The Provincial Power to (Not) Prosecute Criminal Code Offences
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The Provincial Power to (Not) Prosecute Criminal Code Offences Dennis Baker Could the ProvinCe of Ontario have la ProvinCe de l’ontario pourrait-elle refused to prosecute the new “com- refuser d’intenter des poursuites aux modification of sexual activity” crim- termes de la nouvelle infraction crimi- inal offence, as passed by the Federal nelle de « marchandisation des activités Government in response to Bedford? sexuelles » que le gouvernement fédéral That question is the subject of this a adoptée en réponse à l’arrêt Bedford ? paper. While there are clear precedents C’est la question que je me propose for provincial non-enforcement, those d’explorer dans cet article. Certes, il instances of provincial non-enforcement existe des précédents clairs en matière have seemingly been tolerated by a Fed- de non-application provinciale, ces 2017 CanLIIDocs 118 eral Government ambivalent about its exemples de non-application ayant été own laws. My position is that the prov- vraisemblablement tolérés par un gou- inces have at least a concurrent consti- vernement fédéral ambivalent au sujet de tutional power over the prosecution of ses propres lois. Selon moi, les provinces criminal law offences and a concomitant ont au moins un pouvoir constitutionnel power to choose not to prosecute a concurrent en matière de poursuites validly enacted federal law. This position relatives à des infractions criminelles reflects an understanding of the original et un pouvoir concomitant de choisir de bargain struck in 1867 that sees the ne pas intenter de poursuites en vertu criminal justice powers separated func- d’une loi fédérale validement adoptée. tionally, which provides the opportunity Cette position découle d’une compré- for effective “checks and balances” in hension de l’entente initiale conclue en the moderation of criminal law. After dis- 1867 qui prévoit la séparation fonction- cussing the delicate balance established nelle des pouvoirs en matière de justice by the British North America Act, 1867, pénale, laquelle permet d’exercer un the judicial unsettling of this scheme in contrepoids efficace et donc de favori- the early 1980s will be briefly examined ser un certain équilibre en droit crimi- and questioned. While this “unbalan- nel. Après avoir discuté de l’équilibre cing” of the criminal justice powers délicat établi par l’Acte de l’Amérique has likely inhibited provincial exercises du Nord britannique de 1867, on analy- of their prosecutorial authority—or at sera brièvement les aspects judiciaires least contributed to the confusion about déstabilisants de ce régime au début their operation—a provincial power of des années 1980. Bien que le « déséqui- non-enforcement remains viable even libre » des pouvoirs en matière de justice under the Court’s “delegated” approach. pénale ait vraisemblablement entravé Several objections to non-enforcement l’exercice du pouvoir provincial d’inten- are considered and found unwarranted ter des poursuites, ou ait contribué à in light of the overall discretionary tout le moins à semer la confusion au 419 nature of criminal prosecution. Properly sujet de son fonctionnement, un pouvoir understood and exercised, however, provincial de non-application demeure provincial non-enforcement is best viable, même en vertu de l’approche de understood as harmonious with the « délégation » des tribunaux. On exami- constitutional balance struck in 1867 and nera diverses objections à la non-applica- could continue to offer salutary effects tion, jugées injustifiées à la lumière de la for the administration of criminal law in nature éminemment discrétionnaire des Canada. poursuites pénales. Quand il est adéqua- tement compris et exercé, ce pouvoir de non-application provincial peut cepen- dant être considéré comme compatible avec l’équilibre constitutionnel établi en 1867 et pourrait continuer d’offrir des effets salutaires pour l’administration de la justice pénale au Canada. 2017 CanLIIDocs 118 420 CONTENTS The Provincial Power to (Not) Prosecute Criminal Code Offences Dennis Baker Introduction 423 I. The Checks and Balances in Criminal Justice Federalism 426 II. The Unbalancing of the Criminal Justice Powers, 1978–1983 434 III. The Provincial Power to (Not) Prosecute 439 Conclusion 447 2017 CanLIIDocs 118 421 2017 CanLIIDocs 118 The Provincial Power to (Not) Prosecute Criminal Code Offences Dennis Baker* INTRODUCTION 2017 CanLIIDocs 118 In response to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Bedford,1 the Fed- eral Government enacted controversial new legislation that introduced a new prostitution offence (“commodification of sexual activity”), based on the Nordic model of criminalizing the buyers rather than the sellers of sex.2 Among those who were apprehensive about the new legislation was Ontario Premier Kathleen Wynne: “I am left with the grave concern that the so-called Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act will protect neither ‘exploited persons’ nor ‘communities.’”3 Given her doubts, she asked the Attorney General of Ontario to advise on the constitutional validity of the legislation.4 Law professor and Bedford advocate, Alan Young, supported the Premier and suggested she could go even further: “[t]he provinces can decide to nullify a new enactment simply by refusing to * Dennis Baker (University of Guelph). The author would like to thank Rainer Knopff, James Kelly, Matthew Hennigar, Troy Riddell, Byron Sheldrick, Kate Puddister, and the anonymous reviewers for all their comments and suggestions. 1 Canada (AG) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 SCR 1101. 2 Bill C-36, An Act to amend the Criminal Code in response to the Supreme Court of Canada in Attorney General of Canada v. Bedford and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2014, cl 286 (assented to 6 November 2014; Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, SC 2014, c 25, s 20). 3 John Ivison, “Provinces Could Kill New Prostitution Law by Refusing to Enforce it”, National Post (8 December 2014), online: <news.nationalpost.com> [Ivison, “Provinces Could Kill New Prostitution Law”]. 4 Sean Silcoff, “Wynne Questions if Federal Prostitution Law Respects Charter Rights”,The Globe and Mail (7 December 2014), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com>. 423 424 Revue de dRoit d’ottawa • 48:2 | ottawa Law Review • 48:2 prosecute cases brought under this law.”5 Wynne was less sure of her cap- acity to stop prosecutions, noting that the law “was duly passed through a democratic process” and “[t]he Attorney General of Ontario is bound to enforce the Criminal Code.”6 Ultimately, then-Attorney General Meilleur reported that there is “no clear unconstitutionality in the law” and while the Ontario Government will “monitor and determine the impact of the law,” it will also proceed with the approximately 26 cases currently being prosecuted.7 Could the Province of Ontario have refused to prosecute the new “com- modification of sexual activity” offence? That question is the subject of this paper. While there are clear precedents for provincial non-enforcement — in the 1970s, Quebec refused to enforce the federal abortion law, and more recently both British Columbia and Quebec chose not to enforce the assisted suicide provisions of the Criminal Code8 — those instances of provincial non-enforcement had seemingly been tolerated by a Federal 2017 CanLIIDocs 118 Government ambivalent about its own laws. In this instance, the Federal Government clearly wanted its new prostitution offence enforced. A more analogous case might be the inter-governmental wrangling over the long- gun registry, where, among other instances of provincial intransigence, the Attorney General of Saskatchewan declared that no prosecutions of the federal Firearms Act would be conducted in that province.9 The feder- alism controversies over the Firearms Act were never clearly resolved10 but simply abated when the Harper Government first announced an “amnesty” in 2006 and subsequently repealed the long-gun registry in 2012.11 To this day, the legal authority of the province to practice a policy of non-enforce- 5 Ivison, “Provinces Could Kill New Prostitution Law”, supra note 3. 6 Andrea Houston, “Premier Wynne Blasts New Federal Anti-Prostitution Law”, Now Toronto (7 December 2014), online: <nowtoronto.com>. 7 Allison Jones, “Ontario Review Finds Ottawa’s Sex-Work Law Constitutional, Wynne Says”, The Globe and Mail (1 April 2015), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com>. 8 In both cases, the provinces announced policies of non-enforcement prior to the provisions being found unconstitutional by the Court (in R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30, 44 DLR (4th) 385 [Morgentaler] and Carter v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331 [Carter]); see the discussion below. 9 Mark Carter, “Recognizing Original (Non-Delegated) Provincial Jurisdiction to Prosecute Criminal Offences” (2007) 38:2 Ottawa L Rev 163 at 167–68. 10 The Supreme Court found the Firearms Act (SC 1995, c 39) intra vires in 2000 (see Reference re Firearms Act (Canada), 2000 SCC 31, [2000] 1 SCR 783) but this decision left several unresolved matters regarding provincial administration. 11 Bill C-19, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Firearms Act, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2012 (assented to 5 April 2012; Ending the Long-gun Registry Act, SC 2012, c 6). The Provincial Power to (Not) Prosecute Criminal Code Offences 425 ment of a Criminal Code offence remains an open question with competing views. To give just two examples, Osgoode Hall Dean Lorne Sossin thinks that while “a provincial government may oppose a parliamentary