0010.1177/0032321717731660Political StudiesHe et al. research-article2017
Article 1 Political Studies 2 18–1 The Covenant Connection © The Author(s) 2017 3 Reprints and permissions: Reexamined: The Nexus sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav 4 https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321717731660DOI: 10.1177/0032321717731660 5 between Religions and journals.sagepub.com/home/psx 6 7 Federalism in Asia 8 9 10 11 1 2 Baogang He , Laura Anne Allison 12 and Michael Breen2 13 14 15 16 Abstract 17 The covenant connection thesis forms an important basis from which to understand the religious 18 source of federalism. Yet with its Judeo-Christian roots, to what extent does it apply to Asian 19 countries that have different religious traditions? In this article, we explore whether the covenant 20 connection thesis is relevant to Asian federalism in the context of Muslim-, Hindu-, and Buddhist- 21 majority countries. We find that while the presence or absence of a covenantal tradition within a 22 religion can partially explain acceptance of, or resistance to, federalism, there are other religious features that also play a role. These include the extent to which traditional religious organizations 23 are internally centralized, the extent to which religion and state governance are intertwined or 24 separate from each other, and the extent to which a religion that constitutes the core national 25 identity is threatened by other religions that are or may be empowered by federal arrangements. 26 27 28 Keywords 29 comparative federalism, covenant connection, religious traditions, federalism in Asia, religious perspective on federalism 30 31 Accepted: 23 August 2017 32 33 34 35 Introduction 36 In Asia, the correlations between religions and federalism are puzzling and reveal some 37 striking patterns. Among secular states and societies with Confucian traditions, like 38 China, the two Koreas, Vietnam, and Singapore, none have federalism. No Buddhist- 39 majority country has federated, although Myanmar and Sri Lanka have quasi-federal sys- 40 tems. In contrast, both Hindu-majority countries (India and Nepal) have accepted 41 42 43 44 1Deakin University, Burwood, VIC, Australia 2Public Policy and Global Affairs, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore 45 46 Corresponding author: 47 Baogang He, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood, VIC 3125, Australia. Email: [email protected][AQ: 1] 48 2 Political Studies 00(0)
1 federalism as an appropriate means of accommodating diversity. Two Muslim-majority 2 countries—Malaysia and Pakistan—established federalism, although in a more central- 3 ized and authoritarian manner. Christian-majority countries with covenantal traditions, 4 like the Philippines, East Timor, and Papua New Guinea, have unitary political systems, 5 although Christianity has been a relatively recent import. 6 Why are there such differences among Buddhist-, Muslim-, and Hindu-majority coun- 7 tries with regard to federalism in Asia? Obviously there are many historical, geo-political, 8 economic, social, and cultural factors that contribute to these differences. In this article, 9 we focus on religious factors to account for these. We first revisit the covenant connection 10 thesis in the Western federalism scholarship. From a religious perspective, the idea of a 11 covenant encapsulates the idea that relationships between God and humans are under- 12 pinned by morally sustained mutual promises and obligations (Elazar, 2000). Politically, 13 a covenant refers to the process of creating communities and civil societies through com- 14 pacts and agreements to establish durable partnerships (Elazar, 2000). The covenant con- 15 nection’s core idea is that federalism is rooted in Judeo-Christian covenantal traditions 16 (see, for example, Elazar’s four volume study, The Covenant Tradition in Politics), 17 whereby covenantal partnerships create a situation in which “each partner can at least 18 recognize the justice of the other’s claims and then negotiate these claims through mutu- 19 ally agreeable structures designed to facilitate cooperative activity” (Elazar, 2000: 5). 20 Inspired by this simple but powerful intellectual explanation, we attempt to discover 21 whether the covenant connection thesis extends beyond Christianity in the context of 22 Asian federalism. We analyze how the presence or absence of a covenantal connection 23 within Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism affects the establishment and development of 24 federalism in Asia. Our finding is that the covenant connection thesis can partially explain 25 why federalism has taken root in Muslim-majority countries, and it helps elucidate why 26 federalism has not been established within Buddhist-majority countries, where there are 27 no covenantal traditions. However, the covenant connection thesis cannot explain why 28 Hinduism, which also has no covenantal tradition, has been associated with the develop- 29 ment of federalism in India and its emergence in Nepal. It cannot explain why Christian- 30 majority countries in Asia have unitary political systems. Clearly, there is a limit to the 31 covenant connection thesis even within Christianity. 32 We thus contend that the covenant connection thesis merely focuses on the ideational 33 and philosophical bases of federalism, and overlooks other aspects of religion that have 34 played various roles in influencing the development of federalism. We aim to broaden the 35 covenant connection thesis through identifying and examining several pertinent institu- 36 tional and social factors within religious traditions. They include the extent to which tra- 37 ditional religious organizations are internally centralized or centralized by state power, 38 the extent to which religion and state governance are intertwined or separate from each 39 other, and the extent to which a particular religion that constitutes the core national iden- 40 tity is perceived to be threatened by other religions that are or may be empowered by 41 federal arrangements. We therefore make and test the following hypotheses: 42 43 (1) A decentralized administrative structure of a religion creates a favorable condition 44 for federalism. Otherwise, an administratively centralized religion is more likely 45 to lend its support to a unitary system. 46 (2) Differentiation between a particular religion and a state or government creates a 47 favorable condition for federalism. In contrast, if a particular religion is closely 48 identified with a state or government, a federal polity is likely to be more He et al. 3
authoritarian and centralized. It does not, however, preclude the implementation of 1 federalism on its own. 2 (3) An actual or perceived threat to a particular religion that constitutes the core of a 3 national or ethnic identity creates an unfavorable condition for federalism. 4 5 A religious national identity alone will not affect the issue of whether federalism can 6 be introduced or not. Only when there are concerns about the status of the religion upon 7 which a national identity is based—that is, when a particular religion faces a critical chal- 8 lenge from other religions in domestic and international societies, or when there is a 9 perceived threat to the status of the religion in the region that may be heightened by fed- 10 eralism—will a state unify and use political force to defend the domination of its majority 11 religion. In these circumstances, a state would tend toward centralization. 12 The article has three aims. The first aim is to test the application of the covenant con- 13 nection thesis to federalism in Asia. The second aim is to further develop the covenant 14 connection thesis through examining other religious factors that contribute to the success 15 and failure of the establishment and development of federalism in Asia. In doing so, the 16 third aim is to make a valuable contribution to the literature on religious perspectives on 17 federalism through a comparative study of Asia, and in particular an in-depth analysis of 18 the impacts of Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism on federalism in Asia. 19 We adopt a comparative method. First, we select and focus on three religions, namely, 20 Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, to test the covenant connection hypothesis. We do not 21 consider Confucianism (He, 2010), which may be better considered as secular, or 22 Christianity, due to the limits of space and because it has been covered extensively in the 23 literature (Elazar, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999; Kincaid and Elazar, 1985; McCoy and Baker, 24 1991). Second, we select Malaysia and Pakistan from Islam, India and Nepal from 25 Hinduism, and Sri Lanka and Myanmar from Buddhism, and develop a pair analysis of 26 two countries in each religious tradition. Third, we examine institutional and social fac- 27 tors within the three religions that are important to understand the implementation of, or 28 challenges to, federalism in Asia. While identifying and considering divisions and varia- 29 tions both within and across religious traditions, we focus on those that are most prevalent 30 in our case countries. 31 We should make clear in the beginning that while this article focuses on various reli- 32 gious factors that influence the politics of federalism, there are many other non-religious 33 factors that have influenced all developments of federalism. Throughout the article, we 34 note the role of colonialism, race politics, political institutions, democratization (He, 35 2007), political will, and others. 36 Following the conventional definition, federalism is taken to exist when a state has at 37 least two tiers of government that possess legislative and executive powers derived from 38 a constitution, and each tier can act independently in the exercise of those powers. There 39 are other features that are commonly present in federal states, such as bicameralism and 40 an independent court, but not in all. 41 42 The Covenant Connection in Early Federalism 43 44 Federalism is understood to have religious roots informed by a Judeo-Christian covenan- 45 tal tradition developed by the theological philosophies of Bullinger and Althusius, among 46 others (Elazar, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999; Everett, 1997; Kincaid and Elazar, 1985; McCoy 47 and Baker, 1991; Ostrom, 1987). Political federal ideas were connected to the Biblical 48 4 Political Studies 00(0)
1 message that people could be “God’s free and equal partners” if man and God committed 2 to a “relationship of mutual responsibility” (Chebankova, 2009; Elazar, 1987: 313). This 3 partnership between God and man would ensure that people would have God’s blessing 4 and love in return for maintaining faith in God and upholding God’s laws on earth 5 (Chebankova, 2009): 6 7 The idea of covenant betokens not merely a solemn pledge between two or more people to keep 8 faith with each other, to honor an agreement; it involves the idea of co-operation, reciprocity, 9 mutuality, and it implies the recognition of entities—whether it is persons, a people, or a divine 10 being (Davis, 1978: 3). 11 12 During the reformation period in Europe, protestant writers such as Calvin, Heinrich 13 Bullinger, Luther, Beza, and Zwingli considered the idea of covenant to be a central com- 14 ponent of political theology (Elazar, 2001). Bullinger’s 1534 treatise, The One and 15 Eternal Testament or Covenant of God, is considered the “fountainhead” of federalism 16 and was the basic source of federal thought among theologians, political philosophers, 17 and leaders in church and state (Burgess, 2006; McCoy and Baker, 1991). It established 18 the link between federalism and covenant and set out the federal relationships between 19 social groups such as families, congregations, guilds, and commercial groups (McCoy 20 and Burgess, 1991). Johannes Althusius (1563–1638), a political scientist, public official, 21 and reformed Protestant theologian, was the first to secularize covenantalism through 22 political interpretation (McCoy and Baker, 1991: 55).[AQ: 2][AQ: 3] 23 Two federal traditions—the Anglo-American and continental European—diverged 24 over time, but research has shown how they were both influenced by the ideas of Bullinger 25 and Althusius (Burgess, 2006). The continental European tradition has its origins in inter- 26 national affairs primarily, for example, in alliances among groups and leaders, but it is 27 also influenced by social contract theory, sovereignty debates, and Althusius’ experiments 28 with theorizing a political form of governance emanating from covenantal theology 29 (Burgess, 2006). This federal tradition, with its theological, ethical, and political dimen- 30 sions, was brought to the new world, the colonies of New England by the Puritans (McCoy 31 and Baker, 1991). The Puritan Massachusetts Bay Colony, for example, established in 32 British North America in 1629, translated covenantal theology into political and social 33 life, marking the beginnings of the Anglo-American tradition. Encompassing the federal 34 concept of balancing unity and diversity as well as obligations and liberty, the covenantal 35 basis of federalism has also been closely linked to constitutionalism: “the logic of both 36 covenant and constitution demands a democratic evolution: satisfying legitimate human 37 needs, extending human rights” (Riemer, 1980: 141). American constitutionalism, for 38 example, can be interpreted as resulting from a combination of theological covenantalism 39 and the more secular idea of compact (Chebankova, 2009). 40 Daniel Elazar explored the Jewish and Christian ideas of a covenant and their connec- 41 tions to political choices. His research ran along two lines—covenantal connections to 42 federalism stemming from Jewish biblical traditions, and another that focused on US 43 federalism and its colonial origins: 44 This covenant idea is of great importance because of what it offers in the way of building 45 relationships. The Bible develops a whole system of relationships based upon covenants, 46 beginning with the covenants between God and mankind, which serve as initial political acts 47 (Elazar, 1981: 9). 48 He et al. 5
Elazar (1995: 1) makes the bold claim that “the covenants of the Bible are the founding 1 covenants of Western civilization” and that the covenant idea “has within it the seeds of 2 modern constitutionalism.” The question now is whether the covenant connection thesis 3 can be extended to Asia. To what extent do covenantal principles play a role in countries 4 that are not majority Christian? How does the presence or absence of covenantal traditions 5 in Asian religious traditions affect the establishment and development of federalism? After 6 reviewing the status of religion and federalism in Asia, we examine these questions. 7 8 Mapping Religion and Federalism in Asia 9 10 Many parts of the world are undergoing a religious revival. It was not long ago that 11 prominent scholars, like Charles Taylor (2007), proclaimed “a secular age.” Secularization 12 theory, in its most extreme form, foresaw the demise of religion and an anticipated decline 13 in its importance to society (Gauchet, 1997). However, from the rise of the religious right 14 in the United States to the political ambition of Islamic extremists, the trend toward secu- 15 larism has not been consolidated as was expected by many. 16 In Asia, it is true to speak of a religious revival; however, religion has never really 17 given way to secularism as a social or political force. Religion remains an important part 18 of ethnic identity in many cases, and is influential in the political sphere, and in relation 19 to federalism. In India, for example, religion has become more important in recent dec- 20 ades. Previously, the Congress Party ensured religious diversity and India’s religious neu- 21 trality. While political discourse on federalism in Pakistan centers on resource allocation, 22 the role of the Punjab, and democratization, its status as an Islamic federation ensures that 23 religion has always been a component of Pakistan’s political structure. 24 Asia is a religiously diverse region, with substantial populations covering all of the 25 world’s major religious traditions. We focus on South and Southeast Asia. Although each 26 country has its own internal diversity, majority religions are present in each case. Pakistan 27 and Malaysia have state religions and Sri Lanka and Myanmar give special status to one 28 religion. Even in the region’s constitutionally secular countries, notably India, the state 29 often intervenes in and regulates religious affairs. In India, there are as many as five states 30 in the North East which are tribal dominated, and of the eight, three are Christian major- 31 ity. These states enjoy autonomy more than the states in the mainland. Most countries 32 provide religious freedoms; however, these are sometimes compromised by bans on reli- 33 gious conversions and religiously biased legislation. 34 Buddhism is the majority religion in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, 35 and Bhutan. With the exception of Bhutan (and Nepal), people in South and Southeast 36 Asia mostly practice the Theravada form of Buddhism, while Mahayana Buddhism is 37 prevalent in East Asia. There are two Hindu-majority countries, India and Nepal. Pakistan, 38 Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia are Muslim-majority countries, dominated by the 39 Sunni form of Islam. 40 While Sri Lanka’s and Myanmar’s constitutions incorporate a constitutional division 41 of powers, no Buddhist-majority country has federated despite significant pressure to this 42 end. Conversely, both Hindu-majority countries have accepted federalism, although 43 Nepal’s version is fledgling. The federal credentials of Muslim-majority countries are 44 mixed. Pakistan and Malaysia are federations, but are “flawed” in practice (Burgess, 45 2013: 273); Indonesia is substantively decentralized; and Bangladesh is unitary. Table 1 46 provides a summary of the status of federalism and religion in majority Buddhist, Hindu, 47 and Islamic countries in Asia, as outlined above. 48 6 Political Studies 00(0)
1 Table 1. Summary of Religion and Federalism. 2 Religion Countries (% identifying Constitutional status Federalism—presence and 3 with majority religiona) of majority religion typeb 4 5 Hinduism India (79.8) Secular Federation 6 Nepal (81.3%) Secular Federation 7 Islam Pakistan (96.4%) State religion Federation 8 (Sunni) Malaysia (61.3%) State religion Federation 9 Bangladesh (89.1%) State religion Unitary 10 Indonesia (87.2%) Preferential position Quasi-federalism Buddhism Sri Lanka (70.1%) Preferential position An attempt to build hybrid 11 (Theravada) federalism, but failed 12 Myanmar (87.9%) Preferential position Currently on its road to 13 federalism 14 Cambodia (95%) State religion Unitary 15 Thailand (93.6%) Preferential position Unitary 16 Laos (66.8%) Secular (neutral) Unitary 17 Buddhism Bhutan (75.3%) Preferential position Unitary 18 (Vajrayana) 19 Sources: CIA World Factbook (2015); Department of Population Ministry of Labor, Immigration and Population, 20 Myanmar (2016: 12–15). Myanmar Population and Housing Census Report Volume 2-C (2014). 21 aIrrespective of sect. 22 bBased on typology of Ronald Watts (1999).[AQ: 13][AQ: 14][AQ: 15] 23 24 Covenantal Traditions in Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism 25 26 The Quran includes approximately 100 references to a covenant either between God and 27 mankind or between humans, with the majority being between God and man (Lumbard, 28 2015). For many interpreters of the Quran, the covenant is “central to the Quranic concep- 29 tion of humanity and of religious history” (Lumbard, 2015: 2). In particular, verses 7: 30 172–173 have become known as “the Verse of the Covenant” (Al-Qadi, 2003). There are 31 four major trends of interpretation of the verses: the traditional Sunni, the rational 32 Mu’tazill-Shi’, the mystical Sufi, and the popular storytellers’ Qisas Al-Anbiya (Al-Qadi, 33 2003; Lumbard, 2015). Although they differ on certain aspects of the verse (Al-Qadi, 34 2003), there is general agreement that: 35 36 Man promised God in a binding fashion to worship him alone as Lord and God; that man might 37 forget his promise; that God would send prophets to man; and that man on the Day of Resurrection 38 will be judged in accordance with his compliance, or lack thereof, with the promise he made in 39 the Covenant (Al-Qadi, 2003: 333). 40 41 However, the covenant in Islam (Verse 7: 172–173) is understood as hierarchical rather 42 than egalitarian. Egalitarian covenants are between people, while hierarchical covenants 43 are between people and God—acquiesced by the people out of necessity and embedding 44 unequal conditions (Everett, 1997). The Verse of the Covenant’s influence on a Quranic 45 vision of humanity involves a reflection on “man’s dual nature of utmost distinction, on 46 the one hand, and pitiful inconstancy and forgetfulness,” on the other; and a reflection on 47 the nature of sin, so that the “breaches of the covenant … disrupt[s] the equilibrium of the 48 world, thereby making the primary function of prophets sent to mankind to remind people He et al. 7 of their covenant with God” (Al-Qadi, 2003: 333–334). Al-Qadi (2003) has interpreted 1 this covenantal tradition as a cyclical or spiral process that involves a series of cycles of 2 disobedience, destruction, and the resettling of men until the day of judgment. 3 As such, there appears to be a logical link between the Islamic covenantal traditions 4 and federalism in Muslim-majority countries. Just like Christian covenantal links to fed- 5 eralism, Pakistan and Malaysia, two Muslim-majority countries, have established feder- 6 alism consistent with a covenantal tradition within the Quran. The Muslim world displays 7 “a tendency to federate rulers, rather than peoples” and their successful federal structures 8 are due to elite power sharing arrangements based on historical contexts (Elazar, 1987: 9 244–247). Furthermore, Pakistan and Malaysia are both centralized and have either expe- 10 rienced periods of authoritarianism or have authoritarian tendencies within their political 11 structures. While many other non-religious factors like their colonial histories, processes 12 of independence, and race politics (see Hutchinson, 2014) contribute to this phenomenon, 13 the hierarchical nature and cyclical perception of Islamic covenants also play a role. Yet, 14 there are other aspects of the religion that may explain trends within Muslim-majority 15 federations. 16 Hinduism and Buddhism do not have covenantal traditions akin to those that emerged 17 from the Christian or Islamic traditions, although both have strong paternalistic and 18 hierarchical traditions. Kings were supposed to have a divine right to rule, in contrast 19 to a covenantal basis. Even if it were argued that Hindu and Buddhist thought incorpo- 20 rates the idea of covenant, it is unconditional and so better characterized as a promise 21 (Ranamurti, [1935] 1986: 351–357). When a ruler or god makes a promise to the peo- 22 ple, it is not usually reciprocal. For example, the widely revered Hindu epic, the 23 Mahabharata, includes a number of regularly quoted promises by Krishna (an incarna- 24 tion of Hindu god Vishnu) to his “very dear friend” Arjuna (e.g. Chapter IV Verse 7), 25 but none include a notion of equality, reciprocity, or conditionality. Similarly, the 26 Buddha promised to his followers that they would reach enlightenment if they followed 27 a certain path, asking nothing in return. 28 The presence of an (implied) social contract, which bears similarities to covenantal 29 thought, may provide a functional equivalent to a covenantal tradition. Some claim 30 that Buddhism incorporates a social contract idea for the selection or legitimation of 31 kingship (Harris, 1999: 3; Ranamurti, [1935] 1986). However, such appearances are 32 fleeting and sometimes sarcastic; and even if the idea of social contracts exists, it is 33 minor and hierarchical in Buddhist traditions. Most scholars reject the notion of a 34 social contract in Buddhism (see Collins, 1996; Huxley, 1996; Tambiah, 1989). There 35 are instances where the king and the Sangha have tried to reform the other, but the king 36 has usually emerged victorious (Taylor, 2009: 50–51). The Sangha relied on the 37 patronage of kings (Tambiah, 1992). 38 In the Hindu tradition, kings were divinely anointed via Karma. Generally, kings were 39 said to rule according to Dharma (duty, right action, morality), and so in theory, the question 40 of an unjust king should not arise (Huxley, 1996). Reality is not so simple and many kings 41 were far from exemplars of virtuosity. The Mahabharata gives a religious basis for rebellion 42 against an unjust king, and there are myths where Brahmins (the priestly caste) push kings 43 for reforms (Everett, 1997). Otherwise, their accountability to the people is minimal. In the 44 contemporary period, India has long separated government from divine kingship and insti- 45 tutionalized democratic accountability, and Nepal’s shift to a secular democratic federation 46 was consolidated with the 2006 removal of the king, once thought to be an incarnation of 47 the Hindu God Vishnu. With the loss of legitimation following the 2001 royal massacre, 48 8 Political Studies 00(0)
1 after which the new king was one of the few remaining royals, the public rose up and held 2 him to account for his authoritarian turn—that is, it was not until the traditions of divinely 3 anointed kingship broke down that federalism became acceptable. 4 The absence of the covenant tradition has impacted on the resistance to federalism in 5 Hindu- and Buddhist-majority countries. Mutual observance by units and the center is 6 essential for the persistence and effective operation of federalism. However, there are 7 many examples of the center abrogating agreements or acting contrary to the constitution 8 in Buddhist- and Hindu-majority countries in Asia. In Sri Lanka, the devastation of its 9 civil war would in all likelihood have been avoided had the then government not abro- 10 gated the 1957 BC Pact or the 1965 D-C Pact, which were agreed between Sinhala and 11 Tamil leaders (Edrisinha, 2005). The 1987 amendments that established a constitutional 12 division of powers were never properly implemented either, demonstrating the lack of 13 federal spirit and history of covenantal abrogation in Sri Lanka. In Nepal, the constitu- 14 tion-making process was marked by numerous agreements between the government and 15 minority actors. However, many of these agreements were mutually contradictory, bring- 16 ing into question underlying intent, and less than 25% of the 2007 agreements were ever 17 implemented (Hachettu, 2009). In Myanmar, the ethnic nationalities continue to agitate 18 for the proper implementation of the Panglong Agreement, which was entered into in 19 1947 yet quickly undermined and gradually entirely abrogated by the Bamar-dominated 20 center (Sakhong, 2005). 21 Clearly, the absence of a covenantal tradition was a religious source of resistance to the 22 idea of federalism in terms of constitutional agreement. However, there are other sources 23 of, or functional equivalents to, covenantal traditions. In Asia, one of these is British 24 colonial rule and its imposition of law and the imperative of contract and agreement in 25 political life. In India, the covenantal tradition, vis-a-vis federal constitutionalism, 26 evolved through the practice of colonial administration. In contrast, in Nepal, which was 27 never colonized, constitutionalism has been slow to emerge. 28 Federalism in Asia cannot be understood without recognizing the effect of colonialism, 29 where indigenous traditions were supplanted, modified, or subordinated. Other than Nepal, 30 with its recent foray into federalism, all the federations in Asia were former British colo- 31 nies ruled by a mixture of direct and indirect rule (while Nepal was undoubtedly influ- 32 enced by India). Sri Lanka and Myanmar were ruled by the British; however, in the case of 33 Sri Lanka, the British ruled directly through a centralized administration, while Myanmar’s 34 initial federalism did not last. Nevertheless, the bureaucratic heritage has permeated and 35 merged with local traditions. In this case resulting in a hierarchical approach to the state 36 and government, which contributed to the institutionalization of federal—but highly cen- 37 tralized—approaches to the accommodation of diversity (see Breen, 2017). 38 So far we have tested the covenantal connection thesis in Asia and found that it has 39 partial explanatory power and intellectual limits. To go beyond it, in the next three sec- 40 tions, we examine the three hypotheses introduced earlier to develop religious perspec- 41 tives on federalism. 42 43 Islam and Troubled Federalism 44 45 Centralization or Decentralization 46 47 Islam has important decentralized tendencies. Although commencing as highly central- 48 ized under Muhammed and subsequent caliphs, this centralized power quickly declined He et al. 9
(Smith, 1966). There are now many Islamic religious sects and each community will 1 often have its own individual spiritual leader. Although there are exceptions, religious 2 authority is generally not concentrated in the hands of one individual or organization. 3 There are prayer leaders, scripture scholars, legal scholars, and judges, and its institutions 4 — mosques, schools, and charitable groups and activities—are also decentralized and not 5 especially integrated institutionally (Everett, 1997). 6 Islamic societies have long histories of territorial conquest and rule, which required 7 decentralization to sustain. During much of its pre-modern period, the Ottoman Empire 8 was able to maintain widespread authority through an extensive system of devolution and 9 local autonomy that was underpinned by Islamic principles and law while otherwise pro- 10 viding space for ethnic and other (non-Muslim) communities to exercise self-rule 11 (Anscombe, 2014: 15–34). Thus, precedents for federal-type rule exist in Islamic reli- 12 gious and political spheres. Pakistan and Malaysia did not reject the federal-type struc- 13 tures that had been established during colonial rule. Their status as Muslim-majority 14 countries and acceptance of federalism support the claim that decentralization within a 15 religion can offer a favorable condition for federalism. 16 17 Differentiation between Religion and State Power 18 19 While “the Prophet did not bequeath any general theory or model of state, government or 20 constitution” and “there is neither in the Quran nor in the hadith literature anything resem- 21 bling political theory proper” (Ahmed, 2009: 209), Islam is closely tied to the governance 22 and legislation of the state. In the Ottoman Empire, the bureaucratic position of the Grand 23 Mufti was established in the second half of the sixteenth century as the sultan’s chief 24 jurisconsult. While the Grand Mufti’s role and the religious hierarchy underneath him 25 came to be accountable to the government, many Muslim-majority countries continue to 26 include this role, or have variations, such as Indonesia’s Ulama Council and Malaysia’s 27 National Council of Fatwa (Bowering, 2013). In Malaysia, civil courts cannot hear issues 28 that fall under Sharia law. Yet religious influence on politics in Malaysia and Pakistan, 29 while significant, also interact with more secular political processes. Sharia law only 30 applies to Muslims, with non-Muslims following civil law. Islam has a strong influence 31 on politics, but politics also runs parallel to Islam, sometimes superseding religious initia- 32 tives. For example, Islamic criminal law was introduced in the Malaysian states of Perlis, 33 Kelantan, and Terengganu, yet as these remain subject to federal and constitutional over- 34 sight, they remain unimplemented (Lau, 2014). 35 In Pakistan and Malaysia, the head of state must be a Muslim. There is a constitutional 36 provision that the Prime Minister of Pakistan must be a Muslim. In Malaysia, nine of 37 Malaysia’s 13 states have sultans as the head of state who supervise Sharia courts and 38 appoint judges on the recommendation of state Islamic religious departments and 39 councils. 40 Islam has also been used in Pakistan and Malaysia for identity-building and state for- 41 mation, and has thus been closely intertwined with politics. Under certain leaderships, 42 Pakistan and Malaysia have experienced periods of heightening Islamization of the state. 43 In Malaysia, up until the 1980s, Malay-Muslim ethno-centric nationalism bolstered con- 44 nections between religion and politics and informed policies such as those that protect the 45 Bumiputera. In the late 1980s, the United Malays National Organization, under 46 Mohammad Mahathir’s leadership, moved from Bumiputerism to a more multi-ethnic 47 and global approach to Islamization. This involved processes of institutionalizing Islamic 48 10 Political Studies 00(0)
1 political instruments, such as increasing the number of government-employed ulama and 2 thus expanding the state’s religious bureaucracy (Hamayotsu, 2002). Pakistan, under the 3 military rule of General Zia-ul Haq (1977–1988), established a federal Sharia court, made 4 Islamic education compulsory in schools, promoted religious schools, and attempted to 5 Islamize the army (Haqqani, 2004). 6 The connections between Islam and politics may explain the determination of Pakistan 7 and Malaysia to ensure an Islamic element to statehood. Malaysia displayed many secular 8 principles in its initial constitution, laws and policies, and its constitution can be inter- 9 preted as secular (Saravanamuttu, 2009), yet Malaysia and Pakistan still include religious 10 elements within their constitutions. 11 Connections between Islam and politics in Pakistan and Malaysia do not mean that 12 Muslim-majority countries could not establish federalism. The covenant tradition in 13 the Quran and the decentralization within Islam potentially counteract any lack of dif- 14 ferentiation. However, such close connections, combined with hierarchical covenantal 15 traditions, have made Malaysia and Pakistan more inclined to maintain strong centers 16 and more reluctant to accommodate minorities at the expense of an advantaged posi- 17 tion for the dominant group. Indeed, federalism in Malaysia and Pakistan exhibits 18 serious problems. Pakistan’s federalism is centralized and majoritarian, with weakly 19 institutionalized political structures that have repeatedly been destabilized by military 20 leaders and periods of military rule (Adeney, 2012). Until recent constitutional 21 changes, there was concern regarding the extent to which the center could override 22 legislation made at the provincial level, creating a central bias to the federation, and 23 there are ongoing concerns with regard to Punjab dominance in terms of the design 24 and number of federal units and representation (Adeney, 2012). In Malaysia, there has 25 been a sustained centralization drive, despite it being a federation since independence 26 (Hutchinson, 2014). In theory, federal criteria are met, but in reality, responsibilities 27 and resources lean toward the center, to the extent that it has been described as a uni- 28 tary state with federal features (Loh, 2009). Federalism in Muslim-majority countries 29 in Asia is troubled yet functioning. 30 31 National Identity and Perceived Threats 32 33 Islam and national identity in Malaysia and Pakistan are intertwined. Pakistan was built 34 around a Muslim identity as the unifying force, while Malaysia formally equates Malay 35 ethnicity with Islam. In the time of the Ottoman Empire, “ethnicity was practically irrel- 36 evant” as a basis of identity, subsumed by the utility of religious identification (Anscombe, 37 2014: 16–17). In modern times, the constitution of Malaysia stipulates that the religion of 38 the federation is Islam. Pakistan displayed secular values at the time of establishment, 39 despite being relatively religiously homogeneous. Yet eventually in Pakistan, and espe- 40 cially after the death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Islam provided not only the basis for the 41 creation of the state but also the basis of Pakistani identity, and it has maintained its status 42 as an Islamic Republic (Singh and Kukreja, 2014: 88–92). 43 Islam is dominant in huge tracts of Asia and the Arab world and enjoys a comfortable 44 and privileged status in Malaysia and Pakistan. In Malaysia, while the majority of its citi- 45 zens are Muslim, and there is no threat to their religious identity as such, the position of 46 the Malays vis-a-vis other ethnic groups has been guarded or supported judiciously, both 47 in terms of political power and economic position. In Pakistan, Islam’s position has been 48 consolidated by constitutional provisions. Of course, some groups would fear invasion He et al. 11 and conversion by Christianity. The cases of Pakistan and Malaysia therefore partially 1 confirm the hypothesis that religions that are relatively comfortable and do not feel threat- 2 ened are more likely to accept federalism. The appeal to a unitary state to protect one 3 religion like in Myanmar does not exist in Pakistan and Malaysia. 4 5 Hinduism and “the Glory of Diversity” 6 7 Centralization or Decentralization 8 9 Hinduism, at least traditionally, has virtually no formal organization (Smith, 1966). It 10 follows that whatever organization does exist is not centralized. Indeed, Hinduism has 11 really only been collectively defined as such in response to the need by “outsiders” to 12 contrast it with other religions. Hindus “have gloried in diversity,” recognizing multi- 13 ple forms of truth and displaying substantial variation in practice and belief from “vil- 14 lage to village” (Narayan, 1996; Smith, 1998: 202–203). Thus, this supports the first 15 hypothesis. 16 Notwithstanding its lack of institutional organization, Hinduism has a tradition that 17 is highly regulative of society, best indicated by its caste system that assigns rigid 18 social, economic, and political roles to individuals, and its emphasis on the need to 19 perform one’s duty (e.g. see the Bhagavad Gita) (Smith, 1966). Embedded in the caste 20 system are numerous rules of behavior and interaction that may be conceivably trans- 21 ferred into a rules-based system of government—constitutionalism—whether hierar- 22 chical or egalitarian in nature. In Nepal, for example, the caste system and its rigid 23 hierarchy were formalized by a royal decree existing from 1845 to 1951 (Chakravartty, 24 2014: 65). The decree incorporated members of what we would now call other reli- 25 gious traditions, like Buddhists, who were hierarchically placed between Hindu high 26 caste groups and Dalits. 27 28 Differentiation between Religion and State Power 29 30 Hinduism is delinked from the state because of its caste system. The role of governing, or 31 ruling, was confined to the Kshatriya/Chhetri caste, while religious leadership was pro- 32 vided by the Brahmin/Bahun caste. Although this was often a symbiotic relationship, with 33 the kings receiving legitimation from the Brahmin/Bahun caste and vice versa, neither 34 was substantively accountable to the other. Each was able to operate in their own spheres, 35 exist independently, and not rely on patronage. In modern times, this strict caste-based 36 delineation is no longer observed, but its influence persists. All these facts support the 37 second hypothesis that differentiation between religion and state power creates a favora- 38 ble condition for federalism. 39 The lack of organization and centralization within Hinduism meant that in practice, it 40 was very difficult for priests to influence the state or play a substantial role in politics 41 (Smith, 1966). In Nepal, the king was constitutionally an “adherent” of Hinduism (e.g. 42 Article 20(1), The Constitution of Nepal, 1962) but not the head of the religion itself. In 43 India, it was not until the emergence of Hindu nationalist political parties, largely in 44 response to Christian missionaries, that sufficiently organized religious-based affiliations 45 could seek to influence political agendas. Now concerned with Islam more than 46 Christianity, Hindu nationalist parties continue to grow in strength, outstripping the 47 organizational capacities of the Hindu faith itself (Jaffrelot, 2011).[AQ: 4] 48 12 Political Studies 00(0)
1 National Identity and Perceived Threats 2 In response to the scars of partition, India deliberately secularized the state and sought to 3 build a neutral and inclusive national identity (Bhargava, 2010). Hindu nationalist forces 4 have sought to equate India with Hinduism, but this has been consistently resisted by the 5 ruling Congress party, despite nationalist forces gaining power in some states (Allen, 6 1992). In Nepal, there was a closer link between being Nepali and being Hindu until the 7 interim constitution of 2007. Nepal was formally a Hindu state and its federalization 8 coincided with the severance of this relationship and the simultaneous recognition of its 9 multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-lingual make-up (see Articles 3 & 4, The Interim 10 Constitution of Nepal 2063, 2007).[AQ: 5] 11 The status of Hinduism and those who wish to identify as such is not under threat. 12 Hinduism is not a missionary religion, which has mitigated potential spread, but it is 13 protected via anti-conversion laws in India (South Asian Human Rights Documentation 14 Centre, 2008) and in Nepal (Article 26(3), The Constitution of Nepal, 2015) and by the 15 sheer weight of numbers. It is important to isolate the Indian case with regard to partition 16 with Pakistan. This meant that state structures were deliberately designed to be blind to 17 religion and cut across religious cleavages (with some important concessions to minori- 18 ties)—so religion was deliberately not made a basis of state formation (Bhargava, 2010; 19 Jaffrelot, 2011). Hindu nationalists still argue that a defensive posture should be taken 20 against other “internationally supported” religions and that India’s political structures 21 “reflect Western, non-Indian values” (Allen, 1992: 3; Jaffrelot, 2011). However, 22 because the political structures and state boundaries are an outcome of decolonization 23 and partition, Hinduism is unquestionably the dominant religion in India and its status 24 cannot be considered threatened. Can India’s success, and Nepal’s transition, be attrib- 25 uted to the separation of religion from state (not withstanding Bhargava’s (2010) “prin- 26 cipled distance”)? Without a clear link between national identity and religion, or any 27 threat thereto, there is little for the government to protect. Hinduism does not need a 28 privileged position or formal status, let alone the support of a centralized state structure 29 that would prevent other religions taking hold in peripheral areas. The same cannot be 30 said for Buddhism.[AQ: 6] 31 32 33 Buddhism, the State and National Identity 34 35 Centralization or Decentralization 36 Here, we focus mostly on Theravada Buddhism, as practiced in Myanmar and Sri Lanka, 37 but make some mention as relevant of Mahayana and its variant Vajrayana school. 38 Compared to Hinduism, Theravada Buddhism does have a strong organizational pres- 39 ence, through the Sangha (the Buddhist monastic order). However, it is mostly decentral- 40 ized and does not comprise any laity (Siriwardane, 1966). In Sri Lanka, there are three 41 (originally caste-based) sects, which show little doctrinal variation. The sects are divided 42 into district and smaller local groups. Each sect is headed by a senior monk and a working 43 committee, which selects district heads. However, there is considerable regionally and 44 ideologically based fragmentation, with the Nikaya sect in particular consisting of 30–40 45 splinter groups (Tambiah, 1992: 82, 93–94). In Myanmar, the Buddhist Sangha was split 46 into around 10 sects (Matthews, 1999: 28). Traditionally, the king appointed an overarch- 47 ing head, supported by district heads; however, in practice, there was considerable auton- 48 omy, with little practical means or imperative to convey and enforce centrally derived He et al. 13 decisions (Smith, 1966: 13). Later, Myanmar’s then president Ne Win bought the Sangha 1 under a system of centralized control, but there remains considerable fragmentation 2 (Kawanami, 2016: 49). Such attempts to impose a centralized system inhibit the develop- 3 ment of federalism, thus supporting the first hypothesis. 4 Buddhism is philosophically tolerant of other faiths and peoples, but not to the same 5 extent as Hinduism, because Buddha propounds a single path to enlightenment. However, 6 while Hinduism has a high “tendency to regulate society,” Buddhism makes no such 7 attempt (Smith, 1966). It is fundamentally individualistic and egalitarian. However, it 8 does have a long history of interdependence and even unification of religion and state, 9 and religion and identity. 10 11 Differentiation between Religion and State Power 12 13 Functionally, religious and political roles are distinct and a king cannot be a monk, or vice 14 versa, as monks have to renounce the world. However, Buddhism has relied upon the 15 patronage of kings and kings have simultaneously been the head of the religion and justi- 16 fied their authority via Buddhism (Siriwardane, 1966; Taylor, 2009: 55–56). This model 17 of “royal Buddhism” is present across Theravada-majority countries (Matthews, 1992). 18 Even in contemporary cases, leaders have positioned themselves as a Boddhisattva (to be 19 reincarnated next as a Buddha) (Harris, 1999; Kawanami, 2016). Kings have also been 20 active in trying to control the Sangha, who are influential in society irrespective of their 21 role in politics (Smith, 1966; Taylor, 2009: 50–51).[AQ: 7] 22 The ideal philosophy of King Asoka has been particularly influential in Southeast Asia 23 and continues to an extent in the politics of Myanmar and Sri Lanka (Albinski, 1958; 24 Cummiskey, 2013; Smith, 1966). Asoka began a trend toward centralization and away 25 from elected kings (Everett, 1997). He actively supported the monastic communities, 26 promoted the spread of Buddhism, and assumed both roles of political and religious lead- 27 ership. However, the autonomy and toleration of other religions afforded by Asoka, which 28 was a practical necessity, did not persist when Buddhism retracted to Sri Lanka. In par- 29 ticular, the reforms of the King Dutthagamani, mythologized in the Mahavamsa, “empha- 30 sized the symbolic unity of the nation, the ethnic group and the religion,” which was 31 possible because his and other subsequent Buddhist kingdoms were substantively less 32 heterogeneous or geographically dispersed (Obeyesekere, 1992: 142). Thus, Theravada 33 kings began to counter the federal-type arrangements existing in earlier periods, while 34 Hindu kingdoms continued to manage substantive diversity. Even so, prior to coloniza- 35 tion, the island of Sri Lanka comprised co-existing Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms 36 (Wickramasinghe, 2006). 37 In modern times, there is much debate in Sri Lanka about whether monks should par- 38 ticipate in politics and many have been politically active, even participating in parliament 39 (Tambiah, 1992). Indeed, as Sri Lanka considers a new raft of constitutional reforms, 40 each of its three main Buddhist sects has combined to issue a statement opposing consti- 41 tutional reform and further devolution, which it sees as threatening Buddhism’s privi- 42 leged position and the state’s protective role (South Asian Monitor, 2017).[AQ: 8] 43 In Myanmar, monks are not allowed to vote but have been involved in political activism. 44 Also, because Buddhist ecclesia is well-organized, it has a greater ability to influence poli- 45 tics, and in practice, there has been considerable tension between the two spheres. Although 46 Muslims remain a target of extreme Buddhist nationalists, Myanmar’s moves toward fur- 47 ther federalization coincided with a complete absence of political actors appealing to 48 14 Political Studies 00(0)
1 Buddhism for legitimation during the election campaigns of 2010 and 2012, contrasting 2 with its earlier prevalence (Walton, 2016). 3 This is not to say the declining influence of religion in politics is solely responsible for 4 Myanmar’s steps toward further federalization. The military continues to play an integral 5 role in politics and holds a veto right over constitutional change. Myanmar’s 2008 consti- 6 tution and its division of powers between the center and regions was an important step in 7 the so-called “managed transition to democracy.” However, until there is a substantive 8 end to internal conflict, we can expect that the rights of ethnic nationalities, vis-a-vis 9 federalism, will continue to be restrained. 10 11 National Identity and Perceived Threats 12 13 Religion is imbued into the state and national identity in all Theravada Buddhist-majority 14 countries (other than Laos where it practically remains privileged), as compared to the 15 explicit secularism of Nepal and India (see Table 1). Theravada was (re)spawned from Sri 16 Lanka, where there is a myth and understanding of the people, the Island, and the state as 17 protectors of Buddhism, and “where Theravada kings were constantly and destructively 18 assailed by their Hindu neighbors” (Sarkisyanz, 1965: XVIII). This history underpins the 19 melding of religious, linguistic, and nationalistic identity among the Sinhalese and their 20 “minority complex” (Tambiah, 1992: 129–182). In Myanmar, since independence, politi- 21 cal leaders have tried to create a single national identity based on Buddhism (Smith, 22 1991: 35–38), where traditionally “to be Burman is to be Buddhist.”[AQ: 9] 23 Political leaders, who appeal to Buddhism for legitimation, have an associated respon- 24 sibility to protect the religion, which would be undermined should a federal arrangement 25 allow other religious communities to capture state organs (like a provincial government). 26 Buddhism has historically been displaced and threatened by Islam, Hinduism, and 27 Christianity, but has largely renounced violent expansionist movements itself (Cummiskey, 28 2013). The effect of this history can be seen in the defensive postures taken by Buddhist 29 nationalists in Myanmar and Sri Lanka, where each fear being “overtaken” by Muslims 30 or Hindus, or both, and spread propaganda accordingly (Walton and Hayward (2014) on 31 Myanmar; Tambiah (1992) on Sri Lanka). 32 The perceived threatened position of Buddhism relative to other regional religions 33 has led to a defensive and exclusionary response to the demands of minorities, such that 34 in practice, centralized and paternalistic traditions have been emphasized over more 35 accommodating ideals. Thus, Buddhism and supposed threats to its status have been 36 used instrumentally to support anti-federal and assimilative sentiments. This is well 37 demonstrated through the words of the influential Sinhala Commission (2008: 619, Item 38 2.7) on the devolution constitutional reform proposals of the mid-1990s before they 39 were abandoned. 40 41 Conclusion 42 43 To address the puzzle about the various connections between religion and federalism in 44 Asia, we have revisited and tested the covenant connection thesis in Asia. We confirm the 45 validity of the covenant thesis in Islam (it plays a positive role in federalism in Pakistan 46 and Malaysia) and in Buddhism (its absence constitutes an obstacle to the establishment 47 of federalism in Myanmar and Sri Lanka). However, the covenant thesis needs to be 48 revised to account for the development of federalism in India; it still holds true if we He et al. 15
Table 2. Summary of the Four Religious Variables and Their Relation to Federalism in Asia. 1 2 Presence of Centralization Fusion of National Impact on covenantal of religious political and identity status federalism 3 tradition organization religious and perceived 4 leadership threats 5 6 Malaysia Yes Decentralized Yes Yes, Federalism 7 unthreatened accepted but centralized and 8 authoritarian 9 Pakistan Yes Decentralized Yes Yes, Federalism 10 unthreatened accepted but 11 centralized and 12 authoritarian 13 India No, but being Non-centralized No No, Federalism 14 compensated unthreatened accepted and 15 by a proxy inclusive 16 Nepal No Non-centralized No Yes Federalism (historically), accepted 17 unthreatened and to be 18 established fully 19 Myanmar No Partially Yes Yes, Federalism 20 decentralized (historically) threatened resisted and 21 with the state’s only partially 22 centralization efforts conceded 23 Sri Lanka No Partially Yes Yes, Federalism 24 decentralized (historically) threatened resisted and with the state’s only partially 25 centralization efforts conceded 26 27 28 adopt the idea of a functional equivalent or proxy—the absence of a covenantal tradition 29 in Hinduism can be compensated by the colonial imposition of contract custom. 30 However, the covenant connection thesis cannot explain the emergence, develop- 31 ment, and variation of federalism in Asia fully. We have broadened it by investigating 32 three other religious factors. Decentralization within Hinduism and Islam is a favorable 33 condition for federalism—in contrast with the strong organizational presence of 34 Theravada Buddhism, which is not favorable for federalism. The connections between 35 Islam and political leadership in Malaysia and Pakistan have compromised the quality 36 and operation of federalism there, but have not precluded them from establishing fed- 37 eralism. All of these have played roles in promoting or inhibiting the development of 38 federalism. A summary of all four factors and their impact on federalism is presented in 39 Table 2. 40 We develop a religious perspective on federalism and find that the covenant connec- 41 tion is the strongest factor that influences the politics of federalism as it connects a politi- 42 cal culture of adhering to constitutional agreement. The lack of a covenant connection 43 contributes to a culture of abrogating agreement so that it makes it easy to abandon fed- 44 eralism. The other important factor is the actual and/or perceived threat to a national or 45 privileged religion. This appears to be a key condition determining a state’s propensity 46 for, or resistance to, federalize. When one religion is perceived to be threatened, that reli- 47 gion is likely to be politically mobilized to support a unitary polity, as is evidenced by the 48 16 Political Studies 00(0)
1 resistance to federalism in Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Buddhist countries in Asia have 2 tended to feel threatened by neighboring civilizations, in particular, the “minority com- 3 plex” of Sinhalese Buddhists in Sri Lanka is directly related to a perceived threat from 4 Hinduism and contributed to their resistance to federalism (Tambiah, 1992). This high- 5 lights the importance of Huntington’s (1996) thesis that religious identity, or “civiliza- 6 tions,” will be one source of conflict in the area of federalism-building in Asia, at least in 7 Buddhist-majority countries. 8 Our religious perspective on federalism is beneficial in offering a checklist for practi- 9 tioners to rework and rehabilitate their own religious traditions along these four variables. 10 Our position is not religiously determinist; it rather acknowledges the role of agency. 11 Indeed, most major religious traditions have decentralized traditions upon which they can 12 draw, and a doctrinal respect for diversity. Despite several obstacles to federalism within 13 the Buddhist tradition, Buddhist tenants of toleration and compassion are not just compat- 14 ible with but also lend support to federalism as a principle of unity in diversity. The fact 15 that several different religious buildings are located in one street in Yangon, Myanmar, 16 reveals that different religions can and do coexist in Buddhist-majority states. Indeed, the 17 seeds of such change have already been sown. As Saravanamuttu (2016: 5, emphasis 18 added) asserts: 19 20 the centralized unitary state is not only a colonial creation but also a very recent one, when seen 21 against the devolutionary, asymmetric, and pluralistic character of the historic South Asian state 22 tradition from which we can learn rich lessons as we address our contemporary challenges of 23 unity in diversity. 24 25 Acknowledgements 26 The authors would like thank the three anonymous reviewers for their critical and constructive comments and 27 suggestion. 28 29 Funding 30 The author(s) received the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this 31 article: The Ministry of Education, Singapore, for its generous Tier 2 Grant. 32 33 References 34 Adeney K (2012) A Step towards Inclusive Federalism in Pakistan? The Politics of the 18th Amendment. 35 Publius: The Journal of Federalism 42 (4): 539–565. Ahmed I (2009) The Pakistan Islamic State Project: A Secular Critique. In: Siam-Heng MH and Liew TC (eds) 36 State and Secularism: Perspectives from Asia. Singapore: World Scientific, pp.185–211. 37 Albinski HS (1958) The Place of Emperor Asoka in Ancient Indian Political Thought. Midwest Journal of 38 Political Science 2 (1): 62–75. 39 Allen D (1992) Introduction. In: Allen D (ed.) Religion and Political Conflicty in South Asia: India, Pakistan 40 and Sri Lanka. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp.1–14. Al-Qadi WK (2003) The Primordial Covenant and Human History in the Quran. American Philosophical 41 Society 147 (4): 332–338. 42 Anscombe F (2014) State, Faith and Nation in Ottoman and Post-ottoman Lands. New York: Cambridge 43 University Press. 44 Bhargava R (2010) The Promise of India’s Secular Democracy. New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press. 45 Bowering G (2013) The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 46 Breen MG (2017) The Origins of Holding-Together Federalism: Nepal, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. Publius: The 47 Journal of Federalism. Epub ahead of print 22 March. DOI: 10.1093/publius/pjx027. 48 Burgess M (2006) Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice. Oxford: Routledge. He et al. 17
Burgess M (2013) In Search of the Federal Spirit: New Comparative Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives. 1 Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2 Chakravartty B (2014) Balancing Identity and Viability: Restructuring Nepal in a Workable Federal State. In: Karki B and Edrisinha R (eds) The Federalism Debate in Nepal: Post Peace Agreement Constitution 3 Making in Nepal. Kathmandu, Nepal: Support to Participatory Constitution Building in Nepal, United 4 Nations Development Programme, pp.55–76. 5 Chebankova E (2009) Russia’s Noncovenantal Federalism: Past and Present. Journal of Church and State 51 6 (2): 312–340. 7 Collins S (1996) The Lion’s Roar on the Wheel-Turning King: A Response to Andrew Huxley’s “The Buddha and the Social Contract.” Journal of Indian Philosophy 24: 421–446. 8 Cummiskey D (2013) Comparative Reflections on Buddhist Political Thought: Aśoka, Shambhala, and 9 the General Will. In: Emmanuel S (ed.) A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley- 10 Blackwell, pp.35–70. 11 Davis RS (1978) The Federal Principle: Journey through Time in Quest of a Meaning. London: University of 12 California Press. Edrisinha R (2005) Multinational Federaliam and Minority Rights in Sri Lanka. In: He B, Galligan B and 13 Inoguchi T (eds) Multiculturalism in Asia. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.[AQ: 10] 14 Elazar DJ (1981) Kinship and Consent: The Jewish Political Tradition and Its Contemporary Uses. Ramat Gan, 15 Israel: Turtledove. 16 Elazar DJ (1987) Exploring Federalism. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press. 17 Elazar DJ (1995) Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel: Biblical Foundations and Expressions. New Brunswick, NJ; London: Transaction Publishers. 18 Elazar DJ (1996) Covenant and Commonwealth: From Christian Separation through the Protestant 19 Reformation. New Brunswick, NJ; London: Transaction Publishers. 20 Elazar DJ (1998) Covenant and Constitutionalism: The Great Frontier and the Matrix of Federal Democracy. 21 New Brunswick, NJ; London: Transaction Publishers. 22 Elazar DJ (1999) Covenant and Civil Society: The Constitutional Matrix of Modern Democracy. New Brunswick, NJ; London: Transaction Publishers. 23 Elazar DJ (2000) From Biblical Covenant to Modern Federalism: The Federal Theology Bridge. In: Elazar DJ 24 and Kincaid J (eds) The Covenant Connection: From Federal Theology to Modern Federalism. Oxford: 25 Lexington Books, pp.1–14. 26 Elazar DJ (2001) Religious Diversity and Federalism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 27 Everett WJ (1997) Religion, Federalism, and the Struggle for Public Life: Cases from Germany, India, and America. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 28 Gauchet M (1997) The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 29 University Press. 30 Hachettu K (2009) State Building in Nepal: Creating a Functional State. Kathmandu, Nepal: Enabling State 31 Programme. 32 Hamayotsu K (2002) Islam and Nation Building in Southeast Asia: Malaysia and Indonesia in Comparative Perspective. Pacific Affairs 75 (3): 353–375. 33 Haqqani H (2004) The Role of Islam in Pakistan’s Future. The Washington Quarterly 28 (1): 85–96. 34 Harris I (1999) Buddhism and Politics in Asia: The Textual and Historical Roots. In: Harris I (ed.) Buddhism 35 and Politics in Twentieth-century Asia. New York; London: Pinter, pp.1–25. 36 He B (2007) Federalization and Democratization in Asia. In: He B, Galligan B and Ionguchi T (eds) Federalism 37 in Asia. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp.1–32. He B (2010) Four Models of the Relationship between Confucianism and Democracy. Journal of Chinese 38 Philosophy 37 (1): 18–33. 39 Huntington SP (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster. 40 Hutchinson F (2014) Malaysia’s Federal System: Overt and Covert Centralisation. Journal of Contemporary 41 Asia 44 (3): 422–442. 42 Huxley A (1996) The Buddha and the Social Contract. Journal of Indian Philosophy 24 (4): 407–420. Jaffrelot C (2011) Religion, Caste and Politics in India. New York: Columbia University Press. 43 Kawanami H (2016) U Nu’s Liberal Democracy and Buddhist Communalism in Modern Burma. In: Kawanami 44 H (ed.) Buddhism and the Political Process. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.31–55. 45 Kincaid J and Elazar DJ (eds) (1985) The Covenant Connection: Federal Theology and the Origins of Modern 46 Politics. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. 47 Lau M (2014) The Re-Islamization of Legal Systems. In: Peters R and Bearman P (eds) The Ashgate Research Companion to Islamic Law. Surrey; Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, pp.235–249. 48 18 Political Studies 00(0)
1 Loh KW (2009) Federation of Malaysia. In: Michelmann H (ed.) Foreign Relations in Federal Countries. 2 Montreal, QC, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, pp.189–202. Lumbard JEB (2015) Covenant and Covenants in the Quran. Journal of Qur’anic Studies 17 (2): 1–23. 3 McCoy CS and Baker J (1991) Fountainhead of Federalism: Heinrich Bullinger and the Covenantal Tradition. 4 Louisville, KY; Westminster: John Knox Press. 5 Matthews B (1999) The Legacy of Tradition and Authority: Buddhism and the Nation in Myanmar. In: Harris I 6 (ed.) Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth-century Asia. New York; London: Pinter, pp.26–53. 7 Narayan V (1996) The Hindu Tradition. In: Oxtoby WG (ed.) World Religions: Eastern Traditions. Don Mills, ON, Canada: Oxford University Press, pp.317–429. 8 Obeyesekere G (1992) Dutthagamanu and the Buddhist Conscience. In: Allen D (ed.) Religion and Political 9 Conflicty in South Asia: India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp.135–160. 10 Ostrom V (1987) The Political Theory of a Compound Republic: Designing the American Experiment. Lincoln, 11 NE: University of Nebraska Press. 12 Ranamurti P ([1935] 1986) The Problem with the Indian Polity. New Delhi, India: Gian Publishing House. Riemer N (1980) Covenant and Federal Constitution. Publius: The Journal of Federalism 10 (4): 135–148. 13 Sakhong L (2005) Federalism, Constitution Making and State Building in Burma. In: Williams DC and Skahong 14 L (eds) Designing Federalism in Burma. Chiang Mai, Thailand: UNLD Press, pp.11–34. 15 Saravanamuttu J (2009) Malaysia: Multicultural Society, Islamic State, or What? In: Heng Siam-Heng M and 16 Liew TC (eds) State and Secularism: Perspectives from Asia. Singapore: World Scientific, pp.279–300. 17 Saravanamuttu P (2016) Preliminary Submission by the Centre for Policy Alternatives to the Public Representations Committee. Colombo, Sri Lanka: Centre for Policy Alternatives. 18 Sarkisyanz E (1965) Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution. Berlin: Springer Science+Business Media BV. 19 Singh MP and Kukreja V (2014) Federalism in South Asia. New Delhi, India: Routledge India. 20 Sinhala Commission (2008) Interim Report on the Government’s Proposals for Constitutional Reform. In: 21 Edrisinha R, Gomez M, Thamilmaran VT, et al. (eds) Power-sharing in Sri Lanka: Constitutional and 22 Political Documents 1926–2008. Colombo, Sri Lanka: Centre for Policy Alternatives and Berghof Foundation for Peace Support, pp.594–639. 23 Siriwardane C (1966) Buddhist Reorganization in Ceylon. In: Smith DE (ed.) South Asian Politics and Religion. 24 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp.531–546. 25 Smith D (1966) South Asia: Unity and Diversity. In: Smith DE (ed.) South Asian Politics and Religion. 26 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp.1–48. 27 Smith MJ (1991) Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. London: Zed Books. Smith WC (1998) The Concept “Hinduism.” In: Beckerlegge G (ed.) The World Religions Reader. London: 28 Routledge, pp.286–287. 29 South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (2008) Anti-Conversion Laws: Challenges to Secularism and 30 Fundamental Rights. Economic and Political Weekly 43 (2): 63–73. 31 South Asian Monitor (2017) Lankan Buddhist High Priests Oppose Constitutional Changes. South Asian 32 Monitor, 5 July. Available at: http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/07/05/lankan-buddhist-high-priests- oppose-constitutional-changes/ (accessed 25 July 2017). 33 Tambiah SJ (1989) King Mahāsammata: The First King in the Buddhist Story of Creation, and His Continuing 34 Relevance. Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford 20 (2): 107. 35 Tambiah SJ (1992) Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics and Violence in Sri Lanka. Chicago, IL; London: 36 The University of Chicago Press. 37 Taylor CM (2007) A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Taylor RH (2009) The State in Myanmar. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press. 38 Walton MJ (2016) Buddhist Monks and Democratic Politics in Contemporary Myanmar. In: Kawanami H (ed.) 39 Buddhism and the Political Process. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.56–77. 40 Walton MJ and Hayward S (2014) Contesting Buddhist Narratives Democratization, Nationalism, and 41 Communal Violence in Myanmar. In: Ernst D and Mietzner M (eds) Policy Studies. Honolulu, HI: East– 42 West Center.[AQ: 11] Watts RL (1999) Comparing Federal Systems, 2nd edn. Montreal, QC, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University 43 Press. 44 Wickramasinghe N (2006) Sri Lanka in the Modern Age. London: C. Hurst & Co. 45 46 Author Biographies 47 [AQ: 12] 48
Minerva Access is the Institutional Repository of The University of Melbourne
Author/s: He, B; Allison-Reumann, LEA; Breen, MG
Title: The Covenant Connection Reexamined: The Nexus between Religions and Federalism in Asia
Date: 2018
Citation: He, B., Allison-Reumann, L. E. A. & Breen, M. G. (2018). The Covenant Connection Reexamined: The Nexus between Religions and Federalism in Asia. Political Studies, 66 (3), pp.752-770. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321717731660.
Persistent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/198361
File Description: Accepted version