Saeed Bagheri
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
EEdinburghCI Centre for InternationalG and GlobalL Law Gender Inequality and Women in Decision-making in Post- war Societies: Lessons from the Iraqi Kurdistan Saeed Bagheri Edinburgh Centre for International and Global Law Working Paper Series Gender Inequality and Women in Decision-Making in Post-war Societies: Lessons from the Iraqi Kurdistan Saeed Bagheri* ABSTRACT During the war with Islamic State in northern Iraq (2014-17), a notable number of the Kurdish women joined the Peshmerga (Iraqi-Kurdish fighters), the military forces of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in an effort to prevent Islamic State advance into the oil-rich city of Kirkuk in northern Iraq. Beside causing ample international resonance, the presence of women fighters was publicized by the KRG as a sign of modernity and gender equality. However, once the war ended, in the peace negotiations between the KRG and the Iraqi government, the role of the Kurdish women was drastically resized. By looking at the events that took place in Kirkuk before and after Islamic State and the diplomatic follow-up, this study examines the role of the Kurdish women in a war to peace transition, focusing more specifically on the peace negotiations process to ensure that their effective and equal participation in decision-making is respected. Against the backdrop of the clash over the energy-rich city of Kirkuk and a complex power-sharing process in post-war Iraq, this paper provides an insight into respect for international human rights principles, management of gender equality, and the role of women in the creation of a new constitutional order. KEYWORDS: Islamic State, Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), Iraq, gender equality, peace-building. *** 1. INTRODUCTION This study looks into the role of the Kurdish women in the war to peace transition in Iraq after the fall of Islamic State. It focuses on the Iraqi Kurdish women’s role in peace-building processes rather than the Iraqi women’s role because of their active participation on the front lines of the war with Islamic State and their active role in the liberation of Kirkuk. More importantly, the study draws its inspiration from the provisions on gender equality and fundamental rights of women in the Draft Constitution of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.1 The aim of this study is to evaluate the extent to which the Kurdish women’s voices have been heard not only as fighters but also as social and political participants in the peace-building processes in the post-Islamic State Iraq within the context of the social and political structure mainly shaped by men. By considering the long-term tensions between the Iraqi central government and the Iraqi Kurds over Kirkuk, therefore, the study seeks to identify the role of women in the KRG’s policies towards Kirkuk during the KRG’s military resistance against Islamic State in northern * Max Weber Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Law Department of the European University Institute (EUI), Florence, Italy [[email protected]]. 1 Draft Constitution of Kurdistan Region (Approved by Kurdistan Parliament – Iraq on the 24th of June 2009), available at https://collections.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s69g8g0z [last accessed 15 May 2019]. 1 Iraq. Concerning the image of women in the Peshmerga forces2 which was broadly used to construct a positive international picture of unity between Baghdad and the KRG and equality arguments in the war against Islamic State, the main question in the peace-building process which still remains is: where do Kurdish women stand, and do they accumulate power and position in decision-making structures involved in the post-Islamic State Iraq as a reflection of gender equality and human rights in the Iraqi and Kurdish legal system. Section 2 provides a general overview of the Iraqi Kurds unpredicted military resistance against Islamic State in Kirkuk. It focuses on the divisions and conflicts in Iraqi society after the war with Islamic State due to the mismanagement of the energy resources. More crucially, it demonstrates how the Kurdish women have been included in the KRG’s policies in the Islamic State era. In Section 2, the power-sharing and decision-making process in the post-Islamic State Iraq is evaluated from an international law perspective. This section examines the role of women in the decision-making process in post-war societies. Within this particular context, section 3 examines the role of the Kurdish women in the national reconciliation of the post-Islamic State Iraq which is considered in the context of the KRG’s legal and political system. The participation of the Kurdish women in the fight against Islamic State as a reflection of the changing nature of conflicts has made a distinct image of women in the KRG. Given the image- making of the Kurdish women in the KRG, their predicted role in the regional legislation is examined as a requirement of the decision-making process. 2. THE IRAQI KURDS VS. ISLAMIC STATE Before exploring the extent of the Kurdish women’s role in decision-making on war to peace transition in the post-Islamic State Iraq, it is worth commenting on their active role as fighters in the war with Islamic State within the Iraqi borders. This section explores the KRG’s military resistance against Islamic State in Kirkuk and the role of women in the KRG’s policies in the Islamic State era. A. The KRG’s Military Resistance against Islamic State in Kirkuk This section examines the war with Islamic State in Iraq, the confrontation between Islamic State and Peshmerga in Kirkuk, and the short-term conflicts between the Kurds and the Iraqi government after defeating Islamic State in northern Iraq, triggered by aspirations to control energy resources. Focusing on the long-term disagreements between the Kurds and the Iraqi government and the increasing disputes over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk after the fall of Islamic State, the KRG’s military resistance against Islamic State as an advantage to the Kurds are discussed. 2 According to Article 117 of the Iraqi Constitution, the only legal militia in the Iraqi system are the Iraqi armed forces and security services. Therefore, militias outside the framework of the armed forces are prohibited, but Regions such as the Iraqi Kurdistan are permitted to raise regional security forces and guards. Within this particular context, the KRG established Peshmerga as its militia. However, the Peshmerga’s status (as a part of the Iraqi defense system or a separate regional security force) is still a matter of controversy between the Iraqis and Kurds. See Crispin Smith, “Independent Without Independence: The Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga in International Law”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 59(1) (2018), p. 254. See also Dennis P. Chapman, Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government (California: Mazda Publishers, 2009). 2 The military resistance of the KRG against an offensive launched by Islamic State to take control of Kirkuk in 2014 created the ground for the KRG to seize Kirkuk for two years. The strategic advantages of the war with Islamic State for the Iraqi Kurds are addressed here as the major reason for triggering the tension between Baghdad and the KRG. Based on this, the Iraqi Security Forces’ assault against the Kurdish Peshmerga position is evaluated. Historically, the Kurdish ethnic strife against the central government of Iraq since the early 1960s formed the basis for the de facto civil wars between the two sides. During the US-led invasion of Iraq, Kurdish nationalists who were viewing Saddam Hussein’s administration as the major cause of the crushing the Kurds and an obstacle to their political, economic, social and cultural aspirations, enthusiastically supported the Iraqi freedom operation. The fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the ratification of the new Iraqi Constitution in 2005 constituted the major milestones in Kurdish aspirations for their political objectives including the creation of an independent Kurdish state since the new Constitution recognized an autonomous Kurdistan region and KRG in northern Iraq. However, the political position of the KRG was gradually undermined by Iraq’s central government. Following the decision of the central government to off federal budget transfers to the KRG in 2015, a large segment of disappointed Kurdish people gradually lost trust in the KRG and the Iraqi central government and therefore was resentful of having to make sacrifices for a Kurdish nationalism anymore. The consensus view on the federal government’s exclusive power over foreign relations argues that even when governments have a considerable separation of powers for domestic purposes, it is common for the control of foreign relations, including signing energy deals with other countries, to be centralized in a single authority.3 Nevertheless, the KRG leadership has regularly complained about the centralized decision-making about the energy sector and its revenues. In other words, centralizing power entirely in the federal government was a trigger for rising disagreements and tensions between the KRG and Baghdad after the fall of Islamic State. Considering that States are continually undergoing a process of centralization or decentralization, it should be noted that if centralization of government is at odds with the integration or dissolution of the society, culture and economy, the process could lead to civil war, autonomy and secession.4 For this very reason, the Iraqi government’s efforts to centralize power and decision-making in Baghdad formed a basis for the Iraqi Kurd aspiration to create a Kurdish State. While decentralizing power to regional and local governments would balance the competing demands for democracy and unity through assigning specific authorities to the federal government in Iraq.5 The only certain point here is that the economic relationship between the KRG and Baghdad derived from mismanagement, uneven sharing, poor or lack of transparency in production and export records of the energy resources6 and therefore, denying the KRG proceeds from the energy revenues by the Iraqi government and causing the strategic mistrust between them.