Uttar Pradesh - Communal Polarisation Vs Caste Calculus
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846 Uttar Pradesh - Communal Polarisation vs Caste Calculus A K VERMA Vol. 49, Issue No. 18, 03 May, 2014 A K Verma ([email protected]) is with the Department of Political Science, Christ Church College, Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh. After a long time, the focus of the electorate in Uttar Pradesh is on the two national parties much to the discomfiture of regional ones. Whether Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party stand to gain from the changing caste dynamics in the state or the Congress from the increased communal polarisation post-Muzzafarnagar riots, is difficult to say. The 16th parliamentary elections in Uttar Pradesh (UP) have brought to the fore the collapse of the traditional model of caste and communal politics in the state. While the communal polarisation in the state might help the Congress, the realignment of castes might boost the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) prospects. This reconfiguration of the caste- communal model combined with developmental aspirations of electors is likely to produce stunning results. Notwithstanding the presence of traditionally strong regional players such as the Samajwadi Party (SP) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), the nature of contest in the state this time is largely bipartisan; the electorate focusing mainly on national parties. New Communal Model Though many see UP voters voting on communal lines, existing data does not support this proposition. The BJP, symbolising communal politics, rightly or wrongly, was politically marginlised after the demolition of Babri Masjid on 6 December 1992. This is clearly evident in BJPs declining tally over the years in assembly elections (1991: 221, 1993:178, 1996:174, 2002: 88, 2007:51, 2012:47). Its vote share was halved from 31.5% in 1991 to 15.0% in 2012. The Muzzaffarnagar riots, which took place in September 2013, have given a communal twist to the current electoral process in the state. The SP government fell from grace, as Muslims felt that the Akhilesh Yadav government did not do enough to protect them. Moreover, holding of the grand Saifai Mahotsav in Mulayam’s village did not go down well with them, because many children of riot affected families were dying of cold and starvation while the celebrations were taking place. As the riots acquired a Jat vs. Muslim character, and as the most important Jat leader Ajit Singh of the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD) was a minister in the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, Muslims felt ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846 angry with the Congress too. Thus the Muslim anger was directed against the SP, RLD and the Congress, and, at least in western UP, they might have voted for the BSP. With the emergence of Modi as a formidable leader of the BJP, Muslim polarisation started taking place with a view to stopping him and the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) from forming the government at the national level. They perceived that perhaps only the Congress led-UPA could stop them. So Muslims have discarded their traditional method of tactical voting at the constituency level that warrants voting for a party or candidate best capable of defeating the BJP, and have decided to vote for the Congress instead. This might give the Congress party some surprise seats. Otherwise to retain its 21 Lok Sabha seats in these elections, is a formidable task for the party. Even in its bastions of Amethi and Rae Bareli, the Congress stands discredited at the assembly level.1 But Muslim polarisation against Modi and the BJP is not unqualified. Muslims are also divided on caste and class lines; economic interests of the upper caste Ashrafs, middle caste Azlafs and lower caste Arzals differ. The Ashrafs are rich, educated and empowered, whereas Azlafs and Arzals are mostly poor, under-educated or illiterate and marginalised politically. The emergence of Pasmanda (backward/dalit) Muslim movement also points to the same fact; their slogan is “Sheikh, Saiyyad, Mughal, Pathan; kursi chodo bhai jaan” (Sheikh, Saiyyad, Mughal and Pathan brothers, vacate the chair). Neo-rich middle and lower caste/class Muslims are now looking for political empowerment. The political empowerment of Muslims is reflected in their increased representation in assembly and municipal bodies in UP. Their aggregate representation in assembly is 17.1%, which is close to the Muslim population (18.5%) in the state. In 13 out of 70 districts, the share of Muslim MLAs is between 10-25%; in 21 districts, it is between 25-50%; and in five districts (Moradabad, Rampur, Amroha, Balrampur and Shrawasti), Muslim MLAs are 50 to 70% (Verma:2014). Similarly, in urban local bodies, there are 3,681 Muslims elected out of total 11,816 members, pushing their representation to 31.5% (Verma:2012) and boosting their political aspirations. This aspiration of Muslims syncs well with the BJP’s initiative to become inclusive. A section of neo-rich Muslims and the BJP seem to be entering into a complimentary relationship, which might lead to a dilution of the hardcore Hindutva philosophy and help Muslims better appreciate the BJP’s nationalist orientation besides removing fear in their minds. Many Muslims clerics have admonished non-BJP parties for trying to instill fear among Muslims using BJP’s name and warned them that they may vote for Modi if he changes2. This is surely not a personal opinion of individual clerics; it reflects their community’s changing psyche. This change has come due to Muslim experience in the BJP-ruled states such as Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Chattisgarh and even Bihar (where it is in coalition with Nitish’s Janta Dal (United) [JD(U)] where they may not have felt any discomfort; in fact owing to better ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846 governance in many such states, Muslims might have prospered and felt good. While majority of Muslims still have reservations about the BJP, a small section is rethinking and is not allergic to voting for Modi, who has acquired an image of a leader capable of delivering on the development front. This is also reflected in empirical studies by Lokniti (three Tracker Polls and Pre-poll studies)3 that suggest that as against 3% and 7% Muslims who voted for the BJP in 2007 and 2012 respectively, 11% Muslims are likely to vote for the BJP today. Changing Caste Calculus UP’s electoral politics has largely operated within a framework of caste. The state has 41.5% Other backward Classes (OBCs), 21% dalits, 18.5% Muslims and 19% upper castes4. Since 1989, BJP held power in UP for six years. Ever since, there has been a consistent decline in BJP’s vote share in UP, and the nadir was reached in 2012 assembly elections when it got only 15% votes. BJP’s best performance in the state was in 1998 Lok Sabha elections when it got 36.5% votes and 57/82 seats5. Since then, the party has steadily declined. BJP’s strategy in fielding Modi from Varanasi (eastern UP) has hinged on the fact that he belongs to the OBC, and that there is a heavy concentration of OBCs in eastern UP. Also, the party has been doing very badly in eastern UP; it got just 3/29 seats in 2004 and 4/29 seats in 2009. Perhaps the party aimed at clubbing caste with development to reap a good electoral harvest in UP. This strategy seems to being paying dividends. Lokniti Tracker Polls are projecting the BJP’s vote share at 38% in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, which is 1.5% higher than the highest votes polled by the BJP in 1998 (36.5%) Lok Sabha elections. The data shows his acceptance as the future prime minister among all castes (Brahmins:60%, Jats:59%, Rajputs:52%, Kurmis/ Koeris:49%, Yadavs:35%, SCs:25%, Muslims:11%). While Modi detractors highlight his role in the 2002 riots, the electors seem to be giving him some credit for the long distance he has travelled since then taking Gujarat on a higher developmental trajectory. Lokniti data shows that the BJP was not seen responsible for Muzzaffarnagar riots; only 13% voters blamed the BJP as against 45% who blamed the SP for riots. The data shows peoples’ choice for non-BJP parties at 17%, almost half of the figure projected for the BJP. Modi also leads in peoples’ choice as prime minister; he is three times more popular (35 %) than his nearest rival Rahul Gandhi (12 %). Is There a Modi Wave? This election has become Modi-centric. A debate is going on whether there is a Modi wave? What is a wave and how do we discern one? In UP, we have seen three kinds of electoral waves; first was the positive wave for Indira Gandhi in 1971 Lok Sabha elections when she won 73/78 seats in wake of the Bangladesh victory; the second was the negative wave against Indira Gandhi in 1977 when she was penalised for her Emergency excesses and ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846 could not win a single seat, whereas Janata party led by Jayaprakash Narayan got all 85 seats; and third there was a sympathy wave for Rajiv Gandhi in 1984 after Indira Gandhi’s assassination in which Congress got 83/85 seats. Thus, two features are intrinsic to a wave; firstly, it is centered around a charismatic leader (in these cases Indira Gandhi), and secondly, it has the tendency of “winner taking all” or loser getting none. As far as the Modi wave is concerned, it neither is as intense as the Indira Gandhi wave in 1971, nor can it be characterised by a deep negative sentiment against the Congress, as was prevalent in 1977.