Puja Mody the Predictability of Chemical Weapons Use Robert Williams- School of International Service General University Honors Fall 2013

Puja Mody The Predictability of Chemical Weapons Use Robert Williams- School of International Service General University Honors Fall 2013

ABSTRACT It is assessed that the use of chemical weapons by a state on its civilian population can result in important strategic gains for the leader during an ongoing conflict. This use, however, will also cause the state to eventually be forced to destroy their weapons stockpiles and facilities by the international community. In the cases of Iraq, Libya, and Syria, the support of a foreign power was instrumental in determining and catalyzing the use or nonuse of chemical weapons by the state on its internal civilian population. The two clearest indications that a state will launch a large-scale chemical attack are: the presence of an international patron supporting the state and prior reports of small-scale chemical attacks with little to no international response. The long term ramifications and implications of the use of chemical weapons can be speculated but cannot be definitively assessed or predicted. The Iraqi case can be used as an indication on how the current Syrian situation may play out and together both cases can be applied to future and past scenarios. It is assessed that based on the Iraq case, Syria will not reconstitute its chemical weapons stockpile in order to maintain support from the Russian government.

Bottom Line: We assess that the use of chemical weapons by a state on its civilian population can result in important strategic gains for the leader during an ongoing conflict. This use, however, will also cause the state to eventually be forced to destroy their weapons stockpiles and facilities by the international community. If a strong international patron supports the state, the leader will be more likely to take the risk associated with chemical weapons use and it can be expected that the consequences for said use in the immediate aftermath will be substantially mitigated as opposed to if no such support existed. Though there are only two cases of internal chemical weapons use (Iraq and Syria), they both offer signposts that could help predict future cases of use.

KJA. It is assessed that in the case of Iraq, KJB: The case of Syria was both similar and there were a variety of circumstances that different to the case of Iraq. Members of the lead to Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical international community have chosen weapons most of which can be attributed to between the Assad Regime and the Syrian internal and external ethnic and religious Free Army. However, unlike in the case of divides and the culture of the Iraqi Regime at Iraq, the external pressures and climate have the time. The international atmosphere had a direct and monumental impact on the during the Cold War and following the fall of momentum of the internal conflict. the Shah of Iran also made for an environment where Saddam Hussein saw o B1: The rise of the Ba’ath Party in chemical weapons a necessary tool in order Syria and the stark divide between to achieve his goals and maintain power. the various religious factions created an air of turmoil and terror in Syria. o A1: The rise of the Ba’ath Party under As the internal situation in Syria has Saddam lead to increased worsened, a number of international discrimination towards the Shiites actors have exerted influence over the and increased tension with the Sunni conflict in order to further their minority. Fear of the spread of the interests. Islamic Revolution out of Iran lead to o B2: The Syrian Uprising, which vast amounts of international support gathered momentum from the for Iraq when Saddam invaded Iran in protests and demonstrations in 1980. Tunisia and Egypt began as o A2: The Iranians used the Kurdish movement aimed to get the Syrian insurgency in order to destabilize Iraq government to release political from within its borders. The historic prisoners. However, it soon disagreements between the Kurds transitioned into a nationwide civil and Saddam were re-formed during war to battle against the government the Iran- Iraq War and Saddam’s violence. In the process, over 100,000 brutality reflected his desire for people have died and nearly 2 million revenge against the Kurdish minority have been displaced. within Iraq. KJC: Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein employed chemical weapons in order

3 to gain an advantage in the war and create KJE: Though it is impossible with only 2 widespread fear. Not only did he use chemical cases of internal use to create an absolute weapons against the Iranians but he also used template for prediction if a country or leader them against his internal Kurdish population- will use chemical weapons on its civilian the most significant instance being in the population, there are characteristic village of Halabja in 1988. This widespread similarities that can be applied to other fear and lack of international response potential cases. The long term ramifications enabled Saddam to tip the balance of the war and implications of his use of chemical in his favor and forced Iran to agree to a weapons can be speculated but cannot be ceasefire. definitively assessed or predicted. The Iraqi o Iraq’s usage of chemical weapons case can be used as an indication on how the forced Iran to accept a ceasefire in current Syrian situation may play out and 1988. together both cases can be applied to both o In the immediate aftermaths of future and past cases. Saddam’s chemical weapons use, there was little to no response from o With Syria’s continued support the international community. from Russia, it is assessed with high However, following the Gulf War, Iraq confidence that Syria will maintain was forced to dismantle and destroy its alliance with Russia and will not their WMD program by the UN. reconstitute its chemical weapons stockpiles. KJD: Syria’s use of chemical weapons came after being engulfed in a bloody internal o Moammar Gaddafi, dictator of Libya conflict for over two years. Used on both a for over 40 years can only slightly civilian and rebel population by the Syrian be compared to the cases of Iraq government, the usage of chemical weapons and Syria. He possessed chemical resulted in widespread international outrage. weapons, however, when turmoil Assad has since become party to the Chemical and rebellion ensued his country, he Weapons Convention and allowed UN chose not to use his remaining inspectors into his country to destroy his chemical weapons stockpiles out of chemical weapons stockpile. fear of the international o Tactically, the Syrian usage of CW communities reaction. delivered a deadly blow to the morale of the Syrian opposition and bolstered KJF: The consequences and probability of use Assad’s image amongst his of chemical weapons by North Korea is supporters. currently unknown. However, at this stage o Unlike in the case of Iraq, there was there are several similarities between the an immediate international response incidents in Iraq and Syria and recent reports with Syria’s chemical weapons of CW use in North Korea. It is assessed with stockpile disarmed and destroyed moderate confidence that without further within 2 months of the attack. escalation of a major change to the status quo, there is a low probability of North Korea engaging in a large-scale chemical warfare

4 attack against its internal population. weapons on political prisoners for Nonetheless, It will be necessary and prudent experimentation purposes.1 Based on to continue to closely monitor this situation. the aforementioned cases (Iraq and Syria), it is possible to briefly assess o Recent reports have emerged that the prospect of large- scale CW use by North Korea has been using chemical North Korea.

Signposts of Change

Signposts of Change Iraq Syria Libya (E1) North Korea 1. Authoritarian Dictator Yes- Yes- Yes- Yes- who maintains a reign of Saddam Bashar al-Assad Moammer Gaddafi Kim Jong-un terror. Hussein 2. Chemical weapons Yes Yes Yes Yes possession/ capability. 3. Engaged in or losing an Yes: Iran- Yes- Syrian Yes- Libyan Civil No- but ongoing internal or Iraq War Civil War War continued external conflict tensions with S. Korea 4. International No No Yes N/A intervention in ongoing conflict 5. Small scale chemical Yes Yes No Yes- reported weapons use experimentation on political prisoners 6. Large scale chemical Yes Yes No No weapons use 7. Strong international Yes: US and Yes: Russia No Yes- China patron/ supporter USSR 8. CW program was Yes Yes N/A N/A dismantled and CW were destroyed by international community 9. Reconstitute CW NO Prediction= no N/A N/A program/ stockpile?

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DISCUSSION KJA. It is assessed that in the case of Iraq, were curtailed. 3 Under Saddam, Iraq there were a variety of circumstances that was ruled by the secular Sunni Arab lead to Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical elite while the Shiite Arab majority weapons most of which can be attributed and Kurdish Minority were viciously to internal and external ethnic and suppressed.4 religious divides and the culture of the Iraqi Regime at the time. The international o Saddam Hussein can be atmosphere during the Cold War and characterized as a malignant following the fall of the Shah of Iran also narcissist who was psychologically made for an environment where Saddam unable to feel empathy for his Hussein saw chemical weapons a people. Anyone who was not necessary tool in order to achieve his completely loyal to him was branded goals and maintain power. a traitor and killed- a practice that was extremely common throughout Saddam’s regime.5 He fabricated A1: The rise of the Ba’ath Party under plots in order to attack and eliminate Saddam lead to increased discrimination his rivals, a tactic that also allowed towards the Shiites and increased tension for him to send a message to his with the Sunni minority. Fear of the spread of external enemies as well as terrorize the Islamic Revolution out of Iran lead to vast his population into total amounts of international support for Iraq subservience.6 when Saddam invaded Iran in 1980. o Saddam Hussein’s Iraq can be characterized by his party’s radical ideology and culture. The Ba’ath o Modern Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, Party brought together a group of consisted of a religious divide with fervent nationalists around an the majority 60% of the population ideology that was radical, socialist, following the Shia (interchangeable and anti-Western-Nationalist. This with Shiite) branch Islam and 20% of ideology breed a culture of elitist, the population following the Sunni authoritarian, and hierarchical branch of Islam.2 attitudes that were inclined towards encouraging, and precipitating o In 1968, when the Pan-Arab Ba’ath violation solutions to political Party seized power of Iraq under the conflict.7 leadership of Saddam Hussein which resulted in the Sunni minority being o The Sunni-Shia tensions grew more placed in the bulk of the governing volatile after 1979 when the Shah of class. Meanwhile, the majority Shiite Iran was overthrown during the population was denied political Islamic Revolution, which placed rights and their religious freedoms Ayatollah Khomeini, a Shia, in power,

7 combined with the simultaneous control of half the waterway - a Iran- backed uprisings amongst the result that Saddam was not happy Shia population in southern Iraq.8 with but agreed to in order to maintain peace and put an end to o Khomeini advocated for a higher Iranian funded Kurdish uprisings unity of Islam throughout the Middle (See A2).12 In September 1980, East and as a result, his radical Saddam denounced the 1975 followers sought to recreate the agreement and declared Iraq’s Iranian Revolution in Arab states intention to exercise full control over with large Shia Communities such as the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.9 Consequently, when Saddam o In early 1980, Iranian-sponsored attacked Iran in 1980, he was offered Shia activists attempted to a tremendous amount of support by assassinate Iraq’s Deputy Prime the US, who hoped that Iraq would Minister, Tariq Aziz.13 The event counter the radicalism of the catalyzed the start of the Iran- Iraq Khomeini regime from spreading. war and with a large portion of the This similar fear of Shia mobilization international community banking on and Iranian expansionism Iraq’s win against Iran. In reaction to throughout the Arab states was this assassination attempt, Saddam evident in the financial backing given claimed he was acting in self- to Iraq from Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan defense when he invaded Iran in and Saudi Arabia ($20 billion from September 1980. However, in reality, Saudi Arabia alone).10 he was motivated by fear and opportunity.14 o The fall of the Shah and the rise of Khomeini left Iran domestically and o With such strong ideological and internationally vulnerable which international backing, Saddam saw a gave Saddam the ideal opportunity war with Iran as a brief affair. His to strike. Furthermore, by 1980, goals for the war included there was no clear pan-Arab leader destabilizing the Shia influence (Egypt had recently fallen as a result exerted by Khomeini and his of its peace accord with Israel) and supporters in Tehran, gaining full Saddam potentially saw an ambitious control of the Shatt al- Arab opportunity to rise as the new leader Waterway, and placing himself as the of the Arab world.11 leader of the Arab world.15 o His miscalculation of the type of war o Apart from the ideological, Saddam this would be had drastic also had geopolitical reasons for his consequences for Iraq. By 1982 Iran animosity towards Iran. The 1975 has persistently been employing a Algiers Agreement between Iran and “human wave” offensive and it soon Iraq changed the river boundary of appeared that Iraq was on the losing the Shatt al-Arab river giving Iran side of the war.16 As a result,

8 Saddam resorted to desperate agreed on a peace accord granting the military actions in order to tip the Kurds autonomy, however, by 1971 balance in his favor. relations had further deteriorated and the Kurds appealed to the US for aid. o Not only did he lose tens of 20 thousands of soldiers, but he also incurred an estimated $65-80 billion o In 1974, disagreements about the in war debts and failed to achieve Shatt al-Arab waterway reemerged any of his political or military with Iran gaining several kilometers objectives. Instead, after the 1988 of land. However, before Iraq could cease fire, Iraq returned to the 1980 react, in June of 1974, a Kurdish status quo ante.17 rebellion in Northern Iraq began with a considerable amount of support A2: The Iranians used the Kurdish insurgency from Iran.21 in order to destabilize Iraq from within its o Iran provided the Kurds with borders. The historic disagreements between military surveillance and the the Kurds and Saddam were re-formed US, who also supported the during the Iran- Iraq War and Saddam’s Kurds, funneled $16 million brutality reflected his desire for revenge towards the resistance against the Kurdish minority within Iraq. through Iran.22

o Amid growing external tensions with o Iran’s support for this rebellion made Iran and the Sunni-Shia divide, Iraq more vulnerable and Saddam Saddam also had to deal with tensions was forced into signing the Algiers amongst his internal Kurdish Accord in 1975 in order to stop population. Iranian support for the Kurdish Rebellion. As a result of the treaty, o The Kurds are a people without a Iraq lost a large portion of its control state who lived in the mountain over the Shatt al-Arab waterway with region of Iraq, Turkey, and Iran.18 Iran gaining access and control to They are of Iranian stock and have half.23 strong cultural, ethnic, and linguistic ties to Iran but have sought o The injustice that Saddam felt as a independence/ autonomy from the result of this agreement fuelled his governments of Iraq, Turkey, and Iran desire for revenge during the Iran throughout history.19 During Iraq War in order to regain control of Saddam’s regime, the Kurds made up the waterway. approximately 15-20% of the Iraqi population. Similarly to the Shia, they o As the Iran- Iraq war began, the faced widespread discrimination. Kurdish Insurgency (forces of the Kurdish Democratic Party, KDP) o In March of 1970, the Iraqi worked closely with Iran to attack government and the Kurdish parties

9 Iraqi borders. ‘leader of the state and society’ and thus became a part of all areas of o By 1981, Iran was gaining public life.26 considerable ground and had captured key Iraqi cities. And thus the o This sort of indoctrination lead to war entered Iraqi soil and with Iran widespread growth in membership. refusing any cease-fire, Saddam was As of 2010, nearly 10% of the desperate to prevent the fall of population of Syria identifies with the Baghdad, to ensure the survival of his Ba’ath Party. regime, and saw the lack of Kurdish loyalty as a direct affront to his o 75% of Syrian’s follow the Sunni sect regime and thus labeled them, along of Islam while approximately 12% with Tehran, as the ‘enemy’.24 identify as Shia or a part of the Alawite Sect.27 This minority faction, KJB: The case of Syria was both similar which belongs to the Shia branch of and different to the case of Iraq. Members Islam and is lead by the Assad family of the international community have have had a disproportionate chosen between the Assad Regime and the representation in Syria’s security Syrian Free Army. However, unlike in the apparatus, government and military case of Iraq, the external pressures and leadership. climate have had a direct and monumental impact on the momentum of the internal o Prior to the 2011 Syrian uprising, the conflict. last armed insurrection by Sunni Islamist groups was during the late B1: The rise of the Ba’ath Party in Syria and 1970s/early 1980s which resulted in the stark divide between the various religious a rebellion in Hama in 1982 which factions created an air of turmoil and terror was brutally crushed by the late Hafez in Syria. As the internal situation in Syria has al-Assad (father of current president worsened, a number of international actors Bashar al-Assad).28 have exerted influence over the conflict in o This experience had a deep order to further their interests. psychological impact on Assad. He witnessed and learned from the actions of his o Similar to Iraq, Syrian politics has father with regards to been under control of the Ba’ath Party crushing a rebellion. Though since Hafez al-Assad seized power in a Hafez was patient at first, he coup in 1970. The party’s culture of eventually took the necessary elitist and authoritarian leadership actions in order to has been a vital tool in instilling disseminate the rebellion in loyalty as well as controlling the one swoop.29 government and military.25 In 1973 the Syrian constitution was amended o Current President Bashar al-Assad to name the Ba’ath Party as the can be characterized similar to

10 Saddam Hussein in that his complete inaction with authoritarian leadership is a product regards to sanctions on Syria of his complete desire for power, lack during the uprising and failing of empathy for his people as well as to act in order to save civilian absolute need for loyalty.30 lives. 33 o Hezbollah has sent thousands o Following mass demonstrations and of men to support Assad the overthrow of leaders in both forces and fight against the Tunisia and Egypt. Syrian rebels.34 demonstrators also followed the example of the Arab Spring and began o The rebels have received foreign aid mass protests in Syria- initially and support more recently in the demanding the release of political conflict. prisoners and later evolving into a o Following an Israeli strike of a full- scale civil war (see B2). Syrian facility and the EU lifting its arms embargo on o By the end of 2011 President Obama the Syrian opposition in May had publically called for Assad to step 2013 reports emerged of the down as Syria’s leader and the Arab Syrian Government’s use of League had suspended Syria’s chemical weapons on membership. opposition forces. o The US has openly condemned o Several countries in the region the Assad Regime for its surrounding Syria have been working violence against its civilians to politically and financially support during the civil war of over 2 the rebels and are hoping for the end years but has been of Assad’s regime. Qatar and Saudi unsuccessful at getting any UN Arabia specifically have supported the resolutions passed against uprising from the beginning.31 Syria. Following reports of small- scale use by the White o Throughout modern history, Saudi House in June 2013, President Arabia and Syria have had a turbulent Obama authorized direct US relationship with their opposing military support to the ideologies. Syria’s strong tie to rebels.35 Hezbollah in Lebanon and alliance with Iran has been a topic of concern o Assad’s Regime has received support for the Saudi Monarchy for decades. throughout from Iran, Russia, and The Saudi Monarchy is hoping for an Hezbollah. Russia has blocked all UN end to Assad’s rule and that the new Security Council Resolutions to government will be more appeasing authorize military actions in Syria in to Saudi interests. 32 the start of the internal conflict in o Saudi Arabia has also openly 2011, frustrating the international condemned the UN in its community’s ability to respond.

11 unified and stronger. B2: The Syrian Uprising, which gathered momentum from the protests and o Throughout 2012, there was demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt began widespread violence between the as movement aimed to get the Syrian Syrian military and the Syrian Free government to release political prisoners. Army (the rebels), which had resulted However, it soon transitioned into a in the deaths of over 100,000 persons nationwide civil war to battle against the and the displacement of over 2 government violence. In the process, over million civilians who have fled Syria. 100,000 people have died and nearly 2 million have been displaced. o During the summer of 2012, the conflict transitioned from an o In March of 2011, following the insurgency to a civil war. For the first momentum demonstrations of year of the conflict, Assad relied on Tunisia and Egypt, protests began in his father’s counterinsurgency Damascus, Syria with protestors approach. However, Assad’s campaign demanding the release of political failed to put an end to the conflict and prisoners. The security forces even fueled it into transforming into a immediately used violent measures in civil conflict. As a result of this order to put an end to the protests.36 transition, the controlling of the entire As unrest spread across the nation, territory by Assad is no longer seen as Assad announced conciliatory feasible.39 measures, which included releasing several dozen political prisoners and o The overtaking of military bases and lifting the 48- year-old state of the reduced number of jet aircraft emergency. 37 strikes since late 2012 showed that o However, what began as a the overall Syrian Air Force capability series of protests calling for was degrading and as a result the democratic reforms and the regime began using its Surface-to- release of political prisoners Surface Ballistic Missiles (SSBM) soon transformed into a against the Syrian opposition which nationwide battle against the has caused mass displacement government violence and the throughout the country. oppression by the Assad Regime. 38 o By the end of 2012, the Syrian Free Army had succeeded taking over o By July 2011 the unrest is continuing military bases in Damascus and and following mass demonstrations in weakening the Syrian government Hama, Assad sends troops in order to forces.40 The surge of rebel advances restore order resulting in numerous in Syria in early later 2012/ early deaths. Thus by October, the 2013 in the Syrian capital was a cause opposition was becoming more of concern for Assad as it was

12 predicted that Assad is unlikely to regain control of all of Syria.41 KJC: Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, o Assad’s desire to win and Saddam Hussein employed chemical preserve his regime is so great weapons in order to gain an advantage in that he would have rather the war and create widespread fear. Not continued to fight in only did he use chemical weapons against Damascus and Homs rather the Iranians but he also used them against than retreat in 2013. He was his internal Kurdish population- the most more likely to destroy significant instance being in the village of Damascus than to abandon it Halabja in 1988. This widespread fear and to the opposition.42 lack of international response enabled Saddam to tip the balance of the war in his o In July 2013, one month prior to the favor and forced Iran to agree to a chemical weapons attack, rebels said ceasefire. they had captured Khan al-Assal, the last major government help town in C1: Prior to his use of chemical weapons, the west of Aleppo Province.43 Saddam issued public threats alluding to his chemical weapon (CW) capabilities. o Primarily supported by the Alawite Muslims in Syria, by the end of 2012 o As Iraq began to suffer losses at the there were signs of discontent within hands of the Iranian human- wave the Alawite minority, which attacks, its leaders began to sound out presented a challenge to Bashar al- the ramifications of using gas in a Assad’s effort to retain power in the variety of ways. 45 face of an expanding armed rebellion. Though there was no indication of o August 1982, “Baghdad’s Voice of the Alawite desire to change sides in the Masses Radio issues a thinly veiled ongoing conflict, there have been threat to the Iranians by stating that reports of Alawite members who are there is ‘certain insecticide for every no longer happy with the direction of kind of insect.’”46 the civil war and have denounced the regime.44 o In October, the Iraqi chargé d’ affaires o The survival of Assad’s Regime is in Denmark stated “ Iraq will use a dependent on his continued support new secret weapons of mass of the Alawite minority in Syria and destruction if the Iranians launch a the crushing of the Syrian opposition major offensive on the border.”47 forces. Recent increases in foreign o Iraqi broadcasts in Iran also repeated support for the opposition forces was these threats in a form of an a cause for great concern for the ultimatum stating that if” the Assad Regime and resulted in aggressions by Khomeini’s forces multiple uses of chemical weapons. continue, we [Iraq] shall use a weapon that will annihilate and leave no signs of the aggressive revolution

13 guards and misled people.”48 by Iraq.

o And over the next year Iraq continued o Iraq started out employing CW making allusions to their possession sporadically, only when its forces and capability of a powerful new came under intense military pressure. weapon. They [Iraq] further went on Eventually, however, Iraqi use of to use non-lethal tear gas and issued chemical agents progressed to the continuous and persistent warnings point that they began to use the in an effort to scare the Iranians into a weapons in offensive operations.52 retreat.49 o In 1987 the Iraqi’s crossed the final C2: The inaction of the international threshold and employed CW against community during smaller attacks of a similar civilians, first against he Iranian nature gives a state more confidence with Kurds and then against their own which to pursue more aggressive chemical Kurdish population.53 weapons tactics. C4: The alliance between the Kurdish o Learning from the example set by insurgency and the Iranians had been a Italy against Ethiopia in the 1930’s, source of tension in Iraq since the Algiers Iraq began by using non-lethal tear Accords in 1975 and had spilled over into the gas as its first foray into chemical Iran-Iraq War. The aid that the Kurd’s warfare in order to gauge the reaction provided to the Iranians had been directly of the international community. There impacting the war and had caused Saddam to was virtually no reaction by the lose territory to the rebels in the northern international community and by the border region. end of 1982/ beginning of 1983 Iraq was readily using mustard gas more o In 1988, as the war with Iran was extensively.50 nearing an end the regime began to use chemical weapons and cluster o The earliest recorded use of chemical bombs against civilian targets weapons during the Iran-Iraq War suspected of supporting the Kurdish was seen in 1983 and sporadically movement.54 continued at low levels until the late 1980s. In the 1980s, a growing o In August 1988, Kurdish Rebels and Kurdish Insurgency had started Iranian forces captured the village of posing a serious threat to the Iraqi Halabja. In response, Saddam Hussein regime. Kurdish rebels took launched chemical weapons advantage of Iraq’s preoccupation specifically on the residential districts with the war with Iran.51 of the town killing over 5000 civilians, many of which were women and C3: This small- scale use eventually evolved children.55 56 into larger instances of chemical weapons use

14 o Saddam had always had a tumultuous o Iraq’s use resulted in the collapse of relationship with the Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdish insurgency. And allowed his brutality during the Iran- Iraq War for the Iraqi regime to recapture exemplifies the betrayal he felt with Halabja.60 The fear of chemical lack of Kurdish loyalty. From weapon use by Saddam flushed Baghdad’s perspective, the Kurds Kurdish villagers out into the were a ‘hidden column’ of Iran-backed countryside who were then opposition to Saddam’s regime and systematically murdered and buried thus chemical weapons were used on in mass graves, further removing a large scale with great brutality Saddam’s Kurdish problem.6162 against civilians.57 o The usage of CW by Iraq caused an o Furthermore, it had been because of a increase in psychological terror Kurdish uprising in 1974, supported amongst the populations throughout by the Iranians, that Saddam had been Iraq and Iran (Instances of CW use forced to hand over access and terrified Iranian civilians into control of half of the Shatt al-Arab believing they would face gas waterway in 1975. Saddam’s brutality attacks.)63 towards the Kurds in Iraq was partially a residual effect (revenge) of o CW use had a significant impact on these events combined with the the Iranian military and civilian support of Iran by the Kurds. morale as the Iraqi counteroffensives and CW use made troops feel that C5: CW use can have two effects: physical they were defenseless which can (they kill and injure) and psychological (to result in them [the soldiers] breaking scare and produce panic). On the tactical and running after limited losses. 64 level, CW use can influence the shape and outcome of battle.58Iraq’s wave of chemical weapons attacks had tremendous tactical C6: Strategically, Iraqi use of chemical results with regards to the war against Iran. weapons forced Iran to accept a ceasefire and put an almost immediate end to the war. o The chemical weapon attacks against the Kurds had a variety of tactical o Strategic use of CW can produce a purposes including to attack base decision to end the conflict by camps and Kurdish force undermining morale.65 concentrations, to harass and kill retreating Kurdish forces, to inflict o The Regime realized that the Kurdish exemplary collective punishment on insurgents’ main vulnerability was the Kurdish civilians who supported the rural population that sustained them Kurdish insurgency and rebels, and to and by gassing the civilians it [the cause terror among civilians. 59 regime] could break the rebels’ fighting spirit and paralyze the

15 rebels.66 provided direct chemical warfare training to the Iraqi’s 70 o The Halabja Massacre, combined with the Iraqi threat to chemically attack o For Saddam Hussein, immediately Tehran caused mass panic in Iran and after reports of his Chemical weapons dissipated support for the War, use against Iran in the 1980s reached tipping the advantage in Iraq’s favor.67 the UN, there was very little reaction By the end of 1988, there was a of movement by the international ceasefire in place between Iraq and community. April 25, 1985, the UN Iran.68 Security Council issued a statement, which strongly condemned the use of C7: In the immediate aftermaths of Saddam’s chemical weapons in general terms chemical weapons use, there was little to no but stopped short of specifically response from the international community. condemning Iraq specifically.71 Very However, following the Gulf War, Iraq lost all few members of the world community of its international support, were publically were anxious to see Iraq fall of Iran’s condemned for its WMD program and use, Islamic Revolution. They were, and were forced to dismantle and destroy therefore, more willing to tolerate CW their WMD program by the UN. Nearly a if it repelled the Iranians. 72 decade after the destruction of Iraq’s CW stockpile, and despite worldwide speculation, o The US specifically, under President it was discovered in 2003 that Iraq had not Reagan remained slow and silent reconstituted its chemical weapons program. throughout the entire affair, allowing it to continue with the hope that the o The fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 war would turn in favor of Iraq.73 placed the Ayatollah Khomeini’s o The Pentagon and the US State extremist views at the forefront of Department, following the Iran’s internal and international Halabja Incident, made politics. As a result, the US was blanket and unsubstantiated desperate so see Iraq win the war accusations concluding that against Iran in order to contain the there was Iranian use of CW Iranian extremism. and that Iran was at least partly to blame for the Halabja o A clash of ideology between the deaths74 but stated that they Islamic Iran and the Soviet Union also could not discuss the caused the USSR to turn its support information from which they away from Iran and aid their ally Iraq, had drawn their conclusion. who under the 1972 Treaty of These accusations eventually Friendship and Cooperation was a led to statements by other recipient of vast quantities of Soviet European Countries, which weaponry.69 The Soviet Union had did not single out a specific also directly influenced the Iraqi country for use but instead chemical warfare doctrine and also was directed at both.75

16 o Following the end of the Iran- In 1998, when cooperation ends Iraq war, in the fall 1988, the between Iraq and the inspectors, the US government condemned US leads the four- day military Iraq’s CW use but made no offensive ‘Operation Desert Fox’, effort to confiscate its which largely destroys all what was weapons stockpile.76 left of Iraq’s WMD infrastructure.80

o Saddam’s chemical weapons use was C8: Nearly a decade after the destruction of ignored through the end of the war, Iraq’s CW stockpile, and despite worldwide however, the issue resurfaced in 1990 speculation, it was discovered in 2003 that during the first Gulf War when Iraq had not reconstituted its chemical Saddam invaded Kuwait in order to weapons program. take over Kuwait’s oil fields.77 The immediate result was US lead UN o Following the Gulf War and after its coalition, which defeated and use of CW during the Iraq-Iran War, decimated the Iraqi army.78 This Saddam Hussein’s Regime was closely invasion lost Saddam the support of monitored throughout the 1990s and the US. Combined with the the international community crippled simultaneous transformations that its WMD infrastructure.81 the USSR was undergoing under Gorbachev following the fall of Berlin o After his disarmament, Saddam has Wall, Saddam’s superpower support been stigmatized and is referred as disappeared almost overnight thus the man who was willing to use making Iraq susceptible to UN poison gas against his own people. sanctions on its weapons program. President George W. Bush even used Saddam’s past offenses as a sign that o Following the end of the First Gulf he would use WMD again and needed War in 1991, the UN Security Council to be stopped.82 issued a resolution addressing Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq. o Though it was believed that Iraq had Resolution 687 called for Iraq’s restarted its chemical weapons destruction of its presumed WMD programs in 2003, prior to the stockpile and its means of production invasion, it later became apparent as well. UNSCOM is responsible for that Iraq’s once impressive weapons overseeing the inspection and programs had collapsed under UN destruction of chemical weapons. 79 weapons inspections. Iraq lacked With no strong international patron substantial inventories of chemical (such as the US or Russia) supporting weapons after the dismantling of its the regime, Iraq was forced to comply. programs in the 1990s.83

o By 1994, UNSCOM has completed the destruction of Iraq’s known chemical weapons and production equipment.

17 KJD: Syria’s use of chemical weapons came o In July 2013 (one month before after being engulfed in a bloody internal Assad’s large chemical attack that conflict for over two years. Used on both a killed over 1000 people), the US civilian and rebel population by the Syrian Deputy National Security Advisor for government, the usage of chemical weapons Strategic Communications, Ben resulted in widespread international outrage. Rhodes stated that the US intelligence Assad has since become party to the Chemical community assessed with high Weapons Convention and allowed UN confidence that the Assad regime had inspectors into his country to destroy his used chemical weapons, including chemical weapons stockpile. sarin, on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the D1: Syria was known to possess undeclared previous year. The intelligence chemical weapons stockpiles of sarin nerve community also estimated that agent, mustard gas, and cyanide but did not approximately 100-150 people had publically threaten the rebels with a chemical died due to chemical weapons. 86 attack o Though neither Assad nor the Syrian D3: Syria has launched one large- scale attack Regime never verbally threatened CW against the Syrian rebels/ civilian population. use on the rebels, his actions over the past year were unnerving to the US. o On August 21, 2013 the first reports of chemical weapons use came from o Syria has consistently denied or been Syria [near Damascus] with more vague about its chemical weapons than 1300 reported dead among with program. were hundreds of children and civilians. 87 o In July 2012, Syrian officials warned that they would deploy chemical o Immediately following reports of the weapons against any foreign attack, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid intervention but assured the Moualem denied that his country was international community that the using chemical weapons on its Syrian leadership would never use civilians and challenged the world to such weapons against its own citizens. provide evidence that the Syrian 84 government was behind the chemical o This announcement by the weapons attack.88 Syrian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson came following o However, by September 10, 2013 the reports that Syria was moving country’s foreign minister its chemical weapons around acknowledged for the first time that the country.85 the Syrian government possessed chemical arms and declared that the D2: Syria engaged in small-scale chemical country aimed to become a signatory weapons attacks prior to launching a large- to the Chemical Weapons scale attack against its internal population.

18 Convention.89 disheartened and deflated by the Russian disarmament proposal. They D4: CW use can have two effects: physical had hoped that even a limited strike (they kill and injure) and psychological (to would shift the momentum of the war scare and produce panic). On the tactical on the ground.93 level, CW use can influence the shape and outcome of battle.90 o Furthermore, and partially due to this Tactically, the Syrian usage of CW delivered a lack of international military action, a deadly blow to the morale of the Syrian large number of the opposition forces opposition and bolstered Assad’s image in Syria are viewed by the West as amongst his supporters. radical or extremist and have openly allied themselves with Al-Qaeda. o His chemical attack reportedly killed Secretary of State John Kerry has over 1400 people, at least 400 of them stated that of the approximately children.91 He has achieved his goal of 70,000-100,000 oppositionists, 15-20 bolstering his image to his supporters percent are ‘bad guys’ or extremists.94 while at the same time causing a wave o This shift among the rebel of fear and terror amongst the civilian population has made it and rebel population. difficult for the West to fully ally themselves with the o For President Bashar Al- Assad, The opposition forces, which has usage of CW was an attempt to incite overall strengthened Assad’s fear into the minds of the rebel army image. Thus, even slightly, it as well as serve as a reminder/ seems that the balance has assurance to his core supporters, the been tipped in Assad’s favor. members of the Alawite religious sect, o Assad has also continued to maintain of his continued power in Syria.92 the survival of his regime.

o The widespread psychological D6: Unlike in the case of Iraq, there was an damage of the chemical weapons use immediate international response with may result in currently unknown Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile disarmed long- term advantages against the and destroyed within 2 months of the attack. rebels. o Syria went through a tremendous D5: Assad’s use of CW has served, as a major amount of scrutiny following the strategic advantage in is fight against the Assad Regime’s CW attack. Syria’s rebels by creating a rift between the rebels usage of chemical weapons led and the west. immediate outrage and calls for action by the international o For Syria, Insurgents who had community. However, even after the counted on a military strike by the US ‘red line’ of chemical weapons use set or European allies in the event of a by the Obama Administration was large chemical attack were crossed in August 2013 by Assad,

19 there was no military response. Syria has submitted a declaration of its stockpiles of CW to the OPCW o Even after the confirmed use of (Organization for the Prohibition of chemical weapons by the Assad Chemical Weapons). By October 31, Regime in August 2013, Russia 2013 it was confirmed that Syria had maintained it support and diplomatic destroyed or rendered inoperable all tied to the country and further backed of its facilities for mixing and the Syrian government by stating that producing chemical weapons.96 there was no evidence that the government of Syria was responsible o Bashar al-Assad’s immediate stance to for the chemical weapons attack. 95 hand over the chemical weapons and join the CWC enabled him to escape o By early September 2013, Syria punishment from the international offered to give up its chemical community for using chemical weapons in exchange for the US weapons and gain a strategic promising to not take any military advantage in his regime’s fight against action against Syria. the rebels.

o Russia maintained it support of Syria o For Russia, being at the forefront of and mediated the agreement between the diplomatic negotiations on Syria’s the two countries. CW use, there is a tremendous amount at stake with regards to US- o On September 12, 2013 The Assad Russia relations if Syria fails to uphold regime acceded Syria to the Chemical its promise to cease usage of CW. Weapons Convention (CWC) effective immediately and by September 20,

KJE: Signposts of Change. Though it is impossible with only 2 cases of internal use to create an absolute template for prediction if a country or leader will use chemical weapons on its civilian population, there are characteristic similarities that can be applied to other potential cases. The long term ramifications and implications of his use of chemical weapons can be speculated but cannot be definitively assessed or predicted. The Iraqi case can be used as an indication on how the current Syrian situation may play out and together both cases can be applied to both future and past cases.

o With Syria’s continued support from Russia, it is assessed with high confidence that Syria will not reconstitute its chemical weapons stockpiles

Signposts of Change Iraq Syria Libya (E1) 1. Authoritarian Dictator who Yes-Saddam Yes- Yes- maintains a reign of terror. Hussein Bashar al-Assad Moammer Gaddafi 2. Chemical weapons possession/ Yes Yes Yes capability. 3. Engaged in or losing an ongoing Yes: Iran- Yes- Syrian Civil Yes- Libyan Civil internal or external conflict Iraq War War War 4. International intervention in No No Yes ongoing conflict 5. Small scale chemical weapons use Yes Yes No 6. Large scale chemical weapons use Yes Yes No 7. Strong international patron/ Yes: US and Yes: Russia No supporter97 USSR 8. CW program was dismantled and Yes Yes N/A CW were destroyed by international community 9. Reconstitute CW program/ NO Prediction= no N/A stockpile?

E1: The case of Libya large stash of mustard gas.99 Moammar Gaddafi, dictator of Libya for over 40 years can only slightly be compared to the o Though Gaddafi maintained a large cases of Iraq and Syria. Gaddafi fits in with portion of his chemical weapon some of the above listed signposts in that he stockpile throughout the Libyan was an authoritarian dictator who ruled his Uprising from 2011-2012, he never country with an air of terror and that he had resorted to using those weapons in known stockpiles of CW. However, when order to gain a strategic or tactical turmoil and rebellion ensued his country, he advantage in the battle. chose not to use his remaining chemical o This can be attributed to the weapons stockpiles out of fear of the following factors. Firstly, international communities reaction. following the Libyan Uprising, Gaddafi was faced with many o Moammar Gaddafi renounced his of his high- level government chemical weapons in 2003 and moved officials defecting in waves. quickly to eliminate his country’s Second, Gaddafi was charged toxic arsenal. He signed international with war crimes by the treaties and allowed inspectors to international community oversee the destruction of tons of (something that consistently mustard gas. 98 failed with Syria due to Russia and China’s veto in the UN o However, because Gaddafi turned Security Council) and over his CW willingly to international therefore faced even greater inspectors, this process had more consequences had he broken bureaucratic leisurely undertones. the international norms and Unlike the case with Iraq and Syria, used the chemical weapons.100 there was no impending rush to complete the destruction. o Gaddafi had no strong world leader o This is contrary to both Iraq backing him during this period and and Syria’s immediate therefore would have been hesitant to dismantling and destruction. test the international waters with use (of CW) because he ran the risk of a o When Gaddafi was overthrown in large-scale international attack. 2012, a secret cache of munitions was discovered in a desert bunker. KJF: The consequences and probability of Though it has appeared that Gaddafi use of chemical weapons by North Korea is had destroyed his entire weapons currently unknown. However, at this stage stockpile, he had in fact retained a there are several similarities between the

22 incidents in Iraq and Syria and recent testing the international waters reports of CW use in North Korea. It is following Syria’s large-scale use of assessed with moderate confidence that chemical weapons. Therefore, it is without further escalation of a major imperative to be cautious and wary of change to the status quo, there is a low attempts by Kim Jong-un to deliver probability of North Korea engaging in a these chemical weapons on a larger large-scale chemical warfare attack scale. against its internal population. It will be necessary and prudent to continue to o With regards to a strong international closely monitor this situation. patron, North Korea has traditionally enjoyed political and economic o Recent reports have emerged that support from China. However since North Korea has been using chemical Kim Jong-un has taken office, China- weapons on political prisoners for North Korean relations have taken a experimentation purposes.101 North turn. North Korean belligerence has Korean defectors and the South advanced a regional arms race, Korean government have brought the inflaming tensions between China and charges of experimentation forth, its neighbors. however, there is currently no o North Korea’s continues to evidence to substantiate these disregard and defy China’s allegations.102 The following efforts at public diplomacy predictions and comparisons are and is cutting across China’s made based on the assumption that goals of consolidated regional these reports are legitimate. influence. Historically, China has acted as the chair of the F1: For North Korea, Signposts #1,2,5, and 7 Six- Party Talks where North are currently applicable. Korean nuclear Proliferation has been addressed. However, o Kim Jong- un is an authoritarian North Korea’s continued dictator, similar to Saddam and Assad, defiance has become a whose people are subject to roadblock in the development widespread persecution and of China’s image as a credible oppression. and strong global leader.104 o The loss of China as an ally o North Korea is estimated to possess would cause drastic between 2500 tons and 5000 tons of international consequences CW agents. 103 were North Korea to engage in chemical warfare. o The experimentation of chemical weapons by the North Korean F2: Signpost # 3,4,5,6,8, and 9 do not government on political prisoners can currently apply to the situation in North be identified as a form of small-scale Korea and it is unknown how far tensions use and Kim Jong-un’s attempt at with South Korea will escalate. However, it

23 can be judged that if North Korea is not able F3: If North Korea’s current situation had to to guarantee China as its strong international be assessed, it can be judged that the path to backer, there is low probability of North and from use of chemical weapons would be a Korea engaging in large- scale chemical combination of the Iraq and Syria cases. weapons attacks. o There is no internal conflict, unlike o Since early 2013, North and South Syria, but there is an external one like Korean relations have grown in the case of Iraq. increasingly tense. North Korea cut a military hotline between the two o Kim Jong-un will have a high countries, which was one of the few probability of losing its long time ways that senior North and South international ally, China if he was to Korean Officials could talk to each choose to use chemical weapons. The other. In March of 2013, Pyongyang loss of a patron not only makes threatened to shut down a vital chemical weapons use less likely, but factory complex, which is run jointly also increases the likelihood of by the two countries.105 immediate and drastic international action in order to remove the CW.

If the aforementioned signposts were applied to North Korea as of now, here is how North Korea would stack up.

Signposts of Change North Korea 1. Authoritarian Dictator who maintains Yes- a reign of terror. Kim Jong-un 2. Chemical weapons possession/ Yes capability. 3. Engaged in or losing an ongoing No- but continued tensions with internal or external conflict S. Korea 4. International intervention in ongoing N/A conflict 5. Small scale chemical weapons use Yes- reported experimentation on political prisoners 6. Large scale chemical weapons use No 7. Strong international patron/ supporter Yes- China 8. CW program was dismantled and CW N/A were destroyed by international community 9. Reconstitute CW program/ stockpile? N/A

1 Julian Ryall. "North Korea 'Testing Chemical Weapons on Political Prisoners'." The Telegraph, 2 CIA World Factbook, "Iraq." Last modified November 13, 2013. Accessed November 27, 2013. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html. 3 Tony Karon. "Understanding Iraq's Ethnic and Religious Divisions." Time Magazine , February 24, 2006. http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1167476,00.html (accessed November 27, 2013). 4 Ibid 5 Jerrold Post. Interview with Puja Mody. Personal Interview. Bethesda, Maryland; November 18, 2013 6 James Ciment, ed. World Terrorism: An Encyclopedia of Political Violence from Ancient Times to the Post- 9/11 Era. . Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. , 2011. s.v. "Iraq: Saddam Hussein Regime, 1968- 2003." pp. 274 7 Ibid, 273 8 Mark Bucknam and Frank Esquivel, “Saddam Hussein and the Iran-Iraq War” (National War College 2001), 3 9 Stephen C. Pelletiere, The Iran-Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum (New York: Praeger, 1992), 29.

10 Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance:The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States, (New Haven: Yale University Press , 2007)yalepress.yale.edu/book.asp?isbn=9780300120578 (accessed November 27, 2013), 98. 11 Bucknam and Esquivel, 6 12 Mazi Bahadori, “History and Geopolitics of the Iran-Iraq War” (Thesis. University of California- Berkeley 2005), 22 13 BBC News, "Iraq Profile." Last modified October 29, 2013. Accessed November 27, 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14546763. 14 Joost R. Hilrermann, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the gassing of Halabja, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 22. 15 Bucknam and Esquivel, 7 16 Richard M. Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 138 17 Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (New York: Routledge, 1991), 250; Roland Dannreuther, The Gulf Conflict: A Political and Strategic Analysis, Adelphi Paper No. 264 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991/92), 11; Efraim Karsh, “Military Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War,” Orbis (Spring 1989): 210 and 222-223.

18 Parsi, 52 19 Ibid 20 BBC News, "Timeline: Iraqi Kurds- A chronology of Key Events." Last modified April 19, 2011. Accessed November 27, 2013. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/2893067.stm.

21 Bahadori, 18 22 Ibid 23 Ibid, 19 24 Jerrold Post. Interview with Puja Mody. November 18, 2013

25 BBC News, "Profile: Syria's Ruling Ba'ath Party." Last modified July 09, 2012. Accessed November 27, 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18582755. 26 Ibid 27 The CIA World Factbook, "Syria." Last modified November 6, 2013. Accessed November 27, 2013. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html 28 BBC News, "Profile: Syria's Ruling Ba'ath Party." 29 Jerrold Post. Interview with Puja Mody. November 18, 2013 30 Ibid. 31 Jonathan Tepperman. "The Story Behind Syria and Egypt." The New York Times, , sec. Opinion, July 12, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/13/opinion/global/jonathan-tepperman-the-story- behind-syria-and-egypt.html?_r=1& (accessed November 27, 2013). 32 Yazan al-Saadi. "Saudi-Syrian Relation: A Historic Divide." Al-Akhbar english, , sec. Mideast & North Africa, February 04, 2012. http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/3906 (accessed November 27, 2013). 33 Arshad Mohammed and Sylvia Westall. Reuters, "U.S. tries to Calm Saudi anger over Syria, Iran ." Last modified October 21, 2013. Accessed November 27, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/21/us-saudi-un-gulf-idUSBRE99K0BT20131021. 34 Anup Kaphle. "Timeline: Unrest in Syria." The New York Times, sec. Middle East, October 31, 2013. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/timeline-unrest-in-syria/207/ (accessed November 27, 2013). 35 Ibid 36 BBC News, "Syria Profile." Last modified October 08, 2013. Accessed November 27, 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14703995. 37 Ibid 38 Alisa Wiersema. ABC News, "Everything you need to know about the Syrian Civil War." Last modified August 31, 2013. Accessed November 27, 2013. http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/syrian- civil-war/story?id=20112311. 39 Joseph Holliday. The Assad Regime- From Counterinsurgency to Civil War. working paper., Institute for the Study of War, 2013. pp9 . (Accessed November 27, 2013) http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/TheAssadRegime-web.pdf. 40 Anup Kaphle. "Timeline: Unrest in Syria." 41 Holliday, 7. 42 Ibid 43 BBC News, "Syria Profile 44 Kelly MCevers. "Members Of Assad's Sect Break Ranks With Syrian Regime." NPR, , sec. Middle East, April 02, 2013. http://www.npr.org/2013/04/02/176039122/in-syria-some-ruling-minority- alawites-take-risky-stand-against-regime (accessed November 27, 2013). 45 Price, 137 46 Ibid 47 Ibid 48 Ibid 49 Ibid 50 Ibid, 138 51 Hiltermann,13 52 Price, 139 53 Ibid, 139. 54 Hiltermann, 78

55 Brenda K. Uekert, Rivers of Blood: A comparative Study of Government Massacres, (London: Praeger Publishers, 1995),78 56 Ibid, 80 57 Richard L. Russell. "Iraq's Chemical Weapons Legacy: What Others Might Learn from Saddam." Middle East Journal 59 (2005), 198. http://www.jstor.org.proxyau.wrlc.org/stable/4330124 (accessed November 27, 2013). 58 Thomas L. McNaugher. "Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War." International Security, Vol. 15, No. (Fall 1990), 15. http://www.jstor.org.proxyau.wrlc.org/stable/2538864 (accessed November 27, 2013). 59 Russell, 198 60 Hiltermann, 14 61 Ibid, 13 62 Ibid, 17. 63 Ibid, 13 64 Russell, 197 65 McNaugher, 15. 66 Hiltermann, 94 67 Ibid, 144 68 Russell, 198 69 Hiltermann, 23 70 Russell, 194 71 Price, 139 72 Price, 139 73 Shane Harris & Matthew M. Aid. "Exclusive: CIA Files Prove America Helped Saddam as he gassed Iran."Foreign Policy Magazine, August 26, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/25/secret_cia_files_prove_america_helped_saddam_ as_he_gassed_iran?page=0,2 (accessed November 27, 2013). 74 Hiltermann. 4, 193 75 Hiltermann, 126 76 Hiltermann, 213 77 Parsi ,140. 78 Parsi, 140 79 Wright Bryan and Douglas Hopper. NPR, "Iraq WMD Timeline: How the Mystery Unraveled." Last modified November 15 , 2005. Accessed November 27, 2013. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4996218. 80 Ibid 81 Ibid 82 History News Network- George Mason University, "He Has Gassed His Own People." Accessed November 27, 2013. http://hnn.us/article/862. 83 Russell, 187 84 Neil MacFarquhar and Eric Schmitt. "Syria Threatens Chemical Attack on Foreign Force." The New York Times, , sec. Middle East, July 23, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/24/world/middleeast/chemical-weapons-wont-be-used-in- rebellion-syria-says.html?_r=0 (accessed November 27, 2013). 85 Ibid 86 The White House- Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes on Syrian Chemical Weapons Use." Last modified June

13, 2013. Accessed November 29, 2013. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/2013/06/13/statement-deputy-national-security-advisor-strategic-communications-ben-. 87 BBC News, "Syria chemical attack: What we know." Last modified September 24, 2013. Accessed November 29, 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23927399. 88 Al Jazeera, "Syria denies chemical weapons claim." Last modified August 28, 2013. Accessed November 29, 2013. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/20138271141631363.html. 89 Barnard Barnard. "In Shift, Syrian Official Admits Government Has Chemical Arms." The New York Times, , sec. Middle East, September 10, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/world/middleeast/Syria-Chemical-Arms.html?_r=0 (accessed November 29, 2013). 90 Thomas L. McNaugher. "Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War." International Security, Vol. 15, No. (Fall 1990), 15. http://www.jstor.org.proxyau.wrlc.org/stable/2538864 (accessed November 27, 2013). 91 Yuta Kawashima. Arms Control Association, "Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2013." Accessed November 29, 2013. http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of- Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity.

-Paul Richter. "John Kerry says Syria chemical attack killed at least 1,429 people."http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-kerry-us-syria-chemical-attack- 20130830,0,2222419.story

92 Joshua Keating. Slate, "When Chemical Weapons Are Smart Politics." Last modified September 03, 2013. Accessed November 29, 2013. http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2013/09/03/why_did_assad_use_chemical_weapons_the_aut hor_of_the_dictator_s_handbook.html. 93 Michaels, Jim. "Chemical Weapons Deal may end up Strengthening Assad." USA Today , September 11, 2013. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/09/11/syria-libya-putin- lavrov-chemical/2795941/ (accessed November 29, 2013). 94 C.J. Chivers. "Brutality of Syrian Rebels Posing Dilemma in West." The New York Times, , sec. World, September 05, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/world/middleeast/brutality-of- syrian-rebels-pose-dilemma-in-west.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2& (accessed November 29, 2013). 95 RIA Novosti, "US Frustrated by Russian Efforts to ‘Block’ Syria Action at UN." Last modified August 30, 2013. Accessed November 29, 2013. http://en.ria.ru/world/20130830/183051739.html. 96 Yuta Kawashima.

97 If a strong international patron supports the state, the leader will be more likely to take the risk associated with chemical weapons use and it can be expected that the consequences for sue use in the immediate aftermath will be substantially mitigated as opposed to if no such support existed.

98 Joby Warrick. "Lessons from Iraq, Libya loom large as diplomats ponder Syrian weapons probe." The Washington Post, September 14, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national- security/lessons-from-iraq-libya-loom-large-as-diplomats-ponder-syrian-weapons- probe/2013/09/14/5440f544-1d70-11e3-a628-7e6dde8f889d_print.html (accessed November 29, 2013). 99 Ian Black "Libyan rebels discover Gaddafi's chemical weapons." The Guardian, , sec. World News, September 22, 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/22/libyan-rebels-gaddafis- chemical-weapons (accessed November 29, 2013).

100 Jerrold Post. Interview with Puja Mody. November 18, 2013 101 Julian Ryall. 102 Zachary Kallenborn and Raymond Zilinskas. Nuclear Threat Initiative , "Disarming Syria of Its Chemical Weapons: Lessons Learned from Iraq and Libya." Last modified October 31, 2013. Accessed November 29, 2013. http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/disarming-syria-its-chemical- weapons-lessons-learned-iraq-and-libya/. 103 Ibid 104 Paul Haenle. World Politics Review, "North Korea’s Defiance May Reshape China’s Strategic Calculus." Last modified February 22, 2013. Accessed November 29, 2013. http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12738/north-korea-s-defiance-may-reshape-china-s- strategic-calculus. 105 Paul Harris. "North Korea increases tensions with South by issuing threat over factories." The Guardian, March 30, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/31/north-korea-south- factory-threat (accessed November 29, 2013).