The Son of Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Lee Hsien Loong Is His Country's Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister
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Lee Hsien Loong 1 The son of Singapore's senior minister Lee Kuan Yew, Lee Hsien Loong is his country's minister of finance and deputy prime minister. Lee Hsien Loong discusses his views in relation to globalization, and Singapore's position in Asia and the modern world economy. Maintaining a Singaporean Identity in a Global Economy INTERVIEWER: What are the main challenges that globalization poses for you, particularly regarding cultural identity? LEE HSIEN LOONG: It's a totally open and fluid situation. We are open to the world; the world is at our doorstep. It washes in, not just through the windows, but we are immersed in it completely—through the Internet, through the media, through people traveling, coming here, as well as Singaporeans going abroad. Half the population goes overseas every year. So we are completely open. We speak English. And to keep some sense of identity and place and loyalty and cohesion, at the same time as being adaptable and open to change and creativity, that's a tremendous balancing act. INTERVIEWER: Singapore is not alone. You hear that same concern in France, elsewhere. LEE HSIEN LOONG: Yes, but we are more open than most of the others. The French speak French, and they're 60 million or so. We are three million, and we speak English as the working language. And we don't have an ancient history starting with a long line of generals and kings. We [are] 35 years old as a country and still trying to build a national identity at a time when identities are in flux and in question. INTERVIEWER: Why are they important? LEE HSIEN LOONG: Because we exist. They are the reason why we exist. If we did not have a sense of who we were, how we got here, why we want to achieve something, which on the face of it, on the logic of it is probably not worth trying, and prove that logic wrong, then you wouldn't succeed; then you would just evaporate. I mean, you would be off to Palo Alto or to Perth or to London. There are so many other centers in the world where a talented, Lee Hsien Loong 2 enterprising young man or woman can go and make himself feel at home. And if they do, then the balance who are left cannot evaporate away like that. We'll be left without leaders and without options, and that would be a very different Singapore. INTERVIEWER: That's quite a challenge, really. How do you encourage people to stay here? How do you avoid Singapore sort of being absorbed within the global economy? LEE HSIEN LOONG: It's a challenge. I mean, we can't be sure we're winning, but we're trying very hard. You have to offer both the material part as well as the psychological and the spiritual part. It has to be good to live in Singapore, because otherwise nobody will stand for it. But at the same time, it can't just be the most comfortable place to live or the place where you get the best pay, but some sense of idealism, that this is where my parents were or my grandparents, and they built this place. This is where my friends are, whom I went to school with, served in National Service with, where I feel at home and belong to. You don't speak a different language, you don't wear outlandish clothes, but there's a certain Singaporean identity. And if you go overseas and meet people, you can detect a Singaporean from across the street—the way he dresses, slightly; the way he talks; the way he acts. There is a persona which is recognizable and which we are proud of. INTERVIEWER: That's interesting. What is it about that Singaporean that you recognize? LEE HSIEN LOONG: Well, he [is] maybe Chinese or maybe Indian or maybe Malay, but he's not quite a Chinese or Indian or Malay. He's not like somebody from China or somebody from Bombay or Bangalore or somebody from Kuala Lumpur or Jakarta. There has been a process of a acculturation, of adaptation, accommodation with one another; certain expectations that the world does not owe you a living and that you compete on your merits, and if you do well, if you prove yourself you will do well, and there will be a chance for you to rise, and you will go for that. And I think that's an important attribute in this sort of world. You must have that; otherwise, you will not fight for it. INTERVIEWER: I've just got something I pulled off the Internet this morning. It was a piece by David Ignatius of the Washington Post. He interviewed your father [Lee Kuan Yew] in it. He just had a line that struck me: "Globalization is a harsh god that has brought immense new Lee Hsien Loong 3 wealth to Asian nations, but it's also forced them to adapt their economies and even their cultural mores to its demands." What do you think of that? LEE HSIEN LOONG: Well, that is true, but what is the alternative? If you opt out, you end up like Myanmar or like China before it opened up, and that's a much worse choice, particularly for a country like Singapore. Three million people, unable to feed ourselves—we have no alternative. It's served us well. INTERVIEWER: What has? LEE HSIEN LOONG: Globalization. I mean, it's because of globalization that we've got investment from around the world; we've got tourists from around the world. We export one and a half times our GDP every year in goods and services, and we make a living for ourselves. Without [globalization] we wouldn't exist. Opening Up Trade: Consensus and Crisis INTERVIEWER: Part of the film that we're working on now looks at the rise of globalization in the '90s, and I just want to ask you some questions about the history of the '90s. We'll go through them. Looking back in the early part of '90s, we heard a lot about emerging markets. A lot of money was coming in here. What was driving that? How was that money different from the money that had come in to Asia from abroad, you know, in the '70s and the '80s? LEE HSIEN LOONG: Well, first of all, there was a lot more. Secondly, there was a tremendous confidence and hope that this was the Asian century and the place was being transformed, as if you just had to put money there, and it would grow on trees. But it started off with something very real, because the economies and the societies were getting transformed and modernized. People were getting much better educated; they were getting better trained; investments were coming in. Governments were taking a more liberal approach towards economic policy and loosening up on controls and restrictions, and acknowledging that you have to plug in to the world trade. And many of them still have restrictions, but they knew that if you want to bring the multinationals in, you have to give them a fairly free hand. And you have to let them export, and you have to let them hire and fire, and they will do you good. And as this approach worked, people got more confident and did more of that. And that Lee Hsien Loong 4 provoked a virtual cycle. Eventually it went beyond what it should have done and became a little bit of a bubble, which ended up, very sadly, with a crisis. INTERVIEWER: I talked to Robert Rubin in New York about this issue as well, and it seems like there was an effort by the Clinton administration in the early '90s to encourage trade liberalization, influx of capital. Did you sense that at the time? LEE HSIEN LOONG: Yes, it was IMF official policy. In fact, well into the crisis, the IMF was still trying to get countries to open up their capital account and were trying to change the articles in order to put this as one of the IMF's core objectives. It was well intentioned but misconceived. The countries were not ready, and this opened up vulnerability for them. INTERVIEWER: Did you ever sense it was Clinton administration policy as well? LEE HSIEN LOONG: Well, I don't know if you would call it the Clinton policy. I think some people called it the Washington consensus. I mean, this is what the economists around the world felt: that you should open up; you should not have restrictions. Just as trade in goods leads to efficiency, so, too, if you have free capital movements, then capital goes where it can be most productive. And you can borrow overseas to invest at home, or you can save and invest abroad. And this [was] all for the best, in the best of all possible worlds. And it turned out very sadly. INTERVIEWER: What did you think of it at the time? LEE HSIEN LOONG: I don't think it was at the top of our mind, because in the case of Singapore, we had ourselves opened up our capital accounts. We watched the funds flowing in, and there was a certain exuberance which was pushing up all of the asset markets in the region. The parts which came in for productive projects—factories, export-oriented projects—those were well founded and did make a lot of sense. But when the flows came in to the capital markets, and they just said, "Buy the index; here is $100 million from my fund," and billions flowed in every week, that's quite scary, because if it can flow in that way, it can flow out in the same way, which is exactly what happened.