Socratic Dialectic Between Philosophy and Politics in Euthydemus 305E5-306D1

CARRIE SWANSON | 43 Socratic Dialectic between Philosophy and Politics in Euthydemus 305e5-306d1 ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα ἴδμεν δ’, εὖτ’ ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι. Hesiod, Theogony 27-8. Carrie Swanson University of Iowa [email protected] ABSTRACT In the final scene of the Euthydemus, Socrates argues that because the art of speechwriting merely partakes of the two good arts philosophy and politics, it places third in the contest for wisdom. I argue that this curious speech is a reverse eikos argument, directed at the speechwriters own eikos argument for the preeminence of their art. A careful analysis of the partaking relation reveals that it is rather Socratic dialectic which occupies this intermediate position between philosophy and politics. This result entails that Socrates’ peculiar art is only a part of philosophy, and its practitioner only partially wise. Keywords: Euthydemus, partaking argument, rhetoric, sophistry. https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_19_3 44 | Socratic Dialectic between Philosophy and Politics in Euthydemus 305e5-306d1 INTRODUCTION: THE My defense and explanation of this claim PARTAKING ARGUMENT is organized into four sections. I begin in sec- (305E5-306D1) tion §1 by extracting the following initial gloss of the partaking relation from 305e5-306d1: an In his final address to Crito in the Euthyde- art X is a partaker of another art Y just in case mus, Socrates improvises an elaborate deduc- the end at which X aims is identical to the end at tion (305e5-306d1) for the claim that the art which Y aims; but since X only partially shares of speechwriting comes in third place, after in the relevant components that constitute Y, X philosophy and politics, in the contest for wis- will only imperfectly achieve the common end dom (σοφία). As Socrates explains, the basis of at which both X and Y aim. I then turn to con- this poor showing is that speechwriting and its sider a salient difference between the partaking practitioners merely stand between and partake argument of the Euthydemus and Socrates’ re- (μετέχειν) of philosophy and the art of politics. marks on rhetoric and sophistry at Gorgias 462- This curious speech (hereafter ‘the partaking 465. The Gorgias explains the defects of these argument’) has received virtually no serious at- (so called) arts in terms of their imitation or tention in the scholarly literature.1 Its neglect is imposture of true arts; the partaking argument no doubt due to its apparently unserious nature: by contrast attributes the inferiority of an art to the argument as stated is obviously unsound; its being a mere partaker of good arts. I explain its premises are cryptic; and it utterly fails to this difference by pointing to the dialectical clarify for Crito the real distinction between context of the partaking argument. The par- true and false educators (306d-307a). Indeed, taking argument replies to the following λόγος Myles Burnyeat has suggested despairingly that of the ‘speechwriters’ (οἱ λογοποιοί): anyone in the face of these facts, we must conclude that who partakes ‘μετρίως’ of both philosophy and Socrates is portrayed by Plato in this passage as politics is more likely to be successful in both guying the sophists: the obscurity of the argu- private and public life than one who is wholly ment and its apparent logic-chopping nature immersed in either of these arts (305d7-e2). is meant to evoke and parody the eristic argu- Socrates observes in an aside to Crito that the mentation of the brothers Dionysodorus and speechwriters maintain this position ‘εἰκότως’ Euthydemus.2 (305d7), though it is ‘plausible rather than true’ In my view, this interpretation is deeply mis- (εὐπρέπειαν μᾶλλον ἤ ἀλήθειαν, 305e5-6). I taken. While Socrates’ argument is admittedly argue that what Socrates means by this is that both obscure and playful, his final speech in the their defense falls into a class of rhetorical argu- dialogue conceals a completely serious claim ment known as the εἰκός argument, or the ar- about the nature of Socratic wisdom which is gument from likelihood. Socrates thus refrains also crucial to our understanding of the Eu- from dismissing the speechwriters’ art as a mere thydemus as a whole. The serious claim is that it imitation of a good art only because in the im- is neither speechwriting nor sophistry but rather mediate dialectical context he responds to the Socratic dialectic that lies between and partakes speechwriters’ λόγος in kind: his opponent’s de- of philosophy and the political art. This thesis fense is an εἰκός argument; the partaking argu- entails in turn that Socrates’ peculiar art is only ment is a ‘reverse εἰκός argument’. a part of philosophy, and that its practitioner is In section §2 I defend this claim by briefly only partially wise. explaining the nature and function of εἰκός ar- CARRIE SWANSON | 45 guments in the rhetorical tradition. By drawing take of philosophy and politics. But this is not on recent work in the scholarly literature, I ex- something that Socrates genuinely believes. plain that εἰκός arguments are arguments from In section §4 I explain why Socrates rejects ‘likelihood’ because they are grounded in the the speechwriters’ assumption. If rhetoric or its social expectations of the audience. I conclude practitioners partake of philosophy and poli- this section by explaining the technique of the tics, and the latter are good arts, rhetoric will ‘reverse εἰκός’. This is a method of overthrow- turn out to be a partially good art. The same ing one εἰκός argument by means of another will follow for eristic. (For there is abundant which reverses the likelihood of the former’s evidence in the Euthydemus that the sophistic conclusion. duo will defend their superiority in wisdom On the basis of this account I turn in sec- along precisely the same lines as the speechwrit- tion §3 to the analysis of two near doubles of the ers’ λόγος.) However, a causal thesis regarding speechwriters’ λόγος: Isocrates 10.5 (the fifth goodness and wisdom which Socrates and Clei- paragraph of his Helenae encomium) and Gor- nias discovered in the first protreptic episode gias 485a3-e2. I demonstrate that both passages entails that the good-making component of a are εἰκός arguments. I infer that the speech- good art is wisdom, and the bad-making com- writers’ λόγος in the Euthydemus is therefore ponent of a bad art is ignorance. It follows that an εἰκός argument also. I then demonstrate if rhetoric partakes of philosophy and politics, that Socrates’ partaking argument is a reverse rhetoric and its practitioners are partially wise. εἰκός argument. The reversal involves three ba- (The same follows for eristic and its practitio- sis steps. First, it takes over the speechwriters’ ners.) However, as our analysis of partaking in premise that anyone who partakes μετρίως of section §1 reveals, a necessary condition of X both philosophy and politics is more likely to partaking of another art Y is that X aims at the succeed in life than one who is wholly immersed same end as Y. But there is abundant evidence in in these arts. Next, Socrates points out that in- the Euthydemus that Socrates takes both rheto- sofar as men are likely to be benefitted by either ric and eristic to aim at pleasure; and pleasure philosophy or politics, both of these arts must is not the end of either philosophy or politics be good things. But if that is so, then it is after all (rightly conceived). It follows that neither rhet- more unlikely that the speechwriters and their oric nor eristic partakes of philosophy and the art will reap the fruits of wisdom: they will place political art. I argue that the proper relation that third behind philosophy and politics. The social obtains between the former and latter pair of conviction to which this claim is εἰκός or con- arts is imitation, not partaking. I provide a rigor- gruent is that having less than the whole of two ous definition of each relation that explains why goods is less beneficial than having their wholes. this is so. (To anticipate: knowledge of an art Y Socrates’ appropriation of the εἰκός argu- by another art X is not required in order for X ment is successful from one point of view: as to imitate Y since an imitating art (or pseudo- a piece of rhetoric, the partaking argument is art) does not aim at the same end as its object actually more persuasive than the argument it of imitation.) reverses. However, precisely because Socrates In section §4 I draw two main conclusions responds to his opponent by reversal, his in- from my analysis of the partaking argument. ference must leave in place the speechwriters’ The first is that Socrates’ appropriation of a starting point that they stand between and par- rhetorical mode of argument conforms to my 46 | Socratic Dialectic between Philosophy and Politics in Euthydemus 305e5-306d1 definition of imitation. Thus both eristics, rhet- At the commencement of the epilogue (304b6- oricians, and Socrates are imitators. However, 305b3), Socrates concludes his rehearsal of his the air of paradox of this result is removed once encounter with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus it is seen that Socrates and his protreptic rivals and addresses Crito once again directly, repeat- do not imitate the same things: the sophists and ing the suggestion he made in the first outer the speechwriters ignorantly imitate philoso- frame (272b-d) that Crito should join him phy and the political art; by contrast, Socrates in making himself a pupil of the eristic pair. (in the partaking argument) imitates the art Crito demurs: while he is a lover of listening of the rhetorician.3 Moreover, while the soph- (φιλήκοος) to arguments, he cannot imagine ists and speechwriters partake of neither phi- himself ever employing the brothers’ distaste- losophy nor politics, the relation that Socrates ful mode of refutation (304c6-d2).

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