ANNE SAUKA A lack of meaning? Reactive nihilism and processual materiality
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30664/ar.91788 Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
his article explores the ‘lack of meaning’ in phenomenology authors2 alike. contemporary society as a consequence of Besides the new materialist theories, Western dualist thought paradigms and T the theoretical background of body-ontol- ontologies, via Gilles Deleuze’s concept of ‘reac tive nihilism’ following the colloquial murder of ogy connectivity with societal phenom- God. The article then explores processual and ena is particularly exemplified by the cri- new materialist approaches in the understanding tiques of capitalism of Gilles Deleuze and of the lived and carnal self, arguing for immanent Erich Fromm – two very different authors, and senseful materiality as an ethical platform for religious, environmental, and societal soli who, however, allow an analysis of the dis- darity for tomorrow. For the theoretical justifica tinctions of being, becoming and having tion of the processual approach in understand as theoretical models for expressing the ing the enfleshed self, the article employs John genealogical, non-essentialist link between Dupré’s processual approach in the philosophy of biology, as well as Astrida Neimani’s critical ontologies and societies. Having elsewhere posthumanism, and contextualizes these consid further elaborated the necessity for using erations with Erich Fromm’s ethical distinction of genealogy in a natureculture context (Sauka being and having. 2020), I here seek to specifically address the ethical use of processual new materialism Introduction for breaching the rift between human and Western society is often criticized for its life sciences and seeking meaning in life consumerism, superficiality, fragmenta- whilst staying with the trouble (Haraway tion of the self, and difficulty in commu- 2016) of today’s scientific developments. nicating. These and similar reprimands are Hence, in this article, I propose to view directed towards capitalism, the overabun- the problem of seeking meaning in life in dance of information, and the new tech- connection with the ontological paradigms nologies, though the real culprit might be of the body, arguing for a genealogical link sought for in the conventional ontological presuppositions that make up the object- oriented perception of embodiment struc- Neimanis (2013, 2014, 2017), Jane Bennett tures in the West and are widely criticized (2010), Rosi Braidotti (2013, 2019), Stacy today by new materialist1 and ‘lived-body’ Alaimo (2010), Karen Barad (2007, 2017) and many others. 2 In particular, Bernhard Waldenfels (2000) 1 Such as Elizabeth Grosz (1994), Astrida and Gernot Böhme (2003, 2019).
Approaching Religion • Vol. 10, No. 2 • November 2020 125 between an understanding of the body and the machine’. As a phenomenon sitting on ethical and social praxes and attitudes. To the very fringe of dominant viewpoints for demonstrate this link, I contrast an object- the ethical making of meanings and worlds oriented understanding of the body and the (Campagna 2018), spirituality, is a concept resulting ‘reactive nihilism’ ethical para in line with the idea of a need to re-enchant digm with that of a processuality of the the world (Stiegler 2014) and functions as lived body, suggesting that the binarity, still a vehicle for presenting the genealogical prevalent in Western thought formations, is landscape of the discourse cluster of ‘reac- deeply connected with the so-called lack of tive nihilism’. meaning, a reversed dualism that hampers I strive to outline an immanent and pro- the relationality of life and human sciences. cessual view of the lived body as a platform Against the backdrop of a link between for varied spiritual beliefs that allows over- the sociopolitical discourse of ‘reac- stepping the usual conflictual relationships tive nihilism’ (Deleuze 2006: 151) and between scientific skepticism and atheism an understanding of the body, this article and religious faith-based convictions and searches for an ethical platform for facili- praxes. tating solidarity between different (scien- The aforementioned problems are tific or religious) perspectives in processual today broadly discussed in new material- and materialist ontologies of the body. ist and posthumanist contexts. As one such The article can, of course, only endeav- example, the inspiring article collection our to highlight a few significant factors Entangled Worlds: Religion, Science, and contributing to the breach of human and New Materialisms (Keller and Rubenstein life sciences and the resulting rift in spir- 2017) can be mentioned. What is import itual and scientific approaches of life in ant to me here, is to delineate the everyday everyday contexts. The methodological paradigm of reactive nihilism in the West approach here is, therefore, genealogic that follows a simplified binary and object- al (Sarasin 2009; Foucault 1977), striving oriented thought pattern, regardless of con- to exemplify today’s Western attitudes via crete theoretical approaches in sciences, the example of meaning-making and fig- and creates the (unnecessary) rift between urations of the body. Discourses here are human and life sciences, as well as spirit viewed in a materialist context as non- uality and materiality in the understanding essentialist co-producers of lived material of life. ities (Sauka 2020). To do this, I turn to Deleuze’s concept The article goes out from the assump- of ‘reactive nihilism’ originally developed tion that although scientific contexts greatly for the analysis of Nietzsche’s commentary vary (and do not per se justify an object- on modernity, in the first part of this article oriented or dualist worldview), the ‘reactive and apply this principle as a characteriza- nihilism’ paradigm often pushes human tion on the ideological backdrop of today’s science and spiritual experiences into the societal discourse in the West. Here, I go realm of the ‘supernatural’ or ‘imaginary’, beyond Deleuze’s original intention, bring- whilst also denying their ontological valid- ing the ontology of the body in conversa- ity. Often conventionally viewed from the tion with reactive nihilism to demonstrate viewpoint of a dualist mindset, spirituality the ontological tie between object-orienta- and human science in a broader sense in tion and nihilist discourse. the West have become the actual ‘ghost in In the second part of the article, I
Approaching Religion • Vol. 10, No. 2 • November 2020 126 discuss the processual approach in ontol- Cartesian image of the body as a machine ogy, based on Astrida Neimanis and John with the ‘human machine’ metaphor Dupré’s approaches in posthuman phe- (Sarasin 1998: 419–27) that adds sensibility nomenology and the philosophy of biol- and motion to the previously mechanical ogy respectively. Although I am aware of vision of a subject-controlled res extensa. the rich array of authors discussing these In the eighteenth century, scientists still try topics in new materialist circles, I particu- to elaborate the already-objectified under- larly address these theories to exemplify the standing of a body, understood as a device, congruency of science-oriented and spir- even by looking for empirical evidence of itual environmentalism-oriented philoso- a soul (Sennett 1994: 259). However, the phies and their potential for ethical consist- discoveries in blood circulation, nervous ency and co-productivity. system and breathing (ibid. pp. 255–61) do In the third part of the article, I then not result in the affirmation of a centralized apply Erich Fromm’s distinction of being control system of the body with the brain or and having as compatible with Deleuze’s heart as the only venues of nerve-response idea of becoming, here again broadening or sensibility, but rather a facilitated decen- the usage of this conceptual distinction. tralization of forces in the understanding of The conceptual distinction of being and the body, as well as society. having here is exemplary of the broad scope An expansive objectification of the that object-oriented and processual ontol ‘nature’ of humankind is, hence, unsur- ogies provide and suggests this distinction prising – the seventeenth-century image as an underlying issue in Western society of the body as a machine has already put that continues to haunt sociopolitical dis- Western society on a path towards further courses in varying forms, as an almost ines- objectification and fragmentation of life capable tension created by the existential forces; viewing the human body as measur- perceptions of the body and the self. My able on the grounds of a mechanical under- aim here is to also delineate the limitations standing of ‘nature’ inescapably leads to the of a processual approach, stating existential acknowledgment of physiological phenom- having as a necessary element of self-per- ena (such as the functions of the nervous ception that upholds the tension between system, and later the endocrine system and becoming and having that is interpreted hormone production) as part of the scien- as a dialectic of I and the Other (Deleuze tifically researchable arena. From the objec- 2006: 8–10). tification of ‘nature’, the objectification of human and non-human bodies logically A lack of meaning: the nineteenth-century follows3 and, thus, societies in the West physiology discourse The context of the situation might be sought for in the concept of the ‘death of 3 I here follow the argumentation of Michel God’. When Nietzsche utters his bold accu- Foucault (1978) (taking into consider sation: ‘God is dead, God remains dead and ation materiality in Foucault, see Oksala we have killed him’ (Nietzsche 1999a: 481), 2005) and the overall Foucauldian line of it is a sociopolitical statement. The nine- research, in line with my overall research goals to synthesize social constructivist and teenth century comes in with what is some- new materialist/lived-body phenomenol- times referred to as the physiology dis- ogy genealogies of the body and examine course (Sarasin 2000: 51–2), replacing the the impact that body-perceptions and
Approaching Religion • Vol. 10, No. 2 • November 2020 127 come to an objectification of themselves, as with the ‘decline of the soul’ (i.e. the death more and more data speak for the measur- of God) human world-making (Campagna ability and physiological foundation of all 2018) in the West has lost most of the human experiences. space for anchoring ‘meaning’ and ‘values’, However, whilst the sphere of subjec- which are then mostly encapsulated in tivity crumbles, with the discourses of the idea of a rational mind. Thus, already science, hygiene, and physiology becom- by Kant, a ‘reversed dualism’ comes to the ing stronger, simultaneously an infla- fore – namely, whilst body and mind in the tion of individuality is experienced. The West are largely not thought of as differ- scheme is surprisingly simple. Whilst the ent substances, capable of existing separ individual gains worth in the context of ately, ‘mind’ and ‘body’ are still in a hier- Enlightenment humanism, the spheres of archical relationship and form a dialectical freedom, autonomy, and indetermination distinction; only ‘mind’ (replacing ‘soul’) are incommensurable with the sphere of a becomes in a sense fictitiousand ontologic mechanically-conceived ‘nature’, and thus ally second to the body, which is, however, are conceptualized extremely narrowly. In stripped of meaning and mechanically the works of Immanuel Kant, for example, organized (see Lacan 2006). The ‘reversed it is the pure reason and rationality that dualism’ of reactive nihilism still maintains are thought to be worthy of freedom and the figuration of the thingness of nature as equality, whilst the rest of human and non- opposed to the ‘spirit’ for which there is no human expressions are objectified via the place other than the fictitious/physiologic scientific gaze. One shall be free and equal ally grounded realm of the mind, yet it con as beings endowed with a rational mind tinues to uphold the ideal of controlling – a view in itself problematic and tied to the seemingly determined and mechanical the paradigm of human exceptionalism ‘body’. (Haraway 2007: 11). These supposedly non-dualist, yet As a result, the ‘mind’ or ‘reason’ cannot ethically dualist, attitudes of contemporary defend their freedom outside of a senseful, sciences are, I think, best exemplified in irritable body – this sphere is so narrow, the works of Nikolas Rose (Rose and Abi- it cannot be traced, and, ultimately, it is Rached 2013: 200–5), who characterizes erased, caught between the incompatible the advent of neurosciences and their ‘resi binary extremes of a ‘brain’ as nothing due on the socius’ (Deleuze and Guattari more than a physiological function and a 2000: 281) in the reconceptualization of the ‘subject in discourse’ – as a product of the human self. Paradoxically, this neuro-cen- poststructural historicity. Simultaneously, tric view of the human self also maintains a transhumanist picture of a mechanistic, but transformable nature, as well as a ‘materia materializations have on the ethicosocial phobic’ (Keller and Rubenstein 2017: 5) sphere. Thus, whilst I recognize the multi- plicity of scientific views, I briefly outline dream of overcoming the ‘errors of nature’, the predominant line of ‘scientific dis- recapturing the dream of transcendence course’, as it is embedded in everyday expe- and immortality on Earth. Dualism is still riences in the West. This seems especially prevalent, it is still in action; only now it is important, given the material impact differ- ent ideological constellations cause. Thus, turned on its head. simply put, the way one thinks of science This is not the ‘faith in Earth’ Nietzsche affects science and its results. talked about, stating that our lived bodies
Approaching Religion • Vol. 10, No. 2 • November 2020 128 are the ‘big mind’ (Nietzsche 1999b: 39) farther and farther away from the lived – a statement that highlights relational- experiences of the human and non-human ity and multiplicity. It is an entirely dual- selves, among other things causing doubt ist materialism and, at that, one that seeks concerning the applicability of human sci- eternity not in heaven but now on earth. ence to any ‘real-life’ occurrences. If not Transcendence still prevails, only now it is tragic, this situation might be thought of materialized, encapsulated into a cancerous as ironical, seeing how the human sciences (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 163) vision of largely cause the establishment of ideas that life that could be fixated, stopped, idealized. guide us, including ones that eliminate the The reactive nihilism does not change necessity of themselves. the objectives for a human future (Deleuze What is important, however, is not to 2006: 149–51), but rather recaptures them jump to a conclusion that a return to the in a secular setting, enabling a kind of killed God should be the only possible sacralized secularity. Instead of the homo solution for a re-enchantment of the world. sacer (Agamben 1998), there might now be For who was the killed God in this context? a similar ‘state of exception’ for our brains: Why, it was the God that led us to be killers a neuro sacer. The neuro-logical is sacred – namely, as Deleuze put it: ‘negative nihil- – renowned as our hope for tomorrow, yet ism is replaced by reactive nihilism, reac- it can be transformed and bent to our will tive nihilism ends in passive nihilism. From – and, thus, it is simultaneously with and God to God’s murderer, from God’s mur- without power, a continuation of the reac- derer to the last man’ (Deleuze 2006: 151). tive nihilism that encapsulates our hopes The reversion of dualism is already there for transcendence in our bodies. in the statement. With negative nihilism in This is an essentialist, objectified image Nietzsche’s thought, Deleuze understands of a body that overturns the discourse of the ‘no’ saying to the world (Deleuze 2006: flesh and soul, only to constitute a new 147–8) which Nietzsche sees in the social kind of dualism, where the objectively- discourse of institutional religion. However, cast embodiment undergoes sacralization, a reading that I would propose would take whilst the self acquires the status of an ‘illu- a slightly different path; namely, it might be sion’. The conceptual problem is clear – if necessary to ask – why would religion be we, as humans, objectify our surrounding mentioned at all in the context of scientific world, we end up objectifying ourselves – world-building here, in the context of lived humanity is, after all, just as measurable discourse constellations? After all, religious and calculable as anything else, if the cal- and spiritual views widely differ, and the culability and determination of all life are same can be said for scientific ones. The presumed. It is the objectifying gaze turned relation of religion and science here might inward to make sense of the world, which be connected with Christian ‘materiapho- then appears ever more senseless than bia’. In the words of Catherine Keller and before. Mary-Jane Rubenstein: ‘… the major reli- Thus, the sociopolitical discourse in the gious traditions also carry long normative West is largely built upon a reductionist routines of disembodiment. Christianity understanding of science, where faith and in particular has long suffered from a con- philosophy are replaced by data, experi- dition of we could call “materiaphobia” ’ ments, and objectification. The world ‘dis- (Keller and Rubenstein 2017: 5). covered’ as an object of science moves Namely, the dogmatic worldview
Approaching Religion • Vol. 10, No. 2 • November 2020 129 Nietzsche speaks of is a societally-embed- What does reactive nihilism result in? ded religious ‘materiaphobia’ characteristic For one, it structures a new kind of dog- to Christianized Western countries in a spe- matism – ‘you shall believe’ becomes a ‘you cific time-space, also in connection to sci- shall not believe’, at least not unless we have entific developments of the time (see Keller evidence in the form of persuasive data. ‘If and Rubenstein 2017: 5–7), rather than … then’ is the new rule, and one should not a specific religion per se. Thus, ‘materia depart from it. ‘If there is no proof’ one phobia’ (which by no means exhausts the should not believe in God, seems to be the religious traditions but is represented in contemporary mantra. Does it not sound Nietzsche’s thought as the not-yet-killed ludicrous? Logically one can only presume God) causes its reversal, via transferring it could mean that one must not believe, these same thought patterns to modern sci- but where does the imperative come in? ence. In a sense paradoxically, the not-yet- Yet, often this is the atheist motto, echoed, killed God enables the reversal of dualism for example, in the philosophies of the ‘four in reactive nihilism, causing the (partial) horsemen’5 of the new atheism. extinction of a religious worldview (includ- With that one is still faced with an ing that, which enabled the scientific dis- imperative; only now it is secularity that course). Simultaneously the process also becomes sacral, the body being its vessel dispels the possibility of seeking meaning of truth, the most extreme expressions in the flesh, which is still viewed within of which are witnessed in fascist and the context of the ‘materiaphobic’ thought eugenic movements and the communist patterns.4 totalitarianism of the USSR, where religion Where negative nihilism saw the con- is outright banned. It serves to mention that demnation of flesh and materiality and the objectivity of science, is, of course, no exiled materiality as fictitious and illusory, factual objectivity. To forgo the inescapable reactive nihilism does the same with the social constructivism of science, founded ‘soul’, eliminating meaning. All that exists on its reliance of the existing symbolical is the supposedly objective, deterministic orders (Dupré 2012: 40–54) since its inven- physical world, which is why one should tion, coupled with sociopolitical objectives, seek an eternal life on earth, try to pro- next to the most glaring examples, such as gress, try to ascend and transcend our lived the so-called scientific materialism of the realities, by enhancing the reasonable man USSR, the scientific discourse has experi beyond the flesh, via bodily (largely tech- enced various other mishaps – the bio- nological) means, as is best exemplified by logical determinism of the sexes (Laqueur the Enlightenment-inspired transhumanist 1992, 1987; Moi 1999: 19–20) being among (H+) paradigm (Braidotti and Hlavajova them. 2018: 439). Science takes the place of reli- Whilst defining the grounds of knowl- gion, but it does not change the stakes. edge as objective research, instead of meta physical belief or faith, science too seeks to justify social discourses, changing the means of justification, but not the argument 4 As described further, the developments of science, however, again lead our thinking back to the embeddedness of meaning in the flesh, as also explained by Karen Barad 5 Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam (2017: 26). Harris, and Christopher Hitchens.
Approaching Religion • Vol. 10, No. 2 • November 2020 130 itself. Religion goes on, but maybe not so gain traction (Dunn 2019) in human and spirituality. life sciences alike. Similarly, the hygiene discourse of the A change of heart: processuality nineteenth century is gradually comprom and the becoming self ised by the newly-discovered benefits of the Scientific reductionism, however, has ex so-called ‘good’ bacteria, as well as their role perienced its decline. Interestingly, whilst in the development of life, not to mention religion has taken part in the rise of sci- the ardent discussion on anti-biotic resist- ence, science again gives rise to a different ances facilitated by excessive antibiotic use. kind of spirituality. In the words of Karen Moreover, climate change, as well as the cur- Barad: rent COVID-19 pandemic, forces society outside of academic circles to rethink the The point is also to understand how outer boundaries of our bodies and subjec- science deconstructs its own authority: tivities. Responses to climate change, in par- how its own findings undermine the ticular, increasingly paint a picture of a sub- very modernist conceptions on which ject-in-process (Kristeva 1984: 22; McAfee this progressive narrative rests, such as 2004: 29–42), permeated by micro-plastics the scientific belief in the immutabil- and other seemingly alien particles that have ity of matter, the Newtonian concep- now become a part of ourselves (Neimanis tion of time as an external parameter 2017; Braidotti 2013; Alaimo 2010). that marches forward without inter- In the philosophy of biology, this real- ruption, determinism, the nature/cul- ization is reflected in John Dupré’s prop ture dualism, and human exceptional- osition of a processual philosophy that ism (Barad 2017: 26). would prioritize symbiosis and process over branching and substance-centered More and more clearly, science admits approaches. This approach leads to a non- its social constructivism, finding new hierarchical understanding of the sciences, paths of discovery and implementing new as well as allowing for a constitution of the models of analysis. Simultaneously, sym- symbiotic character of the living world. biosis (Margulis 2001) and a processual understanding of bodies and their inter- One of the most significant conse- activity gain significance (Braidotti 2013; quences of the processual hierarchy Neimanis 2017). Recently, for example, of the living world, then, is that it we have started to investigate the mind- makes the physicalist dream of abso- gut connection (Mayer 2015), as well as lute reductionism impossible. … It viewing decision processes as potentially also means that we cannot pick out co-directed by several organs, rather than any level in the hierarchy as ontolog- being a brain-centered event. ically or causally primary. Whereas a Within the neurosciences, concepts such substance ontology that presupposes as plasticity come to the fore, and emotions a structural hierarchy of things only are by now accepted as indistinguishable allows bottom-up causal influences, from reasoning processes (Damasio 1994, a process ontology has no trouble in 2000). Biology inspired investigations into recognizing that causal influences can mushrooms (Tsing 2015; Sheldrake 2020), flow in different directions. (Dupré and other life-forms that we live with, also and Nicholson 2018: 27)
Approaching Religion • Vol. 10, No. 2 • November 2020 131 The processual approach in the philos- Donna Haraway’s expression ‘staying with ophy of biology is reflected also in critical the trouble’ (Haraway 2016) – rather than posthumanist explorations that highlight moving away from the body, to seek refuge enfleshed but meaning-making under- in the neuro-centric life sciences today, standings of life processes, accentuating human sciences and spiritual approaches that whilst life should be understood on the currently engage with what is already given, plane of immanence (Deleuze and Guattari to accentuate the possibilities of a senseful 1994), it does not require us to draw a understanding of immanent materiality in mechanical or meaningless picture of the all its multiplicity and relationality. world. Quite on the contrary, a materialist Thus, the theorization of the porousness approach necessitates not only the refor- of our bodies is an opportunity to establish mation of our views of subjectivity and the a more holistic picture of the human body self, but also a recapturing of biology and as a becoming, historically embedded entity materiality as part of the unfinished, his- that is more of a process than a concrete torical lifeworld. Thus, for example, in the object or a thing. What we are is material- opening paragraphs of her book Bodies of ity and energy, yet, without disintegrating Water the feminist posthumanist Neimanis mind from body or reason from emotion, highlights this porousness of the body via a processual, becoming, historical selfhood the concept of water, stating: comes to the fore that is just as much spir- itual as enfleshed – that is Leib or carnal To rethink embodiment as watery stirs body as the ‘big mind’ (Nietzsche 1999b: up considerable trouble for dominant 39; Waldenfels 2000). If all the experienced Western and humanist understand- emotions, feelings, thoughts, and affects ings of embodiment, where bodies are are materially embedded, materiality itself figured as discrete and coherent indi- loses its determination, objectivity, and fix- vidual subjects, and as fundamentally ation and becomes a living, breathing part autonomous. Evidence of this domin of our worlds. ant paradigm underpins many if not Current developments in biology (such all of our social, political, economic, as the Human Genome Project, Dupré and legal frameworks in the Western 2012: 102–5; Rose 2007: 17) clearly show world. … But as bodies of water we that materiality does not presuppose ‘thing- leak and seethe, our borders always ness’6, but the symbiotic nature of bodies vulnerable to rupture and renegoti ation. (Neimanis 2017: 2) 6 If we were to view the world through the eyes of quantum physics, for example, mat Neimanis’s conceptualization of phe- eriality would even necessitate us to pre- nomenology and posthumanism as com- sume that immanence should also be paired patible paradigms demonstrates that the with a sort of transcendental view, as far as ‘transcendental philosophy presents a sus- porousness of the body should not be tained attempt to problematize natural real- viewed as an even stricter physiologization, ism as our taken-for-granted view of reality’ but rather as a basis for the realization that (Oksala 2016: 4–5), as the actual matter and the materiality of bodies and our enfleshed- energies are only phenomenologically con- ceived in their concreteness and could well ness does not constrain the conceptualiza- be thought of differently, should we not be tion of a senseful selfhood, but rather en humans, but aliens, with radically different ables it. This approach resonates with perceptive powers.
Approaching Religion • Vol. 10, No. 2 • November 2020 132 has hitherto been obscured by the weight other bodily processes, is also the first most of autonomy, which now seems to press us evident proof that the milieu does consti- to accept a determined lifeworld, with the tute a significant part of the ‘chains of caus realization of the technicalities involving ation’, for how else can any intervention our bodies. Thus, still constrained by the occur? A similar argument is also made by reversed dualist notions, one is often com- John Dupré, speaking of ADHD medica- pelled to think the hormone-induced anger tion for children, who argues that, instead might be less important or, indeed, ‘less of attempting positive changes in environ- human’ than a ‘reasonable one’. Such a dis- ments, governments choose to point to the tinction between real vs. hormonal feelings defects of individuals, excluding the prob- is doomed to gradually accept all human lem of the milieu (Dupré 2012: 36). emotion as hormonal (as in, involving a The construction of ‘hormonal vs. real’, material process), devaluing ‘real’ emotion pushes us towards a dangerous game of to the status of illusion, ‘a trick of mind’. reactive nihilism, which highlights the Take the example of hormonal anger: materiality of discourse – the way things it can only be accepted as different in kind are conceived influences strongly their pro- to ‘actual’ anger if one supposes that it is not duction and becoming, thus, also affecting instigated by environmental factors, such their materiality – which is also a reason as ‘a bad situation’– but, then, how could for rethinking body conceptualizations in it be transformed with the intervention of ethical contexts. The acceptance of mater other environmental factors? This might iality in a pluralist and processual manner, seem like a simple linguistic misunder- can, thus, allow moving beyond a dual- standing, but in fact, it goes much deeper ist undervaluation and mechanization of than that. Nikolas Rose (2019: 111–15), materiality. for example, accentuates how our presup- positions of the main source of mental ill- The ethical predicament of becoming ness, which today is thought to be ‘in the and having brain’, completely change the way that these Yet, despite promising theoretical models, illnesses will be treated, highlighting the inherent dualism has hitherto prevailed in problematic acceptance of the ‘chain of social attitudes and praxis; popular media causation’: outlets continue to force a reductionist understanding of the body and consumer … there are many logical flaws in this society in the West still leans heavily on line of reasoning, most crucially the reactive nihilism and the sacralization assumption that the key direction of of secularity. This situation is character- causation is from brain processes to ized also by the ontological disposition of mental life and behaviour, and hence human beings, which unavoidably drives that to intervene in abnormal – or towards conceptualizing oneself and the even normal – mental life and behav- environment via some kind of objectifica- iour, one should intervene in those tion, and thus also creates a rift between the brain processes (Rose 2019: 113). self and the surrounding world. The ethical consequences of the onto- The misrepresentation in reduction- logical models, represented in the carnal ism seems evident. The very idea that we body phenomenology via the ‘carnal body can and should interfere with our brain or that we are’ and the ‘body that we have’
Approaching Religion • Vol. 10, No. 2 • November 2020 133 (Böhme 2003: 26; Fuchs 2013: 82–93) are 1976: 69–83), which include also the self- depicted by Erich Fromm, who differenti- preservatory striving to encapsulate and ates between being and having 7 (Fromm stop life in its tracks. Via his argumenta- 1976, 1992) – as two possible modes of tion reactive nihilism could be depicted as living. Being is associated with life, activ- a pathologization of the mode of having. ity, process, taking action, creativity, Fromm (1976: 82) states: ‘But perhaps more and meaning, whilst living in the mode than anything else, possession of property of having points towards death, passiv- constitutes the fulfillment of the craving for ity, object, narcissism and superficiality, immortality, and it is for this reason that namely, a lack of meaning, which, as per the having orientation has such strength’. Fromm, is associated with the contempor Reading Fromm in a new material- ary capitalist society. ist context, the pathologization of having Despite the linguistic duality, this dis- becomes closely tied to the reversed dual- tinction can be shown to avoid the danger- ism of ‘reactive nihilism’, which also seeks ous contraption of binary thinking. Having, refuge in the immortalization and fixation for Fromm, is always also existential having of an autonomous self on Earth. If cultural (Fromm 1976: 85), the unavoidable object activity is societally perceived as primar- ification that being human presumes, and ily mediated via the ego-function of a lived an inherent part of being. body, individuality is necessarily contrasted Existential having highlights the object to the symbiotic realities of our material ifying abilities of humans – a characteris- existence. If meaningful life were to be tic of the carnal self that facilitates its self- assessed as only possible via this objectifi- alienation – namely, via the ego-function, cation (i.e. self-awareness of a world differ- the carnal, enfleshed self views the world entiated from oneself), autonomy and indi- via the power of objectification, acquiring vidual agency seem to naturally exhaust the also the ability to view the self as a con- ethical narratives. crete thing, to be preferably preserved and To justify solidarity or a joint experience stopped in time. The self, however, is only of life, it should then be built up from indi- possible in constant movement and trans- vidual experiences, namely, constructed, formation, and thus, a perceptual dialec- by providing evidence for its necessity. tics between two equally self-preservatory Similarly, if we assume autonomy as the powers ensues, whilst the objectifying starting position of bodies, we then are power is ontologically rather a ‘tool’ for faced with the problem of the Other, as well the ‘big mind’, as described by Nietzsche as with the problems of ‘other minds’ and (1999b: 39). ‘mind–body’ causation. This problem is, A pathologization of having orienta- nevertheless, rendered non-existent if the tion in life occurs with the proliferation primacy of otherness, of being-together- of narcissistic, passive passions (Fromm before-we-are-alone, should be accepted. This primacy of the other, however, should avoid constituting another imperative, but 7 In new materialist and Deleuzian contexts, rather move beyond the borders of the as well as in reference to the carnal body self and other entirely. In the context of a (Leib) phenomenology, the distinction of being and having might be more precisely process ontology, we are permeated by an termed as a distinction between becoming enfleshed otherness. As symbiotic beings and having (see Sauka 2020).
Approaching Religion • Vol. 10, No. 2 • November 2020 134 we should, thus, not start from a distinc- Conclusion: posthuman spaces – solidarity tion, but rather with the question of ‘how’ for tomorrow? we are together? A reversed dualist understanding is both A reading of Fromm also shows the ontologically as well as ethically problem- inherent limitations of a posthumanist atic and creates rifts between religious and othering of the self, as via existential hav non-religious people, different religions, ing direction of self-preservation a sense and sciences – especially when speaking of selfhood resists total annihilation of of the actual, experienced enfleshedness subjectivity and maintains the position of in the current, lived world. Moreover, as intentionality. Hence, a perceptual dialectic the widespread consumerism and experi always reconstitutes itself. What a recon- enced lack of meaning in Western societies ceptualization of the self within the con- show, an object-oriented understanding cept of becoming can change, however, is of the autonomy of bodies creates a fer- the primacy of becoming over having, thus, tile ground for hedonistic utilitarianism mitigating the potential of pathologization (Fromm 1992: 3) within the reactive nihil- in the having dimension. ism paradigm – and with it, also for the no In an ontological context this relation effort/no pain doctrine (ibid. p. 24) that between existential, unavoidable objecti- suggests to us a spirituality of the consumer fication that is part of our self-awareness type – do whatever it takes if that makes and our experience of life as a becom- you better workers and more effective soci- ing and a process, might be expressed via ety members. Enhance yourself through Nietzsche’s terms of the Apollonian and workouts or religion, if it facilitates a ‘feel- Dionysian forces and their mutual dance good’ mood or motivates for efficient work. (Nietzsche 1999c: 25–38). There is always a Fromm argues that, as work in capitalism is ‘third’, an ‘event’ taking place here, which is understood in monetary terms, as a way for the relation between these forces that bal- earning money for consumption, ‘leisure ances them out. This is, however, problem- time’ increasingly passivizes the consumer: atic, when the Socratic element emerges ‘Man has become the suckler, the eternally (ibid. pp. 83–8) – an element that aspires expectant and the eternally disappointed’ to establish an ‘only’ truth, namely, the (Fromm 1994: 32–3). pathologization or the cancerous version of It could be argued that religion in capit the having directionality. alist societies also acquires the status of Becoming and having, hence, should a consumer good that can be ‘used’ and not be juxtaposed as a mutually exclusive ‘applied’ for enhanced efficiency or as a binary opposites, or else a new kind of dual- mood-enhancer. I think it is best concep- ism ensues – you shall not objectify, which tualized by this quotation by Slavoj Žižek, becomes an objectification itself. An ‘if … commenting on the ‘spiritual logic of late then’ of a different sort, where allhaving capitalism’: directionality in life could be blamed, even though it is unalienable from our experi- No wonder that tantra is so popular ence as human beings and justifies the idea today in the West: it offers the ultimate that we are all in it together, but not all the ‘spiritual logic of late capitalism’ unit- same (Braidotti 2020), and thus enables ing spirituality and earthly pleasures, discussions on ethics and meaning-making transcendence and material bene processes. fits, divine experience and unlimited
Approaching Religion • Vol. 10, No. 2 • November 2020 135 shopping. It propagates the perma- joy, inherited from Spinoza’s philosophical nent transgression of all rules, the ethics (Deleuze 1988: 25–9) and stated as violation of all taboos, instant gratifi- the central virtue in Rosi Braidotti’s affirma cation as the path to enlightenment; tive posthuman ethics of joy (Braidotti and it overcomes old-fashioned ‘binary’ Hlavajova 2018: 221–4), as one of the most thought, the dualism of mind and life-affirming emotions. body, in claiming that the body at its To define ‘joy’ in an ethical context most material (the site of sex and lust) Erich Fromm’s argumentation might be is the royal path to spiritual awaken- employed. In To Have or to Be? (1976), he ing. (Žižek 2010: 7, italics in original) contrasts joy to pleasure:
Žižek’s argumentation, however, misses Joy is the concomitant of productive the point that instead of a transgression of activity. It is not a ‘peak experience,’ dualism, it is rather a reversed dualism that which culminates and ends suddenly, has come to the fore. Principally, this quote but rather a plateau, a feeling state that demonstrates this particular understanding accompanies the productive expres- of the body that has developed in the con- sion of one’s essential human facul- text of the discourse of physiology. Namely, ties. Joy is not the ecstatic fire of the society in the West is faced by a hedonis- moment. Joy is the glow that accom- tic utilitarianism, an imperative of main- panies being. (Fromm 1976: 117) taining and enhancing one’s body, and the sacralization of new, fit and strong bodies, Joy lights up the whole room, joy can which then also presumes either no reli- create an atmosphere. It does not func- gion beyond scientific discourse, or a fast- tion in isolation – we are together in joy, track religion that works as a ‘magic pill’ for joined, before conscious action is taken. human effectiveness and societal success. Thus, joy allows us to experience how it is What is important here is to remem- to be joined before we are divided. Joy is ber the symbiotic and processual nature also importantly a process, a felt sensation of human enfleshedness. If the body is (i.e. it is carnal or leiblich), it can be felt in rephrased in its processuality, the enfleshed the stomach, but at the same time it extends self becomes part of the world, a living our bodily borders beyond what is usually inside and around our environments, co- conceptualized as a border – we can feel joy constituting life as we know it. As part of as togetherness, it is something that exists processes in the world, meaning is con- beyond the self. It is also fleeting as well stituted as a doing, a happening, and an as transformative. Thus, joy seems to con- event. Meaning is not something one cap- stitute a clear example of materiality and tures and constrains in objects. Rather, it is enfleshedness in a senseful setting. processual, and, thus, intercarnal – we all Similarly, one could analyse all the rest connect and intersect on all possible levels. of emotions, feelings, affects and other sen- Upon the basis of such a processual view, sations that exist in our relationship with responsiveness and intentionality can be the world, rather than in us as autonomous viewed as balanced, outside an imperative subjects, but it seems that joy best exempli- of autonomy. fies the intercarnal aspect of senseful activ I would like to exemplify the matter ities that include also spiritual experiences with the seemingly immaterial example of of humankind, and is inclusive; that is to
Approaching Religion • Vol. 10, No. 2 • November 2020 136 say, it reflects sensations that go outside a then’ limitation recedes, and one is not species limitation. The multiplicity that we compelled to answer to the question as to are is changed and supplemented but never whether we are hormonal or angry, as obvi- ceases to be and become, and with this per- ously both are true, and neither is possible sistence allows conceiving an enfleshed without the other. selfhood. Here I would like to argue that the con- Becoming always already precedes the struction of such lived materiality is con- direction of having and is the founding gruent with spirituality or an assumption of force of any kind of selfhood to form. The a deeper, spiritual meaning of life – simul- self might fear its instability and fragil- taneously, it does not exclude also non-reli- ity, as the ego-function longs for fixation, gious attitudes, as it does not presuppose for identity, for anchoring what ‘we are’ any essentialist meaning, but rather evi- into a comprehensible, thing-like form. dences that the source of all senseful life is Transformation and process, however, are embedded and enfleshed, as well as inter- at the very core of what ‘life’ is – without carnal, as bodies extend well beyond the motion, no life can be imaginable. Think of borders of any concrete thing or entity, and Immanuel Kant’s depiction of a dove: ‘The we are thus existing and co-created sym light dove, in free flight cutting through the biotically with all other life always, not only air the resistance of which it feels, could get before the moment of being born. the idea that it could do even better in air- I argue that this is the space from which less space’ (Kant 1998: 129). ethical meaning-making and solidarity in The very instability anxiously ques- thinking can be sought for – a common tioned and examined by philosophers of ground of not-knowing, non-fixedness, many kinds, is at the base of how the self discontinuity, and contingency. A common continuously becomes a self – a transforma indetermination that, nevertheless, also tive, embedded and enfleshed self (think includes our enfleshed cultural multiplic- of the butterfly) that is alsointercarnal and ity and opens the horizon for posthuman lacking in fixed boundaries, not only on the affirmative ethics that includes differenti inside, between the elusive ego and the pre- ation and a multitude of interpretations as conscious ‘other’ of our flesh, but also on an ontological predisposition, not a prob- the outside, between the carnal body and lem to be solved in hopes of achieving the other of the surrounding space. autonomy from the colloquial ‘air’ that sus- This co-constitution leaves us with an tains life and the processual self. Besides instability that is nevertheless also a cre demonstrating the obvious ethical limita- ative space for manifold interpretations tions of a negative or a reactive nihilism, of spirituality, sense, and meaning – the the ‘blind spots’ of dualism also further jus- founding discontinuity does not consist of tify immanent materiality as a solution for reducible particles, it is rather a pluralistic seeking spirituality, not in some excluded, ally interpretable symbolic field, open to isolated factors of our being, but rather in a Nietzschean perspectivism. Viewed via the entanglement of life. To not seek some- a nature–culture continuum, the carnal, thing ‘out there’ (whether an uploaded con- processual, and responsive self can be sciousness or a heavenly abode), but rather constituted as senseful materiality, non- turn towards the being – among other – essentialist, but always transformative – a in solidarity with our fellow beings in this site of history and agency alike. The ‘if … dance of life.
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