate Saddam lead to increased discrimination his rivals, a tactic that also allowed towards the Shiites and increased tension for him to send a message to his with the Sunni minority.
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