Tie Votes in the Supreme Court Justin Pidot
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Measuring Judicial Ideology Using Law Clerk Hiring Adam Bonica
University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics Economics 2016 Measuring Judicial Ideology Using Law Clerk Hiring Adam Bonica Adam S. Chilton Jacob Goldin Kyle Rozema Maya Sen Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Adam Bonica, Adam S. Chilton, Jacob Goldin, Kyle Rozema & Maya Sen, "Measuring Judicial Ideology Using Law Clerk Hiring" (Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics No. 767, 2016). This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Measuring Judicial Ideology Using Law Clerk Hiring Adam Bonica, Adam Chilton, Jacob Goldin, Kyle Rozema, & Maya Sen∗ July 21, 2016 ∗Bonica: Stanford University, Department of Political Science, e-mail: [email protected]. Chilton: University of Chicago Law School, e-mail: [email protected]. Goldin: Stanford Law School, e-mail: js- [email protected]. Rozema: Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, e-mail: [email protected]. Sen: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, e-mail: maya [email protected]. For helpful com- ments, we are grateful to Omri Ben-Shahar, Erin Delaney, Joshua Fischman, Tom Ginsburg, William Hubbard, Tonja Jacobi, Jim Lindgren, Robin Kar, Anup Malani, Jonathan Masur, Richard McAdams, Jennifer Nou, Eric Posner, Max Schanzenbach, Matt Spitzer, Eugene Volokh, and seminar participants at the University of Chicago Law School and at the Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law. -
The Role of Politics in Districting the Federal Circuit System
PUSHING BOUNDARIES: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN DISTRICTING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT SYSTEM Philip S. Bonforte† I. Introduction ........................................................................... 30 II. Background ............................................................................ 31 A. Judiciary Act of 1789 ......................................................... 31 B. The Midnight Judges Act ................................................... 33 C. Judiciary Act of 1802 ......................................................... 34 D. Judiciary Act of 1807 ....................................................... 344 E. Judiciary Act of 1837 ....................................................... 355 F. Tenth Circuit Act ................................................................ 37 G. Judicial Circuits Act ........................................................... 39 H. Tenth Circuit Act of 1929 .................................................. 40 I. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980 ...................................................... 42 J. The Ninth Circuit Dilemma ................................................ 44 III. The Role of Politics in Circuit Districting ............................. 47 A. The Presence of Politics ..................................................... 48 B. Political Correctness .......................................................... 50 IV. Conclusion ............................................................................. 52 † The author is a judicial clerk -
The Cost of Partisan Politics on Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench
Indiana Law Journal Volume 83 Issue 4 Article 11 Fall 2008 Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan Politics on Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada Las Vegas Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Courts Commons, Judges Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons Recommended Citation Lazos Vargas, Sylvia R. (2008) "Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan Politics on Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 83 : Iss. 4 , Article 11. Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol83/iss4/11 This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan Politics on Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench SYLVIA R. LAZOS VARGAS* INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1423 I. WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS TO THE JUDICIARY FROM DIVERSITY? ....... .. .. .. .. 1426 A . D escriptive Diversity ........................................................................ 1428 B. Sym bolic D iversity............................................................................ 1430 C. Viewpoint D iversity ......................................................................... -
“Crisis”: Charting a Path for Federal Judiciary Reform
University of New Hampshire University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository University of New Hampshire – Franklin Pierce Law Faculty Scholarship School of Law 7-1-2020 Revisiting and Confronting the Federal Judiciary Capacity “Crisis”: Charting a Path for Federal Judiciary Reform Ryan G. Vacca University of New Hampshire School of Law, [email protected] Peter S. Menell University of California, Berkeley, School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/law_facpub Part of the Courts Commons, and the Judges Commons Recommended Citation 108 Cal. L. Rev. 789 (2020) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – Franklin Pierce School of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Revisiting and Confronting the Federal Judiciary Capacity “Crisis”: Charting a Path for Federal Judiciary Reform Peter S. Menell* and Ryan Vacca** The modern federal judiciary was established well over a century ago by the Judiciary Act of 1891. Over the next seventy years, the structure and core functioning of the judiciary largely remained unchanged apart from gradual increases in judicial slots. By the mid- 1960s, jurists, scholars, practitioners, and policy-makers had voiced grave concerns about the capacity of the federal system to function effectively in the face of ever-increasing caseloads. Heeding calls for reform, in 1972 Congress charged a commission chaired by Senator Roman Hruska to study the functioning of the federal courts and recommend reforms. -
Senate Section (PDF929KB)
E PL UR UM IB N U U S Congressional Record United States th of America PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 109 CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION Vol. 151 WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, MAY 19, 2005 No. 67 Senate The Senate met at 9:30 a.m. and was ceed to executive session for the con- Yesterday, 21 Senators—evenly di- called to order by the President pro sideration of calendar No. 71, which the vided, I believe 11 Republicans and 10 tempore (Mr. STEVENS). clerk will report. Democrats—debated for over 10 hours The legislative clerk read the nomi- on the nomination of Priscilla Owen. PRAYER nation of Priscilla Richman Owen, of We will continue that debate—10 hours The Chaplain, Dr. Barry C. Black, of- Texas, to be United States Circuit yesterday—maybe 20 hours, maybe 30 fered the following prayer: Judge for the Fifth Circuit. hours, and we will take as long as it Let us pray. RECOGNITION OF THE MAJORITY LEADER takes for Senators to express their God of grace and glory, open our eyes The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The views on this qualified nominee. to the power You provide for all of our majority leader is recognized. But at some point that debate should challenges. Give us a glimpse of Your SCHEDULE end and there should be a vote. It ability to do what seems impossible, to Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, today we makes sense: up or down, ‘‘yes’’ or exceed what we can request or imagine. will resume executive session to con- ‘‘no,’’ confirm or reject; and then we Encourage us again with Your promise sider Priscilla Owen to be a U.S. -
Letter Reso 1..5
*LRB09920652MST45257r* HR1022 LRB099 20652 MST 45257 r 1 HOUSE RESOLUTION 2 WHEREAS, Article III, Section I of the United States 3 Constitution vests judicial authority "in one supreme Court, 4 and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to 5 time ordain and establish"; and 6 WHEREAS, The United States Congress passed the Judiciary 7 Act of 1789, fixing the number of Supreme Court justices at 6; 8 and 9 WHEREAS, In an effort to avoid an evenly divided Court, the 10 Judiciary Act of 1869 increased membership on the Court to one 11 Chief Justice, and 8 Associate Justices; that number has 12 remained unchanged; and 13 WHEREAS, Antonin Scalia became an Associate Justice on the 14 Supreme Court after being nominated by President Ronald Reagan 15 in 1986; Justice Scalia was confirmed by the United States 16 Senate 98-0; he was sworn in on September 26, 1986; and 17 WHEREAS, The death of Justice Scalia has effectively placed 18 the Court in ideological gridlock with respect to liberal and 19 conservative interpretations of the Constitution; and 20 WHEREAS, The Court now consists of 4 members appointed by HR1022 -2- LRB099 20652 MST 45257 r 1 Republican presidents: Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice 2 Anthony Kennedy, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel 3 Alito; and 4 members appointed by Democratic presidents: 4 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Stephen Breyer, Justice 5 Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan; and 6 WHEREAS, A Supreme Court term begins on the first Monday in 7 October, and continues until late June -
Changing the Stakes of Supreme Court Selection and Enhancing Legitimacy
ABOVE THE FRAY Changing the stakes of Supreme Court selection and enhancing legitimacy A Report of the Task Force on Federal Judicial Selection July 8, 2021 Acknowledgements The task force staff is grateful to the many people who assisted in the production of this report. Special thanks to Will McAuliffe and the teams of attorneys at Covington & Burling LLP and WilmerHale and who provided extensive pro bono assistance throughout the project, including Jessica Arco, John Buchanan, Thomas Perrin Cooke, Patricio Martínez Llompart, Kate McNulty, Nicole Roberts, Darcy Slayton, Shannon Tucker, Molly Jennings, Rebecca Cooper, Jane Kim, Rebecca Lee, Amy Lishinski, Blake Roberts, Elena Satten-Lopez, Samir Sheth, and Derek Woodman. We also thank those who provided valuable guidance and scholarship over the course of this project, including James Sample, Charles Geyh, and Danielle Brian. Many experts generously shared their time and expertise with us. Our thanks go out to Debo Adegbile, Daniel Epps, Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Aziz Huq, Mark Gitenstein, Lisa Graves, Linda Greenhouse, Peter Keisler, Adam Liptak, David Pozen, Nancy Scherer, Ilya Shapiro, and Nina Totenberg. TASK FORCE STAFF Sarah Turberville, Project Director David Janovsky, Project Analyst COPY-EDITING AND FACT-CHECKING Neil Gordon Mia Steinle DESIGN AND LAYOUT Leslie Garvey Renzo Velez OUTREACH Caitlin MacNeal Emma Coghlan THE PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT (POGO) is a nonpartisan independent watchdog that investigates and exposes waste, corruption, abuse of power, and when the government fails to serve the public or silences those who report wrongdoing. 1100 G Street NW, Suite 500 We champion reforms to achieve a more effective, ethical, Washington, DC 20005 and accountable federal government that safeguards WWW.POGO.ORG constitutional principles. -
Visiting Judges
Visiting Judges Marin K. Levy* Despite the fact that Article III judges hold particular seats on particular courts, the federal system rests on judicial interchangeability. Hundreds of judges “visit” other courts each year and collectively help decide thousands of appeals. Anyone from a retired Supreme Court Justice to a judge from the U.S. Court of International Trade to a district judge from out of circuit may come and hear cases on a given court of appeals. Although much has been written about the structure of the federal courts and the nature of Article III judgeships, little attention has been paid to the phenomenon of “sitting by designation”—how it came to be, how it functions today, and what it reveals about the judiciary more broadly. This Article offers an overdue account of visiting judges. It begins by providing an origin story, showing how the current practice stems from two radically different traditions. The first saw judges as fixed geographically, and allowed for visitors only as a stopgap measure when individual judges fell ill or courts fell into arrears with their cases. The second assumed greater fluidity within the courts, requiring Supreme Court Justices to ride circuit—to visit different regions and act as trial and appellate judges—for the first half of the Court’s history. These two traditions together provide the critical context for modern-day visiting. DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38ZK55M67 Copyright © 2019 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their publications. -
Falsities on the Senate Floor John Cornyn United States Senator
University of Richmond Law Review Volume 39 Issue 3 Allen Chair Symposium 2004 Federal Judicial Article 13 Selection 3-2005 Falsities on the Senate Floor John Cornyn United States Senator Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview Part of the American Politics Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the Legislation Commons Recommended Citation John Cornyn, Falsities on the Senate Floor, 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 963 (2005). Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol39/iss3/13 This Letter is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FALSITIES ON THE SENATE FLOOR * The Honorable John Cornyn ** Throughout last night's historic round-the-clock session of the United States Senate, a partisan minority of senators defended their filibusters against the President's judicial nominees by mak- ing two basic arguments. Both were false. First, they claim that the Senate's record of "168-4"-168 judges confirmed, 4 filibustered (so far)-somehow proves that the cur- rent filibuster crisis is mere politics as usual.1 But, as I explained in an op-ed yesterday, this is not politics as usual; it is politics at its worst.2 * An earlier version of this Article was originally published on the National Review Online website on November 13, 2003. John Cornyn, Falsities on the Senate Floor, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Nov. -
A Delicate Balance of Life Tenure and Independence: Conditional Resignations from the Federal Bench Allison A
Marquette Law Review Volume 93 Issue 1 Symposium: International Media and Conflict Article 18 Resolution A Delicate Balance of Life Tenure and Independence: Conditional Resignations from the Federal Bench Allison A. Luczak Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr Part of the Law Commons Repository Citation Allison A. Luczak, A Delicate Balance of Life Tenure and Independence: Conditional Resignations from the Federal Bench, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 309 (2009). Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol93/iss1/18 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A DELICATE BALANCE OF LIFE TENURE AND INDEPENDENCE: CONDITIONAL RESIGNATIONS FROM THE FEDERAL BENCH I. INTRODUCTION [T]he judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power; . it can never attack with success either of the other two; and . all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks. Alexander Hamilton1 In a letter dated October 4, 2007, Judge John C. Shabaz of the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin submitted a letter of resignation2 to President George W. Bush.3 The letter states: Please be advised that under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 371(b)(1) I shall assume senior status effective when your nominee appointee, my successor, is confirmed by the United States Senate and on the date of your subsequent appointment on or before January 20, 2009. -
Congressional Record United States Th of America PROCEEDINGS and DEBATES of the 108 CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
E PL UR UM IB N U U S Congressional Record United States th of America PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 108 CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION Vol. 149 WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2003 No. 26—Part II Senate EXECUTIVE SESSION The problem here is that he didn’t cuit Court of Appeals for the District answer the questions the way they of Columbia. wanted him to. He answered them the Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, will NOMINATION OF MIGUEL A. way he should have. We put those ques- the Senator yield for a question? ESTRADA, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE tions and those answers into the UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE Mr. HATCH. I am happy to yield for RECORD today. a question without losing my right to FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUM- It is unfair, after what this man has BIA CIRCUIT the floor. gone through—after all the hearings, Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, one (Continued) all the questions, all the time that has of the issues I have heard raised by the The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The elapsed—almost 2 years—that this other side is that the nominee has not Senator from Utah. highly qualified individual is now being had judicial experience. In fact, the Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, here we filibustered on the floor of the Senate. chairman of the House Democratic His- are in the middle of an unprecedented If the Democrat Members of the Sen- panic Caucus wrote a letter to the Ju- filibuster against the first Hispanic ate do not like his answers, then they diciary Committee, I understand. -
History of the New Hampshire Federal Courts
HISTORY OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE FEDERAL COURTS Prepared by the Clerk’s Office of the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire - 1991 1 HISTORY OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE FEDERAL COURTS TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE & ACKNOWLEDGMENT .......................................................................................... 5 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 7 THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT ................................................................................ 11 Time Line for the Circuit Court and Related Courts ................................................................ 19 JUDGES OF THE CIRCUIT COURT ......................................................................................... 20 John Lowell ............................................................................................................................... 20 Benjamin Bourne ...................................................................................................................... 21 Jeremiah Smith.......................................................................................................................... 21 George Foster Shepley .............................................................................................................. 22 John Lowell ............................................................................................................................... 23 Francis Cabot Lowell ...............................................................................................................