Sovereign Debt Diplomacies OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 9/2/2021, Spi OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 9/2/2021, Spi
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OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 9/2/2021, SPi Sovereign Debt Diplomacies OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 9/2/2021, SPi OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 9/2/2021, SPi Sovereign Debt Diplomacies Rethinking Sovereign Debt from Colonial Empires to Hegemony Edited by PIERRE PÉNET andJUAN FLORES ZENDEJAS 1 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 9/2/2021, SPi 3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Oxford University Press 2021 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted First Edition published in 2021 Impression: 1 Some rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, for commercial purposes, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. This is an open access publication, available online and distributed under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivatives 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), a copy of which is available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of this licence should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2020950729 ISBN 978–0–19–886635–0 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198866350.001.0001 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work. OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 9/2/2021, SPi Acknowledgements One of the nicest things about publishing this volume is the chance to acknow- ledge the people and institutions who sustained our research. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Swiss National Science Foundation (grants CR11I1_162772, IZSEZ0_179604, 10BP12_198576), the University of Geneva, through its Fonds Général and School of Social Sciences, and the Société Académique de Genève. This support has been instrumental for the development of our work, the organization of the meetings and workshops with our contributors and the publication of this book in Open Access. We are most grateful to the discussants and attendees who contributed to our first panel on Sovereign debt diplomacies at the 2017 meetings of the Law and Society Association Conference in Mexico City. This volume also benefited tremendously from the insights of the participants in our 2018 Geneva seminar. Besides volume contributors, this event brought together a wonderful team of experts across disciplinary boundaries: Stephanie Blankenburg, Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, Francesco Corradini, Aline Darbellay, Sebastian Nieto Parra, Makane Moïse Mbengue, Noémi Michel, Boris Samuel, Nathan Sussman and Olivier Vallée. Despite a powerful snow storm and significant travel complica- tions, seminar participants managed to reach Geneva to deliver their presentation while other colleagues participated through videoconferencing. We thank them wholeheartedly for their dedication and commitment. We are also grateful to three anonymous reviewers and to Carlos Marichal and Aurora Gómez who provided us with valuable comments to previous versions of this manuscript. Finally, we are indebted to our colleagues at the Paul Bairoch Institute of Economic History: Mary O’Sullivan, Pilar Nogues-Marco, Sabine Pitteloud, Cédric Chambru, Jean Rochat, Sebastian Alvarez, Edoardo Altamura and Jérémy Ducros. Many thanks to them for having contributed to the success of this collective intellectual effort. OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 9/2/2021, SPi OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 9/2/2021, SPi Contents List of Figures ix List of Tables xi List of Contributors xiii Introduction: Sovereign Debt Diplomacies 1 Pierre Pénet and Juan Flores Zendejas 1. Rethinking Sovereign Debt from Colonial Empires to Hegemony 15 Pierre Pénet and Juan Flores Zendejas SECTION 1. IMPERIAL SOLUTIONS TO SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES (1820–1933) 2. Sovereignty and Debt in Nineteenth-Century Latin America 49 Juan Flores Zendejas and Felipe Ford Cole 3. Foreign Debt and Colonization in Egypt and Tunisia (1862–82) 73 Ali Coşkun Tunçer 4. Independence and the Effect of Empire: The Case of ‘Sovereign Debts’ Issued by British Colonies 94 Nicolas Degive and Kim Oosterlinck SECTION 2. DEBT DISPUTES IN THE AGE OF FINANCIAL REPRESSION: WHEN REPAYMENT TAKES A BACKSEAT (1933–70s) 5. The Fortune of Geopolitical Conditions in Debt Diplomacy: Mexico’s Long Road to the 1942 Foreign Debt Settlement 121 Gustavo Del Angel and Lorena Pérez-Hernández 6. The Multilateral Principle-Based Approach to the Restructuring of German Debts in 1953 142 Laura de la Villa 7. The Revenge of Defaulters: Sovereign Defaults and Interstate Negotiations in the Post-War Financial Order, 1940–65 165 Juan Flores Zendejas, Pierre Pénet, and Christian Suter OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 9/2/2021, SPi viii SECTION 3. POSTCOLONIAL TRANSITIONS AND THE HOPES FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1960s–80s) 8. We Owe You Nothing: Decolonization and Sovereign Debt Obligations in International Public Law 189 Grégoire Mallard 9. Decolonization and Sovereign Debt: A Quagmire 213 Michael Waibel 10. The Global South Debt Revolution That Wasn’t: UNCTAD from Technocractic Activism to Technical Assistance 232 Quentin Deforge and Benjamin Lemoine SECTION 4. THE LEGALIZATION OF SOVEREIGN DEBT DISPUTES BETWEEN WISH AND REALITY (1990s–PRESENT) 11. Placing Contemporary Sovereign Debt: The Fragmented Landscape of Legal Precedent and Legislative Pre-emption 259 Giselle Datz 12. Maduro Bonds 282 Mitu Gulati and Ugo Panizza 13. Contract Provisions, Default Risk, and Bond Prices: Evidence from Puerto Rico 304 Anusha Chari and Ryan Leary Concluding Remarks. (Neo)Colonialism, (Neo)Imperialism, and Hegemony: On Choosing Concepts in Sovereign Debt 331 Odette Lienau Index 341 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 9/2/2021, SPi List of Figures 3.1. Current yield: Tunisia 1862–82 80 3.2. Current yield: Egypt 1862–82 83 3.3. Bond spreads: Egypt and Tunisia, 1862–82 87 4.1. Yield-to-maturity spread of British colonies and British consol 95 4.2. Daily prices (in British pounds) of New South Wales 6.5 per cent (1930–40) bond 106 5.1. Public Debt 1922–1946 (Millions of Dollars) 127 5.2a. Ratio Foreign Public Debt / Fiscal Revenues 1922–1946 127 5.2b. Ratio Total Public Debt / Fiscal Revenues 1922–1946 127 5.3. Budget balance of the federal government (Millions Pesos MX) 128 5.4. Primary Deficit (Millions of Pesos MX) 128 6.1. Pre-war debts negotiated in the LDA 158 6.2. Percentage of currency depreciation in August 1952 as against 1930 159 6.3. 1953 London Debt Agreement on German debts. Face value haircut 161 7.1. Main bondholder committees, 1868–1934 (by year of foundation) 168 7.2. The new political economy of debt dispute settlement before and after the Great Depression 172 7.3. Exim banks, 1919–89 (by year of foundation) 173 12.1. Hunger Bond and PDVSA 2024 6 per cent bond (May–June 2017) 288 12.2. Hunger Bond and PDVSA 2024 6 per cent bond (October 2017–August 2018) 288 12.3. Correlation between democracy and control of corruption (2010–15) 295 12.4. Marginal effect of corruption at different levels of democracy 298 12.5. Marginal effect of democracy at different levels of corruption 299 13.1. COFINA and yields 315 13.2. Marginal effect of COFINA across RISK with 90 per cent CI 316 13.3. Governing law and yields 323 13.4. Governing law and yields: maturity matched 324 13.5. Marginal effect of New York across RISK with 90 per cent CI 324 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 9/2/2021, SPi OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 9/2/2021, SPi List of Tables 4.1. Results of baseline regression 103 4.2. Results for Australia 107 4.3. Results for India 112 5.1. Latin American debt settlements 123 7.1. Yearly duration of debt dispute settlements and degree of bondholders losses 180 12.1. Summary statistics 294 12.2. Spreads, democracy, and corruption 296 13.1. Summary statistics 314 13.2. The significance of PROMESA announcements varies by event 320 13.A.1. Puerto Rican debt summary as of September 2013 326 13.A.2. COFINA and GO debt have comparable characteristics, making them suitable for sample matching 327 13.A.3. The filtering process produces a sample of twenty-nine securities 328 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 9/2/2021, SPi OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 9/2/2021, SPi List of Contributors Anusha Chari is a Professor of Economics and Finance at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She is a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and the Centre for Economic Policy Research. She received a PhD in International Finance from UCLA and a BA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Balliol College at Oxford and Economics at the University of Delhi. She has held faculty positions at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business, the University of Michigan, and The Haas School of Business at Berkeley. Professor Chari was a special advisor to the Indian Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council and member of an Advisory Group of Eminent Persons on G20 Issues.