6 from Atlantic Past to European Destiny Portugal
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6 From Atlantic past to European destiny Portugal António Costa Pinto and Nuno Severiano Teixeira Two political factors conditioned Portugal’s integration into the process of European unification between 1945 and 1974: the dictatorial nature of Salazar’s regime and its tenacious resistance to decolonization.1 It was only following the institutionalization of democracy and the process of decolonization during 1974–75 that the first serious steps were taken to follow a strategy of integrating Portugal into what was then the European Economic Community (EEC) – a policy that was to become the touchstone for political consensus among the moderate political parties of the nascent democracy. A small country on the southern periphery of Europe, Portugal entered the twentieth century with a consolidated liberal regime in a very homogenous nation–state.2 With the abolition of the constitutional monarchy following the republican revolution of 1910, the country experienced a failed democratization. In 1916, Portugal entered the First World War on the side of the Allies, which resulted in a period of endemic cabinet instability and pro-authoritarian military activity that aggravated the young republic’s legitimacy crisis. A coup d’état in 1926 led to the establishment of a military dictatorship that was internally divided as a consequence of the conflicts that existed within the hetero- geneous conservative bloc that supported it. Stability was only restored within the dictatorship at the beginning of the 1930s when António Salazar, the young Catholic-conservative Finance Minister, rose to become one of the longest surviving right-wing dictators in twentieth-century Europe. When Salazar institu- tionalized Portugal’s New State (Estado Novo), the Portuguese economy was backward, with a weak and sparse industrial base.3 Levels of urbanization were low and the structure of Portugal’s active population included 51 per cent engaged in the primary sector. While the New State was inspired by European fascism, its political institutions, which were created in 1933, were primarily influenced by Catholic corporatist ideals that resulted in the institutionalization of a dictatorial regime supported by a weak and elitist single party.4 The Estado Novo was deeply conservative and relied more on traditional institutions like the Church and the Army, and a controlled administration than on mass organizations. The new regime did not seek to challenge the international order – it maintained its privi- leged alliance with the United Kingdom and, as a strategy for ensuring the survival of its fragile African empire, remained neutral during the Second World War. From Atlantic past to European destiny 113 In the period following the Second World War II, the Estado Novo defined itself as an ‘organic democracy’ and endeavoured to conceal its resemblance to fascism; however, institutional and decision-making changes were very limited. It was only after Salazar (who died in 1970) was replaced by Marcello Caetano in 1968 that a series of reforms took place and part of the political elite associated with the old dictator was removed. Salazar’s neutrality during the Second World War, his military concessions to Britain and the United States, and the rapid onset of the Cold War ensured the survival of his regime in an unfavourable post-1945 international climate. Portugal joined NATO and the United Nations (after an initial veto from the Soviet Union) within the next ten years. But it was not easy for the regime to adapt to the new US-dominated international scene. The dictator had always feared and mistrusted the United States; this feeling was heightened as decolonization began and the UN subjected Portugal’s colonial policies to international condemnation. The Salazar regime survived by culti- vating an external image of a benign and ageing authoritarianism that was an anti-communist bulwark of Western civilization, and by efficiently controlling internal opposition. Portugal did not experience the same levels of international isolation as its Spanish neighbour following the Second World War. Its status as a founding member of NATO and as a participant within other international organizations, such as the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) and the European Payments Union (EPU), and its receipt of Marshall Plan funds – albeit on a relatively small scale – are all examples of the country’s international accep- tance.5 The New State and European unification after 1945 Salazar had his own vision, not only as to what he considered Portugal’s position in the world should be, but also its position in the post-Second World War world. His idea of Portugal’s place was based on a traditional thesis that held to two fundamental presuppositions. The first of these was that Portugal was essentially an Atlantic country and as such should not concern itself with continental European questions but should instead concentrate its strategic energies in two directions – towards a privileged, or even exclusive, alliance with the major maritime power, and towards the colonial empire in Africa. He was particularly troubled by Britain’s decline and the rise of the United States, which he regarded with ideological scepticism and political mistrust as the main maritime power. He also rejected the importance of multilateral diplomacy in the international system, and the United Nations in particular. He also had problems accepting the principle of self-rule and, consequently, the resulting process of decoloniza- tion. Finally, he watched in silence as the process of European economic reconstruction was conducted through the criteria of international cooperation rather than under the inter-war principles of nationalist autarchy. Salazar’s scepticism in relation to the United States, and his rejection of decolonization were not new: they had always conditioned his vision of Europe 114 António Costa Pinto and Nuno Severiano Teixeira and its relationship with Africa. He saw the relationship between Europe and Africa as a complementary one and viewed this Europe–Africa binomial as a unity in terms of economic, political and military plans. This was the strategic conception at the heart of all of Salazar’s beliefs and it was this that was to emerge during the formulation of his foreign policy, not only in relation to Europe and European construction, but also to the entire system of Western security and NATO. In Portugal’s foreign policy from the very beginning of the Cold War, two events highlighted the duality of the country’s strategic direction. Portugal’s hesitation over the Marshall Plan in 1947 illustrated its reservations regarding the reconstruction process while the signing of the Lajes Agreement in 1948 – a bilateral defence agreement between Portugal and the United States – heralded Portugal’s incorporation into the Atlantic security system, later confirmed with its entry into NATO in 1949.6 The Marshall Plan led Portugal to participate in all of Europe’s institutional economic cooperation structures – from the OEEC and the EPU to the European Monetary Agreement (EMA).7 In the latter half of the 1940s, and while the European reconstruction process was taking place in an atmosphere dominated by the principle of intergovernmental cooperation, Portugal’s posi- tion was complex and its participation singular, although this very participation was to lead to the country’s integration into all the institutions that were created with the purpose of promoting economic cooperation between the European states. Despite its non-participation in the first purely European military cooper- ation agreements, for example, the Dunkirk and Brussels Treaties of 1947 and 1948 respectively, Portugal followed the development of the Western European Union and was integrated into the Atlantic security system. Of the three types of European cooperation developed during the late 1940s, the only one in which Portugal remained totally marginalized was that of polit- ical cooperation. In fact, not only did the wartime and post-war pro-European movements have no political expression in Portugal (evidenced by the absence of any Portuguese intellectuals at The Hague Congress of 1948), the anti-European principles that drove Portugal’s foreign policy, and the authoritarian nature of the Portuguese regime in particular, excluded it from membership of the Council of Europe. While Portugal had participated in the development of European cooperation during the 1940s, the same cannot be said of its involve- ment with the integrationist movements of the 1950s. Although Salazar may have remained sceptical with respect to inter-governmental cooperation, his atti- tude towards any form of supranational integration or federalism remained openly hostile. Moreover, while Salazar was prepared to accept that the United States was the new Atlantic power, and to alter Portuguese foreign policy to establish a preferential relationship with it after Portugal’s integration into NATO, in his mind this had no bearing on European affairs where he continued to place great importance on the alliance with Britain and to follow Britain’s policy positions very closely. Thus, Portugal stood alongside the United Kingdom at the margins of all European integrationist movements during the 1950s – remaining out of the From Atlantic past to European destiny 115 Schuman Plan and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as well as on the margins of the proposed European Defence Community (EDC) and its associated European Political Community (EPC). It was during the long and complex negotiations leading to the collapse of the EDC that Salazar clearly and unequivocally outlined his thoughts on European integration in a circular to all Portuguese embassies defining the principles of Portuguese foreign policy regarding this process.8 In this document, Salazar’s position was made unam- biguous and can be reduced to three points. First, his scepticism regarding the chance of any process of economic integration or political federalism succeeding was clearly expressed. Second, he stated that even should European federalism succeed, it would not be something that would interest Portugal.