Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: the Ominous Implications
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California Law Review VOL. 79 MARCH 1991 No. 2 Copyright © 1991 by California Law Review, Inc. Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications Martin H. Redisht Gary Lippmant A modified form of civic republicanism has seen a recent revival in constitutionaltheory. The authors critique this "liberal" version of repub- licanism, specifically, its implicationsfor free expression. Though scholar- ship on the intersection of republicanism andfree expression is sparse, the authors extrapolatefrom the "communitarian determinative" model and the "external objective" model of republicanism and apply them to free speech. They argue that even those branches of modern republican theory that privilege communitarian self-determination over externally derived truths present extremely disturbing implicationsfor the viability of free speech theory in many of its traditionalapplications. INTRODUCTION: CIVIC REPUBLICANISM, AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THEORY, AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION With a rush of celebratory rhetoric about the values of civic virtue, communitarian deliberation, and the preference for the common good t Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University. A.B. 1967, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1970, Harvard University. This Article formed the basis for a lecture delivered by Professor Redish as the Lorene Sails Higgins Distinguished Visitor at Lewis & Clark School of Law in March, 1991. T A.B. 1984, Rutgers University; J.D. 1990, Northwestern University. The authors would like to thank Ronald Allen, Randy Barnett, Linda Hirshman, Jane Larson, Gary Lawson, Larry Marshall, Michael Perry, Stephen Presser, and David Van Zandt for their comments on an earlier draft. The Article also benefitted from a faculty workshop at Vanderbilt University School of Law. CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:267 over the pursuit of selfish private interests, modem constitutional theo- rists have begun a revival of classical civic republicanism.' These theo- rists are quick to point out, however, that their vision of civic republicanism differs substantially from the form the doctrine assumed at the time of the nation's founding, when it "prominently displayed[ ] mili- tarist, elitist, religious, and sexist sentiments."' The modem version does share with its spiritual parent a belief in "the notion of a common good ... made possible by 'practical reason' "I and a corresponding concern that social decisions not be made in response to narrow, selfishly moti- vated bargains among legislators and special interests.' The validity of modem civic republicanism is open to question on grounds of both logic and political theory. Once the morally deplorable elements from its past are excised, the classical concept of civic republi- canism may no longer be conceptually viable.' More importantly, although the "liberal''6 version of republicanism generally prohibits the pursuit of private interests, it makes some exceptions that are logically difficult to justify on any ground other than simple political or ideological preference.7 Modem civic republicanism also has disturbing implications 1. See, ag., Fallon, Vhat Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989); The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); Siegel, The Marshall Court and Republicanism (Book Review), 67 TEx. L. REv. 903 (1989). This revival in constitutional theory follows comparable revivals by such historians as Pocock (J.POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975)) and Wood (G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969)), and political theorists such as Sandel (M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982)) and MacIntyre (A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984)). 2. Epstein, Modern Republicanism-Or the Flight From Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633, 1635 (1988); see also Siegel, supra note 1, at 921-22 (discussing Prof. White's characterization of the Marshall Court's modified republicanism as protecting property, liberty, and virtue). 3. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541 (1988). 4. See ia at 1540, 1541, 1550. As Professor Fallon has written, classical republican theory posited that "there exists an objective public good apart from individual goods." Fallon, supra note 1, at 1698. In the words of one commentator: The burden of the communitarian position is that a healthy liberal society is not an aggregation of rights-protecting and interest-maximizing individuals but rather a community of public-spirited citizens oriented toward the common good. Some communitarians, as a consequence, identify with the tradition of civic republicanism, which they contrast with what they see as the rampant individualism of the liberal tradition. T. SPRAGENS, REASON AND DEMOCRACY 4 (1990). 5. See Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1665 (1988) (emphasis in original): "[Tihe absence of the dependent classes-defined by race, gender and property-was essential to the republican view of the world, not an easily correctable accident." 6. Professor Sunstein often refers to the concept of "liberal republicanism." See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1541, 1566-71, 1576. 7. See id. at 1572 ("[S]ocial groups-especially the disadvantaged-should not . be prevented from invoking their private interests in the political process."). 1991] FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION for both constitutional theory and statutory construction.' The implications of the civic republican revival for the theory of free expression have not yet been fully explored. Civic republican scholars have paid only limited attention to such issues'-far less attention than they have devoted to the theories of equal protection,"0 statutory' con- struction,1 and the right of privacy.12 A detailed examination of repub- licanism reveals a number of extremely ominous signs for the viability of free speech theory in many of its traditional applications. Ascertaining the impact of civic republicanism on free speech theory is not easy because republicanism is itself an ambiguous concept.' 3 At the very least, civic republicanism implies a belief in the primacy of civic virtue, the pursuit of the common good over private interest, and the value of deliberation.' 4 Civic republican scholars differ, however, in their approach to the definition of the concept of the "common good." On the one hand, the concept may be defined solely by reference to the commu- nity's own perceptions, taken as a whole, following deliberation. This "communitarian determinative" model places no external value judg- ments on the collective will of the community. An alternative approach to civic republicanism (the "external objective" model) posits, in Cass Sunstein's words, that "commitment to universalism, or agreement as a regulative ideal, takes the form of a belief in the possibility of settling at least some normative disputes with substantively right answers."' 5 If "substantively right answers" to social conflicts exist, attainment of the republicans' deliberative ideal is to be measured by a comparison of the results of the deliberative process with some objective normative value 8. See generally Fallon, supra note 1 (constitutional theory); Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist"Perspective, 83 Nw. U.L. REV. 761, 775-83 (1989) (statutory construction). 9. The primary direct attention to free speech issues by modem republican theorists came in Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1576-78. See also Michelman, Saving Old Glory: On Constitutional Iconography, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1337 (1990). In addition, Professor Robert Post, a free speech theorist who draws on modem republican thought, has discussed the implications of republican theory for one segment of free speech law. See Post, The ConstitutionalConcept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, DemocraticDeliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REV. 601 (1990), discussed at infra text accompanying notes 144-59. 10. See, eg., Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689, 1710-17 (1984). 11. See, e.g., Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007 (1989); Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1581-83. 12. See, eg., Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) (using Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), as an example in arguing that dialogic-republican constitutional theory inspires stronger judicial protection of individual rights than do other competing theories). 13. See infra text accompanying notes 16-28. 14. See infra text accompanying notes 87-174. 15. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1550; see infra text accompanying notes 90-130 (describing Sunstein's theory). CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:267 system, which is presumably derived by means external to an assessment of the desires or views of the community as a whole. In contrast to the "communitarian determinative" model, then, the "external objective" model determines the content of "common good" not by neutral ascer- tainment of the collective popular will, but rather by superimposing a distinct substantive value structure onto the decisions of