The Campaign of 1814: Chapter 15, Part I
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The Napoleon Series The Campaign of 1814: Chapter 15, Part I By: Maurice Weil Translated by: Greg Gorsuch THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814 (after the documents of the imperial and royal archives of Vienna) _____________________ THE ALLIED CAVALRY DURING THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814 ________________________ CHAPTER XV. OPERATIONS OF THE GREAT ARMY FROM 27 FEBRUARY UNTIL THE RECOVERY OF TROYES, 4 MARCH (BAR-SUR-AUBE, TROYES). 27 February 1814. --Schwarzenberg modifies his orders from the 26th at night. Napoleon had not yet left Troyes when the Allied Great Army, taking the offensive, moved in two columns against Macdonald and Oudinot. The first, composed of the corps of Wrede and Wittgenstein, supported by the those Russian grenadiers who marched with the Sovereigns and Schwarzenberg, was responsible for operating on Bar-sur-Aube, against Oudinot, Gérard and the cavalry of Count of Valrny and St. Germain. The second, under the command of the Crown Prince of Württemberg, including the IIIrd and IVth Corps maneuvered near La Ferté-sur-Aube against Macdonald and Milhaud's cavalry. The ruse of Blücher had succeeded beyond all expectations. Despite the secrecy which the Emperor had taken care to surround his departure, although it was directed to shout, in case of attack, "Long Live the Emperor!" And it was rumored to the troops and the people that Napoleon was still in the marshals' army, the Allies knew exactly what to expect, and the attempted night attack in the evening of the 26th against Bar-sur-Aube had been the prelude to the offensive operations the next day. Under the terms of the first dispositions sent by Schwarzenberg, the Vth Corps was to attack the front of Oudinot position in Bar Sur Aube. Part of the VIth corps would have been his reserve, while the remaining troops of Wittgenstein would have performed a flanking movement against the French left. But following the observations submitted by Wrede, this project was abandoned, and the Austro-Bavarians were ordered to wait to attack the town of Bar, until the entire VIth Corps had turned the French left in hopes of cutting off the Dolancourt bridge. Until then, Wrede should simply play with the French with false attacks on their front and diverting their attention from the flanking movement by Arrentières and Arsonval that Wittgenstein was ordered to begin that day. The Vth Corps formed two lines, the Austrians of Frimont the right, the Bavarians in the center and to the left, opposite Bar-sur-Aube, deployed in the morning on the heights between Lignol and Bar, a little behind the junction point of the highways of Colombey-les-Deux-Églises and La Ferté, its left at the Aube. It was covered in front by Russian foot eiger of Pahlen. Some Bavarian free companies occupied the suburb. 12 pieces of Russian artillery and 2 Bavarian batteries had taken position in front of the two lines of infantry; the rest of the Wrede's artillery, which consisted of a total of 96 guns, was in reserve. The Cossacks scoured the countryside, right into Arrentières, left along the Aube. A battalion of Austrian jäger and two hussar squadrons of Archduke Joseph observed the French squadrons on the left bank and stood on the side of Sainte-Germaine. 2 battalions of Székeler (military district infantry) with 2 cannons, guarded the Aube bridge near Fontaine (Boudelin Bridge). At the break of day, Wrede himself undertook the reconnaissance of the positions occupied by Oudinot whose headquarters was in Ailleville. The 2nd Corps (Gérard) formed the right of the French lines; a division occupied Bar-sur-Aube and the rest of the corps filled the hills up to near Filles-Dieu (Val des Vignes), where it connected to the 7th Corps formed in two lines on the hills before Ailleville and Montier-en-l'Isle. The cavalry of Saint-Germain had bivouacked behind the infantry of the 7th Corps in the valley between Montier and Ailleville. The cavalry of Valmy and the National Guard division of General Pacthod remained on the left bank, the first at Spoy, the second at Dolancourt. In accordance with what was decided in the council held the night before, the VIth Corps should have come in line in order to allow the Vth Corps to attack Bar-sur-Aube in the early hours of the morning. It was however only at 7 o'clock in the morning that Wittgenstein left his position from Colombey-les-Deux-Églises and Pratz. The thick fog that covered the valley would have forced Wrede anyway to postpone the start of the engagement. However alarmed by the delay of the Russians and wishing on the other hand, to ensure the unity of command,1 he begged Schwarzenberg, wanting very much for him to go in person to the ground that would serve as the battlefield. The Generalissimo probably had anticipated this request: he was already gone from Colombey and at 9 o'clock, he arrived on the positions of the Vth Corps. Wittgenstein and the King of Prussia, accompanied by his two sons, the Crown Prince and his brother (who was later Emperor William), joined a few minutes later. Positions of Oudinot. --Combat Bar Sur Aube. --At 10 o'clock, the fog cleared. From the positions occupied by his troops Oudinot was bound to discover the direction followed by the columns of Wittgenstein, while the Allies were, too, able to notice that the Marshal had been foolish enough to settle astride the Aube and left a third of his troops on the left bank. The intelligence was not, however, missed by the Duke of Reggio. Since the day before, residents had not ceased to report to him the concentration of forces of the Allies around Colombey and provide the most disturbing and the most certain information both on the composition and strength of the corps placed before him, on the movements and plans of the Allies. The Marshal therefore had been up to date on all information elements he needed to make a resolution. His situation was even more serious as it was his responsibility to seriously engage in, from the moment he had no order from the Emperor, an attempted reconnaissance on the right bank of the Aube. Committed as he was, he should therefore have: either returned the bulk of his forces on to the left bank without waiting for the Allied attack; or resumed from the 27th in the morning his march on Colombey in the direction followed by the Allies in retreat; or at least, if he renounced the continuation of the offensive, hasten to occupy the 26th in the evening and no later than 27th before morning, Arrentières and the heights that border the ravine where the stream flows from the Bresse. Despite the absolute agreement, abundance and sharpness of all this information, the Duke of Reggio had obviously thought that the Allies far from wanting to take anew the chances of a fight, thought only of spreading false rumors intended to ensure the tranquility of their retirement on Chaumont. However, there is every reason to believe that without the fog that hid him from his opponent's movements during the early hours of the morning, the Marshal would have refused to accept battle on positions which, from the night before, he had himself acknowledged were disadvantageous and dangerous. Otherwise he would not, from the 26th in the evening, have informed the Chief of Staff of the impossibility to procure fodder forced him to stop the cavalry of Kellermann at Spoy and to hold that of Saint-Germain between Bar and Arsonval. In the same report, he also explained the reasons why he had felt obliged to leave the bulk of his artillery behind the bridge of Dolancourt. Everything seems to indicate the gifted Oudinot had no intention of fighting near the long defile formed by the road 1"Count Wittgenstein likewise," as General Helldorf expressed in his Notes of the Life of Prince Eugene of Württemberg, "did not care to fight on the same ground as Wrede because he would have been under his command." It is good to remember, says the prince, that Wittgenstein had, "not without reason, a certain reluctance accepting orders from the General he had beaten at Polotsk." (GENERAL HELLDORF, Life of Prince Eugene of Württemberg, according to his memoirs and papers of his aides, v. III, p. 49.) from Dolancourt to Bar-sur-Aube, on a covered and broken terrain, at the mouth of numerous ravines which it was impossible to guard the heads of and by which the Allies could easily appear in his rear. The renewed attack of Wrede on Bar-sur-Aube, the energy and relentlessness made by the Bavarians in their night attack were more than enough indication to convince the Marshal to give up a more dangerous position, that left him completely in open and knowing that he was aware of departure of the Emperor and march of Macdonald on Châtillon. He did nothing, however, and neither the warnings of the locals nor the preparatory movements of Allies shook his confidence, nor dispelled the illusions of the Marshal. "When," we read in the Journal of the Leval Division,2 "the 27th, the Allied army appeared in battle formation, operating on its right a great movement that fog had not allowed us to appreciate, opinions still remained divided. Between 7 and 8 o'clock, a light cavalry detachment that had moved beyond the woods of Lévigny to forage, having been thrown into disarray on the outposts of the 105th, announced a formidable mass of cavalry which soon appeared maneuvering in our direction, and that a strong column of infantry, advancing on the extension of our left flank, came to support its right at the wood of Lévigny.