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A Unified Theory of Copyright† (1) PATTERSON 6/2/2009 6:20 PM BOOK A UNIFIED THEORY OF COPYRIGHT† L. Ray Patterson and Stanley F. Birch, Jr.* Edited by Craig Joyce** TABLE OF CONTENTS EDITOR’S NOTE ............................................................................ 221 PREFACE ...................................................................................... 223 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW ............................... 227 CHAPTER 2. THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE AND COPYRIGHT HISTORY ............................................... 241 2.1 Introduction ............................................................ 241 2.2 The Source of the Copyright Clause ........................ 243 2.3 The Stationers’ Copyright ....................................... 244 2.4 The Printing Patent ................................................ 246 2.5 Copyright and Censorship ...................................... 248 2.6 The Stationers’ Copyright and the Public Domain Problem .................................... 249 2.7 The Statutory Copyright ......................................... 250 2.8 The Battle of the Booksellers: Natural Law v. Positive Law .................................. 253 A. The Millar Case .............................................. 254 †The preferred citation for this book is: L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY F. BIRCH, JR., A UNIFIED THEORY OF COPYRIGHT (Craig Joyce ed., 2009), printed in 46 HOUS. L. REV. 215 (2009). * L. Ray Patterson, Late Pope Brock Professor, University of Georgia School of Law; Stanley F. Birch, Jr., Judge of the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals. ** Craig Joyce is the Andrews Kurth Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. 215 (1) PATTERSON 6/2/2009 6:20 PM 216 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [46:2 B. The Donaldson Case ....................................... 255 2.9 Postscript: The Booksellers’ Copyright Bill ............. 256 2.10 The Constitutional Concept of Copyright ............... 256 CHAPTER 3. THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT AND ITS INTERPRETATION ............................................... 259 3.1 Introduction ............................................................ 259 3.2 The Statutory Development of Copyright ................ 261 A. Publication ...................................................... 262 B. Copyright Formalities .................................... 262 C. Economic Exploitation .................................... 263 3.3 The Structure of the 1976 Copyright Act ................ 264 3.4 Chapter 1 of the 1976 Act: Subject Matter and Scope of Copyright .................. 265 A. The Subject Matter of Copyright and Copyright Conditions .............................. 265 B. The Types of Copyrightable Works and the Scope of Copyright Protection ........... 265 C. The Rights of the Copyright Owner ................ 267 D. The Limitations on the Rights of the Copyright Owner ................................... 267 E. Compulsory Licenses ...................................... 269 F. The Author’s Moral Right in Works of Visual Art ........................................ 270 3.5 Chapter 2 of the 1976 Act: Copyright Ownership and Transfer ........................ 270 A. The Work-for-Hire Doctrine ............................ 270 B. The Distinction Between the Copyright and the Work ................................. 271 C. The Termination Right(s) ............................... 272 3.6 Chapter 3 of the 1976 Act: Duration of Copyright ............................................. 272 A. The Preemption of State Law ......................... 273 B. The Copyright Terms ...................................... 273 3.7 Chapter 4 of the 1976 Act: Copyright Notice, Deposit, and Registration .......... 274 3.8 Chapter 5 of the 1976 Act: Copyright Infringement and Remedies ................... 275 3.9 Chapters 6, 7, and 8 of the 1976 Act: Other Provisions ...................................................... 276 3.10 Interpreting the 1976 Copyright Act ....................... 276 3.11 Copyright as a Regulatory Monopoly ...................... 278 CHAPTER 4. UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT .................................. 281 4.1 Introduction ............................................................ 281 (1) PATTERSON 6/2/2009 6:20 PM 2009] A UNIFIED THEORY OF COPYRIGHT 217 4.2 The Purpose and Function of Copyright ................. 284 4.3 The Subject Matter of Copyright ............................. 285 4.4 The Ownership Component of Copyright ................ 286 4.5 The Relationship Among Copyright Rights ............ 290 4.6 The Different Kinds of Copyright ............................ 293 4.7 The Constitutional Dimensions of Copyright ......... 296 CHAPTER 5. COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH RIGHTS ................... 299 5.1 Introduction ............................................................ 299 5.2 The Free Speech Right of Access ............................. 304 A. Copyright Exists to Promote Learning ........... 304 B. Copyrighted Works Often Contain Public Domain Material ................................. 306 C. Copyright Is a Creation of the Federal Government ................................. 307 D. Copyright and the First Amendment Are Mutually Relevant.................................... 308 5.3 The Free Speech Protections in the Copyright Clause .......................................... 308 5.4 A Return to First Principles .................................... 309 A. Copyright Entails Constitutional Rights ....... 310 B. Copyright is a Limited Monopoly to Serve the Public Interest ............................. 312 C. Copyright Entails Duties for the Copyright Owner ................................. 314 5.5 Copyright as Public, Not Private, Law ................... 315 5.6 Copyright and Free Speech Rights.......................... 317 CHAPTER 6. COPYRIGHT AND FAIR USE ....................................... 321 6.1 Introduction ............................................................ 321 6.2 The Original Concept of Fair Use ........................... 322 6.3 Reasons for the Troublesome Nature of Fair Use .................................................. 327 A. Folsom and the Natural Law Copyright ........ 327 B. Confusing the Use of the Copyright with the Use of the Work in the 1909 Act ....... 329 6.4 The Fair Use Doctrine Codified as a Right............. 331 6.5 Reading and Applying the Fair Use Statute .......... 332 A. Three Types of Copyrightable Works: Creative Works, Compilations, and Derivative Works ............................................ 332 B. Three Kinds of Fair Use: Creative, Personal, and Educational ............. 333 (1) PATTERSON 6/2/2009 6:20 PM 218 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [46:2 C. Applying the Four Statutory Factors with Discretion, Depending on the Type of Work and the Kind of Use............................... 336 6.6 Constitutional Considerations ................................ 337 CHAPTER 7. COPYRIGHT DEFENSES ............................................. 341 7.1 Introduction ............................................................ 341 7.2 Copyright Defenses .................................................. 344 A. Statutory Defenses .......................................... 344 B. Judicial Defenses ............................................ 345 7.3 Principles for Copyright Defenses ........................... 347 A. The Originality Principle ............................... 348 B. The Limited Scope Principle .......................... 348 C. The Quid Pro Quo Principle ........................... 349 7.4 The Development of Copyright Defenses ................. 351 A. The Nature of Copyright as Property ............. 351 B. The Nature of Infringement ............................ 353 C. The Nature of Copyright Defenses .................. 355 D. Copyright Defenses and Users’ Rights............ 355 CHAPTER 8. COPYRIGHT REMEDIES ............................................. 357 8.1 Introduction ............................................................ 357 8.2 The Historical Development of Copyright Remedies ................................................ 359 8.3 The Development of Copyright Remedies in the United States ................................ 362 A. From 1790 to 1909 .......................................... 362 B. The 1909 Copyright Act .................................. 364 C. The 1976 Copyright Act .................................. 366 8.4 The Impact of Remedies .......................................... 367 A. Statutory Damages ......................................... 367 B. Attorney’s Fees ................................................ 368 C. Injunctive Relief .............................................. 369 D. Impoundment, Seizure, and Destruction of Copies and Means of Reproduction ................................... 370 8.5 The Constitutional Implication of Remedies .......... 371 CHAPTER 9. THE NEED FOR A NEW THEORY OF COPYRIGHT ....... 373 9.1 Introduction ............................................................ 373 9.2 The Use of Copyright Theory .................................. 374 9.3 The Two Theories of Copyright ............................... 375 A. The Natural Law Proprietary Theory of Copyright ........................................ 375 (1) PATTERSON 6/2/2009 6:20 PM 2009] A UNIFIED THEORY OF COPYRIGHT 219 B. The Statutory Grant Theory of Copyright ........................................ 377 9.4 Copyright Theory and New Technologies ............... 379 9.5 The Need for a Sound Theory of Copyright ............ 381 CHAPTER 10. A UNIFIED THEORY OF COPYRIGHT ........................ 383 10.1 Introduction ...........................................................
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