Impacts from the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

Radiofrequency Use and Management: Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

January 1982

NTIS order #PB82-177536 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 82-600502

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 Foreword

This study responds to a request from the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation to evaluate the impacts on the United States of key decisions taken at the general World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC-79) and to consider options for preparation and participation in future international telecommunication conferences. It reflects congressional concern for the adequacy of existing machinery and procedures for U.S. policymaking and preparation for such conferences. WARC-79 and related international conferences and meetings demonstrate that contention for access to the radio spectrum and its important collateral element, the geostationary orbit for communication satellites, presents new and urgent challenges to vital U.S. national interests. The growing differences among nations over the use of the radio spectrum and related satellite orbit capacity are reflected in the Final Acts of WARC-79 which will be submitted to the U.S. Senate in January 1982, for advice and consent to ratification. Given the complexities of spectrum management in a changing world environment and the increased importance of telecommunications to both developed and developing nations, it is unlikely that traditional U.S. approaches to these issues will be sufficient to protect vital U.S. interests in the future. Problems require strategies not yet developed or tested. OTA acknowledges with thanks and appreciation the advice and counsel of the panel members, contractors, other agencies of Government, and individual participants who helped bring the study to completion.

JOHN H. GIBBONS Director

/// Radiofrequency Use and Management: Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979 Advisory Panel

Thomas E. Nelson, Chairman Former Director, Office of International Telecommunications Policy, Department of State

Ambassador Jacob Beam Harvey J. Levin Head of the U.S. Delegation to the 1973 Professor, Department of Economics Plenipotentiary Conference of the Hofstra University International Telecommunication Union Edgar T. Martin Nolan Bowie Former Engineering Manager Former Executive Director Broadcasting Service Citizens’ Communications Center U.S. Information Agency

Paul Dembling Ithiel De Sola Pool Former General Counsel Professor, Department of Political Science National Aeronautics and Space Massachusetts Institute of Technology Administration Raymond E. Spence Former Chief Engineer John M. Eger Federal Communications Commission Former Acting Director Office of Telecommunication Policy M. Jon Vondracek Director of Communications James C. Fletcher Center for Strategic and International Former Administrator Studies National Aeronautics and Space Georgetown University Administration Grover M. Yowell Walter R. Hinchman Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired) Former Chief Former Manager Common Carrier Bureau Navy Space Project of Naval Electronic Federal Communications Commission Systems Command

NOTE:: The Advisory Panel provided advice and comment throughout the assessment, but the members do not necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse the report for which OTA assumes full responsibility.

Iv Radiofrequency Use and Management: Impacts From the World Administrative Ratio Conference of 1979 Project Staff

John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTA Science, Information, and Natural Resources Division

Stephen E. Doyle* and Sam Hale,** Program Manager Communication and Information Technologies Program

Raymond B. Crowell, Project Director

Administrative Staff

Jeanette Contee Liz Emanuel Shirley Gayheart

Contractors

J. D. Barnla Kappa Systems Inc. Philip S. Cook John J. Kelleher Future Systems Inc. Susan Stocker William Hatfield Telecommunications Systems

OTA Publishing Staff

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer John Bergling Kathie S. Boss Debra M. Datcher Joe Henson

*Program Manager until March 1981. ** program Manager after March 1981. Acknowledgments Many individuals have assisted in various aspects of this study, each making a valuable contribution to the information and analyses assembled and presented here. Participation does not necessarily reflect agreement with the entire report or any particular aspect of the report. Contributors include:

Contractor Support Linda Bower Jack W. Herbstreit Leonard R. Raish Robert Tomkins J. Russell Burke Heather E. Hudson John Rheinhardt H. E. Weppler Ronald S. Eward Michael Jeruchim Reinhard Stamminger Richard Gould Nicholas Marzella John A. Stein George Hagn Harley Radin Michael Stoil

Reviewers Leo Buss Stephen J. Lukasik Arthur I.. Freeman Richard E. Shrum George Codding Carl Matthews Jonathan Gunter David P. M. Struba William J. Cook Richard Parlow Wendell Harris William R. Torak Robert L. Cutts Samuel E. Probst Edward R. Jacobs Charles K. Watt Arlan K, van Doom A. R. Rasmussen Donald Jansky Lou Feldner Anthony M. Rutkowski David Leive

Agencies Providing Information and Reviews Congressional Research Service, Federal Communications National Telecommunications Library of Congress Commission and Information Department of Defense National Aeronautics and Administration Department of State Space Administration U.S. General Accounting Office

Participants in the OTA Survey Perry G. Ackerman A. James Ebel Harold Kimball Alvin Reiner William Adams John M. Eger Emmett Jay Kitchen Glen Robinson Allen Anderson Harry A. Feigleson Alex C. Latker John T. Robinson Dexter Anderson Charles D. Ferris Robert E. Lee Anthony Rutkowski Lucian L. Arnone Milford R. Fink Stanley Leinwoll Peter Sawitz Earl S. Barbely Arthur L. Freeman Maury Lisann Kalmann Schaefer Jerome D. Barnla L. S. Gallemore Ray Livesay John Serafin Richard Barth Henry Geller Lloyd G. Ludwig Richard Shrum George Bartlett John Gilsenan Stephen J. Lukasik Hillyer Smith Jacob Bean E. Merle Glunt William A. Luther Neil M. Smith Martin W. Bercovici Abilio Gomez James B. McElroy Raymond E. Spence John Paul Berry Robert E. Greenquisit James C. McKinney Ronald F. Stowe Robert S. Black Wendell Harris Neal McNaughton David P. M. Struba Herbert T. Blaker Mervin L. Harrison George Mansur William R. Torak William Berman William Hatfield Richard B. Marsten Robert Tompkins Nolan Bowie Jack W. Herbstreit Edgar T. Martin Phillip G. Tremper Lewis Bradley Roger Herbstritt Sidney Metzger Calvin G. Tuggle Anne Branscomb Walter R. Hinchman John E. Miller Thomas Tycz Dan Brenner Earl J. Holliman Robert P. Moore Arlan K. van Doom Russell Burke David Honig Sharon Nelson R. J. Van Winegarten Leo Buss Gordon Huffcutt Thomas E. Nelson F. W. Voege Paul E. Carroll Marion Hayes Hull John O’Boyle Constantine Warvariv Anna L. Case Charles L. Hutchinson General James D. O’Connell James C. Warwick William Cooke Karyl A. Irion James E. ogle Walter E. Weaver Anthony M. Corrado Eugene Jackson Lawrence Palmer Hans Weiss Cullen M. Crain Edward Jacobs Vernon Pankonin H. Edward Weppler Robert L. Cutts George Jacobs Edwin Parker Howard A. White Satyendranath Das Donald Jansky Richard Parlow Clay T. Whitehead Wilfred Dean Michael C. Jeruchim Paul Phillips Harold Wigren Thijs DeHaas Raymond Johnson Neal Pike Francis K. Williams Willis D. DeHart Harold Kassens James B. Potts Elizabeth L. Young Ithiel de Sola Pool Wayne Kay Wilbur Pritchard Admiral Grover M. Yowell Wilson Dizard John J. Kelleher Samuel E. Probst Charles Dorian John W. Kiebler Joseph P. Rawley vi Contents

Chapter Page 1. Summary ...... 3 2. The Changing Requirements, Influences, and Motivations Among Nations for Use of the Radiofrequency Spectrum...... 25 3. Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum 37 4. WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ...... 67 5. Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies ...... 107 6. Findings, Conclusions, and Observations ...... 129 Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary...... 147 Selected Bibliography...... 157

vil Chapter 1 Summary Contents

— Page Background of Study...... 3 Principal Findings...... 4 General Observations and Trends ...... 5 U.S. Policymaking Structure and Processes for Spectrum Management and International Strategies...... 6 Need for High-Level Government Policy Coordination and Accountability...... 6 Need for New Strategies To Address Spectrum and Related Satellite Orbit Issues ...... 7 The Impacts of WARC-79...... 9 Improving U.S. Spectrum Management and Preparation for International Telecommunications Conferences ...... 12 U.S. Strategies for Dealing With International Spectrum Issues and ITU. . 14 Withdrawal From IT...... 15 Revised ITU Voting Formula ...... 15 Increased Regionalization of ITU...... 16 Better Coordination and Planning...... 17 Common-User System ...... 18 “A Priori" Allotment...... 19 U.S. Options Regarding the Final Acts of WARC-79...... 20 Chapter 1 Summary

Background of Study

The Final Acts of the General World Ad- spectrum and geostationary satellite orbit ministrative Radio Conference (WARC-79) locations. are to be submitted to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification. Issues vital WARC-79 was convened by ITU in an ef- to U.S. interests in continued efficient use of fort to reach global agreement on the revised the radiofrequency spectrum—including sat- international arrangements necessary for ef- ellites operating in geostationary or- ficient and interference-free use of the radio- bit–were addressed at WARC-79 and will be frequency spectrum. The Final Acts of the addressed at future, more specific confer- conference will constitute the “radio regula- ences of the International Telecommunica- tions, Geneva, 1979” and enter into force on tion Union (ITU). January 1, 1982 for those countries that have formally adopted the Final Acts. The The Senate Committee on Commerce, Sci- 1959 Radio Regulations, as partially revised ence, and Transportation requested that the by subsequent specialized administrative ra- Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) de- dio conferences, will be superseded. WARC- termine the impacts on the United States of 79 was of special importance because of the decisions negotiated at the general World broad scope of its agenda, which included Administrative Radio Conference (WARC- most of the major arrangements relating to 79), and consider options for preparation and radio, and because it was the first general ad- participation in future international telecom- ministrative radio conference since 1959 and munication conferences. The request reflects therefore included many developing coun- congressional concern for the adequacy of tries that had won their independence in the existing machinery and procedures for U.S. intervening two decades. telecommunication policymaking and prep- The telecommunication systems of the aration for international telecommunication United States are the most sophisticated, ef- conferences. It also reflects an awareness of ficient, and all-encompassing in the world. the vital and growing role that telecommuni- These systems are a vital element of our eco- cation plays in our society and our depend- nomic strength and security; they are an es- ence on the radiofrequency spectrum. sential part of our culture. Other nations, The purpose of this study was to examine recognizing the key role that telecommunica- WARC-79 in a comprehensive way–describ- tions play in national and international af- ing U.S. preparations and involvement, and fairs, are constantly striving to gain access the impact of the conference. However, no to telecommunication technology. Highly in- attempt was made to examine all issues and dustrialized nations seek to surpass the aspects of WARC-79, but rather to focus on United States in technological inventiveness certain important ones and analyze their and in the practical exploitation of the many consequences for the United States. The telecommunication subsystems that make study considered alternative structures, pro- up a modern “information society. ” cedures, and strategies to improve frequency As a leader in communication technology, spectrum planning and management to as- the United States has been able to devel- sure the United States of continued satisfac- op domestic telecommunication systems in tion of its commercial, Government, and na- large measure apart from the activities of tional security requirements for frequency other countries. At the international level,

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4 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979 the United States has played a leading role cient to protect U.S. vital interests in the in shaping an essentially benign and passive future. mechanism within ITU for allocating radio From the U.S. standpoint, the results of spectrum to certain specified purposes, and WARC-79 are mixed. The proceedings of an assuring spectrum users the right to operate administrative conference of ITU are gener- free from harmful interference by others. ally geared toward arriving at decisions and This international regime, which has suc- adopting provisions that are acceptable to ceeded in avoiding chaos in the use of radio- all nations with certain exceptions identified; frequencies, is coming under considerable an ITU member country is entitled to take a stress as the result of sharply increased de- reservation indicating that it will not be mand for communication services and result- bound by specific unacceptable decisions of ing congestion in economically attractive the conference. Therefore, finding a useful parts of the radio spectrum. WARC-79 and way to measure success and to evaluate a related international conferences and meet- country’s relative standing following an ad- ings demonstrate conclusively that conten- ministrative conference is not easy. Compar- tion for access to the radio spectrum and its ing specific U.S. proposals submitted in ad- important collateral element, the geostation- vance to the conference with the language of ary orbit for communication satellites, pre- the Final Acts of the conference is not a sents new and urgent challenges to vital U.S. straight-forward exercise. While such a com- national interests. The growing differences parison is important, it does not reflect the among nations over the use of the radio spec- underlying reasons and motives for par- trum and related satellite orbit capacity are ticular decisions, the problems encountered, reflected in the Final Acts of WARC-79. or any apparent trends important in evaluating results of an administrative radio confer- Given the complexities of spectrum man- ence. It is important to understand the inter- agement in a changing world environment vening events that underlie decisions, com- and the increased importance of telecommu- promises, reservations, and postponements; nication to both developed and developing not only to evaluate the results of WARC-79, nations, it is highly unlikely that traditional but to prepare for the many future confer- U.S. approaches to these issues will be suffi- ences important to U.S. interests.

Principal Findings

The most significant findings of the OTA ferences of ITU now scheduled to occur study are the following: over the next 7 years. 3. New U.S. approaches are necessary to 1. There is an urgent need for higher level address radio spectrum and related sat- attention to Government policy coordi- ellite orbit issues in a changing world en- nation and accountability for interna- vironment. Solutions to satellite orbit tional telecommunication issues gener- allocation and spectrum reallocation is- ally and for spectrum management issues as envisioned by the Third World sues and international negotiations spe- nations require strategies not yet devel- cifically. oped or tested. 2. Streamlined processes, coordinated 4. WARC-79 resulted in the loss of some Government policies, and sufficient re- U.S. flexibility in certain key spectrum sources on a continuing basis are essen- areas—particularly those affecting na- tial to effective and timely preparation tional defense—and enhanced opportu- for the several major international con- nities in many other areas. Ch. 1—Summary ● 5

5. Operating costs will increase for certain tive costs will need to rise to adequately radio services; interference protection implement WARC-79 decisions and pre- will become less certain; and administra- pare for future radio conferences.

General Observations and Trends

● The world environment for telecom- ests and values in ITU deliberations. In munications has changed significantly in re- other international forums, Third World cent years; two-thirds of the 155 member na- countries here raised related issues under tions of ITU can be classified as developing concepts of the New World economic order or Third World countries. There were 65 na- and New World information order. tions and seven groups of colonies present at ● U.S. requirements for access to the fre- the 1947 Atlantic City Conference, 80 na- quency spectrum and geostationary satellite tions and five groups of colonies at the 1959 orbit locations are expanding with the explo- WARC, and 142 nations (no colonies) at WARC-79. sive growth in telecommunication/information technology, the growing use of satel- ● There are basic differences between the lites, and the increasing dependence on radio United States and Third World countries and satellites for military and national secur- over the principles that should govern the ity purposes. allocation and use of the radio spectrum and ● The disparity between nations in their related satellite orbit capacity. There is inability to use the spectrum is growing; this creasing need to identify and assess options leads to growing disagreement over the allo- to reconcile the sometimes sharply divergent cation and use of specific frequency bands goals of developing and developed countries. for specific services. • Third World countries are increasingly • Spectrum decisions arrived at as a re- able to influence and shape international sult of voting within ITU, as opposed to the communication policies in international commonly practiced consensus approach, forums. will tend to be increasingly adverse to the United States. ● The United States must maintain its technological leadership and expand its in- ● International telecommunication devel- fluence if future actions in a “one-nation, opment is entering a phase in which regional one-vote” forum like ITU are to be favorable and domestic needs and policies will predom- to U.S. positions. inate, as opposed to more general global facilities expansion. The thrust will be on in- ● There has been a gradual shift toward traregional communications and the devel- recognizing the legitimacy of nontechnical opment or enhancement of interregional factors such as political and cultural inter- communication routes. 6 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

U.S. Policymaking Structure and Processes for Spectrum Management and International Strategies

Need for High-Level Government nongovernment spectrum users and to ad- Policy Coordination and just needs consistent with national policy Accountability objectives. The United States lacks an effective ongoing means of collecting data and de- ● The responsibility for spectrum man- veloping and adjusting guidelines to eval- agement and policymaking is divided among uate the merits of one spectrum use over any several Federal agencies with coordination other. conducted on a structured, but often infor- ● The State Department’s International mal basis without clear responsibility and accountability for policy at a high level of Communications Policy Office is not at a high enough level in the Department’s orga- Government. nization to prepare adequately for all the im- ● The United States does not have a con- portant upcoming international conferences sistent and coordinated national telecom- of ITU and make its influence felt in the up- munication policy because of a lack of ap- per echelons of Government and industry. preciation and concern at the top levels of Government and industry, a lack of high- ● Experts warn that lack of high-level con- level policy coordination for international cern has led to a shortage of trained and ex- telecommunication negotiations, and a fail- perienced spectrum management personnel ure to assign sufficient importance to inter- to replace those retiring from Federal Gov- national telecommunication matters, includ- ernment service; there has been insufficient ing spectrum management and the State De- attention to the need for personnel with sup- partment’s role in international negotia- plementary diplomatic, language, negotiat- tions. ing, economic, and legal skills.

● The United States is not adequately ● The rather general wording of Executive equipped to provide comprehensive assess- Order No. 12046 establishing the National ments required to effectively plan for the Telecommunications and Information Ad- future use of the radio spectrum, to forecast ministration (NTIA) leaves it ambiguous as future requirements, to assess the costs and to how far NTIA can go in its coordinating benefits of shifts to new technology, or to role with respect to U.S. international tele- evaluate alternative strategies to deal with communications policy, particularly when international issues regarding allocation and that mandate risks encroachment on the use of the radio spectrum and geostationary general regulatory responsibilities of the orbit. Federal Communications Commission. ● Within the U.S. telecommunications in- ● The schedule of 10 major international dustry there has been significant growth and conferences over the next 7 years to consider change over the past 15 years that have pro- a number of issues vital to U.S. interests un- duced more competing domestic interests derscores our concern that the United States with conflicting demands for spectrum use. reform its policymaking mechanisms and • The U.S. permanent spectrum manage- streamline the cumbersome and time-con- ment analytical mechanisms are not ade- suming procedures for developing U.S. pro- quately equipped to review and verify all the posals for international telecommunication stated requirements of Government and conferences. Ch. 1—Summary ● 7

• A mechanism is needed for collecting ceptions by a sufficient number of coun- and evaluating information on the perceived tries—or by a few large users—serves to needs of other nations for spectrum and reduce the value of the agreements and regu- orbit resources; their receptivity to intrare- lations for all users. Almost 500 footnotes to gional and/or common-user systems, and the International Table of Frequency Alloca- other factors. tions, and 83 protocol reservations taken at WARC-79, reflect increasing difficulty in Need for New Strategies To reaching consensus. Address Spectrum and Related ● Many of the nontechnical issues raised Satellite Orbit Issues in ITU—like those concerning reallocation of spectrum and guaranteed access to the geo- ● There are critical years ahead for ITU. stationary satellite orbit—are among the For the most part, communication activities many issues raised by Third World countries have been conducted by telecommunication in other international forums under the prin- experts and international diplomacy has ciples propounded by the New World eco- avoided debate on ideology and politically nomic order and New World information motivated objectives. The trend towards order. basing decisions on factors other than eco- ● The administrative regulations of ITU nomic and technical matters, and demon- serve the desirable objective—without the strated need is challenging ITU to provide use of sanctions for noncompliance—of mechanisms for resolving differences among avoiding the interference, incompatibilities, nations without a further shift toward the and chaos that would ensue if these or sim- polemical norms common to international ular regulations were not followed. political debate. • Developing countries will continue to • ITU is a political organization that performs both political and technical functions. seek changes in the existing mechanism for vesting rights in the use of frequencies and However, while there is a primarily technical focus for most ITU activities, there has been access to the geostationary orbit. They seek a gradual shift toward recognizing the legiti- a shift away from the current notification and coordination procedure on a “first-come, macy of nontechnical factors, such as polit- first-served” basis, toward a negotiated plan ical and cultural interests and values. The developed on an a priori basis. United States must recognize this shift and develop strategies to use its technology ● Third World countries are likely to more broadly as a tool for resolving interna- resist drastic changes in ITU rules and pro- tional issues that are not subject to technical cedures that operate on the principle of "one- solutions. nation, one-vote” and that provide them • The success of ITU has been due in large with increasing influence and power. They measure to the willingness of its members to will continue to seek technical assistance from the developed countries while pursuing adhere voluntarily to commonly arrived at ITU policies favorable to their own interests. agreements and regulations. The inherent flexibility in ITU processes has also en- . Third World countries will continue to hanced its effectiveness. Reservations and advocate changes in rules and procedures footnotes offer escape for individual coun- that help guarantee their access to the spec- tries from disagreeable decisions of the ma- trum and geostationary satellite orbit. They jority. However, excessive use of these ex- do not wish to rely on the “good efforts, ” 8 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrate Radio Conference of 1979

promises, and technical ability of the devel- dating new demands in the future. It is oped countries to “engineer-in” future sys- becoming increasingly difficult for the devel- tems on a case-by-case basis, as needed. oping countries to accept the proposition that they will have access to spectrum on an ● ITU administrative radio conferences interference-free basis at some future date as attempt to produce results that all nations their needs materialize. The outlook is that can accept. Reservations, footnotes, and the radiofrequency spectrum and the geosta- other means to reduce negative conse- tionary orbit will become more congested in quences allow each nation to more or less the lower, more economic and desirable fre- view the results as favorable. This approach quency bands even though use of frequen- supports the perception of having all win- cies by one country does not necessarily ners and no losers. However, because of preempt those same frequencies from use by growing differences among nations these other countries. procedures are beginning to produce diluted and cumbersome results that may render existing mechanisms to regulate use of spec- ● Certain U.S. spectrum requirements trum less and less meaningful. (e.g., for military radars) are not of interest to the majority of other countries. The diffi- • Because of competing interests and culty that faces the United States in seeking growing differences over use of the spectrum to convince a majority of the 154 other ITU there will be winners and losers in the fu- member countries to adopt regulations that ture as a result of the ITU decisionmaking accommodate U.S. radars in conflict with process. other possible uses by other countries is real ● WARC-79 showed the increasing influ- and was demonstrated at WARC-79. ence of the Third World as a political force in ITU. The struggle for influence between the . Frequencies and satellite locations allo- developed and developing nations will con- cated to individual nations are not vested in- tinue at future ITU conferences. At the pres- definitely under current ITU procedures, ent time, the developing countries derive and changes in operating parameters require their power from their collective numbers; recoordination and registration. This creates the developed countries from their technical uncertainty for present satellite system op- competence, know-how, and leadership. The erators. The risks may increase that spec- influence of the developing countries can trum and orbit will not be available to pro- most effectively be exploited in ITU legisla- vide for continuity of service from the pres- tive forums; the developed nations’ through ent to the next generation of satellites. More- ITU technical administrative organs. over, this problem is not overcome by the adoption of a negotiated rigid a priori allot- ● The preeminence of U. S technological ment plan to assure future access, since such leadership and technical ability served the a plan would tend to freeze technology and United States well in international spectrum accommodate only those new or second gen- negotiations when decisions were primarily eration satellites that fit the original tech- based on technical matters, but more and nical scheme. more U.S. problems with other countries involving the radio spectrum are influenced by political and economic considerations. ● The growing lack of agreement among nations over which specific frequency bands ● The developed countries are expanding should be allocated for which specific ITU their use of spectrum to higher frequency radio service classification (e.g., radioloca- bands as lower, more economical, bands be- tion, fixed-satellite, broadcasting) strongly come congested. They rely on technology to suggests that mechanisms other than serv- provide solutions to problems of accommo- ice classifications should be examined. —.

Ch. 1—Summary ● 9 —

. The voluminous, complex, and detailed tions are becoming more burdensome and provisions of the international radio regula- less meaningful to individual users.

The Impacts of WARC-79

The specific consequence of WARC-79 tion, and broadcasting satellites (and decisions on U.S. interests regarding par- their feeder links) in increasingly ticular services can best be treated in terms crowded orbits. Most of these satellite of how the conference dealt with specific spectrum uses have military as well as technical issues created by some significant civil applications. In addition, there is trends in telecommunications. These trends the continuing use of the SHF spectrum include the following: for terrestrial systems.

● The increasing demand for high frequen- The actions of WARC-79 with respect to cy (HF) spectrum by the more developed these operational trends, and the technical countries to meet maritime and interna- issues they raised, either closely reflected tional broadcasting needs conflicts with U.S. proposals or were acceptable to the the desires of the less developed coun- United States with certain important excep- tries to use HF for inexpensive domestic tions. However, this judgment hardly does communications. The reduction in the justice to the overall results of WARC-79, use of HF (3 to 30 MHz) by international particularly the future implications to the fixed point-to-point operations as United States. The long-term trends may be satellite and cable use expands is not running against the United States in the sufficient to offset this increasing de- sense that more problems without apparent mand. solutions are foreseen. The United States ● The rapid growth in very high frequency finds itself increasingly in a defensive mode, (VHF) (30 to 300 MHz) and ultrahigh trying to minimize losses rather than seek- frequency (UHF) (300 to 3000 MHz) ing significant changes to improve its long- land-mobile operations in the face of term posture. continuing vital U.S. military requirements, and the heavy use of these bands For example, at the same time that signifi- for TV broadcasting, now necessitates cant amounts of spectrum were added to the greater sharing of frequencies, e.g., by allocations for the fixed-satellite service radiolocation-sharing with radionaviga- (FSS), generally consistent with U.S. objec- tion and with other services, and by tives, the conference also adopted a resolu- land-mobile sharing with TV broad- tion that calls for a space planning confer- casting. ence to plan space services using the geosta- ● There has been rapid growth of both do- tionary satellite orbit that was not con- mestic and international fixed satellite sistent with U.S. objectives. The technical requirements in the super high fre- rules that affect the design and operation, quency (SHF) (3 to 30 GHz) spectrum and hence the cost, of satellite systems were coupled with growth in microwave radio in general agreement with U.S. positions, relay, space research, and Earth-explor- but the ability to implement new technol- ation satellite services, and the con- ogies and offer new services via satellite in tinuing need to protect important radio- the future depend in part on the decisions to astronomy operations. These require- be made at the space planning conferences in ments are being pressured by new de- 1985 and 1987 and the broadcasting satellite mands to accommodate mobile, naviga- conference scheduled for June 1983, to plan 10 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

broadcasting satellite service (BSS) in region tive subdivision approach usually relying on 2 (the Americas) in the 12-GHz band. a negotiated plan) have won past acceptance There is a significant difference between at conferences of ITU. Over the last 75 years the approach advocated by the United one or the other approach has been advocated and used by nearly all nations to allo- States for using the geostationary satellite cate spectrum, both internally and interna- orbit and any rigid a priori allotment and tionally. On a domestic level, the a posteriori planning approach that may be advocated approach is often coupled with an adjudica- by some developing nations. The United tion procedure for deciding among com- States, as well as many other countries, has peting applicants, as is the case in the consistently favored a flexible approach that United States. On the international level, ad- assigns orbit locations and satellite frequencies on a case-by-case basis, often referred to judication is almost impossible because of sovereignty claims. Most nations have been as “first-come first-served. ” The U.S. ap- unwilling to allow an international body to proach seeks to accommodate needs as re- determine whether they can or cannot use a quired and relies, at least in part, on techno- radio channel or satellite position. Where logical advancements and good engineering practices to “engineer-in” the next satellite channels become limited, the recourse in the recent past has been to adopt an a priori and accommodate all users. Such an approach is consistent with existing practice method. However, for the allocation of radio under ITU procedures for the notification, bands and services, like FSS, which are affected by rapidly changing technology, or coordination, and assignment of radiofre- which are fraught with political controversy, quencies generally. a priori methods tend to promote too ri- Many developing countries, on the other gid technical specifications or exaggerated hand, see a detailed negotiated plan that as- claims for channels. Much of the controversy signs specific frequency channels and orbital at WARC-79, and likely to emerge at future positions to each country under a rigid a conferences, arises from the question of the priori allotment plan as a means to guar- appropriate administrative arrangements to antee them future access. This approach determine rights to the use of frequencies does not depend upon advances in technol- free from harmful interference. ogy or new engineering techniques to assure accommodation of newcomers, but neither Several countries made planning proposals does it provide for technological improve- at WARC-79, ranging in scope from plan- ments that might accommodate growing re- ning all space services in all frequency bands quirements. The developed countries already allocated to space services, to planning only have the economic and technological means FSS in bands newly allocated to that service of launching and utilizing domestic satellite below 10 GHz. However, it is clear that FSS systems; most developing countries do not, was the main target of these proposals. De- even though many do make use of joint-user veloping a plan of this nature is an enormous systems like the International Telecommuni- undertaking and would not have been pos- cations Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) sible at WARC-79; however, acceptance of global satellite system. The developing na- the principle of “planning” was a major goal tions are concerned that as the “later com- of the developing countries. ers” to ITU (hence later served) there will be little or no way to accommodate their domes- The U.S. delegation worked to prevent any tic requirements. decision to convene a “planning” conference. When it became clear that such a conference Both a posteriori (the case-by-case ap- would be approved, the United States ar- proach usually relying on a notice and rec- gued successfully to keep the terms of ref- ordation procedure) and a priori (the collec- erence rather broad. The first session of “WARC on the Use of the Geostationary tention: increased operating costs, reduced Satellite Orbit and the Planning of Space operating flexibility, uncertainty surround- Services Utilizing It,” scheduled for July ing important pending issues, and the need 1985, will consider which services and which for thorough preparations to address issues frequency bands to “plan.” Further, the at future conferences. meaning of “plan” will be decided, and will There is no immediate cost impact im- not necessarily be a rigid “a priori” type. posed by WARC-79 regarding national The operative thought in determining the security systems, largely because of the fre- type of planning is to provide “in practice quency flexibility of existing U.S. equip- equitable access’ to the geostationary orbit. ment, the success of the U.S. delegation at The second session of the conference, sched- WARC, and reservations taken by the uled for September 1987, will meet to enact United States to counter adverse conference the decisions of the first. decisions. However, there will be future It has been the official position of the undetermined costs associated with fre- United States, shared by a number of other quency management, the development and countries, that a rigid a priori plan for FSS is procurement of more sophisticated equip- bad planning and bad engineering; that it is ment, compatibility studies, and coordina- likely to inhibit technological innovation, tion to prevent interference with competing result in inefficient use of the orbit and spec- users of the spectrum. trum, and have a major adverse impact on Department of Defense (DOD) interests U.S. telecommunication systems. Thus, the were impacted by losses of exclusivity for United States faces a significant challenge radiolocation (radar) operations and by in- over the next few years to develop compel- creased sharing with other services in many ling arguments against a rigid a priori ap- of the radiolocation bands. For example, proach and to carry that message convinc- demands that radar operations be discon- ingly to all parts of the world well before tinued in certain bands to accommodate ex- these conferences convene; or to find alter- panded FSS operations led to considerable natives acceptable to all parties. Some possi- acrimony, which was only eased by a non- ble alternatives are considered in the report binding U.S. commitment in a formal and summarized below. declaration to try to accommodate FSS in The adoption of the space planning con- those bands. The status of radiolocation was ference resolution is a vigorous reminder retained but the pressure from competing that the effective management of orbit and fixed-satellite interests will certainly con- spectrum utilization on both a worldwide tinue. and a regional basis is a continuing process As an indication of concern for security in- that is becoming increasingly more difficult terests, the United States took a reservation and complex. The achievement of U.S. objec- indicating that this country, in the operation tives at ITU conferences is no longer a mat- of radars in certain bands, will not guarantee ter of reaching painstaking agreement on protection to, nor coordination with, other technical solutions to problems of frequency radio services. The action was necessary be- coordination and multiple usage of spec- cause so many countries took footnotes stat- trum. It will also require sophisticated, ing their intention to operate fixed and political negotiations; imaginative, innova- mobile radio stations in bands hitherto used tive approaches; and long, hard bargaining. exclusively by radars. Radars are designed No immediate changes in operations using to operate in the presence of interference, the radio spectrum or geostationary satellite either purposeful or accidental. The degree orbit are required in the United States as a to which these counterinterference tech- result of WARC-79. However, there are niques will have to be improved and used de- longer range impacts that require prompt at- pends on how extensively other countries in- 12 ● Radiofequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

troduce fixed and mobile services in these Americas, the latter must now share fre- bands. quencies with the terrestrial fixed service, including private microwave systems widely U.S. objectives for the fixed-satellite service and the mobile-satellite service (MSS), used in the United States. This sharing could result in interference to BSS Earth station including DOD airborne, shipborne, and receivers operating in the same area as fixed ground-transportable Earth station sys- station transmitters. The private microwave tems, were achieved in large measure. Signif- users are concerned that sharing with direct- icant amounts of spectrum were added to broadcasting satellites is not feasible and allocations of the FSS and no operational or that they may be forced to vacate the band. economic dislocations were imposed on any This concern is reinforced by footnote 37870 existing FSS system. No major burden ap- of the Final Acts of WARC-79 that places pears to be placed on the U.S. Government terrestrial services on a noninterference or private operating entities in complying basis to BSS operating in accordance with a with the decisions of WARC-79 regarding plan to be prepared at the 1983 region 2 FSS. However, the differences between the broadcasting satellite conference. How this United States and many developing coun- conflict will be resolved within the United tries over approaches to use of the geosta- States is a current matter before the FCC. tionary satellite orbit, to be resolved by future conferences, leaves the impact on FSS A U.S. objective at WARC-79 was to gain uncertain. more frequency allocations for HF broadcasting (e.g., the Voice of America). This The U.S. objective to maintain the status could only be done at the expense of the quo for MSS in the 235- to 399.9-MHz band fixed service and was therefore opposed by used for U.S. Naval Fleet satellite com- many developing countries that use HF, munications was partially achieved; how- shortwave radio for internal domestic com- ever, coordination provisions (article N13A) munications. The HF broadcasting alloca- were added which included a condition that tions were increased conditioned on the suc- stations in MSS not cause harmful in- cessful outcome of a specialized HF broad- terference to those of other services oper- casting conference to be held in the mid- ating, or planned to be operated, in accord- 1980’s to “plan” for more efficient and ance with the table of allocations. The equitable use of the broadcasting bands. United States found this condition unaccept- While the conference agenda will be rela- able, and together with most of its North tively broad and open, it was apparent at Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies WARC-79 that the United States and the de- entered a formal reservation in the final pro- veloping countries have significant differ- tocol. ences as to the type of planning to be under- While WARC-79 largely eliminated fre- taken. quency-sharing between FSS and BSS in the

Improving U.S. Spectrum Management and Preparation for International Telecommunication Conferences

Consistent with the findings of past study ment and participation in international tel- commissions and task forces going back to excommunication conferences is inadequate. 1950, this study finds that the present U.S. Primarily, the problems stem from the ab- Government structure for spectrum manage- sence of high-level Government attention to Ch. 1—Summary ● 13 effective policy development and coordina- spectrum allocation decisions and the in- tion on a consistent and continuing basis troduction of newer technology. These with centralized accountability. should include techniques for evaluating the relative economic viability of alternative At least four options are available to the radio uses, as well as radio v. nonradio com- Congress in addressing this issue: 1) main- munication systems. Experience with eco- tain the status quo and make no changes; nomic techniques could be gained by limited 2) maintain the present structure, but raise application to certain selected services and the level of attention and accountability frequency bands. within the responsible agencies; 3) establish a mechanism—such as a task force of high- There have been problems in the timely level Government officials—to develop, ex- formation of U.S. delegations for ITU confer- amine, and make recommendations on struc- ences arising from the need for the early in- tural and procedural improvements, or; clusion of experts from industry and other 4) establish a permanent board, council, or nongovernment organizations. Preparations interagency committee of high-level Govern- for international telecommunications con- ment officials to be responsible and account- ferences could be improved by replacing the able for international telecommunication pol- ad hoc approach with an ongoing conference icy coordination and the preparations for in- preparatory structure with a focal point for ternational conferences. high-level responsibility and accountability and involving all the concerned Government Certain shortcomings in spectrum man- and nongovernment telecommunication in- agement could be corrected without any fun- terests. These problems could be addressed damental change in the structure of FCC or and the effectiveness of U.S. participation in NTIA. Assigning spectrum management a international telecommunications meetings higher priority, particularly within FCC, and improved by the following additional steps: using resources more efficiently would make a significant difference. For example, FCC 1. Industry and other nongovernment del- could improve its data base for spectrum egates could again be permitted to par- management with the help of its own com- ticipate fully as U.S. representatives at puter and spectrum experts. international telecommunication confer- The validation of spectrum requirements, ences and take any assignments on the and the apportioning of spectrum between delegation for which their skills and ex- Government and nongovernment users, perience qualify them. Legislation to ac- Needs closer scrutiny. A mechanism using complish this passed both Houses of the analytical tools to help evaluate needs and 96th Congress. However, the legislation assess priorities among competing users of to which it was added was vetoed by the the spectrum would provide decisionmakers President for reasons unrelated to the with basic information and data for use in exemption. establishing policies and reviewing require- 2. Consideration could be given to finding ments. While Federal spectrum require- means to comply with due process re- ments are reviewed by the Interdepartment quirements under the Administrative Radio Advisory Committee and its Spec- Procedures Act and still name industry trum Planning Subcommittee, this function and other nongovernment representa- needs to be strengthened and broadened to tives to delegations on a timely basis. effectively consider longer range impacts. 3. Guidelines and implementing mechan- Economic techniques (e.g., auctions, lot- isms could be established for naming the teries, spectrum fees, resale of frequency chairman and individual members of assignments, etc.) should be considered, at U.S. delegations. The qualifications re- least on an experimental basis, to provide quired, the distribution of skills needed, guidance on the consequences of different and type of representation desired could 14 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

be determined at an early stage of con- in the preparatory effort. Whatever spe- ference preparation. Individuals chosen cial Government assistance is required to serve on the delegation could be se- to assure particular representation lected from the best candidates avail- could be made available in the early able, especially those who participated stages of conference preparations.

U.S. Strategies for Dealing With International Spectrum Issues and ITU

U.S. participation in ITU faces new and From a strategic standpoint, the United difficult challenges. Having started in 1865 States has a wide range of options. At one as a relatively noncontroversial organization extreme, the United States could conclude of 20 nations concerned with the interoper- that the drawbacks of continued participa- ability of their telegraph systems, ITU has tion in ITU outweigh the benefits, and with- evolved into a tendencious assembly of 155 draw from the organization or decline to par- nations that look to ITU to solve fundamen- ticipate in its deliberations. At the other ex- tal issues of resource allocation increasingly treme, the United States could decide to vital to economic growth and development. avoid controversy within ITU and simply yield to other nations on controversial mat- The ITU structure, which was well suited ters. Between these extremes are a number to the analysis of interference between radio of alternatives. One that requires no struc- communication systems, and to achieving a tural or procedural changes in ITU would be consensus on noncontroversial matters better coordination of U.S. views and objec- among a small number of broader issues, is tives with other nations in advance of ITU sorely tested by the demands of numerous meetings, and better U.S. planning based on countries exhibiting the widest possible improved understanding of other nations’ range of technical, economic, cultural, and views. political backgrounds. An organization that has traditionally been concerned with tech- Another strategic option would be for the nical and operating standards for radio United States to seek to remove the most equipment and administrative mechanisms controversial issues from the ITU forum and that give a country the right to operate radio attempt to solve them in other ways. A cur- stations free from harmful interference from rent example would be to respond to the others is being asked to satisfy the demands demands of developing countries for “guar- of developing countries for “guaranteed ac- anteed access” to radio spectrum and satel- cess” to an equitable share of the radio spec- lite locations by developing the institutional trum and satellite locations that many of arrangements to ensure domestic communi- them have no immediate capacity to use. cation services to qualifying nations. This could be a common-user satellite system It is increasingly questionable whether either building upon the present INTELSAT U.S. negotiating skills and technological proficiency can secure essential U.S. goals and structure or creating a separate system for objectives in a forum that employs a “one- domestic services. nation, one-vote” decisionmaking formula From a -structural standpoint, assuming and in which the United States and the other that ITU can be changed, a number of op- industrial countries are greatly outnum- tions may be available. The United States bered by the less industrialized member could seek to revise the voting formula of countries. ITU to one more fair to the United States, Ch. 1—Summary ● 15 perhaps by giving added voting weight to fairly effective. However, it is likely that those countries that contribute most heavily ITU would disintegrate if the principal de- to the United Nations budget. A more mod- veloped countries abandoned it. Overall, the est proposal would be to increase the number lack of a central spectrum allocation and co- of ITU regions beyond the present three so ordination authority with global participa- that regional issues could be dealt with by a tion would probably lead to a more frag- smaller number of countries most directly mented use of the spectrum, with fewer com- concerned. mon worldwide channels, less standardization, and possible difficulties with inter- Withdrawal From ITU operability of certain common systems, and a general increase in interference problems Would withdrawing from ITU guarantee between services. the United States unhindered use of the spectrum allocation or frequency assignments the United States needs? Probably Revised ITU Voting Formula not. ITU members rely on the organization As an option less drastic than withdrawal to avoid interference from the radio signals from ITU, the United States might join with of others and to achieve interoperability of other industrial nations to force a revision of certain mutually used systems, such as ra- the ITU’s “one-nation, one-vote” decision- dionavigation. The assignment of a par- making formula toward one that would re- ticular frequency is of little value if others flect the dominance of these nations in the feel free to use it for purposes that cause in- actual use of the spectrum. If successful, terference. There are no effective interna- this option would greatly reduce the ability tional sanctions to force compliance with of the Third World nations to block or force ITU decisions. Therefore, the United States changes in U.S. positions. relies, as do all nations, on the voluntary A revised voting formula might reduce the agreement and cooperation of other nations contention over spectrum allocation matters to refrain from interfering with its use of the at ITU; make ITU more efficient; help to spectrum. make spectrum use more efficient by pre- For applications that are vulnerable to including the adoption of unworkable alloca- terference, U.S. preemption of spectrum (i.e., tion schemes; and be no less fair than the use what we wish to use) would be ineffective voting practices used in a number of other because any nation that chose to interfere, international bodies that benefit Third whether for a valid need or by intentional World nations without being controlled by jamming, could greatly reduce the value to them. The stimulus for concurrence of Third the United States of the preempted spec- World nations with such a proposal would be trum. Any preemption for uses that were the possibility that, were it rejected, the de- invulnerable to interference (e.g., high-power veloped countries might withdraw from ITU radar systems with electronic countermeas- and render it essentially irrelevant. ure capacity) would likely result in retalia- The reaction of Third World nations is dif- tion by other nations in areas where the ficult to predict, but it seems most likely United States is vulnerable. that they would bitterly resist any reversal It is conceivable that the United States of their recent successful trend toward fuller could abandon ITU and establish a more participation and refuse to make any conces- congenial grouping of developed countries as sion on ITU voting formulas. From a general a forum for coordination to avoid radio in- foreign policy standpoint, it is important to terference, and simply ignore other coun- consider how much support the United tries. Coordination and information ex- States might obtain from other developed change would become less certain, but still countries, many of which do not feel the 16 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference Of 1979 ...——

spectrum problems as acutely as the United the particular issue. The purpose would be to States. The United States must also con- reduce the number of nations debating or sider whether it wishes to take an assertive voting on issues that do not affect them policy stance toward ITU apart from a gen- directly, thus reducing unnecessary conten- erally more assertive stance toward Third tion. World nations. WARC-79 was attended by 142 nations. It may not be necessary that the proposed Approximately 1,670 delegates and advisors change in voting arrangements apply to all met for 11 weeks and considered nearly ITU spectrum decisions, but just to those 17,000 proposals (more than 900 from the allocations that might qualify as major mat- United States), and held more than 900 meet- ters. The latter case is equivalent to estab- ings. Surely any approach that might help lishing a new, separate forum with revised limit further WARCs to more modest pro- voting arrangements and routing major mat- portions would be worthy of study. More im- ters to that forum rather than to ITU. portantly, when nations vote on issues that Objectively, it would seem that the in- do not directly affect them the opportunities to trade votes at no cost to themselves, but terests of the developing countries lie with which help others to sustain confrontations. the continued existence of ITU and with con- Large meetings also tend to encourage bloc tinued technical and economic aid from the voting, which has already begun to emerge developed countries. If this choice were clearly and convincingly drawn, the Third at ITU. Thus, subdividing ITU into smaller World nations would probably come to rea- units, either on the basis of geographic sub- lize that these benefits outweigh such hypo- regions or on the basis of particular issues, thetical advantages as satellite orbital slots would divide the Third World bloc into that many do not have the capability to use. smaller, less dominant groups. Whether they would ultimately decide the Decentralized decisionmaking does not matter on objective grounds is difficult to guarantee that the U.S. position will prevail. predict. In any event, it appears unlikely Being outvoted by 10 to 1 is no more satisfy- that a change in voting within ITU is possi- ing than being outvoted by 154 to 1. How- ble under the present structure. ever, it is easier to bargain in detail with 10 nations than 154, and if a quid pro quo must Increased Regionalization of ITU be offered, the total cost is likely to be lower. At present, ITU divides the world into The mechanics and economics of increas- three geographic regions and many issues ing substantially the number of conferences that can be treated separately and effective- is also important to consider. The limited ly in a single region are considered in this U.S. professional staff available to prepare way. (Region 1 covers Europe, the U. S. S. R., for and attend spectrum conferences is al- Turkey, Mongolia, and Africa. Region 2 cov- ready stretched thin, and if the United ers North, Central, and South Americas, the States does not wish simply to skip many of the meetings— a risky proposition—this Caribbean, and Greenland. Region 3 covers staff would need to be considerably aug- South Asia, Australia, New Zealand, and the mented. The developing countries would find Pacific.) Regional administrative radio con- it even more difficult to prepare for a heavy ferences are scheduled on a variety of spe- schedule of meetings. cific issues, allowing WARCs to “spinoff” certain controversial matters. One option Increased decentralization of ITU could, in would be to extend this process of region- principle, lead to greater fragmentation in alization on a geographic basis to smaller the use of the spectrum, with the same bands subregions, and/or on an issue basis to in- being used for different purposes in different clude only those nations directly affected by regions to a much greater extent than is now Ch. 1—Summary ● 17 the case. While this may be acceptable in the ity. Creating a role for the developing coun- short run, the long-term implications are tries in cooperative planning efforts is likely worthy of study. If, for example, a new serv- to make them more receptive to the positions ice were proposed that would be global in and plans that are forthcoming. character, obtaining the necessary global spectrum allocation might require changes Long-range planning of spectrum utiliza- in the allocations to many different services tion is presently inadequate and not easily in many different locales. At the least, it accomplished in an area where technological might be necessary to create an institution- rate of change is rapid and in a competitive alized system for coordinating decentralized system like that in the United States where decisions. policy makers are more likely to be responding to problems than to be developing long- Better Coordination and Planning range plans. However, better long-range planning for telecommunication services and As a relatively conciliatory approach, the spectrum needs is clearly necessary to cope United States could mount a major effort to effectively with the ITU allocation process. develop long-term plans for spectrum use Developing and sharing planning techniques that would take into account the spectrum and data with other countries would not requirements of developing nations, to aid make a new planning process vastly more them in understanding the realistic options difficult or costly, and might make it more available to meet their short- and long-term reliable in the long run. needs, to offer such technical and economic It is also necessary to know the extent to assistance as might be needed to enable them to participate actively in the planning which developing countries’ positions at process, and to seek their concurrence with ITU are based on their own vital interests fair, objective, and realistic proposals. rather than on misunderstandings and politics; it is unlikely that they would com- To a significant extent, the confrontations promise vital interests for the sake of com- initiated by Third World nations in ITU are ity. A cooperative planning process would based on suspicion and mistrust of devel- tend to expose true interests and clarify the oped countries. Perhaps this is based on a negotiations. lack of understanding of the true potential of technology to create the spectrum resources As a practical matter, the majority of the they will need in the future. But many Third developing countries cannot now make use World nations also question whether they of advanced communications technology will be able to take advantage of that tech- without technical and economic assistance nology and they question the good faith of from technologically advanced countries. If the developed countries to share the benefits the majority of nations were to vote to adopt of advanced technology. rules that limit or preclude the use of advanced technology to which they do not have The fact remains that there is adequate independent access, communication capabil- spectrum for all nations at the present and ity would suffer and costs would increase in that technology will very likely expand the the long term for all users. Thus, the cost of effective utility of the available spectrum to assisting other countries in using advanced satisfy future needs. The problem for the technology must be balanced against the United States is to convince other nations, cost to the United States of not being able particularly the developing countries, that to take full advantage of such technology spectrum and orbit capacity will be available ourselves. This equation deserves close anal- and that their needs for service can be satis- ysis. fied. Technical assistance can be very useful in this regard, and economic assistance can Cooperative planning has worked in the help make the benefits of technology a real- past; the United States was a leader in coop- 18 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979 erative planning for INTELSAT and the In- would provide the private capital and tech- ternational Maritime Satellite Organization nological resources necessary to construct (INMARSAT). The exact mechanism for co- and launch the system, and would operate operative planning is an important and com- and manage it in conjunction with other plex matter, made more difficult by divided using nations. All nations in the joint ven- responsibility in the United States for com- ture would have the option of purchasing a munications policy in general and spectrum share of the common enterprise, up to their planning in particular. However, it should be actual percentage of use of the system, and possible to graft onto the existing structure sharing proportionately in any profits. Such a sufficiently comprehensive mechanism an arrangement would be similar to that gov- with high-level responsibility to assure effec- erning the INTELSAT global satellite sys- tive long-range planning and to foster coop- tem used for international telecommuni- eration with other nations. cations. High-capacity satellite systems employing technology to make a common- As an alternative, ITU could be invested user system economic and operationally at- with a planning staff to undertake long- tractive to developing countries for domestic range coordination, analysis, and planning. services could be part of the existing Such a “neutral” planning expertise might INTELSAT structure or a separate struc- be less likely to be mistrusted by Third ture established for this purpose. World nations, and perhaps more capable of defusing potential disagreements. Naturally, Many developing nations are concerned the United States would participate in the that the satellite orbit locations are being oc- process and perhaps may more easily influ- cupied rapidly on a “first-come, first-served” ence a planning process in which the meas- basis, and that by the time they are in a posi- ure of power is technical expertise, rather tion to use satellite systems there will be no than influence an ITU conference in which desirable orbit locations left for them. It the measure of power is votes. The United seems clear that the requirements of devel- States has consistently opposed any in- oping countries will be for satellite service crease in the power of ITU, particularly, ef- and not for satellite orbit locations that they forts to expand the planning role of the In- may not be able to use. This option would ternational Frequency Registration Board. provide service without allocating dedicated orbit locations for individual users. A broader, more extensive, and more conciliatory approach to international spectrum Moreover, the cost of developing and planning would be required under this option launching a dedicated satellite system is and could have a real chance of success, very high, well beyond the capability of most given some major changes in the U.S. ap- developing countries for the foreseeable proach. In the long run it could be the least future. This option could provide satellite expensive and most effective option avail- service well in advance of the time these able to this country. countries could afford their own systems, and much more cheaply. No large initial capital investment would be required from Common-User System user nations, and there would be little risk. As an alternative to contention for sat- While this policy option does not address ellite slots on the geostationary orbit, the the full range of problems before ITU, it does United States and other developed countries offer the prospect of relieving the pressure could enter into a joint venture with develop- on a particularly important and contentious ing countries to construct, launch, and oper- issue. If low cost and technically attractive ate a common satellite system to meet do- domestic satellite capacity is made available mestic needs for telecommunication and/or through an international organization that broadcast services. The developed nations accommodates the sovereignty interests of Ch. 1—Summary ● 19 each country, many developing countries tial degree of flexibility important to the could come to see access to orbital slots and United States, including the key qualifica- satellite frequencies as a side issue with tion of a requirement for regular technolog- availability of service being the main objec- ical updating that would help to avoid the tive. Increasing adoption of the INTELSAT- worst consequences associated with rigid al- type alternative would free up orbital slots lotment schemes. for those major developing countries that As far as the United States is concerned, continue to desire their own separate domes- certain types of a priori allotment plans tic systems whether for political reasons, or would not be as objectionable as others. because requirements justified such a sys- Plans based on sound engineering and opera- tem economically. tional parameters might be workable inter- A common-user system need not require nationally, at least on a regional basis. In- any Government funding by the United deed, U.S. domestic satellite operations are States. Sufficient capital and technical re- based more or less on an a priori approach. sources exist in the private sector in the In the long run the United States may have United States, and within Europe and enough satellite capacity, made possible by Japan, to construct such a system as a com- advanced technology, to meet domestic mercial venture with expectations of future needs even if the orbit and system available markets for follow-on equipment and serv- to the United States is reduced. In the short ices. Alternatively, such systems could con- run, the United States already has substan- ceivably be initiated with World Bank loan tial numbers of operational satellites with guarantees. additional satellite systems planned for operations in the near future. “A Priori” Allotment In addition to the possible advantages that may result from improvements in tech- The United States could agree to par- nology, there are two factors that may help ticipate with other nations in the develop- reduce the impact of a priori allotment plans ment of a long-range plan for the utilization on the United States. One is advanced tech- of satellite orbit locations to serve partici- nology, including cellular satellite technol- pating nations’ domestic communications re- ogy, already on the drawing boards, which quirements. This plan would assure that or- will permit the construction of a large, wide- bital slots would be available for the use of band satellite that can provide very large ca- all nations when needed. In exchange for this pacity from a single orbit slot. The other fac- agreement, the developed nations would like- tor is the particular geography of region 2 ly insist that the plan be based on sound op- (North and South America). From the stand- erating principles and be updated regularly point of using the geostationary satellite to take account of the latest, most efficient orbit, region 2 is naturally divided into two technology available. parts–those nations located in the Northern A priori allotment of satellite orbit slots Hemisphere and those in the Southern Hem- has been a cause celebre among developing isphere. A second geographic factor that countries. At WARC-79, a resolution was serves to separate the hemispheres is the dis- adopted to consider this issue at a two-part placement in longitude of the nations in the space planning WARC in the mid-1980’s. Northern and Southern Hemispheres. Also, The United States has opposed a priori allot- those nations closer to the Equator enjoy the ment plans for satellite service as wasteful widest possible visibility of the orbit and and inhibiting to technological advance- have the greatest flexibility in positioning ment. Although this option goes a long way satellites. Moreover, the North American toward accommodating the position of the Continent consists of three countries with developing countries, it maintains a substan- very large land areas that made the use of 20 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979 advanced technology using shaped-beam an- ditional allotments would be available. This tennas attractive. would force designers to plan their systems Although an a priori plan is implied in the on the basis of short-term recovery of invest- approach, it could be implemented without ment. the adverse limitations of a rigid a priori plan such as adopted at the 1977 WARC. If this It is also important to examine the tactical approach is possible, then an a priori allot- aspects of agreeing to an a priori allotment ment to one country would not include using policy. By participating in the development the same allotment for others if certain of a plan, the United States would be in technical and operational guidelines were a position to influence the type of plan followed. adopted and possibly gain concessions on other issues of importance to the United There may even be some benefits to the States. United States from adopting an a priori allotment plan. At present, there is consider- In short, the linkages and tradeoffs among able uncertainty about the outcome of the these and other possible approaches to 1983 Region 2 Broadcasting Satellite Ad- future use of the geostationary satellite orbit ministrative Radio Conference and the space cast each U.S. policy option in a different planning conferences in the mid-1980’s. If a light. Careful review in each case is needed decision is postponed, the uncertainty would for sound policy formulation. Rather than re- continue. A situation would then be perpet- jecting a priori allotments as inherently uated in which any existing domestic satel- wasteful, it may be in the U.S. interest to ex- lite orbit slot may be withdrawn in the fu- amine the practical effects, to examine the ture. Moreover, no satellite system designer possibility of a quid pro quo, and if the result could plan the logical evolution of a proposed looks acceptable, to-work with the develop- system with confidence that the required ad- ing countries to implement the plan.

U.S. Options Regarding the Final Acts of WARC-79

As the largest and most technically ad- could have a direct impact on U.S. telecom- vanced user of the radio spectrum on a munications operations. worldwide basis, the United States ap- proached WARC-79 with the greatest stake The Final Acts of WARC-79 will ultimate- in reaching agreement on a new table of fre- ly come before the U.S. Senate to be consid- quency allocations and a revised set of re- ered for ratification as a treaty. There are lated technical and administrative regula- several options available: tions. 1. The United States can ratify the Final While the Department of State has indi- Acts without delay. Completing the rati- cated official U.S. satisfaction with the out- fication process prior to January 1, 1982 come of WARC-79, the United States ulti- when the 1979 radio regulations enter mately took six reservations in the final pro- into force will indicate to other nations tocol to the Final Acts of WARC-79, helping our goodwill and determination to abide to bring the overall total to 83. Two of the six by our international obligations. The were directed at political issues, but the re- Final Acts constitute the “radio regula- maining four were directed at decisions that tions, Geneva, 1979, ” which replace the Ch. 1—Summary ● 21 —. — —

1959 regulations as partially revised by ratification of those provisions (which the administrative radio conferences would have to be listed in precise detail) held in 1963, 1966, 1971, 1974, and 1978. where the United States chooses to re- The Final Acts also incorporate the pro- main bound by the provisions of exist- visions of the 1977 broadcast satellite ing regulations previously ratified WARC as modified by WARC-79. (which would also have to be listed in 2. The United States can ratify the Final precise detail). Acts with conditions, thereby under- 5. The United States can withhold ratifica- scoring and making explicit the reservation of the Final Acts pending the out- tions taken at Geneva. In particular, the come of several important international United States could reiterate the rea- conferences dealing with telecommuni- sons for taking reservations in the pro- cations issues. This would deny FCC tocol to the Final Acts to emphasize and the current administration any legal U.S. concern regarding the issue raised. basis for implementing decisions taken 3. The United States can ratify the Final at WARC-79, many of which were Acts with additional reservations that strongly advocated by the United either state U.S. refusal to acquiesce to States and fought for by the U.S. delega- particular decisions taken at WARC-79, tion and which are scheduled for imple- beyond those cited in earlier U.S. pro- mentation by other ITU members on tocol statements, or set forth U.S. policy January 1, 1982. The most immediate in- with respect to future actions by ITU or ternational telecommunications confer- specific implementation of the WARC- ence of great importance to the United 79 Final Acts. While it is not uncommon States is the September 1982 plenipo- for the U.S. Senate to attach conditions tentiary. The actions taken at this con- to a resolution of ratification of a bilat- ference to revise the ITU convention will eral international agreement, which the be basic to all future conferences of ITU. other party can readily accept or reject 6. The United States can reject the Final through its own ratification processes, Acts of WARC-79 in their entirety and attaching conditions to a multilateral announce that we intend to abide by agreement raises difficulties. the preexisting radio regulations, as 4. The United States can ratify the Final amended. The consequences would be Acts in part, specifically withholding similar to those cited above. Chapter 2 The Changing Requirements, Influences, and Motivations Among Nations for Use of the Radiofrequency Spectrum Contents

Page Introduction ...... 25 Can the United States Disregard the Motivations of Other Nations? ...... 27 How Dependent is the United States on the Radiofrequency Spectrum Including Use of the Geostationary Satellite Orbit?...... 27 How Different From Other Countries is the United States in Its Need and Use of the Radio Spectrum ...... 29 Why Is It Necessary To Coordinate Radiofrequency Use Internationally?. 30 How Is the Radiofrequency Spectrum Managed in the United States?. . . . . 31 How Is the Radiofrequency Spectrum Managed Internationally? ...... 32 Issues Addressed in the OTA Study ...... 33 Chapter 2 The Changing Requirements, Influences, and Motivations Among Nations for Use of the Radio frequency Spectrum

Introduction

By any measure, the 1979 World Adminis- rather to focus on certain important results trative Radio Conference (WARC-79) was a and analyze their consequences for the complex international event. The facts are United States. deceptively simple. For 11 weeks in the WARC-79 was held to reach global agree- autumn of 1979, between September 27 and ment concerning the international arrange- December 5, the nations of the world met at ments necessary for efficient and interfer- Geneva as a legislative organ of the Interna- ence-free use of the radio spectrum. ITU tional Telecommunication Union (ITU), a brings nations together almost continuously specialized agency of the United Nations at meetings and conferences necessary for (U.N.). The conference produced a 984-page coordinating the use of all telecommunica- document–the Final Acts of WARC-79– tions (conveying information by wire, radio, which sets forth regulations, resolutions, fiberoptic, etc.). WARC-79 was special be- and recommendations for radio communica- cause of the broad scope of its agenda, which tion worldwide. For most nations of the included most of the major arrangements re- world, those Final Acts will represent a mul- lating to use of the radio spectrum. These ar- tilateral treaty and a basic source of public rangements are of two major types: 1) tech- international law. The U.S. Senate must give nical and operational standards; and 2) ad- its advice and consent to ratification before ministrative mechanisms that give member the United States becomes a party to the countries the right to operate particular treaty. radio stations free from harmful interference These simple facts, however, do not begin from others. Governments around the world to explain why hundreds of thousands of have their own national arrangements for staff-hours, millions of dollars, and tens of this, and devise necessary international ar- millions of pages were expended in prepara- rangements through ITU. This activity is tion for, and conduct of, this conference. often referred to as “spectrum manage- They also do not explain why so many tele- ment. communication specialists and policy makers The first function, relating to technical around the world have focused on and ana- and operational standards, consists of estab- lyzed this conference and the events sur- lishing specifications concerning the way rounding it. The purpose of this report is to radio equipment should perform, the way it examine WARC-79 in a comprehensive should be operated (particularly in emergen- way—describing U.S. preparations and in- cy situations), and which portion of the spec- volvement, and the impact of the conference. trum should be reserved for particular kinds However, no attempt was made to examine of radio uses. This last function is usually ac- all issues and aspects of WARC-79, but complished by defining certain kinds of radio

25 —

26 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979 .—

“services’ such as broadcasting, mobile, The United States, for example, is unique radiolocation, etc., and setting forth a “table in many ways. While most countries have of allocations” indicating which frequency placed the ownership and operations of tele- bands are reserved for particular services. communication systems in government or Both in the United States, and in ITU, much public hands, the United States supports work usually surrounds the preparation of private ownership and commercial opera- the table of allocations. Indeed, much of the tions. Government ownership and operation work at WARC-79 was devoted to this task. of communication systems are reserved for those cases where commercial systems are The second major management function, either not available, or inappropriate, as in determining rights in operating radio sta- the case of some military operations. Even tions is not always easily accomplished to so, a large part of U.S. military communica- everyone’s satisfaction. Whether domesti- tions are handled by commercial systems. cally or internationally, when radio channels The United States is dedicated to the princi- become limited, and the possibility of sta- ple of free enterprise with private and public tions interfering with each other on the same access to the radio spectrum. frequency becomes likely, some kind of administrative arrangement must be estab- The differences between the Western na- lished for deciding which country has the tions and the East bloc countries have been right to operate a radio facility free from reflected in world forums like the United Na- harmful interference in a given geographical tions for many years. However, the most area. In the domestic situation, a govern- basic change in the distribution of influence ment agency simply devises and enforces in the world has been the emergence of over a methods of doing this. On the international hundred developing nations since World level, the matter is more complicated be- War II. Even more significant is that these cause every nation regards itself as abso- nations are increasingly organized around lutely sovereign, unwilling to be governed by their common plight of underdevelopment the dictates of any other nation or an inter- and they have exercised increasing influence national organization. As a practical matter, and power in international arenas where however, the desire to maintain interference- votes are cast on the basis of “one-nation, free radio communication has led most na- one-vote. ” This does not mean that there is tions to follow arrangements fashioned at solidarity among Third World countries on conferences of ITU. all communication and radiofrequency spectrum matters. On the contrary, there are The role of communications within a coun- many and varied differences among such try depends on its political system, the state diverse nations as India and Indonesia, of economic development, access to technol- Nigeria and Tanzania, or Brazil and Cuba. ogy, and the nature of its society. No two Nevertheless, on matters of broad principle countries are exactly the same and the use of and approaches to the use of world resources communication varies greatly among the and management of the radio spectrum and countries of the world. On a broad basis, the geostationary satellite orbit, the focus of distinctions are generally made among three world politics has shifted towards the Third groups: the more highly developed industrial World. There are many questions and issues democracies; the varying stages of develop- surrounding the Third World call for redis- ment in the East bloc countries; and the de- tribution of the world’s resources, for tech- veloping countries of the Third World. While nology transfer, and for changes in the way these distinctions are significant, there are world news and other information is dissem- also many important differences within each inated. The United States is dedicated to the of these broad categories. principles of free flow of information and Ch. 2—The Changing Requirements, Influences, and Motivations Among Nations ● 27

freedom to express ideas.* In many coun- “New World economic order” and “New tries the media are government controlled or World information order” now under debate financed and alternative sources of private in world institutions like the U.N. Educa- capital are limited. These and other issues tional, Scientific, and Cultural Organization are encompassed under the general titles of (UNESCO). —. — *While the United States is dedicated to the principles of first amencinwn~ rlght~ ha~e restrictions, and there is no free flow of information and freedom to express ideas, it right to access to media other than the limited rights u rider should be noted that both in practice and in theory these prin- the Fairness I)octrine’s equal time pro~isions and right to ciples are not absolute. For example, information is not free; repl~’ LO persona I attacks.

Can the United States Disregard the Motivations of Other Nations? The United States, like all other nations of give and take of international compromise. the world, can ill afford to have its vital com- The complexities have multiplied and efforts munications disrupted by interference from to cooperate and achieve a measure of uni- radio transmissions of other countries. Con- formity among nations in their use of the sequently, it must be aware of other nations’ radio spectrum and geostationary satellite motivations for frequency utilization and orbit have become more difficult. This is not cooperate within reasonable limits. There is unexpected given the increasing reliance of an underlying incentive among all nations to both the developed and developing worlds on avoid interference to their individual domes- use of the radio spectrum and geostationary tic operations; to communicate among one satellite orbit; the growing disparity among another using international facilities on an nations over particular needs and existing interference-free basis; and to cooperate gen- investments in various parts of the spec- erally to minimize differences in the alloca- trum; and the philosophical differences be- tion and use of frequencies. There are also coming more evident with the growing influ- many diverse interests and each country ence of the Third World. seeks to maximize its own position in the How Dependent is the United States on the Radiofrequency Spectrum Including Use of the Geostationary Satellite Orbit? The United States and other highly devel- semination of information and information- oped countries like Canada, Japan, and those related services. Much of this is now handled of Western Europe are moving from the in- via microwave radio relay or domestic sat- dustrial age to the information age. This ellites. Thus, the United States has an ever- means that a large and increasing share of increasing dependence on the radiofrequen- the gross national product (GNP) of these cy spectrum and the geostationary orbit. countries arises from information-related services as opposed to agricultural and man- Since the 1940’s, the United States has ufacturing activities. The GNP of the United been the acknowledged world leader in the States is approaching $3 trillion. Almost half telecommunication field. Supporting tech- of all U.S. economic activity is a result of the nologies range from transistors, semicon- collection, organization, analysis, and dis- ductors, and chip technology to microproc- 28 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979 essors; and from microwave and coaxial ity. For example, before 1965 and the launch cable to satellite and fiberoptic. The produc- of the first commercial communications sat- tivity of the U.S. telecommunication indus- ellite (Early Bird) there was no demand for try has grown more than twice as fast as pro- satellite frequencies and concerns over park- ductivity for the U.S. economy overall since ing slots on the geostationary orbit were 1950. The result has been that within a sin- nonexistent. Today, close to 100 communica- gle generation the communication and infor- tion satellite systems, with several satellites mation industry has become one of the most each, are in operation or in the planning productive and vital in the world. Current es- stage. The issues over use of the geosta- timates place the market for world telecom- tionary satellite orbit are growing more in- munication, electronic, and computer equip- tense and the potential consequences are far- ment and services at $250 billion per year. -reaching both nationally and internationally. The United States has a 45-percent share of Four U.S. domestic satellite systems are this market that is growing at an annual rate operational and three additional systems are between 10 to 15 percent. Worldwide reve- being planned. Some 25 U.S. commercial nues from telecommunication services alone satellites providing a range of domestic com- exceeded $170 billion in 1980. munication services from basic telephone circuits to direct-to-home entertainment may Advances in technology have revolution- be operating within the next 5 years. Inter- ized the supply of telecommunication equip- national decisions about use of the spec- ment and services. The economic and social trum/orbit will have great bearing on the structure of the United States is tied directly future of commercial satellite service and on to the availability of the radio spectrum and U.S. military satellite systems. the geostationary satellite orbit to support the high growth telecommunication/informa- At the same time that new services ex- tion industry. U.S. defense systems, vital to pand, the traditional uses of the spectrum our national security and that of our allies, like AM, FM, and TV broadcasting grow. depend on the radio spectrum and satellite Almost 70 percent of the national telephone orbit availability. Defense operations are network (circuit miles) is composed of radio making increased use of both space and ter- relay systems using microwave frequencies restrial systems that use the radio spectrum to carry long-distance communications. and every element of the defense structure Business, industrial, public, and individual must continue to have timely and flexible ac- usage of radiofrequencies range from taxis cess to the radio spectrum to carry out its and CB radios to oil pipeline management, mission for national security. and search and rescue operations. The Federal Government is by far the The number and variety of users and serv- heaviest single user of the radio spectrum ices continue to expand in an information and the Department of Defense (DOD) uses society. The commercial, private, public, and more spectrum than any other agency. This government telecommunication users all includes early warning defense systems of compete for use of the radio spectrum. Other ground and airborne radars, Navy fleet com- industries like transportation, entertain- mand and communication systems, air navi- ment, banking, trade, and the news media gational aids, enemy detection and location place increasing demands on telecommunica- devices, and modern electronic weapons that tion services. Airplanes don’t fly, TV pro- use communications as an integral part of grams aren’t aired, financial transactions their operations. DOD has also produced cease, orders go undelivered, and important much of the new technology that has led to world events go unreported without modern broader uses of the radio spectrum. communications. Growth in traditional and new telecommunication services has created Some additional examples of Government new demands for spectrum/orbit availabil- use of the radio spectrum help illustrate the Ch. 2—The Changing Requirements, Influences, and Motivations Among Nations ● 29 reliance that a developed nation, like the and detection activities. The National United States, places on interference-free Weather Service operates weather radars, operation of the radio spectrum. The Federal balloon stations, and meteorological satel- Aviation Administration provides naviga- lites for forecasting land and sea weather. tional and air traffic control service to com- Without access to the radio spectrum there mercial, civil, and Government aircraft rep- could be no space exploration program and resenting about 35 million flights a year. The the National Aeronautics and Space Ad- Department of Justice is a major user of ministration (NASA) would have no reason radio for law enforcement, crime prevention, to exist.

How Different From Other Countries is the United States in Its Need and Use of the Radio Spectrum?

The United States and other developed The United States uses microwave frequen- countries with sophisticated communication cies domestically and has replaced most of infrastructures focus much attention on its HF radio with more reliable satellite and their need to apply new technology, offer a submarine cable circuits for international variety of advanced services, and support telephone and other services. Therefore, the military and other Government functions U.S. position at WARC-79 was to use HF and services. Generally these objectives go radiofrequencies for international broadcast- far beyond a basic need to communicate. ing, mobile services, and other growing serv- They involve the complexities of satisfying ices important to the United States, but not the competing and often conflicting require- the services of comparable interest to many ments that come from a host of business, of the developing countries. It should be social, political, national, and institutional noted however, that developing countries objectives. are taking an increasing interest in international broadcasting and exercised a key role The developing world, on the other hand, is in decisions affecting this service in the HF much more preoccupied with the need to es- radio bands. tablish a basic capability, gain self-reliance and control over their own communciations, A current and particularly important issue and harness the powers of communciations that serves to illustrate a difference in basic for educational, social, and economic devel- principle between the United States and the opment. These differences in the stage of Third World concerns the geostationary sat- development and basic needs are reflected in ellite orbit. The Third World countries have disputes over specific frequency spectrum expressed concern that the developed coun- allocations as well as disagreements over tries may proceed to launch satellites until fundamental principles that govern alloca- the capacity of the orbit is used-up before the tion and use of this unique resource. For in- developing countries are able to use it. To stance, many developing nations took a protect against this eventuality, the Third strong position at WARC-79 to allocate high World advocates a principle of distribution frequency (HF) radio bands (HF radio) for of orbit locations among nations under an a fixed services that they need in order to priori allotment approach. They believe such develop basic domestic telephone and other an approach would guarantee them future services. While not reliable, HF radio is access since it would allocate orbit locations relatively inexpensive and easy to establish. on a preplanned, negotiated basis. The 30 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

United States, on the other hand, has im- geographical proximity of two countries mediate needs and regards such an a priori gives rise to many potential conflicts that re- allotment as wasteful and undesirable. Un- quire resolution. The United States and der the present ITU approach, the United Canada and the United States and Mexico States as well as other nations, can take ac- have a continuing need to coordinate use of count of the advances in technology and op- the radio spectrum. erating techniques to “engineer-in” the next There is considerable flexibility in the in- satellite and fulfill requirements as neces- ternational radio regulations for countries to sary on an “as-needed” basis. use the radio spectrum independently for dif- The differences among countries regarding ferent services. However, there are mitigat- the radio spectrum cover a broad range. Con- ing factors, like the need to coordinate use at flicts occur between nations no matter what border areas between countries that argue the stage of development simply because na- for uniformity in use. This doesn’t mean that tions are not uniform in their present use or the coordinating problems go away, but only future plans for this resource. Unlike most that they become more manageable. Other other nations, the United States places great factors like producing, selling, and operating emphasis on personal communication and radio equipment in different world markets private use of the spectrum (e.g., CB radios provide incentives for uniform and some- and mobile radio for private use, large num- times nonuniform technical and operating ber of amateur radio operators, etc.). The standards. Certainly there must be a certain United States has global military commit- measure of uniformity or international comments with diverse military spectrum re- munications could not occur between coun- quirements, a large concentration of scien- tries. Indeed, many services are global in tific uses of spectrum including space nature requiring international agreement for research and radioastronomy. The United spectrum allocation and protection against States is also a major exporter of telecom- interference. Such services include aero- munication equipment. nautical, maritime, and satellite services. An airplane making flights internationally must Under international regulations, countries be able to navigate and communicate as it need not coordinate frequency use unless flies in different parts of the world. The In- there is a potential of interference with ternational Telecommunication Satellite Or- another country. In other words, those do- ganization (INTELSAT) global satellite sys- mestic radio operations that do not send sig- tem with 106 member countries is an exam- nals across national boundaries that could ple of an international common-user system cause interference are not of international that requires uniform radio spectrum alloca- concern. A TV broadcast station in the mid- tions. Thus, the necessity to reach agree- dle of the United States does not require ments and coordinate spectrum use among coordination with any other country. How- nations goes far beyond the basic need to ever, a TV broadcast station close to the U.S.-Canadian border requires coordination avoid radio interference. because its signal crosses into Canada. This

Why Is It Necessary To Coordinate Radiofrequency Use Internationally?

Electromagnetic radio waves behave dif- Many factors determine the behavior of par- ferently depending on the particular part of ticular frequencies. Whether or not interfer- the spectrum or frequency range being used. ence will occur depends on many factors in Ch. 2—The Changing Requirements, Influences, and Motivations Among Nations ● 31 addition to the particular frequencies used. part by the power of the transmitter, FCC The transmitter power, type of receiver, and limits the amount of power stations can use. geographical separation between receivers, Different classes of AM stations are author- and type of terrain over which the signal ized different power limits and thus have dif- travels are examples. The Earth’s atmos- ferent coverage areas. Through such domes- phere has different effects on different parts tic regulatory decisions, FCC can increase or of the radio spectrum. Different layers of the decrease the number of station assignments ionosphere reflect or absorb radio energy dif- available in the United States independent ferently depending on the frequencies used, of international decisions. However, interna- time of day, time of year, and period of the tional decisons bear directly on domestic sunspot cycle. Frequencies lower in the spec- issues in several ways. For example, trum tend to travel or propagate along the WARC-79 decided to increase the amount of ground and follow the curvature of the radio spectrum available for AM broad- Earth. This so-called “groundwave” be- casting by extending the frequency range to comes less important as the frequency range 1,705 kHz. While the United States had pro- increases and the “skywave” or reflections posed to expand allocations to the broad- from the ionosphere become more important. casting service, the conference results were To achieve effective communications, one not the same as the U.S. proposal. In any must choose frequencies from the band event, new AM radio receivers will need to be whose propagation characteristics are best manufactured to receive this extended range suited for the intended use. of frequencies, and the future result will be more AM radio stations. Recently, the issue Using today’s technology, most of the of reducing the channel spacing used by AM world’s radio communication systems oper- stations from 10- to 9-kHz spacing has been ate at frequencies between 10 kHz and 40 a subject of attention both within the United GHz (between 10,000 and 40 billion cycles States and internationally. It appears that per second). Over this range of frequencies, the U.S. position will be to maintain the some 40 different radio services are inter- 10-kHz channel spacing. nationally allocated certain segments or “bands of frequencies” within which to There are many examples to illustrate the operate. For example, AM radio broadcast complexities of spectrum management and stations operate in the so-called medium fre- policymaking regarding use of the radio quency (MF) part of the spectrum (300 kHz spectrum. Almost any decision regarding to about 3 MHz) and are allocated the band radio spectrum and satellite orbit availabil- 535 to 1,605 kHz. An individual AM station ity has many and varied consequences with- located in the United States is assigned a in the United States and internationally. specific center frequency and a 10-kHz band- Chapter 4 of this report discusses some of width by the Federal Communications Com- the major decisions negotiated at WARC-79 mission (FCC). Since the geographical area of and their possible consequences for the coverage of an AM station is determined in United States.

How Is the Radiofrequency Spectrum Managed in the United States?

Government policymaking and spectrum government telecommunications. This in- management responsibilities are divided. eludes spectrum management and the licens- Congress enacted the Communications Act ing of radio facilities except those operated of 1934, which created the FCC and gave it by the Federal Government. The 1934 act responsibility and authority to regulate non- gave the President responsibility and au- —.

32 • Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

thority over spectrum management matters have treaty status and thus require Senate and operation of radio facilities of the Fed- action. eral Government—both civil and military. The Federal Government is responsible The management of Government use of the for, and engaged in, many activities under spectrum has been delegated by the Presi- the broad term of spectrum management. dent to the National Telecommunications The Government function of evaluating and Information Administration (NTIA) in needs and sorting priorities for access to the the Department of Commerce, aided by the radio spectrum among the many competing Interdepartment Radio Advisory Commit- and often conflicting interests within the tee (IRAC). IRAC consists of representa- United States is a complex process. The ex- tives of the major Government agencies panding telecommunication industry adds making use of the spectrum and includes a more and more participants and, to a lesser liaison representative from FCC. extent, public interest and single interest The Department of State, consistent with groups are entering the spectrum manage- its responsibilities for U.S. foreign policy, ment process. performs a central role in U.S. preparations The radio spectrum is allocated, opera- for and participation at international con- tional rules are set, and specific frequency ferences concerning the radiofrequency spec- assignments are made by two Federal agen- trum. The Department of State heads U.S. cies—NTIA and FCC. NTIA does it for the delegations that negotiate with foreign gov- executive branch of the Federal Government ernments at conferences called by ITU. and FCC does it for the private sector and Other bilateral or multilateral dealings with for the State and local governments. Deal- foreign countries about spectrum manage- ings with foreign countries about the radio ment matters come under the general prov- spectrum, including negotiation at interna- ince of the State Department. tional conferences, are the responsibility of Congress has both general and specific the Government. In addition to their role as oversight responsibilities for these agencies spectrum manager, the agencies of the ex- and their conduct of spectrum management. ecutive branch use more radio spectrum Moreover, the U.S. Senate must give advice than any other single user. They have access and consent to ratification before the Presi- to almost half of the radio spectrum allo- dent can sign international agreements that cated in the United States. Most of the allo- bind the United States in a treaty with other cated spectrum is available to both Federal nations. The Final Acts of WARC-79 will Government and private and nongovern- form the international radio regulations that ment users on a shared basis.

How Is the Radiofrequency Spectrum Managed Internationally?

The primary world forum for international tional Telecommunication Convention and cooperation and coordination for use of tele- to the radio regulations. communications of all kinds is ITU with 155 ITU is one of several specialized agencies member nations. ITU acts as the world’s of the U.N. However, ITU long predates the clearinghouse for telecommunication mat- U.N. itself. ITU, which was founded in 1865, ters, and members of the Union undertake a joined with the International Radiotele- treaty relationship for use of the radiofre- graph Convention signatories in 1932 to quency spectrum as a party to the Interna- become ITU. Ch. 2— The Changing Requirements, Influences, and Motivations Among Nations ● 33

ITU does not have a permanent constitu- than spectrum matters and includes tech- tion, but rather operates under the Interna- nical standards, operating practices, ac- tional Telecommunication Convention that counting and rate issues, as well as matters is revised periodically at ITU plenipoten- relating to wire communications. Just as tiary conferences. While basic to every func- ITU’s influence is broader than spectrum tion of the Union, the convention is relative- consideration, so are international influences ly brief. Details delineating ITU’s activities on spectrum issues broader than ITU. In- and the responsibilities of membership are deed, there are no less than a dozen interna- spelled out in four other documents known tional organizations concerned with telecom- as the administrative regulations: the tele- munication/information matters and they graph regulations, the telephone regulations, impact directly and indirectly on the issues the radio regulations, and the additional ra- of spectrum management, as illustrated dio regulations– each of which enjoys treaty later in this report. Such organizations in- status in its own right (the United States is clude the Universal Postal Union; the World not a party to the additional radio regula- Intellectual Property Organization; the In- tions that were ultimately suppressed by tergovernmental Maritime Consultative Or- WARC-79 and will pass into history on Jan- ganization; the International Civil Aviation uary 1, 1982). WARC-79 was convened to re- Organization; INTELSAT: the Intergovern- vise the radio regulations. Although several mental Bureau for Informatics; the Inter world and regional specialized radio confer- American Telecommunication Conference; ences were held in the interim, the last con- the Organization for Economic Cooperation ference to consider the full range of radio and Development; the North Atlantic Treaty regulations was held in 1959. Organization; and other groups of the U.N. family, particularly UNESCO and the U.N. In the world arena, ITU is the focal point Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer for spectrum management. Its role in tele- Space with its Working Group on Direct communications, however, is much broader Broadcasting Satellites.

. Issues Addressed in the OTA Study The OTA study examines broad aspects of terms of possible consequences for the spectrum management within the United United States. The present and future roles States and internationally. The present Gov- of ITU are considered with a range of alter- ernment structure and decisionmaking proc- native approaches for future U.S. participa- esses for spectrum management are re- tion in ITU. The study discusses alternative viewed. Possible changes and improvements strategies for dealing with current and to existing processes are discussed and alter- future issues that will be raised at several native policymaking mechanisms are pre- important conferences within the next few sented in the study. years. A review of the WARC-79 conference and the major decisions taken are addressed in Chapter 3 Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum Contents

Page The Structure of Spectrum Management for the United States...... 37 The Role of NTIA...... 38 The Role of the FCC ...... 38 The Department of State’s Role...... 40 The Public Role...... 42 Past Critiques of U.S. Telecommunication Policymaking ...... 42 Prospects for the Future...... 44 International Management of the Spectrum – the ITU...... 46 ITU Structure ...... 47 Political Issues ...... 49 The Future of ITU...... 50 The Changing ITU Environment ...... 52 Other International Organizations Involved in Telecommunications ...... 54 U.S. Preparations for WARC-79 ...... 56

TABLE Table No. Page l. U.S. Delegates to WARC-79 by Organization ...... 60

LIST OF FIGURES Figure No. Page l. Federal Communications Commission Structure-August 1981 ...... 39 2. Actors Involved in FCC Rulemaking ...... 41 3. 0rganizational Chart of ITU ...... 48 Chapter 3 Domestic and International Management of the Radio frequency Spectrum

From the earliest practical utilization of other characteristics of electromagnetic radio for ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship com- radiation. munications in the early 1900’s it was appar- Without such agreements radio communi- ent that international agreements were re- cations would be chaotic. Mutual interfer- quired to coordinate use of the electromagnetic spectrum and avoid interference. For ence would make radio reception so unreli- full and effective use of radio communica- able as to be virtually useless. The history of spectrum management has been marked by tions there had to be common standards for increasingly complex mechanisms for the ra- equipment design and mutually consistent tional and economical exploitation of in- operating techniques. Most of all, there had to be agreement on ways to achieve inter- creasingly congested channels of communication. The success of these arrangements is ference-free, compatible use of the radiofrequency spectrum by radio systems whose a tribute to man’s commonsense and inge- nuity. radiated energy may overlap in various dimensions of space, time, frequency, and

The Structure of Spectrum Management for the United States

Telecommunication is an essential element cipal agencies. The procedures followed are in the economic and social life of the United both formal and informal, and there are an States and a vital factor in the effective func- increasing number of diverse constituencies. tioning of virtually every department and agency of the Federal Government. Yet, de- Spectrum management in the United spite the nationwide and worldwide impor- States, including the development of policy, tance of rapid, reliable, responsive telecom- is divided, depending on whether the spec- munications, the United States does not trum user is a Government or nongovern- have a centralized means to oversee and co- ment entity. The Communications Act of ordinate national policy decisions. 1934 assigns to the President the responsibility for management of the electromag- There is no single U.S. Government orga- netic spectrum used by agencies and depart- nization responsible for overall frequency ments of the Federal Government. FCC is re- management, policies, and processes. In- sponsible for managing all nonfederal gov- stead, there are several governmental orga- ernment use. nizations having key roles and responsibilities with the National Telecommunications It is the status of the user, not the frequen- and Information Administration (NTIA), the cies employed or the particular category of Federal Communications Commission (FCC), service, that determines whether the Presi- and the Department of State being the prin- dent (or his agent) or FCC has jurisdiction.

37 —

38 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

For example, spectrum use by the Depart- munications Satellite (COMSAT), by State ment of Defense (DOD) and the individual and local governments, and by citizens and military services is under the jurisdiction of amateur radio operators, is the responsibil- the President, while spectrum use by com- ity of FCC. mon carriers such as AT&T and the Com-

The Role of NTIA

Under Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1977 ticipates through a liaison representative ap- and Executive Order No. 12046, of March pointed by FCC. The functions of IRAC in- 26, 1978, President Carter transferred his clude assisting NTIA in the development of authority to assign frequencies to the Secre- the national table of frequency allocations, tary of Commerce, who further delegated it the assignment of frequencies to stations to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for owned and operated by the U.S. Govern- Communications and Information (who is ment, and in the development and carrying also the Administrator of NTIA). out of basic policies, procedures, programs, and technical matters pertaining to the man- Assisting the Administrator of NTIA is an agement and employment of the radiofre- advisory body called the Interdepartment quency spectrum. Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC). IRAC has been in continuous existence since 1922, IRAC has a secretariat that provides gen- having been established even earlier than eral support to all committee activities and a the Federal Radio Commission, which pre- variety of specialized subcommittees and ad ceded the present FCC. It has performed hoc or special working groups to deal with essentially the same functions for the past particular matters, such as frequency as- 59 years, although the organization and signments, international notification, and structure of the executive branch, and the of- preparations for international conferences. fice, or department, or administration in The subcommittees are concerned with ongo- which IRAC has been housed have been ing activities whereas ad hoc groups deal changed many times. with specific-term subject matter. IRAC is made up of representatives of 20 Federal agencies and departments. FCC par-

The Role of the FCC

As noted earlier, FCC, which is an inde- consent of the Senate. They supervise all pendent Federal agency reporting directly to FCC activities, with delegation of respon- Congress, is charged with regulating inter- sibilities to boards and committees of com- state and foreign communications by means missioners, individual commissioners, and of radio, wire, and cable. This charter encom- staff units. The commissioners are aided by passes both economic regulation and the a staff of some 2,000 regular employees, management and licensing of users of the about a fourth of whom are engaged in field radio spectrum. operations (see fig. 1). The seven commissioners of FCC are ap- There are five operating bureaus, reflect- pointed by the President with the advice and ing the functional basis of FCC: broadcast, Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum ● 39

■

,<., . . -.

0 W3 —

40 . Radiofrequency Use and Management Irnpacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979 cable television, common carrier, field opera- mittees, and from the bureaus responsible tions, and private radio. In addition, there for the several radio services. The table is are six staff offices, including the Office of amended after coordination with IRAC Science and Technology (OST), which is the where necessary and issuance of notices of focal point within the Commission for Spec- proposed rulemaking (NPRMs) (see fig. 2). trum Management, and the Office of Plans Once a frequency band has been allocated and Policy (OPP). to a particular radio service, the bureau re- Broad policy questions, having some spec- sponsible for that service will develop rules trum management or frequency allocation for its use on the basis of information gath- aspects (e.g., the use and status of the ultra- ered through NOIs, NPRMs, and other FCC high frequency (UHF) portion of the spec- procedures. trum or the investigation of interim provi- Spectrum management matters before in- sions for broadcasting satellites, often re- ternational organizations (for example, pro- ferred to as direct broadcasting satellites) posals of the United States for changes to have been the subject of studies by OPP. ITU radio regulations) are the responsibility The primary focus for domestic spectrum of OST. This office works closely with the management at FCC is in the spectrum man- operating bureaus and other offices in FCC agement division within OST. This division, concerned with spectrum management mat- which is responsible for, among other things, ters. Moreover, the FCC liaison represent- the National Table of Frequency Allocations, ative to IRAC is from OST. FCC’s views and obtains the views of the public (and cor- policies regarding its responsibilities for the porate representatives) through publication private sector use of the spectrum are re- of notices of inquiry (NOIS), advisory com- flected within IRAC by this representative.

The Department of State’s Role

It can be seen that policy for international Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), the telecommunication, including the orderly International Telegraph and Telephone Con- use of the radiofrequency spectrum, cannot sultative Committee (CCITT), and the Inter- be considered the exclusive concern of any national Frequency Registration Board single executive department or agency of the (IFRB), or by regional bodies, such as the Federal Government. Nevertheless, telecom- Inter-American Telecommunications Confer- munications negotiations and agreements, ence (CITEL) of the Organization of Amer- both bilateral and multilateral, remain an im- ican States. The State Department can des- portant part of the foreign relations of the ignate another agency or commission to rep- United States and therefore fall within the resent the United States at a particular jurisdiction and responsibility of the State meeting or for a specified purpose. Thus, for Department. example, FCC has been designated as the organization that transmits notifications and The Department of State, with recommen- advance publication information required by dations from NTIA, FCC, and others, names the radio regulations to IFRB of ITU. Simi- delegations to international telecommunica- larly, the Commission conducts bilateral tion meetings, whether sponsored by inter- meetings with Canada regarding nongovern- national organizations, such as the Interna- ment frequency use near the border, and tional Telecommunications Union (ITU) (and DOD participates directly in the communica- its permanent bodies, the International tions negotiations of the North Atlantic Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum ● 41

Figure 2.—Actors Involved in FCC Rulemaking

Y“- 4 ‘ “h Executive Judicial Public Congress Branch Branch .

Notice Report Opinion of and Order and Order Inquiry Adopting Denying (NOI) Change Petition (Editorial (MO&O) changes only)

I Comments I

r 1 I I Additional I Report and Orders

Petition for 4 I Reconsideration

Memorandum Opinion and Order

SOURCE FCC Communicator. September 1975

Treaty Organization (NATO) and its sub- specialized, highly technical international ordinate bodies, such as the Allied Radio conferences and negotiations (meteorology, Frequency Agency. world health, agriculture, etc. ) the State De- partment looks to other Government agen- Typically, U.S. delegations to internation- cies, private sector organizations and com- al meetings in general, and ITU and its bod- panies, and individuals having knowledge of ies in particular, have included individuals each field. In the case of international from Government agencies, and nongovern- telecommunications, the State Department ment organizations. As in the case of other relies heavily on FCC, NTIA, and the na- 42 . Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

tional committees for CCIR and CCITT, as ministration (NASA), and the Department of well as on individual agencies such as DOD, Transportation, as well as experts from the the National Aeronautics and Space Ad- private sectors.

The Public Role

The Department of State may establish an al, scientific, research, manufacturing, and advisory committee for specific conferences, public interest organizations may be ap- as it did in the case of WARC-79. The public, pointed to the U.S. delegations to such including representatives of industrial meetings. groups and organizations, participate as individual members of such a State Depart- U.S. international communication policy ment body. The public, industry, and private must reflect a coordinated balance of foreign interests may participate in the decision- and domestic policy considerations. More- making process by filing comments and over, effective negotiations in the telecom- views with FCC through its public NOIS and munications field, including spectrum coor- NPRMs and in Government/industry advi- dination, requires a combination of U.S. pol- sory committees set up by FCC prior to icymaking authority embodying essential many of the individual conferences. This features not easily combined. For example, public process to decide spectrum issues for there must be cooperation among mission- the nonfederal government use of the spec- oriented Federal departments and agencies, trum is in contrast to the NTIA/IRAC non- extensive public and congressional participa- public process to decide Federal use of the tion, continuity over the years, and an over- spectrum. Finally, individuals from industri- all sense of direction and purpose.

Past Critiques of U.S. Telecommunication Policymaking

These elements have not always been suc- 3. How shall the United States develop a na- cessfully brought together. A Communica- tional policy and position for dealing with tion Policy Board reporting to President other nations in seeking international tele- Harry S Truman in 1951 identified five spe- communications agreements? cific issues as being basic to the Nation’s 4. How shall the United States develop pol- telecommunication problems. These were: icies and plans to foster the soundness and vigor of its telecommunications agree- 1. How shall the United States formulate ments? policies and plans for guidance in reconcil- ing the conflicting interests and needs of 5. How shall the United States Government Government and private users of the spec- strengthen its organization to cope with trum space–that is, for guidance in mak- the four issues stated above? ing the best use of its share of the total spectrum? The policy board report emphasized spec- 2. How shall the United States meet the re- trum usage, national security, and the main- current problem of managing its total tele- tenance of a sound industry as key subjects communications resources to meet the to be borne in mind when considering the changing demands of national security? issues quoted above. With regard to “inter- Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum ● 43 national agreements, ” the same report focus for public policy. The result has stated:* been that policy has evolved as a patchwork of limited, largely ad hoc responses Just as the United States has no clear pol- to specific issues, rather than a cohesive icy for dividing its share of spectrum space, framework for planning. Government so it has lacked satisfactory means of deter- organization for the formulation and im- mining policy as a basis for negotiations plementation of communications policies with other nations for the world division of reflects this evolution. the spectrum. The United States, in prepar- — Early government involvement in tele- ing positions for international negotiations, communications often involved ad hoc has in effect asked Federal and other responses to individual problems as claimants to state their needs, and then they appeared. presented the total as the United States re- — The framework established by the quirement. In those portions of the spectrum Communications Act of 1934, although where these totals have been small enough combining the broadcasting and com- to fit within the world complement, our mon carrier regulatory functions, re- delegations to conferences have had a negoti- mains limited in scope. able position. In some cases, however, the — The post World War I I period has been total stated requirements have exceeded not characterized by the growth of commu- merely those which could reasonably be put nications activities and a series of nar- forward as the proper United States share, rowly focused studies and limited orga- but have actually exceeded the total phys- nizational changes. ical content of the bands. Furthermore, there B. The patchwork nature of the present is no permanent mechanism by which the structure is not conducive to optimum stated requirements of the United States performance of the telecommunications users could be adjusted with equity and safe- activities and requirements of the Federal ty. The imperative need for means of making Government. such adjustments hardly requires elabora- — Existing organizational arrangements tion. make effective spectrum management Sixteen years later in 1967, President Lyn- difficult. — don B. Johnson sent a message to Congress The absence of a central focus possess- advising that a “Task Force on Communica- ing the requisite technological and economic skills makes more difficult the tion Policy” was being established to ex- development of a sound and forward- amine a number of major questions in the looking international telecommuni- communications policy area. While most of cations policy. the thrust of the task force was aimed at the — The policy coordination necessitated use of satellite and space technology, it was by the plethora of government telecom- apparent that the problems identified in munications roles is inadequately per- 1951 by President’s Truman’s Policy Board formed by a multiplicity of commit- remained unresolved. tees. — Recent events have underscored the In chapter 9 of its report–entitled “The lack of an effective government capa- Roles of the Federal Government in Tele- bility for long-range telecommunica- communications, the task force stated:** tions policy planning. A. Traditionally, government has viewed Thus, the 1968 report reiterates the issues telecommunications primarily as a raised earlier by President Truman’s Com- mission-support function, rather than a munications Policy Board, and the reitera- tion is particularly applicable in the areas of Government organization and spectrum *See Telecommunications—A Program For Progress, a management. In January 1980, the U.S. report by the President’s Communications Policy Board, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, dated March 1951, Irvin Stewart, Chairman. **See Final Report of the President ‘S Task Force On c’om- and Transportation requested the Chairman murzications Policy, Dec. 7, 1968. of the Office of Technology Assessment 44 . Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

Board to address the following two ques- for the executive branch and the President’s tions:* responsibilities for spectrum management. (1) In view of the original United States posi- Over the years, the job of “Assistant Di- tions, what will be the probable impact of rector for Telecommunications Manage- the decisions made at WARC-79 on the ment” became, in 1970, the Director of the U. S.? How should the U.S. adjust its Office of Telecommunications Policy and preparation and participation in future in- then, in 1978, the entire telecommunications ternational telecommunications confer- function was transferred out of the Execu- ences in order to more effectively active Office of the President to the Depart- complish its objective? (2) Should the United States modify its ment of Commerce (DOC) where the present allocations procedures and tables in order NTIA is now located. to respond to the WARC-79 decisions? In the final analysis, one may conclude What are the major U.S. spectrum needs that, despite its worrisome deficiencies, the likely to be during the next twenty years and how will they be accommodated? U.S. telecommunications policymaking and management machinery has worked. How The request reflects a continued concern well, and how efficiently, are matters of dis- for the existing machinery and procedures pute. The good results rest on the fact that for U.S. telecommunications policymaking over the years highly dedicated, competent, and preparation for international telecom- career personnel made the system work. munications conferences. Similar expres- Since spectrum is the common denominator sions of concern in the past did lead to struc- in all uses of radio, coordination has been tural changes but with little apparent result. essential for the various radio services to President Eisenhower eliminated the office function in a compatible manner. It is this of the “Telecommunications Advisor to the coordination, which over the years has President” and replaced it with an “Assist- become a very specialized and sophisticated ant Director for Telecommunications” in the function, that frequently bears directly on Office of the Director of Defense Mobiliza- the policy decisions. The United States has tion. The duties assigned were focused on been extremely fortunate in that, in the past, telecommunications policies and standards it has been able to send to international con- —— ferences representatives who were experi- *See joint letter signed by Senators Cannon, Packwood, enced and competent to deal with what have Hollings, Goldwater, and Schmitt to the Hon. Morris K. Udall, Chairman, Office of Technology Assessment, dated been essentially technical rather than politi- Feb. 11, 1980. cal and economic matters.

Prospects for the Future

But today, more than ever, telecommuni- ment spectrum users and objectively verify cations encompasses far more than just and adjust needs consistent with national spectrum management, and U.S. policy for- policy objectives. There is no ongoing effec- mulation in advance of international negotia- tive means of collecting data and developing tions involves more than just those issues guidelines to judge the merits of one spec- forced by the need for frequency coordina- trum use over any other. tion. The existing U.S. structure is inadequate in that the permanent, ongoing spec- In an international negotiating environ- trum management mechanisms are not ade- ment that has become increasingly political, quately equipped to review all stated re- U.S. spectrum management specialists have quirements of Government and nongovern- been called on to anticipate U.S. telecom- Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum ● 45 munications requirements far into the future did not regard the fragmentation of U.S. pol- without adequate long-range analysis. The icymaking to be a matter of great signifi- absence of such a strategic, long-term plan- cance in preparing for future WARCs. Yet he ning approach reflects the absence of con- went on to say: cern for telecommunications issues at the highest levels of Government and hampers Of course, it is necessary to have some locus of final decision making; there must be the effectiveness of U.S. negotiators. some place, where in Truman’s words, the Lack of high-level concern has also led to a “buck stops.” So far as international policy shortage of trained and experienced engi- is concerned the answer seems reasonably neering personnel to replace those retiring clear: the Secretary of State speaking for the from Federal Government service. Nor has President has, and must retain, the ultimate responsibility. there been sufficient awareness of the need for personnel with supplementary economic, The State Department’s role extends be- legal, and diplomatic skills, as well as foreign yond mere final review and approval of inter- language proficiency. national policy positions. It also has a role to play in shaping policy positions—to ensure The three principal players in conducting that international policy concerns are prop- telecommunication negotiations are the De- erly integrated into the policy making proc- partment of State, DOC (through NTIA), ess from its inception and not merely layered and FCC. Thus, within the executive branch on top of it at the point of final decision. there is a built-in fragmentation of telecom- An important element of future prepara- munications policy. The Department of tion will be developing appropriate linkages State is clearly the focal point for the con- with other elements of international commu- duct of foreign relations but its Office of In- nications policy. Obviously radio spectrum ternational Communications Policy is lightly use and management does not stand apart manned and well down in the State Depart- from other aspects of international commu- ment’s organizational structure. It is not in a nications and communications policy. De- strong position to make its influence felt in spite the highly specialized technical character of radio spectrum management which the upper echelons of Government and in- sets it apart from, say, U.N. or UNESCO dustry. debates over free-versus-balanced-flow of in- Under Executive Order No. 12046, NTIA formation or development assistance pro- is assigned functions that include develop- grams, the issues are often related. ing and setting forth, in coordination with As a first step some permanent mecha- the Secretary of State and other interested nism for intra-Departmental and interagen- agencies, plans and programs that relate to cy coordination is appropriate. Such a mech- international telecommunications. From a anism was developed in 1978 as a first at- practical standpoint, NTIA lacks sufficient tempt to bring together some of the major resources and “clout” to fully carry out its strands of international communications policy. Thereafter coordination was pursued mandate effectively. Moreover, the rather more or less informally as part of the general wording of the Executive order WARC-79 preparations. For the future, how- leaves it ambiguous as to how far NTIA can ever, policy review and development ought go in its coordinating role, particularly when not to be dominated by some specific major that mandate risks encroachment on the event such as WARC. The “big event” is general regulatory responsibilities of FCC. probably of diminishing importance in international diplomacy. The process of continu- In his testimony before the Subcommittee ing negotiations through a series of confer- on International Operations of the House ences has become predominant in almost all Foreign Affairs Committee on July 31, 1980, aspects of international affairs, including in- Glenn O. Robinson, who was chairman of the ternational communications policy. It U.S. delegation to the 1979 WARC, said he follows that too great an emphasis on single 46 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference Of 1979

events, such as future WARCs, as a focal Thus, the expressions of concern over the point for policy coordination could lead to a lack of permanent mechanisms for coor- distorted perspective on policy issues and dinating U.S. international communication objectives. policy persist to the present time. The pres- As to what organizational structure might ent structure is not adequate to develop tele- be needed to carry out the future role of coor- communication policies, to effect long-range dinating international communications pol- planning, and assure the achievement of icy I have no specific recommendations. I do U.S. goals. not think a large new office is required to handle the task, but the responsibility must be clearly recognized and given stature com- mensurate with its high importance.

International Management of the Spectrum – the ITU

ITU is the principal international institu- and the unprecedented diversification of tion for achieving agreement and coopera- communications technology. tion among nations on the use of telecommu- An international agreement-making and nications. It is a unique organization that rulemaking organization whose members ad- has managed to bring the merits of technical here to many varied legal systems, it has collaboration to a level where participating avoided legal doctrine. Its fundamental gov- governments feel a vested interest in the erning principles are contained in the ITU agreements reached. Convention, a constitution first adopted in Adherence to ITU agreements is volun- 1932 that remains subject to periodic revi- tary and cannot be enforced by higher au- sion. According to this convention the pur- thority. There are no sanctions to compel an poses of ITU are: ITU member to abide by ITU rules. How- 1. to maintain and extend international co- ever, membership in ITU entails a treaty operation for the improvement and ra- obligation to conform to the collective deci- tional use of telecommunications of all sions of its members. Its activities might be kinds; described by systems analysts as a nonzero 2. to promote the development of technical or positive-sum game in which there are no facilities and their most efficient opera- winners or losers and where all the partici- tion with a view to improving the effi- pants benefit. The mechanisms of ITU are ciency of telecommunications services, designed to achieve the maximum utilization increasing their usefulness and making of the electromagnetic spectrum by the them, so far as possible, generally widest range of users, and to avoid a situa- available to the public; and tion where one user is accommodated at the 3. to harmonize the actions of nations in expense of another. the attainment of those ends. ITU was created in 1932 by the merger of The activities of ITU are organized for the two existing groups-the International Tele- attainment of specific objectives, the most graph Union (founded in 1865) and the Inter- important of which are: national Radiotelegraph Convention signatories. It has grown in breadth and scope • allocation, registration, and coordinated over the years—surviving two world wars utilization of the radiofrequency spec- Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum ● 47

trum to avoid harmful interference be- ● promoting collaboration in setting tele- tween radio stations of different coun- communication rates as low as possible, tries; while maintaining efficiency of services ● planned development of telecommuni- and independent financial administra- cations facilities, particularly those us- tion; and ing space techniques. Creating, develop- ● conducting studies, collecting and pub- ing, and improving telecommunication lishing public information, adopting res- equipment and networks in developing olutions, and formulating regulations on countries; matters relating to telecommunications.

ITU Structure

The ITU structure combines conferences, In the intervals between plenipotentiary or policymaking bodies, and permanent conferences, the administrative council acts organs. The plenipotentiary conference is on behalf of the entire membership in formu- the supreme body of ITU. It consists of the lating policy and overseeing the work of delegations of member countries meeting ITU. First instituted in 1947 with 18 mem- every 5 to 9 years to formulate general bers (ITU then had 73 member states and an policies, establish budget guidelines, elect annual budget of 4 million Swiss francs), the members and top officials, and conclude council now has 36 members. (ITU has agreements between the ITU and other in- grown to 155 members and has a budget of ternational organizations. Only the plenipo- 67 million Swiss francs, or approximately tentiary conference can amend or revise the $31 million). Meeting each spring in Geneva, ITU Convention. The next such conference the council approves the annual budget, is scheduled for September 1982 in Nairobi, determines the size and grading of the staff, Kenya (see fig. 3). sets salaries and allowances, and determines the schedule of conferences and meetings Administrative conferences are convened and their agendas. It has become a forum for to consider specific telecommunication mat- discussion of certain political issues such as ters as the need arises. They may be either the question of South Africa, Rhodesia, the worldwide or regional in scope and participa- Portuguese colonies in Africa, and the Mid- tion. (ITU divides the world into three re- dle East. gions—region 1 covers Europe, the U. S. S. R., Turkey, Mongolia, and Africa; region 2 The council has also contended with the covers North, Central, and South Americas, issue of the languages to be provided in in- the Caribbean and Greenland; region 3 terpretation and document translation at covers South Asia, Australia, New Zealand, conferences. Interpretation and translation and the Pacific. ) Conference agendas may are provided in French, English, and Span- concern all radio communications services ish, plus Chinese and Russian for all official and all frequency bands or may be restricted documentation. In addition, there is inter- to a particular band and one or more serv- pretation in Arabic at plenipotentiary and ices. Among the administrative conferences administrative conferences. held in the 1970’s were those dealing with space, maritime and aeronautical radio com- The general secretariat has grown in size munications, satellite broadcasting, and and responsibilities over recent years. Since WARC-79. The Final Acts of such confer- 1965, the Secretary General of ITU has been ences become treaties following ratification chosen from among candidates from devel- by ITU members. oping countries. The present Secretary Gen- 48 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference Of 1979

Figure 3.—Organizational Chart of ITU

1 I I 1 1 Secretariat

SOURCE International Telecommunication Union

eral, Mohammed Mili of Tunisia, assisted by secretary general, there is a diffusion of au- his deputy, Richard Butler of Australia, thority among ITU’s permanent organs coordinates and supervises the day-to-day leading to what is sometimes described as activities of ITU. He employs a multina- ITU’s “Federal structure. ” No one element tional general secretariat staff to support of ITU’s secretariat has overall responsibil- the other permanent organs of XTU–IFRB ity for the operation of ITU. The Secretary and the two technical committees: CCIR and General cannot dictate the registration of CCITT. The secretariat includes a technical frequencies by IFRB nor does he have tech- cooperation department that assists devel- nical responsibilities for the activities of oping countries, using funds provided by the International Consultative Committees the United Nations Development Program (CCIs). Also, IFRB cannot dictate the tech- (UNDP). (The current members of IFRB are nical findings of CCIs. Nevertheless, the Sec- from the U.S.S.R, Canada, Morocco, Japan, retary General, IFRB, and CCIs are required and the United Kingdom.) to work together to meet the needs of the members. This sharing of executive power Unlike other international organizations in has given rise to certain conflicts and which sole executive direction resides in a rivalries. Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum “ 49

Led by five officials elected by the plenipo- In practice, CCIs have studied, issued re- tentiary conference, IFRB records the date, ports on, and made recommendations con- purpose, and technical characteristics of fre- cerning communication systems operations quency assignments by member countries and advanced technologies as they have with a view to achieving international recog- been developed. The member nations of ITU nition. IFRB also records orbital positions look to CCIs for information and guidance on assigned to geostationary satellites. It ex- the use of these techniques and their reports amines each frequency notification received and recommendations are respected and gen- for conformity with the international radio erally accepted by member nations in the regulations and for the possibility of harmful planning, design, and operation of telecom- interference. If the examination is favorable, munication systems. the frequency assignment is entered in the master register; if not, it is returned to the The responsibilities of ITU to lend assist- notifying country with suggestions regard- ance to developing countries and to study ing a solution to the difficulty. Through ref- their special problems is a challenge to an erence to the master register and the board’s organization whose principal purpose is weekly circulars, operators worldwide have agreement-making. The rationale is simple access to a listing of all registered frequency enough. For agreement-making to be effec- assignments. tive, all participants must be in a position to participate and cooperate. The less devel- CCIR, which is currently headed by an oped countries need help in extending their American, and CCITT, whose director is telecommunications services and in develop- French, are ITU’s best known permanent ing appropriate administrative and technical organs. All member countries and certain skills. Thus, technical assistance promotes private operating companies, scientific and better global communications generally. industrial organizations can participate in their work. The ITU Convention prescribes The challenge to ITU lies in extending this the duties of CCIR as the study of technical assistance without overtaxing its limited re- and operating questions relating to radio sources. The extraordinary growth of telecommunications and the issuing of recom- communication technologies and services mendations. The CCITT members are to has already strained ITU’s capacity to pro- study and make recommendations regarding duce effective international agreements on a technical, operating, and tariff questions timely basis. Furthermore, ITU must com- related to telegraphy and telephony. pete with other organizations for the serv- The work of CCIs is conducted by a num- ices of telecommunications specialists that it ber of study groups whose members include would like to assign to assist developing experts in each of the specialized areas of in- countries. The costs of ITU’s administration terest to the study groups. The product of of UNDP aid programs must be met by con- these study groups is the basis for standards tributions from developed countries that and specifications that are generally ac- may prefer to see ITU concentrate on its cepted by all administrations and users. agreement-making functions.

Political Issues

At various times, member nations of ITU reasons. For example, this happened to and signatories to the convention have been Spain in 1947, and Rhodesia, South Africa, excluded from ITU conferences for political and Portugal were excluded from a 1973 con- 50 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

ference. There have also been occasions tem. European countries were able to select a when efforts to exclude nations have failed single system from among almost 20 com- to win approval of the membership. peting designs but North American interests, committed financially to a different de- In other instances, the structure of ITU sign, were unwilling or unable to be accom- has been flexible and pragmatic enough to modating enough to find a compromise sin- assign country codes for worldwide automat- gle standard. ic telephone dialing to nations that, at the time, were not members of ITU (e.g., East Overall, the achievements of ITU are im- Germany, the Peoples Republic of China). pressive considering its inherent weaknesses and the complexity of its structures and pro- Unfortunately, ITU is not always success- cedures. Modern states are clearly unwilling ful at agreement-making. For example, in to cede substantial power to any internation- the postwar years three incompatible stand- al organization. Yet, ITU has managed to ards for color TV broadcasting were adopted maintain order in an environment that could in several parts of the world to the obvious easily have been chaotic. The growing needs detriment of international coordination and for maritime and aeronautical communica- standardization. As a result, European TV tions have been met. Efficient international set manufacturers must provide parallel cir- telegraph and telephone service would have cuitry to accommodate the different stand- been difficult without ITU or similar organi- ards and international program exchange is zations. Despite the strong economic in- seriously burdened by the conversion of terests of national equipment suppliers, standards at switching points. there was sufficient collaboration within CCITT to accomplish the shift from oper- A similar problem developed in the search ator-assisted international phone service to for a standardized digital transmission sys- automatic dialing, routing, and switching.

The Future of ITU

Whether ITU can continue to function ef- and safe international air travel. Developing fectively in the future is another question. countries have limited need for these The influx of “new” nations to membership “radar” systems. By the same token, there in ITU in recent years has brought a dif- is contention between the developed and less ferent set of values and concerns to the orga- developed countries over the use of high fre- nization. The new members have brought a quency (HF) bands. The developing coun- heightened demand for programs of aid and tries depend on HF for domestic point-to- technical assistance to developing nations. point communication in large measure They have fostered regionalism and, most whereas the developed countries are more important, they have increasingly demanded likely to use the same frequencies for equitable access and usage of spectrum and international broadcasting, mobile, and orbital slots for geosynchronous satellites. other services. The needs of these developing nations are The principal issue of contention has been often at odds with those of the developed the so-called “first-come, first-served” prin- world. For example, industrialized countries ciple used by ITU member countries to regis- need considerable amounts of radio spec- ter radiofrequency assignments. Basically, trum to support sophisticated worldwide ra- “first-come, first-served” has meant that dionavigation and radiolocation systems whoever develops a use for a given frequency considered vital to their national security first and notifies IFRB of this intended use Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radio frequency Spectrum . 51 has established a claim to protection from responding obligation of nations to avail harmful interference. This has meant that themselves of these uses without prejudice the bulk of the frequency assignments have to the interests of other nations. been assigned to the developed countries. Claims of the developing nations to “equi- Moreover, some of those assignments, par- table access” were further underscored by ticularly those used for HF fixed (point-to- point) services, have been abandoned by the Resolution No. Spa 2-1, adopted by the 1971 WARC (and included in the Final Acts of developed countries in favor of microwave WARC-79), dealing with space telecommuni- and satellite systems but, it is charged, have not been given up for reassignment. (It cations, which states: should be pointed out that to a large degree . . . considering that all countries have equal the radio spectrum is reusable. This means rights in the use of both the radio frequen- that a frequency assignment made to one cies allocated to various space radio commu- country does not necessarily preclude its use nication services and the geostationary sat- by another country.) ellite orbit for these services; The developing countries, therefore, fear . . . taking into account that the radio fre- that when they are finally prepared to use quency spectrum and the geostationary satellite orbit are limited natural resources and radio services not needed at their present should be most effectively and economically stage of development, the spectrum space used; will no longer be available. They have trans- lated this fear into a demand for “equitable . . . having in mind that the use of the allo- and/or guaranteed access” to the frequency cated frequency bands and fixed positions in the geostationary satellite orbit by individ- spectrum. The developed countries have re- ual countries or groups of countries can start sponded by insisting that the fears of the de- at various dates depending on the require- veloping nations are groundless, that new ments and readiness of technical facilities of technology will free up certain frequencies countries; while allowing other frequencies to be shared Resolves by a greater number of stations and services. 1. That the registration with the ITU of fre- However, frequency-sharing usually re- quency assignments for space radio com- quires more sophisticated and expensive munication services and their use should equipment and increases the need and com- not provide any permanent priority for plexity of coordination to avoid interference. any individual country or groups of coun- Most developing countries lack trained tries and should not create an obstacle to engineers sufficiently competent in fre- the establishment of space systems by quency management to carry out compli- other countries; cated coordination procedures and also lack 2. That, accordingly, a country or a group of the required sophisticated and expensive countries having registered the ITU frequencies for their space radio communica- equipment to avoid interference. tion services should take all practicable “Equitable access” also refers to commu- measures to realize the possibility of the nications satellites and the newer members use of new space systems by other coun- of ITU frequently cite the 1967 U.N. Treaty tries or groups of countries so desiring; on Outer Space that recognized the common 3. That the provisions contained in Para- interest of all nations, regardless of the graphs 1 and 2 of this resolution should be taken into account by the administrations degree of their economic or scientific and the permanent organs of the Union. development, in the uses of outer space and in the “nonappropriation” of outer space by This 1971 position was reinforced at ITU’s any one nation. While each state has the Malaga-Torremolinos Plenipotentiary Con- right to the free and peaceful utilization of ference in 1973 that amended the ITU Con- space, the treaty is viewed as implying a cor- vention to include article 33, which reads: 52 . Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

In using frequency bands for space radio cally so that countries or groups of countries services members shall bear in mind that ra- may have equitable access to both in confor- dio frequencies and the geostationary satel- mity with the provisions of the radio regula- lite orbit are limited natural resources, that tions according to their needs and the tech- they must be used efficiently and economi- nical facilities at their disposal.

The Changing ITU Environment

It is clear that the developing countries The success of ITU, as noted earlier, has have also succeeded in establishing a re- been due in large measure to the willingness source management philosophy designed to of its members to adhere voluntarily to com- protect their interests. Although ITU may monly arrived at agreements and regula- remain a viable institution, there have been tions. There is no compulsion to comply, ex- some subtle and important changes in the in- cept common usage, custom, and a perceived stitutional framework under which the tech- stake in international order. The inherent nical functions and work of ITU are carried flexibility granted ITU members has also out. Moreover, WARC-79 clearly showed the enhanced its effectiveness. Subject to a vote power of the Third World as a political force of disapproval by fellow members, any na- in ITU. Although the collective objectives of tion may serve notice through a footnote the developing countries were limited, they that it intends to allocate a particular fre- were generally achieved. quency to some usage beyond that specified by other countries, or to specify a usage as The struggle for power between the devel- primary or secondary. A member country oped and the less developed nations must be may also take a reservation indicating that it expected to continue at future ITU confer- cannot protect a particular spectrum alloca- ences. In the most basic sense, the devel- tion approved by an ITU conference. oping countries derive power from their collective numbers via the “one-nation, one- The common desire of most countries to vote” principle. The developed countries de- minimize the number of footnotes and excep- rive their power from their technical compe- tions to the international table of allocations tence, know-how, and leadership. The devel- was not realized at WARC-79. Eighty-three oping countries’ power can most easily and statements, representing reservations, were usefully be exploited in the ITU legislative included in the final protocol of the forums; the developed nations’ through the WARC-79 Final Acts. The United States technical administrative organs. took six reservations. The remaining 77 statements, some of which bear the names of The developed country strength lies in the several countries (up to 20, in one case), can permanent organs of ITU and the delegation be grouped in three categories: general reser- of authority and work efforts within that vations, political reservations, and specific structure. Control, in the sense of inclusion reservations. or exclusion of issues and agenda items, and in the handling of budgetary matters, is Thirty-five reservations were “general” in most easily exercised here. It is natural for that they were intended to reserve a govern- the developing countries to seek to change ment’s right to take whatever steps it con- these administrative organs to advance their sidered necessary to protect its radio com- own interests and objectives. The 1982 pleni- munication services should other ITU mem- potentiary meeting could well see a further- bers fail to observe the radio regulations. ing of this effort. Other reservations were “political” in that ——

Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum ● 53 they related to territorial disputes or sover- Rao of India, the country selected to coor- eignty claims that had little impact, if any, dinate satellite issues for NAM. on the ITU or on spectrum use for radio com- The NAM Yaounde meeting was a clear in- munication purposes. dication that these countries will be prepar- The remaining reservations of other coun- ing for future conferences on a collective tries were addressed to specific issues, prin- basis, seeking to make the most of their bloc cipally the allocation of HF bands among the voting strength. broadcasting, fixed, and mobile services. There were only a few collective objectives Some dealt with localized problems associ- sought by the Third World at WARC-79: ated with UHF band use. control of the selection of the conference It would be going too far to say that the chairman; taking of numerous reservations at WARC- a large allocation of HF frequencies to 79 signaled a sharp decline in ITU effective- the fixed service; ness. But it should be noted that the reserva- satellite planning and HF broadcasting tions, when coupled with the widespread use planning conferences; of footnotes to denote unwillingness to pro- a bar to the encroachment of land mobile tect a particular frequency allocation in a and other services into frequencies particular locale, resulted in degrading of the reserved for broadcasting at UHF in table of allocations and thus makes future region 1; and coordination more difficult. continued technical assistance. Throughout the 1970’s, repeated efforts These goals were generally achieved with were made both within and outside ITU to the exception of the first; after a week of assess the competing demands being made disagreement, the conference had to settle on the radio spectrum. In addition to the for a compromise chairman from Argentina various CCIR study groups that addressed who was not a candidate of either the devel- the growing requirements of different serv- oped or less developed nations. Overall, ices, there was a CCIR plenary assembly in WARC-79 did demonstrate the increasing in- Kyoto, Japan and the CCIR interim working fluence of the Third World in ITU. party (4/1) in Tokyo; both met in 1978, the The results of the OTA-sponsored survey* latter being directed primarily toward fixed shows that 74 percent of the U.S. delegates to satellite service considerations. In October/ WARC-79 and 67 percent of the nondele- November 1978, the WARC special prepara- gates responding to the survey believe that tory meeting (SPM) was held in Geneva. the relative influence of the Third World countries at ITU conferences has increased Among some Third World countries there was a feeling that SPM was dominated by the developed countries because of its tech- *The OTA-sonsored survey consisted of a questionnaire of 51 questions mailed to 169 individuals involved directly or nical nature, and therefore was to be treated indirectly with preparations for WARC-79, and/or with imple- with some suspicion. It was natural, then, mentation of the results of WARC-79. A total of 110 ques- that other preparatory meetings should take tionnaires were completed and returned: 55 from U.S. delegates to WARC-79: 29 from nondelegate Government person- place outside the framework of these tradi- nel; 18 from nondelegate members of the advisory committee tional ITU entities. One of these was a May to the U.S. delegation; 26 from nondelegate industry person- 1979 gathering of the nonalined movement nel; and 41 from nondelegate individuals in the private sector. In addition, 20 in-depth face-to-face interviews were con- (NAM) in Yaounde. Two specific resolutions ducted with 13 Government officials and 7 industry officials. produced at this gathering called for a future The results of the survey and an analysis of the answers and satellite planning conference and specified information received through the survey and interviews are presented in the report prepared by Kappa Systems, Inc., working arrangements for WARC-79. The under contract to OTA. The report can be found in app. A to vice-chairman of this meeting was Dr. M. K. this report. 54 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

i greatly over the past 5 years. Another 23 ternational telecommunications issues are kP percent of those responding believe there has quite different, and often hostile, to those of F been only a slight increase in the influence of the United States. As traditional advocates i the Third World countries. During the same of the free flow of information, the United i time, 51 percent of the U.S. delegates and 59 States is opposed to prior censorship of percent of the nondelegates surveyed believe either television or radio broadcasts. There- there has been some decrease in U.S. influ- fore, the United States rejects the idea that ence, though only 12 percent and 18 percent any country should obtain prior consent be- of the delegates and nondelegates, respec- fore broadcasting a radio or TV signal to tively, saw this as a major decrease. Looking another country. The issue has not been ahead, the respondents see U.S. influence raised for HF radio broadcasting because so from now through 1985 remaining about the many countries engage in international same (39 percent) or slightly decreasing (45 broadcasting. The added impact of televi- percent). Some increase in U.S. influence is sion, however, has kept the issue of prior foreseen by some respondents (14 percent), consent at the forefront of debate on interna- while a major decrease is foreseen by only a tional communications within the U.N. Edu- small number (2 percent). cational, Scientific, and Cultural Organiza- tion (UNESCO) and the U.N. Committee on The interests that guide many of the less the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). developed countries in their approach to in-

Other International Organizations Involved in Telecommunications

U.S. national interests in telecommunica- furthering international peace and under- tions are interwoven with a broad range of standing. specialized international organizations. In addition to ITU, they include, UNESCO, the More recently, UNESCO has become in- U. N., the World Intellectual Property Orga- volved in studying the potential uses of nization (WIPO), the Universal Postal Union direct broadcasting satellites and has (UPU), the Intergovernmental Bureau of In- adopted a set of norms regarding their use. formatics, the Intergovernmental Maritime Within the past few years, UNESCO’s Inter- Consultative Organization (IMCO), the In- national Commission for the Study of Com- ternational Civil Aviation Organization munication Problems (commonly known as (ICAO), CITEL, and the Organization for the MacBride Commission because of its Economic Cooperation and Development chairman Sean MacBride) has focused atten- (OECD). tion on the so-called “New World information order” and Third World complaints UNESCO’s jurisdiction is extremely broad about the imbalance in news flowing in and and the organization has taken an active in- out of less developed countries and the need terest in communications through the adop- to develop a communications infrastructure tion of resolutions, by publishing studies, in the Third World. and by sponsoring and attending specialized seminars and conferences. It has partici- U.N. involvement in communications pated at ITU conferences in an observer issues has surfaced most prominently within status, for example, in an effort to promote COPUOS and the Working Group on Direct shortwave broadcasting as a means of Broadcasting Satellites. COPUOS and its Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum • 55 subcommittees on legal, scientific, and tech- systems, including “electronic mail.” UPU is nical matters have been significant forums also involved in the controversial issue of the for the discussion of guidelines to govern the subsidization of costly mail delivery systems use of the geostationary orbit for radio com- through high tariffs on electronic communi- munication. A conference on the peaceful cation systems. This cross-subsidization, uses of outer space is scheduled for 1982 and which is common among countries that have will consider and discuss means to resolve integrated government administration of such issues as whether there need be prior postal, telephone, and telegraph systems, consent obtained before one nation uses sat- has impacted severely on transnational cor- ellites in space to broadcast a signal which porations heavily dependent on international extends beyond its own borders into other communications. countries. The United States opposes prior consent in principle. It is technically impos- The Intergovernmental Bureau for Infor- sible to avoid some “spillover” when broad- matics is a Rome-based organization, outside casting to one’s own country via space satel- the U. N., which holds periodic conferences to lite. If prior consent were to be strictly en- consider broad policy and legal questions re- forced, it would be impossible for the United lated to transborder data flows and related States to develop a domestic system for electronic information issues. It is influential direct broadcasting by satellite without the among developing countries and its resolu- prior consent of its neighbors (e.g., Cuba). tions have wide impact.

Increasingly, the United States finds itself IMCO has several components that con- at odds with Third World and other coun- sider telecommunications issues relating to tries that seek to impose restrictions on the maritime navigation and ICAO does the flow of information across national frontiers same with respect to air navigation. The and on the information-gathering activities most important regional organization in of journalists. The “New World information which the United States deals with commu- order” being demanded by many less devel- nications matters is CITEL which seeks re- oped nations within UNESCO appears to gional agreements and develops a consensus many in the United States to be adverse to on common positions for Western Hemi- commercial information gathering and dis- sphere countries prior to meetings of ITU. semination that is not under tight govern- OECD, though largely oriented toward ment control. Europe, seeks to harmonize the differing views of all industrialized countries on such WIPO administers a number of interna- controversial communications issues as con- tional conventions intended to protect the in- trol of transborder data flows. tellectual property rights of the authors of information that is stored, disseminated, or U.S. representation to these organizations displayed through electronic systems. In re- comes from many levels of Government, cent years, WIPO and UNESCO have joint- both within and outside the Department of ly sponsored working groups to study satel- State. Within the department, two bureaus lite program distribution, cable TV, and na- play major roles in the determination of in- tional copyright and patent legislation for ternational communications policy: the Bu- developing countries. reau of International Organization Affairs and the Bureau of Economic and Business UPU was established in 1874 and is the Affairs. Other State Department compo- second oldest existing international organi- nents that play ancillary roles are the Under zation. It has become embroiled in communi- Secretary for Security Assistance, Science cations issues because of the rapid evolution and Technology, the policy planning staff, of electronic information and communication and the Legal Advisor’s Office. ——

56 . Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

For 30 years there has been mounting con- papers for WARC-79. Some 800 people were cern in the United States over Government involved in one way or another. It is esti- procedures for developing telecommunica- mated that the State Department alone tions negotiations. The absence of central- spent about $1 million in preparing for ized management and policy coordination WARC-79 and this amount does not include has frequently been noted and it would ap- the expenses of other Government agencies pear that the United States was fortunate to involved, nor of private industry organiza- preserve its essential interests up to and tions. By its very nature, this was a complex through WARC-79. The question remains— and time-consuming process. With the large will the procedures, mechanisms, and proc- number of international telecommunications esses that gave a margin of success in the conferences and meetings scheduled for the past continue to work in the future? 1980’s and 1990’s, it is clear that a more ex- peditious procedure for the preparation, co- The United States spent approximately 5 ordination, and adoption of U.S. proposals years formulating the proposals and position and positions is needed.

U.S. Preparations for WARC=79

The 20-year period between the previous Organization, and the rhetoric at the NAM general World Administrative Radio Confer- conference in Havana immediately prior to ence in 1959 and WARC-79 was one of vast WARC-79 generated further concern that change. The number of nations belonging to telecommunication and spectrum issues ITU almost doubled–from 87 to 155. There were to be politicized. were tremendous advances in telecommunication technology, including the devel- As noted earlier, ITU, like the U.N. Gener- opment of satellite communications. World- al Assembly, operates on the principle of wide demands for improved communications “one-country, one-vote.” The United States had greatly increased. As an added incentive and other, large developed countries have no to convene a general WARC, it was widely more voting power than Haiti or Vatican recognized that inconsistencies had devel- City. However, in practice, ITU attempts to oped in the general regulations having ap- resolve technical issues and reach decisions plication to more than one of the individual by consensus and reverts to voting only radio services. The fact that a number of when a consensus cannot be obtained. There- specialized radio conferences had been held fore, the United States embarked on an early since 1959 resulting in decisions not entirely effort to direct the focus of the conference to consistent with each other also suggested the major technical issues and away from ex- the need for a comprehensive conference. traneous political matters. The United States expected WARC-79 to U.S. preparatory work for WARC-79 pro- take place in a contentious atmosphere. The ceeded under the following broad guidelines: rising economic aspirations of the develop- Flexibility. —The primary goal was to ing countries, coupled with their perceived maintain flexibility to meet the future requirements for a fair share of the radio needs of users in telecommunication spectrum and the geostationary satellite matters within the framework of the in- orbit made confrontation appear inevitable. ternational radio regulations. The decision of ITU in 1973 to follow U.N. Minimal change. –The preparatory ef- General Assembly precedent and grant ob- forts should result in proposals for only server status to the Palestine Liberation those changes to the radio regulations Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum ● 57

that were absolutely required in order to commercial, private, and non-federal govern- meet the needs of users. ment use of the spectrum. ● Defensible positions. —The proponents of new requirements should be in a posi- Ad Hoc Committee 144 of IRAC had rep- tion to defend the required revisions of resentation from all Federal agencies with a the radio regulations, including alloca- major interest in radio communications and tions, using sound and fully developed spectrum use. It was responsible for develop- technical arguments, including accurate ing recommended U.S. proposals for WARC- and current listings in the master inter- 79 concerning Government use of the spec- national frequency list. trum. Both FCC and NTIA staff experts ● Accommodate world needs. –The prepa- were involved in commenting on the propos- ratory work should take into account als of other administrations and developing the proposals for changes to the radio position papers for the delegation to the con- regulations advanced by other nations ference, including compromise or fall-back and should resist only those that might positions. impede our national flexibility to an unacceptable degree. Recommended U.S. proposals adopted by . Point of no retreat. — Where it was ap- FCC (nongovernment) and NTIA (Govern- parent that proposed U.S. changes to ment) were fully coordinated and submitted the radio regulations, including mod- to the Department of State which was itself ified, allocations, are likely to be op- aware of the proposals as they were being posed, the preparatory work must devel- developed through participation in FCC and op, in advance of the conference, final NTIA processes. Therefore, the State De- fall-back positions. partment was knowledgeable about large areas of agreement as they were reached, as U.S. preparations involved broad partici- well as the fewer areas of disagreement. Al- pation by Government agencies, the tele- most all the differences concerning the pro- communication industry, and the public. posals to be made by the United States were There was active U.S. participation in plan- successfully resolved between FCC and ning sessions held under the auspices of such NTIA. Only one issue (proposed allocations international organizations as CCIR, as well for international broadcasting in the HF as in multilateral forums such as NATO, the bands) was carried to the President through Conference of European Post and Telecom- the National Security Council. munication Administrations, and CITEL. Within the United States, FCC, as the Industry proposals and views or those of body responsible for the regulation of non- nongovernment service suppliers or orga- government uses of the radiofrequency spec- nizations are treated within the FCC mech- trum, established docket 20271 as early as anism. FCC, barring appeals to the courts, January 1975 to develop the nongovernment has the final responsibility and authority for U.S. proposals for the conference. NTIA, regulating the nongovernment use of the through IRAC established Ad Hoc Commit- spectrum. Therefore, FCC develops non- tee 144 to develop the proposals of the government proposals under the open and United States affecting Government users due process procedures of the Administra- of spectrum. IRAC also participated in Ad tive Procedures Act. FCC must decide Hoc Committee 144. Eventually, FCC issued among competing and often conflicting pro- nine NOIs that drew comments from many posals advocated by various segments of the segments of the telecommunication industry communication industry, other commercial and the public. Through this process FCC users, private and public users, as well as developed and adopted the proposals for State and local government users.

84-591 0 - 82 - 5 58 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

Advance preparations for WARC-79 got CCIR and other ITU activities also pro- underway at the State Department as early vided an opportunity for the United States as 1975 when it began work on obtaining to discuss its views in international forums. funds for the delegation, the selection of the CCIR held an SPM in 1978 to prepare a tech- head of delegation and of other members. In nical base for the guidance of the conference 1977, the State Department sought informa- and for administrations then preparing their tion on the views of other governments and own proposals. ITU itself held three semi- the positions likely to be taken by them. Re- nars (in Kenya, Panama, and Australia). quests for information were cabled to U.S. These seminars were primarily for the bene- embassies abroad but the results were not fit of the developing nations—to acquaint satisfactory for several reasons. The United them with the issues they would face in the States has- only one telecommunication at- conference and with the technologies that taché (based permanently in Geneva). Em- had been developed most recently in the bassy personnel in many posts apparently radio-telecommunication field. lacked the necessary expertise to discuss the In January 1978, Glenn O. Robinson, pro- subject with responsible foreign officials and fessor of law at the University of Virginia effectively gather information. The reporting task was rendered even more difficult by and a former FCC commissioner, was named the fact that many proposals of the Third head of the U.S. delegation to WARC-79. Professor Robinson was given the rank of World countries were not fully developed until shortly before the conference began. Ambassador for the duration of the conference. This limited appointment by the Presi- In 1978, the State Department established dent did not require Senate confirmation. a public advisory committee for WARC-79 This raised some concern about the general consisting of 38 members from industry and question of the selection process for the head the general public. Several public interest of U.S. delegations to international telecom- groups, researchers, educators, and minority munication conferences. More specifically, interests were represented. The purpose of there was concern expressed by several Sen- the advisory committee was to advise the ators over U.S. preparedness for the confer- State Department and the head of the ence, especially focused on the question of WARC delegation in all areas related to the the U.S. ability to counter effectively the ex- conference and to help develop positions and pected demands of the less developed coun- negotiating strategies. There was some criti- tries for a greater share of frequency alloca- cism of the role of this advisory committee tions and for changes in ITU procedures. from both members and nonmembers. Some The submission of Professor Robinson’s of its members felt that their views had little name for Senate confirmation as Ambassa- or no impact. dor to the conference may have provided an effective opportunity to explore those con- Beginning in 1977, the State Department cerns. arranged for international consultation to Subsequent to Robinson’s designation, an communicate and explain the U.S. views and initial delegation of 20 representatives from proposals as they were being developed for Government agencies was formed and even- the conference. Bilateral discussions were tually the full delegation of 67 persons was held in 48 countries by teams of U.S. experts named. In addition, some 30 individuals involved in the preparation process. In addi- were named to a U.S. technical support tion, the United States participated in multi- group that worked first in Washington, D. C., lateral forums. Proposals of interest to the and later in Geneva. U.S. military were also described and coordinated through NATO and its Allied Radio Traditionally, U.S. delegations to telecom- Frequency Agency. munication conferences are made up largely Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum • 59 of spectrum managers and technical experts and conditions for sharing often determine from Government agencies and industry. the successful adoption of the proposed allo- Theoretically, representation on the delega- cation. In such discussions, obviously, the tion should not be necessary to protect the participation of the technical experts on the particular interests of an agency, industry, delegation is essential. Often such technical company, or other organizations or groups experts are not spectrum managers but work because the delegation is committed to work for Government or nongovernment organiza- for the U.S. proposals adopted during the tions which operate communication facilities preparatory process described above. Not or other radio facilities. In the case of Gov- only are the U.S. proposals adopted and sub- ernment agencies this includes NTIA, mitted to ITU before a conference convenes NASA, the Federal Aviation Administra- (in this instance, by January 1979), but com- tion, DOD, FCC, and others. In the case of promise positions are likewise agreed to nongovernment organizations, it includes within the United States before the con- employees of companies that provide tele- ference. communication systems and services, such as AT&T and COMSAT, and equipment However, during a conference—and manufacturers such as Hughes Aircraft Co. WARC-79 was no exception—new compro- and the Harris Corp. The role of these non- mises and new alternate proposals are often governmental experts is of great importance required when previously agreed U.S. pro- to the work of the delegation. posals are not accepted by other administrations. At such times, the delegation, in con- Since 1959, an average of 33 percent of the sultation with higher echelons of Govern- U.S. delegations to the eight ITU confer- ment in Washington, must develop and then ences held during that period were engineers agree on the new positions. In such circum- and scientists from nongovernment orga- stances, U.S. delegations almost without ex- nizations. For example, at the broadcasting ception strive for compromises that will win satellite WARC held in 1977, 41 percent of general acceptance and that are as close as the U.S. delegation was nongovernment. The possible to the original U.S. proposals and U.S. delegation to the WARC-79 conference thoroughly consistent with U.S. goals was predominately Government. Only 27 agreed to prior to the conference. percent of the delegates were nongovern- Proposals - to modify the international ment including 18 percent from the telecom- table of allocations are based largely on the munication industry (see table 1). requirements or desires of individual countries to operate particular radio services in Delegations from other developed coun- particular bands. Needs differ among countries include spectrum managers from the tries. Decisions are driven in many cases by government ministries of telecommunication such nontechnical arguments as economic (often referred to as PTT’s; postal, telegraph, and national importance of one service vis-a- and telephone authority) and engineers, sci- vis another. On the other hand, allocation entists, and technical experts involved with decisions may be dictated by technical con- the design, development, and operation of siderations, particularly those allocations in- telecommunication systems and other radio volving the sharing of frequencies between equipment. Unlike the structure in the two or more services. The arguments sup- United States, most other countries place porting these latter allocations are based on the operation of “commercial,” as well as complex technical factors: acceptable inter- government, communication facilities in the ference levels and noise, power flux den- hands of the government, or with an entity sities, antenna patterns, etc. For these allo- owned or controlled by the government. cations, the conclusions of the technical com- Therefore, the composition of foreign delega- mittee of a conference on the feasibility of tions is predominately government with 60 • Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

Table 1 .–U.S. Delegates to WARC-79 by U.S. share of the commonly operated inter- Organization national facilities with foreign entities. For Number of Percent of example, AT&T and the several U.S. interna- Organizational affiliation delegates delegates tional record carriers own and operate sub- Federal Government: marine cables between the United States FCC ...... , ...... 18 26.5% NTIA (and other Commerce Department) 8 12 and Europe under contractual agreements Department of Defense ...... 6 9 with European telecommunication authori- Department of State ...... 6 9 NASA* ...... 4 6 ties. COMSAT owns and operates the U.S. International Communications share of the satellites operating in the global Agency* * ...... 2 3 Department of Transportation...... 2 3 International Telecommunications Satellite National Science Foundation , ...... 1 1.5 Organization (INTELSAT) system together Office of Science and Technology Policy (White House) . . . . 1 1.5 with 106 other countries.

Total ...... 48 71.5% Private Corporations: The U.S. Government conducts negotia- COMSAT ...... 3 4.5% tions on telecommunication matters of a for- AT&T ...... 1 1.5 Hughes Aircraft ...... 1 1.5 eign policy nature including U.S. partici- Motorola ...... 1 1.5 pation in ITU conferences. In forming U.S. Rockwell International ...... 1 1.5 Satellite Business Systems...... 1 1.5 delegations to ITU conferences, the Govern- Western Union ...... 1 1.5 ment has looked to the U.S. operating com- Total ...... 9 13.5% panies and equipment manufacturers to pro- Industry associations , ...... 3 4.5 All other ...... 7 10.5 vide expertise not generally available within Total ...... 67 100 % the Government. A delegation of Govern- *Includes Systematics General Corp. representatives. ment and industry representatives reflects **Includes Board of international Broadcasting. SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment. the split responsibility for telecommunication activities in the United States. The in- some representation from manufacturers of clusion of industry experts on U.S. delega- communication equipment. tions was brought into question in 1978 as a result of an apparent conflict of interest in When it comes to a discussion of technical an international conference dealing with an issues, such as system design capabilities entirely different subject (the renegotiation and sound operating practices, the experts of the international coffee agreement during on other delegations expect their proposals which representatives from coffee companies to be discussed by similarly knowledgeable participated as members of the U.S. delega- experts from the United States. Over the tion). Following that incident, the Depart- years, U.S. delegations to international tele- ment of State, acting on the advice of the communication conferences have included Department of Justice, adopted new guide- industry and private sector experts involved lines based on the conflict of interest provi- in the day-to-day operations of communica- sions of the U.S. Code (sees. 203, 205, 207, tion systems. This is a natural result of the and 208 of title 18) that effectively limited U.S. structure whereby the ownership, oper- participation of nongovernment delegates to ations, and management of commercial and international conferences. Although the private communication systems are func- guidelines permitted nongovernment dele- tions performed by private enterprise sub- gates to address technical points, they pre- ject to Government regulation. U.S. telecom- vented such delegates from addressing pol- munication companies, and not the U.S. icy issues or serving as spokesperson for Government, are responsible for negotia- U.S. proposals. tions with foreign entities for the construction and operations of international telecom- These restrictions were first imposed dur- munication facilities. These companies un- ing the highly technical 1978 SPM of CCIR dertake the financial obligations and own the in preparation for the WARC-79 conference. Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum “ 61

An amendment to a State Department ap- dence to the argument that those companies propriation bill (Public Law 96-60) intro- with representatives on the delegation would duced by Sen. Harrison Schmitt, and passed have an advantage in supporting positions by the 96th Congress, exempted WARC-79 before FCC over those companies not repre- from these guidelines. However, the exemp- sented and who might be taking contrary or tion came only shortly before the conference, conflicting positions in the FCC process. leaving the role of nongovernment delegates uncertain until late in the preparatory effort. This problem was avoided by naming only This may account, in part, for the low per- Government representatives to the WARC- centage of industry delegates to WARC-79. 79 delegation during the time of the FCC deliberations. Following adoption of proposals Legislation to exempt all international and the conclusion of the FCC process, in- telecommunication conferences from the re- dustry and other nongovernment represent- strictions of the State Department guide- atives were named to the delegation. This lines was enacted in the 96th Congress. How- may also account, in part, for the relatively ever, the legislation to which it was added small number of industry representatives on was vetoed by the President (the reason for the delegation. Also, some industry and the veto was unrelated to the exemption). Government officials have argued that the The Senate again passed the exemption pro- addition of industry experts to the delega- vision, but the House did not consider the tion at such a late stage (spring of 1979) measure before adjournment. reduced their role and effectiveness. Another issue concerning the makeup of An additional issue concerning the formu- U.S. delegations was highlighted in prepar- lation of the delegation resulted from the ing for WARC-79. In formulating proposals real or perceived need to include individuals for nongovernment use of the spectrum, with differing viewpoints, to add representa- FCC must evaluate needs and sort argu- tives from public and consumer interest ments among competing commercial and pri- groups, and provide adequate participation vate interests vying for spectrum alloca- by minorities and by women. tions. This process follows FCC guidelines for rulemaking under the Administrative This, together with the pressures from Procedures Act. Basic issues about the fair- Federal agencies, various elements of indus- ness of this process were raised by the tim- try, public, and special interest groups to be ing of establishing the U.S. delegation. represented on the delegation made the selection and functioning of the U.S. delega- The benefits derived from early creation of tion a perplexing exercise open to criticism. a U.S. delegation to prepare for the confer- On the one hand, these problems can be dis- ence were recognized for WARC-79. How- missed as a reflection of the times and the in- ever, conflict of interest and violation of due creased importance of telecommunication in process were also recognized as possible con- all sectors of society. The stakes are high sequences of naming industry representa- and the need to be represented is perceived tives to the delegation before the FCC proc- to be important. On the other hand, the prob- ess of adopting U.S. proposals was complete. lems may reflect the absence of a clear Gov- The concern was that individuals named to ernment policy regarding the selection and the delegation would be in a position to advo- approval of individuals to serve on delega- cate the proposals of their companies in tions to telecommunication conferences. FCC’s decisionmaking process better than those companies without representatives on Adding representatives to the delegation the delegation. Moreover, delegates were with no apparent role other than to fulfill likely to have access to information not gen- some nonspecific requirement to include spe- erally available to nondelegates, giving cre- cial interest, racial, or sexual representation 62 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979 proved to be frustrating for all concerned help alleviate the problems encountered in with no apparent benefits. There were four preparing for WARC-79. delegates funded by the Department of The OTA-sponsored survey on WARC-79 State under the “Biden amendment.”* At preparations and impacts asked respondents least two of those delegates have stated pub- to list the four or five most important quali- licly that their role was never defined nor did fications an “ideal” member of a U.S. dele- they provide any substantive contribution gation to a WARC-type conference should to the deliberations of the delegation. Other have. While no human being could meet all of members of the delegation were also appar- the qualities listed by all of the respondents, ently unsure of the role of the Biden amend- a U.S. delegate who conformed to the most ment delegates. One of the Biden amend- frequently repeated qualifications would re- ment delegates reported that other delega- quire the following attributes: tion members seemed to treat the Biden delegates as though they had not earned the Personality right to be on the delegation. ● good communicator, adept at self- expression; As stated above, the function of the U.S. ● mature, “diplomatic” personality; delegation at international telecommunication ● international reputation in some field; conferences is to seek agreement on U.S. pro- ● willing to accept advice from technical posals submitted to the conference. These experts; proposals are developed under U.S. domestic ● able to exert independence from parochi- procedures and laws. Any shortcomings in al interests; these procedures regarding participation of ● willing to compromise; and concerned and interested parties are unlikely ● willingness and ability to work hard. to be corrected by last minute measures to Experience: add to or adjust the membership of U.S. del- ● negotiating experience, particularly at egations. The process of preparing for inter- ITU meetings; national conferences should include the natu- ● spectrum management experience; and ral selection of the most qualified individuals ● operational experience in at least one to serve on U.S. delegations with the range radio service. of skills and disciplines required to negotiate Knowledge: the U.S. proposals. Representation on U.S. ● broad understanding of telecommunica- delegations cannot overcome any perceived tions, including technical competence deficiency in U.S. domestic processes. and an understanding of the societal im- Clear guidelines for the type of representa- pacts of telecommunication technology; tion to be included are necessary and meas- ● ability and understanding necessary to ures to ensure that the right combination of support and explain U.S. positions at skills are represented by the individuals the conference; selected to serve on U.S. delegations are ● knowledge of present and planned spec- essential. That individuals with these skills trum management requirements of U.S. will be available when needed should not be users; left to chance. Specific action to develop and ● knowledge of ITU history and proce- train individuals and assure that U.S. dele- dures; gations are equipped with these skills would ● a “feel” for international politics, or at *According t.o a amendment sponsored by Senator Joseph least a personal world view; and ● Biden, which became sec. 113 of Public Law 95-105, the State fluency in at least one foreign language, Department is authorized to reimburse individuals or orga- usually cited as French or Spanish. nizations for their costs of participation in State Department Sensitivity: activities if such persons represent an unrepresented or underrepresented interest in the proceedings and otherwise ● sensitivity to Third World positions and could not afford to participate. cultural differences; Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum ● 63

● sensitivity to U.S. national security con- Another 25 percent felt that the effective- cerns; and ness of the process was low and another 12 ● sensitivity to users’ and consumers’ percent said it was totally ineffective in needs, and the ability to relate these achieving that goal. Only 14 percent of the needs to spectrum allocations. respondents rated the degree of effectiveness of the process high in achieving the goal The results of the OTA-sponsored survey of selecting the most effective delegation also show that a majority of the respondents possible. chose “selection of the most effective delegation possible” as the number 1 goal of the Possible actions to address the problems preparatory process from a list of 12 goals. of industry participation and broader repre- However, less than half (48 percent) of the sentation of interests and skills are dis- respondents felt that the process was mod- cussed in chapter 5 of this report. erately effective in achieving that goal. Chapter 4 WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts Contents

Page The U. S. Role...... 67 How WARC-79 Differed From WARC-59...... 68 The Impacts of WARC-79...... 70 Key Conference Decisions and Their Consequences...... 73 The Fixed-Satellite Service ...... 73 The Fixed Service ...... 77 The Land-Mobile Service ...... 78 The HF Broadcasting Service...... 79 National Security Systems ...... 81 Military-Related Issues and Objectives ...... 81 Fixed Service ...... 84 Resolutions, Recommendations, Reservations, and Declaration ...... 99 The Impacts of WARC-77...... 103

LIST OF TABLES

Table No. Page 2. Service Arc of Geostationary Orbit...... 74 3. Distribution of the HF Band Before WARC-79...... 84 4. Distribution of the HF Band After WARC-79...... 84 5. Summary of WARC Gains and Changes in Status on Fixed Allocations Between 27.5 MHz and 15 GHz...... 85 6. Summary of WARC Gains, Losses, and Changes in Status on Mobile Allocations Between 27.5 MHz and 15 GHz...... 86 7. Pre- and Post-WARC Radiolocation Allocations ...... 89 8. Comparison of WARC Radiolocation Allocations and U.S. Proposed Allocations Above 40 GHz ...... 91 9. Summary of WARC Gains and Changes in Status on Fixed- and Mobile-Satellite Allocations Above 27.5 MHz ...... 95 Chapter 4 WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts

From the point of view of a developing with more efficient use of the spectrum country burdened with poverty, illiteracy, when, in fact, such systems may be too cost- and disease, access to modern telecommuni- ly for many developing countries. cations is every bit as vital as it is to the United States. Conversely, whether the De- When the technically advanced, industrial partment of Defense (DOD) can communi- nations get together with Third World coun- cate with a missile submarine at sea or a tries to discuss telecommunications and high-flying jet bomber over Alaska is of spectrum management, their needs and pri- much less consequence to the leader of a orities are so different that their negotiating Third World country than whether he can goals and objectives are far apart. Viewed send a simple radio message to a doctor or against this background, and the mounting village administrator 100 miles outside his frustrations of the developing countries, capital city. U.S. delegates to the World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC-79) that convened The gap between the modern “information in Geneva in September 1979, had reason to society" —with its computers, microproces- be wary. It was the first general administra- sors, and multichannel satellite systems— tive radio conference in 20 years and was un- and the developing nations struggling to questionably the largest and most signifi- harness basic, unsophisticated radio sys- cant intergovernmental meeting on radio tems to the task of economic development is communications in more than a decade. growing wider. At today’s pace, a villager in central Africa is likely to watch an American There had been tremendous advances in film on a community television set long telecommunications since the last WARC, before he has an opportunity to use a tele- held in 1959. Worldwide demand for im- phone. proved communications had greatly in- The gap in priorities is equally wide. It is creased, together with a sharp rise in the de- difficult, for example, to persuade a repre- mand to use the radio spectrum. Inconsist- sentative of a developing country to give up encies had developed in the general regula- certain radiofrequencies that provide him tions having to do with more than one of the with a rudimentary telephone system in individual radio services. A number of spe- order that the Voice of America can broad- cialized radio conferences had taken place cast more clearly. The task of persuasion is since 1959 resulting in decisions that were made no easier by suggesting that a satellite inconsistent with one another, thus adding or a microwave system would provide the de- to the urgency of convening a general con- veloping country with better phone service ference.

The U.S. Role

As the largest and most technically ad- in reaching agreement on a new table of fre- vanced user of the radio spectrum on a quency allocations and a revised set of re- worldwide basis, the United States ap- lated technical and administrative regula- proached WARC-79 with the greatest stake tions. At previous WARCs, the United

67 68 . Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

States had been a strong advocate of com- mental change, but not wholesale shifts in promise and had tried to set an example by spectrum allocations or in ITU procedures. not taking reservations that would indicate Because of the rapid and frequently unfore- refusal to abide by a particular decision of seen changes in communications technology, the conference. the United States was committed to the general principle of flexibility so that any deci- A determination to avoid needless contro- sions made at WARC-79 would permit fu- versy and to arrive at mutually acceptable ture accommodation to new circumstances. compromises continued to guide the U.S. delegation at Geneva in 1979. The goal of the The United States was on record as sup- United States was to ensure that whatever porting, in principle, changes in interna- changes were made in International Tele- tional spectrum allocations and related fre- communication Union (ITU) regulations gov- quency management procedures that would erning the allocation and use of radio spec- accommodate the needs of other nations, trum were made in light of current U.S. eco- consistent with its own interests and with nomic, social, and technical requirements. the essential requirements and sound princi- The United States would support incre- ples of international spectrum utilization.

How WARC-79 Differed From WARC-59

WARC-79 was vastly different from any ices vital to their growing information econ- previous ITU administrative radio confer- omies. * The developed countries, for exam- ence, both in size and complexity. Member- ple, could seriously consider shifting some ship in ITU stood at 154. Almost half the na- broadcasting services out of the radio spec- tions eligible to attend WARC-79 did not trum entirely and onto cable to make room in even exist in 1959. the ultrahigh frequency (UHF) and very high frequency (VHF) bands for new mobile serv- These new nations brought rising expecta- ices. Most Third World countries could not tions that increased demand for telecommu- conceive of such a move. nication services worldwide. New communication technologies that made increasing use WARC-79 differed from WARC-59 in that of different forms of telecommunications demands on the radio spectrum had signifi- had come into being including satellites. cantly increased; more countries were mak- Other techniques made it possible for ing greater use of spectrum for a greater va- radiofrequencies to carry more information riety of purposes. Moreover, the conference than ever before. Coordination and avoid- sessions, while still highly technical in ance of interference procedures were more nature, were influenced to a greater extent highly developed. than in the past by political and economic While the countries of the developed world considerations that can best be understood introduced these improvements as a matter within the context of a confrontational of choice, developing nations often could not North-South relationship and the so-called “New World economic order. ” This new rela- afford to abandon less expensive and less sophisticated equipment and procedures even tionship is characterized by more sharply though these were not technically efficient in defined demands of the less developed na- their use of spectrum. They had to be con- tions for a redistribution of the world’s tent with older, less sophisticated telecom- *lt should be recognized that technically inefficient uses of munication systems while the industrialized spectrum may nonetheless be economically most efficient at a nations pursued new technologies and serv- particular stage of development for a developing country. Ch. 4— WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 69

wealth and resources, and for an end to what fered sharply in their goals and interests. they regard as exploitation by the indus- For example, Brazil was anxious to develop trialized nations. It is also marked by a its own satellite communications system and growing awareness among developing coun- disputed the claims of Colombia and other tries that in many international fora where equatorial nations to sovereignty over the the “one-nation, one-vote” principle prevails space above their territories where geosyn- they enjoy an advantage in numbers. chronous satellites could be parked. There is a long history of international co- Nor did the developed countries always operation in radiofrequency matters, but share the same sense of priority. Other there were forces at work that made agree- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ments difficult to reach at Geneva in 1979. members gave only lukewarm support for The developing countries were guided by a certain U.S. military requirements for spec- set of general principles aimed at gaining trum and the United States and Canada split preferential treatment for themselves (e.g., over some important issues. an Algerian proposal to give priority to de- The United States has found it necessary veloping countries in the use of 70 percent of in the past to take reservations and other ac- the high frequency (HF) fixed bands). They tions at ITU conferences to protect its inter- demanded guaranteed access to certain con- ests. The United States took a substantive gested frequency bands and to the geosta- reservation at the 1937 WARC, refused to tionary satellite orbit. They refused to sign the Final Acts of the 1950 Mexico City accept the vital importance for national secu- WARC, and did not become a party to the rity and financial investment of some ad- additional radio regulations. However, as vanced U.S. communications systems. More- noted earlier, the United States has been a over, there was an unwillingness on the part strong advocate of compromise and has for of many developing countries to accept pack- the most part refrained from using the ac- age deals in which a U.S. concession in one cepted practice of taking a reservation on a area was linked to a developing country con- particular clause or section of the Final Acts cession in another. of a conference to indicate that the provision WARC-79 also differed in that there were would not be considered binding. The only recognizable ideologies in spectrum matters substantive reservation dealing with radio that were associated with particular coun- communication taken by the United States tries or groups of countries. For example, in recent years was at the 1974 maritime those countries that already had extensive WARC. telecommunication systems were most inter- At WARC-79, the U.S. delegation found it ested in pursuing expensive efforts to get necessary to deviate from this policy of set- the most out of spectrum and to identify ting an example for resolving differences those frequencies that were not being fully within the conference. The United States utilized. Countries that were still developing ultimately took six reservations, helping to their telecommunication services were anx- bring the total to 83. Two of the six were ious to prevent the more sophisticated users directed at political issues but the remaining from preempting their potential use of large four have a direct impact on U.S. telecom- portions of the radio spectrum and geosta- munication operations. In one of these, the tionary satellite orbit space before they, United States rejected the terms of a foot- themselves, could determine their own fu- note to the ITU radio regulations that could ture needs. jeopardize the continuing use of U.S. mil- This is not to say that there was unanimity itary mobile satellite systems in the UHF among the Third World nations. They dif- band. 70 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference Of 1979

The Impacts of WARC-79

Finding a meaningful way to measure suc- requirements in the super high fre- cess and evaluate results of an administra- quency (SHF) (3 to 30 GHz) spectrum tive radio conference is not as simple as com- coupled with growth in microwave radio paring specific U.S. proposals submitted to relay, space research, and Earth-ex- the conference with the Final Acts of the ploration satellite services, and the con- conference. While such a comparison is im- tinuing need to protect important radio- portant, it does not reflect the underlying astronomy operations. reasons and motives for particular decisions, the problems encountered, or any apparent These requirements are being pressured trends important in evaluating results of an by new demands to accommodate mobile, administrative radio conference. It is impor- navigation, and broadcasting satellites (and tant to understand the intervening events their feeder links) in increasingly crowded or- that underlie decisions, not only to evaluate bits. Most of these satellite spectrum uses the results of WARC-79, but to prepare for have military as well as civil applications. In the many future conferences important to addition, there is the continuing use of the U.S. interests. SHF spectrum for terrestrial systems. The specific consequences of WARC-79 de- The actions of WARC-79 with respect to cisions on U.S. interests regarding particular these operational trends and the technical services can best be treated in terms of how issues they raised either closely reflected the conference dealt with specific technical U.S. proposals or were acceptable to the issues created by some significant trends in United States with certain important excep- telecommunications. These trends include tions. However, this judgment hardly does the following: justice to the overall results of WARC-79, particularly the future implications for the ● A reduction in the use of HF (3 to 30 United States. The long-term trends may be MHz) by international fixed point-to- running against the United States in the point operations as satellite and cable sense that more problems without apparent use expands, coupled with the increas- solutions are foreseen. The United States ing demand for HF spectrum by the finds itself increasingly in a defensive mode, more developed countries to meet mari- trying to minimize losses rather than seek- time and international broadcasting ing significant changes to improve the long- needs, conflicts with the desires of the term posture of the United States. less developed countries to use HF for inexpensive domestic communications. For example, significant amounts of spec- ● The rapid growth in VHF (30 to 300 trum were added to the allocations for the MHz) and UHF (300 to 3000 MHz) land- fixed-satellite service (FSS) in general ac- mobile operations in the face of con- cordance with U.S. objectives. The technical tinuing vital military requirements and rules that affect the design and operation, the heavy use of these bands for TV and hence the cost, of satellite systems were broadcasting now necessitates greater generally in agreement with U.S. positions. sharing of frequencies, for example, by Where U.S. desires were not precisely met, radiolocation sharing with radionaviga- no significantly adverse repercussions re- tion and with other services, and by sulted. No immediate or significant changes land-mobile sharing with TV broad- in the structure or operation of U.S. fixed- casting. satellite telecommunication services will ● There has been rapid growth of both do- result from conference decisions. No opera- mestic and international fixed-satellite tional or economic dislocation was imposed Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts • 71 on any existing FSS system, and no major lotment plan as a means to guarantee future burden appears to be placed on the Gov- access. This approach does not depend upon ernment, or private operating entities, in advances in technology or new engineering order to comply with the decisions of technologies to assure accommodation of WARC-79 regarding FSS. newcomers, but neither does it provide for technological improvements that might be However, the conference also adopted a necessary to accommodate growing require- resolution that calls for a space planning ments. The developed countries already have conference to be held in two sessions to plan the economic and technological means of space services using the geostationary satel- launching and utilizing domestic satellite lite orbit. The first session, to be held in systems; most developing countries do not, 1985, will define the type of planning and de- even though many do make use of joint user termine which services and which frequency systems like the International Telecommuni- bands should be planned. The second ses- cations Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) sion, scheduled for 1987, will do the actual global satellite system. The developing na- planning. The space conference, as well as tions are concerned that as “late comers” the previously scheduled broadcasting satel- (hence later served) there will be little or no lite conference set for June 1983 to plan way to accommodate their domestic re- broadcasting satellite service in region 2 (the quirements. Americas) in the 12-GHz band, are of vital importance and concern to the United Both a posteriori (the case-by-case ap- States. The ability to implement new tech- proach usually relying on a notice and recor- nologies and offer new services via satellite dation procedure) and a priori (the collective in the years ahead depend in part on the deci- subdivision approach usually relying on a ne- sions taken at these future conferences. gotiated plan) have won past acceptance at conferences of ITU. Over the last 75 years There is a significant difference between one or the other approach has been advo- the approach advocated by the United cated and used by nearly all nations to allo- States for using the geostationary satellite cate spectrum, both internally and interna- orbit and any rigid a priori allotment and tionally. On a domestic level, the a posteriori planning approach advocated primarily by approach is often coupled with an adjudica- some developing nations. The United States, tion procedure for deciding among compet- as well as other countries, has consistently ing applicants, as is the case in the United favored a flexible approach that assigns States. On the international level, adjudica- orbit locations and satellite frequencies on a tion is almost impossible because of sov- case-by-case basis, often referred to as “first- ereignty claims. Most nations have been un- come, first-served. ” The U.S. approach seeks willing to allow an international body to to accommodate needs as required and relies, determine whether they can or cannot use a at least in part, on technological advance- radio channel or satellite position. Where ments and good engineering practices to channels become limited, the recourse in the the next satellite and accom- “engineer in” recent past has been to adopt an a priori modate all users. Such an approach is con- method. However, for the allocation of radio sistent with existing practice under ITU pro- bands and services like FSS, which are af- cedures for the notification, coordination, fected by rapidly changing technology, or and assignment of radiofrequencies gen- which are fraught with political controversy, erally. a priori methods tend to promote too rigid Many developing countries, on the other technical specifications or exaggerated hand, see a negotiated plan that assigns spe- claims for channels. Much of the controversy cific frequency channels and orbital posi- at WARC-79 and that likely to emerge at tions to each country under a rigid a priori al- future conferences, arises from the question 72 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979 of the appropriate administrative arrange- proach and to carry that message convinc- ments to determine rights to the use of fre- ingly to all parts of the world well before quencies free from harmful interference. these conferences convene; or to find alternatives acceptable to all parties. Examples of Several countries made planning proposals such alternatives are discussed in chapter 5. at WARC-79, ranging in scope from planning all services in all frequency bands to The adoption of the space planning confer- allocated space services, planning only FSS ence resolution is a vigorous reminder that in bands newly allocated to that service the effective management of orbit and spec- below 10 GHz. However, it is clear that FSS trum utilization on both a worldwide and a was the main target of these proposals. regional basis is a continuing process that is Developing a plan of this nature is an enor- becoming increasingly more difficult and mous undertaking and would not have been complex. The achievement of U.S. objectives possible at WARC-79; however, acceptance at ITU conferences is no longer a matter of of the principle of “planning” was a major reaching painstaking agreement on technical goal of the developing countries. solutions to problems of coordination and multiple usage of spectrum. It will require The U. S. delegation worked to prevent sophisticated, political negotiations; im- any decision to convene a “planning” confer- aginative, innovative approaches; and long, ence. When it became clear that such a con- hard bargaining. ference would be approved, the United Perhaps an acceptable compromise will be States argued successfully to keep the terms found regarding the satellite orbit planning of reference rather broad. The first session of issue prior to the 1983 region 2 conference. the “WARC on the Use of the Geostationary Nevertheless, the mechanism to develop and Satellite Orbit and the Planning of Space test a possible solution before the meeting is Services Utilizing It,” scheduled for July not now apparent, and the task of shaping a 1985, will consider which services and which compromise during the meeting may prove frequency bands to “plan.” Further, the too difficult. While there is no certainty that meaning of “plan” will be decided, and will the majority of the region 2 countries will not necessarily be a rigid “a priori” type. favor a rigid orbital and frequency allotment The operative thought in determining the plan like the one adopted for regions 1 and 3 type of planning is to provide “in practice at WARC-77 for broadcasting satellite serv- equitable access” to the geostationary orbit. ice (BSS), the United States must be pre- The second session of the conference, sched- pared for such a prospect nevertheless. Ac- uled for September 1987, will meet to enact cording to the OTA survey cited in chapter the decisions of the first. 3, only 8 percent of the respondents believe It has been the official position of the that a compromise between the United United States, shared by a number of other States and the Third World positions on a countries, that a rigid a priori plan for FSS is priori allotment is impossible; an additional bad planning and bad engineering; that it is 15 percent believe that a compromise is pos- likely to inhibit technological innovation, sible, but undesirable. A majority of the re- result in inefficient use of the orbit and spec- spondents, 68 percent, believe that a prac- trum and have a major adverse impact on tical compromise is possible and desirable, U.S. telecommunication systems. Thus, the although relatively few have any specific United States faces a significant challenge concept of the form such compromise could over the next few years to develop compel- take. The remaining 9 percent expressed no ling arguments against a rigid a priori ap- opinion. Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts “ 73

Key Conference Decisions and Their Consequences

The Fixed-Satellite Service number of satellites that can be placed in the geostationary orbit is nearly unlimited. FSS is defined as “a radio communication However, the current ITU convention recog- service between Earth stations at specified nizes that satellites operating in a common- fixed points when one or more satellites are frequency band must be sufficiently sep- used; in some cases this service includes sat- arated to avoid harmful interference. For ex- ellite-to-satellite links, which may also be ef- ample, U.S. communication satellites cur- fected in the intersatellite service; FSS may rently operating in the 4- to 6-GHz frequency also include feeder links for other space radio bands and serving the same or adjacent cov- communications services.” erage areas are presently required by the This definition fails to convey fully both Federal Communications Commission (FCC) the diversity of applications that already ex- to be separated by 4°. It is important to note ist, and those that are expected to be accom- that the required separation between satel- modated in FSS in the future. The emer- lites operating in the same frequency band gence of the wide variety of applications for could be greatly reduced if the coverage fixed-satellite service stems in a major way areas are separated geographically. For ex- from the properties of a natural phenomenon ample, satellites operating in FSS with known as the geostationary satellite orbit. proper antennas could be essentially colo- This orbit is circular, some 165,000 miles in cated in the geostationary orbit when one circumference, and in the plane of the satellite serves the United States while the Equator approximately 22,300 miles above second satellite serves a South American the Earth’s surface. At this altitude, a country. satellite in orbit rotates about the Earth’s axis at the same rate as the Earth (one revo- A second limitation to the capacity of the lution per day) and appears to be stationary geostationary orbit occurs as a consequence when viewed from a point on the Earth. This of geometric considerations. Only a portion special characteristic of the geostationary of the geostationary orbit is visible from a orbit allows an Earth station antenna to particular coverage area on Earth. To illus- point at a geostationary satellite without the trate, table 2 shows the portions of the geo- need for expensive antenna-tracking equip- stationary orbit “available” to the various ment. Earth stations in the intended cover- countries in region 2. age area and a geostationary satellite are continuously visible to each other in contrast Sharing of the geostationary orbit in a par- to a satellite in any other orbit. These unique ticular frequency band is principally a problem of sharing between adjacent countries. characteristics have caused the member nations of ITU to view the geostationary orbit For the United States, the sharing problem is largely with Canada and Mexico. The di- as a “natural resource.” The ITU convention mensions and capacity of the geostationary recognizes the geostationary satellite orbit as a limited natural resource. orbit available to the United States, assuming an appropriate international coordina- With consideration only for avoidance of tion approach, is essentially independent of physical collisions between satellites, the the use of the orbit by countries in regions 1

85-591 0 - 82 - 6 74 • Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

Table 2.—Service Arc of Geostationary Orbit nas, and lower noise receivers are examples. The required separation between satellites is Visibility arc for minimum elevation a second category of improvement possible angle of 100 through improvements in technology. Inter- World (degrees in west ference-resistant modulation methods and region Coverage range longitude) improved antenna sidelobe performance are North Canada, including Yukon examples. In the third category, the dimen- America and Northwest Territories 114-116 Canada, Vancouver to sions of the available orbit arc may be ex- Halifax...... 61-128 tended through the application of intersatel- USA, including Hawaii, lite links. As a first approximation, the avail- Alaska, and Puerto Rico. 133-134 USA, CONUS only...... 61-134 able arc may be increased by the latitude ex- USA, CONUS and Hawaii. . 91-134 tent of the service area. For the United Latin Brazil ...... 0-109 States, the use of intersatellite links might America Columbia...... 10-143 Chile/Argentina...... 10-130 more than double the available arc. Total regional coverage . . . 10-109 Mexico/Caribbean ...... 46-143 The ability of a country to make these im-

SOURCE: Telecommunications Systems Inc. provements depends on its own level of technological advancement, ability to pay for or 3, or in South America. Conversely, the such improvements, and the sociopolitical use of the geostationary orbit by countries in needs and trends within the country. Also, North America should not significantly limit the extent to which a country can take ad- the availability of the orbit for countries in vantage of these improvements is deter- the other regions or in South America. mined in part by the actions of other coun- Again, this assumes an appropriate interna- tries. Again, appropriate international coor- tional coordination approach. dination and cooperation are required. Chap- In summary of the points made above, the ter 5 discusses alternative approaches for co- capacity of the geostationary orbit for a par- ordinating use of the geostationary satellite ticular country operating in a given fre- orbit. quency band is determined primarily by four During the last decade many countries factors. These are: have taken advantage of the telecommunica- 1. the dimensions of the available arc tion capabilities offered by the orbit/spec- as determined by geometric considera- trum resource. As a result there are many tions; domestic satellite systems in operation and 2. the characteristics of individual satel- being planned, as well as international sys- lites at each orbital position; tems (e.g., INTELSAT) shared by many 3. the separation between satellites operat- countries throughout the world. These sys- ing in that band as required to avoid tems support a variety of services, including harmful interference; and broadcasting and maritime-mobile. The spe- 4. the number of adjacent countries plan- cific functions rendered by these established ning to operate in the same frequency services, and those being planned or fore- band. seen, include:

The usable capacity of the geostationary ● Domestic and international point-to- orbit available to a particular nation may be point connections for trunk telephony increased under three of the limiting factors and television distribution. enumerated above. First, the capacity at ● each orbital position may be increased “Thin-route” telephony and instruc- through application of technology improve- tional television to remote areas. ments. Frequency reuse, higher satellite ● Data transmission and computer-to- power, more efficient and higher gain anten- computer communication. Ch. 4— WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 75

● Facsimile, teletext, videotext (view- In other actions, WARC made additional data), and electronic mail. uplink allocations acceptable to the United • Interoffice connections for teleconfer- States, including those at 6425 to 7175 MHz encing, inventory control, and the like, and 17.3 to 18.1 GHz. The former band was for large organizations. allocated to provide the uplink for fixed satellite service in the bands 3400 to 3700 Central to the utility and the economic at- tractiveness of satellite systems is their and 4500 to 4800 MHz. Both bands (6425 to 7175 MHz and 19.3 to 18.1 GHz) were almost unlimited “connectivity” or flexibil- needed for feeder links to satellites in other ity; i.e., the possibility of mutually connect- ing a large number of Earth terminals services such as broadcasting and maritime- mobile satellites. Still other downlink fre- through a single satellite. Thus, many nations believe that many of their future tele- quencies were allocated to FSS in the band 10.7 to 11.7 GHz as the United States had communication needs can be satisfied by proposed. These frequencies will also be geostationary satellite systems, whether used for the increasing requirements of wholly owned or jointly operated by regional INTELSAT. entities. This is true for both advanced and A major objective of the United States developing countries but particularly the lat- was to resolve the difficult sharing situation ter who hope through the use of satellites to in region 2 between FSS and BSS in the leapfrog many of the problems and much of 1000-MHZ bandwidth at 12 GHz. The confer- the time and expense required to install con- ence agreed with the U.S. proposal to sep- ventional terrestrial communication sys- arate the two services by allocating the 12.1- tems. to 12.7-GHz segment to the BSS and the At WARC-79, the United States sought to 11.7- to 12.3-GHz segment to the FSS. Al- expand the allocations to FSS for both do- though the frequency-sharing between the mestic and international use. There was a space services was thus largely eliminated particular need for frequencies below 10 (12.1 to 12.3 GHz remains a shared band, but GHz and this requirement gave rise to con- sharing may be completely eliminated by the siderable controversy throughout the con- 1983 regional conference), BSS must now ference. The United States was determined share with the terrestrial fixed service in- to preserve the status of the radiolocation cluding private microwave systems widely service in the 3400- to 3600-MHz band, now used in the United States. This sharing could used by important military radar systems. result in interference to BSS Earth station The band has long been shared with FSS, receivers operating in the same area as pri- and in order to facilitate use of FSS systems, vate microwave fixed-station transmitters. particularly INTELSAT, some delegations The private microwave users are concerned proposed to downgrade radar to secondary that sharing with direct-broadcasting satel- status. A compromise was ultimately lites is not feasible and oppose sharing in the worked out that restored primary status for 12-GHz band. The concern is that home re- radars subject to a footnote provision ceivers for direct-broadcasting satellites urging, but not mandating, ITU members to would receive interference from terrestrial phase out of the band and to take practicable microwave transmitters. As a practical mat- steps to protect FSS. The United States and ter, the microwave users anticipate the several other countries formally declared burden to resolve any resulting interference their intention to accommodate FSS when it problems will be placed on them. This con- is feasible to do so. (This topic is covered in cern is reinforced by footnote 3787D of the greater detail in a later section.) Allocations Final Acts of WARC-79, which places terres- to FSS were also made in the 4- and 6-GHz trial services on a noninterference basis to bands. BSS operating in accordance with a plan to 76 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

be prepared at the 1983 region 2 broadcast- tion of domestic communication satellites is ing satellite conference. How this conflict now under development. When this new gen- will be resolved within the United States is a eration of satellite systems becomes opera- current matter before FCC. tional, in a decade or more, there are likely to Existing FSS allocations at higher fre- be lower costs and higher availability both in new types of services and in number of users, quencies were maintained. In general, all particularly those in remote areas. U.S. objectives were met in the bands above 40 GHz (to 275 GHz). These bands will be U.S. operating practices for planning, allo- used in future years as advanced technology cating, managing, and using the spectrum is developed and as communication require- allocated to FSS have not been altered as a ments continue to grow. result of WARC-79 decisions. The expansion of allocations would seem to mitigate some Apart from the decision to convene a space policy conflicts that might have existed WARC to “plan” use of the geostationary before. For example, the guiding U.S. policy orbit and related spectrum, WARC-79 will for commercial FSS systems has been to per- have some longer range impacts on FSS. For mit any financially and technically qualified example, new allocations to FSS are likely to motivate system designers to exploit these entity to compete in the marketplace. The decision to allocate separate bands to FSS frequencies, especially in the 4- to 6- and and BSS about 12 GHz serves to alleviate, at 11- to 14-GHz bands where bandwidth was least temporarily, a potential problem area. more than doubled. In order to take advantage of this increased capacity, a spacecraft The results of WARC-79, insofar as FSS is payload built on current technology would concerned, do not impose any hardships on have to double in size, weight, and power re- the Government to comply with the de- quirements. To keep these at a minimum we mands contained in the Final Acts. Some ef- may see renewed efforts at material develop- fort will be required to amend the existing ment, to build, for example, lighter weight documentation, manuals, and computer pro- filters, more efficient solar cells and space- grams to reflect the new regulations and qualified solid-state amplifiers. The avail- modifications to the old ones, but this is a ability of the U.S. Space Transportation one-time effort. System (Shuttle) will have increasing impact A related obligation concerns technical as- on the capacity and costs of satellite sys- sistance to developing countries. WARC-79 tems, particularly when the shuttle attains adopted a series of resolutions and recom- full capability to locate spacecraft in geosta- mendations that call on the industrialized tionary orbit. The large bandwidth available nations to give additional help to the Third may also create opportunities in traffic World in telecommunciations. FSS is the routing flexibility not possible with smaller service that developing countries look to for bandwidths. This may stimulate spacecraft satisfying many of their needs. These resolu- switching technology and the associated tions and recommendations are basically in satellite-switch logic, as well as the develop- line with the U.S. approach to technical ment of shaped spot beams. assistance since they regard the United Na- Generally speaking, the impact of tions Development Program (UNDP) as the WARC-79 on the availability and cost of primary source of financing. They do not call FSS systems was favorable because sub- for the establishment of either mandatory or stantial increases were granted in the voluntary funds for technical cooperation. “lower” frequency bands where technology But the question arises as to whether, and to is well developed and relatively economical. what extent, it is desirable or necessary, as WARC also reaffirmed the FSS allocations an extension of U.S. foreign policy, to offer near 20 and 30 GHz where the next genera- unilateral assistance to developing countries Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 77 with a view to influencing their attitudes on Sharing is not without cost, but these pen- FSS “planning” and other issues. The poten- alties have been felt to be in the interest of tial benefits of using U.S. technology and ex- overall efficient use of the spectrum by all pertise to provide assistance and develop services in order to permit additional use of closer coordination and planning activities the frequency bands. There is a price paid in with developing countries are discussed in the practical use of radio-relay systems in chapter 5. the shared environment because of the need to shorten repeater spacings and to under- The Fixed Service take complex route engineering to avoid interference to or from satellite Earth stations. The fixed service above 1 GHz supports This can result in the need to build more excommunication systems that are more com- pensive repeater sites or even the addition of monly known as microwave, radio-relay sys- extra repeater stations to bypass a problem; tems and widely used in the United States it can also require a shift in frequency bands by common carriers, Government agencies, or, in extreme cases, switching to cable for and business. some route segments. Substantial frequency allocations between With new provisions for sharing in addi- 1 and 40 GHz were made to the fixed service tional bands, and with additional types of by the 1959 WARC. Those allocations (par- space services, the pressure on radio relay ticularly those between 1 and 15 GHz) have system design will be increased. The con- been used extensively and considerable ef- ference recognized this as a complex problem fort has been expended on the design of and identified several aspects of sharing on radio-relay equipment and field engineering which further consideration and refinement methods. As a result, the available alloca- are needed and asked the International tions have been used very efficiently. In- Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) to un- creasingly large volumes of communication dertake appropriate studies. have been squeezed into each radio channel and there has been careful planning of adja- The decisions of WARC-79 affecting the cent systems to avoid excessive interference. use of microwave radio relay systems do not mandate any drastic reconsideration of U.S. Because of the highly efficient use of exist- practices in allocating and managing the ing allocations, there were few proposals at spectrum. The principal new allocations are WARC-79 for changes. Those changes that those between 40 and 275 GHz, which open were adopted by the conference consisted up a number of new, wide bands for the fixed mainly of attempts to aline the allocations service that are shared with several other among the three regions and, by means of services. There will be decisions to be made footnotes, to accommodate the specific on whether any of these bands is to be lim- needs of individual countries. ited domestically to an individual service in- More significant for the fixed service were stead of being shared broadly as provided in new allocations made to the space services the international table, and whether any that will permit additional use by those serv- should be identified exclusively for U.S. ices, on a coequal basis, of bands already al- Government or nongovernment use. located to the fixed service. Such sharing In order to simplify the administrative was first included, on a limited basis, in the process for certain countries which other- allocation table of 1963 as a means of accom- wise might need to coordinate with a number modating the new concept of communication of neighboring states, the radio regulations satellites. At that time technical criteria were revised and simplified at the risk of cre- were introduced to control the amount of in- ating future interference problems. The terference each service might impose on the changes were opposed by the United States, other. Canada, and others as counterproductive. 78 . Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

Potential policy conflicts involving the As noted earlier, the provisions for space fixed service arise from WARC decisions on systems to share frequency bands with the the shared use of frequency bands with fixed service tend to complicate, make more space services. Such sharing requires accom- expensive, and even inhibit the growth of modation or even sacrifices on the part of radio-relay systems, but in the past this has each service. How much sharing will be not resulted in the dislocation of existing allowed, and the degree to which one service services or systems. will be affected in order to facilitate the other, become policy determinations that are The new allocations for broadcasting satel- little appreciated at present. lites to share in the 12.2- to 12.7-GHz band may well cause dislocations to private micro- The most conspicuous case that will re- wave systems. Frequency sharing will be quire action in the near future is the treat- quite a different problem from that in other ment of the 12.1- to 12.7-GHz band. There, “shared” bands. In fact, licenses being BSS will now share with private microwave issued now for private microwave stations systems. The use of sensitive receiving in- bear a warning to the effect that continued stallations in BSS coupled with the necessity operation is not assured. to locate them at any place within the service area of the satellite, essentially precludes Distribution of television by terrestrial radio-relay operation within the coverage radio-relay systems may also suffer disloca- area of a broadcasting satellite on any radio- tions, depending on the ultimate decisions frequency channel to be used for satellite on sharing conditions. The 6.425- to broadcasting. Hence, the extent to which 6.525-GHz band, which is the principal band channels and areas are reserved for broad- used by common carriers for service to casting, to the exclusion of private micro- broadcasters and for closed-circuit uses such wave systems, is under study in the United as medical demonstrations and sporting States and will be a major policy determina- events, and the band 6.875 to 7.075 GHz, tion. which is heavily used by the broadcasters, are now to be shared with satellites. Another area of potential conflict is the sharing of frequency bands by the mobile- satellite service (MSS) and FSS. MSS is a dif- The Land-Mobile Service ferent category of service than the discrete For the past 20 years, land-mobile has services like maritime MSS or land MSS. It been one of the fastest growing radio serv- was developed primarily for military satellite ices. Not only has use of land-mobile radio communications use, wherein the Earth sta- systems increased for local governments, tion may be located from time to time any- businesses and for other specialized uses, where within a defined area (and even oper- but land-mobile use as part of the terrestrial ated in moving vehicles such as aircraft and telephone network has increased greatly. ships), rather than being limited to a fixed, Further growth can be expected with the ad- predetermined location. So far there has vent of cellular public telephone systems and been little practical experience of this type, the increase of private radio requirements. but the idea that a small essential area around the radio-relay station would be pro- The United States has already added land- tected, while a large area would be reserved mobile to portions of the UHF television for the convenience of the mobile-satellite band 470 to 890 MHz in the U.S. domestic Earth station is a concept not fully under- table of allocations, an action permitted stood or accepted. Because of these con- under the ITU’s radio regulations, provided cerns, the conference made only very limited no interference is caused to stations of other allocations to MSS. countries operating in those frequencies. The Ch. 4— WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 79

United States proposed at WARC-79 that The HF Broadcasting Service most of the band 470 to 960 MHz be allocated to the land-mobile service, sharing on a In recent decades, growing numbers of primary basis with broadcasting in the lower countries have turned to HF (shortwave) part, and with fixed and radiolocation serv- broadcasting to carry news, entertainment, ices in the upper part. This would permit comment, and propaganda to audiences be- each country in region 2 to determine which yond their own borders. The potential effec- of the internationally allocated primary serv- tiveness of these broadcasts has been ham- ices would be implemented in their own pered by two factors: 1) the congestion of the areas. shortwave frequency bands by more and more stations with ever-higher transmitter WARC only partially accepted these pro- power, resulting in unintentional interfer- posals. The mobile service was added to the ence; and 2) jamming—the deliberate inter- bands 806 to 902 MHz on a primary basis, ference with broadcast signals. but on a secondary basis in the bands 470 to 512 MHz and 614 to 806 MHz. A footnote WARC-79 offered the first opportunity raises mobile to primary status in the United since 1959 for the international community States, with the provision that such use is to attempt to alleviate the present conges- subject to the coordination procedures of ar- tion in HF broadcasting and the United ticle 14 of the radio regulations. The United States went to the conference seeking a sub- States submitted a protocol statement re- stantial expansion of spectrum allocated to jecting the article 14 procedure, however, the this service. The United States did not win requirement for coordination, coupled with approval for all its proposals but the overall the continued use of 470 to 512 MHz in outcome was satisfactory from both the Canada for broadcasting, and the use of technical and political standpoints. As a band 614 to 806 MHz in both Canada and result of WARC-79, congestion and interfer- Mexico for the same purpose, makes our use ence should be reduced considerably by the of these bands for the mobile service prob- end of the 1980’s and reception of HF broad- lematic. A similar situation prevails regard- casts should be clearer. For the United ing U.S. proposals for the 902- to 960-MHz States, this will benefit the Voice of Amer- band where the United States, Canada, and ica, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Mexico use the same segments for compet- (RFE/RL), the Armed Forces Radio and Tele- ing services and where coordination in vision Service, and several private organiza- border regions may be difficult. tions engaged in HF broadcasting. The United States must determine its To reduce interference and congestion, the policies and means to follow through on conference agreed to an increase of 850 kHz this declaration. There are no FSS Earth sta- in the HF broadcasting bands between 9 and tions currently operating in the 3.4- to 21 MHz, including the creation of a new 3.6-GHz band. In its declaration, the United 13-MHz band. This represents an overall in- States agreed not to withhold support if crease of 33 percent in the allocation for HF INTELSAT decided to undertake FSS in broadcasting. The United States had pro- that band. If such a decision was imple- posed a 46 percent increase, while the Soviet mented, the United States would be under Union asked for no increase at all. The com- strong pressure to restrain radar operations promise was the result of an initiative by that might interfere with international satel- nonalined countries and it was especially lite operations. welcomed because the allocation will ulti- 80 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference Of 1979

mately become exclusive, although it re- In an effort to deal with the continued mains shared until the fixed service opera- problem of deliberate jamming by the Soviet tions now using it can be reaccommodated. Union and other Communist bloc countries, Despite appeals by the United States and the United States made the following proto- other countries, proposals to expand the im- col statement at the conclusion of the con- portant 6- and 7-MHz bands failed by very ference: narrow margins, largely because many developing countries claimed a continued need for Administration of the United States of America, calling attention to the fact that these bands for other forms of communica- some of its broadcasting in the high fre- tion. quency bands allocated to the broadcasting WARC-79 also agreed to convene a special- service are subject to willful, harmful inter- ized HF broadcasting conference in the ference by administrations that are signa- mid-1980’s to plan for the more efficient and tory to these Final Acts, and that such interference is incompatible with the rational equitable use of the broadcasting bands, and and equitable use of these bands, declares it tied the bringing into force of the new allo- that for as long as this interference exists, it cations to the effectiveness of this confer- reserves the right with respect to such in- ence. The United States initially opposed terference to take necessary and appropriate this follow-on conference but switched to actions to protect its broadcasting interests. support the idea when it became apparent In so doing, however, it intends to respect that WARC was running behind schedule the rights, to the extent practicable, of ad- and that U.S. interests might suffer substan- ministrations operating in accordance with tial damage in the atmosphere of frustration these Final Acts. that prevailed. Other smaller countries, like Iran, also The United States achieved one goal by complained of Soviet jamming which, al- keeping open the scope and character of the though not directed at them, interfered with follow-on conference; the agenda will be open their broadcasting. Neither the Soviet Union and the meeting does not constitute an as- nor any of the other Eastern bloc nations signment or allocation conference. Neverthe- that currently jam U.S. broadcasts sub- less, there are potential problems with this mitted an official statement to answer the follow-on conference. Political issues, such as U.S. complaint. “prior consent,” could prove troublesome. U.S. delegation representatives who dealt Also, as noted above, the increased alloca- with HF broadcasting issues reported that tions to HF are dependent upon success in the nonalined movement countries generally accommodating the fixed services that were supported or opposed U.S. positions on ousted from the spectrum given to interna- the basis of their own interests and not for tional broadcasting. For this reason, the ulterior political motives. Some of the United States, together with the United strongest opposition to U.S. proposals came Kingdom, Spain, Greece, Saudi Arabia, Cy- from Latin America, especially on the issue prus, Sri Lanka, and Zambia in a multina- of fixed services v. broadcasting. Brazil and tional protocol statement, reserved the Costa Rica proved to be more influential right—in the absence of an adequate plan— than Cuba in controlling the Latin American to take the necessary steps to meet the needs delegations. of the HF broadcasting services. Similar independent reservations were made by 17 The Soviet Union, which often operates other countries. (Three host countries HF broadcasting stations “out of band,” i.e., for RFE/RL transmitters–West Germany, using frequencies allotted to some other Spain, and Portugal–were among those tak- service, did not request additional HF ing reservations.) broadcasting frequencies. However, this Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 81 may be explained by the fact that the Soviet The problem of “universality” is partly Union entered a protocol statement in the solvable through bilateral and multilateral Final Acts of the 1959 General Administra- agreements, but there is still a significant tive Radio Conference regarding HF fre- impact on system planning and operation. quency bands and thus the Soviet Union Some military systems are fielded in a less does not consider their operations “out of advanced state of development than their band.” civil counterparts. As a result, they must be adjusted more. They are also used in field National Security Systems tests and exercises, and the frequency coordination is an important component of the This report deals at length with the conse- planning. Nevertheless, advanced technol- quences to U.S. national security of deci- ogy developments can provide some solu- sions reached at WARC-79. The extensive tions. treatment is not intended to disparage the importance of WARC for other U.S. inter- Military-Related Issues and Objectives ests. It arises, rather, from the peculiar The security of the United States depends nature of DOD communications require- on economic health as well as defense pos- ments and their broad-ranging use of satel- ture. The following discussion, however, lites and radiofrequency spectrum. focuses on the major military-related issues The Final Acts of WARC-79 represent a and objectives that were identified going generally acceptable compromise that satis- into WARC-79: fied most U.S. national security needs but ● Radiolocation (radar) will require some significant changes in the – Minimize encroachment of radar coming years. Greater numbers of different bands, below 1000 MHz, especially in operations will have to make use of the same the 400- and 800-MHz bands, and at frequency bands; systems will need greater 3.4 and 5 GHz. frequency flexibility to cope with competing ● Satellites (radionavigation) users of the spectrum. The magnitude and – Provide for NAVSTAR Global Posi- cost of these changes cannot be known for tioning Satellite (GPS) at 1,227 and some time; they will be determined in part by 1,575 MHz. the manner in which the new radio regula- ● Satellites (communications) tions agreed on at WARC-79 are actually im- – Recognize and provide for MSS. plemented worldwide. – Obtain reasonable sharing criteria for Without being pessimistic, it should be MSS. noted that most of the major reservations – Avoid any a priori plans that would that the U.S. delegation took at WARC-79 allocate or preposition geostationary involved national security considerations. orbit spacing. This fact by itself justifies a thorough look ● High frequency (HF) at the short- and long-term consequences for — Insure adequate HF allocations for U.S. security of decisions reached at the con- non-line-of-sight (NLOS) nonsatellite ference. strategic communications, beyond line-of-sight (LOS) tactical communi- Military systems must be prepared to op- cations. erate anywhere in the world, and geograph- – Avoid regulatory limitations that ical restrictions on some bands generate ad- would inhibit over-the-horizon (OTH) ditional requirements for frequency flexibil- radars. ity—sometimes demanding costly increased . Fixed and mobile (terrestrial) design and operational complexity. – Maintain status quo in the 4400- to 82 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

4900-MHz band, pertinent to NATO report to the Air Force, and DOD has pro- requirements. vided a national security assessment to the – Retain the 14.5- to 15.35-GHz bands Senate that will consider the Final Acts for for fixed and mobile systems per- ratification as a treaty. The DOD consensus tinent to NATO requirements, and is that with some exceptions, the WARC-79 minimize the growth of the space outcome did not degrade the national secu- services in these bands. rity of the United States. However, it is rec- ● Intelligence ognized that costs must increase in the fu- – Avoid any regulations that limit or ture. Some of the results and an estimate of reduce flexibility of operation. their impact on national security were apparent immediately after the conference. For ex- One part of the U.S. preparation strategy ample, our national security posture was im- was to participate in and strengthen the In- proved when the United States: ternational Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) of ITU as a technical forum. Toward ● Obtained provisions in the allocation ta- that end, DOD participated actively in the ble that accommodate the NAVSTAR- work of CCIR study groups, the CCIR XIV GPS on a worldwide basis; and Plenary held in Kyoto, Japan (June 1978), ● Obtained provisions for the operation of and in the CCIR special preparatory meeting mobile-satellite terminals at 7 and 8 (SPM) for WARC-79 held in Geneva in Oc- GHz (although the specific frequency tober 1978. DOD prepared substantial docu- bands are not consistent with the cur- mentation for SPM in the following technical rent design and channelization plans for areas: the DSCS [Defense Satellite Communi- cations System] III). ● GPS ● Mobile-satellite systems While the United States as an entity min- — Sharing criteria imized its losses due to conference actions, – Coordination areas DOD (as a major U.S. international user of ● Radiolocation the radio spectrum) did bear the brunt of the – Sharing loss of flexibility for use of the spectrum — Signal characteristics (e.g., radiolocation). The United States took ● Mobile sharing with fixed service (HF six reservations, four of which dealt directly band) and one of which dealt peripherally with deci- ● Spread-spectrum techniques sions that could adversely affect national ● Techniques above 50 GHz. security. The documents prepared for the CCIR ple- It should be recognized that the total im- nary and SPM by DOD were in most cases pact of WARC-79 will take some time to adequate technically to support the DOD po- assess due to the interdependence with im- sitions at WARC; however, the decisions ul- plementing actions of other nations, par- timately taken at WARC-79 did not neces- ticularly those with whom the United States sarily turn on technical data. It should be is allied militarily. recognized that CCIR work is a continuing program and future active U.S. and DOD Spectrum Availability for participation is essential. National Security The results of WARC-79 are provided in Major national security questions are: the Final Acts, and the overall results as “What portions of the radiofrequency spec- they pertain to the United States have been trum are available for DOD use, and what summarized by Ambassador Robinson and was the effect of WARC-79 allocation ac- the members of the delegation. The national tions on DOD’s capability to perform its mis- security impacts have been considered in a sion?” There is no simple, single answer to Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts “ 83 these questions. However, one method of percent. The shared use of bands by service gaining some perspective is to examine the was greatly increased. The conference made status of the major radio bands and services significant reallocations to maritime (includ- employed by DOD in the revised table of al- ing several new bands above 10 MHz) and to locations developed by WARC-79 and com- international broadcasting operations. This pare it with the existing table. The bands led, in part, to U.S. reservations. The aero- below 27.5 MHz and above 15 GHz are nautical-mobile service bands were not treated on a band basis; whereas, between changed. A detailed reaccommodation pro- 27.5 MHz and 15 GHz the changes are cedure, whereby services displaced would be treated on a service basis for the fixed, mo- provided for elsewhere in the spectrum, was bile, radiolocation and fixed-satellite and mo- a part of the revised HF allocation agree- bile-satellite services. All of these bands and ment. The conference action lessened the services are vital to U.S. national security. number of assignments that may be af- They are used: for example, for command, fected. The time frame for completion of the control, and intelligence systems; for radio- changeover as specified by the conference navigation; for military weapon systems further reduces the overall impact on DOD that use radiosignals for guidance and tar- and other HF users. The immediate pro- geting; for early warning and all forms of cedure is for each administration to review communication. Moreover, they must oper- all the HF fixed service listings in the inter- ate in all parts of the world under various national frequency list as furnished by the conditions of competing spectrum use. International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB). This review will: Bands Below 4 MHz ● Delete entries not required. ● Identify remainder by category, regular The following changes were made in the operational use, standby, occasional use bands below 4 MHz: on a reserve basis. • The radionavigation service in the very ● Determine hours of operation. low frequency (VLF) and low frequency IFRB was to be advised by March 1981 of (LF) bands was expanded. This was a the administrations’ findings. Then, begin- U.S. proposal for protection of nongov- ning in July 1984, administrations will be re- ernment and military operations. quired to effect the changeover from the old ● The medium frequency (M F) spectrum assignment to a new assignment. For bands for AM broadcasting was expanded to above 10 MHz the changeover will be com- 1605 to 1705 kHz. pleted by July 1, 1989, and for bands below ● Fixed and mobile operations between 2 10 MHz by July 1, 1994. (Tables 3 and 4 and 4 MHz were maintained; however, show the distribution of the HF band before footnotes and power limitations were and after WARC-79.) specified in an attempt to reduce interference. The 20-, 30-, 40-GHz Bands

The HF Band (4 to 27.5 MHz) In the bands at 20, 30, and 40 GHz, virtually all U.S. requirements for FSS and The United States proposed to reduce allo- MSS were met, though in certain instances cations to the fixed service by 18 percent and the sharing with other services as agreed by reallocate these frequencies to the maritime- the conference may not prove to be feasible. mobile, broadcasting, radio astronomy, ama- The MSS proposals in these bands were com- teur, and mobile (except aeronautical-mobile) panion to MSS proposals in the 7- to services. While there was only a 14-percent 8-GHz bands. The successes achieved will reduction in HF spectrum available to DOD, strengthen military communications by sat- the exclusive bands were reduced by over 65 ellite. 84 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

Table 3.–Distribution of the HF Band (4000 to 27,500 kHz) Before WARC-79 — Exclusive Shared Total Service kHz Percent kHz Percent kHz Percent Fixed service...... 10,157 43.2% 4,348 18.5% 14,505 61.7% Maritime mobile ...... 3,850 16.4 2,202 9.4 6,052 25.8 Land mobile ...... — — 4,177 17.7 4,177 17.7 Broadcasting ...... 2,350 10.0 300 1.3 2,650 11.3 Aeronautical fixed and mobile . . . 1,795 7.6 50 0.2 1,845 7.8 Amateur...... 900 3.8 – – 900 3.8 Others ...... 116 0.5 – – 116 0.5

SOURCE. H A. Feigleson, “High Frequency in the Future,” IEEE Trans. EMC, vol. 23, No. 3, August 1981, draft

Table 4.–Distribution of the HF Band (4000 to 27,500 kHz) After WARC-79

Exclusive Shared Total Service kHz Percent kHz Percent kHz Percent Fixed service...... 3,704 15.8% 8,191 34.9% 11,895 50.7% Maritime mobile ...... 4,650 19.8 158 0.6 4,808 20.5 Land mobile ...... — — 2,120 9.0 2,129 9.0 Other mobile ...... — — 6,442 27.4 6,442 27.4 Broadcasting ...... 2,930 12.5 250 0.1 3,180 12.6 Aeronautical ...... 1,815 7.7 80 0.3 1,895 8.0 Amateur ...... 1,300 5.5 50 0.2 1,350 5.7 Others ...... 200 0.8 66 0.2 266 1.0 SOURCE: H. A. Feigleson, “High Frequency in the Future,” IEEE Trans. EMC, vol. 23, No, 3, August 1981, draft.

Fixed Service cation changes imposed by WARC will have a significant effect on the operation of these Table 5 is a summary of WARC-79 gains systems. The allocation of the fixed service and changes in status on fixed allocations on a primary basis to the 7250- to 7300- and between 27.5 MHz and 15 GHz as reflected 7975- to 8025-MHz bands was also expected in the allocation tables. Between 15 to 40 (but not welcomed) by DOD. DSCS operates GHz there were no changes to the fixed serv- uplinks in the 7900- to 8400-MHz band and ice allocation tables; and, above 40 GHz, the downlinks in the 7250- to 7750-MHz band. gains were extensive—virtually assuring fre- Airborne satellite communication operations quency support for DOD fixed requirements are planned for the 7975- to 8025-MHz band, above 40 GHz. The table does not show which was an exclusively allocated satellite those fixed bands that were unchanged, but band in most of the world prior to WARC-79, does give a measure of the gains made by the although this “exclusivity” was already fixed service. However, between 1 and 15 diluted significantly by footnotes. Coordina- GHz, the fixed service gains were made by tion of airborne satellite operations in a band sharing with the radiolocation and FSS. with existing fixed systems within the United States has been very difficult. The Some gains in spectrum allocations for the proliferation of fixed communication sys- fixed service are not in DOD’s best interests, tems will exacerbate this problem. though the results were expected at the conference. The 420- to 430-MHz and 440- to The band 4400 to 4990 MHz, is in heavy 450-MHz bands contain important DOD ra- use by the military service for tactical com- diolocation systems that are expected to munications, including tropospheric scatter have a long lifetime. These systems will now operations; and in NATO Europe it has been have to share with the fixed service. The allo- designated a military band. In 1963, a Ch. 4— WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 85

Table 5.—Summary of WARC Gains and Changes in Status on Fixed Allocations Between 27.5 MHz and 15 GHz

Bandwidth MHz (nearest tenth) Frequency band Change Prior major use (MHz or GHz) Region(s) Primary Secondary MHz of the band 27.5-28 MHz 1 0.5 + 0.5 Met aids 41.015-47 1 6 6 BC 54-68 2 14 14 BC 68-72 2 4 4 BC 74.6 -74.8 2 and 3 0.2 + 0.2 Aero nav 75.2 -75.4 2 and 3 0.2 + 0.2 Aero nav 76-88 2 12 12 BC 136-138 All 2 +2 Space research 146-148 3 2 +2 AM 174-216 2 42 42 FX MO BC 220-225 2 5 +5 AM RL 230-235 1 5 5 Aero nav 420-430 2 and 3 10 + 10 RL 440-450 2 and 3 10 + 10 RL 470-512 2 42 +42 BC 470-610 3 140 + 140 BC and Rnav 614-890 2 84 192 + 276 BC 1435-1525 2 90 90 MO 1530-1535 1 and 3 10 10 Space OPS 1660.5-1670 All 1.6 7.9 + 9.5 Met aids 2300-2450 2 and 3 150 150 RL 3300-3400 2 100 + 100 RL 3400-3500 2 and 3 100 + 100 RL and FX satellites 4990-5000 2 10 + 10 Radio astronomy 5850-5925 2 75 + 75 RL 7250-7300 All 50 +50 FX satellite 7975-8025 All 50 +50 FX satellite 10-10.45 GHz 1 and 3 450 + 450 RL 10.5-10.55 GHz 2 and 3 50 +50 RL 14.3 -14.4 GHz 1 and 3 100 + 100 FX satellite and nav satellite

SOURCE Systematics General Corp., “The World Administrative Radio Conference 1979,” final report

U.S.S.R. proposal for the inclusion of FSS, 4990 MHz the aeronautical-mobile service is Earth-to-space on a primary basis in the excluded. band 4400 to 4700 MHz was accepted as part of a conference compromise among the Mobile Service United States, United Kingdom, and the The summary of WARC-79 gains, losses, Union of Soviet Socialists Republics. To date and changes in status on mobile allocations there is no known satellite use of this band; between 27.5 MHz and 15 GHz is given in however, the INTELSAT intentions to use table 6. As can be noted, the differences be- this band became apparent at WARC-79. tween tables 5 and 6 are minor, and many of This desired use became coupled to negotia- the comments concerning the fixed service tions related to the band 3400 to 3700 MHz. changes apply to the mobile service. While In order best to protect current known the mobile service has several reductions in operations in the band, FSS was shifted to the status of the service, it suffered no loss 4500 to 4800 MHz (sharing with the fixed of a band. and mobile services), and its direction was changed to space-to-Earth. The bands 4400 Radiolocation (Radar) to 4500 MHz and 4800 to 4990 MHz remain primarily fixed and mobile, except that in In the United States, the radiolocation the subbands 4825 to 4835 MHz and 4950 to service provides the spectrum support for 86 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference Of 1979

Table 6.—Summary of WARC Gains, Losses, and Changes in Status on Mobile Allocations Between 27.5 MHz and 15 GHz

Bandwidth MHz Frequency band Change Prior major use (MHz or GHz) Region(s) Primary Secondary MHz of the band 27.5-28 MHz 0.5 + 0.5 Met aids 41.015-47 6 6 BC 54-68 14 14 BC 68-72 4 4 BC 74.6 -74.8 0.2 + 0.2 Aero nav 75.2 -75.4 0.2 + 0.2 Aero nav 76-88 12 12 BC 100-108 8 –8 BC 136-138 2 +2 Space research 146-148 2 + 2 AM 174-216 42 42 FX MO BC 220-225 5 +5 AM RL 230-235 5 5 Aero nav 420-430 10 + 10 RL 440-450 10 + 10 RL 470-512 42 +42 BC 470-610 140 + 140 BC and Rnav 614-980 110 236 + 346 BC FX RL 862-960 98 +98 BC FX 1660.5-1670 1.6 7.9 +9.5 Met aids 2300-2450 150 150 RL 3300-3400 100 + 100 RL 3400-3500 100 + 100 RL and FX satellites 3400-3600 200 200 FX and FX satellites 4990-5000 10 + 10 Radio astronomy 5850-5925 75 +75 RL 7250-7300 50 +50 FX satellite 7975-8025 50 +50 FX satellite 10-10.45 GHz 450 + 450 RL 10.5-10.55 GHz 50 +50 RL 11.7 -12.5 GHz 800 800 FX BC and BC satellites 11.7 -12.1 GHz 400 400 FX FX satellite BC satellite 14.3 -14.4 GHz 100 + 100 FX satellite nav satellite

SOURCE Systematics General Corp., “The World Administrative Radio Conference 1979,” final report, certain Government operations—principally ment of Transportation, meteorological military radars. Frequency management for radars under the Department of Commerce, this service, including assignments, coor- and Earth exploration satellite radars with dination, etc., is under the jurisdiction of the the National Aeronautics and Space Admin- National Telecommunications and Informa- istration. Nongovernment radar users are tion Administration (NTIA) but operational regulated by FCC. responsibility is with DOD and the Federal Aviation Administration. As such, radioloca- It should be noted further that not all sys- tion proposals and associated position tems in the radiolocation service are radar papers were generated in DOD with the aims systems. These other systems include highly of national security in mind. It should be accurate, position-fixing systems similar in noted that radar systems for different pur- principle to the Loran and Omega hyperbolic poses and with different technical character- radionavigation systems. Used for survey- istics and operational requirements are used ing purposes such as offshore oil exploration, by many other telecommunication services these systems are technically navigation de- and are administered by other agencies. vices but have been traditionally operated in Thus, radionavigation radars generally fall the radiolocation service, using its frequency under the operational purview of the Depart- allocations and subject to its technical Ch. 4— WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 87 standards. The existing allocation for never materialized. The U.S. proposal con- radiolocation (and the proposals to retain tained provisions to meet the well recognized them) have a firm foundation in the technical need for additional bandwidth for FSS in the aspects of radio wave propagation and radar frequency bands below 10 GHz. At the same system missions. time, the United States was committed to retaining spectrum support for major military During the preparation for WARC, prob- radar systems in the 3.4- to 3.6-GHz band. lems were foreseen in three major areas in- Predictions of pressures to turn this band volving seven different bands. Problems in over to FSS were indeed fulfilled at WARC. the UHF band were deemed particularly im- The intensive, and sometimes acrimonious, portant because this is the frequency range negotiations included at one time the sub- best suited for the long-range, air-surveil- mission of a proposed footnote by the United lance mission. Prior to WARC-79, a world- States that would exclude FSS in the United wide primary allocation existed for radiolo- States from operating in the 3.4- to 3.7-GHz cation in the band 430 to 440 MHz, while in band. The final result was a compromise; a regions 2 and 3 it extended from 420 to 450 compromise achieved by the removal of any MHz. It was known that there would be in- mandatory requirement to stop radar opera- tensive pressure for allocation of these bands tions in the band. In addition to the alloca- to the fixed and mobile services. The U.S. tion status defined in the table of allocations position, therefore, was to retain at least the and the footnotes, a declaration was signed existing worldwide primary allocation and by several members of INTELSAT (the acquiesce to secondary status in the adjoin- United States included) that says, in part, ing bands, if necessary. WARC did, in fact, “they shall make reasonable effort to accom- arrive at this result along with a reduction to modate FSS.” Thus the status of radioloca- secondary status in the 890- to 942-MHz tion was retained, but with the foreknowl- band. By country footnote, the United edge that the pressure from the fixed- States retained a primary allocation for itself satellite community, both internal and ex- in those bands where the status had been re- ternal to the United States, would continue. duced. It is the position of DOD that the radar system using these bands have suffi- In the 17.3- to 17.7-GHz band, the second- cient flexibility to perform their mission. All ary status for radiolocation was part of the of the systems involved have some modes of U.S. fallback position because of the very operation that could create undesirable in- limited current use of the band by radar sys- terference. However, the retention of pri- tems. By footnote, WARC-79 decreed that mary status in the United States will pro- the band could be used for broadcast satel- vide sufficient training opportunities to lite uplinks, and this action was acceptable maintain operator proficiency in these to the United States. With such usage, fur- modes. The WARC results fell reasonably ther study may show that radiolocation op- within the U.S. fall-back position in these erations are possible with an acceptably low bands until the fixed and mobile footnotes probability of interference. started mounting up. Unable to control the flood of countries participating in these foot- The United States was well aware of the notes, the United States entered the reserva- spectrum crowding occurring in the radio- tion contained in Protocol Statement No. 38. navigation bands and had made several proposals to alleviate it. Proposals from other Of the three bands noted as problem areas countries sought to temper the problem by in the fixed-satellite and radar sharing area, combining radionavigation and radioloca- only the 3.5-GHz band was a serious prob- tion into a common service—radio-determi- lem. The 17.5-GHz band will require further nation—or by adding radionavigation as a study but raises no immediate hardships, coequal sharing partner with the radioloca- and the anticipated problems at 5.5 GHz tion service. In addition to adopting some of 88 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference Of 1979 the U.S. proposals for beacons, transponders ly, fallback positions were prepared and, and the like, WARC opted for making ra- with one exception, adhered to during dionavigation an equal partner. However, WARC. The one exception was in the 890-to WARC came painfully close to defining aero- 942-MHz band where radiolocation was re- nautical and maritime radionavigation as duced to a secondary service in region 2. safety services, an action that would have in- This reduction was mitigated by the addi- cluded these services in the regulation re- tion of footnote 3669A, which provides pri- garding harmful interference to safety serv- mary status to this service in the United ices. This action may be interpreted to give States. The footnote was weakened by preferential status to the radionavigation Canada’s insistence on making the footnote service and bodes ill for the equality of the subject to the procedures of article N13A. partnership. The U.S. recognition of this This amendment was unacceptable to the state of affairs is contained in the reserva- United States and formed the basis for a portions taken in the affected bands in Protocol tion of the bands covered by the reservation No. 38. noted in paragraph 4 of Protocol Statement No. 38 (which deals with the larger band 890 The radiolocation portion of the U.S. pro- to 960 MHz). Thus, the objective of retaining posals to the WARC sought the following radiolocation allocations has been met and, four major items: as such, continues to make available the fre- 1. retain radiolocation allocations in all ex- quencies required for the development and isting bands except 216 to 225 MHz; operation of radiolocation systems in the 2. provide adequate provision for radiolo- United States. cation above 40 GHz; Not apparent from table 7, however, is a 3. include allocations for space radar; and host of key decisions with respect to four 4. provide worldwide primary allocations other services that will greatly affect the for high-accuracy, position-fixing radio- radiolocation service. These four services are location systems between 1615 and 3400 the fixed and mobile services (which will be kHz. discussed as a pair), the radionavigation In a strictly literal sense, all four objectives services (including the aeronautical and were met. From a practical point of view, maritime radionavigation service), and FSS. however, only items 2, 3, and 4 can be The decisions made for the fixed and mo- claimed as truly successful. Concerning the bile service involved inserting these services first point, the existing radiolocation alloca- by footnote in virtually every radiolocation tions were indeed retained, but the addition band (as well as in bands for other services) of other services on a primary basis will have between 420 MHz and 36 GHz. The foot- a significant effect on the design, develop- notes are the so-called “country footnotes” ment, performance and operations of radiolo- in which each country claims band usage for cation systems operating between 400 MHz a service that is in addition to or alternative and 40 GHz. to the service stated in the table of alloca- Item I.–Table 7 compares the status of tions itself. On the average, about 25 percent the radiolocation allocations between the ex- of the member nations of ITU are involved in isting radio regulations and those created by these footnotes; however, over 40 percent of the Final Acts of WARC-79, indicating in the member countries are involved in the the final column the changes that were made band 430 to 440 MHz. A precedent for these in the table of allocations. It is seen that the country footnotes did exist in the previous status of radiolocation was reduced in six radio regulations but the number of coun- bands. In all of these bands, pre-WARC ne- tries involved was small, generally less than gotiations had indicated that pressure for re- 10 in a given band. These few exceptions ductions was likely to be heavy. Consequent- were quite manageable in terms of worldwide Ch. 4— WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts • 89

Table 7.—Pre- and Post-WARC Radiolocation Allocations

Bandwidth - MHz Primary Secondary Frequency band Region Old New Old New Change 216-225 1 — — — NOC MHz 2 ‘9 – – 919 3 — — 9 7 -2 t 420-450 1 10 10 20 20 NOC MHz 2 30 10 – 20 1 20 3 30 10 – 20 t 890-942 1 — — 52 52 NOC MHz 2 52 – – 52 l 52 3 — — 52 52 NOC 1215-1400 1 135 135 50 50 NOC MHz 2 135 135 50 50 NOC 3 135 135 50 50 NOC 2300-2500 1 — — 200 200 NOC MHz 2 200 200 – – NOC 3 200 200 – – NOC 2700-3400 1 300 300 400 400 NOC MHz 2 300 300 400 400 NOC 3 300 300 400 400 NOC 3400-3700 1 — — 200 200 NOC MHz 2 300 (200) + – 300 i 300 3 300 (200) + – 300 I 300 t 5250-5925 1 300 300 300 300 NOC MHz 2 375 300 300 375 1 75 3 300 300 375 375 NOC t 8.5-10.0 1 1100 1100 400 400 NOC GHz 2 1100 1100 400 400 NOC 3 1100 1100 400 400 NOC t 10.0-10.68 1 500 500 180 180 NOC GHz 2 550 550 130 130 NOC 3 550 550 130 130 NOC t 13.4-14 1 600 600 – – NOC GHz 2 600 600 – – NOC 3 600 600 – – NOC t 15.7 -17.7 1 2000 1600 — 400 ! 400 GHz 2 2000 1600 – 400 i 400 3 2000 1600 — 400 1 400 24.05-24.25 1 200 200 – – NOC GHz 2 200 200 – – NOC 3 200 200 – – NOC t 33.4-36 1 2600 2600 – – NOC GHz 2 2600 2600 – – NOC 3 2600 2600 – – NOC

t U S reservation — Lost bandwidth i Status reduced + See text NOC No change

SOURCE Telecommunications Systems Inc. 90 . Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

operations. Now, however, the exceptions radio regulations showed that the radioloca- can become extremely difficult with the ex- tion and FSS would share this band equally pected proliferation of the fixed and mobile at least in regions 2 and 3. In the U.S. na- services. The difficulty will be particularly tional table of allocations, the band was severe for airborne radar operations because alloted to (and in use by) the radiolocation the large LOS distances these signals travel service. Studies conducted in preparation for when aircraft are at high altitudes can cause WARC showed that the specific systems be- interference over large areas extending into ing used by these services could not share other countries. the band. On the basis of the radar system usage, the U.S. position was to retain radio- Because of this incompatibility between location as a primary service with the provi- the fixed and mobile services on the one sion that a part of the band could be made hand and radiolocation service on the other, available to support fixed-satellite communi- the United States entered reservations to cations. the Final Acts in Protocol Statement No. 38 for the frequency bands 430 to 440 MHz, This position was steadfastly maintained 5650 to 5850 MHz, 8500 to 8750 MHz, through a protracted period of intense nego- 10,000 to 10,500 MHz (where the fixed and tiations at WARC. The final result did, in- mobile services were added as a primary deed, reduce radiolocation to a secondary service in the table of allocations rather than service in the table of allocations, but, by by footnote), 13.4 to 14 GHz, 15.7 to 17.3 footnote, primary status was restored in re- GHz, and 33.4 to 36 GHz. Fixed and mobile gions 2 and 3 over the band 3400 to 3600 footnotes were also included in the bands MHz. The footnote contains a directive for 1215 to 1300 MHz and 3300 to 3400 MHz, administrations to take all practical steps to but some mitigating circumstances pre- protect FSS after 1985 along with a nonbind- cluded the need for U.S. reservations. ing plea for radiolocation systems to cease In the band 1215 to 1300 MHz, one-third operations by the same year. As part of the of the countries present in the fixed and mo- compromise, a formal declaration was signed bile footnote are also represented in a radio- by the United States, Canada, the United navigation footnote for the same frequency Kingdom, the Netherlands, Australia, and band. It was felt that the fixed and mobile Belgium vowing to make reasonable effort to usage would not be so severe as to warrant a accommodate FSS in the band. The national U.S. reservation. In the 3300- to 3400-MHz table of allocations, currently under develop- band a clause was inserted in the footnote ment jointly by FCC and IRAC, will make that negates the primary status of the fixed limited allowance for FSS in the band 3600 and mobile services in the regions around the to 3700 MHz with the remainder of the band Mediterranean Sea. It was felt that this was being retained in the radiolocation service. sufficient to obviate a need for a reservation in this band. In the FCC’s third notice of inquiry concerning implementation of the Final Acts of A second key decision was made in connec- WARC-79 (Docket 80-739), the FSS allocation with the radionavigation services. The tions in the bands 3.7 to 3.7 GHz and 4.5 to decision here was to add maritime radionavi- 4.8 GHz are proposed to be limited to inter- gation as a primary service in the radioloca- national satellite systems and excludes do- tion bands 8850 to 9000 MHz and 9200 to mestic satellite systems. According to the 9300 MHz, and to add radionavigation as a third notice of inquiry, the expectation is primary service in the band 9500 to 9800 that no more than one Earth station on each MHz. U.S. coast can be successfully coordinated The third key decision concerned FSS in with stations operating in the radiolocation the band 3400 to 3700 MHz. The existing service. Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts . 91

Item 2.–WARC-79 presented the first op- radiolocation systems is considerably en- portunity to allocate the frequency bands hanced from that which existed prior to above 40 GHz to terrestrial services. The WARC-79. U.S. radiolocation position in this frequency Item 4.–It was the U.S. objective to ob- range was to obtain four primary bands and tain more substantial frequency support for three secondary bands primarily in the re- the accurate position-fixing systems in the gions of reduced atmospheric absorption, MF band. While WARC did not provide a the so-called “propagation windows. ” common, worldwide band for these nonradar WARC allocated six primary bands and four radiolocation systems, it did provide pri- secondary bands. A comparison of the U.S. mary status over 30 kHz in region 1, 245 proposals with the WARC action is shown in kHz in region 2, and 193.5 kHz in region 3 table 8. It is clear that there is adequate fre- coupled with secondary status over 80 kHz quency support for radiolocation system de- in region 2 and 200 kHz in region 3. velopment in these bands. Item 3.—Prior to WARC-79 there was no Reservations provision for spaceborne radars in the radio The U.S. reservations on radiolocation regulations. The matter has been rectified by matters, noted above, were contained in the the WARC-79 action of permitting space- initial set of reservations filed by various ad- borne radars in every radiolocation band be- ministrations in the Final Protocol of Decem- tween 1 and 36 GHz as well as the band 78 to ber 3, 1979. About 20 of the 51 reservations 79 GHz. The U.S. proposal was to accommo- submitted contained a statement by the sub- date space radars on a secondary basis in the mitting government that it would take the bands below 14 GHz and on a primary basis steps necessary to protect its interests in the above 14 GHz regardless of the service that event of noncompliance with or reservations was employing the radar systems. The ac- to the Final Acts by other administrations. tual wording in the WARC-79 footnotes pro- The following day, 32 additional reserva- vides secondary status to space radioloca- tions were entered, 24 of which contained tion systems in all the radiolocation bands similar statements. Three of those twenty- from 1 to 14 GHz and in the band 35.5 to four made specific mention of the U.S. Reser- 35.6 GHz it has primary status. Radars used vation No. 38. in the Earth-exploration satellite service have primary status in the bands 35.5 to The reservation by the United States con- 35.6 GHz and 78 to 79 GHz, with secondary tained in paragraph 4 of Protocol Statement status in all the radiolocation bands from 1 No. 38, relating to the 890-to 960-MHz band to 24.25 GHz. Thus, the status of spaceborne will, in all probability, cause a problem along the U.S. borders primarily relating to non- Table 8.—Comparison of WARC Radiolocation government operations. The issue will be- Allocations and U.S. Proposed Allocations come one of the many topics for discussion Above 40 GHz and negotiation in the future U.S. bilateral Bands in U.S. proposal Bands allocated meetings on telecommunication matters (G Hz) (GHz) with Canada, Mexico, and other nearby — 59-64 Primary 76-81 Primary 76-81 Primary countries. The reservation merely places 92-95 Primary 92-95 Primary these countries on notice that the United 95-101 Secondary 95-101 Secondary States will coordinate its usage of the band — 126-134 Primary but will not seek agreement prior to making 142-150 Secondary 134-142 Secondary 165-170 Primary 144-149 primary assignments. Although radar users must 221-229 Secondary protect nongovernment operations in this 240-250 Primary 241-248 primary band, one reason agreements will not be sought is that U.S. radiolocation usage in- SOURCE. Telecommunications Systems Inc. 92 • Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

volves the newest long-range surveillance The insertion of multiple country fixed radar in operation by the Navy, as well as and mobile footnotes into the table of alloca- another Navy surveillance radar now in the tions threatened chaos for many services. advanced development stage. Through strenuous efforts by the United States, Brazil, and other countries, the situa- The reservations involving the bands tion was eased for some “passive” services where radionavigation was added as a pri- (Earth-exploration satellite, space research, mary service along with radiolocation (8500 to 9000, 9200 to 9300, and 9500 to 9800 and radio astronomy) and the meteorological aids service. Radiolocation did not fare as MHz) can, if not forestalled, result in long- well. Although many countries deplored term, worldwide problems. Radar usage by these footnotes as being counter to the de- the radiolocation service is extremely heavy velopment of a rational table of allocations, in the radiolocation bands between 8500 and the United States was the only country to 10,000 MHz. The addition of the radionavi- act on them. The action noted in paragraph 3 gation service and the multicountry fixed of Protocol No. 38 indicated that the United and mobile footnotes in this band have taken States, in the operation of radiolocation sta- 900 MHz of virtually exclusive radiolocation tions, will not guarantee protection to, nor in the current radio regulations and added coordination with, other services. The action one or more primary services over the entire was necessary because the existence of the band. Technical and administrative solu- fixed and mobile footnotes in every radiolo- tions must be sought if radiolocation is to retain its effectiveness. Some effective tech- cation band between 1 and 40 GHz jeopard- nical solutions were proposed to the 1978 ized all radars operating to serve national defense. Straightforward as it is with regard CCIR special preparatory meeting by the to the interference radars might cause to United States and the United Kingdom. other services, the U.S. reservation contains Study of the technical solutions to radioloca- the implicit statement that the radars can tion-radionavigation sharing needs to be pur- operate in the presence of interference from sued in CCIR. A more immediate solution, fixed and mobile emitters. All radars are albeit partial, could be found administra- designed to be operated in the presence of in- tively. terference, either purposeful or accidental. The U.S. International Radio Advisory The degree to which these interference rejec- Committee (IRAC) has shown no inclination tion techniques will have to be improved and to add radionavigation to the national table used depends on how extensively other coun- of allocations. IRAC might examine the mat- tries introduce fixed and mobile services in ter more thoroughly and develop a set of these bands. recommendations for use by the State De- This implementation is not expected to oc- partment in discussions with other coun- cur equally in all the bands to which the foot- tries. The recommendations should propose notes have been added primarily due to eco- an orderly introduction of radionavigation nomic considerations. However, early imple- on an “as-needed” basis rather than throw- mentation is expected in the bands around 1 ing the bands open to any and all navigation GHz and below where economical hardware use. The intent would be to buy time for the already exists for fixed and mobile applica- introduction of technical solutions. In the tions. absence of such a planned introduction, the radiolocation service may soon find itself The U.S. reservations in Protocol No. 38 having a de facto secondary status because contain the only specific reference to the ra- of the safety-of-life aspects of the radionav- diolocation service. Of the remaining proto- igation service. col statements, a few are political, many deal Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts • 93 with specific bands and services, and the ma- of WARC-79. The increased costs will be as- jority contain protective clauses indicating sociated with additional needs for opera- that the country or countries submitting the tional frequency flexibility, development, protocol will take necessary action in the and procurement of hardware for interfer- event that other signatories abrogate the ence-free operation while retaining existing Final Acts. Only three protocol statements performance, and increased participation in mention No. 38 and even in those cases the international forums such as CCIR. concern seems to be more with the 6- and Frequency management is a continuing 7-MHz bands than with radiolocation. Thai- task, occupying staff people at the headquar- land, in Protocol No. 60, notes that it will ters and unit level. Internationally, frequen- allocate the band 435 to 438 MHz to the cy managers ensure equitable allocations for mobile, except aeronautical-mobile, service various services as dictated by national on a primary basis. Thus, while there is no needs; at the national level, they allot the specific threat to the radiolocation service, the mechanism is in place for electronic and allocated frequencies as appropriate to national usage; at the unit level, they assign political harassment should any country frequencies in accordance with the local con- decide on this course of action. ditions. At all levels there is the need to deal with the incidence of interference. It is clear Radar Spectrum Availability that all of these functions as applied to the and Costs radiolocation service will increase because of the additional services added by WARC to The availability of spectrum for the radio- the radiolocation bands. location service had been significantly increased below 200 MHz and above 40 GHz New coordinating activities must now take and has remained virtually intact between place between the radiolocation service and these two frequencies. The principal benefit the fixed, mobile, Earth-exploration satellite, is that the new table of allocations (including space research, radio astronomy, aeronau- the footnotes to the table) in the radio regula- tical radionaviagation, maritime radionavi- tions continue to provide basic allocations gation, radionavigation, and FSS. These ac- for radiolocation service in all the currently tivities are expected to be particularly heavy used bands as well as some new bands. as the allowed usage in the fixed, mobile, and radionavigation bands are implemented. Sig- Of equal importance is the retention in the nificant numbers of interference incidents United States of a primary status (by footnote) for radiolocation in the bands 420 to are also expected in these bands entailing the development of techniques to eliminate 430, 440 to 450, and 890 to 942 MHz. It is in or reduce this interference. these bands, which were reduced to secondary status in the table of allocations, that the As noted earlier, all military radars are de- United States has, and is developing, sophis- signed to operate in the presence of inten- ticated surveillance radars. While these tional (jamming) and unintentional (inter- radars have operational modes suitable for ference) signals. Numerous electronic coun- worldwide use in a secondary status, the ter-countermeasure (ECCM) techniques are footnotes will provide the opportunity for ex- incorporated into systems to reduce the ef- ercising all modes of operation at U.S. train- fects of unwanted electromagnetic emis- ing sites. The results of WARC have, there- sions. However, ECCM is not a panacea for fore, done little to reduce the spectrum avail- interference problems. In this regard, a few able for radar operations. comments on radars, ECCM, and interference are in order. Adequacy of spectrum availability notwithstanding, the costs of radar develop- First, radar performance is measured in ment and operation must increase as a result terms of a clear radiofrequency environment —

94 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

with no interference present. Most ECCM The third cost increase derives from a need techniques involve some performance degra- for radar developers to expand their partici- dation. For this reason, a particular ECCM pation in CCIR. This expansion is extremely should be used only when it is needed. Of important in light of the many new sharing course, when interference is present, ECCM situations created by WARC. Prior to will improve system performance but will WARC, CCIR participation was considered generally not bring it back to its clear envi- relatively unimportant by radiolocation ronment performance. Second, ECCM tech- users since there was little sharing or in- niques are largely signal-specific. Thus, a teraction with other services. During prep- radar will have several techniques to be able arations for WARC, it became apparent that to continue to operate in a changing radiofre- the many exclusive bands employed by the quency environment. Not all techniques are radiolocation service would be reallocated or compatible so that use of one may preclude shared. Because of this likelihood, represen- the use of another. When multiple tech- tatives of the radiolocation service par- niques are used, the performance degrada- ticipated in the IRAC preparing for the tion due to each is cumulative. And third, WARC-79 AD Hoc 144 and CCIR study radar emissions, which generate interference group activities, served as members of the into other services, are seldom considered as SPM delegation, and were part of the U.S. part of an ECCM package. delegation to WARC. These factors when coupled with the ex- This representation should continue at pected proliferation of radiolocation band CCIR in order to establish a sound and con- usage by other services means that radiolo- sistent technical background for radar topics cation systems will spend more time with in the reports of CCIR plenary meetings (the ECCM circuits operating and, through their CCIR Green Books). The absence of this radiofrequency emissions, be interfering technical basis may have been part of the with more systems in other services. In the reason that radiolocation received little short term, the need for extensive modifica- support at WARC-79. The representation tions to existing systems is not anticipated. should consist of not only headquarters pol- However, planning should begin now for nec- icy personnel but also scientists and engi- essary modifications to radars operating in neers from Government laboratories and the frequency bands where the United from Government contractors. Perhaps States took a reservation. In the long term, CCIR participation should become a “line development work on new and existing sys- item” in the budget of every radar system tems will have to be increased to ensure mis- development. And CCIR should not be the sion-fulfilling performance in the presence of only involvement. Future ITU conferences increased interference. This additional devel- dealing with specific services and specific opment work should concentrate both on regions will continue to have an effect on keeping unwanted signals out of the receiver radiolocation matters. It would be prudent and on reducing the level and direction of un- to have radar expertise at these meetings as necessary (“spurious”) emissions coming well. from the radar. This represents more than just an incremental increase in the ECCM Fixed-Satellite and budget of radar development, since perform- Mobile-Satellite Services ance in the presence of the “friendly” interference should equate to the current per- Table 9 provides a summary of WARC-79 formance in a clear environment. The in- gains and changes in status on fixed and crease may range from 5 to 15 percent de- mobile satellite allocations above 27.5 MHz pending on the type of radar and the prolif- as reflected in the allocation tables. The data eration of the other services in the radar in the bandwidth and change columns illus- bands. trates that all the changes in the FSS and Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 95

Table 9.—Summary of WARC Gains and Changes in Status on Fixed- and Mobile. Satellite Allocations Above 27.5 MHz

MHz Type of Frequency band Bandwidth Change Prior major use satellite (MHz or GHz) Region(s) Primary Secondary MHz of the band MO 608-614 MHz 2 6 +6 BC MO 1544-1545 All 1 +1 Aero mobile satellite FX 5850-5925 2 75 + 75 RL FX 6425-7075 All 650 + 650 FX MO FX 10.7-10.95 GHZ All 250 + 250 FX MO FX 11.2-11.45 All 250 + 250 FX MO FX 12.1 -12.3 2 200 + 200 FX MO and BC FX 12,75-13.25 All 500 + 500 FX MO FX 14.5 -14,8 All 300 + 300 FX MO FX 17,3 -17.7 All 400 + 400 RL MO 19.7 -20.2 All 500 + 500 FX satellite FX 27-27.5 2 and 3 500 + 500 FX and MO MO 29.5-30 All 500 + 500 FX satellite FX 30-31 All 1000 + 1000 FX satellite FX 37.5 -39.5 All 2000 + 2000 FX and MO FX and MO 39.5 -40.5 All 2000 + 2000 FX and MO FX 42.5 -43,5 All 1000 + 1000 BC satellite MO 43.5-47 All 3500 + 3500 Various MO satellites FX 47.2 -50.2 All 3000 + 3000 Not allocated MO 50.4 -51.4 All 1000 + 1000 FX satellite MO 66-71 All 5000 + 5000 Various MO satellites FX and MO 71-74 All 3000 + 3000 Not allocated FX 74-75.5 All 1500 + 1500 Not allocated FX and MO 81-84 All 3000 + 3000 Not allocated MO 95-1oo All 5000 + 5000 Various MO satellites MO 134-142 All 8000 + 8000 Radio astronomy FX 149-150 All 1000 + 1000 Various MO satellites FX 152-164 All 12000 + 12000 Not allocated MO 190-200 All 20000 + 20000 Various satellites FX 202-217 All 15000 + 15000 Not allocated FX 235-236 All 1000 + 1000 Radio astronomy FX 238-241 All 3000 + 3000 Radio astronomy MO 252-265 All 13000 + 13000 Various satellites

SOURCE Systematics General Corp., “The World Administrative Radio Conference 1979, ” final report, volS I and II

MSS allocations were positive and generally footnote 3762B does not permit aircraft sta- provided primary service status. The impres- tions to operate in the 8025- to 8400-MHz sion that everything went well for FSS and band in region 2. So, although the goal of 125 MSS (and for DOD satellite interests) does MHz for up and downlinks for fixed-satellite not reflect the full implications of WARC-79 and mobile-satellite communications was decisions. There may be problems in satisfy- achieved, this meant that the partial ex- ing the DSCS requirements in the 7- to clusivity that existed for FSS was lost in the 8-GHz band. DOD’s WARC-79 initial goal two 50-MHz bands (7250 to 7300 MHz and for satellite operations was to increase the 7975 to 8025 MHz). The DOD plans for use two partially exclusive 50-MHz FSS bands of ground-mobile forces (transportable) and to 125 MHz for both fixed-satellite and airborne satellite terminals in the United mobile-satellite communications, and to add States, NATO countries, and in selected mobile-satellite as a secondary service in the areas of the Pacific must take account of the two 500-MHz FSS bands 7250 to 7750 MHz WARC-79 decisions. Frequency support for and 7900 to 8400 MHz. Footnote 3764B was these types of DSCS operations will require added to the table of allocations that author- long lead times to coordinate with host ad- ized the bands 7250 to 7375 MHz (space-to- ministrations. Earth) and 7900 to 8025 MHz (Earth-to- space) for use by MSS (subject to agreement The coordination requirements for mobile- obtained under the procedure set forth in ar- satellite use in the 235- to 399.9-MHz band ticle N13A)—a major gain. An additional have become more complex due to WARC- 96 “ Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

79. Previously, under footnote 3618/308A, ● reservations taken by the United the use and development of this service was States. only subject to the agreement among the administrations concerned and those having It should be emphasized that there will be services operating in accordance with the future costs resulting from the actions at table, which may be affected. Now the modi- WARC-79. The nature of these costs are fied 308A (3618) requires two conditions to varied. The military, in particular, is affected be fulfilled: by the number of footnotes (about 500) to the table of frequency allocations that make it . Agreement must be obtained under the impossible in some cases to know which procedure set forth in article N13A. countries will use which frequency bands for – Under this article agreement among which services. Attempting to design mili- administrations now becomes more tary systems and plan operations on a world- complex due to increased data to be wide basis with such uncertainty will in- furnished–and adding IFRB to the crease system costs and decrease opera- coordination process. tional flexibility. This means, among other ● Stations in MSS do not cause harmful things, that system planners will need to interference to those of other services design military systems that have the flex- operating (or planned to be operating) in ibility to operate in several different fre- accordance with the table. quency bands. The extent of the changes and The United States and most NATO coun- the magnitude of the costs associated with tries took a reservation in the final protocol WARC-79 decisions will not become clear for against this second provision on the basis some time. Discussions between the United that this imposes a condition of noninterfer- States and other countries–particularly our ence that could lead to a request to cease op- NATO allies—about implementation plans eration of a previously coordinated satellite will help clarify the future operating envi- system in the case where an administration, ronment. despite having agreed to such a satellite WARC-79 resulted in a large number of fu- system, puts into service (or merely plans) ture conferences and DOD should actively a system that might receive harmful inter- participate in the preparation for national ference. and international meetings pertinent to these conferences—including the activities Costs Pertinent to National Security of CCIR—to ensure that DOD spectrum Costs have been discussed earlier in this needs are accommodated and that our na- report. Summarized here are the cost im- tional security interests are protected. DOD pacts of WARC-79 from the standpoint of should also provide technically knowledge- national security. There is no major immedi- able, experienced (and, to the extent possi- ate cost impact of WARC-79 regarding na- ble, multilingual) members to the U.S. dele- tional security systems. No heavily used gations. Of the three world conferences and equipment must be moved to another band seven regional conferences recommended in or phased out and no expensive retrofits are the Final Acts of WARC-79, the most impor- required to existing DOD equipment be- tant from a national security standpoint are: cause of WARC-79 actions. Three reasons ● World Administrative Radio Conference explain this lack of immediate cost impact: on the Geostationary Orbit and the ● frequency flexibility of existing U.S. Planning of Space Services (1985 and equipment; 1987); and ● success of the U.S. delegation at ● World Administrative Conference for WARC-79; and Mobile Services (1983). —-

Ch. 4— WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 97

Mobile services were popular with the de- Radiolocation (Radar) .-The service re- veloping nations, and, with little regard for tained almost all of its allocations above 200 the technical aspects of sharing between dif- MHz; the only actual reduction of allocation ferent radio services, many additions were to the radiolocation service occurred in the made to the table of frequency allocations in 216- to 230-MHz band in region 3. This oc- support of these services. The conference curred when 9 MHz of a secondary allocation added many provisions impacting radar and (216 to 225 MHz) was reduced to 7 MHz (223 weapon system frequency bands, both for to 230 MHz). When considering the magni- terrestrial and satellite operations. tude of spectrum allocated for radiolocation use, this reduction of 2 MHz is minor. Con- The overall DOD impact of these and other sistent with the U.S. proposals, radiolo- changes related to sharing will be a greater cation was reduced to a secondary serv- need for U.S. planners, managers, equipment ice—except that in region 2 (the Americas) it suppliers, and operational forces to be aware will be on a primary basis until 1990 after of frequency band limitations, and a need to which no new stations are to be authorized. ensure better system development review to However, significant loss in radiolocation understand how U.S. systems can live with status resulted from WARC-79 in certain ra- those of other countries. These changes add diolocation bands below 20 GHz. This loss of up to one thing for DOD—increased costs. status plus the movement of other users into These include: costs associated with addi- the bands combined to force the United tional needs for operational frequency man- States to take a reservation (No. 38) affect- agement; costs associated with the development and procurement of the more sophisti- ing certain radiolocation bands. cated equipment (e.g., increased tunability) Although there was little actual loss of needed to permit interference-free operations allocations, the provisions for radar were with other services in the same band; and probably changed more by WARC-79 than costs associated with proving the system is for any other single radio operation. For ex- compatible, such as electromagnetic com- ample, in the band 3400 to 3600 MHz, there patibility (EMC) studies. And there will be are provisions for radar to operate world- increased costs of coordination with our wide, but radar users must afford some allies. Other costs may become apparent measure of protection to satellite and radio over time (e.g., as the HF reaccommodation relay operators. The United States operates takes effect in the coming years). the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), the Navy’s AEGIS, and several Summary of the National Security other systems of importance to DOD (e.g., Impact of WARC-79 missiles, air traffic control, air surveillance, The major DOD-related issues and objec- etc. ) in the band 2900 to 3700 MHz, and their tives were enumerated earlier. Here is a sum- operations may be affected through the need mary of the major impacts on those issues for added planning coordination. If there is and objectives. Before beginning a more de- extensive implementation of satellite com- tailed summary, however, it should be reit- munications in this band below 3600 MHz, erated that in general the national security then the problems mentioned above would interests of the U.S. were not endangered by be compounded–especially in Europe. The WARC-79 actions. Nevertheless, continued radiolocation service lost some exclusivity in active participation by DOD in the planning the band 8500 to 10,000 MHz where DOD and conduct of future discussions and con- operates navigation, air search, fire control ferences will be required to ensure that radars, and various airborne systems. When follow-on actions to WARC-79 do not jeop- footnotes are considered, radiolocation effec- ardize national security. This will require tively lost exclusivity over the whole band adequate budget support. (8500 to 10,000 MHz). This could eventually 98 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference Of 1979 place constraints on radar operations and in- in some areas will become increasingly dif- crease demands on system designers. Short- ficult. term relief is provided by Protocol State- ment No. 38, and intermediate term relief All U.S. objectives were met in the 20-,30-, can be negotiated with U.S. allies through and 40-GHz bands that may be used by fu- bilateral and multilateral agreements out- ture generation military satellite systems side of the radio regulations. Nevertheless, (e.g., DSCSs), including provisions for ac- radar as it currently operates will become in- commodating MSS. creasingly unwelcome in many parts of the The United States sought to avoid the world, and new design and operational possible future loss of system design flex bil- strategies will be needed before the end of ity and orbit locations associated wit a the century. rigid a priori allocation plan for satellites in Radionavigation. –The U.S. objective of the geostationary orbit. While no plan was providing two bands (1215 to 1240 MHz adopted at WARC-79, plans were made for a and 1559 to 1610 MHz) for space-to-Earth future conference on space systems to be navigation signals to accommodate the held no later than 1985–with a follow-on NAVSTAR/GPS was achieved. NAVSTAR/ conference about 18 months later. These GPS is the cornerstone of future DOD high space conferences will probably result in accuracy global navigation. It can also pro- some form of orbit spectrum planning that vide for improved civil navigation. could inhibit technological development. The impact on all future DOD space systems is Satellite Communications.—The U.S. ob- potentially very large. Proper preparation jective to maintain the status quo for MSS for these conferences is essential, including in the 235- to 399.9-MHz band used by the adequate budget allocations. Naval Fleet Satellite Communication Sys- tem (FLTSATCOM) was partially achieved; High Frequency.–The U.S. objectives of however, coordination provisions (article providing for the increasing requirements of N13A) were added that included a condition international broadcasting (e.g., Radio Free that stations in MSS not cause harmful in- Europe, Voice of America, etc.) and maritime terference to those of other services operat- operations (while limiting the loss of HF ing, or planned to be operated, in accordance spectrum for DOD operations) were met, al- with the table of allocations. To forestall the though the United States took reservations potential negative impact, the United States below 10 MHz for both of these services. The and most of its NATO allies, took a reserva- net reduction of only 14 percent in HF spec- tion in the Final Protocol. trum available to DOD should not adversely affect U.S. strategic networks, which rely in- A major U.S. objective was achieved creasingly on satellites, and the available through the recognition of MSS. The bands spectrum should accommodate our tactical 7250 to 7750 MHz and 7900 to 8400 MHz and other HF national security require- had been allocated to FSS (DSCS I, II, III, ments. NATO SATCOM). Now, the MSS can operate on a primary basis in the bands 7250 to Fixed and Mobile (Terrestrial) .-The U.S. 7375 MHz and 7900 to 8025 MHz; however, objective of maintaining the status quo in there was a corollary loss of the partial ex- the important NATO band of 4400 to 4990 clusivity for FSS in two 50-MHz bands (7250 -MHz was not met. The band is heavily used to 7300 MHz and 7975 to 8025 MHz). There by the military for tactical communications was a net gain for national security objec- (primarily radio relay and troposcatter sys- tives through these changes, although tems). Although the present and past alloca- deployment of satellite systems without tions provided for FSS in this band, there is causing interference to radio relay systems no known satellite system operating as such. Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 99

In order to provide some protection, the technical cooperation in maritime tele- fixed-satellite was changed from uplink to communications, especially by provid- downlink and shifted from 4400 to 4700 ing technical advice and by assisting in MHz to 4500 to 4800 MHz, which is shared training personnel; with fixed and mobile. (The aeronautical- technical cooperation in national radio mobile service is excluded from 4825 to 4836 propagation studies in tropical areas MHz and 4950 to 4990 MHz by footnote.) designed to improve and develop the The band 14.5 to 15.35 MHz was also desig- developing countries’ radiocommunica- nated by NATO as a primary military band tions; for fixed and mobile services. WARC-79 in- development of national radio frequency cluded the FSS (Earth-to-space) in the band management within the developing 14.5 to 14.8 MHz shared equally with fixed countries through such means as re- and mobile. By footnote, FSS would be lim- gional seminars and training; ited to the broadcast feeder links and would transfer of technology in telecommuni- be reserved for countries outside Europe. cations for the purpose of developing The effect is that, if satellite service is in- services and attaining social, economic, stituted, the military systems would have to and cultural objectives of the develop- be located and operated in a manner that ing countries; and would not cause interference. Analyses of use or role of telecommunications in potential interference might lead to the re- rural development. quirement for sharing sensitive military technical data with civil administrations. Those resolutions look to UNDP as the The impact of these changes cannot be fully primary source of funding. However, the determined until after discussions with our United States will be expected to participate NATO allies. directly or indirectly in the areas described. Some decisions must be made how the Intelligence, –The impact of WARC-79 on United States should respond to requests for U.S. intelligence systems is not discussed in assistance. this report. Many of the resolutions and recommenda- Resolutions, Recommendations, tions relating to the CCIR study topics have to do with such highly controversial subjects Reservations, and Declaration as the use of the geostationary satellite orbit Many of the important consequences of and the planning of space services utilizing WARC-79 derived from resolutions and rec- it; the convening of a WARC for the plan- ommendations approved by the conference ning of the HF bands allocated to the broad- and from reservations and declarations by casting service; and, the convening of a re- individual countries indicating a refusal to gional administrative radio conference for be bound by a particular decision of the con- this detailed planning of the broadcasting- ference or agreeing to undertake certain ac- satellite service in the 12-GHz band and as- tions in order to conform to a decision. sociated feeder links in region 2. A total of 87 resolutions and 90 recommen- About 2 dozen specialized world or region- dations were adopted by WARC-79. Many of al administrative radio conferences were pro- the resolutions referred certain topics for posed at WARC-79, many of which can af- study by CCIR or proposed the convening of fect U.S. interests. The conference recom- world or regional administrative radio con- mended that three world conferences and ferences. In addition, the developing coun- seven regional conferences be held. (The rec- tries introduced several resolutions seeking ommended conferences and their projected increased assistance in the following areas: dates are listed at the end of chapter 6.) 100 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

A reservation, as noted earlier, is a formal to 399.9 MHz. The NATO countries agreed statement, as part of a protocol, wherein an that they could meet the prescribed coor- ITU member indicates that it will not abide dination procedures called for in the foot- by a particular decision of a conference. note. However, they rejected an additional These reservations are called protocol state- provision of this footnote imposing a condi- ments in the Final Acts of WARC-79 and tion of noninterference. The concern was this time the United States took a total of that this condition could lead to a request to six. (Reservations generally provide a means cease operation of a previously coordinated by which countries can accept the majority satellite system when another country mere- of decisions reached by a WARC without ly planned a system that might receive being bound by a particular decision.) harmful interference from a MSS operating in the band. A separate reservation of Two of the six were rebuttal statements in Canada supported the U.S. view that future which: 1) the United States rejected a Cuban or planned terrestrial systems should not complaint that U.S. use of radiofrequencies jeopardize existing MSS. at our Guantanamo Naval Base was an im- pediment to Cuba’s communication services In Protocol No. 36, the United States and Cuban sovereignty; and 2) the United joined the seven other countries in pro- States joined with 22 other countries in testing the inadequate provision for HF noting that the claims of equatorial coun- broadcasting–particularly at 6 and 7 MHz. tries to sovereignty over segments of the Fourteen other countries individually took geostationary orbit were not germane to the reservations on this same matter. They all work of the conference. Such rebuttal state- expressed concern that the forthcoming HF ments are common in conferences such as broadcasting conferences (1984 and 1986) WARC-79 to indicate that political rhetoric will be hampered by the lack of adequate al- should not be confused with international locations, and reserved the right to take the agreements. necessary steps to meet the needs of their HF broadcasting services. A third U.S. reservation called attention to the fact that our international broadcasting The United States took a major reserva- in the HF bands was being intentionally tion in Protocol No. 38 that was submitted in jammed by other ITU members and re- five parts. The first two parts referred to served the right to take “necessary and ap- Protocol Nos. 36 and 32. The third part propriate action” to protect U.S. broadcast- stated that the United States could not ing interest. The statement was included pri- guarantee protection to or coordination with marily to put the jamming problem on the other services that experienced interference record inasmuch as the subject was not men- from radars operated on a primary basis in a tioned during the course of the conference, variety of specified bands. The fourth part although Israel made a reference to jamming stated that the United States reserves the in its statement for the final protocol. right to operate fixed, mobile, and radiolocation services in the bands 470 to 806 MHz None of these three reservations will im- and 890 to 960 MHz without the required co- pact on telecommunications operations di- ordination procedures specified in footnotes rectly; however, all three are likely to resur- pertaining to these bands. The United States face at future conferences. agreed to coordinate its usage of such serv- The remaining three U.S. reservations ices with neighboring countries that are affected, but not with all the other countries dealt directly with spectrum matters. In Pro- tocol No. 32, the United States participated that might, for no apparent good reason, re- in a joint NATO statement rejecting the quest coordination under article 14. terms of a footnote affecting the operation of Part five of the reservation addresses the MSS in the bands 235 to 322 MHz and 335.4 failure of the conference to provide adequate Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 101 allocations for the maritime-mobile service number of reservations on this single subject below 12 MHz. In this reservation, the shows that the issue of HF allocations is far United States indicated that allocations to from settled. Continuing difficulties are like- the mobile service below 10 MHz would be ly, including actual interference with ex- used to satisfy maritime mobile require- isting services, the inability of some coun- ments. tries to satisfy their requirements, and a troublesome time at future scheduled broad- The U.S. reservations contained in Proto- casting conferences. col Statement 38 represent a conscious decision to take whatever steps are necessary to This leaves nine specific foreign reserva- protect vital U.S. national interests. They tions on all other subjects. Of these nine, cannot be regarded simply as a failure by the four deal with the UHF band. All are related U.S. delegation to get what it wanted at to localized problems, none of which greatly WARC-79. This is no more valid than listing affect the United States. The remaining five the hundreds of U.S. proposals that won ap- are as follows: proval and thereby claiming overall success. ● Belgium warned that it will use the band 100 to 104 MHz for a new network of Foreign Reservations broadcasting stations. Since the band is The remaining 77 reservations, some of now, and has been, allocated for this which bear the names of several countries, service, the reservation addresses the can be grouped in three categories: question of allotments or assignments in a region 1 broadcasting plan, a sub- ● general reservations; ject outside the agenda of WARC-79. . political reservations; and ● Japan said in another statement that it ● specific reservations. will continue to use the band 130 to Some 35 reservations can be categorized 526.5 kHz for aeronautical radio-bea- as “general” in that they were merely state- cons. If region 1 broadcast stations con- ments of a country’s intent to do whatever is tinue to cause interference in the band necessary to protect its radio-communica- 190 to 285 kHz, Japan will reallocate to tion services should other ITU members fail protect itself. to observe the radio regulations or take ● Nigeria claimed that the allocation of 14 other detrimental measures. to 14.8 GHz for feeder links to broadcasting satellites is not acceptable. This Another 17 reservations are “political” in reservation is apparently intended to in- that they relate to territorial disputes dicate that 14.0 to 14.5 GHz will be used (United States and Cuba over Guantanamo; for INTELSAT satellite services in Ni- Great Britain and Argentina over the Falk- geria leaving only 300 MHz for feeder land Islands; Chile and Great Britain over links to broadcasting satellites. How- the Antarctic). two others relate to sov- ever, sharing arrangements between ereignty claims to the geostationary orbit. those services should help assure ade- Finally, 28 reservations address specific quate spectrum for feeder links. issues. Of these, 19 are concerned with the ● In a joint reservation, France and Swit- allocation of HF among the broadcasting, zerland objected to high-power broad- fixed, and mobile services. The majority of cast stations below 5000 kHz and above these were entered by developing countries 41 MHz. Brazil expressed opposition to and state that they may not be able to sat- a WARC resolution establishing the pe- isfy their fixed and mobile service require- riod of validity of frequency assignments with the reduced allocations and they ments to satellites prior to the 1985 and reserve the right to continue using these 1987 space planning conferences, argu- frequencies for those services. The large ing that the resolution would prevent —

102 Ž Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

the planning conferences from deciding vital to national security and these radars on other distributions of frequency and would interfere with satellite operations in orbit allotments. However, the resolu- the same band. tion specifically stated that its applica- Negotiations were intense and a com- tion should not prejudge decisions of the promise was found late in the conference. planning conferences. The final result did, indeed, reduce radioloca- . Finally, a Thailand reservation ex- tion to a secondary service in the Interna- tended its allocation to the mobile serv- tional Table of Allocations. However, by a ice (except aeronautical-mobile) to the footnote to the table of allocations, primary entire band 430 to 440 MHz. The effect status was restored to the radiolocation is minimal because of the many other service in regions 2 and 3 for the bands 3.4 to services and countries already included 3.6 GHz. The footnote includes a directive by footnotes. for ITU members to take all practical steps to protect FSS after 1985 with a nonbinding Declaration appeal for radiolocation systems to cease op- The United States signed a formal declara- erations by 1985. The compromise was made tion of intent together with other countries possible by the removal of any mandatory re- at the WARC-79 conference as part of the ef- quirement to cease radar operations in the fort to resolve the controversy surrounding band. As part of the compromise, a declara- use of the band 3.4 to 3.7 GHz. tion was signed by the United States, Can- ada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, In ITU regions 2 and 3 (the Americas, Australia, and Belgium vowing to make rea- Oceania, and Asia) this band is allocated on sonable effort to accommodate FSS in the an equal basis to both the fixed satellite and band. radiolocation services. Based on studies showing that it is not feasible for these two The United States will determine how to services to share the same band, the United implement the intent of the declaration States has not implemented FSS, but has through its domestic processes. There are no carried on important military radar opera- FSS Earth stations currently operating in tions in this band. Commercial satellite sys- the 3.4- to 3.7-GHz band. However, the tems—both the global INTELSAT system United States agreed not to withhold sup- and U.S. domestic systems—operate in the port if INTELSAT decided to undertake adjacent band 3.7 to 4.2 GHz. The U.S. pro- FSS operations in that band. If such a deci- posal to the WARC-79 was to maintain the sion was made, the United States would be status quo and retain radiolocation as a under strong pressure to restrain radar oper- primary service in the 3.4 to 3.7 GHz band. ations that might interfere with interna- While the United States was prepared to tional satellite operations. make some provision for FSS to use a part of In the FCC’s third notice of inquiry con- the band, other countries, particularly from cerning implementation of the Final Acts of the developing world, insisted that the entire WARC-79 (General Docket 80-739) FCC pro- band be made available to expand satellite posed that only limited use be made of the service. FSS allocations in the 3.6- to 3.7-GHz and From the viewpoint of the satellite oper- 4.5- to 4.8-GHz bands. The FCC’s notice pro- ator, this proposal represents a logical and poses a limitation on the use of these bands cost effective expansion into a band contigu- to international satellite systems (specific- ous with existing operations. The problem ally the INTELSAT global system) and ex- for the United States, of course, is that it has cludes domestic satellite systems. FCC ex- large investments in radar equipment that is pects, according to its third notice of in- Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts c 103 quiry, that no more than one Earth station successfully coordinated with stations oper- on each coast of the United States can be ating in the radiolocation service.

The Impacts of WARC-77

The 1977 World Administrative Radio Neither of these two goals would have Conference for broadcasting satellites was been helped by adoption of an evolutionary convened to plan the use of the 11.7- to plan that was subject to change. Moreover, 12.2-GHz band that had been allocated in the United States, Canada, and Brazil were 1971 on a primary basis to the broadcasting the only countries planning use of the band satellite service, the fixed service, broad- for FSS and therefore concerned with prob- casting service, and (in region 2 only) FSS. lems of sharing between broadcasting satel- The decisions reached at WARC-77 are lites and FSS. Also, the United States and superseded by the Final Acts of WARC-79, Canada had unilaterally ruled out primary but the manner in which these decisions domestic use of the band for terrestrial were reached, and their longer term conse- services. quences, deserve some discussion. The U.S. delegation made extensive ef- Because the broadcasting satellite service forts to find fallback positions, or supporting was in an early stage of development, the technical documentation, which, while en- United States produced elaborate technical compassing U.S. views, would meet the con- arguments in advance against the adoption cerns of other countries. These efforts were of a detailed geostationary orbit and channel unsuccessful. The United States failed to allotment plan, believing that such a plan forestall the adoption of a detailed plan for would waste orbit and spectrum and hinder regions 1 and 3, but succeeded in putting off technological advances. The United States detailed planning for BSS in region 2 until proposed instead that the conference ap- 1983. prove certain actions that would encourage It can be argued that the United States planning that was evolutionary and flexible, prepared for the wrong conference in 1977. rather than detailed and restrictive, and The delegation was thoroughly armed with would make adequate provision for FSS in technical arguments based on experimental region 2 (the Americas). operation of ATS-6 and CTS, satellites with The conference ignored the U.S. technical broadcasting capabilities. The United States arguments and embraced the concept of de- sent representatives to a series of regional tailed planning for two basic reasons: ITU seminars and held bilateral discussions with a number of countries, including West ● the majority of developing countries Germany, Japan, the U. S. S. R., and the wanted to be assured of guaranteed ac- United Kingdom. Reports from these meet- cess to specific orbital slots and chan- ings made it clear that the U.S. position was nels and were convinced that a detailed shared by very few countries and was more a priori plan offered them that assur- than likely doomed to failure from the start. ance; and • a number of European countries be- Thus, in spite of a major U.S. effort, the lieved that the adoption of an a priori principle of a “negotiated plan” for the space plan would permit them to proceed with services was established and fully accepted development of terrestrial services in by a large majority of ITU members at the 11.7- to 12.2-GHz band. WARC-77, and the “planning” adopted was 104 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979 detailed planning including specifications of proaches that will satisfy renewed demands national orbital positions, channel assign- for “guaranteed access” for all countries and ments, service areas, and a variety of de- still permit the introduction of advanced tailed technical characteristics. There is no technology to increase the capacity of the reason to assume that this approach will not geostationary orbit and related spectrum to be advocated for other space services, such meet increasing requirements. as FSS, in future conferences. A major challenge for the United States will be to develop alternate planning ap- Chapter 5 Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies Contents

Page Introduction ...... 107 A More Restrictive Global Information Environment...... 108 Renewed Focus on Regional Telecommunications ...... 108 A More Active and Stronger Government Presence...... 109 U.S. Government Communications Policy and Structures...... 109 U.S. Structure and Processes for Spectrum Management...... 110 Possible procedural and Structural Improvements...... 111 Procedural Improvements...... 111 Structural Improvements...... 112 U.S. Strategies for Dealing With International Spectrum Issues and ITU. . 114 Policy Option No. l: Withdrawal From ITU...... 116 Policy Option No. 2: Revised ITU Voting Formula ...... 117 Policy Option No.3: Increased Regionalization of ITU ...... 118 Policy Option No. 4: Better Coordination and Planning ...... 119 Policy Option No. 5: Common-User System ...... 121 Policy Option No.6: “A Priori" Allotment...... 123

LIST OF FIGURES Figure No. Page 4. Displacement in Longitude for Countries in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres...... 124 5. Available Geostationary Arc...... 125 Chapter 5 Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies

Introduction

Countries planning for the extension and motes electronic information transfer that growth of their telecommunications net- will have significant, often radical, effects on works and improvements in communications the structures of cities, transportation, generally have to set out a reasonably long- economics, education, banking, postal serv- term strategy since a number of very impor- ices, the nature and control of information tant factors (resources, investments, socio- media, the privacy and security of citizens, political needs and trends, international rela- as well as general lifestyles. Changing polit- tions, technological possibilities and threats) ical, sociological, and economic needs or con- must be considered concurrently. straints will, in turn, strongly influence the range, tariffs, and structure of the telecom- Communications and information systems munications facilities and services. The fu- technology has reached the stage where con- ture environment is considerably more un- cepts such as the “information-based socie- certain than the present volatile scene. It is ty” are the subject of intense national and also more political and characterized by a international discussion. High technology growth in the “communications conscious- systems of advanced computer-communica- ness” of people. tions including digital/switched facsimile, computer polling systems, packet switching There is growing recognition that elec- data networks, distributed processor-con- tronic and telecommunication technologies trolled switching, and multiple-access satel- and their application to new integrated lite systems are appropriate to the needs of systems are an important source of economic both developed and less developed countries. stimulus. The importance of these technol- The use of such technology can greatly re- ogies in social and economic development, duce costs for important services; they can national security, cultural diffusion, and in- extend service to rural or remote points; they fluence over popular thinking combine to can give these countries fast and convenient create a strong bias and argument for pro- access to the best and most advanced infor- moting and protecting national information mation banks in the world. Many nations are industries and U.S. electronics manufactur- beginning to grasp these implications. As a ing capability. result, telecommunications is increasingly Information power is being increasingly viewed as a “tool for development” and as a recognized and used by the nations of the key to greater information capacity and world to increase and enhance their eco- power. This suggests that national commu- nomic and political power. Telecommunica- nication and telecommunication planning tions is a key resource in the creation and ex- must take account of broader considerations ploitation of information capacity and than were once considered necessary. power. As nations realize and appreciate the The telecommunication planner faces a pivotal role and importance of information new and potentially explosive situation. The and information power, telecommunication facilities and services now being considered policies will be viewed as strategic means for create a new infrastructure—an electronic in- increasing national sovereignties and reor- frastructure that makes possible and pro- dering world affairs.

107 108 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

A More Restrictive Global Information Environment

Information exchange between and among tries, and the global patterns of information nations is essential if nations of the world are power, the future suggests a much more re- to function as viable societies in a multi- strictive global information environment. polar, information interdependent world. On the way to this new global information The global flow of information is essential to infrastructure, the United States and other the sustenance of the current level and pat- nations will face a broad range of major prob- tern of the world’s collective intelligence and lems and issues including: economic production, development, and growth. The underlying principles of free- ● international technical operating stand- dom of information and freedom of expres- ards and procedures; sion have given rise, in some countries, to ● privacy and other considerations affect- the doctrine of free flow of information. For ing transborder data flows; 30 years, the idea, given legitimacy at the ● international marketing rules; United Nations, was that no barriers should ● reconciliation of national differences prevent or distort the flow of information concerning service availability and ac- among nations. This doctrine is presently cessibility, information availability and under serious attack. accessibility, sociocultural variations, frequency assignments and manage- The absence of, or loss of confidence in ment, national telecommunications and freedom of information rights or privileges information policies; in many of the Third World nations, as well ● impacts on national sovereignty; as the Communist countries, is a fundamen- ● influence and control of information on tal threat to the global flow of information. world events, attitudes, and outcomes; In conjunction with the indirect barriers im- and posed by other international information ● the benefits of information imports v. issues and concerns, namely transborder the cost of information dependency. data flow, the potential regulation of information imports and exports (contained in na- Many of the developing countries are al- tional policies for patents, advertising tech- ready evidencing an awareness of the link- nology transfers, direct investment, appro- ages among these issues and of the interplay priate technology, etc.), the protection of do- and interdependency that exists with radio mestic electronics and information indus- spectrum matters.

Renewed Focus on Regional Telecommunications

The 20 years ranging from about the mid- tablishment of international satellite com- 1950’s to the mid-1970’s can be communication facilities and institutions (e.g., sidered the global expansion phase in the de- INTELSAT). The thrust was towards inter- velopment of international telecommunica- continental connections and national access tions. This was dominated by the initial lay- to the global satellite network. Dramatic de- ing of undersea telephone cables and the es- creases in international satellite communica- Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies • 109 tion costs and a corresponding increase in Corresponding to this shift in needs and demand reflected and characterized this opportunities will be a change in institu- global expansion period. tional influence. Regional bodies such as the We are presently in a phase in which European Conference of Postal and Telecom- regional needs and policies will predominate. munications Administration (CEPT), the Nations will become more interested in spe- Arab satellite consortium (ARABSAT), and cific connectivity of external communication entities that support regional policies of routes in support of national and regional political and economic integration (such as political and economic goals and information the Association of Southeast Asian Nations policies as contrasted with the more general (ASEAN) will grow in influence relative to nature of global facilities expansion. The such bodies as the International Telecom- thrust will be on intraregional communica- munication Union (ITU), which will be com- tions along with focused development or pelled to accommodate these pressures and enhancement of specific interregional com- make strategic changes. munication routes.

A More Active and Stronger Government Presence

Without doubt, governments around the monopoly, that whether state owned or not, world will become increasingly involved in is likely to be a government or quasi-govern- the development, management, and control ment institution. This is not the case in the of communications technologies, products, United States and it is a factor that assumes and applications. They will seek to utilize added importance as computer and commu- and manipulate telecommunications, includ- nications services continue to converge, ing frequency matters, in furtherance of na- eroding the boundaries between the private tional and international goals. and public sector in communication and in- In most of the world, telecommunication formation goods and services. services are provided by a state-sanctioned

U.S. Government Communications Policy and Structures

How is the United States likely to fare in various services to function in a compatible this new environment? While it can be ar- manner. It is this coordination, which has gued that the present structure of the U.S. over the years become a very specialized and Government and its policymaking processes sophisticated art, that frequently bears in the telecommunication areas have pro- directly on policy decisions. Much of the tected and sustained our vital national in- ITU-sponsored negotiations relate to spec- terests to date, the question is whether it will trum use. Because of this, spectrum manage- be adequate for tomorrow. Since spectrum ment in the United States has been scruti- is the common denominator in all uses nized many times, sometimes criticized, and of radio, coordination is essential for the sometimes praised, down through the years. 110 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

Starting at least 30 years ago there has 1. The lack of appreciation at the top deci- been concern over the effectiveness of the sion levels of the Federal Government government structure to cope with the inter- and industry as to the vital role of tel- national aspects of telecommunications— ecommunications in the international particularly the negotiation of agreements and domestic political, economic, and within ITU and other United Nations (U. N.) private affairs of the United States, and organizations. Most of the international ne- the need for policy coordination. gotiations have been motivated by technical 2. There is a lack of centralized policy coor- considerations, primarily radio spectrum dination and guidance for international issues, without the advantage of a clearly telecommunication negotiations at a stated overall national telecommunication high enough level in the Federal Govern- policy. ment to be effective. 3 The State Department’s Office of In- The United States has done well in most of ternational Communications Policy is these negotiations but with each interna- neither staffed nor institutionally orga- tional conference the maneuvering room has nized to carry out effectively all of the decreased and thus the preparation and ac- functions involved in international tele- tual negotiating have become more difficult. communications negotiations. As we go into the decade of the 1980’s, the These structural weaknesses are a direct international aspects of telecommunications reflection of the lack of clear U.S. policy for are becoming more preeminent than ever. No telecommunication matters including spec- longer can fundamental telecommunication trum management issues. Moreover, the policy issues be avoided by relying on tech- U.S. permanent spectrum management nical agreements, motivated by technical mechanisms are not adequate to review all considerations, and negotiated on the pre- stated requirements of Government and sumption that only technical issues need nongovernment spectrum users objectively resolution. Unfortunately, the present Fed- or to verify and adjust needs consistent with eral Government structure, while respond- national policy objectives. The United ing to the technical aspects of international States also lacks an effective means of col- communications negotiations, has not devel- lecting data and developing guidelines to oped a mechanism or procedure for devel- judge the merits of one spectrum use over oping comprehensive policy. any other. There are three fundamental weaknesses in the present structure:

U.S. Structure and Processes Spectrum Management

The planning and management of the spec- agency develops its requirements for spectrum in the United States is handled by-the trum and orbit use and-these are discussed Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and coordinated through the mechanisms of (as manager for nongovernment users) and the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Com- by the National Telecommunications and In- mittee (IRAC) and its several subcommit- formation Administration (NTIA) (as man- . tees. The nongovernment requirements of ager for Federal Government agencies re- commercial public and private users are de- quiring spectrum for their radio-communi- veloped through the FCC notice of inquiry cation systems). Each executive branch (NOI) process often with the aid of advisory Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies “ 111 committees. NTIA and FCC coordinate to level forum for the generation of Govern- resolve differences and together with the ment proposals and coordination between State Department develop a single set of them and the nongovernment proposals is U.S. proposals for ITU administrative radio usually a special ad hoc committee of IRAC. conferences such as WARC-79. Such ad hoc committees include participation by FCC liaison representatives who pre- NTIA and FCC must agree on the bands sent the nongovernment view. that are proposed for individual services and this requires agreement on the eventual do- Consensus between NTIA and FCC on the mestic allocation of each band: whether for division of spectrum between Government Government use, nongovernment use, or and nongovernment users does not necessar- shared use. The State Department serves as ily ensure the most efficient use of spectrum. ombudsman in resolving disagreements, if Moreover, IRAC is an advisory committee to any, over U.S. proposals to international NTIA and it can recommend but cannot radio conferences and the President acts as compel spectrum-efficient design or tech- final artiber if the State Department cannot nology on large, powerful agencies like the resolve the problem. Depending on the por- Department of Defense (DOD). The power tion of the spectrum involved, shared use and resources of NTIA to successfully chal- ranges from about 20 percent for the region lenge spectrum decisions of such agencies between 100 and 1000 MHz to 100 percent are limited. for the band 10 to 100 kHz. The working

Possible Procedural and Structural Improvements

Procedural Improvements ● efficient and timely preparation for and participation in ITU conferences; and Improvements needed in the present pro- ● effective management of existing serv- cedures for managing and planning Govern- ices and users on a continuing basis. ment and nongovernment use of the spectrum include better means to provide ade- Some of these shortcomings could be cor- quately for: rected without any fundamental change in the structure of FCC or NTIA. Assigning ● validation of requirements, giving par- spectrum management a higher priority and ticular attention to current spectrum using resources more efficiently would help usage, technology and development improve the present situation. For example, trends, and sharing opportunities be- FCC should be able to improve its data base tween competing users of the spectrum; for spectrum management with the help of ● inclusion of spectrum and orbit efficient its own computer and spectrum experts. The techniques and technology in system de- establishment of deadlines for inclusion of sign of both Government and nongov- licensing information in FCC master files ernment systems; can be accomplished by FCC action. A more fundamental procedural change would be to ● apportionment of frequency spectrum place all incoming applications for licenses, between Government and nongovern- construction permits, authorizations, etc., in ment services based on national prior- FCC computer on receipt. In other words, ities; FCC could institute an information and data ● effective planning for future spectrum processing system approach to aid its spec- and orbit needs; trum management activities. 112 • Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

The validation of spectrum requirements, ences and take any assignments on the dele- and the apportioning of spectrum between gation for which their skills and experience Government and nongovernment users, qualify them. Legislation to accomplish this should receive closer scrutiny. A mechanism passed both Houses of the 96th Congress. using analytical tools to evaluate needs and However, the legislation to which it was assess priorities among competing users of added was vetoed by the President for rea- the spectrum would provide decisionmakers sons unrelated to the exemption. The meas- with basic information and data for use in ure was again passed by the Senate and re- establishing policies and reviewing require- ported by the responsible House committee, ments. Federal spectrum requirements are but the House of Representatives did not reviewed by IRAC and its Spectrum Plan- consider it before adjournment; 2) consid- ning Subcommittee, but this function needs eration could be given to finding means to to be strengthened and broadened to effec- comply with due process requirements under tively consider longer range impacts. FCC the Administrative Procedures Act and still needs to be better equipped to assess future name industry and other nongovernment spectrum requirements of the private sector, representatives to delegations on a timely including the use of new technology. basis; and 3) establish guidelines with an implementing mechanism to name the chair- Economic techniques (e.g., auctions, lot- man and individual delegates to the U.S. del- teries, spectrum fees, resale of frequency egation. Qualifications required, distribution spectrum assignments, etc.) should be con- of various skills needed, and type of sidered, at least on an experimental basis, to representation desired would be selected provide guidance on the consequences of dif- from the best candidates available, especial- ferent spectrum allocation decisions and the ly those who participated in the preparatory introduction of newer technology. These effort. If special Government support is nec- should include techniques for evaluating the essary to assure certain representation, then relative economic viability of alternative that support should be available early in the spectrum uses, as well as radio v. nonradio preparatory stages. communication systems. The use of economic techniques in spectrum management Structural Improvements might require legislative action. FCC, perhaps with the aid of a task force, other Chapter 3 discussed the present structure Government agencies that have studied the within the Federal Government to perform question, industry groups, and private ex- spectrum management and participate in in- perts, could select a few services for detailed ternational telecommunication conferences. analysis of the prospects of using one or Consistent with the findings of past commis- more economic techniques. FCC could then sions and task forces going back to 1950, present its recommendations for the experi- this study also finds that structural im- mental application of a selected technique, or provements are necessary. Primarily, the techniques, to one or a limited number of problems stem from the absence of high-level services and frequency bands to Congress Government attention to effective policy for its information and action, if necessary. coordination. Accountability for spectrum management issues and international nego- Problems relating to forming a U.S. tiations is difficult to assign under the pres- delegation for WARC-79 could be addressed and the effectiveness of U.S. participation in ent structure. international meetings could be improved by Congress could consider ways to improve several steps: 1) industry and other nongov- the present structure or examine possible ernment delegates could again be permitted changes in the structure. A detailed analysis to participate fully as U.S. representatives of alternatives is beyond the scope of this at international telecommunication confer- study that concentrates on the results of Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies ● 113

WARC-79. However, at least four options out the Government. Several possible pro- are available to Congress: cedural measures were discussed earlier. In 1. maintain the status quo and make no addition to those, it may be beneficial to changes; establish a more formal and continuing conference preparatory mechanism within the 2. maintain the present structure, but raise the level of attention and account- existing structure of divided responsibilities among several Government agencies. This ability within the responsible agencies; would replace the more “ad hoc” approach 3. establish a mechanism—such as a task followed in the past. If such a mechanism force of high-level Government officials—to develop, examine, and make was not justified when ITU conferences were recommendations on structural and pro- held at infrequent intervals, it appears necessary now when over a dozen confer- cedural improvements; or 4. establish a permanent board, council, or ences are scheduled over the next 7 or 8 interagency- committee of high-level years. Complex issues of vital concern to the U.S. with direct consequences for both inter- Government officials to be responsible national and domestic telecommunications and accountable for international telecommunication policy coordination and are on the agendas of these meetings. Devel- the preparations for international con- oping and recommending skilled delegates for U.S. delegations could be made a part of ferences. this process. Formal training in negotiating, Option 1: Status Quo. language, and diplomatic skills could also be included. The relatively low priority given to spectrum management issues within the Govern- Option 3: Create a Task Force To Examine ment will likely continue under the status and Make Recommendations on Structural quo as discussed in this report. This reflects Changes. the relative lack of appreciation and attention at a high level of Government to tele- Congress could mandate that an in- communications generally. Even with the teragency task force of high-level officials unprecedented number of upcoming confer- from responsible Government agencies be ences of ITU and the direct importance of established. This task force would examine these conference decisions to the United alternative structural changes, assess the States, the State Department, particularly, pros and cons of each, and report to the will find it difficult to raise the priority of President with recommendations. The Presi- radio spectrum issues vis-a-vis other nontele- dent, in turn, could make a report to Con- communication foreign policy issues. More- gress with specific proposals where legisla- over, FCC is unlikely to assign a higher pri- tion is required. Because of the divided re- ority to spectrum management in light of sponsibilities and direct influences of several other pressing regulatory policy issues. Government agencies, the task force might include representatives from the following Option 2: Raise the Level of Attention agencies: Department of Commerce—includ- Within the Present Structure. ing NTIA, Department of State, FCC, DOD, Congress could take steps through its Department of Justice, Office of Manage- oversight activities to focus attention on ment and Budget, and possible repre- ways to improve coordination and develop sentation from the Office of the U.S. Trade coherent policies and strategies for interna- Representative. tional telecommunication matters generally and spectrum issues in particular. Congress Option 4: Establish a Permanent Board or could require special reports from responsi- Other Mechanism. ble agencies on steps taken to improve the Congress could consider the establishment status quo spectrum management through- of a permanent board, council, or inter- 114 . Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

● agency committee to coordinate interna- board could be made accountable for seeing tional telecommunication policy. Spectrum that policies and actions are coordinated and management issues and international negoti- that a coherent and effective program for ations would be key elements of the work of U.S. international telecommunication mat- this body. Such a board could be charged ters is maintained. As a part of its functions, with the continuing responsibility to: coor- the board would assure that the necessary dinate international telecommunication pol- linkages are made among the various ele- icy; plan and direct strategies to achieve pol- ments within Government agencies, between icy objectives; assess the need for personnel agencies, between Government and indus- and other resources within the Government try, and among the international forums con- to conduct an effective international pro- cerned with telecommunication matters. gram including ways to use resources more Bills have been introduced in the Senate effectively; - and prepare for international and House recently to establish a mechan- conferences and meetings. ism aimed at improving the U.S. posture for Depending on the specific mandate for international telecommunication matters. such a board, the present structure for spec- Also, in recent years, other legislation has trum management within the Government been introduced that would alter the present would be altered to a greater or lesser extent. Government structure for telecommunica- For example, the present structure could be tion matters. These and other approaches left intact with the board providing the cen- could be considered under options 2 and 3 tralized point of coordination. However, the above.

U.S. Strategies for Dealing With International Spectrum Issues and ITU

The United States may have reached a in the technical language that has been the crossroads in its relationship with ITU. Hav- sine qua non of ITU. Thus, the mechanism ing started in 1865 as a relatively noncon- that brought together highly trained engi- troversial organization of 20 nations con- neers to consider abstruse issues of in- cerned mainly with the interconnection of terference between sophisticated communi- their telegraph systems, ITU has evolved cations systems is becoming a focal point for into a contentious assembly of 155 nations broader policy issues with political postur- that look to the Union to solve fundamental ings by delegates to further national and issues of allocation and regulation of radio political objectives. ITU structure, pro- spectrum resources. cedures, and mechanisms have not changed, but the problems have changed enormously. The ITU structure, which was well suited The ITU must now develop greater flexibil- to the analysis of interference between radio ity if it is to function effectively in a new and communications systems, and to achieving dynamic environment. a consensus on noncontroversial matters among a small number of broader issues, is The radio spectrum is essential to the com- sorely tested by the demands of numerous munications infrastructure of the United countries exhibiting the widest possible States, and it is not an easy matter for the range of technical, economic, cultural, and United States to concede its vital national in- political backgrounds. Many of these issues terests to satisfy the demands of many na- did not originate at ITU, but have ended up tions that repeatedly assert their “equal there, often argued by delegates unschooled right” to the radio spectrum even though Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies . 115 . they have no immediate need or capability to treme, the United States could decide to use additional allotments for the foreseeable yield to other nations on controversial mat- future. U.S. officials must ask themselves ters and play a passive role within ITU. Be- whether this nation can continue to accept tween these extremes there are a number of these same structures, procedures, and alternatives. One that requires no structural mechanisms in an important, essentially al- or procedural changes in ITU would be a locative forum as are routinely tolerated in serious attempt at better coordination of our other situations that are more abstract or views and objectives with other nations in political in nature, and less concerned with advance of ITU meetings, and better U.S. vital U.S. interests. Will U.S. negotiating planning based on improved understanding skills and technological proficiency enable us of other nations’ views. to achieve our essential goals and objectives Another strategic option that might help in a forum that employs a “one-nation, one- to achieve U.S. objectives even if ITU re- vote” decisionmaking formula and in which mained essentially unchanged would be for the United States and the other developed the United States to seek to remove con- countries are greatly outnumbered by the troversial issues from the ITU forum and at- less developed member countries? tempt to solve them in other ways. A current The answer is not readily apparent. What example would be to respond to the demands is apparent is that our technically oriented of developing countries for “guaranteed ac- approach that has served so well in nego- cess” to radio spectrum and satellite loca- tiating the technical issues of the past two or tions by developing the institutional ar- three decades, is simply not sufficient for the rangements to ensure domestic communica- broader issues of today. The United States tion services to these nations. This could be must make some policy decisions, reflecting a common-user system either building upon changes in U.S. strategy or in the structure the present INTELSAT structure or creat- or procedures of ITU, and then augment the ing a separate system for domestic services. scope and training of the responsible U.S. Such a solution would offer each nation all of personnel consistent with those decisions. the satellite services or capability it could realistically use, without allocating to small The United States has essentially two nations significant amounts of satellite spec- alternatives: it can seek various improve- trum and orbit locations that might then re- ments in the present means for solving spec- main unused for the foreseeable future. trum allocation problems within ITU as it is From the structural standpoint, assuming now constituted, or it can seek to alter the that ITU can be changed, a number of op- existing structure, procedures, or mech- tions are available. One relatively extreme anisms of ITU itself. The policy options con- example would be to seek revision in the sidered here may be divided into two broad voting formula of ITU to one that was more categories, strategic and structural. advantageous to the United States, perhaps From the strategic standpoint, assuming by giving added voting weight to those coun- no significant changes in ITU, the United tries that contribute most heavily to the States has a wide range of options. At one U.N. budget. A more modest option would extreme, the United States may conclude be to increase the number of ITU regions that the drawbacks of continued participa- beyond the present three so that regional tion in ITU outweigh the benefits, and with- issues could be dealt with by a smaller draw from the organization or decline to par- number of countries most directly con- ticipate in its deliberations. At the other ex- cerned. 116 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

Policy Option No. 1: Withdrawal much in the interest of many other nations From ITU as in our own. Would withdrawing from ITU guarantee What would happen to the generally the United States unhindered use of the friendly process of coordination to avoid spectrum allocation or frequency assign- harmful interference? The bulk of our coor- ments we need? Probably not. Member na- dination takes place with the developed tions of ITU rely on the organization to countries that are fewer in number and with avoid interference from the radio signals of whom the United States has fewer funda- others and to achieve interoperability of cer- mental differences than with the Third tain mutually used systems. Avoidance of in- World nations that have recently begun chal- terference is the essence of spectrum alloca- lenging and, in some cases, outvoting the tion or frequency assignment processes. The United States. It is conceivable that the assignment of a particular frequency is of lit- United States could abandon ITU and estab- tle value if others feel free to use it for pur- lish a more congenial grouping of developed poses that cause interference. There are no countries as a forum for coordination to effective sanctions to force compliance with avoid interference, and simply ignore other ITU decisions. Therefore, the United States, countries. Coordination and information ex- as do all nations, relies on the voluntary change would become less certain by the agreement and cooperation of other nations omission of the majority of nations, even if to refrain from interfering with its use of the their spectrum use is relatively limited, but spectrum. would still be fairly effective. We could also continue to coordinate with many of them in- Abrupt withdrawal from an ITU in which formally, since that would also continue to the United States was unable to have its own be in their interest. Eventually they might way could well intensify the risk of interfer- even seek to join the coordinating forum of ence. For applications that are vulnerable to the developed countries, although the terms interference, it seems clear that preemption of reference and voting basis might be much of spectrum would be ineffective. Any nation different from ITU. that chose to interfere, whether due to a valid need for the particular frequency band It seems likely that ITU–or that part that or by intentional jamming, could greatly deals with radio matters, as opposed to tele- reduce the value to the United States of the phone and telegraph-would disintegrate if preempted spectrum. the principal developed countries abandoned it. A major mechanism for technical assist- There are some important spectrum uses ance to developing countries would disinte- that are relatively invulnerable to interfer- grate with it, leading perhaps to negoti- ence (e.g., high-power radar systems with ations for a new mechanism. Probably these electronic countermeasures capability), but negotiations would be conducted on a basis any preemption of spectrum by the United that would more nearly reflect the relative States would likely result in retaliation by technical and economic strengths of the other nations in areas where it was vulner- various nations involved, rather than the able. There might also be spill-over into ITU’s “one-nation, one-vote” formula. nonspectrum relationships with other nations, such as transborder data flow or In the resulting “free-for-all” atmosphere, telecommunication equipment trade mat- large nations and organizations would prob- ters. Extreme forms of retaliation, such as ably get whatever spectrum they needed, refusal to interconnect telephone or telex subject only to coordination among them- systems with the United States, would be selves. In the short run, smaller nations unlikely since these services are probably as could take whatever spectrum they wanted. Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies ● 117

But in the long term, if the larger nations de- in the actual use of the spectrum. If success- veloped technology and systems for their ful, this option would greatly reduce the abil- own purposes, rather than for common ity of the Third World nations to block or usage, the smaller nations could find spec- force changes in U.S. positions. trum unavailable, or perhaps limited to those One possible formula for revised voting is frequencies that are complicated and expen- a combined weighting factor based on land sive to use. area and population. Another possibility is Overall, the lack of a central spectrum the proportion of present use of telecommu- allocation and coordination authority would nications, or investment in telecommunica- probably lead to a more fragmented use of tions, which would clearly favor the devel- the spectrum, with fewer common worldwide oped countries in the short run. A third for- channels, less standardization, and possible mula might be based on the relative propor- difficulties with interoperability of certain tion of overall contributions to the United common systems, and a general increase in Nations and its various specialized agencies. interference problems between services. In There are numerous precedents for un- short, the result of spectrum preemption and equal voting arrangements in international withdrawal from ITU would lead to a rela- organizations. In the INTELSAT board of tively less organized mechanism for spec- governors, voting is in proportion to invest- trum management having significant disad- ment in the system (which is in turn propor- vantages for both developed and develop- tional to utilization of the system), and ing countries. Whether these disadvantages voting in the World Bank is in proportion to would at some time be outweighed by the contributions. There are, of course, a number benefits of increased access to frequency of agencies and conferences which adhere to bands vitally needed by the United States the “one-nation, one-vote” principle. Ex- would depend on the specifics of those needs amples are the United Nations Educational and the degree of conflict present in ITU at Scientific and Cultural Organization, the In- that time. ternational Labor Organization, and the Law The results of the OTA-sponsored survey of the Sea Conference. None of these is an show that a clear majority of the survey operational organization, and none is es- respondents would strongly oppose, or even pecially well known for reaching accom- consider U.S. withdrawal from ITU. Nearly modations efficiently and expeditiously. two-thirds of the respondents strongly dis- A revised voting formula might reduce the agree with the suggestion that the United contention over spectrum allocation matters States view withdrawal from ITU as an op- at ITU; make ITU more efficient; help to tion even under hypothetical “worst case” make the use of the spectrum more efficient conditions. And 18 percent of the respond- by precluding the adoption of unworkable ents agreed or agreed strongly with the sug- allocation schemes; and be no less fair than gestion that the United States consider with- the voting practices used in a number of drawal from ITU. other international bodies that benefit Third World nations without being controlled by Policy Option No. 2: Revised ITU them. The stimulus for concurrence of Third Voting Formula World nations with such a proposal would be the possibility that, were it rejected, the As an option less drastic than withdrawal developed countries might withdraw from from ITU, the United States might join with ITU and render it essentially irrelevant. other developed nations to force a revision of the ITU’s “one-nation, one-vote” decision- The reaction of Third World nations is dif- making formula toward one that would re- ficult to predict but it seems most likely that flect the dominance of the developed nations they would bitterly resist any reversal of 118 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

their recent successful trend toward asser- that can be treated separately and effective- tiveness and refuse to make any concession ly in a single region are considered in this on ITU voting formulae. From a general for- way. Regional administrative radio confer- eign policy standpoint, it is important to ences are scheduled on a variety of specific consider how much support the United issues, allowing the World Administrative States might obtain from other developed Radio Conferences to “spinoff” certain con- countries, many of which do not feel the troversial matters. One option would be to spectrum problems as acutely as the United extend this process of regionalization on a States. The United States must also con- geographic basis to smaller subregions, sider whether it wishes to take an assertive and/or on an issue basis to include only those policy toward ITU apart from a generally nations directly affected by the particular more assertive stance toward Third World issue. The purpose would be to reduce the nations. Should spectrum and communica- number of nations debating or voting on is- tions policy be the “leading edge” of a new sues that do not affect them directly, thus re- U.S. posture of asserting our interests vig- ducing unnecessary contention. orously? This issue needs to be faced early, WARC-79 was attended by 142 nations. in the broadest possible forum, since the Approximately 1,670 delegates and advisors answer will be one of the key factors in the met for 11 weeks (one week more than sched- selection of any policy option. uled), considered nearly 17,000 individual It can also be asked whether the proposed proposals (more than 900 from the United change in voting arrangements should apply States), and held more than 900 meetings. to all ITU spectrum decisions, or just to Surely any approach that might help limit those allocations that might qualify as major further WARCs to more modest proportions matters. The latter case is equivalent to es- would be worthy of study. More important- tablishing a new, separate forum with rely, when nations vote on issues that do not vised voting arrangements and routing the directly affect them, opportunities for trad- major matters to that forum rather than to ing votes arise at no cost to themselves, but ITU. which help others to sustain confrontations. Large meetings also tend to encourage bloc Objectively, it would seem that the in- voting, which has already begun to emerge terests of the developing countries lie with at ITU. Thus, subdividing the ITU into the continued existence of ITU and with con- smaller units, either on the basis of geo- tinued technical and economic aid from the graphic subregions or on the basis of par- developed countries. If this choice were ticular issues, would divide the Third World clearly and convincingly drawn, the Third bloc into smaller, less dominant groups. World nations would probably come to realize that these benefits outweigh such hypo- There are numerous precedents for this. thetical advantages as satellite orbital slots In addition to the three ITU spectrum re- that they may never use. Whether they gions, there are five International Telegraph would ultimately decide the matter on objec- and Telephone Consultative Committee re- tive grounds is difficult to predict. In any gions, three ocean basin groups within event, it seems unlikely that a change in the INTELSAT, and a North American Region- voting formula within ITU will occur given al Broadcasting Agreement, which coor- the present structure of ITU. dinates broadcasting in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Policy Option No. 3: Increased While a potentially useful approach, and Regionalization of ITU one ITU has tried to some extent (e.g., the forthcoming WARCs on Mobile Services, At present, ITU divides the world into high frequency planning, and the geosta- three geographic regions and many issues tionary satellite orbit), decentralization is .

Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies ● 119 not applicable to all problems. Some services nations in their planning and conference cannot be considered separately from others preparation. with which they interfere. Frequency bands in which signals propagate for many thou- One way to assist the Third World nations sands of miles cannot be considered on a would be on a regional basis. This could take regional basis, and some issues (e.g., in- the form of providing special regional rap- teroperability of aircraft communications porteurs; of educating and assisting key systems) are fundamentally global in charac- countries, which would in turn assist others ter. The key is to define a spectrum problem or act on their behalf; or of establishing and in a way which leaves significant numbers of supporting a joint planning capability for a nations unaffected. For example, the ultra- group of nations in a region. Apart from the high frequency TV and microwave fixed regional approach, we could assist certain (radio relay) service, which use signals of country blocs in their planning and prepara- limited propagation range, might be treated tion. on a subregional basis. Increased decentralization of ITU could, in Decentralized decisionmaking does not, of principle, lead to greater fragmentation in course, guarantee that the U.S. position will the use of the spectrum, with the same band prevail. Being outvoted by 10 to 1 is no more being used for different purposes in different satisfying than being outvoted by 153 to 1. regions to a much greater extent than is now However, it is easier to bargain in detail with the case. Advanced technologies may in- 10 nations than 153; and if a quid pro quo crease the opportunity for regions and must be offered, the total cost is likely to be subregions to operate reasonably independ- lower. ent of one another. While this may be acceptable in the short run, the long-term implica- The mechanics and economics of increas- tions are worthy of study. If, for example, a ing substantially the number of conferences new service were proposed that would be is also important to consider. The limited global in character, obtaining the necessary U.S. professional staff available to prepare global spectrum allocation might require for and attend spectrum conferences is al- changes in the allocations to many different ready stretched thin, and if the United services in many different locales. At the States does not wish simply to skip many of least, it might be necessary to create an in- the meetings (a very risky proposition) this stitutionalized system for coordinating de- staff would need to be augmented. The decentralized decisions. veloping countries would find it even more difficult to prepare for a heavy schedule of meetings. Policy Option No. 4: Better Coordination and Planning Developing countries tend to have very few professionals available to consider spec- As a relatively conciliatory approach, the trum matters; a few key people might decide United States could mount a major effort to spectrum policy for an entire country. Also, develop long-term plans for spectrum use in some cases even the key individuals lack that would take into account the spectrum sufficient expertise to comprehend the needs requirements of developing nations, to aid and technical requirements of their own them in understanding the realistic options country, let alone understand and appreciate available to meet their short- and long-term the complex spectrum problems of the needs, to offer them such technical and eco- United States. Assuming that this effect nomic assistance as might be needed to en- overbalances any possible advantage to the able them to participate actively in the plan- United States from keeping them in ignor- ning process, and to seek their concurrence ance, it may be in our interest to assist these with fair, objective, and realistic proposals. 120 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administration Radio Conference of 1979

The acceptance at WARC-79 of U.S. pro- nomic assistance can help make the benefits posals for new spectrum allocations devoted of technology a reality. Creating a role for to remote-sensing activities offers support the developing countries in cooperative plan- for the view that advance coordination and a ning efforts is likely to make them more concerted effort to explain and justify re- receptive to the positions and plans that are quirements can have a significant impact on forthcoming, even though they benefit both countries that might otherwise be skeptical the developed nations and themselves. or indifferent. The delegation of Senegal Long-range planning of spectrum utiliza- came to WARC-79 with specific instructions tion is presently inadequate and not easily to support U.S. remote-sensing proposals, accomplished in an area where technological thanks to a special effort by the National rate-of-change is rapid and in an open com- Aeronautics and Space Administration petitive system like that in the United (NASA), backed by the State Department, to States where policy makers are more likely to enlist the help of U.S. embassies overseas in be responding to problems than to be devel- lobbying appropriate authorities in their oping long-range plans. However, better host countries. A NASA slide presentation, long-range planning for telecommunication with tape-recorded commentary in English, service and spectrum needs is clearly neces- French, and Spanish drew appreciative au- sary in order to cope effectively with the diences from delegations at the conference ITU allocation process. Developing and itself. Of the some 50 remote-sensing pro- sharing planning techniques and data with posals made by NASA for both passive- and other countries would not make a new plan- active-sensing programs, all were accepted ning process vastly more difficult or costly, by the conference to a greater or lesser and might make it more reliable in the long degree and, contrary to expectations, there run. was no opposition to U.S. proposals that could be traced to political motivations. It is also necessary to know the extent to which developing countries’ positions at To a significant extent, the confrontations ITU are based on their own vital interests initiated by Third World nations in ITU are rather than on misunderstandings and pol- based on suspicion and mistrust of devel- itics; it is unlikely that they would com- oped countries, perhaps based on a lack of promise vital interests for the sake of com- understanding of the true potential of tech- ity. A cooperative planning process would nology to create the spectrum resources they tend to expose true interests and clarify the will need in the future. But many Third negotiations. World nations also question whether they will be able to take advantage of that tech- As a practical matter, the majority of the nology and they question the good faith of developing countries cannot now make use the developed countries to share the benefits of advanced communications technology of advanced technology. without technical and economic assistance from technologically advanced countries. If The fact remains that there is adequate the majority of nations were to vote to adopt spectrum for all nations at the present and rules that limit or preclude the use of ad- that technology will very likely expand the vanced technology to which they do not have effective utility of the available spectrum to independent access, communications capa- satisfy future needs of all nations. The prob- bility suffer and costs increase in the long lem for the United States is to convince term for all users. Thus, the cost of assisting other nations, particularly the developing other countries in using advanced technol- countries that spectrum and orbit capacity ogy must be balanced against the cost to the will be available and that their needs for United States of not being able to take full service can be satisfied. Technical assistance advantage of such technology ourselves. can be very useful in this regard, and eco- This equation deserves close analysis. Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies ● 121

It can also be argued that giving technical planning in particular. It should be possible, and economic assistance to the Third World however, to graft onto the existing structure nations will simply provide them with the a sufficiently comprehensive mechanism sophistication they need to challenge our with high-level Government responsibility to own positions more effectively in the future. assure effective long-range planning and to While not invalid on its face, this argument foster cooperation with other nations. ignores our ability to live in relative har- As an alternative, ITU could be invested mony with dozens of highly developed na- with a planning staff to undertake long- tions, and to avoid excessive contention in range coordination, analysis, and planning. spectrum allocation matters with some of Such a neutral planning expertise might be these nations that are sworn enemies. We less likely to be mistrusted by Third World have more to lose from ignorance than from nations, and perhaps more capable of defus- true disagreement. ing potential disagreements. Naturally, the It is useful to recall what can happen in the United States would participate in the proc- absence of cooperative planning. As prepara- ess and perhaps could more easily influence a tion for the 1977 Broadcast Satellite WARC, planning process, in which the measure of the United States developed comprehensive power is technical expertise, rather than an data and explanations to show that a techno- ITU conference, in which the measure of logically based “first-come, first-served”, or power is votes. The United States has con- evolutionary approach, would assure ade- sistently opposed any increase in the power quate access to the geostationary satellite of the ITU, particularly efforts to expand the orbit for all nations. However, other nations planning role of the International Frequency were intent on adopting a rigid a priori plan Registration Board (IFRB). and simply were not interested in the U.S. A broader, more extensive, and more con- arguments. Most of the U.S. preparatory ciliatory approach to international spectrum work was of little value and the U.S. delega- planning would be required under this option tion was thus forced to develop alternative and could have a real chance of working, positions on an ad hoc basis, during the con- given some major changes in the U.S. ap- ference. proach. In the long run it could be the least This experience serves as a reminder that expensive and most effective option avail- it is no longer feasible to go to an ITU con- able to this country. ference with a well-documented technical solution to a problem and expect other na- Policy Option No. 5: Common- tions to embrace the U.S. position. A certain User System degree of advance coordination is necessary, as a minimum, and probably was one of the As an alternative to contention for geosta- reasons that the United States achieved cer- tionary satellite orbit slots, the United tain objectives at WARC-79. The prior coor- States and other developed countries could dination undertaken by NASA on U.S. re- enter into a joint venture with developing mote-sensing proposals is a case in point. countries to construct, launch, and operate a common satellite system to meet domestic Cooperative planning has worked in the needs for telecommunication and/or broad- past; the United States was a leader in cast services. The developed nations would cooperative planning for INTELSAT and provide the private capital and technological INMARSAT. The exact mechanism for co- resources necessary to construct and launch operative planning is an important and com- the system, and would operate and manage plex matter, compounded by divided respon- it in conjunction with other using nations. sibility in the United States for commu- All nations in the joint venture would have nications policy in general and spectrum the option of purchasing a share of the com- . .

122 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

mon enterprise, up to their actual percentage A further indication of INTELSAT’s suc- of use of the system, and sharing propor- cess, and of the developing countries’ stake tionately in any profits. Such an arrange- in the INTELSAT organization has been ment would be similar to that governing the that organization’s evolution towards play- INTELSAT global satellite system used for ing a larger role in provision of domestic international telecommunication. High-capa- satellite services. In 1974, Algeria proposed city satellite systems employing technology to lease spare INTELSAT capacity for en- to make a common-user system economic hancement of its domestic telecommunica- and operationally attractive to developing tion network. Since then a total of 20 coun- countries for domestic services is needed to tries have leased capacity from INTELSAT make a common-user system for domestic for domestic services and an additional 15 services viable. Such a system could be part countries have expressed interest in leasing of the existing INTELSAT structure or a capacity in the next 2 years. By mid-decade, separate structure established for this pur- the total number of clients could easily grow pose. to 50 countries. Many developing nations are concerned INTELSAT has responded to this demand that the satellite orbit locations are being oc- by committing itself to include planned do- cupied rapidly on a “first-come, first-served” mestic capacity, as opposed to relying solely basis, and that by the time they are in a posi- on preemptible, spare capacity, in future tion to use satellite systems there will be no generations of satellites and has also sought desirable orbit locations left for them. It to develop higher powered satellites to be seems clear that the requirements of devel- compatible with the small ground stations oping countries will be for satellite service that have proven to be the most economical and not for satellite orbit locations that they for domestic services. may not be able to use. This option would provide service without allocating dedicated While this policy option does not address orbit locations for individual users. the full range of problems before ITU, it does offer the prospect of relieving the pressure Moreover, the cost of developing and on a particularly important and contentious launching a dedicated satellite system is issue. If low cost and technically attractive very high, well beyond the capability of most domestic satellite capacity is made available developing countries for the foreseeable fu- through an international organization that ture. This option could provide satellite serv- accommodates the sovereignty interests of ice well in advance of the time these coun- each country, many developing countries tries could afford their own systems, and could come to see access to orbital slots and much more cheaply. No large initial capital satellite frequencies as a side issue with investment would be required from user na- availability of service being the main objec- tions, and there would be little risk. The tive. Adoption of the common-user system technical expertise required to use such a alternative would free-up orbital slots for system is far less than is needed to construct those major developing countries that con- one. tinued to desire their own separate domestic systems whether for political reasons, or This is not a new concept. The prec- because requirements justified such a sys- edent for such an initiative is the global tem economically. INTELSAT satellite system. Today 106 countries, the great majority of them devel- A common-user system need not require oping, share in the management and oper- any Government funding by the United ation of the satellites that have been opti- States. Sufficient capital and technical mized for international usage. resources exist in the private sector in the —

Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies ● 123

United States, and within Europe and Japan States and others have opposed a priori allot- to construct such a system as a commercial ment plans for satellite service as wasteful venture with expectations of future markets and inhibiting to technological advance- for follow-on equipment and services. Alter- ment, Although this option goes a long way natively, such systems could conceivably be toward accommodating the position of the initiated with World Bank loan guarantees. developing countries, need not be adverse to U.S. interests. It maintains a substantial In summary, to the extent that developing degree of flexibility important to the United countries can be persuaded to evaluate their States including the key qualification of a re- needs for domestic satellite service apart quirement for regular technological updat- from political considerations, they may come ing that would help to avoid the worse conse- to believe that a common-user system can quences associated with rigid allotment serve many of these needs at an early date schemes like the one adopted at WARC-77 and more cheaply than can dedicated sys- for regions 2 and 3. tems, which could be many years away. Whether operated by INTELSAT or by a As far as the United States is concerned, separate organization, whether financed certain types of a priori allotment plans with public or private funds, such a common- would not be as objectionable as others. user system could relieve the pressures now Plans based on sound engineering and opera- creating the international tensions over use tional parameters might be workable inter- of the geostationary satellite orbit. And nationally, at least on a regional basis. In- while not a precedent in any specific way for deed, U.S. domestic satellite operations are dealing with the broader range of ITU spec- based more or less on an a priori approach. trum problems, a successful common-user In the long run, the United States may have system might at least show that difficult enough satellite capacity made possible by problems can in some cases be removed from advanced technology to meet domestic ITU for separate treatment. needs even if the orbit and spectrum available to U.S. satellites is reduced. In the short Policy Option No. 6: “A Priori” run, the United States already has substan- Allotment tial numbers of operational satellites with additional satellite systems planned for The United States could agree to partici- operations in the near future. pate with other nations in the development In addition to the possible advantages of a long-range plan for the utilization of that may result from updates to presently satellite orbit locations to serve par- unforeseen technology, there are two factors ticipating nations’ domestic communica- that may help reduce the impact of a priori tions requirements. This plan would assure allotments on the United States. One is ad- that orbital slots would be available for the vanced technology including cellular satel- use of all nations when needed. In exchange lite technology, already on the drawing for this agreement, the developed nations boards, which will permit the construction of would likely insist that the plan be based large, wideband satellites that can provide upon sound operating principles and up- very large capacity from a single orbit slot. dated regularly to take account of the latest, The other factor is the particular geography most efficient technology available. Tech- of region 2 (North and South America). As nical planning assistance would be provided. far as the geostationary orbit is concerned, A priori allotment of satellite orbit slots region 2 is naturally divided into two has been a cause celebre among developing parts—those nations located in the Northern countries and at WARC-79 a resolution was Hemisphere and those in the Southern Hem- adopted to consider this issue at a two-part isphere. A second geographic factor that space WARC in the mid-1980’s. The United serves to separate the hemispheres is the dis- 124 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

placement in longitude of the nations in the A plan could be devised to take advantage two hemispheres (see figs. 4 and 5). More- of the geographic and technological factors over, those nations situated close to the discussed above, which would serve to iso- Equator enjoy the widest possible visibility late the capacity of the geostationary sat- of the geostationary satellite orbit from ellite orbit into subregional areas. Specif- within their borders and have the greatest ically, it is technically feasible and could be flexibility in positioning satellites in that operationally practical for the geostationary orbit. orbit to be used by nations of North America Limitations on the number of satellites essentially independent of the use of the or- that can be placed in the geostationary orbit bit to be used by nations of South America. is the fundamental factor that must be ad- Moreover, the North American Continent dressed to arrive at a solution to equitable consists of three countries with very large access for all nations in region 2. The capabil- land areas that make the use of advanced ity of the geostationary satellite orbit is pri- technology using shaped-beam antennas at- marily limited by the need to separate satel- tractive. Except for some possible coordina- lites operating in the same frequency band. tion problems near the border areas, it may When serving the same or adjacent coverage be possible to reuse the entire orbital arc sep- areas are not in close proximity, the required arately for each of the three countries. separation between satellites serving these The implications of this approach and its areas may be significantly reduced. For ex- linkage to the policy options discussed above ample, current U.S. requirements for separa- are as follows: tion between satellites in the fixed-satellite service serving a common coverage area is 4 1. This solution will require both coordina- to 5 degrees. However, a satellite serving the tion and planning by the member na- United States and another one serving a tions of region 2 (Policy Option No. 4). South American country, if properly de- 2. This solution would essentially lead to a signed, could be essentially colocated subdivision of region 2 into two parts without harmful interference. (Policy Option No. 3). 3. The practical use of a common-user sys- Figure 4.— Displacement in Longitude for Countries tem would be enhanced by this approach in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres (Policy Option No. 5). Although an a priori plan is implied in the approach, it could be implemented without the adverse limitations of a rigid a priori plan such as adopted at WARC-77. If this approach is possible, then an a priori allotment to one country would not preclude using the same allotment for others if certain technical and operational guidelines were followed. There may even be some benefits to the United States from adopting an a priori allotment plan. At present, there is considerable uncertainty about the outcome of the 1983 Region 2 Broadcasting Satellite Ad- ministrative Radio Conference and the

. \ 1 Space Planning Conference in the mid- \ \ 1 1980’s. If a decision is postponed, the uncertainty would continue. A situation would SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment then be perpetuated in which any existing Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies ● 125

Figure 5.—Available Geostationary Arc

North America (Southern) Alaska (Southern) Greenland

(Southern) Canada

115 95 I Territorial I United States (Continental 48 States) limits I 1 I 130 114 82 63 56 Visible arc above Mexico 20° elevation I 1 t 163 157 147 61 49 43 Central America

Guatemala {

Honduras ! El Salvador I i Costa Rica I Panama t Caribbean Area Bahamas Barbados I Dominican Republic t i Grenada I South America 10 Venezuela I Colombia

Guyana i Surinam i

French Guiana i

Brazil 1 1 \ I 1 112 I I Ecuador 10 3 –2 {

Bolivia

Paraguay i

30 17 8 130 121 37

SOURCE J D. Barnia —.

126 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979 domestic satellite orbit slot may potentially jecting a priori allotments as inherently be withdrawn in the future. Moreover, no wasteful, it may be in the U.S. interest to ex- satellite system designer could plan the log- amine the principle, to modify it to avoid its ical evolution of a proposed system with con- worst aspects, to examine the practical ef- fidence that the required additional allot- fects, to examine the possibility of a quid pro ments would be available. quo, and if the result looks acceptable, to work with the developing countries to imple- It is also important to examine the tactical ment the plan. aspects of agreeing to an a priori allotment policy. By participating in the development The results of the OTA-sponsored survey of a plan, the United States would be in a po- show that the majority (68 percent) of the sition to influence the type of plan adopted respondents believe that a practical com- and possibly gain concessions on other promise is possible and desirable between issues of importance to the United States. the evolutionary approach and a rigid a In short, the linkages and tradeoffs among priori plan for use of the geostationary orbit. these and other possible approaches to fu- Another 15 percent of the respondents think ture use of the geostationary satellite orbit that a compromise is possible but undesir- cast each U.S. policy option in a different able from a U.S. standpoint. Only 8 percent light. Careful review in each case is needed of the respondents said that a practical com- for sound policy formulation. Rather than re- promise is impossible. Chapter 6 Findings, Conclusions, and Observations Contents

Page Introduction ...... 129 Principal Findings of the OTA Study ...... 130 General Observations and Trends ...... 130 U.S. Policymaking Structure and Processes for Spectrum Management and International Strategies...... 131 Need for High-Level Government Policy Coordination and Accountability ...... 131 Need for New Strategies to Address Spectrum and Related Satellite Orbit Issues ...... 132 Options ...... 134 Strategies to Address International Issues and Deal With ITU...... 136 Strategic Approaches—Options...... 136 Structure of ITU—Options...... 137 Consequences of WARC-79...... 138 General Observations...... 138 Major Decisions and Consequences ...... 139 Options Regarding Ratification of the Final Acts of WARC-79...... 141 Future Conferences and Issues ...... 142 1982 Plenipotentiary...... 142 Space Planning Conference...... , ,. 142 HF Broadcasting Conference...... 143 1983 Broadcasting Satellite Conference for Region 2...... 143 Other Conferences ...... 143 Chapter 6 Findings, Conclusions, and Observations

Introduction

The telecommunication systems of the nations, it is highly unlikely that traditional United States are the most sophisticated, ef- U.S. approaches to these issues will be suffi- ficient, and all-encompassing in the world. cient to protect U.S. vital interests in the These systems are a vital element of our eco- future. The growing differences among nomic strength and security; they are an es- nations over the use of the radio spectrum sential part of our culture. Other nations, and related satellite orbit capacity are recognizing the key role that telecommunic- reflected in the Final Acts of WARC-79. ation plays in national and international affairs, are constantly striving to surpass the Overall, the results of WARC-79 are United States in technological inventiveness mixed. Generally, the proceedings of an ad- and in the practical exploitation of the many ministrative conference of the International telecommunication subsystems that make Telecommunication Union (ITU) are geared up the modern “information society. ” toward arriving at decisions and adopting provisions that are acceptable to all nations. As a leader in technology, the United It is expected that all nations will report States has been able to proceed with its do- favorable results with certain exceptions mestic telecommunication programs more or identified. Even then, a country is free to less independent of international concerns. take a reservation and not be bound by spe- The United States has played a major role in cific unacceptable results. Therefore, finding shaping what has been essentially a benign a useful way to measure success and eval- and passive international mechanism re- uate a country’s relative standing following sponsive to the task of providing order to the an administrative radio conference is not key element in 20th century communica- easy. Comparing specific U.S. proposals sub- tions—the radiofrequency spectrum. mitted to the conference with the Final Acts This international regime is coming under of the conference is not a straightforward ex- considerable stress as the result of sharply ercise. Too many events intervene to color increased demand for new communication the comparison between the preconference services and resulting congestion in key position and the ultimate result on many im- parts of the radio spectrum. WARC-79 and portant issues. While such a comparison is related international conferences and meet- important, it does not reflect the underlying ings demonstrate conclusively that conten- reasons and motives for particular decisions, tion for access to radio spectrum and its im- the problems encountered or any apparent portant collateral element, the geostationary trends important in evaluating results of an orbit for space satellites, presents new and administrative conference. urgent challenges to vital U.S. national in- It is important to understand the interven- terests. ing events that underlie decisions, not only Given the complexities of spectrum man- to evaluate the results of WARC-79, but to agement in a changing world environment prepare for the many future conferences of and the increased importance of telecommu- consequences for the United States. As a nication to both developed and developing highly developed user of spectrum and a

129 130 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979 world leader in telecommunication tech- and much to lose in the international process nology, the United States has much to offer of establishing rules and regulations.

Principal Findings of the OTA Study

The most significant findings of the study ellite orbit issues in a changing world en- are the following: vironment. Solutions to satellite orbit allocation and spectrum reallocation 1. There is an urgent need for higher level issues as envisioned by the Third World attention to Government policy coor- nations require strategies not yet devel- dination and accountability for interna- oped or tested. tional telecommunication issues gener- 4. WARC-79 resulted in the loss of some ally and for spectrum management is- U.S. flexibility in certain key spectrum sues and international negotiations spe- areas—particularly those affecting na- cifically. tional defense—and enhanced opportu- 2. Streamlined processes, coordinated nities in many other areas. Government policies and sufficient re- 5. Operating costs will increase for certain sources on a continuing basis are essen- radio services; interference protection tial to effective and timely preparation will become less certain; and administra- for the several major international con- tive costs will need to rise to adequately ferences of ITU now scheduled to occur implement WARC-79 decisions and to over the next 7 years. prepare for future radio conferences. 3. New U.S. approaches are necessary to address radio spectrum and related sat-

General Observations and Trends

● The world environment for telecommu- ● There are basic differences between the nications has changed significantly in recent United States and Third World countries years; two-thirds of the 155 member nations over the principles that should govern the of ITU can be classified as developing or allocation and use of radio spectrum and re- Third World countries. lated satellite orbit capacity. There is increasing need to identify and assess middle ● The United States must develop ap- range options to reconcile the sometimes proaches to use its technology and expand sharply divergent goals of developed and de- its influence if future actions in a “one- veloping countries. nation, one-vote” forum, like ITU, are to be favorable to U.S. positions. ● The disparity between nations in their ability to use the spectrum is growing; this ● There has been a gradual shift toward leads to growing disagreements over the al- recognizing the legitimacy of nontechnical location and use of specific frequency bands factors such as political and cultural inter- for specific services. ests and values in ITU deliberations. In other international forums, Third World ● Third World countries are increasingly countries have raised related issues under able to influence and shape international concepts of the New World economic order communication policies in international and New World information order. forums. Ch. 6—Findings, Conclusions, and Observations . 131

● Spectrum decisions arrived at as a satellites for military and national security result of voting within ITU, as opposed to purposes. the commonly practiced consensus ap- ● International telecommunication develop- proach, will tend to be increasingly adverse ment is entering a phase in which regional to the United States. and domestic needs and policies will predom- • U.S. requirements for access to the fre- inate, as opposed to more general global fa- quency spectrum and satellite orbit loca- cilities expansion. The thrust will be on in- tions are expanding with the explosive traregional communications and the devel- growth in telecommunication/information opment or enhancement of interregional technology, the growing use of satellites, communication routes. and the increasing dependence on radio and

U.S. Policymaking Structure and Processes for Spectrum Management and International Strategies Need for High-Level Government international issues regarding allocation and Policy Coordination and use of radio spectrum and the geostationary Accountability satellite orbit. ● Within the U.S. telecommunication in- ● The responsibility y for spectrum man- dustry there has been significant growth and agement and policymaking is divided among several Federal agencies with coordination change over the past 15 years, which has produced more competing domestic interests conducted on a structured, but often infor- with conflicting demands for spectrum use. mal, basis without clear responsibility and accountability for policy at a high level of ● The United States’ permanent spectrum Government. management mechanisms are not adequately equipped to review and verify all the • The United States does not have a con- stated requirements of Government and sistent and coordinated national telecommu- nongovernment spectrum users and to ad- nication policy because of a lack of apprecia- just needs consistent with national policy tion and concern at the top levels of Govern- objectives. The U.S. lacks an effective on- ment and industry, a lack of high-level policy going means of collecting data, developing coordination for international telecom- and adjusting guidelines to evaluate the munication negotiations, and a failure to merits of one spectrum use over any other. assign sufficient importance to international telecommunication matters, including spec- ● The State Department’s International trum management and the State Depart- Communications Policy Office is not at a ment’s role in international negotiations. high enough level in the Department’s organizational structure to be in a position to pre- ● The United States is not adequately pare adequately for all the important up- equipped to provide comprehensive assess- ments required to effectively plan for the coming conferences of ITU and make its influence felt in the upper echelons of Govern- future use of the radio spectrum, to forecast ment and industry. future requirements, to assess the costs and benefits of shifts to new technology, or to ● Lack of high-level concern has also led evaluate alternative strategies to deal with to a shortage of trained and experienced 132 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979 spectrum management personnel to replace polemical norms common to international those retiring from Federal Government political debate. service; there has been insufficient attention ● Third World countries are likely to to the need for personnel with supplement- resist drastic changes in ITU rules and pro- ary diplomatic, language, negotiating, eco- cedures that operate on the principle of “one- nomic, and legal skills. nation, one-vote” and that provide them ● The rather general wording of Executive with increasing influence and power. They Order 12046 establishing the National Tele- will continue to seek technical assistance communications and Information Adminis- from the developed countries while pursuing tration (NTIA) leaves it ambiguous as to compromises favorable to their own in- how far NTIA can go in its coordinating role terests. with respect to U.S. international telecommunications policy, particularly when that ● The developed countries are expanding mandate risks encroachment on the general their use of spectrum to higher frequency regulatory responsibilities of the Federal bands as lower, more economical bands be- Communications Commission (FCC). come congested. They rely on technology to provide solutions to problems of accommo- ● The schedule of 10 major international dating new demands in the future. It is be- conferences over the next 7 years to consider coming increasingly difficult for the develop- a number of issues vital to U.S. interests un- ing countries to accept the proposition that derscores the fact that the United States they will have access to spectrum on an in- must reform its policymaking mechanisms terference-free basis at some future date as and streamline the cumbersome and time- their needs materialize. The outlook is that consuming procedures for developing U.S. the radiofrequency spectrum and geostation- proposals for international telecommunica- ary orbit will become more congested in the tion conferences. lower, more economical and desirable frequency bands even though use of frequen- ● A mechanism is needed for collecting and evaluating information on the perceived cies by one country does not necessarily pre- needs of other nations for spectrum and empt those same frequencies from use by orbit resources; their receptivity to intrare- other countries. It seems increasingly clear gional and/or common-user systems, and that the United States will need to explore other factors. new strategies and policy options to reconcile Third World interests with the objectives of the United States. Need for New Strategies to Address Spectrum and Related ● WARC-79 showed the increasing in- Satellite Orbit Issues fluence of the Third World as a political force in ITU. The struggle for influence between ● There are critical years ahead for ITU. the developed and developing nations will For the most part, the manner in which acti- continue at future ITU conferences. At the vities have been conducted by telecommuni- present time, the developing countries cation experts and international diplomacy derive their power from their collective num- has avoided debate on ideology and political- bers; the developed countries from their ly motivated objectives. The trend toward technical competence, knowhow, and leader- basing decisions on factors other than eco- ship. The influence of the developing coun- nomic and technical matters, and demon- tries can most effectively be exploited in the strated need is challenging ITU to provide ITU legislative forums; the developed na- mechanisms for resolving differences among tions through ITU technical administrative nations without a further shift toward the organs. Ch. 6—Findings, Cone/us\ons, and Observations ● 133

● The success of ITU has been due in large cation, and information flow by developing measure to the willingness of its members to and using telecommunication infrastructure adhere voluntarily to commonly arrived at themselves. agreements and regulations. The inherent ● Developing countries will continue to flexibility in the ITU processes has also en- seek changes in the existing mechanism for hanced its effectiveness. Reservations and vesting rights in the use of frequencies and footnotes offer escape for individual coun- access to the geostationary orbit. They seek tries from disagreeable decisions of the ma- a shift away from the current notification jority. However, excessive use of these ex- and coordination procedure on a “first-come, ceptions by a sufficient number of coun- first-served” basis, toward a negotiated plan tries—or by a few large users—serves to developed on an a priori basis. This is ex- reduce the value of the agreements and reg- pected to reduce the uncertainties they fear ulations for all users. in gaining access through the current ap- ● Existing ITU procedures that vest proach, albeit at the expense of a possible rights in the use of spectrum to countries on “freezing” of technology. an “as needed, first-come, first-served basis” ● The administrative regulations of ITU are viewed by developing countries as not serve the desirable objective—without the serving their objectives and they now seek use of sanctions for noncompliance—of to alter those procedures. avoiding the interference, incompatibilities ● The growing lack of agreement among and chaos that would ensue if these or sim- nations over which specific frequency bands ilar regulations were not followed. should be allocated for which specific radio • The voluminous, complex, and detailed services (the International Table of Fre- provisions of the international radio regula- quency Allocations) strongly suggests that tions are becoming more burdensome for the mechanisms other than service classifica- world and less meaningful to individual tions should be examined. users.

● ITU is a political organization that per- . Third World countries will continue to forms both political and technical functions. advocate changes in rules, regulations, and However, while there is a primarily technical procedures that help guarantee their per- focus for most ITU activities, there has been ceived right of access to the spectrum and a gradual shift toward recognizing the legit- geostationary satellite orbit. They do not imacy of nontechnical factors, such as polit- wish to rely on the “good efforts, promises, ical and cultural interests and values. The and technical ability of the developed coun- United States must recognize this shift and tries to “engineer-in” future systems on a develop strategies to use its technology case-by-case basis, as needed. more broadly as a tool for resolving these broader international issues that are not sub- ● ITU administrative radio conferences seek to produce results that all nations can ject to technical solution. accept. Reservations, footnotes and other ● Many of the nontechnical issues raised means to reduce negative consequences in ITU—like those concerning reallocation of allow each nation to more or less view the spectrum and guaranteed access to the geo- results as favorable. This approach supports stationary satellite orbit—are among the the perception of having all winners and no many issues raised by Third World countries losers. However, because of growing dif- in other international forums under the prin- ferences among nations, these procedures ciples propounded by the New World eco- are beginning to produce diluted and cum- nomic order and New World information bersome results that may render existing order. Those countries seek to alter the age- mechanisms to regulate world spectrum use old pattern and structure of trade, communi- less and less meaningful. 134 . Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

● Because of competing interests and 1. The lack of attention at the top decision growing differences over use of the spectrum levels of the Government and industry there will be winners and losers in the future as to the vital role of telecommunica- as a result of the ITU decisionmaking tions in the international and domestic process. political, economic, and private affairs of the United States and the need for ● The preeminence of U.S. technological policy coordination; leadership and technical ability served the 2. There is a lack of high-level centralized United States well in international spectrum policy coordination and guidance for in- negotiations when decisions were primarily ternational telecommunication negotia- based on technical matters. But more and tions at a high enough level in the Gov- more U.S. problems with other countries in- ernment to be effective. volving spectrum use are nontechnical. 3. The State Department’s International ● Certain U.S. requirements to use spec- Communications Policy Office is neither trum, such as radars for military purposes, staffed nor institutionally organized to are not of interest to the majority of other carry out effectively all of the functions countries which prefer to have this same involved in international telecommuni- spectrum allocated to services they need or cation negotiations. desire. The difficulty that faces the United Congress could consider ways to improve States in seeking to convince a majority of the present structure or examine possible the 155 other ITU member countries to changes in the structure. A detailed analysis adopt regulations that accommodate U.S. of alternative structures was beyond the radars that conflict with other possible uses scope of this study, which concentrates on by other countries is real and was demon- the results of WARC-79. However, at least strated at WARC-79. four options are available to Congress: ● Rights to frequencies and satellite loca- 1. maintain the status quo and make no tions to individual nations are not vested in- changes; definitely under current ITU procedures, 2. maintain the present structure, but and changes in operating parameters require raise the level of attention and account- recoordination and registration. This creates ability within the responsible agencies; uncertainty for present satellite system op- 3. establish a mechanism—such as a task erators. The risks may increase that spec- force of high-level government offi- trum and orbit will not be available to pro- cials—to develop, examine, and make vide for continuity of service from the pres- recommendations on structural and pro- ent to the next generation of satellites. More- cedural improvements; or over, this problem is not overcome by the 4. establish a permanent board, council, or adoption of a negotiated rigid a priori allot- - interagency committee of high-level ment plan to assure future access, since such Government officials to be responsible a plan would tend to freeze technology and and accountable for international tele- accommodate only those new or second gen- communication policy coordination and eration satellites that fit the original tech- the preparations for international con- nical scheme. ferences.

Options Possible Procedural Improvements Possible Structural Improvements ● Improvements needed in the present procedures for managing and planning Gov- There are three fundamental weaknesses ernment and nongovernment use of the spec- in the present Federal Government policy- trum include better means to provide ade- making structure: quately for: Ch. 6—Findings, Conclusions, and Observations ● 135

— evaluation and validation of spectrum that have studied the question, industry requirements, giving particular atten- groups and private experts, should select a tion to current spectrum usage, technol- few services and frequency bands for de- ogy and development trends, and shar- tailed analysis of the prospects of using one ing opportunities between competing or more economic techniques. The Commis- users of the spectrum; sion could then present its recommendations — inclusion of spectrum and orbit efficient for the experimental application of a selected techniques and technology in system technique, or techniques, on one or a limited design of both Government and nongov- number of services and frequency bands to ernment systems; the Congress for its information and action, — apportionment of frequency spectrum if necessary. between Government and nongovernment services based on national priori- ● Problems relating to forming a U.S. ties; delegation for WARC-79 could be addressed — effective planning for future spectrum and the effectiveness of U.S. participation in and orbit needs; international meetings could be improved by — efficient and timely preparation for and several steps: participation in ITU conferences; and — 1. industry and other nongovernment effective management of existing serv- delegates could again be permitted to ices and users on a continuing basis. participate fully as U.S. representatives ● Many of these shortcomings could be at international telecommunication con- corrected without fundamental changes in ferences and take any assignments on the Government structure. the delegation for which their skills and experience qualify them; The validation of spectrum requirements, 2. consideration could be given to finding and the apportioning of spectrum between means to comply with due process re- Government and nongovernment users, quirements under the Administrative needs closer scrutiny. An enhancement of ex- Procedure Act and still name industry isting mechanisms using analytical tools to and other nongovernment representa- help evaluate needs and arrange priorities tives to delegations on a timely basis; among contentious users would provide bet- 3. permanent guidelines to name the chair- ter information for decisionmakers. Military man and individual delegates to the U.S. requirements are reviewed by the Interde- delegation could be established; partment Radio Advisory Committee 4. qualifications required, distribution of (IRAC) and its Spectrum Planning Subcom- various skills needed, and type of repre- mittee, but this function needs to be sentation desired could be determined at strengthened and broadened to be more ef- an early stage of preparation for confer- fective in the future. ences; ● Economic techniques should be con- 5. individuals chosen to serve on U.S. dele- sidered, at least on an experimental basis, to gations could be selected from the best provide guidance on the consequences of dif- candidates available, especially those ferent spectrum allocation decisions and the who participated in the preparatory ef- introduction of newer technology. These fort; and should include techniques for evaluating the 6. any special Government support neces- relative economic viability of alternative sary to acquire particular representa- spectrum uses, as well as radio v. nonradio tion on the delegation could be available communication systems. early in the preparatory stages.

● FCC, perhaps with the aid of a task ● Preparations for international telecom- force including other Government agencies munication conferences could be improved 136 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

by replacing the ad hoc approach with an on- accountability involving all the concerned going conference preparatory structure with Government and nongovernment telecom- a focal point for high-level responsibility and munication interests.

Strategies to Address International Issues and Deal With ITU

The United States must make some policy and satellite locations by developing the decisions reflecting changes in U.S. strategy institutional arrangements to ensure do- or in the structure or procedures of ITU, and mestic communication services to quali- then augment the scope and training of the fying nations. This could be a common responsible U.S. personnel consistent with user satellite system either building those decisions. upon the present INTELSAT structure or creating a separate system for domes- The United States has essentially two al- tic services. Such a solution would offer ternatives: 1) it can seek various improve- each nation a role and stake in the ments in the present means for solving spec- system with satellite services or capabil- trum allocation problems within ITU as it is ity it could realistically use. This could now constituted; or 2) it can seek to alter the avoid the issue of allocating to small na- existing structure, procedures, or mechan- tions significant amounts of the radio isms of ITU itself. The policy options consid- spectrum and satellite orbit locations ered here may be divided into two broad cat- which might then remain unused for the egories, strategic and structural. foreseeable future. Strategic Approaches – Options 2. Develop a comprehensive program with necessary resources to better coordinate ● From the strategic standpoint, assum- U.S. views and objectives with other na- ing no significant changes in ITU, the tions, in advance of ITU meetings, and United States has a wide range of options. adjust U.S. proposals based on im- At one extreme, the United States may con- proved understanding of other nations’ clude that the drawbacks of continued par- views. ticipation in ITU outweigh the benefits, and 3. Develop a range of options for “plan- withdraw from the organization or decline to ning” the use of the geostationary satel- participate in its deliberations. At the other lite orbit–between the evolutionary ap- extreme, the United States may decide to proach advocated by the United States yield to other nations on controversial mat- and any rigid a priori allotment plan ters, accept all decisions taken within ITU, that may be advocated by some develop- and play a passive role in its deliberations. ing countries—and consider these op- Between these extremes there are a number tions informally with key countries prior of alternatives. to ITU conferences. 1 Seek to remove the most controversial 4. Seek to raise the level of technical com- issues from the ITU forum and attempt petency among ITU member states and to solve them in other ways. A current raise the level and quality of communi- example might be to respond to the cations and information capabilities ac- demands of developing countries for cessible to them through educational “guaranteed access” to radio spectrum and technical assistance programs. Ch. 6—Findings, Conclusions, and Observations ● 137

Structure of ITU – Options 2. Revised ITU voting formula–As an option less drastic than withdrawal from ● From the structural standpoint, assum- ITU, the United States might join with ing that ITU can be changed, a number of other developed nations to force a revi- options are available. One relatively extreme sion of the ITU’s “one-nation, one-vote” option would be for the United States to decisionmaking formula toward one withdraw from ITU. Another option would that would reflect the dominance of the be to seek to revise the voting formula of developed nations in the actual use of ITU to one more advantageous to the United the spectrum. If successful, this option States, perhaps by giving added voting would greatly reduce the ability of the weight to those countries that contribute Third World nations to block or force most heavily to the U.N. budget. A more changes in U.S. positions. But those na- modest option would be to increase the tions are likely to resist such revisions number of ITU regions beyond the present vigorously and given their current vot- three so that regional issues could be dealt ing strength it is difficult to see how any with by a smaller number of countries most weighted voting scheme could be forced directly concerned. in ITU short of amassing pressure in 1. Withdrawal from ITU—Member nations many other areas. of ITU rely on the organization to avoid 3. Increased regionalization of ITU–At interference from the radio signals of present, ITU divides the world into others and to achieve compatibility of three geographic regions and many is- interconnected telecommunication sys- sues that can be treated separately and tems. Avoidance of interference is the effectively in a single region are consid- essence of spectrum allocation or fre- ered in this way. Regional administra- quency assignment processes of ITU. tive radio conferences are scheduled on Withdrawal from ITU could well inten- a variety of specific issues, allowing sify the risk of interference. It seems the World Administrative Radio Confer- clear that preemption of radio spectrum ences to “spinoff” certain controversial by the United States would be ineffec- matters (and incidentally, to delay their tive and that U.S. radio services would consideration). One option would be to be vulnerable to interference without re- extend this process of regionalization on course to the protections provided under a, geographic basis to smaller subre- the international radio regulations. Any gions, and/or an issue basis to include nation that chose to interfere, whether only those nations directly affected by due to a valid need for a particular fre- the particular issue. The purpose would quency band or by intentional jamming, be to reduce the number of nations could greatly reduce the value to the voting on issues that do not affect them United States of the preempted spec- directly, thus reducing unnecessary con- trum. Withdrawal from the ITU organi- tention and possibly reducing costs and zation would not eliminate the mutual time of reaching a multilateral agree- desirability for the United States and ment. other countries to coordinate spectrum use as well as other telecommunication activities now performed through ITU. 138 . Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

Consequences of WARC-79

General Observations States because it demonstrated conclusively that the developing countries could unite to ● ITU administrative radio conferences pursue a collective goal. In this case, the goal are difficult to rate in terms of success or was consistent with the objectives of the failure. The box score approach, which meas- Western European countries goal (albeit for ures proposals submitted against the confer- different reasons), but inconsistent with U.S. ence Final Acts, is inadequate and mislead- (and others) proposals and efforts to adopt a ing because it fails to take account of the im- different approach based on technical argu- portance and consequences of particular de- ments to support the U.S. position. It also cisions. The underlying trends and the bases showed that the perceptions and priorities of for decisions and compromises, which have the developing countries differed from ours important future consequences, are not cap- and that technical arguments could not be tured in the win, loss, and tie columns. counted upon to win out over political con- ● WARCs are conducted and apply mech- siderations. anisms that allow each member-nation to ● At WARC-79, there was too much to do, perceive that most of its needs are met no too little time to do it, and too many conflict- matter how unfortunate the results may be ing interests to deal effectively with many of for the collective international community. the issues. Therefore, the conference made ● In general and apart from any specific use of the several vehicles available to an ad- proposal or action, the members of the in- ministrative conference to proceed without formed community responding to the OTA- forcing agreements or attempting to resolve sponsored survey perceived WARC-79 as difficult issues that could be postponed. Tak- producing results that were either somewhat ing footnotes to the allocation table; adopt- better than expected or about what was an- ing resolutions; postponing issues to future ticipated before the conference. However, ex- conferences; and taking reservations are ve- pectations may have been colored by the hicles that have always been available, but growing concern over possible confrontation at WARC-79 ITU members found it neces- with the Third World that preceded WARC- sary to use them more than ever before. 79. ● No immediate changes in operations ● The OTA-sponsored survey found that using the radio spectrum or geostationary most individuals responding to the question- satellite orbit are required in the United naire believe that WARC-79 had a favorable States as a result of WARC-79. However, the impact on both U.S. national interests (53 longer range impacts in terms of increased percent) and their own organization (58 per- operating costs, reduced operating flexibil- cent). The major exception to this view is ity, uncertainty surrounding important found among a minority of individuals main- pending issues, and the need for thorough ly in the private sector, who maintain that preparations to address issues at future con- WARC-79 had a net unfavorable impact on ferences require immediate attention. their organizations’ operations (15 percent). ● The radio regulations serve essentially A substantial number of respondents (33 two functions: 1) to establish technical percent) said that the results of WARC-79 standards and regulations about what kinds were neither favorable or unfavorable to U.S. of services can use what parts of the spec- national interests. trum under given conditions; and 2) to estab- ● The 1977 broadcasting satellite WARC lish procedures for countries to acquire oper- was of great importance for the United ating rights and protection from interfer- Ch. 6—Findings, Conclusions, and Observations ● 139

ence. Developed countries participate in ● Department of Defense (DOD) interests WARCs with a strong focus on improving were impacted by losses of exclusivity for and elaborating on technical standards and radiolocation (radar) operations and by in- procedures to protect existing spectrum creased sharing with other services in many users; developing countries want to focus on of the radiolocation bands. For example, underlying principles, alternative ways to demands that radar operations be discon- vest rights in the use of frequencies, and tinued in certain bands in order to accom- ways to make ITU more responsive to their modate expanded FSS operations led to con- needs. siderable acrimony, which was only eased by a nonbinding U.S. commitment in a formal ● INTELSAT, as a world organization of declaration to try to accommodate FSS in 106 member countries, had significant influ- those bands. The status of radiolocation was ence at WARC-79 on fixed-satellite service retained but the pressure from FSS interests (FSS) matters. will certainly continue. • The nonalined nations played a signifi- ● Radar usage by the radiolocation serv- cant role at WARC-79, frequently operating ice is extremely heavy in the radiolocation as an effective force. bands between 8500 and 10,000 MHz. The ● WARC-79 adopted several resolutions addition of the radionavigation service and and provisions that call for increased assist- the multicountry fixed and mobile footnotes ance in various forms to developing coun- in this band have taken 900 MHz of virtually tries. exclusive radiolocation allocations in the current radio regulations and added one or more ● The conference resolutions calling for a primary services over the entire band. Tech- number of future conferences, including nical and administrative solutions must be those to “plan” space services and the inter- sought if radiolocation is to retain its effec- national broadcasting service, demonstrate tiveness. IRAC, in particular, could develop that the achievement of U.S. objectives at a set of recommendations for use by the ITU conferences will no longer be a matter of State Department in discussions with other reaching agreement on technical solutions to countries with a view to encouraging the problems of spectrum allocations and fre- orderly and restrained introduction of radio- quency coordination; it will require im- navigation on an “as needed” basis in order aginative approaches, with political negotia- to buy time for the development of technical tions involving long, hard bargaining. solutions to sharing problems. In the absence of such a planned introduction, the Major Decisions and Consequences radiolocation service may soon find itself having a de facto secondary status because ● There is no major immediate cost im- of the safety-of-life priorities accorded the ra- pact imposed by WARC-79 regarding na- dionavigation service. tional security systems, largely because of ● The United States took a reservation in- the frequency flexibility of existing U.S. dicating that the United States, in the opera- equipment, the success of the U.S. delegation of radars, will not guarantee protection tion at WARC, and reservations taken by to, nor coordination with, other services. The the United States. However, there will be action was necessary because the existence future, undetermined costs resulting from of the fixed and mobile services footnotes in actions at WARC-79—costs associated with every radiolocation band between 1 and 40 frequency management, the development GHz jeopardized radar operations to serve and procurement of more sophisticated national defense. equipment, compatibility studies, and coordination to prevent harmful interference ● Notwithstanding the fact that WARC- with competing users of the spectrum. 79 did little to reduce the total spectrum 140 . Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979 available for radar operations, and also, that telecommunication services will result from U.S. military radars are now required to conference decisions. No operational or eco- operate worldwide in a secondary status, the nomic dislocation was imposed on any ex- costs of radar development and operation isting FSS system. No major burden appears must increase as a result of decisions taken to be placed on the U.S. Government or pri- at WARC. New coordinating activity must vate operating entities in order to comply now take place between the radiolocation with the decisions of WARC. However, the service and a number of other services that differences between the United States and will share the same frequency bands, par- many developing countries over approaches ticularly the fixed, mobile, and radionaviga- to use of the geostationary satellite orbit, to tion services. A significant number of in- be resolved by future conferences, leaves the terference incidents can be anticipated in impact on FSS uncertain. these bands. In the long term, modifications of existing systems and development of new • While, based on U.S. proposals, ones must be increased to guarantee the per- WARC-79 largely eliminated frequency shar- formance of military radars in the presence ing between FSS and broadcasting-satellite of increased interference. A further added services (BSS) in the Americas, BSS must cost derives from the need for radar develop- now share with the terrestrial-fixed service. ers to expand their participation in CCIR in This sharing could result in interference to order to lay a better foundation for U.S. pro- BSS Earth-station receivers operating in the posals concerning radars at future con- same area as fixed-station transmitters. This ferences. could have a negative impact on private microwave systems that use the band 12.3 to ● U.S. objectives for FSS and the mobile- 12.7 GHz. These private systems are widely satellite service (MSS) (including DOD satel- used in the United States by a variety of lite interests) were achieved in large meas- users. If required to vacate the band to pro- ure. The DOD goal of adding 125 MHz for tect BSS and move to a higher frequency up- and down-links for the two services was band, there would be economic and opera- achieved, but this meant that the partial ex- tional consequences. clusivity that existed for FSS was lost. There may be problems in satisfying some ● WARC-79 made substantial increased DOD satellite communication requirements allocations to FSS in the “lower” frequency in the 7- and 8-GHz bands. Also, the United bands where technology is well developed States and most NATO countries took a and relatively economical. WARC-79 also reservation regarding language in the Final reaffirmed the FSS allocations near 20 and Acts that requires that stations in MSS op- 30 GHz where the next generation of domes- erating in the band 235 to 399.9 MHz not tic communication satellites is now under cause harmful interference to those of other development. This new generation of satel- services operating, or planning to operate, in lites is likely to offer a greater variety of accordance with the table of allocations. services to more users and lower costs. ● Significant amounts of spectrum were • Because of the highly efficient use added to allocations for FSS, in general ac- already being made of existing allocations cordance with U.S. objectives. The technical for the fixed service, the changes adopted at rules that affect the design, operation, and WARC-79 consisted mainly of attempts to cost of satellite systems were generally in aline the allocations among the three regions agreement with U.S. positions. Where U.S. and, through footnotes, to accommodate the desires were not precisely met, no signif- specific needs of individual countries. icantly adverse repercussions resulted. No immediate or significant changes in the ● The decisions of WARC-79 affecting the structure or operation of U.S. fixed-satellite use of microwave radio relay systems do not Ch. 6—Findings, Conclusions, and Observations . 141

mandate any drastic U.S. changes in spec- the fixed service, and was therefore opposed trum allocation and management. by many developing countries. The HF broadcasting allocations were increased con- ● In order to simplify the administrative process for certain countries which other- ditioned on the successful outcome of a wise might need to coordinate with a number specialized HF broadcasting conference to of neighboring states, the radio regulations be held in the mid-1980’s to “plan” for more were revised and simplified at the risk of efficient and equitable use of the broad- creating future interference problems. The casting bands. While the conference agenda changes were opposed by the United States, will be relatively broad and open, it was ap- Canada, and others that felt that sound tech- parent at WARC-79 that the United States nical judgments should not be eroded by po- and the developing countries have signifi- litical or administrative considerations. cant differences as to the type of planning to be undertaken. Also, political issues, such as • The U.S. objective to gain more frequen- “prior consent,” could prove troublesome, at cy allocations for high frequency (HF) broad- this conference. casting could only be done at the expense of

Options Regarding Ratification of the Final Acts of WARC-79

1. The United States can ratify the Final state U.S. refusal to acquiesce to particular Acts without delay with the normal clarifica- decisions taken at WARC-79, beyond those tion of U.S. statements in the Final Protocol. cited in earlier U.S. protocol statements, or Completing the ratification process prior to set forth U.S. policy with respect to future January 1, 1982, when the 1979 radio regula- actions by ITU or specific implementation of tions enter into force will indicate to other the WARC-79 Final Acts. While it is not un- nations our goodwill and determination to common for the Senate to attach conditions abide by our international obligations. The to a resolution of ratification of a bilateral in- Final Acts constitute the “Radio Regula- ternational agreement, which the other par- tions, Geneva, 1979, ” which replace the 1959 ty can readily accept or reject through its regulations as partially revised by the ad- own ratification processes, attaching condi- ministrative radio conferences held in 1963, tions to a multilateral agreement raises dif- 1966, 1967, 1971, 1974, and 1978. The Final ficulties. Acts also incorporate the provisions of the 4. The United States can ratify the Final 1977 broadcast satellite WARC as modified Acts in part, specifically withholding rat- by WARC-79. ification of those provisions (which would 2. The United States can ratify the Final have to be listed in precise detail) where the Acts with conditions, thereby underscoring United States chooses to remain bound by and making explicit the reservations taken the provisions of existing regulations previ- at Geneva. In particular, the United States ously ratified (which would also have to be could reiterate the reasons for taking reser- listed in precise detail). vations in the Final Protocol to emphasize 5. The United States can withhold ratifica- U.S. Government concern regarding these tion of the Final Acts pending the outcome issues. of several important international confer- 3. The United States can ratify the Final ences dealing with telecommunication is- Acts with additional reservations that either sues. This would deny FCC and the current 142 • Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979 administration any legal basis for imple- taken at this conference to revise the ITU menting decisions taken at WARC-79, many convention will be basic to all future con- of which were strongly advocated by the ferences of ITU. United States and fought for by the U.S. delegation, and which are scheduled for imple- 6. The United States can reject the Final mentation by other ITU members on Jan- Acts of WARC-79 in their entirety and an- uary 1, 1982. The most immediate interna- nounce that we intend to abide by the preex- tional telecommunication conference of great isting radio regulations, as amended. The importance to the Unites States is the Sep- consequences would be similar to those cited tember 1982 plenipotentiary. The actions above.

Future Conferences and Issues

1982 Plenipotentiary tions and approaches between the United States and other countries for use of the ● This conference provides the United radio spectrum and the geostationary satel- States with an opportunity to propose lite orbit are issues for the 1982 ITU plen- changes in the structures and procedures of ipotentiary conference and justify a major ITU, and to resist changes proposed by U.S. effort to prepare for the conference. others that are not in the interest of the United States. It is vital that the United States make thorough preparations for this Space Planning Conference meeting and to anticipate fully the proposals that may be put forward by other ITU . This specialized WARC on the use of the members. geostationary satellite orbit and the planning of space services utilizing it will have ● The basic principles contained in the two sessions—July 1985 and September ITU convention will be reviewed and modifi- 1987. It poses a serious threat to potential cations made in accordance with the will of U.S. use of space communications because it the majority. The convention serves to guide could result in a form of “planning” contrary international cooperation for use of telecom- to U.S. interests. The extent to which a flexi- munications of all kinds, and governs the ble and efficient method of planning space functioning of ITU itself. Changes in the services can be devised and “sold” to the convention will be fundamental to future conference represents a challenge to the meetings of ITU. For example, any change United States. in article 33 of the convention concerning use of the spectrum and the geostationary ● The conference will also determine satellite orbit would have a direct bearing on which frequency bands used for space serv- the WARC scheduled to plan space services ices are to be planned. U.S. efforts to have using the geostationary orbit. the conference concentrate on those higher frequency bands that are unoccupied, or lit- ● The United States should give careful tle used, will collide with the demands of consideration to the future role of ITU vis-a- developing countries to have the conference vis international information policy issues concentrate on planning the use of the more and the New World information order de- economical, lower frequency bands. The mands of Third World countries. United States must determine its own readi- The results of the OTA-sponsored survey ness to incur the expense of moving to shows that more than 80 percent of the re- higher frequencies and its readiness to spondents agree that the conflicting posi- understand the motivations and deal effec- Ch. 6—Findings, Conclusions, and Observations • 143 tively with the pressures to plan a broad cent believe that a compromise is possible, range of frequency bands. but undesirable; only 8 percent of the respondents believe that a compromise be- HF Broadcasting Conference tween the United States and the Third World positions on a priori assignment is im- ● This conference, to be held in two ses- possible; another 9 percent expressed no sions starting in January 1984, is to plan the opinion. This underscores the need to iden- efficient and equitable use of the HF broad- tify and analyze specific strategies and op- casting bands. Active U.S. participation and tions which might provide the basis for such careful preparation will help ensure that the a compromise. increased allocations to HF broadcasting made at WARC-79 are not jeopardized by • WARC-79 made allocations for BSS failure to accommodate the fixed services from 12.3 to 12.7 GHz and for FSS from 11.7 that were removed from the international to 12.1 GHz. Left to be resolved at the 1983 broadcasting bands, but must be reaccom- conference is the band 12.1 to 12.3 GHz modated in other parts of the spectrum. allocated in 1979 to both services. Decisions surrounding the 1983 conference bear direct- • Rapid developments in direct broadcast- ly on the future growth of domestic satellite ing from satellites are likely to rekindle service. FSS and BSS both will be affected debate on such political issues as “prior con- by these decisions. Domestic issues involv- sent” at the HF planning conference. The ing direct broadcasting satellites planned for United States will need to be prepared to ad- operation in the 12-GHz band must be address this and other current issues over the dressed as a part of the overall policy con- question of the free flow of information. siderations by the United States.

1983 Broadcasting Satellite Other Conferences Conference for Region 2 ● The 10 additional administrative radio ● To prepare for the 1983 region 2 confer- conferences to be held over the next 7 years ence, the United States will need to develop include some that will be as important, if not its detailed requirements for broadcasting more so, than WARC-79 itself. (Scheduling is satellite channels and submit them to ITU a tentative and some could be delayed by ac- year in advance of the meeting. Also, the tion of the ITU’s administrative council desired satellite coverage areas are required and/or the 1982 plenipotentiary conference.) to be submitted. A U.S. position will need to Some of these conferences offer the United be taken on the total bandwidth to be allo- States an opportunity to reopen the question cated to broadcasting satellites as opposed of allocation proposals that were not ac- to satellites operating in the fixed satellite cepted by WARC-79 (e.g., WARC for the mo- service in the 12 GHz band. bile services in 1983).

● The United States could be faced with ● These future conferences offer a forum the prospect of a majority of region 2 coun- for the United States to reiterate the impor- tries voting for a rigid orbital and frequency tance of the radiolocation service and to help allotment plan such as the one adopted for resolve coordination problems arising from regions 1 and 3 at the 1977 WARC for BSS. the sharing of bands with the fixed and According to the OTA-sponsored survey, a mobile services. majority of the respondents, 68 percent, . The following is a list of the future ITU believe that a practical compromise is possi- conferences currently scheduled: ble and desirable, although relatively few have any specific concept of the form such November 1981,6 weeks, region 2, MF-BC compromise could take; an additional 15 per- RARC, second session; 144 • Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

August 1982, 4 weeks, region 1, FM-BC January 1986, 7 weeks, HF-Broadcasting RARC, first session; WARC, second session; September 1982, 6 weeks, ITU Plenipo- September 1986, 4 weeks, region 2, HF- tentiary Conference; Broadcasting RARC (New Bands); February 1983, 3½ weeks, Mobile Services January 1987, 4 weeks, African VHF/ WARC; UHF-Broadcasting RARC; June 1983, 5 weeks, region 2, Broadcast- September 1987, 6 weeks, Space Services ing Satellite RARC; WARC, second session; January 1984, 5 weeks, HF-Broadcasting March 1988,6 weeks, region 3, VHF/UHF WARC, first session; Bands RARC; and October 1984, 6 weeks, region 1, FM-BC September 1988, 6 weeks, Mobile Services RARC, second session; WARC. July 1985, 6 weeks, Space Services WARC, first session; Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary Acronyms and Abbreviations—

AFNAVSAT — Air Force Navigation Satellite FLTSATCOM — Fleet Satellite Communication AM — amplitude modulation System (Naval) ARFA — Allied Radio Frequency FM — frequency modulation Agency (NATO) FMAC — Frequency Management AWACS — Airborne Warning and Advisory Committee to the Control System National Telecommunications BSS — broadcasting-satellite service and Information C-E — communications-electronics Administration (DOD parlance) FSS — fixed satellite service CCIR — International Radio FX — fixed service Consultative Committee of GHz — gigahertz (1 billion cycles per the International second) Telecommunication Union GPS — global positioning satellite CCIs — reference to both the CCIR (sometimes NAVSTAR/GPS) and CCITT (DOD) CCITT — International Telegraph and HF — high frequency (3 to 30 MHZ) Telephone Consultative Hz — hertz (one cycle per second) Committee of the IBI — International Bureau of International Informatics Telecommunication Union ICA — International CITEL — Inter-American Communications Agency Telecommunication ICAO — International Civil Conference of the Aeronautical Organization Organization of American IFL — International Frequency List States IFRB — International Frequency COMSAT — Communications Satellite Registration Board Corp. IMCO — Intergovernmental Maritime COPUOS — The United Nations Consultive Organization Committee on the Peaceful INMARSAT — International Maritime Uses of Outer Space Satellite Organization C 3 I — command, control, INTELSAT — International communications, and Telecommunications Satellite intelligence (DOD parlance) System DNS — The Department of Defense IRAC — Interdepartment Radio Navigation Satellite system Advisory Committee DOD — Department of Defense ITU — International DSCS — Defense Satellite Telecommunication Union Communication System kHz — kilohertz (1000 cycles per ECAC — Electromagnetic second) Compatibility Analysis LF — low frequency (30 to 300 kHz) Center (DOD), Annapolis, Md. LR — radiolocation service (fixed) EHF — extremely high frequency (30 MF — medium frequency (300 to to 300 GHz) 3000 kHz) EIRP — effective isotropically radiated MHz — megahertz (1 million cycles power (measured in watts) per second) EMC — electromagnetic compatibility MO — mobile service FAS — Frequency Assignment MR — radiolocation service (mobile) Subcommittee of the NASA — National Aeronautics and Interdepartment Radio Space Administration Advisory Committee NATO — North Atlantic Treaty FCC — Federal Communications Organization Commission NTIA — National Telecommunications

147 ——.

148 . Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

and Information UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Administration Scientific, and Cultural RARC — Regional Administrative Organization Radio Conference UPU – Universal Postal Union RL — radionavigation service (fixed) VHF — very high frequency (30 to RO — radionavigation service 300 MHz) (mobile) VLF — very low frequency (3 to 30 SHF — super high frequency (3 to 30 kHz) GHz) WARC – World Administrative Radio UHF — ultrahigh frequency (300 to Conference 3000 MHz) WIPO – World Intellectual Property U.N. — United Nations Organization UNDP — United Nations Development Program . Glossary

A priori planning—procedure by which frequen- Assigned frequency–the center of the frequency cies and orbital locations are allotted to indi- band assigned to a station. vidual countries according to a plan negoti- Assigned frequency band–the frequency band ated by member-nations and implemented by within which the emission of a station is au- ITU, thorized; the width of the band equals the nec- Aeronautical mobile service-a mobile service be- essary bandwidth plus twice the absolute val- tween aeronautical stations and aircraft sta- ue of the frequency tolerance. Where space tions, or between aircraft stations, in which stations are concerned, the assigned fre- survival craft stations may participate; emer- quency band includes twice the maximum gency position-indicating radiobeacon sta- Doppler shift that may occur in relation to tions may also participate in this service on any point of the Earth’s surface. designated distress and emergency frequen- Assignment (of a radiofrequency or radiofre- cies. quency channel) —authorization given by an Aeronautical mobile-satellite service-a mobile- administration for a radio station to use a satellite service in which mobile Earth sta- radiofrequency or radiofrequency channel tions are located onboard aircraft; survival under specified conditions. craft stations and emergency position-indi- Band–in radio, frequencies that are within two cating radiobeacon stations may also par- definite limits and are allocated for a definite ticipate in this service. purpose or service, e.g., the standard AM Aeronautical radionavigation-satellite service-a broadcast band. radionavigation-satellite service in which Broadcasting-satellite service–a radio-communi- Earth stations are located onboard aircraft. cation service in which signals transmitted or Aeronautical radioavigation service—a radionav- retransmitted by space stations are intended igation service intended for the benefit and for direct reception by the general public. for the safe operation of aircraft. Broadcasting service–a radio-communication Allocation (of frequency band) –entry in the table service in which the transmissions are in- of frequency allocations of a given frequency tended for direct reception by the general band for the purpose of its use by one or more public. This service may include sound trans- terrestrial or space radiocommunication serv- missions, television transmissions, or other ices or the radio astronomy service under types of transmission. specified conditions. This term shall also be CCIR–International Radio Consultative Com- applied to the frequency band concerned. mittee, a permanent organ of ITU where Allotment (of a radio frequency or radio fre- member-nations and recognized private oper- quency channel) —entry of a designated fre- ating agents formulate recommendations quency channel in an agreed plan, adopted by concerning technical and operational radio a competent conference, for use by one or matters. more administrations for a terrestrial or CCITT–International Telegraph and Telephone space radiocommunciation service in one or Consultative Committee, a permanent organ more identified countries or geographical of ITU where member-nations and recognized areas and under specified conditions. private operating agents formulate recom- Amateur service-a radiocommunication service mendations concerning technical, opera- for the purpose of self-training, intercom- tional, and tariff aspects of telecommunica- munication, and technical investigations car- tion. ried out by amateurs, i.e., by duly authorized CCIR SPM–special preparatory meeting of persons interested in radio technique solely CCIR convened in 1978 by the Secretary Gen- with a personal aim and without pecuniary in- eral of ITU to provide technical support to terest. WARC-79. Analog transmission—a technique that trans- dBW–a measure of power, decibels referened to mits the signal in a continuous electrical 1 watt, waveform. The information context of the sig- Digital transmission— a technique that transits nal is conveyed by the value or magnitude of the signal in the form of one of a diswe some characteristics of the signal such as the number of codes. The information content amplitude, phase, or frequency of a voltage. the signal is concerned with discrete state

84-591 f) - 82 - 11 150 “ Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

the signal, such as the presence or absence of for frequencies, in the usable portion of the a voltage, a contact in the open or closed posi- radio spectrum, to radio-communication serv- tion, or a hole or no hole in certain positions ices. on a card. Frequency allocation table (national)–a table in Earth exploration-satellite service–a radio-com- the FCC Rules and Regulations allocating munication service between Earth stations bands of frequencies, in the usable portion of and one or more space stations, which may in- the radio spectrum, to radio-communication clude links between space stations, in which: services. 1) information relating to the characteristics Geostationary satellite–a geosynchronous satel- of the Earth and its natural phenomena is ob- lite whose circular and direct orbit lies in the tained from active sensors or passive sensors plane of the Earth’s Equator and which thus on Earth satellites; 2) similar information is remains fixed relative to the Earth; by exten- collected from airborne or Earth-based plat- sion, a satellite that remains approximately forms; 3) such information maybe distributed fixed relative to the Earth. to Earth stations within the system con- Geostationary satellite orbit–the oribit in which cerned; and 4) platform interrogation may be a satellite must be placed to be a geostation- included. This service may also include feeder ary satellite. links necessary for its operation. Geosynchronous satellite–an Earth satellite Emission–radiation produced, or the production whose period of revolution is equal to the of radiation, by a radio transmitting station. period of rotation of the Earth about its axis. Evolutionary planning approach–procedure by Harmful interference–interference that en- which frequency assignments and orbital lo- dangers the functioning of a radionavigation cations are notified by member-nations and service or of other safety services or seriously recorded by ITU on a more or less first-come, degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts first-served basis without any rigid a priori a radio-communication service operating in plan. accordance with these regulations. Facsimile–a form of telegraphy for the transmis- HF broadcasting—high frequency, or shortwave sion of fixed images, with or without half- broadcasting, used primarily for government- tones, with a view to their reproduction in a sponsored information services (e.g., Radio permanent form. Moscow, Voice of America), and for domestic Feeder link-a radio link from an Earth station at broadcasting in many developing countries. a specified fixed point to a space station, or IFRB–International Frequency Registration vice versa, conveying information for a space Board, a permanent organ of ITU with five radio-communication service other than for officials elected by the plenipotentiary confer- the fixed-satellite service. ence, examines notifications of frequency as- Fixed-satellite service-a radio-communication signments from member-nations for conform- service between Earth stations at specified ity with the radio regulations. fixed points when one or more satellites are INTELSAT– International Telecommunication used; in some cases this service includes sat- Satellite Organization with 106 member- ellite-to-satellite links, which may also be ef- nations that own and operate the satellites in fected in the intersatellite service; the fixed- the Global Communication Satellite System. satellite service may also include feeder links Interference–the effect of unwanted energy due for other space radio-communication services. to one or a combination of emissions, radia- Fixed service–a radio-communication service be- tions, or inductions upon reception in a radio- tween specified fixed points. communication system, manifested by any Footnote– in the international table of frequency performance degration, misinterpretation, or allocations a “footnote” conveys special loss of information that could be extracted in information and often is a means by which an the absence of such unwanted energy. ITU member-nation may claim frequency International frequency list-a listing of all the band usage for a service that is in addition to frequencies in use in the world, as notified by or alternative to the service stated in the administrations to the International Tele- cable of allocations. communication Union. Frequency allocation table (international)–a IRAC–Interdepartment Radio Advisory Com- table in the radio regulations allocating bands mittee; a body of 20 Federal agencies and de- Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary ● 151

partments that assists NTIA in the develop- mobile Earth stations by means of one or ment of the National Table of Frequency Al- more space stations. locations, the assignment of frequencies to Mobile service—a radio-communication service stations operated by the Federal Government between mobile and land stations, or between and other spectrum management functions. mobile stations. IRAC Ad Hoc 144–the ad hoc group established Orbit–the path, relative to a specified frame of within IRAC to develop recommended U.S. reference, described by the center of mass of a proposals for WARC-79 pertaining to the satellite or other object in space subjected Federal Government use of the spectrum and primarily to natural forces, mainly the force to comment on U.S. position papers. of gravity. ITU—International Telecommunication Union; Permissible interference–interference at a higher the U.N. related organization with responsi- level than that defined as permissible inter- bilities in the field of international telecom- ference and which has been agreed upon be- munications including spectrum manage- tween two or more administrations without ment; present membership of 155 nations. prejudice to other administrations. ITU Convention–the governing instrument of Permitted service-a class of allocation. Per- ITU that sets forth the structure and activi- mitted and primary services have equal ties of the Union; only the plenipotentiary rights, except that in the preparations fre- conference of ITU can amend or revise the quency plans, the primary service should Convention; it last met in Malaga-Tor- have prior choice of frequencies (printed in remolinos in 1973. “grotesque light” type in the ITU table of Land mobile-satellite service-a mobile-satellite allocations. ) service in which mobile Earth stations are lo- Plenipotentiary conference–the supreme body of cated on land. ITU that has the power to amend or revise Land mobile service—a mobile service between the ITU convention. base stations and land mobile stations, or be- Power flux density—a measure of the power tween land mobile stations. radiated by a transmitter, used as a con- Maritime mobile-satellite service–a mobile- straint on certain services to protect other satellite service in which mobile Earth sta- services in a shared band. tions are located onboard ships; survival craft Primary service–a class of allocation. Stations in stations and emergency position-indicating a primary service may not cause harmful in- radiobeacon stations may also participate in terference to stations in the same, or another this service. primary service, and can claim protection Maritime mobile service-a mobile service be- from interference from stations in primary, tween coast stations and ship stations, or be- permitted, and secondary services. Printed in tween ship stations, or between associated solid capitals in the ITU table of allocations. onboard communication stations; survival Private operating agency–any individual or com- craft stations and emergency position-indi- pany or corporation, other than a governmen- cating radiobeacon stations may also partici- tal establishment or agency, which operates a pate in this service. telecommunication installation intended for Maritime radio-navigation-satellite service—a an international communications service or radio-navigation-satellite service in which capable of causing harmful interference with Earth stations are located onboard ships. such a service. Maritime radionavigation service-a radionav- Radar-a radiodetermination system based on igation service intended for the benefit and the comparison of reference signals with radio for the safe operation of ships. signals reflected, or retransmitted, from the Meteorological aids service—a radio-communica- position to be determined. tion service used for meteorological, includ- Radiation–the outward flow of energy from any ing hydrological, observations and explora- source in the form of radio waves. tion. Radio–a general term applied to the use of radio Mobile-satellite service—a radio-communication waves. service: 1 ) between mobile Earth stations and Radio astronomy service–a service involving the one or more space stations, or between space use of radio astronomy. stations used by this service; or 2) between Radio Regulations, Geneva, 1979–the Final Acts —

152 . Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

of WARC-79 will constitute the Radio Regu- the U. S. S. R., Turkey, the Territory of the lations, Geneva, 1979 and enter into force on Mongolian People’s Republic, and areas to January 1, 1982, for those countries that have the north of the U. S. S. R.; region 2–North, formally adopted the Final Acts. Central, and South Americas, the Caribbean, Radio waves or hertzian waves–electromagnetic and Greenland; and region 3—Asia, Oceania, waves of frequencies arbitrarily lower than Australia, and New Zealand. 3000 GHz, propagated in space without arti- Safety service—a radio-communication service ficial guide. used permanently or temporarily for the safe- Radio communication–telecommunication by guarding of human life and property. means of radio waves. Satellite-a body that revolves around another Radiocommunication service-a service involv- body of preponderant mass and that has a ing the transmission, emission, and/or recep- motion primarily and permanently deter- tion of radio waves for specific telecommuni- mined by the force of attraction of that other cation purposes. body. Radiodetermination–the determination of the Satellite link-a radio link between a transmit- position, velocity, and/or other characteris- ting Earth station and a receiving Earth sta- tics of an object, or the obtaining of information through one satellite. tion relating to these parameters, by means of Satellite system—a space system using one or the propagation properties of radio waves. more artificial Earth satellites. Radiodetermination-satellite service–a radio- Secondary service—a class of allocation. Stations communication service for the purpose of ra- on a secondary service may not cause interfer- diodetermination involving the use of one or ence to stations in a primary or secondary more space stations. service, and may not claim protection against Radiodetermination service–a radio-communica- interference from stations in a primary serv- tion service for the purpose of radiodeter- ice existing or subsequently installed. Printed mination. in upper and lower case in the ITU table of al- Radiolocation—radiodetermination used for pur- locations. poses other than those of radionavigation. Services—a functional use of the radio spectrum Radiolocation service—a radiodetermination where designated frequency bands are allo- service for the purpose of radiolocation. cated for particular uses, e.g., broadcasting Radionavigation-radiodetermination used for service, radiolocation service. the purposes of navigation, including ob- Space-radio communication—any radio communi- struction warning. cation involving the use of one or more space Radionavigation-satellite service–a radio-deter- stations or the use of one or more reflecting mination-satellite service used for the pur- satellites or other objects in space. pose of radionavigation. Space research service—a radio-communication Radionavigation service—a radiodetermination service in which spacecraft or other objects in service for the purpose or radionavigation. space are used for scientific or technological Recognized private operating agency–any pri- research purposes. vate operating agency, as defined above, Space system–any group of cooperating Earth which operates a public correspondence or stations and/or space stations employing broadcasting service and upon which the obli- space-radio communication for specific pur- gations provided for in article 44 of the con- poses, vention are imposed by the member in whose Telecommunications—any transmission, emis- territory the head office of the agency is sit- sion, or reception of signs, signals, writing, uated, or by the member that has authorized images, and sounds or intelligence of any na- this operating agency to establish and oper- ture by wire, radio, optical, or other electro- ate a telecommunication service on its ter- magnetic systems. ritory. Telegram—written matter intended to be trans- Regions of ITU–for the allocation of frequencies, mitted by telegraphy for delivery to the ad- the world has been divided into three regions dressee. This term also includes radiotele- by ITU. Exact boundaries of the regions are grams unless otherwise specified. given in the radio regulations; a general de- Telegraphy–a form of telecommunication that is scription follows: region I—Europe, Africa, concerned in any process providing transmis- Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary ● 153

sion and reproduction at a distance of docu- transmission of transient images of fixed or mentary matter, such as written or printed moving objects. matter or fixed images, or the reproduction at Terrestrial radio communication—any radio com- a distance of any kind of information in such munication other than space-radio communi- a form. For the purposes of the radio regula- cation or radio astronomy. tions, unless otherwise specified therein, tele- WARC-77—a specialized World Administrative graphy shall mean a form of telecommunica- Radio Conference that met in Geneva in the tion for the transmission of written matter by winter of 1977 to plan for the broadcasting- the use of a signal code. satellite service in the band 11.7 to 12.5 GHz. Telephony–a form of telecommunication set up WARC-79–a General World Administrative for the transmission of speech or, in some Radio Conference that met in Geneva in the cases, other sounds. fall of 1979 to revise the international radio Television—a form of telecommunication for the regulations of ITU. Selected Bibliography Selected Bibliography

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