Building a Prospect Theory Model of Ethnic Civil War Termination
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
FIGHTING FOR FRAMES OR PROSPECTS FOR PEACE? BUILDING A PROSPECT THEORY MODEL OF ETHNIC CIVIL WAR TERMINATION by Robert Davis Butts A.B., Government (2006) Dartmouth College Submitted to the Department of Political Science in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology September 2007 © 2007 Robert Davis Butts All Rights Reserved The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part in any medium now known or hereafter created. Signature of Author …………………………………………………………………………………………. Department of Political Science July 31, 2007 Certified by …………………………………………………………………………………………………. Barry Posen Ford International Professor of Political Science Thesis Supervisor Accepted by …………………………………………………………………………………………………. Roger Petersen Associate Professor of Political Science Chairman, Graduate Program Committee 2 FIGHTING FOR FRAMES OR PROSPECTS FOR PEACE? BUILDING A PROSPECT THEORY MODEL OF ETHNIC CIVIL WAR TERMINATION by ROBERT DAVIS BUTTS Submitted to the Department of Political Science on July 31, 2007 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Political Science ABSTRACT Ethnic civil wars are the most abundant form of large-scale, deadly conflict in the world today, yet the dedicated study of ethnic civil war is relatively new within political science. One empirical observation repeated in the literature is that civil wars are less likely than interstate wars to end in negotiated settlements, and more likely to end in military victory for one side. Recently, scholars have employed expected utility theory and the security dilemma to construct models of how ethnic combatants choose between settling their differences at the bargaining table or on the battlefield. Rooted in the rational choice paradigm, these models draw upon utility calculations and security concerns to describe ethnic combatants’ decision processes and explain the low rate of ethnic war settlement. Two problems with these rational choice models, however, are that they cannot account for cases of ethnic war in which combatants elect to continue fighting losing battles when a normatively “rational” settlement is available, and that they do not seem to accurately describe the decision-making behavior of ethnic combatants. In this thesis, I draw upon the principles of prospect theory, a descriptive theory of choice under conditions of risk and uncertainty, to construct a psychological model of ethnic war termination. I argue that ethnic combatants do not behave as rational choice theories suggest; rather, they choose to settle or fight by framing the possible outcomes as gains or losses relative to a subjective reference point. I analyze my theory by comparing it to three prominent rational choice models: Mason and Fett’s expected utility theory, Walter’s credible commitment theory, and Kaufmann’s demographic separation theory. I then perform a first-brush test of my theory by applying all four models to two case studies, the Ethiopian- Eritrean War and the Bosnian Civil War, to determine which model best explains the behavior of the combatants. I find that prospect theory provides added value over the rational choice models. I then review the implications of my prospect theory model for humanitarian interventions into ethnic conflict. Finally, I conclude by suggesting potential directions for future research in this area. Thesis Supervisor: Barry Posen Title: Ford International Professor of Political Science 3 4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Thanks to Barry Posen and Roger Petersen, whose assistance and insightful feedback helped make this project a reality. Thanks to my friends and family, who have always supported me in all that I do. Finally, a special thanks to Carolyn Lathrop, who brought me up when I was down, kept me calm when I was anxious, put me on track when I was lost, and always reminded me what the important things are. This is for her. 5 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................................3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS........................................................................................................................5 TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................................................7 TABLE OF FIGURES................................................................................................................................9 INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................................................11 CHAPTER ONE: THE PROBLEM OF CIVIL WAR TERMINATION............................................15 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES........................................................................15 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS.......................................................................................................16 CURRENT KNOWLEDGE AND LITERATURE REVIEW.......................................................18 CHAPTER TWO: RATIONAL CHOICE AND ETHNIC WAR TERMINATION..........................25 MASON AND FETT’S EXPECTED UTILITY MODEL ............................................................25 THE SECURITY DILEMMA AND ETHNIC WAR TERMINATION .......................................31 WALTER’S CREDIBLE COMMITMENT MODEL ...................................................................32 KAUFMANN’S DEMOGRAPHIC SEPARATION MODEL......................................................41 COMMON IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODELS........................................................................49 CHAPTER THREE: PROSPECT THEORY AND ETHNIC WAR TERMINATION.....................51 PRINCIPLES OF PROSPECT THEORY .....................................................................................52 IMPLICATIONS FOR ETHNIC WAR.........................................................................................57 PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL OF ETHNIC WAR TERMINATION...........................................58 ADDED VALUE OF THE PROSPECT THEORY MODEL .......................................................74 CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDY OF THE ETHIOPIAN-ERITREAN WAR.................................79 RATIONALE FOR SELECTING THE CASE..............................................................................79 COURSE OF THE ETHIOPIAN-ERITREAN CIVIL WAR........................................................79 TESTING THE MODELS AGAINST THE CASE.......................................................................94 CHAPTER FIVE: CASE STUDY OF THE BOSNIAN CIVIL WAR...............................................107 RATIONALE FOR SELECTING THE CASE............................................................................107 COURSE OF THE BOSNIAN CIVIL WAR...............................................................................108 TESTING THE MODELS AGAINST THE CASE.....................................................................129 7 CHAPTER SIX: PRESCRIPTIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERVENTION...............................151 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND ETHNIC WAR ....................................................151 MASON AND FETT’S PRESCRIPTIVE CONCLUSIONS ......................................................157 WALTER’S PRESCRIPTIVE CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................159 KAUFMANN’S PRESCRIPTIVE CONCLUSIONS..................................................................165 DRAWING PRESCRIPTIVE CONCLUSIONS FROM PROSPECT THEORY.......................171 CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................................181 REFERENCES........................................................................................................................................183 BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.......................................................................................................................187 8 TABLE OF FIGURES TABLES…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. TABLE 1. MASON AND FETT’S MODEL.................................................................................30 TABLE 2. WALTER’S MODEL...................................................................................................40 TABLE 3. KAUFMANN’S MODEL ............................................................................................48 TABLE 4. PROPOSED PROSPECT THEORY MODEL ............................................................71 TABLE 5. ETHIOPIAN CASE STUDY REFERENCE POINTS ..............................................102 TABLE 6. ETHIOPIAN CASE STUDY OUTCOME VARIANCE...........................................103 TABLE 7. ETHIOPIAN CASE STUDY RENORMALIZATION..............................................105 TABLE 8. BOSNIAN CASE STUDY REFERENCE POINTS..................................................139 TABLE 9. BOSNIAN CASE STUDY OUTCOME VARIANCE ..............................................142 TABLE 10. BOSNIAN CASE STUDY RENORMALIZATION ...............................................147 FIGURES…………………………………………………………………………………………………… FIGURE 1. THE VALUE FUNCTION.........................................................................................52 FIGURE 2. THE WEIGHTING FUNCTION................................................................................56