DOCSLIB.ORG

Seeing Consciousness Through the Lens of Memory

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Seeing Consciousness Through the Lens of Memory ll Magazine infected rhesus macaques. bioRxiv https://doi. what the experience is about, for org/10.1101/2020.03.13.990226. My Word 17. McCray Jr., P.B., Pewe, L., Wohlford-Lenane, C., example, an apple or a snake. Hickey, M., Manzel, L., Shi, L., Netland, J., Seeing First-order theories, such as Jia, H.P., Halabi, C., Sigmund, C.D., et al. recurrent processing theory [2,3], posit (2007). Lethal infection of K18-hACE2 mice infected with severe acute respiratory syndrome consciousness that consciousness originates in brain coronavirus. J. Virol. 81, 813–821. regions specialized in the processing 18. Docherty, A.B., Harrison, E.M., Green, C.A., through the lens of Hardwick, H.E., Pius, R., Norman, L., of a given kind of information. For Holden, K.A., Read, J.M., Dondelinger, F., memory perceptual states of consciousness, Carson, G., et al. (2020). Features of 20,133 these include, for instance, visual UK patients in hospital with covid-19 using the ISARIC WHO Clinical Characterisation Protocol: or auditory cortices. For emotions prospective observational cohort study. BMJ Joseph E. LeDoux1,2,3,* like fear, subcortical areas such as 369, m1985. and Hakwan Lau4,5 19. Mao, L., Jin, H., Wang, M., Hu, Y., Chen, S., the amygdala have been proposed He, Q., Chang, J., Hong, C., Zhou, Y., Wang, D., to be a fi rst-order locus [4]. In fi rst- et al. (2020). Neurologic manifestations of We humans have long thought of order theories, the phenomenal feel hospitalized patients with coronavirus disease 2019 in Wuhan, China. JAMA Neurol. 77, 1–9. ourselves in terms of bodily and mental and content of the experience are 20. Poyiadji, N., Shahin, G., Noujaim, D., Stone, M., spheres of existence. These days fully accounted for by some specifi c Patel, S., and Griffi th, B. (2020). COVID-19- associated acute hemorrhagic necrotizing many of us understand that the mental pattern of neural activity within these encephalopathy: CT and MRI features. 296, aspect of who we are is embedded fi rst-order areas. E119–E120. in the part of the body known as the Higher-order theories, on the 21. Klok, F.A., Kruip, M., van der Meer, N.J.M., Arbous, M.S., Gommers, D., Kant, K.M., Kaptein, brain, and is therefore also part of our other hand, suggest that fi rst- F.H.J., van Paassen, J., Stals, M.A.M., Huisman, physical, bodily self. Although most order representations may not be M.V., et al. (2020). Incidence of thrombotic complications in critically ill ICU patients with of us accept this scientifi c conclusion suffi cient to account for either the COVID-19. Thromb. Res. 191, 145–147. about the physicality of the mind, phenomenal feel or the content of many nevertheless feel as though the conscious experience [5–7]. They 1Radboud University, 6525 XZ Nijmegen, their mind possesses some quality posit that some higher-order cognitive The Netherlands. 2University Medical Center, lacking in other physical systems mechanism, possibly involving circuits Utrecht Brain Center, Utrecht University, 3584 within their body, and even within their in prefrontal cortex, is needed in order 3 CG Utrecht, The Netherlands. Netherlands brain — we have fi rst-hand knowledge to monitor or meta-represent the Cancer Institute, 1066 CX Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 4Radboud University Medical of our thoughts and feelings, but not fi rst-order information. As such, the Center, 6525 GA Nijmegen, The Netherlands. of the neural processes that control information represented in fi rst-order 5Maastricht University, 6211 LK Maastricht, body processes related to digestion, structures remains non-conscious The Netherlands. 6University of Groningen, respiration, heart rhythm, and so on, (or pre-conscious) if no higher-order 9712 CP Groningen, The Netherlands. nor of the brain’s control of much of re-representation is involved. With 7 University of Groningen, University our behavior. respect to fear, this view posits Medical Center, 9713 GZ Groningen, The Netherlands. 8Biomedical Primate Research In this My Word, we explore the that the amygdala controls non- Center, 2288 GJ Rijswijk, The Netherlands. question of what is different about conscious defensive responses, 9Metris BV, 2132 NG Hoofddorp, The a brain state about which you are such as behavioral and physiological Netherlands. 10University Medical Center, conscious from one that you are responses to threats, but that higher- 3584 CX Utrecht, The Netherlands. 11Leiden not? We will argue that all conscious order re-representation, possibly University Medical Center, 2333 ZA Leiden, experiences involve elements of involving prefrontal cortex, is required The Netherlands. 12Amsterdam University Medical Centers, 1105 AZ Amsterdam, memory and meta-representation. in order to generate the subjective The Netherlands. 13Erasmus University This framework may help us better experience of fear in response to the Medical Center, 3015 GD Rotterdam, The understand the subjective qualitative threatening stimulus [7–9]. For higher- Netherlands. 14Netherlands Institute for character of conscious experiences, order theories, the phenomenal quality Neuroscience, Royal Netherlands Academy as well as why meta-representations and conscious content both require of Arts and Sciences, 1105 BA Amsterdam, may be involved in generating even the higher-order state. The Netherlands. 15Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, 1098 the simplest of such experiences. XH Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 16Charles Memory and consciousness River, 5231 DD Den Bosch, The Netherlands. Phenomenal ‘feel’ and conscious The pioneering 19th century 17Oncode Institute, 3521 AL Utrecht, The content psychologist Hermann von Helmholtz Netherlands. 18Wageningen University, William James famously referred to the proposed that conscious perception 6708 PB Wageningen, The Netherlands. special property of conscious states is an ‘unconscious inference’ based in 19Utrecht University, 3512 JE Utrecht, The Netherlands. 20Life and Medical Sciences in terms of ‘warmth and intimacy’. part on memory. Consistent with von Institute, University of Bonn, 53115 Bonn, These days it is common to describe Helmholtz’s logic, we propose that Germany. 21Netherlands Institute of Ecology, this as a phenomenal ‘feeling’ — the all states of consciousness depend Wageningen University, 6708 PB Wageningen, quality that makes red seem red, an on memory [7–9], and specifi cally The Netherlands. 22Viroclinics Xplore, 5374 apple seem like an apple, and fear on mechanisms that integrate 23 RE Schaijk, The Netherlands. Wageningen feel fearful [1]. There is considerable sensory and memory information Bioveterinary Research, 8221 RA Lelystad, The Netherlands. disagreement about what this quality unconsciously (i.e. pre-consciously). *E-mail: [email protected]; is and how it may come about in the A fundamental distinction in [email protected] brain in relation to the actual content; memory research is between R1018 Current Biology 30, R1009–R1035, September 21, 2020 © 2020 Elsevier Inc. ll Magazine Table 1. Anoetic, noetic, and autonoetic consciousness. Consciousness Knowledge Memory Meta-representation Self Example thought Anoetic Non-knowing Procedural Non-cognitive Implicit Thought not involved Noetic Fact-knowing Semantic Cognitive Assumed “There is an apple” Autonoetic Self-knowing Episodic Cognitive Explicit “I see an apple” memories that are formed and stored Noetic states of consciousness relations between dynamical neural in a way that can be consciously depend on semantic memories of profi les and sensory inputs. These retrieved, and memories that are factual and conceptual information implicit memories are used to classify stored implicitly, and hence are about what things are and are not. the wavelength of the present stimulus not consciously experienced when For example, seeing a bird and with other stimuli from the past retrieved [10]. People can have recognizing it as a robin not only with similar neural profi les. Indeed, conscious introspections and talk requires sensory processing of the empirical fi ndings show that colors about explicit memories, but they visual properties of the present and other low-level visual features can only show the effects of past robin, but also semantic, including are embedded in a local spatial and implicit procedural learning through conceptual, memories about what temporal contexts of other neurons nonverbal behavior. One consequence birds and robins are. In sharp contrast and are processed relative to these is that a person with damage to to autonoesis, noetic states do not [14]. The color of a stimulus, when the circuits underlying explicit require explicit self-awareness and do not conceptualized by semantic memories can procedurally acquire not support mental time travel. memory, can only be experienced and perform behaviors which they A third kind of state recognized relationally with respect to other have no conscious memory of having by Tulving is anoetic awareness. possible color representations, which acquired; conversely, damage to Although the most basic, it is the is what accumulated procedural one of the many procedural memory least intuitive, and requires some memories offer. Accordingly, what we circuits prevents behavioral learning discussion. Tulving referred to anoetic consciously see as red only looks red by that system, but spares the ability consciousness as states of ‘non- because of the way it looks similar to to remember the episode in which knowing’, by which he meant that and different from other stimuli that they tried to learn
Load more

Recommended publications
  • What Is Wrong with the No-Report Paradigm and How to Fix It Ned Block New York University Correspondence: [email protected]
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by PhilPapers Forthcoming in Trends in Cognitive Sciences What is wrong with the no-report paradigm and how to fix it Ned Block New York University Correspondence: [email protected] Key words: consciousness, perception, rivalry, frontal, global workspace, higher order Abstract Is consciousness based in prefrontal circuits involved in cognitive processes like thought, reasoning, and memory or, alternatively, is it based in sensory areas in the back of the neocortex? The no-report paradigm has been crucial to this debate because it aims to separate the neural basis of the cognitive processes underlying post-perceptual decision and report from the neural basis of conscious perception itself. However, the no-report paradigm is problematic because, even in the absence of report, subjects might engage in post-perceptual cognitive processing. Therefore, to isolate the neural basis of consciousness, a no-cognition paradigm is needed. Here, I describe a no-cognition approach to binocular rivalry and outline how this approach can help resolve debates about the neural basis of consciousness. Acknowledgement: Thanks to Jan Brascamp, Susan Carey, Thomas Carlson, David Carmel, David Chalmers, Christof Koch, Hakwan Lau, Matthias Michel, Michael Pitts, Dawid Potgieter and Giulio Tononi for comments on an earlier version. What is the Neural Basis of Consciousness? In recent years the scientific study of consciousness (see Glossary) has focused on finding the neural basis of consciousness in the brain. There are many theories of the neural basis of consciousness, but in broad strokes theories tend to divide on whether consciousness is rooted in the ‘front’ or the ‘back’ of the brain.
    [Show full text]
  • Consciousness, Philosophical Issues About Ned Block New York University I
    To appear in The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science Consciousness, Philosophical Issues about Ned Block New York University I. The Hard Problem There are a number of different matters that come under the heading of ‘consciousness’. One of them is phenomenality, the feeling of say a sensation of red or a pain, that is what it is like to have such a sensation or other experience. Another is reflection on phenomenality. Imagine two infants, both of which have pain, but only one of which has a thought about that pain. Both would have phenomenal states, but only the latter would have a state of reflexive consciousness. This entry will start with phenomenality, moving later to reflexivity and then to one other kind of consciousness. The Hard Problem of consciousness is how to explain a state of consciousness in terms of its neurological basis. If neural state N is the neural basis of the sensation of red, why is N the basis of that experience rather than some other experience or none at all? Chalmers (1996) distinguishes between the Hard Problem and “easy” problems that concern the function of consciousness. The Hard Problem (though not under that name) was identified by Nagel (1974) and further analyzed in Levine (1983). There are two reasons for thinking that the Hard Problem has no solution. 1. Actual Failure. In fact, no one has been able to think of even a highly speculative answer. 2. Principled Failure. The materials we have available seem ill suited to providing an answer. As Nagel says, an answer to this question would seem to require an objective account that necessarily leaves out the subjectivity of what it is trying to explain.
    [Show full text]
  • The Mystery of David Chalmers
    Daniel C. Dennett The Mystery of David Chalmers 1. Sounding the Alarm ‘The Singularity’ is a remarkable text, in ways that many readers may not appreciate. It is written in an admirably forthright and clear style, and is beautifully organized, gradually introducing its readers to the issues, sorting them carefully, dealing with them all fairly and with impressive scholarship, and presenting the whole as an exercise of sweet reasonableness, which in fact it is. But it is also a mystery story of sorts, a cunningly devised intellectual trap, a baffling puzzle that yields its solution — if that is what it is (and that is part of the mystery) — only at the very end. It is like a ‘well made play’ in which every word by every character counts, retrospectively, for something. Agatha Christie never concocted a tighter funnel of implications and suggestions. Bravo, Dave. Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2013 So what is going on in this essay? It purports to be about the pros- pects of the Singularity, and since I can count on readers of my essay For personal use only -- not for reproduction to have read Chalmers, I needn’t waste so much as a sentence on what that is or might be. See Chalmers (2010). I confess that I was initially repelled by the prospect of writing a commentary on this essay since I have heretofore viewed the Singularity as a dismal topic, involving reflections on a technological fantasy so far removed from actuality as to be an indulgence best resisted. Life is short, and there are many serious problems to think about.
    [Show full text]
  • Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology
    MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, X (1986) Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology NED BLOCK eaning is notoriously vague. So, it should not be surprising that se- Mmanticists (those who study meaning) have had somewhat different purposes in mind, and thus have sharpened the ordinary concept of meaning in somewhat different ways. It is a curious and unfortunate fact that semanti- cists typically tell us little about what aspects of meaning they are and are not attempting to deal with. One is given little guidance as to what extent “rival” research programs actually disagree. My purpose here is to advocate an approach to semantics relevant to the foundations of psychology, or, rather, one approach to one branch of psychology, namely cognitive science. I shall be tallung in terms of some of the leading ideas of cognitive science, most importantly the representational theory of mind, aspects of which will be sketched as they become relevant.’ The representalist doctrine that my argument depends on is that thoughts are structured entities. I know this will be a sticking point for some readers, so I will say a bit more about what this comes to, and I will compare my position with related positions that reject it. My strategy will be to begin with some desiderata. These desiderata vary along many dimensions: how central they are to meaning, how psycho- logically oriented they are, how controversial they are. I will argue that one approach to semantics (not to keep you in suspense-conceptual role seman- tics) promises to handle such desiderata better than the others that I know about.
    [Show full text]
  • Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience
    BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2007) 30, 481–548 Printed in the United States of America doi: 10.1017/S0140525X07002786 Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience Ned Block Department of Philosophy, New York University, New York, NY 10003 [email protected] Abstract: How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We see the problem in stark form if we ask how we can tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: Find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases – when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority – and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: Do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is “Yes,” then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is “Yes”? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! This target article argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. I argue that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if we assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things being equal) by the explanations it allows.
    [Show full text]
  • Mental Paint Ned Block New York University the Greatest Chasm In
    In Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge edited by Martin Hahn and Bjorn Ramberg, MIT Press, 2003 Mental Paint Ned Block New York University The greatest chasm in the philosophy of mind--maybe even all of philosophy-- divides two perspectives on consciousness. The two perspectives differ on whether there is anything in the phenomenal character of conscious experience that goes beyond the intentional, the cognitive and the functional. A convenient terminological handle on the dispute is whether there are “qualia”, or qualitative properties of conscious experience. Those who think that the phenomenal character of conscious experience goes beyond the intentional, the cognitive and the functional believe in qualia.1 The debates about qualia have recently focused on the notion of representation, with issues about functionalism always in the background. All can agree that there are representational contents of thoughts, for example the representational content that virtue is its own reward. And friends of qualia can agree that experiences at least sometimes have representational content too, e.g. that something red and round occludes something blue and square. The recent focus of disagreement is on whether the phenomenal character of experience is exhausted by such representational contents. I say no. Don’t get me wrong. I think that sensations--almost always--perhaps even always--have representational content in addition to their phenomenal character. What’s more, I think that it is often the phenomenal character itself that has the representational content. What I deny is that representational content is all there is to phenomenal character. I insist that phenomenal character outruns representational content.
    [Show full text]
  • 52928593.Pdf
    TURING TEST AND CONVERSATION A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER ENGINEERING AND INFORMATION SCIENCE AND THE INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE OF BILKENT UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE By Ayşe Pınar Saygın July, 1999 I' ^ ΐ> i' н Ш с έ ^ · Η 11 I certify that I have read this thesis and that in niy opin­ ion it is fully adequate, in scope and in qiuility, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science. Asst. Prof. Dr. Ilyas (.JiyeklifPrincipal Advisor) I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opin­ ion it is fully adequate, in scope and in cpiality, as ci thesis for the degree of Master of Science. Asst. Prof. Dr. Bilge Say I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opin­ ion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, cis a thesis for the degree of Master of Science. Davenport Approved tor the Institute of Engineering and Science: Prof. Dr. Mehinet Baray, Director of Insj^t^i of Engineering and Science Ill ABSTRACT TURING TEST AND CONVERSATION Ayşe Pınar Saygın M.S. in Computer Engineering and Information Science Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Ilyas Çiçekli July, 1999 The Turing Test is one of the most disputed topics in Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. It has been proposed 50 years ago, as a method to determine whether machines can think or not. It embodies important philosophical issues, as well as computational ones. Moreover, be­ cause of its characteristics, it requires interdisciplinary attention.
    [Show full text]
  • Wittgenstein and Qualia1
    Philosophical Perspectives, 21, Philosophy of Mind, 2007 WITTGENSTEIN AND QUALIA1 Ned Block New York University (Wittgenstein, 1968) endorsed one kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis and rejected another. This paper argues that the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis that Wittgenstein endorsed (the “innocuous” inverted spectrum hypothesis) is the thin end of the wedge that precludes a Wittgensteinian critique of the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis he rejected (the “dangerous” kind). The danger of the dangerous kind is that it provides an argument for qualia, where qualia are (for the purposes of this paper) contents of experiential states which cannot be fully captured in natural language. I will pinpoint the difference between the innocuous and dangerous scenarios that matters for the argument for qualia, give arguments in favor of the coherence and possibility of the dangerous scenario, and try to show that some standard arguments against inverted spectra are ineffective against the version of the dangerous scenario I will be advocating. The leading idea of the paper is that an argument for qualia based on spectrum inversion does not require that the inversion be behaviorally indistinguishable. At one crucial point, I will rely on a less controversial version of an argument I gave in Block (1999). Wittgenstein’s views provide a convenient starting point for a paper that is much more about qualia than about Wittgenstein. 1. Introduction The content of an experiential state can often be described in public language partly in terms of qualities of objects that bear some salient relation to the state, for example, “looks red” or “feels like sandpaper” or “smells rotten”, but it is the contention of this paper that public language terms including terms for such properties of objects do not fully capture the contents.
    [Show full text]
  • The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates
    INTRODUCTION The Many Faces of Consciousness: A Field Guide Guven Gfizeldere There is perhaps no other phenomenon besides This testimonial was one of the many unsettling consciousness that is so familiar to each of us and personal accounts of "becoming conscious" under yet has been so elusive to any systematic study, general anesthesia, gathered in response to the philosophical or scientific. In thinking about con- following advertisement, which appeared in four sciousness, the puzzlement one often finds oneself national newspapers in Great Britain in 1984: in is rather like St. Augustine's riddle in his con- templations about the nature of time: When no SURGERY: Have you ever been conscious dur- one asked him, he knew what it was; being asked, ing a surgical operation when you were supposed however, he no longer did. (Augustine of Hippo to be anaesthesized? A medical research team 1961: Book 11.) would like an account of your experiences. What is at the heart of this puzzlement? Is there Write in confidence. a genuine difficulty that underlies it? What are the The goal of this advertisement was to gather specific issues that comprise the problem of con- firsthand accounts of gaining consciousness under sciousness? (Is there really a "the problem of general anesthesia, in order to investigate the consciousness"?) And are we facing a phenom- truth of a number of patients' discomforting post- enon the understanding of which lies forever be- surgery reports and to provide legal guidance for yond our intellectual capacities? These are the the accumulating court cases.2 questions that I will pursue below.
    [Show full text]
  • Hilary Putnam (1926–2016): a Lifetime Quest to Understand the Relationship Between Mind, Language, and Reality
    c 2016 Imprint Academic Mind & Matter Vol. 14(1), pp. 87{95 Hilary Putnam (1926{2016): A Lifetime Quest to Understand the Relationship between Mind, Language, and Reality David Leech Anderson Department of Philosophy Illinois State University, Normal, USA Hilary Putnam was one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century. His peers have called him \one of the finest minds I've ever encountered" (Noam Chomsky) and \one of the greatest philosophers this nation has ever produced" (Martha Nussbaum). Standard obituaries covering his \life and times" are available in the mass media.1 This essay 1See, e.g., the New York Times (www.nytimes.com/2016/03/18/arts/hilary- putnam-giant-of-modern-philosophy-dies-at-89.html), the Guardian (www. theguardian.com/books/2016/mar/14/hilary-putnam-obituary), or the Huffington 88 Anderson will focus exclusively on the legacy he has left from his published works and from the way he has modeled a philosopher's life. Hilary Putnam was a towering figure in philosophy of language, phi- losophy of mind, and in metaphysics, and special attention will be paid (below) to those contributions. His influence, however, extends well be- yond those boundaries. He has published works in dozens of different research areas, of which the following is only a small sample. Early in his career he contributed (with Martin Davis, Yuri Matiyasevich, and Julia Robinson) to the solution of Hilbert's 10th problem, a major result in mathematics which, together with other related accomplishments, would have warranted an appointment in a mathematics department. While his central focus was not ethics and political philosophy he advanced a sus- tained attack on the fact-value distinction { a central presupposition of logical positivism and a position that he thought continued to influence research in many areas to deleterious effect.
    [Show full text]
  • Why and How Does Consciousness Seem the Way It Seems? Daniel C
    Why and How Does Consciousness Seem the Way it Seems? Daniel C. Dennett Are-expression of some of the troublesome features of my oft-caricatured theory of Author consciousness, with new emphases, brings out the strengths of the view and shows how it comports with and anticipates the recent introduction of Bayesian ap- Daniel C. Dennett proaches to cognitive science. daniel.dennett$tufts.edu Keywords #ufts %niversity Bayes | Consciousness | Hume | !nversion | "ualia | #ransduction &edford, &A, %.'.A. Commentator David Ba(ler davidhbassler$gmail.com )ohannes *utenberg-Universit+t &ain,, *ermany -ditors #homas &et,inger met,inger $uni-main,.de )ohannes *utenberg-Universit+t &ain,, *ermany )ennifer &. .indt /ennifer.windt$monash.edu &onash %niversity &elbourne, Australia 1 Introduction People are often baffled by my theory of con- and 2esse Prin/ '()+(,, 3now better, and offer sciousness, which seems to them to be summed theories that share important features with up neatly in the paradoxical claim that con- mine. toyed with the idea of tryin! to re-offer sciousness is an illusion. How could that be? my theory in terms that would signal the areas Whose illusion? And would it not be a con- of agreement and disagreement with these wel- scious illusion? What a hopeless view! n a bet- come allies, but again, life is short, and have ter world, the principle of charity would set in found that tas3 simply too much hard work. 4o and they would realise that probably had with apologies, "m goin! to restate my position somethin! rather less daft in mind, but life is with a few new—or at least newly emphasi/ed short, and we"ll have one less difficult and coun- 5wrin3les, and let them tell us where we agree terintuitive theory to worry about if we just dis- and disagree.
    [Show full text]
  • The Content of Consciousness: Do We Need Qualia?
    Kaleidoscope Volume 9 Article 23 November 2011 The onC tent of Consciousness: Do We Need Qualia? Sara Copic Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/kaleidoscope Part of the Philosophy of Mind Commons Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. Recommended Citation Copic, Sara (2010) "The onC tent of Consciousness: Do We Need Qualia?," Kaleidoscope: Vol. 9, Article 23. Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/kaleidoscope/vol9/iss1/23 This Summer Research and Creativity Grants is brought to you for free and open access by the The Office of Undergraduate Research at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kaleidoscope by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Spotlight On Summer Research and Creativity Grants Sara Copic phenomena) must be accounted for without invoking other The Content of Consciousness: kinds of substances. Thus, while substance dualism (the idea that there are physical and mental substances which have Do We Need Qualia? different and mutually exclusive properties) is out, property Philosophy is the practice of coming dualism is still in the game. Hence, both an intentionalist and a to understand that with which we believe phenomenist could be property dualists, holding the view that we are most intimately familiar – our mental properties (thoughts, beliefs, phenomenal experience) social norms, the golden rule, learning, are fundamentally irreducible to their physical realizers (Heil our consciousness (to name just a few). Of course, there is 177). Since qualia preclude functional, cognitive, or intentional a sense in which we are all familiar with and understand characterization, they must, if they exist, supervene on these consciousness: we experience it in our normal waking life.
    [Show full text]