EEdinburghCI Centre for InternationalG and GlobalL Law

Gender Inequality and Women in Decision-making in Post- war Societies: Lessons from the Iraqi Kurdistan

Saeed Bagheri Edinburgh Centre for International and Global Law Working Paper Series Gender Inequality and Women in Decision-Making in Post-war Societies: Lessons from the Iraqi Kurdistan Saeed Bagheri*

ABSTRACT During the war with Islamic State in northern Iraq (2014-17), a notable number of the Kurdish women joined the Peshmerga (Iraqi-Kurdish fighters), the military forces of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in an effort to prevent Islamic State advance into the oil-rich city of Kirkuk in northern Iraq. Beside causing ample international resonance, the presence of women fighters was publicized by the KRG as a sign of modernity and gender equality. However, once the war ended, in the peace negotiations between the KRG and the Iraqi government, the role of the Kurdish women was drastically resized. By looking at the events that took place in Kirkuk before and after Islamic State and the diplomatic follow-up, this study examines the role of the Kurdish women in a war to peace transition, focusing more specifically on the peace negotiations process to ensure that their effective and equal participation in decision-making is respected. Against the backdrop of the clash over the energy-rich city of Kirkuk and a complex power-sharing process in post-war Iraq, this paper provides an insight into respect for international human rights principles, management of gender equality, and the role of women in the creation of a new constitutional order.

KEYWORDS: Islamic State, Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), Iraq, gender equality, peace-building.

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1. INTRODUCTION This study looks into the role of the Kurdish women in the war to peace transition in Iraq after the fall of Islamic State. It focuses on the Iraqi Kurdish women’s role in peace-building processes rather than the Iraqi women’s role because of their active participation on the front lines of the war with Islamic State and their active role in the liberation of Kirkuk. More importantly, the study draws its inspiration from the provisions on gender equality and fundamental rights of women in the Draft Constitution of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.1 The aim of this study is to evaluate the extent to which the Kurdish women’s voices have been heard not only as fighters but also as social and political participants in the peace-building processes in the post-Islamic State Iraq within the context of the social and political structure mainly shaped by men. By considering the long-term tensions between the Iraqi central government and the Iraqi Kurds over Kirkuk, therefore, the study seeks to identify the role of women in the KRG’s policies towards Kirkuk during the KRG’s military resistance against Islamic State in northern

* Max Weber Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Law Department of the European University Institute (EUI), Florence, Italy [[email protected]]. 1 Draft Constitution of Kurdistan Region (Approved by Kurdistan Parliament – Iraq on the 24th of June 2009), available at https://collections.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s69g8g0z [last accessed 15 May 2019].

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Iraq. Concerning the image of women in the Peshmerga forces2 which was broadly used to construct a positive international picture of unity between Baghdad and the KRG and equality arguments in the war against Islamic State, the main question in the peace-building process which still remains is: where do Kurdish women stand, and do they accumulate power and position in decision-making structures involved in the post-Islamic State Iraq as a reflection of gender equality and human rights in the Iraqi and Kurdish legal system. Section 2 provides a general overview of the Iraqi Kurds unpredicted military resistance against Islamic State in Kirkuk. It focuses on the divisions and conflicts in Iraqi society after the war with Islamic State due to the mismanagement of the energy resources. More crucially, it demonstrates how the Kurdish women have been included in the KRG’s policies in the Islamic State era. In Section 2, the power-sharing and decision-making process in the post-Islamic State Iraq is evaluated from an international law perspective. This section examines the role of women in the decision-making process in post-war societies. Within this particular context, section 3 examines the role of the Kurdish women in the national reconciliation of the post-Islamic State Iraq which is considered in the context of the KRG’s legal and political system. The participation of the Kurdish women in the fight against Islamic State as a reflection of the changing nature of conflicts has made a distinct image of women in the KRG. Given the image- making of the Kurdish women in the KRG, their predicted role in the regional legislation is examined as a requirement of the decision-making process.

2. THE IRAQI KURDS VS. ISLAMIC STATE Before exploring the extent of the Kurdish women’s role in decision-making on war to peace transition in the post-Islamic State Iraq, it is worth commenting on their active role as fighters in the war with Islamic State within the Iraqi borders. This section explores the KRG’s military resistance against Islamic State in Kirkuk and the role of women in the KRG’s policies in the Islamic State era.

A. The KRG’s Military Resistance against Islamic State in Kirkuk This section examines the war with Islamic State in Iraq, the confrontation between Islamic State and Peshmerga in Kirkuk, and the short-term conflicts between the Kurds and the Iraqi government after defeating Islamic State in northern Iraq, triggered by aspirations to control energy resources. Focusing on the long-term disagreements between the Kurds and the Iraqi government and the increasing disputes over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk after the fall of Islamic State, the KRG’s military resistance against Islamic State as an advantage to the Kurds are discussed.

2 According to Article 117 of the Iraqi Constitution, the only legal militia in the Iraqi system are the Iraqi armed forces and security services. Therefore, militias outside the framework of the armed forces are prohibited, but Regions such as the Iraqi Kurdistan are permitted to raise regional security forces and guards. Within this particular context, the KRG established Peshmerga as its militia. However, the Peshmerga’s status (as a part of the Iraqi defense system or a separate regional security force) is still a matter of controversy between the Iraqis and Kurds. See Crispin Smith, “Independent Without Independence: The Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga in International Law”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 59(1) (2018), p. 254. See also Dennis P. Chapman, Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government (California: Mazda Publishers, 2009).

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The military resistance of the KRG against an offensive launched by Islamic State to take control of Kirkuk in 2014 created the ground for the KRG to seize Kirkuk for two years. The strategic advantages of the war with Islamic State for the Iraqi Kurds are addressed here as the major reason for triggering the tension between Baghdad and the KRG. Based on this, the Iraqi Security Forces’ assault against the Kurdish Peshmerga position is evaluated. Historically, the Kurdish ethnic strife against the central government of Iraq since the early 1960s formed the basis for the de facto civil wars between the two sides. During the US-led invasion of Iraq, Kurdish nationalists who were viewing Saddam Hussein’s administration as the major cause of the crushing the Kurds and an obstacle to their political, economic, social and cultural aspirations, enthusiastically supported the Iraqi freedom operation. The fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the ratification of the new Iraqi Constitution in 2005 constituted the major milestones in Kurdish aspirations for their political objectives including the creation of an independent Kurdish state since the new Constitution recognized an autonomous Kurdistan region and KRG in northern Iraq. However, the political position of the KRG was gradually undermined by Iraq’s central government. Following the decision of the central government to off federal budget transfers to the KRG in 2015, a large segment of disappointed Kurdish people gradually lost trust in the KRG and the Iraqi central government and therefore was resentful of having to make sacrifices for a Kurdish nationalism anymore. The consensus view on the federal government’s exclusive power over foreign relations argues that even when governments have a considerable separation of powers for domestic purposes, it is common for the control of foreign relations, including signing energy deals with other countries, to be centralized in a single authority.3 Nevertheless, the KRG leadership has regularly complained about the centralized decision-making about the energy sector and its revenues. In other words, centralizing power entirely in the federal government was a trigger for rising disagreements and tensions between the KRG and Baghdad after the fall of Islamic State. Considering that States are continually undergoing a process of centralization or decentralization, it should be noted that if centralization of government is at odds with the integration or dissolution of the society, culture and economy, the process could lead to civil war, autonomy and secession.4 For this very reason, the Iraqi government’s efforts to centralize power and decision-making in Baghdad formed a basis for the Iraqi Kurd aspiration to create a Kurdish State. While decentralizing power to regional and local governments would balance the competing demands for democracy and unity through assigning specific authorities to the federal government in Iraq.5 The only certain point here is that the economic relationship between the KRG and Baghdad derived from mismanagement, uneven sharing, poor or lack of transparency in production and export records of the energy resources6 and therefore, denying the KRG proceeds from the energy revenues by the Iraqi government and causing the strategic mistrust between them. However, rising the Islamic State group in Iraq and capturing several towns including Mosul and Kirkuk in 2014 actuated Peshmerga to take control over Kirkuk with an unpredicted military resistance against the Islamic State. Within this particular context, the KRG found the war with Islamic State as a strategic advantage to Kurdish solidarity by

3 Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Volume II) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 838; Wilhelm Lehmann, Attribution of Powers and Dispute Resolution in Selected Federal Systems (Luxemburg: EU Publications, 2002), p. III. 4 David L. Phillips, Power-Sharing in Iraq (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2005), pp. 27-28; Quincy Wright, pp. 837-838. 5 Quincy Wright, p. 15; David L. Phillips, p. 6. 6 Signing the contracts by the KRG’s Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) without much oversight from the parliament was the main reason that prompted Baghdad to accuse the KRG of a poor transparency record. See Bilal A. Wahab, Iraq and KRG Energy Policies: Actors, Challenges and Opportunities (Sulaimani: The Institute of Regional and International Studies, 2014), p. 23.

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taking control of the energy resources in Kirkuk. However, Peshmerga’s presence in the oil- rich Kirkuk region escalated the conflict between Kurdish and Iraqi forces in the region. The occupation of critical oil-producing areas of Syria (in 2013) and oil-refining resources in northern Iraq (in June 2014) by Islamic State has shown that without energy resources Islamic State would not be entirely able to create an Islamic Caliphate ruling the world. After taking control of Syria’s oil-rich territories in 2013, Islamic State was encouraged to continue the same effort in northern Iraq, where oil fields are abundant.7 Hence, in 2014 the group was operating within the major energy-bearing regions in Iraq and Syria and had control over a number of oil fields and the related infrastructure.8 However, Islamic State was confronted with military resistance by the Peshmerga, who took control of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk and prevented Islamic State’s advance across northern Iraq. The Peshmerga presence in the oil-rich region around Kirkuk after Islamic State escalated the conflict between Kurdish and Iraqi forces in northern Iraq, where Islamic State was completely defeated and left the region. In other words, the divisions and conflicts in Iraqi society that arose shortly after the fall of Islamic State were directly linked to the main resources based in Kirkuk, which were also considered the optimal objective for Islamic State in strengthening its economic and military capabilities. To be clear, controlling the KRG’s oil policy and industry and integrating all energy decision- making in Baghdad was an attitude that the KRG leadership was displeased with. In a sense, this policy of the central government pushed the KRG to struggle to balance its proceeds from the national budget through taking control over Kirkuk as a golden advantage of the war with Islamic State. B. The Role of Women in the KRG’s Policies in the Islamic State Era: The Victims or the Active Role Players Towards Independence The Iraqi Kurds’ 100-year struggle for autonomy and independence has been the major reason for the political disputes between the Kurds and Iraqi central government especially on sharing the federal budget and the status of the disputed territories including the oil-rich governorate of Kirkuk in northern Iraq. In essence, the oil-rich city of Kirkuk was already the main reason behind the underlying tensions within the Iraqi society, even before the rise and defeat of Islamic State. However, the rise of Islamic State in northern Iraq was an unmissable opportunity for the Kurds to take control over Kirkuk as a result of a robust fight against Islamic State. However, the main question this study investigates here is whether the Kurdish women have been used as the victims of the conflicts or if they acted as politically active players towards independence. Given the KRG’ recent policies and legislation aiming towards the progress of the Kurdish women’s social and political rights,9 the Kurdish women’s participation in the war with Islamic State provided a very decisive advantage to the KRG in taking control over Kirkuk. At first

7 Alexander D. Robinson et al., When the Islamic State Comes to Town: The Economic Impact of Islamic State Governance in Iraq and Syria (California: RAND Co, 2017), p. xvi; Robin M. Mills, Under the Mountains: Kurdish Oil and Regional Politics (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2016), p. 3. 8 UN Security Council, Report on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and the Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant: Report and Recommendations Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2170 (2014), UN Doc. S/2014/815 (14 November 2014), para. 57, p. 20, available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_815.pdf [last accessed 15 May 2019]. 9 The issue of the progress of the Kurdish women’s social and political rights will be evaluated in detail in the next section.

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glance, therefore, it might be said that in the conflict-affected region like the Middle East where women have already been treated as second-class citizens, the Kurdish women have a relatively fair personal status in the Iraqi society. By considering the Kurdish women as a part of the KRG’s militia motivated by Marxist thoughts and early feminist understanding of equality10, the KRG tried to re-conceptualize the role of women and gender relations within the political struggle. In a way, the Kurdish women’s aspiration to gain equality as a matter of international human rights law has been already realized by taking part in the conflicts against Islamic State not only as fighters but also as military commanders. As expressed by al-Ali and Pratt, the relations between the Kurdish women and the KRG are shaped by their views on the achievements of the KRG with regard to gender equality.11 However, the substantial participation of the Kurdish women in the military operation against Islamic State and rescuing Kirkuk cannot be indicated as outstanding progress in gender equality, public life, human rights and social justice in the Iraqi society given that they have not been included in decision-making processes after the war. Given the fact that lifting gender- based restrictions on military could identify the political gender equality, introducing the Kurdish militia as a platform for women to show and improve their knowledge and skills with a growing awareness in partnership with the Kurdish men does not show per se an enormous progress in equality, diversity and respect for human rights. In other words, by showing the Kurdish women as part of the Kurdish militia in combat against Islamic State, the KRG tried to promote a narrative of gender equality within the Iraqi Kurdish society. Given the causes, consequences and the worst effects of armed conflict, however, the people join military forces mostly because they do not have any other options. For instance, in the wake of the Islamic State’s aggression in north-western Iraq in 2014 in which a large number of the defenseless women were killed or raped by the Islamic State’s forces, the Iraqi Kurdish women found no way out unless taking weapons.12 Importantly, the gender-based violence such as “honor” killings, abuse and killings of women including wife, daughter and sister by their male family members for bringing perceived shame upon the family, forced marriages and underage marriages still persist in the Iraqi Kurdistan13 and are mostly the major reasons for the Kurdish women to join the militia. Moreover, it has already been proven that the Islamic State’s fighters are afraid of being killed by female fighters. In a word, the Peshmerga’s women fighters consider the rare spectacle of female fighters as an advantage against Islamic State because the Islamic State’s fighters “are prejudiced against being killed by women and denied Jannat (heaven)”.14 In such a case,

10 Nadje Al-Ali & Latif Tas, “Dialectics of Struggle Challenges to the Kurdish Women’s Movement”, LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series, No. 22 (2018), p. 13; Saladdin Ahmed, “The Inauthenticity of the Left in the Kurdish Liberation Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan”, Journal of Socialist Theory, Vol. 46(1) (2018), p. 69. 11 Nadje Al-Ali and Nicola Pratt, “Between Nationalism and Women’s Rights: The Kurdish Women’s Movement in Iraq”, Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication, Vol. 4 (2001), p. 344; See also Katherine Ranharter, Gender Equality and Development After Violent Conflict: The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 12 Marco Nilsson, “Muslim Mothers in Ground Combat Against the Islamic State: Women’s Identities and Social Change in Iraqi Kurdistan”, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 44(2) (2017), p. 268; Luisa Dietrich and Simone E. Carter, Gender and Conflict Analysis in ISIS Affected Communities of Iraq (Oxford: OXFAM, 2017), p. 30. 13 The International Women’s Human Rights (IWHR), Women’s Human Rights Violations in Iraq (Submitted to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 31 August 2015), available at https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CESCR/Shared%20Documents/IRQ/INT_CESCR_CSS_IRQ_21592_E.p df [last accessed 15 May 2019]. 14 Debangana Chatterjee, “Gendering ISIS and Mapping the Role of Women”, Contemporary Review of the Middle East, Vol. 3(2) (2016), p. 209; Mari Toivanen and Bahar Baser, “Gender in the Representations of an Armed Conflict Female Kurdish Combatants in French and British Media”, Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication, Vol. 9 (2016), p. 308.

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therefore, it cannot be expected that the Kurdish women participated in ground combat against Islamic State to express political demands in the feminist term, given the fact that women may not be heard when they voice their demands and articulate feminist interests.15 This is a question about “the liberal discourse of feminism and gender equality” that I adopt as the theoretical orientation in support of my argument. As a feminist legal thought, the liberal feminism refers to “those liberal ideals of equality and rights or liberties apply to women”.16 As Nicola Lacey has explained, the liberal feminism has been associated with the ideas of “equality of opportunity” (formal equality).17 This is an approach that supports my argument where I argue that peace-building process should better represent entire the Kurdish population, which includes women. Although the Kurdish women’s military participation is a demonstration of women empowerment which would enhance women’s representation in political decision-making processes and peace negotiations, getting women in the room when significant political and geopolitical decisions are made, would make the female fighting as a sign of progress useless. That is to say, “if women and men are not different, then they should not be treated differently under the law”.18 For this very reason, the liberal feminism as a valuable tool of feminist critique of international law criticizes international law for failing women and liberal inclusion for ignoring them and marginalising their participation.19 From this point of view, including women in significant positions of power, policy-making and decision-making processes would ensure gender equality in the national and regional level, if the government take a stand against discriminatory practices and behaviors. In essence, the leadership would play a significant role in women’s opportunity to participate equally with men in peace-building processes in terms of liberal feminism and gender equality.20 Looking at all these aspects makes it clear and comprehensible that the Kurdish women’s active involvement in fighting Islamic State provided an incredible advantage to the KRG to push back Islamic State and take control over the disputed oil-rich city of Kirkuk. By taking effective control over Kirkuk, the women Peshmerga also became part of the mission to secure Kirkuk and nearby oil fields. As a result, taking control over oil fields of Kirkuk, the key element of the Kurdish economy, merely gave the KRG more ground to demand an independent State. However, the future of women Peshmerga fighters and women’s representation in the KRG

15 Pilar Domingo et al, Women’s Voice and Leadership in Decision-Making: Assessing the Evidence (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2015), p. 86. 16 Nicola Lacey, “Feminist Legal Theory and the Rights of Women” in Karen Knop (ed.), Gender and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 20. 17 Lacey divides feminism into Liberal Feminism, Radical Feminism, Marxist and Socialist Feminism, and Difference Feminism. Nicola Lacey, pp. 19-26. For the other classifications, see Nancy Levit and Robert R. M. Verchick, Feminist Legal Theory: A Primer (New York and London: New York University Press, 2006), pp. 15-44; Judith Lorber, Gender Inequality: Feminist Theories and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 18 Judith Lorber, p. 15; Alice Edwards, Violence Against Women under International Human Rights Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 38. 19 Alice Edwards, p. 37; Hilary Charlesworth, “Feminists Critiques of International Law and Their Critics”, Third World Legal Studies, Vol. 13(1) (1995), p. 7. 20 Judith H. Stiehm, “Women, Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Gender Balance and Mainstreaming”, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 8(2) (2001), p. 40; Rosa Linda T. Miranda, “Impact of Women’s Participation in Decision-Making”, Prepared for the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (Addis Ababa, 2005), p. 6, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/eql-men/docs/EP.7_rev.pdf [last accessed 15 May 2019].

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remains unclear and the major question that remains is whether, and to what extent their contributions will be recognized in the KRG’s policies in the near future.21

3. DECISION-MAKING ON WAR TO PEACE TRANSITION IN THE POST-ISLAMIC STATE IRAQ In order to identify the Kurdish women’s involvement and the extent of their role in decision- making on war to peace transition after the fall of Islamic State in Iraq, it is important to consider the challenges women faced in decision-making on war to peace transition in post- war societies from an international law perspective. Within this context, this section explores the role of the Kurdish women in reconciliation of the post-Islamic State Iraq as a matter of gender equality.

A. An International Law Perspective of Women’s Role in Decision-Making on War to Peace Transition in Post-War Societies International peace and security are the most crucial and contentious concerns of the international community, taking into account the strategic interests of powerful actors. At the same time, non-State actors and a wide range of civil society actors can play an important role in establishing peace and security. Within this particular context, women are one of the most important groups in all societies who have been both enemies to armed conflict and have made efforts to build peace. Women are usually one of the main actors in conflicts and peace issues. In a sense, women have generally played a significant role as agents and contributors in establishing peace and justice. However, in times of armed conflicts, they have mostly been victims of armed conflicts. As a matter of the commitment to peace and non-violence in societies, the importance of women’s initiatives in peace-building process and prevention of violence has been clearly identified by the UN Security Council in its eight Resolutions 132522, 182023, 188824, 188925 (2010), 196026 (2011), 210627 (2013), 212228 (2013) and 2242.29 These resolutions recognize the role and contributions of women to peace-building, as well as their fundamental right to be included in peace negotiation processes. The Resolutions are considered the Security Council’s “Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPS)”.30 Among the resolutions, Resolution 1325 is of considerable importance in designing an effective framework to consider the impacts of armed conflicts on women. The Resolution has consolidated five thematic areas of protection, equal participation, prevention, and relief and recovery as the key pillars of the Resolution that calls for the effective participation of women

21 Hanar Marouf, “Peshmerga Female Fighters: From Frontline to Sideline”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2008), available at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/peshmerga-female- fighters-from-frontline-to-sideline [last accessed 15 May 2019]. 22 UN Security Council, S/RES/1325 (2000), 31 October 2000. 23 UN Security Council, S/RES/1820 (2008), 19 June 2008. 24 UN Security Council, S/RES/1888 (2009), 30 September 2009. 25 UN Security Council, S/RES/1889 (2009), 5 October 2009. 26 UN Security Council, S/RES/1960 (2010), 16 December 2010. 27 UN Security Council, S/RES/2106 (2013), 24 June 2013. 28 UN Security Council, S/RES/2122 (2013), 18 October 2013. 29 UN Security Council, S/RES/2242 (2015), 13 October 2015. 30 Paul Kirby and Laura J. Shepherd, “The Futures Past of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda”, International Affairs Vol. 92(2) (2016), p. 374. For more details about the WPS agenda, see Nicole George and Laura J Shepherd, “Women, Peace and Security: Exploring the implementation and integration of UNSCR 1325”, International Political Science Review, Vol. 37(3) (2016), pp. 297-306.

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in conflict prevention, resolution and peace-building; the mainstreaming of gender equality in peace-keeping missions.31 Given the most basic human rights that are violated in both international and non-international armed conflicts, women and children are among the most injured groups. Violence against women in armed conflict is a matter of human rights and international humanitarian law.32 In this regard, the grave violations against women resulting from conflicts rape, forced pregnancy, forced sexual exploitation, forced prostitution and human trafficking of women as war strategies are disgusting and inhumane procedures that are strongly condemned. Violence against women during times of armed unrest has threatened international peace and security, however, there is no evident in efforts to formalise and implement Resolution 1325 and the WPS agenda and at the international level, there are no agreed indicators or benchmarks for assessing progress on preventing violence against women.33 More importantly, the preference for military expenditure and military policies instead of the essential resources for comprehensive development and poverty reduction have generally increased the problems and miseries of women. Women have always been the first harmless victims of collapsed social and political infrastructure in the result of armed conflicts and militarization of governments. As a result, a large part of the efforts made by the UN and the UN system organizations (including the centres, agencies, organizations, commissions, programmes, etc.) has been centred on preventive diplomacy34 and on women’s participation in decision-making on the transition from war to peace and peace-building process in post-war societies. Although women are frequently portrayed as victims of armed conflicts, their major role as active participants in the States’ efforts to end conflicts and reconstruction efforts of societies and post-war economic life cannot be ignored. In spite of deficiency and inability of international peace treaties to compensate for the suffering of women in armed conflicts, peace- building processes are the most basic ways to alleviate and repair women’s harms and form a primary basis for international responsibility for the consequences of violations against women. Women are community members and may be future political leaders. Therefore, their contributions in compliance with the Security Council Resolution 1325 are vital to prospects

31 Paul Kirby and Laura J. Shepherd, p. 378; Sharon B. Rolls, “Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: Linking Women, Peace and Security in the Pacific” in Gina Heathcote and Dianne Otto (eds.), Rethinking Peacekeeping, Gender Equality and Collective Security (New York: Palgrave McMillian, 2014), p. 119. 32 The term “violence against women” has been defined in the Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action (1995), as “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life”. See Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action (adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women), New York: UN (27 October 1995), para. 113, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/Beijing%20full%20report%20E.pdf [last accessed 15 May 2019]. 33 Nicole George and Laura J Shepherd, p. 302; UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women (SRVAW), Indicators on Violence against Women and State Response, UN Doc. A/HRC/7/6, 29 January 2008, para. 21, available at https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/7session/A-HRC-7-6.doc [last accessed 15 May 2019]. 34 The UN preventive diplomacy was presaged by Article 99 of the UN Charter allowing the Secretary-General to bring to the Security Council’s attention threats to international peace and security. It refers to an action that can prevent disputes from arising between States. It can also prevent existing disputes from escalating into armed conflict, as well as limit the spread of the latter should they occur. See Kemi Ogunsanya and Kwezi Mngqibisa, “A Gender Perspective for Conflict Management” Occasional Paper No. 4/2000 (2015), p. 3, available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/accord-gender-2000.pdf [last accessed 15 May 2019].

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for peace-building and development which ensure that strategies to incorporate a gender perspective have a future beyond the peacekeeping period.35 Accordingly, the participation of women in the peace processes is a prerequisite for post-war issues, as well as for long-term conflict prevention and long-term consequences of conflicts affecting women. Assuring and maintaining the conditions for promotion and protection of international peace and security, human rights, democracy and the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the principles of the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of States and respect for State sovereignty would promote women’s advancement and empowerment. Despite the devastating impacts of armed conflicts on women, they often endeavor to preserve order in societies during armed conflicts as peacekeepers.36 By considering the ongoing conflicts, violence and instability around the world, the implementation of cooperative strategies for peace and security is an urgent necessity. Within this context, “equal access to and full participation in power structures and decision-making, and to increase women’s capacity to participate in decision-making and leadership”37 and their initiatives in conflict prevention and resolution efforts would be a strong asset for maintaining and promoting peace and security. Given the UN Security Council Resolutions in support and confirmation of the role of women in peace negotiations, the next section will analyse the limited role of the Iraqi women in the peace negotiations between the Iraqi and Kurdish officials. Despite the efforts made by the UN bodies and the initiatives carried out by States to improve the gender balance in the legal and political systems, however, excluding women from peace-building negotiations and ignoring their strategic capabilities in working on political advocacy, human rights and post-war national reconciliation is a demonstration of the failure in transforming WPS agenda theory into practice, especially in the KRG case.

B. The Role of the Kurdish Women in Reconciliation of the Post-Islamic State Iraq Effective control over Kirkuk by the KRG after the fall of Islamic State in northern Iraq in June 2014, empowered the Kurdish side. The KRG’s strengthened economic capability after Islamic State was an imperative factor in holding an independence referendum in the Iraqi Kurdistan’s provinces including Erbil, Duhok, and Sulaymaniyah and the disputed region of Kirkuk on 25 September 2017. However, a crisis between the KRG and Baghdad was triggered by the decision of the Iraqi government, parliament and Supreme Court in Baghdad to call the referendum unconstitutional and illegitimate. The escalated tension between two sides eased when the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) quickly recaptured Kirkuk on 16 October 2017 and imposed sanctions (including the closure of borders with neighboring countries, an

35 Cara Gleeson, Sharna de Lacy, May Maloney and Fiona McAlpine, “Security Council Resolution 1325: Age and Gender in Conflict and the Future of Feminist Activism”, in Gina Heathcote and Dianne Otto (eds.), p. 229; Gina Heathcote and Dianne Otto, “Rethinking Peacekeeping, Gender Equality and Collective Security: An Introduction”, in Gina Heathcote and Dianne Otto (eds.), p. 9. 36 In 2008–17, the UN conducted 48 peace operations, of which 23 were peacekeeping operations. The percentage of female participation in the UN peacekeeping operations has been around 28.2 per cent between 2008 and 2017. See Timo Smit and Kajsa Tidblad-Lundholm, “Trends in Women’s Participation in UN, EU and OSCE Peace Operations”, SIPRI Policy Paper (2018), pp. vii, 3. 37 Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action (1995), para. 134.

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international flight ban) against the KRG.38 Thereafter, the KRG and Baghdad began intensive negotiation in order to improve the relations and establish a prolonged peace and stability between and within the Iraqi and Kurdish societies. Given the fact that the Iraqi Kurdish women had already been active participants in combats against Islamic State in northern Iraq, their participation in peace talks with the Iraqi central government was expected. However, as Pakshan Zangana, Secretary-General of the KRG High Council for Women Affairs pointed out, the role of women in politics is still receding since the Kurdish women have been excluded both from the preparatory meetings and from the diplomatic conferences. Accordingly, it is important for political leaders to create a conducive environment for the effective and meaningful participation of women in peace negotiations to unite the country.39 they were excluded both from the preparatory meetings and from the diplomatic conferences. The different level of participation in combat and in the peace-building efforts brings about a complex set of questions. In this respect, the realities of the image-making of the Kurdish women in the KRG and their predicted role in decision-making processes in the governmental level need to be investigated within the context of the KRG’s legal and political system in theory and practice.

(i) Image-Making of the Kurdish Women in the KRG Following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Iraqi Kurds shifted the regional government into a strong bargaining position through the Draft Constitution of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region approved by the Kurdistan Parliament on 24 June 2009. One of the primary and innovative concepts of the Draft Constitution was minimizing Sharia and Islamic identity in the Iraqi Kurdistan as a bludgeon to keep women down as it has been in traditional Arab societies. In a sense, the Kurdish officials made significant efforts to guarantee women’s rights such as gender equality, prohibition of gender discrimination, protection and promotion of civil and political rights covered by the international treaties to which Iraq is a party.40 For instance, in an attempt to fight all forms of discrimination against women and the achievement of gender equality in the region, Article 20 (3) of the Draft Constitution provides that “Men and women shall be equal before the law. The Government of the Region must seek to remove all obstacles hindering equality in all spheres of life, and in civil, political, social, cultural and economic rights. The Government of the Region guarantees that all shall enjoy their rights, as stipulated in this Constitution and the international charters signed by the State of Iraq”. It is also worth noting that the Draft Constitution changed some of the trends on the Kurdish women’s political participation and leadership. It provides in Article 41 (2) that “Fair

38 Ellen Scholl, Shaping Iraq’s Oil and Gas Future (Washington DC: Atlantic Council, 2018), p. 10; See also Eric Pichon, “Iraqi Kurdistan’s Independence Referendum”, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing (October 2017), p. 5, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/608752/EPRS_BRI(2017)608752_EN.pdf [last accessed 15 May 2019]. 39 See United Nations Iraq, “16 Days of Activism Meeting Focuses on Expanding Women’s Political Space in Iraq [EN/AR/KU]”, Report from the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UN Press Releases & Statements, 6 December 2017), available at http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=8298:16- days-of-activism-meeting-focuses-on-expanding-women-s-political-space-in-iraq&Itemid=605&lang=en [last accessed 15 May 2019]. 40 Michael J. Kelly, “The Kurdish Regional Constitution within the Framework of the Iraqi Federal Constitution: A Struggle for Sovereignty, Oil, Ethnic Identity, and the Prospects for a Reverse Supremacy Clause”, Penn State Law Review Vol. 114(3) (2010), p. 736.

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representation of all geographic localities, ethnic and religious groups shall be taken into consideration when organizing a system for electing members, as well as guaranteeing that no less than 30% of the seats in the Kurdistan Parliament be reserved for women representatives”. Regardless of the extent to which the new constitutional rules impacted the Iraqi Kurdish society, the Kurdish women’s military resistance against Islamic State’s advance across in northern Iraq demonstrated women’s empowerment in the Iraq Kurdish society. It has already been identified that although women have been envisaged as the primary victims of violence in times of war, they can also actively engage in conflicts, not only as combatants but also as peace-builders, in post-war societies. In spite of the decisive efforts of the UN and the other responsible organizations to integrate a ‘gender perspective’41 in conflict prevention and foreign occupation, women cannot play a substantial role in the post-war era as much as they do in the conflicts as fighters alongside men due to the culture and country of origin. So far, the practice has shown that women’s role is consistently overlooked by the conflicting parties in peace negotiations. As a result of the emergence of Islamic State in northern Iraq, the Kurdish women broke down the Iraqi patriarchal culture by joining the militia as active combatants against Islamic State’s aggression. Regardless of what impelled them to join the male Peshmerga in the front lines of conflicts, the Kurdish women took a significant step towards equality in the Iraqi society. Given that the Kurdish women served as active members of the Peshmerga over the years, it is not surprising that they took weapons to defend and secure themselves. In contradistinction to major roles (as fighters and commanders) the women played within the Peshmerga for decades, it seems that the war with Islamic State has been a unique opportunity for the KRG to take advantage of women fighters at the front lines of the fight against Islamic State to regain the disputed region of Kirkuk. It was also a unique opportunity for Kurdish women to demonstrate their capabilities as effective combatants. Given the defeat of Islamic State, however, the evidence shows that the Kurdish women’s participation in political activities still remains limited due to the discriminatory national laws.42 According to the UN reports, although Iraq has made progress in advancing the political representation of women (a minimum of 25% of elected legislative positions are reserved for women, and there are visible female politicians and civil society leaders at both the national and provincial levels), women remain underrepresented at all levels.43 That is to say that even if it is accepted that the Kurdish women are active in the Kurdish parliament or in local councils, the number of women occupying key roles including executive positions is still very small. Therefore, it is quite difficult to claim that they provide valuable contributions towards improving the political system within the KRG. The unfair random number of the Kurdish women incorporated into significant positions of power in the regional government, administration and the KRG’s political system is a sign of the ongoing inequality within the Iraqi Kurdistan. Apparently, the Iraqi Kurdish society is still patriarchal and the Kurdish women still face patriarchal attitudes towards women’s

41 A gender perspective focuses on conflict resolution and peace-building contributions based on the perspective of both women and men. In essence, the gender perspective requires an equal sharing of the tasks of peace- building between both genders. See Christine Bell, Text and Context: Evaluating Peace Agreements for Their ‘Gender Perspective’ (New York: UN Women, 2015), p. 4; Kemi Ogunsanya and Kwezi Mngqibisa, p. 9. 42 Zeynep N. Kaya, “Gender and Statehood in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq”, 18 LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series, No. 18 (2017), p. 17. 43 UN Security Council Letter S/2018/475 (18 May 2018) (Summary of the Meeting on Women and Peace and Security in Iraq, held by Informal Expert Group on 29 March 2018), at 2, available at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_475.pdf [last accessed 15 May 2019].

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participation in social, political and economic life and gender-based violence. In this sense, although the Kurdish women are in a situation in which they can exercise some political rights, they have little power to effectively challenge the status quo and work towards gender equality, given that the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament’s (IKP) record in improving equality and fundamental rights has been far less successful.44

(ii) The Kurdish Women’s Predicted Role as the Decision-Makers in Post-War Iraq The Kurdistan Region’s Draft Constitution was written on 22 August 2006 and approved by an outright majority of the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament (IKP) on 24 June 2009. According to the Draft, the Constitution should be ratified in a referendum before it takes effect. Therefore, the IKP located in Erbil (the capital of the Iraqi Kurdistan region) approved the Constitution in June 2009 with 96 votes out of a total of 97. In the 111-seat parliament, eleven seats are reserved for the minorities in Kurdistan five for Assyrians, five for Turkmen and one for Armenians.45 The KRG Council of Ministers established a High Council for Women’s Affairs on 14 December 2009 to support gender mainstreaming in policy-making, combat violence and discrimination against women and also to enhance the status of women through advising the government on gender mainstreaming policies and developing appropriate strategies.46 Given the Kurdish women’s role as decision-makers assigned by the new Draft Constitution, it would be illuminating to explore the political participation of women in the Kurdistan Region’s activities over the past few years. The High Council for Women’s Affairs began its work in June 2011 under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister at that time and with the membership of six ministers including Interior, Finance and the Economy, Justice, Culture and Youth, Labor and Social Affairs, and Education. Obviously, the Council was established to develop its status in cooperation with official bodies, NGOs, relevant regional and international agencies, and the preparation, follow-up and evaluation of policies, programs and laws related to women’s issues and their fundamental rights in general. The Council’s establishment is deemed a positive step to improve the intervention of the government for the advancement of women in the region. After three years of the work of the Council, however, there is no special law to organize its work and the Council suffers from weakness in its human and technical resources to deal with gender and lacks its own budget. According to a Shadow Report47 by

44 Susan McDonald, “Kurdish Women and Self-Determination: A Feminist Approach to International Law” in Shahrzad Mojab (ed.), Women of a Non-State Nation: The Kurds (California: Mazda Publishers, 2001), pp. 146-151. 45 Ali Naji, “Election of Kurdistan Parliament: Kurdish Competition with Consequences on Baghdad”, Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies (2018), p. 3, http://www.bayancenter.org/en/wp- content/uploads/2018/08/09090909087.pdf [last accessed 15 May 2019]. 46 Kurdistan Regional Government, “National Strategy to Confront Violence against Women in Kurdistan 2012 - 2016 (Five Years Plan)”, Supreme Council for Women Affairs (2012), available at http://www.ekrg.org/files/pdf/strategy_combat%20violence_against_women_English.pdf [last accessed 15 May 2019]. The gender mainstreaming is a means to transform male-centered power which has been implemented by the post-war States in response to local, national, and international demands and struggles for gender justice and gender equality since the 1990s. See Lisa Kindervater and Sheila Meintjes, “Gender and Governance in Post-Conflict and Democratizing Settings” in Fionnuala N. Aoláin et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 472. It is worth mentioning that the gender mainstreaming is a matter of equality between women and men and the promotion of women’s status and roles in societies which has been promoted by the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action in 1995. See Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action (1995), p. 11. 47 “Iraqi Women in Armed Conflict and Post-Conflict Situation”, CEDAW Shadow Report (submitted to the CEDAW Committee at the 57th Session, February 2014), available at https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/IRQ/INT_CEDAW_NGO_IRQ_16192_ E.pdf [last accessed 15 May 2019].

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CEDAW (2014), the Council did not achieve the concrete impact of the empowerment of the Kurdish women because the projects of the strategies prepared by the Council and approved by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, do not enter into force.48 The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) is a major international instrument which aims at gender equality and women’s participation in public and political life. The Shadow Report states that following the uprising in Kurdistan region in 1991 and the formation of Kurdish autonomy in 1992, the Iraqi Kurdish women started actively to participate in its political role in the Kurdistan National Assembly and the first cabinet, as women could achieve the percentage of 7% in the first Parliament of Kurdistan in 1992. This percentage increased to become 27% in the second parliament in 2005 and 33% in 2012. According to the Shadow Report of the CEDAW (2014), this is the highest percentage of women in the Middle East, as the women chaired several committees in the Kurdish parliament as decision-makers.49 As underscored by the CEDAW Shadow Report, however, the male domination appears evident in the performance of government and the distribution of key positions in official representations at conferences, meetings and supervisory departments outside the region.50 This is precisely reflected in the male-dominated processes of negotiations between the KRG and Baghdad after the fall of Islamic State and the Kurdish independence referendum. The study found that the KRG has not been effective in improving the male-dominated actors’ capacity to work effectively with women and this has led them to exclude women from governance. Although the Kurdish women and men were drawn together necessarily to fight against Islamic State in northern Iraq, they could not take joint action to reconstruct the conflict-affected society of Iraq after the defeat of Islamic State. Ignoring the Kurdish women’s capabilities and their determinative role in politics and decision- making processes is a matter of gender inequality and discrimination in post-war situations51 which is substantially embedded in historical and cultural identity and traditional cultural practices as the preconditions for the development of cultural and social competences in the Iraqi Kurdistan region that refuse to recognize the gender equality in the society. Despite the Kurdish women activists’ struggles for human rights and their combat against the existing gender-based discrimination and violence, the paths to women’s empowerment in social and political life still remain closed and women continue to be underrepresented in the local and national government. As a former Iraqi Kurdistan member of the Iraqi Parliament (2006-2010), Tanya Gilly Khailany, rightly pointed out “Peace needs women’s meaningful participation. For that to happen, first, women must get a seat at the table. In [Iraq], there have been many women in political parties, they have headed women’s caucuses in the parliament, but when it comes to core issues, women are still not at the table. It is also about bringing issues that matter to women to the table”.52 Following the fall of Islamic State in Iraq, a peaceful Iraqi society will be established through the promotion and protection of fundamental rights and gender equality within the Iraqi society. In a society in which women had a significant role in the front lines of conflicts as fighters,

48 CEDAW Shadow Report, pp. 21-22. 49 CEDAW Shadow Report, p. 65. 50 CEDAW Shadow Report, p. 21. 51 See for more information, UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), “CCPR General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (The Equality of Rights Between Men and Women)” (29 March 2000), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10, para. 5, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/45139c9b4.html [last accessed 15 May 2019]. 52 UN Women, “When It Comes to Women’s Rights, There’s No Room for Diplomacy” (19 October 2018), available at http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2018/10/in-the-words-of-tanya-gilly-khailany [last accessed 15 May 2019].

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however, the gaps in the effective implementation of the constitutional rules assigned by the Draft Constitution would leave women disadvantaged when seeking to exercise the gender equality as their primary right. Despite the innovative concepts of the Draft Constitution of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, especially in terms of gender equality and empowerment of women, the evidence shows that the KRG has still a male institutional structure. As mentioned earlier, the ties between KRG and Baghdad have been improved since the independence referendum held in Kurdistan on 25 September 2017. Following the long-term tensions taken between the KRG and Baghdad over the referendum, the KRG officials have made considerable efforts to negotiate outstanding issues including the federal budget, oil revenues, border controls, status of the Kurdish airports, which were closed to international flights, disputed territories and the status of Kirkuk which would entirely ensure the peace and stability in the region. After recapturing the oil-rich city of Kirkuk by the Iraqi forces, the prominent delegations from the KRG visited Baghdad to discuss the major issues with official members of the Iraqi government. Among the groups of envoys represented the KRG in the meetings with Baghdad, however, there is no evidence that the Kurdish women participated in any of the meetings and negotiations about the post-war situation in Iraq. This means that the Kurdish women are not empowered politically at local and national levels of government. The UN Security Council appropriately marked that “women are still under-represented in decision-making in regard to conflict. If women are to play an equal part in security and maintaining peace, they must be empowered politically and economically, and represented adequately at all levels of decision- making, both at the pre-conflict stage and during hostilities, as well as at the point of peace- keeping, peace-building, national reconciliation and reconstruction”.53 Within this context, the main question that inevitably comes up at any step of the KRG-Baghdad post-war negotiations is about the extent to which women have been included in the preliminary and initial negotiations which would form the basis for the agreements and bilateral peace treaties between the KRG and Baghdad. As Haeri and Puechguirbal argue, “[peace negotiations] have been overwhelmingly male- dominated based on the assumption that the male fighters who started the war are the only ones able to stop it, i.e. the same fighting men, but in peace-making packaging”.54 This is why women have been often absent from peace talks and, therefore, the peace agreements held between the parties in the absence of women “largely do not address women’s perspectives or concerns”.55 However, even if admissible, such an assumption might be indicated if women’s contributions to war efforts have generally not been recognized.56 In this sense, women are more likely to be denied places at peace negotiations and therefore are unable to draw attention to the particular difficulties they experience in conflict situations.57 That having been said, post- war societies are constructed in part in response to ideas about “who took part in armed struggles”.58 On this basis, in this study I use this pattern in support of the argument that in post-war society of Iraq in which the Iraqi Kurdish women had a substantial role in practice as

53 UN Security Council, “Peace Inextricably Linked with Equality between Women and Men” (Statement by the UN Security Council President on Occasion of International Women’s Day, SC/6816, 8 March 2000), available at https://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000308.sc6816.doc.html [last accessed 15 May 2019]. 54 Medina Haeri and Nadine Puechguirbal, “From Helplessness to Agency: Examining the Plurality of Women’s Experiences in Armed Conflict”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 92(877) (2010), p. 106. 55 Christine Bell, “Women, Peace Negotiations, and Peace Agreements: Opportunities and Challenges” in Fionnuala N. Aoláin et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 417. 56 Orly M. Stern, Gender, Conflict and International Humanitarian Law: A Critique of the ‘Principle of Distinction’ (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), p. 6. 57 Judith Gardam and Michelle J. Jarvis, Women, Armed Conflict and International Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 8; Orly M. Stern, p. 6. 58 Orly M. Stern, p. 6.

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fighters in the front lines of conflicts against Islamic State and also in the clashes between the KRG and Iraqi forces, peace negotiations would be successful and closer to rule of law by significant involvement of women. Conversely, working on peace-building and peace negotiations without women in mind, even if successful, would lead to meaninglessness and betrayal as it would develop a general sense of disengagement and suppression of expectations within the society. After all, given that women are the group most affected by violence in armed conflicts, it is worth mentioning that decisions made on peace-building in a post-war society will affect women more than the other parts of that society. The harsh truth is that women especially those who participate in conflicts as the combatants and confront their own set of challenges, including the risk of sexual abuse or harassment are often subjected to mistreatment by all participants in armed conflict; by “friendly” and “enemy” forces, by civilian and military personnel, including the UN peace-keeping forces.59 Therefore, excluding women from peace-building negotiations and decision-making processes in post-war societies can be considered violence and abuse against women as much as what happens in times of armed conflicts. This is an overall challenge also in liberal democratic systems where the governments have not proven themselves particularly capable of solving the problem of the exclusion of women from executive power. Whereas, women can be engaged directly in peace negotiations as members of the negotiation team, or they can participate in peace-building processes as observers. In this occasion, the Iraqi Kurdish women who have already participated in the war against Islamic State and in combat with the Iraqi forces in Kirkuk could share information and data relevant to the peace process with more audiences based on their experiences. In addition, women could provide consultations without direct participation in the negotiations.60 As such, they could discuss the issues related to peace-building and post-war situation by identifying the challenges ahead and making initiative proposals. As Virginia Woolf rightly argues, women can best help prevent war since they don’t repeat men’s words follow their methods. They are able to find new words and create new methods and this makes them to be seen as individuals able to play a major part in the achievement of a long-term and stable peace.61 Finally, considering the fact that women often operate outside existing power structures underpinning the conflict, providing informal consultations would give them an opportunity to lobby and promote dialogue for the implementation of their proposals by using national and international legal norms.62

4. CONCLUSION Women are extremely successful in reducing structural violence as peace-makers. However, this significant aspect is often underestimated, hindered and suppressed by the governments. World-over, governments and male-dominated actors are reluctant to accept diversity and gender-based experiences in times of conflict and peace-building. Although women are less likely than men to support conflicts and violence, they often suffer violence more than men, as women, mothers, family members of fighters and victims. Thus, because they have also been victims of violence in armed conflict, they can help in the post-war reconciliation process and

59 Judith Gardam and Michelle J. Jarvis, p. 7; Medina Haeri and Nadine Puechguirbal, p. 111. 60 Given the importance of women’s role in peace-building processes, the peace agreements that result are 20% more likely to last at least two years when women are included in a peace-building process and an agreement is 35% more likely to last for fifteen years if women participate in its creation. See Marie O’Reill, Reimagining Peacemaking: Women’s Roles in Peace Processes (New York: International Peace Institute, 2015), p. 12. 61 Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1966), p. 143; Charlotte Lindsey, Women Facing War (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 2011), p. 28. 62 Jamille Bigio and Rachel Vogelstein, How Women’s Participation in Conflict Prevention and Resolution Advances U.S. Interests (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2016), p. 6.

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prevent violence in the future if they are fully included in the reconstruction process. Precisely, women and men need to be equal partners in the peace-building processes despite the gender- based assumptions about economic, social and cultural roles that substantially preclude the sharing of responsibility between men and women in all spheres that is necessary to equality.63 Conversely, women who have participated in conflicts in different positions, are often ignored by the conflict parties in the post-war decision-making processes. This points to theories that treat women as the object rather than the subject of international politics and conflicts.64 As it is seen in the post-Islamic State Iraq, the parties to conflicts keep women and women-centered issues out of the table, recalling that the female fighters do not take a weapon to fight for gender equality and freedom. Such a male-dominated approach used by States leaders as a justification for excluding women from peace negotiations, debating that women’s participation in the post- war negotiations should not be a matter of controversy, given that gender equality is not the cause of conflict. Within this particular context, the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 was an outstanding step taken by the UN to ensure justice and gender equality in all societies.65 Although Iraq was the first Arab country that launched a National Action Plan (NAP) for the implementation of the Resolution 1325 in 2014 to defend women’s rights and provide support to the Iraqi Government and the KRG in implementing the Resolution, the post-Islamic State process demonstrated that no outstanding progress has been made in women’s rights and justice and no lessons have been taken from the Security Council’s 1325 Resolution.66 Notwithstanding the military resistance of the Iraqi Kurdish women against Islamic State, it is a tragic truth that the KRG still insists on the inevitability of traditional and cultural values, and thus ignores women in the most significant stage of reconciliation and rebuilding the post-Islamic State Iraq. Given that peace negotiations are often carried out by State leaders, the absence of women within the leading governmental positions and opposition parties is the other precise reason for women’s low participation rate in the peace talks and peace-building processes in post-war societies. As long as the Kurdish women are not incorporated into the high-level political positions in the KRG, they will face the major challenge in peace-building processes concerning inequality, oppression and abuse exercised over women due to the patriarchal social structures embedded in the Iraq Kurdish society based on traditional and cultural practices. This is a matter of the highly presented “the feminine honor code or honor thinking” within the Iraqi Kurdish society. This way of thinking is based on the belief that considers Kurdish women as morally pure, good mothers, and virtuous wives who do not strive for professional success. It encourages women to hope for early marriages and to remain sexually inexperienced, otherwise risking shame to their family’s honor. In essence, the feminine code of honor entails sexual shame or chastity which is expressed in terms of virginity before marriage, restraint in sexual relations, pudeur in social relations with men, and decorum.67 This is, in fact, a matter

63 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/2005/4 (11 August 2005), para. 14; Charlotte Lindsey, p. 28. 64 See for more details, Laura Sjoberg, “Theories of War” in Fionnuala N. Aoláin et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 3-16. 65 See for more details on the Resolution 1325, Constance de la Vega and Chelsea E. Haley Nelson, “The Role of Women in Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Devising Solutions to the Demand Side of Trafficking”, William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law, Vol. 12(2) (2006), pp. 437-465. 66 Yasmin M. Khodary, “Women and Peace-Building in Iraq”, Peace Review, Vol. 28(4) (2016) p. 505. 67 Toni Wright, “On ‘Sisterhood’: What Iraqi Kurdish Women Migrants Have to Say about Women and the Commonalities They Share”, Journal of International Women’s Studies, Vol. 15(2) (2014) p. 184; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., “Honor in the Mediterranean and Northern Europe”, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,

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of domestic abuse perpetrated by men and patriarchal domination and control exercised over women in the Iraqi Kurdish society. For this reason, the Kurdish women who challenged gender stereotypes through playing an active role in fighting against Islamic State in northern Iraq, are still ignored in high-level governmental, professional and leading roles. All in all, peace-building and post-war national reconciliation cannot be achieved in a society in which women are constrained from getting high-level leadership positions by virtue of patriarchal values. As a matter of gender equality and justice, this is the core components of international human rights law that ought to be ensured by States regardless of the traditional and cultural values. In essence, gender equality and justice would be achieved through breaking with traditions that do not serve equality, fundamental rights and the rule of law. For this very reason, States leaders need to engage in gender mainstreaming in their national policies, ensuring a way towards equality, justice and prevention of violence against women through enhancing the social and political inclusion of women irrespective of their sex, race, ethnicity, origin and religion.

Vol. 33(1) (2002), p. 17; Diane E. Kinga, “The Personal Is Patrilineal: Namus As Sovereignty”, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, Vol. 15(3) (2008), pp. 226-230.

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