Struggle for Marawi
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Struggle for Marawi Steven Rood, Fellow-in-Residence Kapihan sa SWS March 8, 2018 Social Weather Stations War for Hearts and Minds Struggle for Marawi March 8, 2018 2 1 Struggle for Marawi March 8, 2018 3 Philippines Special Operations Struggle for Marawi March 8, 2018 4 2 Islamic State: “Brothers in Marawi” Nasheed: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QOG5A-uvTlY Struggle for Marawi March 8, 2018 6 https://asiafoundation.org/resources/ pdfs/SWSFebMarJun2015Surveys.pdf Struggle for Marawi March 8, 2018 8 3 SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING OF MUSLIMS VS. CHRISTIANS, PHILIPPINES, 2017Q1-Q4 MUSLIMS CHRISTIANS Net Gainers +7 +19 Net Optimists +30 +41 Net Sat. with Life +25 +36 Net Happy +15 +39 Jobless (% of adults) 15.8 20.1 Struggle for Marawi March 8, 2018 9 READINESS TO HELP THE VICTIMS OF THE MARAWI CITY CRISIS, PHILIPPINES, SEP 2017 Net* +40 Unready, 20% Ready, Undecid 60% ed, 20% * Net readiness= % Ready minus % Unready correctly rounded. Don’t know/Refuse responses are not shown. Q87. Gaano po kayo ka-handang tumulong sa mga naging biktima ng krisis sa Marawi City? Kayo po ba ay… (SHOWCARD) Third Quarter 2017 Social Weather Report September 23-27, 2017 National Survey 4 THINGS ONE CAN DO IN ORDER TO HELP THE VICTIMS OF THE MARAWI CITY CRISIS, PHILIPPINES, SEP 2017 (Base: Those who are ready to help the victims of Marawi City Crisis) Pray for/offer mass for the victims 54% Donate relief goods 51 Donate clothes 49 Donate money 16 Work personally in packing/ delivering relief goods 13 Keep/protect victims in own house 4 Give free transportation/rides 2 Give free medicine 0.1 Q88. KUNG TALAGANG/MEDYO HANDA: Alin po sa mga sumusunod ang inyong kayang gawin upang makatulong sa mga biktima ng krisis sa Marawi City? Alin pa po? (SHOWCARD, ALLOW MULTIPLE RESPONSES) Third Quarter 2017 Social Weather Report September 23-27, 2017 National Survey Mindanao and Sulu Archipelago – Mainstream Moro Fronts Islamic City of Marawi MNLF heartland MILF heartland Moro National Liberation Front Moro Islamic Liberation Front Struggle for Marawi March 8, 2018 12 5 Area of Operation of Selected Groups Butig, Marawi (IS-Ranao; Maute) Proposed territory of the Bangsamoro Parang, Barira, Buldon, Matanog-- Ca mp Abubakar MILF) Sulu (ASG KFR) Basilan (ASG,Hapilon) SPMS Box,,BIFF Struggle for Marawi March 8, 2018 13 Formal Conflict Management–MNLF & MILF 1976 – Tripoli Agreement – MNLF–Marcos ▪ Marcos unilaterally re-interpreted it 1987 – Jeddah Accord – MNLF – Aquino ▪ Overtaken by 1987 Constitution under Cory Aquino 1996 – “Final Peace Agreement” (FPA) – MNLF – Ramos ▪ Integration of MNLF into PNP & Army (actually, MNLF sons & nephews) ▪ “Arms to Farms” in reality was Arms AND Farms 2001 – Start of serious progress in MILF talks 2008 – MOA-AD debacle, near-agreement with MILF ▪ Declared unconstitutional, violent upsurge, 750,000 IDPs 2014 – Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro (CAB) w/ MILF 2015 – Mamasapano incident (44 PNP-SAF killed) so no Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) to implement CAB 2016 – Joint Communique on conclusion of Tripartite (OIC-MNLF- GPH) Review of the Implementation of the 1996 FPA 2017 – Expanded Bangsamoro Transition Commission revises draft BBL 2018 – Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) again before Congress Struggle for Marawi March 8, 2018 14 6 Upsurge in Violent Extremism Abu Sayyaf (1991 breakaway from MNLF in Sulu [Tausug] and Basilan [Yakan]) – Abdurajik Janjalani fought in Afghanistan, got funding from Osama bin Laden – Beginning late 1990s, mostly known for kidnapping and piracy – But in particular, Basilan ASG retained Islamic thrust (Isnilon Hapilon) Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (in Maguindanao/North Cotabato) – In 2008, Umbra Kato as MILF commander attacked (MOA-AD) – In 2011 declared “bughat” by MILF after long process (died 2015) ▪ Beginning 2014, reports of recruiting on college campuses in Mindanao Maute brothers (“Islamic State—Ranao”), middle-eastern trained (Maranao, based themselves in Butig, LdS) – Beginning 2016, frequent clashes with AFP, culminating in November in Butig, LdS Struggle for Marawi March 8, 2018 15 Islamic State Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared Caliphate June 27 2014) – July 2 Taguig inmates; July 23 Hapilon swear “bay’ah” – 2016 – ISIS names Hapilon Amir, releases video urging militants to go to PH – December 2016 – Hapilon goes to Lanao del Sur – May 2017 – plan to seize Marawi at beginning of Ramadan – prematurely set off by arrest attempt on Hapilon Islamic City of Marawi, July 2014 Struggle for Marawi March 8, 2018 16 7 Urban Warfare in Mindanao Conflict ▪ Jolo, February 1974, 8 days to wrest control from MNLF – City burned as the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) retook it ■ Zamboanga, September 2013 – 20 days – 208 MNLF killed – 20 AFP & 5 PNP – 12 civilians – 119,000 displaced ▪ Marawi, May-October 2017 – 919 militants killed, – 165 AFP & PNP, 47 civilians – 460,000 displaced, mostly home-based Struggle for Marawi March 8, 2018 17 Dress Rehearsal – Butig, Lanao Sur (26 Nov 2016) 6 days 63 militants killed; 2 AFP killed, “They have been decimated. 35 injured The capability to sustain and get back to the fight is no longer there” – AFP, Dec. 1, 2016 Mautes ‘said that they will go down upon Marawi to burn the place. And I said, “Go ahead, do it.”’(Du30, Dec 12) Struggle for Marawi March 8, 2018 18 8 Troubled Maritime Region Troubled Maritime Region Indanan-Inabanga Marawi April 2017 February 2013 invasion of Sabah by Sulu Sultanate Basila n Samal Island – Patikul Sulu September 2015 Lahad Datu “Back Door” Via Sangihe Money smuggling via Tawau Chain to finance #MarawiClash Struggle for Marawi March 8, 2018 19 Understanding Violent Extremism in Mindanao Findings from Fieldwork (The Asia Foundation) Photo courtesy of the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, The “East Asia Wilayah’ and Indonesia (21 July 2017: IPAC Report No. 38) 9 Mutually reinforcing push factors: Frustration borne out of continuing perceived and actual marginalization of Muslims in Mindanao. ■ Anti Muslim bias; sense of persecution ■ Unaddressed historical injustices ■ Experiences of human rights violations; need for revenge ■ Military operations seen as willful destruction of Muslim communities Dire political and economic situation ■ Corrupt officials and overall bad governance ■ Poverty, illiteracy, unemployment Frustration with the MNLF and MILF leadership and the peace process ■ Non–passage of the BBL as evidence of government treachery ■ Nationalist Moro fronts cooperation with the “enemy” Mutually reinforcing pull factors: ■ Emotional and spiritual appeal of extremist ideology ■ Extremist ideology as compelling response to the present situation ■ Power and social prestige in the community ■ Belonging to a select group of young Muslim heroes and warriors ■ Adventure and romantic appeal of youthful idealism ■ Financial reward 10 Who are the likely recruits? ■ In mainland Mindanao (urban) ▪ Usually college students ▪ Higher level students of madrasah ▪ Young, idealistic and with leadership potential ▪ Many belong to the middle class families ■ In the islands ▪ Young, poor with low education ▪ Usually children and relatives of MNLF fighters ▪ Personally suffered loss of family members due to conflict The extremist narrative; their spiel ■ Singularity of aqeedah: “this is the correct way of practicing Islam. All others are innovation and unacceptable” ■ Islam is under attack globally and locally ■ Muslims will always be deceived by non-Muslims ■ Khilafa is the answer to the problems of Muslims ■ Peace process is a deception ■ MNLF and MILF are traitors; turned their backs to true jihad 11 Recruitment process? (Basilan & Sulu) (ASG) Guerilla Feeds Indoctrinati training Initial offer those who on on Financial and to learn come for kidnapping enticements swearing of Arabic religious and allegiance education violence Recruitment process (Mainland) (Dawlah Islamiya, Ansar Al-Khilafa Philippines) Recruitment Student Financial Social from among organization family Enticemen media s members t Guerilla training and swearing of allegiance mubaya Short Public Islamic Interpersona wave l displays of study discussions; ISIS flags radio circles long intimate to project channel called car rides popularity s halaqa 12 What makes the extremist groups resilient? Community and family support ▪ Not necessarily because of shared belief ▪ Social obligation to help family members in need ▪ Cultural obligation to help a Muslim who is fighting a non-Muslim ▪ Government seen as the common enemy Community tolerance and silence due to fear of reprisal from extremists Communities also benefit financially (Sulu & Basilan) Foreign support ▪ Aside from regular payments to members, $600,000 for Marawi ▪ Coordination of different elements – ASG and Maute, or Dr. Mahmud for Indonesians Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) ▪ Bangsamoro Basic Law to implement peace agreement ▪ Faces rough ride in Congress, particularly House of Representatives ▪ The “Bangsamoro narrative” is counter to that of the caliphate ▪ Community resilience interventions ▪ Space for community-based dialogue; management of localized conflict ▪ Positive messaging with the religious (note: some local ulama threatened) ▪ Security sector reform on Countering Violent Extremism ▪ Rethinking of present security sector approach to VE ▪ Governance Issues ▪ Work to improve accountability of local officials ▪ Legal framework (Bank Secrecy, Money Laundering, Human Security Act – 5 year 2010-2015 to declare ASG terrorist group) Struggle for Marawi March 8, 2018 28 13 Role of Mainstream Moro Fronts MILF: