Electricity Market Reform Process in Determining the Viability of Investment in New Nuclear Power Stations
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Energy and Climate Change Committee Building New Nuclear: the Challenges Ahead Ref Organisation Page NUC 01 and NUC 01a Department of Energy and Climate Change 2, 27 NUC 02 and NUC 02a EDF Energy 29, 37 NUC 03 Nuclear Issues 39 NUC 04 University of Greenwich 41 NUC 05 Energy & Infrastructure Project Finance 48 NUC 06 James Lawton 58 NUC 07 Donald Miller 63 NUC 08 Institution of Mechanical Engineers 66 NUC 09 Office for Nuclear Regulation 73 NUC 10 Peter Mellor 77 NUC 11 Nuclear Industry Association 80 NUC 12 Civil Engineering Contractors Association 86 NUC 13 Cardiff University 91 NUC 14 The Institute of Physics 100 NUC 15 World Wildlife Fund Scotland 103 NUC 16 New Nuclear Local Government Association 111 NUC 17 Greenpeace 118 NUC 18 Sedgemoor District Council 124 NUC 19 Institution of Civil Engineers 131 NUC 20 Weinberg Foundation 134 NUC 21 The Royal Academy of Engineers 138 NUC 22 GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy 141 NUC 23 CITB Construction Skills 146 NUC 24 NuGeneration 152 NUC 25 Horizon Nuclear Power 159 NUC 26 Environment Agency 163 NUC 27 Supporters of Nuclear Energy 167 NUC 28 SSE 170 Written evidence submitted by the Department of Energy and Climate Change (NUC 01) The Committee is aware of the significance of the electricity market reform process in determining the viability of investment in new nuclear power stations. What other factors contribute to investment decisions for new nuclear? Overview As with other low carbon technologies, investment in new nuclear plant involves high upfront capital costs with low operational costs which makes them particularly exposed to fluctuations in the price they can achieve for the electricity they generate. However, the sheer size of the investment and the complexity and associated risks of these projects means there is lower scope for new entrants in the short term. Financing first plant Analysis published by KMPG1 concluded that new nuclear investment in first plant will be funded against the balance sheet of existing development consortia members at least until the operational phase. This is because there are limited sources of external finance (with the exception of new consortia partners with existing nuclear experience) likely to come forward due to uncertainty and risk with first plant and in particular the history of cost overruns in the pre-operational phase for new nuclear plant. The role for HMG is to facilitate this investment by working with industry to take actions to minimise the risk of delay or cost over-run to first plant and to increase regulatory and market certainty. Timely deployment of first plant could also have knock on benefits for securing financing for subsequent plant. Issues with financing multiple plant Although it is expected that the current consortia will be able to finance first plant against balance sheet is not clear how many plant could be financed in this way and it is considered unlikely that large scale and rapid expansion of nuclear generation involving multiple parallel build could be financed in this way. Current development consortia are already highly leveraged and as currently configured will have access to a limited amount of capital to use for UK new nuclear projects which faces competing demand from different technological and geographical markets. 1 “Securing Investment in Nuclear in the Context of Low Carbon Generation” available from http://www.kpmg.com/UK/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/PDF/Market%20Sector/Pow er_and_Utilities/Securing-investment-in-Nuclear.pdf Page 2 of 171 If the first new nuclear plant are built to time and cost in the UK this could open up different sources and approaches to financing the construction phase of nuclear plant in t he UK. Issues with refinancing operational plant Given that a major risk for nuclear investment is the uncertainty in the construction phase it should be easier to refinance operational plant provided that there is greater certainty on revenues, Government policy, liabilities and performance. Greater certainty over revenues and government policy is expected to be addressed by EMR policies whilst certainty over the level of liability is being addressed to some extent through the work on Funded Decommissioning Plans and Paris / Brussels. What have been the political and policy impacts of the Fukushima incident? Political Impacts Following the accident at the TEPCO Nuclear Power Plant in Fukushima the UK Government remains committed to ensuring energy security through a diverse energy mix that includes nuclear energy. To ensure the UK position on nuclear remained robust in terms of safety the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change commissioned Dr Mike Weightman, the Chief Nuclear Inspector, to undertake a review of the impacts of the accident on the UK civil nuclear industry. Dr Weightman delivered an interim report in May 2012 and a final report in September 2012. His report included a number of recommendations that Government, industry and the regulators are working towards implementing. However, the report was clear that there were no significant weaknesses in the UK system and therefore there were no grounds to change the position that nuclear energy should form part of the UK’s energy mix. The Government’s position on nuclear is therefore unchanged. Dr Weightman’s report and the Government’s response can be found at: http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/meeting_energy/nuclear/safety_and_ sec/weightman/weightman.aspx Other Policy Impacts and Action Stress Test In addition to the review undertaken by Dr Weightman the UK has also fully participated in the European Union’s (EU) comprehensive safety assessment Page 3 of 171 for the EU’s 143 nuclear power plants – the so called stress tests. The stress test followed the following steps: • Operators applied the stress test criteria in June 2011 and provided a progress report to national regulators in August and a final report at the end of September 2011. • National regulators assessed the reports and provided a national progress report to the Commission on 15th September with the final report being submitted at the end of 2011 . • The Commission provided an initial report of the findings of the Stress Test to European Council in December. • This was followed by a peer review of the national reports between January and April 2012. • This process was completed on 25th April 2012 through a published statement where ENSREG (European Nuclear Safety Regulators) and the Commission jointly endorsed the final report of the Peer Review Board on the EU nuclear safety stress tests exercise . The UK National report was in line with the assessment undertaken by the Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations on the impact of the Fukushima accident on the UK nuclear industry (as requested by the Secretary of State) and the UK’s interim report on progress with the implementation of the stress test exercise. The final report indicates that they are no fundamental weaknesses in the definition of design basis events or the safety systems to withstand them for UK NPPs. However, like earlier findings the report does identify some areas that will need to be strengthened in light of the lessons learned from Fukushima. Licensees and the ONR have derived a number of potential improvements, mainly to enhance resilience of emergency arrangements but also to enhance safety margin assessment methods. There are also potential improvements to the type or number of barriers to some hazards, e.g. flooding, which should increase defence in depth to beyond design basis events. The outcomes from these assessments will be considered and where necessary addressed as part of each sites commitment to continuous improvement under the requirements of the existing UK nuclear safety regime. The results of the stress test exercise (including the UK’s national report) can be found at: http://www.ensreg.eu/eu-stress-tests Dr Weightman has also committed to publishing an update in the Autumn that will combine the progress from both his lessons learned report and the stress tests – this will also most likely be located on DECC website. EU Nuclear Safety Frameworks As an EU Member State the UK is obliged to comply with the EU Nuclear Safety Directive (Council Directive 2009/71 – Euratom). The Directive came into force in July 2009. The UK implemented the Directive using the existing UK Page 4 of 171 nuclear safety regulatory regime and confirmed this position (through a transposition note) with the European Commission within the transposition deadline – ie July 2011. In ensuring the Directive had been fully implemented consideration was given to the outcome of the review undertaken by Dr Weightman and the interim results of the stress test (both mentioned above). The UK regulatory regime requires operators to seek continuous improvement and take all reasonably practicable steps to ensure nuclear safety (ie operators are obliged to consider international best practice and apply lessons learned from Fukushima). It was therefore decided that the legislation in place was robust as it already took account of the need to learn lessons from accidents such as those at Fukushima and also gave effect to the Directive. T he Commission have confirmed the UK have implemented the Directive. European Commission are currently undertaking a review of the EU Nuclear Safety Directive in light of the lessons learned from the Stress Test exercise. The review is due to be complete by the end of 2012. While it would be premature to comment on the outcome of the review DECC have already confirmed that we will be fully participating in discussions on any proposals to change the current Nuclear Safety Directive to ensure they are proportionate and evidence based. T his is in line with normal practice. Other International Activity In addition the UK has participated in the development of the IAEA’s Action Plan on strengthening the international nuclear safety framework in light of lessons learned from the accident at Fukushima.