The National Park Service Response

Hurricane Isabel Review Group

August 4, 2004 Table of Contents

Page 3 Introduction

Page 4 Executive Summary

Page 5 Section I The Hurricane

Page 6 Section II Parks and Offices Prepare

Page 10 Section III The Hurricane’s Impacts

Page 11 Section IV The Parks Take Stock

Page 13 Section V The NPS Response

Page 17 Section VI Assessment and Recovery

Page 25 Section VII The Costs

Page 26 Section VIII The Critique

Page 34 Section IX Park Comments

Page 37 References

Page 38 Appendix 1 Select Chronology of Hurricane and Recovery Operations

Page 42 Appendix 2 Wind, Rain and Surge for Selected NPS Areas NOAA Map of Hurricane Isabel Wind Velocities NOAA Map of Hurricane Isabel Rainfall Totals

Page 45 Appendix 3 Incident Critique Participants

Page 46 Appendix 4 Park/Office Commenters

2 Introduction

At the outset of the National Park Service response to the damage inflicted on a host of Eastern parks by Hurricane Isabel in September, 2003, a decision was made to prepare a report on that response that would focus on the principal actions taken by the involved incident management teams and provide a useful record for the review and consideration of managers, incident teams and park staffs both now and in the future.

Work began on the report in October, 2003, and the narrative segment (Sections I – VII) was completed by winter. Section VIII was completed in May, 2004, following a critique of the incident management teams’ response to the hurricane, conducted in Richmond, , in February, 2004. Section IX, containing some specific park comments, was added following a review of the report by most of the superintendents of the hardest-hit parks.

The report was written and edited by Bill Halainen, who serves as both a management assistant at Water Gap NRA and as writer, editor and reporter of both the National Park Service’s daily Morning Report and the front page of its internal web newsletter, InsideNPS. He brought to the project his extensive experience as a writer- editor, his years as a staffer in the Ranger Activities Division in Washington, and his long-time association with incident management teams on virtually every significant incident to occur in the National Park Service for the past two decades.

We hope that you find this report useful, both as a narrative and as an instructional document. I particularly call your attention to the critique contained in Section VIII, which contains numerous important recommendations on ways in which we can further improve our response to incidents in the parks.

Karen Taylor-Goodrich Associate Director, Visitor and Resource Protection Washington Office, National Park Service

3 Executive Summary

On Monday, September 1, 2003, a formed off the west coast of and began moving west. Five days later it became the ninth named storm of the year – Tropical Storm Isabel.

By Thursday, September 11, Isabel had become a Category 5 hurricane, with winds estimated to be as high as 167 mph. The intensity of this storm raised alarms all up and down the East Coast, as only two previous Category 5 storms – the and in 1969 – had struck the United States mainland in the previous century. Both had been catastrophic.

Parks along throughout the three eastern NPS regions – Southeast, National Capital and Northeast – began making preparations. Most followed previously developed and frequently utilized park hurricane plans; others instituted plans, or began taking the requisite precautionary actions.

Fortunately, Hurricane Isabel weakened rapidly just before making landfall, and came ashore as a Category 2 storm near Cape Lookout NS on the afternoon of Thursday, September 18. It then tracked across and Virginia, losing its tropical characteristics before continuing due north until it merged with a weather system over .

Initial assessments revealed that a total of 31 parks in the three regions had sustained damage sufficient to require the preparation of condition assessments. Hardest hit were the North Carolina seashore areas, several historic parks in eastern Virginia (Colonial NHP, Richmond NB, Petersburg NB, George Washington Birthplace NM, and Federicksburg/Spotsylvania NMP), Shenandoah NP, and parks in and around Washington, DC.

The National Park Service’s Type 1 Incident Management Team (IMT) and the Eastern Type 2 IMT were called out to assist. The former dealt with the Virginia historic parks, the latter with the North Carolina seashore areas. These two teams were followed by three more Type 2 IMT’s – the Pacific West IMT at Cape Lookout NS, a second Eastern IMT at NS, and the Central IMT at Colonial NHP (also serving the other Virginia historical sites).

Over the course of the next month (through October 19), these teams mobilized hundreds of people – hotshot crews to cut trees, FMSS specialists to assess damage, curatorial specialists to triage and salvage artifacts – in a sustained and successful effort to help parks cope with the hurricane’s impacts.

Overall, Hurricane Isabel inflicted approximately $137 million in damage to 27 parks reporting damage. This figure did not include the sizable costs of the recovery operations themselves.

In February, 2004, members of these teams, regional emergency service coordinators, Washington and regional curators and Washington office staff met in Richmond and conducted a critique of the hurricane response.

This report contains a summary of the National Park Service response to Hurricane Isabel, the findings of the critique team, and some observations and comments from the affected parks.

4 I. The Hurricane

Hurricane Isabel formed from a tropical wave that moved westward from the coast of Africa on September 1st. Over the next several days, the wave moved slowly westward and gradually became better organized. On Saturday, September 6th, the wave became a tropical depression, then grew to become Tropical Storm Isabel just six hours later.

Isabel turned west-northwestward on September 7th and intensified into a hurricane. Strengthening continued for the next two days as the hurricane moved west-northwest and northwest.

On September 10th, Hurricane Isabel turned west and maintained this direction for the next three days. On the 11th, the storm strengthened to Category 5 on the Saffir- Simpson Hurricane Scale, with winds estimated at 145 knots (167 mph). After this peak, winds subsided a bit, but remained in the 130 to 140 knot (150 to 161 mph) range until September 15th. During this time, Isabel had a persistent , measuring 35 to 45 nautical miles (40 to 52 miles) across .

On September 13th, the hurricane turned to the west-northwest; on the 15th, to the northwest; and on the 16th to the north-northwest. The latter motion would continue for the rest of Isabel's life as a .

Increased vertical on Monday, September 15th, caused Isabel to gradually weaken. The system dropped to below Category 3 (110 mph) on September 16th and remained a Category 2 storm, with 98 to 104 mph winds, for the next two days. During that time, the overall size of the hurricane increased.

5 Isabel made landfall near Drum Inlet, North Carolina, on Thursday, September 18th, as a Category 2 hurricane, then lost strength as it moved across eastern North Carolina. It weakened to a tropical storm over southern Virginia, then lost tropical characteristics as it moved across western on September 19th.

Extra-tropical Isabel then moved northward into Canada and was absorbed into a larger weather system moving eastward across south central Canada early the next day.

See Appendix 1 for a chronology of the hurricane’s development and passage and the subsequent recovery operations.

II. Parks and Offices Prepare

Hurricane Isabel began attracting close attention from parks on the Eastern Seaboard over the weekend of September 13th and 14th because of its power and its shift in direction toward the U.S. mainland. The prospect appeared high that, depending on track, numerous parks in Southeast, Northeast and/or National Capital Regions could be severely affected by this dangerous hurricane. Only two Category 5 storms – the 1935 Keys Labor Day Hurricane and Hurricane Camille in 1969, both catastrophic and deadly – had hit the nation in the previous hundred years.

Parks along or near the coast with hurricane plans began putting them into effect early in the week, and more inland parks within the hurricane’s predicted track also began gearing up for the storm’s arrival:

x Moores Creek NB – The park put its hurricane plan into effect on Monday and began securing non-visitor use facilities. On Tuesday, closure operations continued, and the park closed to visitation at 5 p.m. All employees were released at close of business to secure personal belongings and evacuate if necessary.

x Cape Lookout NS – The park implemented its hurricane emergency plan on Monday, September 15th, and closed as of 4 p.m. All concession operations and incidental business permittees began shutting down, and vehicle ferries were only transporting vehicles from the park to the mainland. Staff were dismissed at 1 p.m. on Tuesday, September 16th, to allow time to secure personal property and evacuate. Efforts to evacuate barrier islands with no vehicle access were successful with the exception of Shackleford Banks, where approximately 100 surfers refused to honor the evacuation orders. Park employees were sent home at 1 p.m. on Tuesday.

x Cape Hatteras NS – The park also activated its hurricane plan on Monday. Park campgrounds were closed at 9 a.m. and all other public park buildings were closed by 4 p.m. Dare County issued a mandatory evacuation order at noon on Tuesday. Highway 12 was already being overwashed in a couple of places, with conditions expected to worsen at high tides. Ocracoke Campground was closed on Tuesday after Hyde County issued an emergency evacuation order for Ocracoke Island. All special events, including three surfing tournaments and seven weddings, were cancelled, and the National Air Tour scheduled for Wright Brothers for the weekend was postponed. The IMT and park management moved to the Dare County Detention Center.

x Colonial NHP – The park’s management team met on Monday and put Colonial’s hurricane plan into effect. Maintenance staff secured the park's communication center and other buildings. Jamestown and Yorktown were closed on Thursday.

6 x Petersburg NB – The park management team first discussed what actions would be needed to prepare for the storm on Monday, September 15th. The management team agreed to meet again soon afterwards to discuss storm preparations only. They met with the park safety committee on Tuesday and created an action plan, established a phone-tree calling list, and identified specific actions that could be taken to prepare the park for the hurricane. Those actions were taken by Wednesday afternoon, when all but critical staff were sent home. The park was gated and closed on Thursday and all staff were directed to stay at home. x Richmond NB – Park battlefields and the Cold Harbor and Glendale Visitor Centers were closed on Thursday. x Shenandoah NP – An incident management team was activated to prepare for the storm and post-storm cleanup. There were two divisions – the first covered HQ, Big Meadows and Skyline Drive north to Front Royal, the second covered Big Meadows south to Rockfish Gap. North and South Districts were closed on Wednesday night; lodges and all other park facilities closed at noon on Thursday, followed by the full length of Skyline Drive. All park and concession employees living in housing along the drive were evacuated by noon on Thursday except for a group of about 60 concession employees and two protection rangers at Skyland Lodge. x George Washington Birthplace NM/Thomas Stone NHS – The former, which is adjacent to the tidal portion of the Potomac River, began implementing its emergency response action plan on Tuesday. The parks closed on Thursday. x Fredericksburg/Spotsylvania NMP – The park closed on Thursday. The maintenance staff began preparing equipment for flooding, tree cleanup, power outages, and so forth. x Prince William FP – The campground closed on Thursday, and all camp VIPs and hosts living in RVs were evacuated. x Manassas NB – Potable water was cached and all equipment made ready. Portable toilets were cleaned and made ready for use. Emergency and maintenance vehicles were moved to a high, open, treeless area. x Chesapeake and Canal NHP – Park staff reviewed the park’s flood plan. All picnic tables, portable toilets and other loose items were removed from campgrounds and other facilities. Employees were given tetanus shots; vehicles and equipment were readied; emergency food and water were placed at selected locations. The concession at Great Falls was closed on Thursday. Railings were removed from the Great Falls overlooks, and sandbags prepared for placement. The canal boat was drydocked. x Antietam NB – The park closed on Thursday. All group campers were notified. x Harpers Ferry NHP – Normal park operations were suspended at noon Wednesday and the park’s flood plan was activated. ICS was put into effect. Preparations were made to remove artifacts, exhibits, equipment, etc. from the historic Lower Town. The park based its preparations on the prospect of a flood level of 28.5 feet, which would be 10.5 feet above flood stage. The park closed on Wednesday, and all employees assisted with moving the contents of Lower Town buildings. The labor- intensive process required emptying of the bottom floors of over 20 historic structures into five tractor-trailers and moving the contents out of the flood plain.

7 x Monocacy NB – A trailer was rented to pack up all visitor center property and move it to higher ground. That task was completed on Wednesday.

x George Washington Memorial Parkway – Park staff began evacuating the Belle Haven Marina on the Potomac River on Monday.

x Rock Creek Park – Preparations for the hurricane included implementing plans to protect electrical equipment from possible power surges and readying chainsaws and tree equipment in anticipation of tree cleanup needs.

x Wolf Trap Farm Park – Park staff lowered and bagged the rain/wind shields in the Filene Center. All of the tents in the park were taken down, and picnic tables by Wolf Trap Run were relocated to higher ground. The drive-through and stage door areas in the rear of the Filene Center were sandbagged.

x National Capital Parks Central – Maintenance employees filled sandbags, checked generators, obtained additional generator rental units, purchased lightweight, water fallible jersey barriers, deployed barricades to 17th Street and park HQ, and placed trucks with additional barricades on stand-by. Vehicles were moved to higher ground. A pumping team was ready to assist with flooding and sewage backups, and an electrical team was on hand for restoring/maintaining emergency power. A tree crew was also on hand for downed trees and debris. Sandbags were provided to USPP’s Central District along with barricades for road closures. Central District staff moved vehicles as appropriate, sandbagged as needed, insured that tanks were full, and inspected cruisers for first aid kits, rope, life jackets, throw rings, flares, shovels, and axes.

x National Capital Parks East – Activities included the following: acquisition and placement of sandbags, securing of the park/USPP Anacostia compound entrance with fill, placement of tarps over the Bethune archive collections, securing of Fort Washington VC shutters, preparations for closing “low” roads in Piscataway Park, corralling and moving Oxon Cove Park livestock to safer compounds with shelter, and checking parkways for possible tree hazards.

x National Capital Regional Office – The office is located on a spit of land between the Potomac River and Washington Channel. Past experience and storm impact projections indicated a potential for cutting off access to the office and the possibility of flooding of the main and annex buildings and adjacent parking lots. Unprotected windows were taped, government vehicles moved to higher ground in Arlington Cemetery, building systems shut down prior to the storms arrival, critical files and equipment relocated or otherwise protected, and cabinets containing park and regional office OPFs shrink-wrapped to minimize water damage from potential roof leaks. A regional office damage assessment team was placed on alert. x Assateague Island NS – The park closed down on Monday, September 15th, pending the arrival of Hurricane Isabel. All visitors were evacuated from the island and the island was closed by Wednesday at 6 p.m. The park headquarters area was secured, critical equipment was moved, and housing area residents were evacuated. Park headquarters and evacuated resident employees were relocated to the Hampton Inn in Salisbury, .

8 x Fort McHenry NM&HS/Hampton NHS – Park staff moved everything subject to high wind indoors, tied picnic tables together, etc., and removed items in basements subject to flooding. Neighboring agencies (the Naval Reserve Center, Corps of Engineers, and FD) were permitted to park vehicles in the park, as Fort McHenry has some of the highest ground on the point. x Catoctin MP – Chainsaws, generators, and other necessary equipment were readied. Contacts points were obtained for all employees in case callbacks prove necessary. All overnight facilities closed at noon Wednesday. x Delaware Water Gap NRA – In anticipation of heavy rains and possible significant flooding along the Delaware River and its tributaries, the park convened its Type 3 IMT and begun planning for the likely arrival of the storm on Friday. All public use areas were closed on Thursday, including the river. x Gateway NRA - All park units completed emergency preparations by Thursday. Special preparations were in place for potential flooding and power outages. Arrangements were also made to maintain communications systems in order to provide for site security and safety. x Gateway NRA: Sandy Hook Unit – The park took a number of actions, including installation of plywood shutters on its historic lifesaving station/VC, fee booths, lifeguard/first aid stations, and fee support building; fueling of all vehicles and emergency generators; pre-positioning of generators; removal of handicapped accessible boardwalks from the beaches; relocation of heavy equipment and emergency vehicles to high ground; meeting with tenant organizations to discuss park closure; temporarily wrapped-up and cleaned-up two line-item construction projects; removed the tarpaulin roof from the concessioner restaurant; and removed the park's 41-foot boat from the water. x Statue of Liberty NM – The park put its emergency plan into effect on Monday. Actions undertaken during the first few days of the week included IT security and file backup, acquisition of essential supplies, identification of essential personnel, securing of exterior items and exhibits, security of vessels, and establishment of temporary screening sites at Liberty State Park and Battery Park. x NS – The park began preparations for the hurricane on Monday afternoon. The park went into ICS on Tuesday morning in accordance with the park’s hurricane plan. Mosquito trapping stations and deer feeding units were removed from the field. Boats under 22 feet were taken from the water and most motor vehicles secured in buildings or barged to the mainland. A task force was setup on Wednesday at the west entrance at the lighthouse area to provide a short training session and check-in/check-out for those residents who lacked driving permits but had 4WD vehicles and an immediate need to get to their island residences to secure property and make other preparations for the storm. Camping areas and marinas were closed. x Cape Cod NS – The park put its hurricane response plan into effect early in the week. The park remained open, but beaches and other potentially hazardous areas were closed.

9 III. The Hurricane’s Impacts

Although Hurricane Isabel struck the Mid-Atlantic area with considerable ferocity, its intensity had diminished dramatically from its peak on September 13th. On that date, a dropsonde (an airborne instrument to send meteorological information back to earth by radio) recorded a maximum wind of 203 knots (233 mph) in the eyewall – the strongest wind ever observed in an . Meteorologists estimated that maximum sustained winds at the hurricane’s peak were about 145 knots (167 mph).

Isabel brought hurricane conditions to portions of eastern North Carolina and sou theastern Virginia. The highest observed wind on land was sustained at 69 knots (80 mph) with a gust to 85 knots (98 mph) at an instrumented tower near Cape Hatteras. Gloucester Point, Virginia, across from Colonial NHP, reported sustained winds of 60 knots (69 mph) with a gust to 79 knots (92 mph). The wind record from the most seriously affected areas, however, is incomplete, as several observing stations were either destroyed or lost power as Isabel passed. See Appendix 2 for a wind map.

Tropical storm conditions affected a large area from eastern North Carolina northward to the eastern Great Lakes and western . Reagan National Airport in Washington, D.C., reported 39 knot (45 mph) sustained winds with a gust to 50 knots (58 mph). Sustained tropical storm-force winds were also reported at Kennedy and LaGuardia Airports in City, while a gust of 52 knots (61 mph) was reported in south central Pennsylvania. Extratropical Isabel brought gale-force winds to portions of the eastern Great Lakes and southeastern Canada.

Isabel produced storm surges of six to eight feet above normal tide levels near the point of landfall along the Atlantic coast of North Carolina. Farther north, values ranged from four to six feet along the Virginia coast, two to four feet along the Maryland, Delaware and shorelines, and one to two feet along the coast of Long Island and in the Long Island sound.

In the North Carolina estuaries, storm surge values were generally four to six feet above normal tide levels over the eastern portions of the and most of the . Values of six to ten feet above normal tide levels were observed in the western end of the Pamlico Sound. Storm surges of three to five feet above normal tide levels were observed over the central portions of the and five to six feet over the southern portion of the Bay in the vicinity of , Virginia.

Surge values of six to eight feet above normal levels were observed in the upper reaches of the Chesapeake Bay near Annapolis and Baltimore, Maryland, and in most of the main stem rivers draining into the Chesapeake Bay. Even higher surges occurred at the heads of the rivers – eight and a half feet above normal at the Richmond City locks along the in Virginia and nearly eight feet along the Potomac River in Washington, D.C. Water levels exceeded previous record levels established in the Chesapeake-Potomac Hurricane of 1933 in Washington, D.C., Baltimore and Annapolis.

Rainfall from Hurricane Isabel averaged four to seven inches over large portions of eastern North Carolina, east-central Virginia and Maryland. Rainfall totals of eight to twelve inches, with locally higher amounts, occurred in the Shenandoah valley in northern Virginia. Upper Sherando, Virginia, reported a storm total of over twenty inches. Lesser amounts in the two to four inch range occurred elsewhere over eastern Virginia and the Delmarva Peninsula. See Appendix 2 for a rainfall map.

10 Although damage inflicted by the hurricane on National Park Service units and offices will be itemized in subsequent sections, its worth noting the overall impacts the storm had on Mid-Atlantic and Northeastern states.

Hurricane Isabel was directly responsible for 16 deaths and indirectly responsible for another 34 deaths. The hurricane caused widespread wind and storm surge damage in coastal eastern North Carolina and southeastern Virginia. Storm surge damage also occurred along Chesapeake Bay and the associated river estuaries, while wind damage occurred over portions of the remaining area from southern Virginia northward to New York. The estimate for insured property damage came to $1.685 billion – $925 million in Virginia, $410 million in Maryland, $170 million in North Carolina, $80 million in Pennsylvania, $45 million in New York, $25 million in New Jersey, $20 million in Delaware, and $10 million in . The total damage for Isabel was estimated to be about twice that of the insured damage, or $3.37 billion.

IV. The Parks Take Stock

By the Monday following the hurricane’s passage, a total of 31 parks in three regions had reported damage sufficient to require the preparation of condition assessments. It was quickly evident that the brunt of the impact had fallen on parks in North Carolina, Virginia and around Washington, D.C. Section V and VI will focus on those parks that sustained the most damage and required the assistance of incident management teams or direct regional support.

Damaged historic structure at Cape Lookout.

x Cape Lookout NS – The eye of the hurricane passed over Drum Inlet, which separates South and Core Banks. Almost every boat dock and ramp in the park was lost. Portsmouth Village sustained extensive damage from storm surge, and infrastructure throughout the park (except for Harkers Island) was seriously damaged. Two concession operations sustained extensive damage. Other damage included the destruction of water systems, 40 septic systems, the park’s solar energy/generator systems, and 40 private vehicles.

11 Section of NC Highway 12 washed out by storm. x Cape Hatteras NS – Sections of Highway 12, the only transportation corridor for Hatteras and Ocracoke Islands, were covered with deep sand in some place and completely washed away in other places. Campground facilities and docks were damaged, the Bodie Island maintenance shop lost a third of its roof, two parking lots washed away, and about two-thirds of the pony pen fencing was either damage or washed away. x Colonial NHP – Nearly 450 trees fell around buildings and on the . Hundreds more were on park tour roads, trails and lands. About 90% of the 1,000,000 cultural artifacts at Jamestown were impacted when the building flooded. The Jamestown Visitor Center and Glasshouse and Swan Tavern and the Archer House in Yorktown were all damaged, as were a number of bridges on the Jamestown Island loop road. x Richmond NB – More than 1,200 trees were down on roads and trails, and entire segments of park forests were flattened. The log cabin (an old visitor center) was damaged, and trees fell on historic earthworks. x Petersburg NB – Nine buildings were damaged. The storm surge caused severe shoreline erosion at City Point, and destroyed the pier at that location. More than 2,000 trees were down on roads and trails. x George Washington Birthplace NM – Over 300 trees were downed or damaged, including many trees in a historic 19th century eastern red cedar grove. The shoreline along the Potomac River was severely eroded, causing as yet undetermined archeological damage. Structural damage was inflicted to the birth site foundation, colonial workshop, spinning shop, historic spring house, and one of the housing units. The visitor center suffered extensive roof and deck damage.

12 Downed trees here at Fredericksburg and elsewhere were a major problem.

x Fredericksburg/Spotsylvania NMP – More than 1,000 trees fell on park roads, trails, developed areas or on neighboring landowners. One tree disturbed two Civil War graves in the national cemetery. Six buildings sustained roof damage.

x Shenandoah NP – Hundreds of trees fell throughout the park on roads and trails. Much of Skyline Drive was accordingly closed.

x Chesapeake and Ohio Canal NHP – Over 2,300 trees fell throughout the park, and the flooding Potomac River damaged the towpath.

x George Washington Memorial Parkway – Twelve bridges on the park’s bike trail were damaged or washed away, and significant tree damage occurred throughout the park.

x National Capital Parks – Heavy damage was inflicted to the headquarters annex for NCP Central, which had five feet of water on its first floor. NCP East headquarters and the Park Police’s Anacostia Operations Facility were also flooded. More than 100 trees fell on the National Mall.

x Hopewell Furnace NHS – The historic Tenant House #2 was severely damaged by limbs falling from a sycamore tree in the front yard.

V. The NPS Response

Even before Hurricane Isabel made landfall, it was evident that the National Park Service would very likely need to provide assistance to parks sustaining damage from the storm’s passage. Ample precedent, from Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew and on through many subsequent storms, showed that parks struck by hurricanes were simply unable to cope with the dimensions of the problems they faced, particularly when their employees were usually dealing with problems at home as well.

13 IMT Callout and Initial Deployment

On September 16th, the Washington Office decided to stage JD Swed’s Type 1 team at an East Coast location where it would be available for rapid deployment to any park or parks that were affected by the hurricane to a degree warranting support from the national team. That decision was based on the previously developed guide for determining the type of team or teams required based on incident complexity. After evaluating options, the Type 1 team decided to stage in Charlotte, North Carolina. Team members began arriving there on Wednesday, September 17th.

On Friday, Swed’s team began moving from Charlotte to Williamsburg, Virginia. This location was chosen because of the proximity to Colonial NHP, which had sustained major damage, and to several other parks that were asking for assistance – Fredericksburg/Spotsylvania NMP, Richmond NB and Petersburg NB.

Meanwhile, one of the Eastern Type 2 incident management teams (Rick Brown, IC) was also mobilized. On Saturday, September 20th, Brown’s team began assembling at Cape Hatteras. They were to manage the response to impacts sustained by Cape Lookout NS, Cape Hatteras NS, Wright Brothers NM and Fort Raleigh NHS – a group that came to be collectively referred to as the North Carolina Seashore Areas.

At Shenandoah NP, the superintendent mobilized the park’s Type 3 team (Clayton Jordan, IC) prior to the hurricane’s arrival to deal with any problems that might arise in that park. That team immediately went to work after Isabel’s passage.

Swed’s team was also responsible for indirectly overseeing Brown’s Type 2 team and Jordan’s Type 3 team. Those teams would do their own ordering, IAPs, and 209s, but would work with Swed’s team in joint briefings and coordinate the ordering of critical resources (such as aircraft, saw teams, falling bosses, equipment operators and radios) through the Type 1 team. Swed’s team would also provide some assistance to the downtown parks in National Capital Region.

It was immediately evident that the first challenge to these teams would be logistics. The massive tree damage throughout North Carolina, Virginia and Maryland had caused major power and communications outages. Swed’s team eventually staged from a visitor facility at , but spent several days obtaining electricity and phone service. Brown’s team moved into the headquarters building for the Group. Their major challenge would be the logistics of getting crews and other incident personnel from the mainland to the islands, as access by either road or water was limited and the islands constituting Capes Lookout and Hatteras were unable to provide support for permanent deployment of team members.

For the Type 1 team, the weekend and first few days of the following week were dedicated to organization, assessment and orientation of incoming personnel who would be working on incident recovery operations. Incident operations were divided into two branches – one to deal with the problems at Colonial NHP, the other to assist in recovery operations at Petersburg NB, Richmond NBP and Fredericksburg/Spotsylvania NMP. Branch directors completed visits to all these sites on Monday and Tuesday.

14 Rick Brown’s Type 2 team began organizing operations there. A meeting with Outer Banks Group Superintendent Larry Belli and Cape Lookout NS Superintendent Bob Vogel on Wednesday led to the completion and signing of a delegation of authority for his team. Operations were divided into two branches. The Outer Banks Group branch had four divisions – one for Wright Brothers and Fort Raleigh, one for Bodie Island, one for , and one for Ocracoke Island; the Cape Lookout branch had two divisions – one for Core Banks and one for Portsmouth Village.

The stage was now set for a month-long recovery operation which would involve hundreds of people and six incident management teams. For purposes of this narrative, the activities of incident management teams on the two major operations – the North Carolina seashore areas and the Virginia historical parks – will be itemized separately. Activities of the Type 3 team at Shenandoah NP will be found under that park’s entries in the following section.

North Carolina Seashore Areas

Of the four sites included in incident operations, Fort Raleigh NHS proved to have the fewest problems. Following a few days of cleanup, the incident management team was able to turn management of the site back over to the park. Wright Brothers NM was turned over to the park shortly thereafter.

Most work focused on Cape Lookout NS and Cape Hatteras NS. Resource commitments increased steadily through the last week of September. A total of 80 people were committed by Wednesday, September 24th; four days later, that number had jumped to 172 people. Hotshot and regular fire crews were dispatched to the incident on September 29th, increasing the Type 2 team’s ability to clear areas and make repairs.

On October 5th, Brown’s Type 2 Eastern IMT transitioned to two Type 2 teams – Denny Ziemann’s Pacific West IMT at Cape Lookout and Bob Panko’s East IMT at Cape Hatteras. Ziemann was replaced as IC by Scott Wanek on October 15th.

These two teams continued work for the next two weeks. On October 19th, Panko’s team transitioned to a Type 3 team headed by Richard Devenney, finance chief on the Type 2 team. Wanek’s Pacific West team also demobilized on the 19th.

Virginia Historic Parks

Crews and other resources arriving in Williamsburg throughout the first week after the hurricane’s passage brought the total number of personnel assigned to the incident to 173 by Friday, September 26th. Early work efforts focused on orienting personnel to the operations, with a heavy emphasis on safety due to the increased hazards involved in tree removal operations, especially with vehicle traffic on the Colonial Parkway. Team members also held short training sessions on ICS for newly-arrived personnel, as many of the people assigned to the incident had minimal previous exposure to the system.

A key early decision was to utilize the new National Park Service FMSS system to collect information on damage sustained by the park. FMSS, a system for collecting, recording and tracking detailed data on all park assets, had been developed by the agency to provide accurate information on the Service’s maintenance needs. By the time Hurricane Isabel struck, most parks were in the final stages of collecting all the information required by the system, thereby providing an excellent tool for accurately assessing both damages and the cost to repair them.

15 Members of Augusta Hot Shot crew cutting trees on Jamestown.

In order to make such a broad evaluation of parks, an FMSS team was established to compile and input facilities assessment information received from all the parks that sustained hurricane-related damage. The team provided direct assistance to the following parks: Colonial NHP, Fredericksburg/Spotsylvania NMP, Petersburg NB, George Washington Birthplace NM, Richmond NB, and C&O Canal NHP. Assessments were completed by October 6th and covered 27 parks.

Removal of trees in all areas was greatly speeded by the arrival of a number of 20- person fire crews – both Type 1 “hotshots” and regular Type 2 crews – from around the country. These crews, with their extensive training and experience in firefighting operations, were superbly equipped to deal with the extraordinary tree damage throughout the area. The Augusta Hotshots, for example, were able to clear trees from the tour roads in Colonial NHP one afternoon at a rate of almost 100 trees per hour. A number of these crews had been brought to the area by FEMA to assist with their operations; once released by FEMA, they were picked up by the Type 1 team.

The rapidly expanding operation – from 50 people committed on September 23rd to 246 a week later and 368 by October 5th – necessitated in depth logistical support. An entire hotel complex was rented from Colonial Williamsburg and transformed into a base camp for incident operations, including a full-scale catering operation under a tent in the middle of the hotel quadrangle.

16 A major emphasis of the operation was the triage and care of the Jamestown curatorial collection and the movement of the entire collection to Fort Lee near Petersburg. This effort required large numbers of people and incurred very substantial costs. The recovery effort continued until November 19th. After the teams demobilized, work continued under the oversight of the director of the Northeast Museum Services Center.

On Monday, October 6th, Swed’s Type 1 national team turned over management of the recovery efforts for these parks to Sherrie Collins’ Type 2 Central IMT. Members of Swed’s team traveled to Washington and briefed Director Mainella and her senior staff on the recovery operations and associated costs the following day. On October 9th, Collins met with the superintendents at Colonial and Richmond to finalize those projects to be undertaken by the team and those that would be done by the parks after the team departed.

Some of the crews reached the end of their two-week assignments toward the end of the first full week in October and demobilized. Hotshot and regular crews from Tennessee, Mississippi, Arizona, Utah and elsewhere departed and were replaced by crews from Arkansas, Oklahoma and Florida. Recovery work at Fredericksburg/Spotsylania, Petersburg and Richmond concluded on the evening of Wednesday, October 15th. Some crew members and equipment joined the Colonial Parkway cleanup operation, but the majority began demobilizing. By the end of the week, operations were winding down at Colonial as well. On October 19th, the incident command post in Colonial Williamsburg was closed down and Collins’ team and remaining personnel demobilized and headed home.

VI. Assessment and Recovery

Because of Hurricane Isabel’s path and its rapid movement inland, the hardest hit parks were all within an area extending from North Carolina’s Outer Banks west to the Blue Ridge and north to Washington, D.C. Most affected areas were able to recover fairly quickly using their own resources. The following areas sustained the most damage, with most requiring assistance from the above-noted teams. They are listed from south to north.

Cape Lookout NS

During the first week, crews worked hard to cleanup the park and also began work on repairing facilities. By Friday, September 26th, substantial progress had been made on repairs to docks and ramps. By the end of the subsequent weekend, much of the park had been reopened to pedestrians. Exceptions included Portsmouth Village, the area surrounding concession facilities at Long Point, and the Great Island fishing camps. Joining NPS workers were many local hires – a total of 20 by October 1st – who had been laid off from their regular jobs because of the hurricane. Most passenger ferry service had resumed by October 1st.

Crews worked as quickly as possible to rebuild docks and reopen the park to vehicle traffic. By October 7th, there were two passenger docks up and available for NPS use and public pedestrian traffic. Crews continued to clean up debris in the lighthouse area and were working on the water system for the visitor center there. Composting toilets were being repaired for visitor use at Cape Lookout. In Portsmouth Village, crews were concentrating on repairing the haul-over dock and beginning to work on historic structures. The entire park was open to pedestrians, with the exception of the immediate areas around Portsmouth Village, Morris Marina Kabin Kamps, and the Alger Willis Fishing Camps.

17 Four fishing shacks in the area north of Long Point were damaged beyond repair by the hurricane. They were demolished and removed in October. At the same time, approximately 200 trees were removed from the Portsmouth Village area. The water system was repaired in the Portsmouth VC and the building was cleaned. Materials were ordered to repair two bridges in the Portsmouth area, the Wallace Channel dock pilings, and the Les & Sally dock pilings along with other emergency repair projects.

Many abandoned vehicles were uncovered by the storm, and, along with the other hazardous debris, were removed – a hazardous, tedious job. Several buried septic tanks were also uncovered by the hurricane and floated onto the park’s beach and marshes. These were removed. By mid-October, work was still underway on the historic structures at Portsmouth Village. Over 400 trees had been removed from the area, but more work remained.

Because of the hurricane’s passage, crews and staff also had to deal with an increased incidence of cultural artifacts being uncovered or washed up on the beach from the many shipwrecks off the Outer Banks. Some of these wrecks are many hundreds of years old. Rangers and visitors were routinely finding wooden ship parts, pottery shards and other evidence of those wrecks. Park personnel, in addition to emergency cleanup and repair duties, were involved in processing and preserving these artifacts.

Cape Hatteras NS

Sections of the park opened again to the public on Monday, September 29th, following a 12-day closure. Two ramps, about 11 miles of beach and the Hatteras Island Visitor Center were included in this first phase. Coquina Beach was also reopened, though minor repairs were still needed at the bathhouse. The Bodie Island Visitor Center opened the day before, as did the NPS campground at Oregon Inlet and the Oregon Inlet Fishing Center. Cape Hatteras Lighthouse reopened on October 1st.

18 Removing trash from Cape Hatteras.

With the arrival of Panko’s Type 2 IMT on October 5th, efforts began to evaluate and transfer those responsibilities back to the park management that were appropriate at the time. Approximately 20 people were released back to the park within a few days. A resource assessment team arrived on October 8th and met with the superintendent. This team, which operated under the direction of park staff, was brought in for immediate assessment of damaged areas to allow hurricane recovery efforts to continue.

On October 9th, the team began evaluating conditions and making recommendations. All operations in the park north of Hatteras Inlet transitioned to normal park supervision and chain of command on the same day. The incident management team continued to provide parkwide support, but the majority of operational activities managed by the team were on Ocracoke Island. Several ramps were opened, and debris was cleared along a stretch of beach in order to facilitate a planned weekend fishing tournament.

Public ferry access to Ocracoke Island resumed on October 10th. Facilities on the island also opened, as did a number of ramps. The area from Ramp 55 south to Hatteras Inlet was temporarily closed while a contractor laid pipe to dredge sand for the breech just south of Frisco. That closure continued for about five days.

19 By October 16th, the incident management team was able to provide a comprehensive status report:

x All ranger stations and visitor centers were open and operational. x All maintenance facilities except Bodie Island were open and operational. x The Ocracoke Airport was open and operational. x 22,000 feet of coral fencing for the historic Banker ponies was destroyed by the storm and one pony died. Park staff was working to build three miles of new fencing on higher ground, pending replacement of the entire facility. x Ramps 2 and 4 with access from Coquina Beach to Oregon Inlet were open. x Ramp 23 north to the tri-village area of Salvo, Waves, and Rodanthe was open. x Ramps 27, 30, 34, and 38 were open with access to beach. x Ramp 38 south to Ramp 43 was open to pedestrians to the beach. x Ramp 43 remained closed due to flooding. x Ramp 44 and 45 were open with access to the beech. x There was access to the beach via the inter-dunal road from Cape Point to Ramp 49. x Ramp 49 was still underwater and closed. x Ramp 55 south to Hatteras Inlet was open on an intermittent basis. x Ramp 57 was closed. x Ramp 59 needed work and was closed due to closure of NC 12. x Ramp 67 had been repaired but was inaccessible due to closure of NC 12. x Ramp 68 was open. x Ramp 70 was graded, usable, and open, but needed resurfacing x Ramp 72 was closed and needed repair.

Wright Brothers NM/Fort Raleigh NHS

Wright Brothers reopened at noon on Thursday, September 25th, after being closed for nearly a week. All facilities were reopened. Fort Raleigh was reopened the following day, except for some trails that remained closed because of downed trees.

Colonial NHP

The park was the hardest hit of all the areas in Virginia. Although removal of trees would prove to be a major, time-consuming task throughout the park, it was quickly evident that the most critical damage had been inflicted on the visitor center at Jamestown and its curatorial collection, both of which had been flooded. The historic glasshouse had also been damaged, and several bridges on the loop road on Jamestown Island had been displaced from their moorings. Structural damage at Yorktown was limited, but there was considerable erosion along the York River.

All roads – both tour roads at either end of the park and the 23-mile-long Colonial Parkway – were covered with trees. The parkway from Route 199/Kings Point west to Route 159 at Jamestown and from Route 199/Cheatham Annex east to Yorktown were the first segments to be reopened, both on the Monday after the hurricane passed. The entire length of the parkway reopened to traffic on Thursday morning, but it took until early October before trees were removed from road edges. Roadsides were cleared of all debris within ten feet of the road. Crews began clearing the Yorktown Battlefield tour road after the parkway was reopened. The tour roads on the Yorktown Battlefield reopened on September 30th, at which point crews turned to removing trees from the roadsides where they’d been piled. That work was finished on October 9th and the crews assigned to the battlefield joined those cleaning up along the parkway. Although the Jamestown Island tour roads were also cleared be early October, the roads could not be reopened because of the damage to the bridges.

20 Triaging artifacts on the plaza in front of the Jamestown Visitor Center.

The Yorktown Visitor Center opened on Thursday, September 25th, but the damage to the Jamestown Visitor Center was so substantial that it was quickly evident that it would be a long time – if ever – before it could be repaired. Hardest hit were the 600,000 artifacts and cultural objects stored in the building. A majority of the items were underwater and required professional restoration. A firm specializing in emergency salvage of archival items had been contacted by the park right after the hurricane passed and arrived on scene on Saturday, September 20th. Artifacts were removed from the visitor center and were triaged, documented and boxed up for later shipment to a site where restoration work could take place. Curatorial specialists from NER and NCR and the staff of the Association for Preservation of Virginia Antiquities (APVA) participated in the salvage operation. Arrangements were soon made to move the collection to a warehouse in Fort Lee, adjacent to Petersburg NB. Seventy pallets of artifacts were moved to the fort in early October. Triage and rehabilitation work proceeded at that location.

The visitor center itself was deemed to require more of an investment in repairs (at least $2 million) than was warranted due to the extensive water damage to its electrical, heating and air conditioning systems. The building was going to be replaced by 2007, in time for the 400th anniversary of the founding of Jamestown, which was a further consideration. Besides functioning as the area’s main visitor contact point and housing the park’s cultural artifact collection, the visitor center provided space for employee offices and a large bookstore operated by Eastern National. Plans were developed for an interim visitor contact station that would accommodate these functions until the new visitor center was constructed. To meet the park’s immediate needs, a modular trailer from Shenandoah National Park was moved to Jamestown for use as a contact station and office space until plans and funding for the interim facility were finalized. Jamestown was reopened to visitors on Thursday, October 16th.

21 Petersburg NB

Damage assessments began on the weekend after Isabel passed. By Tuesday, a fairly accurate picture had been compiled. The waterfront park at City Point on the James River was devastated; the boardwalk deck over the James River was completely destroyed. Wind-thrown trees smashed the wall and gravestones at Poplar Grove National Cemetery, and trees falling a Forts Wadsworth, Fisher, Wheaton, Welsh, Urmston and Gregg tore up earthworks. More than 2,000 downed trees were counted throughout the park.

The destroyed boardwalk at City Point in Petersburg NB.

Tree removal crews dispatched by the Type 1 team arrived on Thursday, September 25th, to help park staff with cleanup. By October 1st, there were 43 people working on recovery operations, 15 of them from the park. As work progressed, additional damage was discovered, including cave-ins along the tunnel to The Crater, sloughing of large sections of the bluff face at City Point and additional tree fall damage. The nearby Army base at Fort Lee provided great assistance during the recovery operation, providing a site for relocation of the Jamestown antiquities (as noted above) and a place for the park to dump tons of trees and wood debris. Removal of all debris was completed by October 9th. Crews completed all work on site on October 15th.

Richmond NB

As at Petersburg, it soon became evident that downed trees were the major problem – more than 1,200 in the park’s various units. The Chickahominy Bluff, Gaines Mill and Malvern Hill parking areas, Cold Harbor tour road, and park facilities at the Tredegar Iron Works, Cold Harbor and Chimborazo Hill were quickly reopened, but the rest of the park remained closed.

22 As with Petersburg and Fredericksburg/Spotsylvania, the park received assistance on Thursday, September 25th, in the form of tree-removal crews. By October 9th, all roads and trails in three of the park’s five units had been reopened. Crews then focused on cleaning up the Fort Harrison complex, completed on October 14th, and the Cold Harbor unit, completed the following day.

Shenandoah NP

Although the park was west of the areas that sustained the worst impacts, winds accelerated over its high ridges and caused major tree damage, particularly along the 105-mile length of Skyline Drive. The entire parkway was closed for the first few days after the storm. The first segment to reopen was a portion of the drive in the Central District around Skylands.

Within a week of the storm’s passage, crews working under Jordan’s Type 3 team had made significant progress. On Friday, September 26th, the park reopened additional sections of Skyline Drive and other facilities. Skyline Drive was reopened from Thornton Gap at Route 211 (milepost 31.5) to Swift Run Gap at Route 33 (milepost 65.5). On Saturday morning, Skyline Drive reopened from Front Royal at milepost 0 to milepost 5 for daytime driving only. Byrd Visitor Center (milepost 51.0), including most interpretive programs at Big Meadows and Skyland, resumed normal operations on Friday morning; Big Meadows Campground and Big Meadows Lodge and Wayside also resumed operations. Dickey Ridge Visitor Center reopened for normal operations Saturday morning. Lewis Mountain, South River picnic area and Dickey Ridge picnic area remain closed due to hazardous trees, as do portions of Skyline Drive in the North District and the entire South District. Many trails were also cleared by that point.

By October 2nd, park crews had cleared and reopened Matthews Arm and Lewis Mountain Campgrounds and the Elkwallow Wayside. Another section of Skyline Drive was also opened, which meant that all of the road was open except for the segment from Swift Run Gap to Rockfish Entrance Station.

By October 6th, the section of Skyline Drive that was still closed was reopened from Swift Run Gap south to Loft Mountain. Facilities at Loft Mountain were also largely opened.

Fredericksburg/Spotsylvania NMP

Park staff counted between 800 and 1,000 trees down on roads, landscaped areas, trails and neighbors’ yards. About 300 had been cleared away by the Wednesday after the hurricane’s passage. Both visitor centers and the historic mansion at Chatham were reopened by the Saturday after the storm, but about 60% of the park remained closed and inaccessible. Crews were dispatched to the park by the Type 1 team on Thursday, September 25th, to help park staff with cleanup.

With the assistance of those crews, substantial headway was made, and park roads were substantially clear of trees by the end of the following weekend. All roads were reopened by early in the week. Crews then turned to park trails and the formal gardens at Chatham. By October 9th, crews had completed most of the recovery work at the park.

23 George Washington Birthplace NM/Thomas Stone NHS

Thomas Stone sustained minor damage and was able to reopen almost immediately, but it was a much different situation at the birthplace – over 300 trees downed or damaged, including many in a historic 19th century eastern red cedar grove; severe shoreline damage along the Potomac (the cliff line was cut back about 50 feet), including the loss of an archeological site; structural damage to five buildings; and extensive roof and deck damage at the visitor center.

By October 1st, all main park roads had been cleared and opened, but the park remained closed due to hazardous conditions and lack of power. On October 6th, the park was able to report that considerable headway had been made in recovering from the storm, and the visitor center reopened.

National Capital Parks

These areas, which abut and overlap each other in downtown Washington, suffered most seriously from the flooding of the Potomac River – both from the hurricane and the heavy rains that fell on the following Monday and Tuesday. Dozens of offices in the headquarters for NCP East were flooded, causing serious damage. The Park Police’s District One facility in NCP Central was also seriously flooded, as were park headquarters and an annex.

Flooded Park Police facility.

Mitigation of the damages to these building was done by a contractor and included forced air drying of structures, disinfecting surfaces, and salvaging water-damaged equipment and files.

24 George Washington Memorial Parkway

Although the parkway was quickly reopened, tree damage through the rest of the park’s 7,200 acres was severe. About 750 were knocked down. Most significant, however, was the damage inflicted on trail bridges (about half of them were lost or in serious disrepair) and the boardwalk at Teddy Roosevelt Island (entirely lost). About two-thirds of a mile of river shoreline also needed stabilization.

C&O Canal NHP

The level of the Potomac River, already high because of Hurricane Isabel, was raised by the nearly four inches of rain that fell on Monday night and Tuesday. The high waters and hurricane tree damage led to the closing of much of the park. By Thursday, nearly 48 miles of the park’s towpath (Georgetown to Pennyfield Lock and Taylor’s Lodge to Dam #5) had been reopened, but another 136 miles were still closed. The Georgetown and Cumberland visitor centers were open, but those at Great Falls and Williamsport remained closed.

By Friday, the lower 166 miles of the towpath had reopened, but the remainder of the trail was closed because of downed trees and towpath conditions. The remaining two visitor centers were opened a day later.

Overall, the park sustained damage to about 80,000 square feet of parking lots and roads, lost about a thousand trees, and recorded damage to one historic and three modern houses.

VII. The Costs

Utilizing preliminary damage assessments prepared by parks, incident management teams and regional offices, the Washington Office prepared a summary of the cumulative impacts of the hurricane on the 27 parks reporting damage.

According to these assessments, Hurricane Isabel inflicted about $137 million in damage on the parks. Estimates at specific parks included these sums:

x Cape Hatteras National Seashore – $28 million x Cape Lookout National Seashore – $17 million x C & O Canal National Historical Park – $17 million x Colonial National Historical Park – $20 million x Fredericksburg/Spotsylvania Battlefields – $10 million x George Washington Memorial Parkway – $8 million x Richmond National Battlefield – $4 million

Earlier in 2003, parks elsewhere in the system reported damage of about $13 million, so the total damage assessment for the year came to $150 million. All the projects were entered into the facility assessment program for funding in priority order.

25 VIII. The Critique

On February 5, 2004, a critique of the incident management response to Hurricane Isabel was held in Richmond, Virginia. Attending were members of the responding incident management teams, regional emergency services coordinators, cultural resource managers and others (see Appendix 3 for complete listing).

The objective of the session was to conduct a thorough review of the overall response, from beginning to end, and determine what had worked and what could be improved. The assessment followed the systematic “after action review” model employed by the military, and focused on the following thirteen areas:

1. Pre-hurricane activities 2. Actions during the hurricane 3. Evaluation of hurricane impacts 4. Assignment of incident management teams 5. Command and control 6. Planning and strategy 7. Operations and tactics 8. Logistics 9. Resource ordering 10. Finance 11. Safety 12. Documentation 13. Park-specific issues

There was an open discussion of issues under each topic, followed by itemization of successes and areas needing improvement – a model followed in this report.

1. Pre-Hurricane Activities

As it became increasingly evident that Hurricane Isabel would strike the United States, probably somewhere along the eastern seaboard, parks within the possible projected path of the storm began activating their hurricane plans. All parks in Southeast Region and some near the coast in Northeast Region have such plans; National Capital Region parks do not, but low-lying areas have plans for dealing with flooding – a much more frequent occurrence in the Potomac River basin.

During the days prior to the hurricane’s landfall, emergency planning and response staff in the Washington Office and the three affected regions – Southeast, Northeast and National Capital – were engaged in parallel efforts to prepare for an anticipated ICS response. Working with the incident complexity guide (see Appendix), the acting Associate Director for Resource and Visitor Protection determined that the National Park Service’s national Type I incident management team should be pre-positioned to respond to the worst hit areas. The team was accordingly mobilized, staged in Charlotte, North Carolina, and begin preparations for deployment before Hurricane Isabel hit land.

The regions, working as a multi-agency coordinating (MAC) group and operating with a good deal of experience in dealing with hurricanes, made plans to callout their joint Eastern incident management team, feeling that it would be sufficient to manage any problems that arose. The team was not staged ahead of time due to fiscal constraints.

26 Meanwhile, the Associate Director for Cultural Resources and her staff were engaged in a similar process that focused on the protection of museum collections and other cultural assets in parks in the hurricane’s path.

Planning and preparations were therefore underway at several levels – the parks, the regions separately, the regions together as a MAC group, and the Washington Office at two separate loci. Communications both vertically and laterally were spotty.

Successes

x The staging of the Type 1 team well ahead of time (more than the minimum 36 hours lead time deemed critical) made it possible for the team to attend to a number of vital functions before actually deploying – identify resources, develop plans, make logistical arrangements, get incident management software up and running, obtain equipment, etc. x Parks along the coast have substantial experience with hurricanes and activated and executed their plans quickly and effectively.

Improvements

x Procedures need to be developed whereby Washington, the regions and other affected areas work together to develop a consensus approach to the agency response, determine roles and functions of all players, clarify where the authority lies for making decisions, establish trigger points for making decisions, and assuring continuous and effective communications among all principals. x Cultural resource management specialists need to be involved in the planning process from early on.

2. Actions During Hurricane

During the time (most of September 18 and 19) that the hurricane was transiting the area from North Carolina to Canada, the teams continued to prepare for deployment. The Type 1 team was obtaining information on damage and reviewing response options; the Type 2 team was preparing to move to North Carolina; and a cultural resources response team was being put together.

Successes

x The system for moving information on preparation for and response to the hurricane, worked out over the course of responding to numerous hurricanes in the past 15 years (particularly Hugo and Andrew), continues to be effective. Information from the parks moves up through regional offices to Washington and is disseminated to all interested parties via the Morning Report and InsideNPS. Hurricanes are tracked and reported on from the first concrete threat to a park through to the end of the majority of recovery operations. This minimizes the need for numerous calls to and from many offices.

Improvements

x As noted above, a concerted effort needs to be made to assure effective, continuous and timely communications among principals in Washington and the regional offices, including cultural resources staff. Procedures to attain this end need to be prepared and put into place.

27 3. Evaluation of Hurricane Impacts

Incident teams and other responders had considerable difficulty in assessing the hurricane’s impacts because of the tremendous number of trees that were blown down and the road washouts that occurred in many areas. It took a number of days for these access issues to be resolved, during which time decisions often had to be made on partial or incomplete information.

Successes x The parks have become very adept at tracking, keeping in touch with and accounting for all their employees. All were accounted for in short order. x Experience has also made for improved quality in reporting. Detailed estimates were quickly prepared, partly due to the availability of enormous amounts of pertinent information in the recently developed FMSS maintenance databases. x Team members felt that they were able to make good decisions with incomplete information, based on their experience and on past patterns of hurricane damage.

Improvements x Central offices need to be patient in waiting for initial assessments to be completed, partly because of access problems, partly because of the scope of damage often inflicted by storms, and partly because of lack of staff to make assessments. x Incident management teams need to do a better job of providing superintendents and managers with guidance on what to expect after a hurricane, based on past experience, thereby promoting realistic expectations about what can be done and when. x Parks and incident teams should be ready to move quickly on cultural resource issues because of the deleterious effect of delays on many cultural assets. Rapid action to protect or move cultural resources is critical and should be considered an emergency. x Teams need to be certain that the infrastructure – accommodations, work space, utilities, etc. – is in place before committing. Without effective logistics, teams are greatly constrained in their ability to respond effectively. x Evaluate life safety and emergency issues first. Treat them separately from recovery and mitigation issues. x Fully evaluate safety issues before committing and ensure that all PPE needs are met at the outset. x Assure that one or more helicopters are on standby for team use in order to assure quick movement, rapid initial assessment of damages, and access to affected areas.

4. Assignment of Incident Management Teams

The assignment and interrelationship of the teams committed to the incident drew considerable discussion, particularly the coordination role of the Type 1 team and the issue of delegations of authority. (Editor’s note: Subsequent comments on this summary of the critique make it clear that resolution of confusion over delegations is perhaps the most important issue that the agency needs to address – and as soon as possible).

28 Members of that team made an early decision not to serve as an area command team (ACT) because the situation was more like a complex. It appeared at that time that only one or two teams would be needed to cover the estimated work load, which would limit the need for an ACT. It also appeared that resources could be coordinated through Shenandoah NP dispatch, thereby further negating the need for an ACT. Since initial damage assessments indicated that the most damage was at Colonial NHP, the decision was then made to locate the Type 1 team there and have the Type 2 team work with the Outer Banks parks.

The regions had a different perspective. They felt that the regional emergency coordinators could have handled resource allocation and should have filled this role. They also were of the opinion that the Type 1 team was a de facto ACT because of the coordinating role that it had in the hurricane response. The IC for the Type 1 team demurred, noting that they never took on any of the roles inherent to ACTs.

Another issue raised was the matter of multiple delegations of authority. The incident commander for the Type 2 team was operating under two park delegations (Cape Hatteras NS and Cape Lookout NS), and the Type 1 team’s delegation from was Washington. Complicating these was additional guidance received from the regions.

Two opinions on this issue were expressed. The first was that the Type 2 team IC did not need a delegation from each superintendent – that he only needed the one from the Type 1 team. The second was that a delegation from the director is appropriate if fulfilling a Washington Office function, but that a delegation should be developed with a superintendent when assuming duties normally within the superintendent’s purview in order to clarify the mission, facilitate the eventual transition to normal operations and assure local accountability for the team’s expenditures. An additional observation was made that basic ICS principles need to be followed, with everyone working under one delegation, and that a delegation from a superintendent is trumped by one from a regional director, and one from a regional director is trumped by one from the director.

Reviewers also observed that the unprecedented nature of the incident, which involved numerous parks in three regions, added to the management challenges.

Successes x None specified.

Improvements x Delegations need to follow the formal route from director on down, with all players involved in the process. This should be augmented by additional training on delegations of authority at both the team and park levels. x The multi-tasking issue needs to be resolved. Oversight from the Washington Office is one task, response to an incident is an entirely separate task. x A coordinating group should be established to deal with multiple interrelated incidents. x Washington and regional office staffs need to be better educated on the fundamentals of ICS. Because many people don’t understand or even know about ICS, they go outside the formal lines of authority and responsibility, causing duplication of efforts and leading to conflicting deployment of resources. x Procedures need to be developed and put into place to delineate principal players at all levels and the flow of formal communications through the system at the outset of an incident.

29 5. Command and Control

There was little discussion on this topic.

Successes x None specified.

Improvements x The delegation of authority from superintendents to teams should take place at transition meetings in order to assure that all parties understand all particulars.

6. Planning and Strategy

There was little general discussion on this topic, as the reviewers went directly to an enumeration of successes and areas needing improvement.

Successes x The practice of posting ICS 209’s on the FAM (Fire and Aviation Management) web site made it possible for all interested parties to access the information immediately. x The relatively new I-Suite software proved very effective in management finances and logistics. x FMSS proved to be a highly effective tool for making damage assessments and also made it possible to complete them quickly and accurately. x The practice of holding training sessions on ICS in the field for those new to the system was effective. x Internal incident communications – principally through briefings – were timely and effective.

Improvements x The Type 2 teams need to have access to cache computers loaded with I-Suite. x All incident management teams (from Type 3 on up) need to be trained in the use of I-Suite and FMSS to assure effective transitions between teams in step-up and step-down phases. x The capability for effective internal communications (radios) needs to be upgraded ASAP in order to assure instant communications with divisions on an incident. x Planning should be done at the very outset of an incident so that the first incident action plan (IAP) is in place before operations begin. Operations can’t be effective without an IAP in place. x Reviewers had a series of interrelated recommendations for the assessment process and assessment teams, including the following: assure that damage assessment teams are conversant with ICS and FMSS; model resource assessment teams after the BAER (burned area emergency recovery) team model, or the Northeast Region assessment strike team model; build bridges between teams and the budget and legislative affairs offices to assure that there’s a two-way understanding of needs; build links between FMSS and finance; improve the cost estimating capabilities of FMSS; augment FMSS with another system that has more nuances in assessing cultural resources; don’t use park staff to make assessments unless absolutely necessary.

30 7. Operations and Tactics

Discussions were included in the list of successes and improvements.

Successes x The Type 2 team facilitated the process whereby park staff were able to get back to work right away. x NCR was able to use GSA’s emergency tree contract to get seven Asplundh crews in the field within just one day. x The teams had the presences of mind to include the acreage cleared of trees in the totals for hazard fuel reduction. x Contracting was used effectively by the teams to augment park and incident management team staff. x BMS Catastrophe, a company specializing in dealing with cultural resources, was brought in quickly at Jamestown in Colonial NHP. NCR was able to use an agreement with Servicemaster to have cleanup crews on- site in National Capital Parks within 24 hours. x Utilizing maintenance division supervisors familiar with ICS as operations sections chiefs proved very effective. x The end-of-incident transitions back to the parks went quite well.

Improvements x The Type 1 team was not successful in recycling or selling the enormous amount of lumber produced from cutting trees, although concerted efforts were made. And what money came in from the timber that was sold didn’t go toward cost recovery. Thought needs to be given to a way to deal with this before the next hurricane. x The ICS guide needs to include sample draft contracts. x Incident management teams need to have higher level contracting authority. x Because of serious logistical challenges, recovery operations at Cape Lookout NS should have been handled by a separate team (as was eventually the case) rather than a branch.

8. Logistics

Discussions were included in the list of successes and improvements.

Successes x The Type 1 team was able to bring in a logistics chief who was “hurricane qualified” and able to get things rolling before arriving on scene. x The Type 1 team brought in buying teams. x The Type 1 team kept its staging operation running for 24 hours before getting the ICP up and running, and also left players in place in Charlotte while other team members were heading to Williamsburg. This provides overlap and continuity. x The Type 1 team also filled out unit leader positions before moving – another way in which staging ahead of time provides an advantage. x Logistics worked well, making it possible to support FEMA and Red Team crews and staff and thereby saving money in the long run. x The Type 1 team was able to support the local economy by using facilities at Colonial Williamsburg. x The Type 2 team was also able to support the local economy by using AD hiring authority.

31 Improvements

x The ICP for an incident needs to be separate from park headquarters. x Teams need to scout out the areas where they’ll be based before moving and get their logistics in place before setting up on site. x Fire camps can be used if nothing else is readily available – or, alternatively, mobile and self-contained ICP’s. x An improved and longer stand-down period needs to be included at the end of each incident to sort out and cleanup logistics issues. x Teams should make use of the mobile trailer now available at Shenandoah NP. It’s a single-axle trailer, measuring 12’ x 6’ x 8’, and is filled with supplies. x I-Suite is a real asset, but it doesn’t work well on some of the computers used by the teams. Those systems need to be upgraded, or I-Suite computer systems need to be rented and shipped at the outset of an incident.

9. Resource Ordering

The teams had some problems in dealing with VICC and SACC because of the breadth of the incident. Specialists were needed who were not in the system because they aren’t used on fires.

Successes

x Use of I-Suite and an ordering manager right from the start greatly enhanced resource ordering.

Improvements

x The ROSS ordering system should be used for those people who are qualified for an incident who also have qualification and certification for fires; Shenandoah NP’s EICC should be used for other resources needed by the NPS for its own non-fire incidents. A two-tiered system needs to be formally established – ROSS for standard positions, Shenandoah for the same positions if not available through ROSS. All positions not available via fire should be sought exclusively through Shenandoah. x Resources that might be needed on hurricanes and other non-fire incidents need to be identified now and entered into the system so that they’re readily available and it’s not necessary to make numerous calls to find qualified folks.

10. Finance

Overall, there were no problems, as the system worked well. The problems that did occur came after the incident was over – working out finances at the crossover between two fiscal years, obtaining authority to pay overtime to exempts, the transition at the end of the incident.

Successes

x The transition from the Type 1 to Type 2 team in Williamsburg went well, particularly because some people were carried over from one team to the other. x As in other arenas, I-Suite proved to be a real plus.

32 Improvements x The issue of payment of overtime for exempts needs to be definitively resolved. x The NPS needs to make better use of its administrative payment teams. x SOP’s for accounting need to be established at the beginning of an incident, preferably using the fire accounting model. x The issue of “ownership” of finances after an incident is over needs to be resolved, since financial issues can go on for as long as a couple of years after an incident is over. This is particularly challenging in complex incidents with multiple parks involved. An incident finance transition plan needs to be developed. x All finance people need to be using the same software.

11. Safety

All participants agreed that creation of a safe environment was particularly important on this incident because of the numerous safety hazards that were present throughout the parks.

Successes x The inclusion of a Type 1 safety officer on the Type 1 team right from the outset was a big plus for safety. x Addition of an industrial hygienist to the team early on was important because of the presence of mold and other biological hazards. x Safety officers were used at every major work site, thereby assuring close attention to safety.

Improvements x Safety officers should be on site early and assigned to each division in future operations. x Health issues need to be tracked after an incident, where appropriate.

12. Documentation

Discussions were included in the list of successes and improvements.

Successes x None specified.

Improvements x Procedures need to be developed to specify which records must be maintained and where they are to be stored. x The process for preparing histories for large incidents needs to be standardized. The historian should be brought in early.

33 12. Park-Specific Issues

The critique concluded with a general listing of issues that pertained to specific parks. They included the following and were followed by some general suggestions on improving aspects of operations pertinent to parks:

x The assignment of one team to cover Cape Lookout NS and Cape Hatteras NS presented serious problems due to logistics, eventually resolved by bringing in a second team. This needs to be kept in mind in future incidents in which distance and logistics present challenges. x The Outer Banks also had to deal with incidents within the incident – an airplane crash and an equine encephalitis issue and the problem of sand management. This added to complexity. x The use of a CISD team and the assistance provided by Dick Ring, due to his experience with , proved to be important and were well received. x An agency adviser from Richmond NBP and Petersburg NB should have been at the IMT meetings in order to facilitate communications.

Improvements

x A better assessment needs to be made of the capabilities of park staffs in dealing with hurricanes and ICS. Park staffs need to be trained in the fundamentals of ICS. x On each incident, there needs to be an identified, single point of contact between the team and the park. x Incident management teams need to communicate better and more frequently with their host parks. x Resource assessment procedures need to be improved. x Hurricane plans need to be reviewed to ensure that they are current. Many of them are not. x Curators need to be trained in ICS, and the curatorial handbook needs to contain a section on dealing with emergencies and ICS. A program should be prepared that can be given to curators, explaining what happened at Jamestown. x The problem of extending 14-day details to 21-day details needs to be resolved and addressed in procedures. x An all-risk handbook needs to be developed to deal with many of the above issues.

IX. Park Comments

Following the completion of internal reviews by the incident management teams, the report and critique were disseminated to the superintendents of the most-affected parks for additional revisions and comments. Some of those were incorporated in the text; the remainder appear below. Park contributors are listed in Appendix 4.

Cape Lookout NS

The park was “very appreciative of the assistance that we received from all levels in meeting our responsibilities for mitigating safety issues, emergency restoration of services for park visitors, and longer term restoration of park facilities and resources.”

34 Park staff identified the following issues as causing high stress during the recovery operations: x Use of coordination centers other than those normally employed caused consternation all around. x Requirements on the park to produce damage assessments with limited information way too early in the process proved very trying. x Requirements for parks to get everything into FMSS, then duplicate the work in entering the data into PMIS, was a challenge, and was further complicated by the grouping – by region or WASO – of damage elements into arbitrary groups on which the PMIS projects were based. x A continuing concern in emergency salvage and recovery work was the possibility that expenditures might not be funded. x The park staff was challenged by the expectations placed on them during the initial gearing-up phase of the team deployment and concerned that the team might be dissatisfied with some aspects of their efforts. x Budget tracking of the incident from its onset to the present has been a significant challenge.

Outer Banks Group

Two comments were offered: x The park asked for and got both natural resources and cultural resources assessment teams. The teams, made up of outside specialists who worked with park staff, reviewed al three parks in the group and made some good and important recommendations, most of them put into place. The cultural resources team found a large number of valuable artifacts exposed by the storm and recommended and/or carried out conservation measures; the natural resources team looked at the changed landforms and identified and made recommendations for management of new endangered species habitat. The teams were important parts of the recovery operation, but the park had to make arrangements for them as the IMT felt that doing so was outside their purview. x The park recommends that teams of natural and cultural resource specialists be identified and ready to respond to incidents. Each location and type of incident potentially requires its own particular mix of specialists. Guidelines should also be developed for their use. They should work with park staff and develop written reports with review, analysis and recommendations.

Petersburg NB

The park offered one comment, along with revisions incorporated into the text above: x Agency advisors from Richmond NBP and Petersburg NB should have been invited to the IMT meetings to facilitate communications throughout the incident. This opportunity was not communicated to the parks. The demobilization of the teams from the park sooner than the originally proposed date meant that some tasks on the list of items to be repaired were not completed and others were not begun.

35 Richmond NBP

The park noted that “ the preplanning (and) timeliness of getting the teams deployed and providing assistance to the park was superb.” Two issues were specified: x The turnover from the initial IMT to the follow-up team overseeing operations in the park could have been better. x No team or staff were left in place to account for fire cache or rented equipment. The park had rented equipment on site for eight weeks after the incident ended without even knowing that it was rented. Because of this, the Service incurred costs that could have easily been avoided.

George Washington Birthplace NM

The park extended its appreciation for help rendered, particularly to the EICC at Shenandoah NP, which made concerted efforts to assist the park and provide materials requested. x In large, multi-park incidents like these, efforts need to be made to contact smaller parks at the outset and communicate with them regularly. x Assistance would have been appreciated in determining appropriate funding account numbers for charging costs for recovery efforts.

Fredericksburg/Spotsylvania NMP

The park offered a number of comments and several revisions, which were incorporated into the text: x Shenandoah NP shutdown its server on the morning of September 18th without notice to the park (Fredericksburg’s service goes through Shenandoah). The park therefore did not receive any of the notifications about the mobilization of the Type 1 team or any other preparations, and did not know why service was out. Nobody contacted the park to determine whether or not they’d received these email notifications. In future incidents, the IMT should establish voice communications early on. x Loss of telephone service and electricity complicated the above, as phones were out for 24 hours following the storm’s passage. Communications were through cell phones, and different members of the IMT were calling different members of the park staff, causing confusion. Calls continued to be misdirected for some time despite repeated efforts to correct the situation. Because communications are dynamic after a hurricane’s passage, the IMT needs to assure that communications are up and running, that they’re checked periodically, and that the list of contacts is kept current. x The park’s staff was continually being asked to work on damage assessments and had to submit numerous different damage reports. Disagreements in WASO over the usefulness of FMSS compounded the problem. In the future, one system should be designated for damage assessments. x Although the tree removal crews did a great job, it took six days to get help on-site. x When the IMT demobilized, a briefing should have been offered on the status of contracts in the park. The park didn’t learn until too late that roofing contracts hadn’t been issued, thereby precluding the possibility of getting them funded with emergency funds from 2003.

36 References

“Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Isabel, 6 – 19 September 2003,” by Jack Beven and Hugh Cobb, National Hurricane Center. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/2003isabel.shtml?text

The Morning Report, Monday, September 15, 2003, through Monday, October 20, 2003.

“Hurricane Isabel,” Powerpoint presentation, Type 1 Incident Management Team.

37 Appendix 1

Select Chronology of Hurricane Isabel and Recovery Operations

Day/Date Time Event ======

Saturday, 9/6 --- Tropical Storm Isabel forms in the Atlantic.

Sunday, 9/7 --- Isabel becomes a hurricane.

Thursday, 9/11 --- Hurricane Isabel strengthens to Category 5 with maximum sustained winds estimated at about 170 mph.

Saturday, 9/13 --- Hurricane Isabel turns to the west-northwest.

Monday, 9/15 --- Increased vertical wind shear causes Isabel to weaken.

--- Parks along the Eastern Seaboard from the Carolinas to Massachusetts begin putting their hurricane plans into effect.

Tuesday, 9/16 --- Hurricane Isabel turns to the north-northwest, a course it would hold for the rest of its life as a tropical cyclone. The storm weakens enough to drop to Category 3.

11 a.m. Hurricane Watch issued for Little River Inlet (SC) to Chincoteague (VA); Tropical Storm Watch issued for South Santee River (SC) to Little River

5 p.m. Tropical Storm Watch extended to include Chincoteague (VA) to Little Egg Inlet (NJ) and Cape Fear (NC) to NC/VA border

11 p.m. Hurricane Warning issued for Albermarle and Pamlico Sounds; Tropical Storm Warning for Little River to Cape Fear

--- The Service decides to mobilize the national Type 1 incident management team (JD Swed, IC).

Wednesday, 9/17 --- Isabel becomes a Category 2 hurricane with winds of 85 to 90 knots (98 to 104 mph).

5 a.m. Hurricane Warming extended north to Chincoteague; Tropical Storm Watch extended north to Sandy Hook.

11 a.m. Hurricane Watch changed to Tropical Storm Warning from South Santee River to Cape Fear and from Chincoteague to Sandy Hook.

--- Swed’s Type 1 team stages in Charlotte, North Carolina, and begins planning the response.

38 Thursday, 9/18 5 a.m. Tropical Storm warning extended from Sandy Hook to Moriches Inlet (NY)

1 p.m. Hurricane Isabel makes landfall near Drum Inlet, North Carolina, as a Category 2 storm.

--- Hurricane Isabel moves across eastern North Carolina, then weakens to a tropical storm over southern Virginia.

Friday, 9/19 --- Hurricane Isabel loses its tropical characteristics as it moves across . Extra-tropical Isabel moves northward into Canada and is absorbed into another weather system.

2 p.m. Swed’s Type 1 team begins operations from a hotel at Colonial Williamsburg.

Saturday, 9/20 --- Brown’s Type 2 team assembles at Cape Hatteras NS headquarters. Contractor arrives at Colonial NHP to begin emergency salvage of artifacts at Jamestown.

Sunday, 9/21 ------

Monday, 9/22 --- Parts of Colonial Parkway at Colonial NHP reopen.

Tuesday, 9/23 --- Cape Hatteras NS Superintendent Larry Belli and Cape Lookout Superintendent Bob Vogel sign delegation of authority for Brown’s team.

Wednesday, 9/24 --- Part of Skyline Drive in Shenandoah NP’s Central District reopened (??). Both visitor centers and historic mansion at Chatham reopen in Fredericksburg/Spotsylania NMP.

Thursday, 9/25 --- Wright Brothers NM reopens. The entire length of Colonial Parkway is reopened to traffic. Yorktown VC also reopens. Fire crews arrive to assist with tree removal at Petersburg NB, Richmond NBP and Fredericksburg/Spotsylania NMP. Nearly 48 miles of towpath at C&O Canal NHP and the Georgetown and Cumberland VC’s reopen.

Friday, 9/26 --- Fort Raleigh NHS reopens. Skyline Drive in Shenandoah NP reopens from MP 31.5 to MP 65.5; Byrd VC, Big Meadows Campground and Big Meadows Lodge reopen. A total of 166 miles of towpath at C&O Canal NHP had been reopened to visitor use.

Saturday, 9/27 --- Skyline Drive reopens from MP 0.0 to 5.0 for day use only; Dickey Ridge VC reopens. The Great Falls and Williamsport VC’s at C&O Canal NHP reopened.

Sunday, 9/28 ------

39 Monday, 9/29 --- Parts of Cape Hatteras NS reopen. Much of Cape Lookout NS reopens.

Tuesday, 9/30 --- Yorktown Battlefield tour roads reopen at Colonial NHP.

Wednesday, 10/1 --- Cape Hatteras lighthouse reopened. Park roads are cleared and reopened at George Washington Birthplace NM.

Thursday, 10/2 --- Matthews Arm and Lewis Mountain Campgrounds and the remainder of Skyline Drive (except for the portion from Swift Run Gap to Rockfish Entrance Station) at Shenandoah NP reopened.

Friday, 10/3 ------

Saturday, 10/4 ------

Sunday, 10/5 --- Brown’s Type 2 East IMT transitions to Denny Ziemann’s Pacific West IMT at Cape Lookout NS and Bob Panko’s East IMT at Cape Hatteras NS.

Monday, 10/6 --- Swed’s IMT transitions to Sherrie Collin’s Type 2 Central IMT. The FMSS team completes assessments of 27 parks affected by the hurricane. Most of the remaining closed section of Skyline Drive reopens. The visitor center at George Washington Birthplace NM reopens.

Tuesday, 10/7 --- Swed’s team meets with Director Mainella and senior staff in WASO and briefs them on the incident and its costs.

Wednesday, 10/8 ------

Thursday, 10/9 --- Removal of all debris from Petersburg NB completed. All roads and trails in three of Richmond NBP’s units reopened. Almost all recovery work completed in Fredericksburg/Spotsylania NMP.

Friday, 10/10 --- Ocracoke Island at Cape Hatteras NS reopens to the public.

Saturday, 10/11 ------

Sunday, 10/12 ------

Monday, 10/13 ------

Tuesday, 10/14 --- Fort Harrison unit of Richmond NBP reopened.

Wednesday, 10/15 --- Scott Wanek replaces Denny Ziemann as IC for the Pacific West IMT. Cold Harbor unit of Richmond NBP reopened. Recovery work concludes at Fredericksburg/Spotsylania NMP, Richmond NBP and Petersburg NB.

40 Thursday, 10/16 --- Jamestown Island reopens at Colonial NHP.

Friday, 10/17 ------

Saturday, 10/18 ------

Sunday, 10/19 --- Panko’s IMT at Cape Hatteras transitions to Richard Devenney’s Type 3 team and demobilizes. Colllins’ IMT and Wanek’s IMT demobilize.

41 Appendix 2

Wind, Rain and Surge Figures for Selected NPS Areas (or Nearby Communities)

NWS Reporting Locale Park Sustained Peak Storm Rain Wind Gust Surge Total

Croatan CALO ------5.91” Cherry Point CALO --- 62 --- 5.24” Cape Hatteras pier CAHA 68 83 7.7’ --- Gloucester Point COLO 60 79 ------Kingsmill COLO ------6.6’ --- Williamsburg COLO ------4.50” Petersburg PETE ------5.59” Richmond RICH 33 63 --- 4.32” Matthews Arm SHEN ------8.40” Colonial Beach GEWA ------5.4’ --- Fredericksburg FRSP ------2.79” Quantico Marine Base PRWI 47 67 ------Washington, DC NCR 39 50 7.9’ 2.31” Baltimore FOMC 38 48 8.2’ --- Ocean City ASIS 36 46 6.5’ 1.97” Sandy Hook GATE --- 39 ------Scranton DEWA --- 35 ------JFK Airport GATE 35 43 --- 0.16” Islip FIIS 27 33 --- 0.29”

42 Appendix 2 - Continued

NOAA Map of Hurricane Isabel Wind Velocities

43 Appendix 2 - Continued

NOAA Map of Hurricane Rainfall Totals

44 Appendix 3

Incident Critique Participants – February 5, 2004

J.D. Swed Incident Commander, National IMT Skip Brooks Incident Commander, National IMT Sherrie Collins Incident Commander, Central IMT Denny Ziemann Incident Commander, Pacific West IMT Scott Wanek Incident Commander, Pacific West IMT Rick Brown Incident Commander, East IMT

Doug Wallner Planning Section Chief, East IMT Deb Schweizer Finance Section Chief, National IMT Dennis McGinnis Operations Section Chief, National IMT Dave Lattimore Planning Section Chief, National IMT Karl Merchant Planning Section Chief, East IMT Mary Beth McClure Finance Section Chief, Central IMT

Don Boucher Emergency Services Coordinator, NCR Ken Garvin Emergency Services Coordinator, SER Marc Vagos Emergency Services Coordinator, NER

Dennis Burnett Law Enforcement Program Manager, WASO

Ann Hitchcock Cultural Resources, WASO John Roberts Cultural Resources, WASO Sara Wolf Cultural Resources, NER

Greg Stiles Facilitator Bill Halainen Recording Secretary

45 Appendix 4

Park/Office Reviewers

Wouter Ketel Chief Ranger, Cape Lookout National Seashore (with concurrence of Bob Vogel, Superintendent)

Daniel Hodgson Facility Manager, Richmond National Battlefield (with concurrence of Cynthia MacLeod, Superintendent)

Vidal Martinez Superintendent, George Washington Birthplace National Monument

Russ Smith Superintendent, Fredericksburg/Spotsylvania National Military Park

Larry Belli Superintendent, Outer Banks Group

Bob Kirby Superintendent, Petersburg National Battlefield

Sara Wolf Director, Northeast Museum Services Center

46