CTC Sentinel Objective

DECEMBER 2007 . Vol 1 . Issue 1

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents West Point Releases First Introduction Issue of CTC Sentinel 1 West Point Releases First Issue of CTC Sentinel By LTC(P) Joseph Felter he combating terrorism center documents. We also look forward to at the U.S. Military Academy at West releasing two major reports this spring, Reports Point is privileged to present the CTC including a historical study of failed jihadist 1 Abu Musàb al-Suri’s Critique of Hard T Sentinel, a new monthly online journal movements and our Shià Ideology Atlas. Line Salafists in the Jihadist Current devoted to understanding and confronting By Brynjar Lia contemporary threats posed by terrorism, With the recent passing of our Distinguished 4 Countering Terrorist Use of the Web as insurgency and other forms of political violence. Chair, General Wayne A. Downing, we would a Weapon The CTC Sentinel draws from the Center’s like to dedicate this inaugural issue to him. As By Bruce Hoffman network of scholars and practitioners dedicated General Downing used to remind the Center’s 6 Al-Qaìda Losing Ground in Iraq to the study of terrorism and counter-terrorism faculty—only slightly adjusting the motto of By Mohammed M. Hafez to provide the most well-informed forum for the British SAS—“Who thinks wins.” We 8 Al-Qaìda’s Resurgence in Pakistan the analysis of these most pressing security hope you will find the CTC Sentinel to be a By Bruce Riedel challenges facing the United States and its allies. valuable resource that informs your thinking 10 The Saudi Process of Repatriating and and enhances our collective understanding Reintegrating Guantanamo Returnees The CTC Sentinel supports the Combating of the persistent challenges facing the United By Christopher Boucek Terrorism Center’s dual mission of educating States and its allies by terrorist and insurgent 12 Leading Egyptian Jihadist Sayyid Imam a new generation of leaders and conducting groups. Renounces Violence objective, policy-relevant, informative and By Jarret Brachman rigorous research of the highest standards LTC(P) Joseph Felter, Ph.D. 14 Securing Yemen’s Cooperation in the geared both to the specialist and larger Director, Combating Terrorism Center Second Phase of the War on al-Qaìda interested public. Reflecting the CTC’s Department of Social Sciences By Gregory Johnsen commitment both to academic excellence U.S. Military Academy 15 Southern Thailand Insurgency Fails to as well as to the military, law enforcement Achieve Popular Support community and other practitioners in the Reports By Peter Chalk field, the CTC Sentinel will include relevant scholarly research as well as articles with a Abu Musàb al-Suri’s 17 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity more practical orientation. For example, each Critique of Hard Line 18 CTC Sentinel Staff issue will feature an operational after-action Salafists in the Jihadist report from military personnel returning from combat operations as well as a monthly Current chronology of significant terrorist incidents. By Brynjar Lia

Leading this project is Erich Marquardt, About the CTC Sentinel the recent scholarly literature on al- who joins the CTC from The Jamestown The Combating Terrorism Center is an Qa`ida has focused on studying internal Foundation, where he was the editor of independent educational and research divisions and ideological schisms in the Terrorism Focus and Terrorism Monitor and institution based in the Department of Social global jihadist current.1 This literature has the Program Manager of Global Terrorism Sciences at the United States Military Academy, uncovered important fault lines with regard Analysis. The Sentinel’s editorial board includes West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses to al-Qa`ida’s priorities on issues such as CTC Director of Research Dr. Jarret Brachman, the Center’s global network of scholars and media and propaganda efforts versus military Senior Research Fellow Dr. Assaf Moghadam practitioners in order to understand and organization. Differences over the primacy of and Senior Associate Brian Fishman. confront contemporary threats posed by religious-theological purity versus military-

terrorism and other forms of political violence. strategic effectiveness have also come to light. The CTC Sentinel is one of several new initiatives that we are pleased to announce. 1 Vahid Brown, Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership The views expressed in this report are those of Early next year, the CTC will launch an Schisms in Al-Qa’ida 1989-2006 (West Point, NY: Com- the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, entirely redesigned website, which will bating Terrorism Center, 2007), available at www.ctc. the Department of the Army, or any other agency feature an interactive tool for searching usma.edu/aq/aq3.asp; Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: of the U.S. Government. Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge & New York: Cam- our growing collection of Harmony bridge University Press, 2005).

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This article aims at contributing to this little guidance in terms of understanding greatly, they all revolved around the general literature by discussing the clash between doctrinal disputes and conflicts within dilemma of how to strike a balance between ideological purists and military strategists the jihadist current itself.5 Furthermore, it ideological purity vs. political utility. in al-Qaìda as seen through the writings may misleadingly identify contemporary of one of al-Qaìda’s most articulate and jihadists as simply radicalized elements These clashes suggest that the spread of prolific writers, Mustafa bin Àbd al-Qadir within, or as by-products of, a broader purist Salafist doctrines in the jihadist Setmariam Nasar, better known by his pen Salafist phenomenon. Instead, it may be current from the 1980s onwards has not been names Abu Musàb al-Suri and Ùmar Àbd more fruitful to speak of Salafism as one of a source of strength and renewal, but instead al-Hakim.2 Until his arrest presumably in several competing ideological strands within constituted a considerable obstacle to jihadist Quetta, Pakistan in late 2005, al-Suri was the jihadist current. Furthermore, one may mobilization, and has more often than not one of the most outspoken voices in the identify a spectrum, or a continuum, of served to handicap and cripple jihadist jihadist current. His critical analysis of positions within the contemporary Salafi- groups by embroiling them in schisms and previous jihadist experiences, especially jihadism, defined by two extreme positions. internal conflicts. on Algeria, provoked strong responses and debates. Furthermore, his ambitions to On the one extreme are hard line Salafist There are reasons why jihadist ideologues integrate Marxist guerrilla warfare theory purists for whom doctrinal purity is of like al-Suri came to use such vitriolic and into the jihadist war fighting doctrine, to quintessential importance, even if it means harsh words about leading Salafist clerics. introduce self-criticism as an accepted fighting side battles, alienating allies and Al-Qaìda’s struggle against the United genre and method in jihadist thinking shattering any semblance of a common front States and its European and Arab allies— and his attempts to critically analyze the against the “Zionist-Crusader” enemy. At the Saudi Arabia, in particular—has always jihadist current “objectively” inevitably other extreme are hard line jihadists, who led to numerous clashes with orthodox and are primarily military strategists, and whose conservative elements, especially the strong main preoccupation is political outcome, not “He styled himself as Salafist current in al-Qaìda. doctrinal purity. a writer, theorist and

Salafism Abu Musàb al-Suri belongs to the latter strategist, not as a Muslim While the term Salafism is historically category. Even though he himself was born cleric.” associated with a late 19th and early 20th into a Syrian Sufi family (the Rifa‘iyyah order century Islamic reformist movement, today’s in Aleppo), he came to adopt and defend Salafists are very different. Their main Salafist doctrines in his writings, but he did characteristic is their strict emulation of the this only because it was the best strategy depended on a minimum of political-religious practices of the Prophet Muhammad and his in the current times. From his writings, it legitimation, which explains why there is far companions at the pristine Islamic age, and becomes apparent that had he been born more literature on jihadist websites dealing hence an abhorrence of any later “innovation” 20 years earlier, al-Suri would have fought with the question “why jihad?” than “how (bidà) in belief and religious practice, an equally hard under Marxist or pan-Arab jihad?”6 obsession with God’s oneness (tawhid), slogans. He styled himself as a writer, a rejection of human rationality and an theorist and strategist, not as a Muslim cleric. Since the mid-1990s, leading Salafist clerics extreme exclusiveness, even hatred, toward Together with many other leading jihadists, from Saudi Arabia and Yemen have refuted other Islamic schools and tendencies.3 Even Abu Musàb al-Suri clashed with “purist Usama bin Ladin’s message and defended their if only a small segment of today’s Salafists Salafist” elements in al-Qaìda on a number regimes against jihadist propaganda. Al-Suri support al-Qaìda, the term “Salafi-jihadism” of occasions. While the specific issues varied took considerable interest in these disputes, has nevertheless been latched to al-Qaìda and he authored a long study that detailed both by outsiders and by jihadist ideologues 5 For the purpose of this article, Abu Musàb al-Suri’s and analyzed Bin Ladin’s and the London- themselves. own definition will suffice. He defined the jihadist cur- based Saudi dissident leader Saad al-Faqih’s rent rather comprehensively, determined partly by ide- criticism of Shaykh Abdul Aziz bin Baz and A common categorization of Salafism is ology and partly by its main enemies: “It comprises or- Shaykh Mohammed bin Salah bin ‘Uthaymin, 7 Quintan Wiktorowicz’s typology that ganizations, groups, assemblies, scholars, intellectuals, two of Saudi Arabia’s most famous scholars. divides Salafism into three currents: purists, symbolic figures and the individuals who have adopted Seeing himself not as a religious cleric who politicos and jihadists, united by a common the ideology of armed jihad against the existing regimes could challenge the clerics on their turf, al- Salafist creed, but sharply divided on how in the Arab-Islamic world on the basis that these are to interpret the context and reality in which apostate regimes ruling by not what Allah said (bi-ghayr 6 Brynjar Lia, “Al-Qaeda Online: Understanding Jiha- 4 the creed should be implemented. While a ma anzala Allah), by legislating without Allah, and by dist Internet infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Online, useful starting point, the typology provides giving their loyalty and assistance to the various infidel January 2006. enemies of the Islamic nation. The jihadist current has 7 Ùmar Àbd al-Hakim (Abu Musàb al-Suri), The Tes- 2 For his biography, see Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global also adopted the program of armed jihad against the colo- timony of the Leaders of the Mujahidin and the Reform [Cur- Jihad: The Life of al-Qaìda Strategist Abu Musàb Al-Suri (London & New York: Hurst and Columbia University nialist forces which attack Muslim lands on the basis that rent] about the Sultan’s Clerics in the Land of the Two Holy Press, 2007). those regimes are allies fighting Islam and Muslims.” See Places, Called Saudi Arabia: A Reading and Commentary 3 Bernard Haykel, “Radical Salafism: Osama’s Ideol- Ùmar Àbd al-Hakim (Abu Musàb al-Suri), The Global of the Letters and Communiques by Shaykh Usama bin La- ogy,” Dawn, 2001. Islamic Resistance Call. Part I: The Roots, History, and Ex- din and Doctor Saad al-Faqih to Shaykh bin Baz, Shaykh bin 4 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Move- periences. Part II: The Call, Program and Method (Arabic) ‘Uthaymin and the Clerics of the Land of the Two Holy Places ment,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29:3 (2006): pp. (Place and publisher unknown, December 2004), p. 685. (Arabic) (Kabul: The Ghuraba Center for Islamic Studies 207-239. Hereafter cited as The Global Islamic Resistance Call. and Media, January 31, 2001).

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Suri found it most useful to launch his attack most conflict prone of all. He said that they Hard Line Salafists in London and Afghanistan through the words of the two most well-known are a sect at war with “nearly every other The adoption of hard line Salafist positions Saudi dissidents, one from the reformist revivalist school.”12 Al-Suri considered the by leading jihadists led to several important camp and the other from the jihadist camp. Salafists as a liability and would rather be leadership schisms. In the mid-1990s, a The intended audience was clearly jihadist without them and their doctrinal feuds. That serious conflict erupted between Abu Musàb sympathizers and recruits who were hesitant is unfortunately not an option, however, al-Suri and Abu Qatada al-Filistini, who were to join al-Qaìda without necessary religious because, as al-Suri pointed out, “most of then the two main ideologues behind the al- legitimation. This is also what concerned al- the jihadists chose the Salafist doctrine, Ansar Newsletter in London, the mouthpiece Suri the most with regard to the negative role jurisprudence and program”; in this way, of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in played by “the purist Salafists.” Their clerics “the problem came to us, eventually.”13 Algeria and probably the most prominent “mislead the mujahidin” and turned them jihadist journal at that time. Al-Suri was away from the battlefield by preaching loyalty Al-Suri viewed the various conflicts emanating gradually estranged because Abu Qatada’s to corrupt rulers who had allied themselves from the disputes over Salafist doctrine as hard line Salafist supporters gained control with the infidels. a significant security hazard for the jihadist over the GIA media unit. He later recalled movement, and a considerable threat to the in his memoirs how people like him were The reason why anti-Bin Ladin rhetoric by movement as a whole: denounced as politicos and even heretics by leading Salafist scholars had such resonance the Salafists: among al-Qaìda’s core recruitment base was It causes internal strife among Muslims that the jihadist movement did not have a well- and within the resistance movement In their eyes, we were only activists established and unified ideological foundation itself at a time when we are being (harakiyyun), who theorized in politics. separate from the Salafist school; its ideological invaded by the American and Zionist We were not clean of the Muslim character was multifaceted, evolving and Mongols and their war machines, Brotherhood virus, despite the fact that open to new influences. In al-Suri’s analysis, and at a time when their satellites we were among the jihadists. We did the jihadist current’s ideology derived from a are eavesdropping on our ideological not understand the issues of Islamic variety of sources. It was “a mixture of jihadist murmurs and monitoring our daily doctrine!!18 Qutbist organizational ideology, the Salafist movements…14 creed and the Wahhabite call.”8 While Qutbism The clash between military jihadist had been dominant until the 1980s, doctrinal Furthermore, the arrogant exclusiveness pragmatists and hard line Salafists was Salafism and Wahhabite theology had begun propagated by Salafist doctrinarians has led also manifest in Afghanistan, the main to make an impact during Arab participation to the inability of the jihadist current to form playing field for the jihadists since the late in the Afghan liberation war during the 1980s. alliances and cooperative relationships with 1980s.19 There were significant differences in Its influence on the jihadist current has grown other Islamic militants.15 The Salafist presence religious observance and practices between ever since.9 in the jihadist current created in reality an the Arab volunteer fighters, many of whom incompatibility of strategic proportion since were observant Salafists, and the Afghan Salafism as a Source of Internal Discord and “the resistance has to be popular, meaning resistance, who by and large observed the Conflict a complete participation of all sects of the Hanafi school and were tolerant of Sufi Abu Musàb al-Suri witnessed with unease population, inclusive of all of its multiple shrines and other practices that Salafists the growing influence of Salafist hard line diverse groups” if it were to succeed.16 regarded as godless “innovation” in Islam. ideologues in al-Qaìda. Historically, This had been a problem during the first doctrinal disputes within the Sunni faith Al-Suri also found that the Salafists shared Arab-Afghan experience from the mid-1980s had bred “partisan fanaticism” and caused the responsibility for the spread of takfiri to c.1992, and no less so during the “second “bloodshed, conspiracies and internecine (excommunication) ideas and practices within round” following the Taliban’s seizure of fighting” on a grand scale.10 While these the jihadist current. He repeatedly refuted the power in 1996 until its downfall in late 2001. schismatic battles were somewhat contained notion that the mainstream jihadist ideology during the anti-colonialist struggles in “has merged with takfirism,” as is often argued Hence, a significant segment of the Arab- the 18th and 19th centuries, they had now by jihadist opponents, but he did concede that Afghan community in Afghanistan mistrusted reemerged with full force, according to al- hard line Salafist interpretations and practices the Taliban on purely religious grounds, which Suri, due to the growing power of the “Salafist “led in turn to a narrowing of the margin came on top of their outspoken contempt trend.”11 Al-Suri depicted the Salafists as the between the jihadists and the takfirist trend,” a for Afghanistan’s general backwardness weakness which has been amply exploited by and primitiveness. The Arab-Afghans 17 8 The Global Islamic Resistance Call, p. 697. the enemy. Since the rise of modern political soon became embroiled in tense ideological 9 True to his pedagogical, tutorial style of writing, al-Suri Islamism in the first half of the 20th century, disputes over whether the Taliban regime summed up the basic components and elements of the ji- the issue of takfir has probably been the should be considered an Islamic emirate, hadist current in this neat mathematical equation: “Some most divisive one of all. Therefore, al-Suri’s for which it would make it worth fighting basic elements from the Muslim Brotherhood ideology + criticism here is quite significant. and to which emigration was obligatory. The organizational program of Sayyid Qutb + The legal- Many Arab militants who had moved to political doctrine of Imam ibn Taymiyah and the Salafi- 12 Ibid., p. 1060. Afghanistan simply considered the Taliban yya school + The jurisprudential and doctrinal heritage of 13 Ibid., p. 1060. regime just another temporary safe haven the Wahhabite call ---> The political legal organizational 14 Ibid., p. 1060. program for the jihadist current.” Ibid., p. 698. 15 Ibid., p. 846. 18 Ibid., p. 31. 10 Ibid., p. 1060. 16 Ibid., p. 846. 19 This section draws heavily on Lia, Architect of Global 11 Ibid., p. 1060. 17 Ibid., p. 842. Jihad, pp. 239-245.

3 DECEMBER 2007 . Vol 1 . Issue 1 from which they might train their members Conclusion Countering Terrorist Use and reorganize their forces in preparation for Al-Suri’s critique of the Salafists in the an armed campaign in their home countries. jihadist current has highlighted interesting of the Web as a Weapon For them, the Taliban regime could never ideological cleavages inside al-Qaìda and become a starting point for the coming Islamic contemporary jihadism, which often tend By Bruce Hoffman caliphate. Therefore, fighting alongside the to be overlooked since most jihadist writers Taliban against the Northern Alliance was not avoid the topic or phrase it in such obfuscated This article is excerpted from the author’s a religious duty. Among the hard line Salafists language that it becomes unintelligible to testimony, titled, “Using the Web as a Weapon: in the Arab-Afghan community, the criticism outsiders. The Internet as a Tool for Violent Radicalization of the Taliban went much further. They argued and Homegrown Terrorism,” that was presented to that it was utterly impermissible to fight There is little doubt that doctrinaire Salafist The U.S. House of Representatives Committee on alongside the Taliban regime because it meant influences have profoundly altered the Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, fighting under an infidel banner. ideological character of the jihadist current Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk since the early 1990s, following decades Assessment, on November 6, 2007. In his books, al-Suri wrote at length describing of Qutbist dominance in militant Islamic the destructive role played by the Salafist rhetoric. The rise of Salafist discourses and terrorism has long been understood hardliners in Afghanistan. The Salafists’ doctrines has in many ways reduced the to be a violent means of communication. contempt for the Taliban and other non-Salafist political content in contemporary jihadist The terrorist act itself is thus deliberately mujahidin fighters knew no boundaries: ideology and weakened its ability to provide designed to attract attention and then, formulas for alliances with other political through the publicity that it generates, to One of the astonishing things I must forces. Indeed, perhaps the most important communicate a message. Indeed, nearly a mention in this context is a statement element in al-Suri’s critique of the Salafists is quarter of a century ago, Alex Schmid and made by one of those extremist their exclusiveness and eagerness to engage Janny de Graaf observed that, “Without 1 Salafi-jihadists. He told me in one of in side battles with “deviancy” and “un- communication there can be no terrorism.” our conversations that “jihad must Islamic sects.” By the very presence of these But communication is essential for a terrorist be under the Salafist banner; its ideological elements at the heart of the jihadist movement not just to summon publicity and leadership, program and religious current, this global insurgent movement is attention, but also to promote its longevity rulings must also be Salafist…If we bound to have limited popular appeal and is and ensure its very survival. Without an should accept that non-Salafists destined to remain what Abu Musàb al-Suri effective communications strategy, a terrorist participate with us in jihad, we only did not want it to become, namely “elitist,” movement would be unable to assure a do so because we need them. However, “marginal” and doomed to failure. continued flow of new recruits into its ranks, they should not have any leadership motivate and inspire existing members as well role at all. We should lead them like Dr. Brynjar Lia is a Research Professor at the as expand the pool of active supporters and a herd of cows to perform their duty Norwegian Defense Research Establishment passive sympathizers from which terrorism of jihad.” I couldn’t really understand (FFI) where he currently heads FFI’s research on also draws sustenance. how we are going to participate in international terrorism and radical Islamism. jihad with our brethrens in religion Trained in Arabic, Russian and Middle Eastern Given this constellation of requisite and faith if we should deal with them studies, he obtained his Ph.D. in contemporary sustainable resources—motivated minions, as a herd of cows…!20 Middle Eastern history at the University of Oslo. energized recruits, generous supporters and He was a Visiting Fulbright Scholar at Harvard willing sympathizers—it is not surprising Obviously, such contemptuous attitudes University from 2001-02. Dr. Lia is the author that terrorists today devote so much time opened up serious cleavages in the Arab- of The Society of the Muslim Brothers in and energy to communications. That they Afghan diaspora regarding the future course of Egypt 1928-42, Globalisation and the Future have fastened on the internet as an especially action, especially with regard to their position of Terrorism: Patterns and Predictions, A efficacious vehicle for this purpose—given on the Taliban. Police Force without a State: A History of the its rapid (often in real time), pervasive Palestinian Security Forces in the West Bank geographical reach, and cost-effective 2 In Afghanistan, al-Suri became known as one and Gaza and Building Arafat’s Police: The characteristics—is not surprising either. of the Taliban’s most faithful defenders against Politics of International Police Assistance As Professor Gabriel Weimann of Haifa the Salafists. Al-Suri had always displayed in the Palestinian Territories After the Oslo University notes in his seminal study, Terror pragmatism and leniency vis-à-vis non- Agreement. His most recent book is Architect of on the Internet, when he began studying this adherence to the strict Salafist code of conduct Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaìda Strategist phenomenon nearly a decade ago, there were as long as the zeal and determination to fight a Abu Musàb al-Suri. only about 12 terrorist group websites. By jihad was beyond doubt. He found this among the time he completed his research in 2005, the Taliban.21 1 Alex Schmid and Janny de Graaf, Violence As Commu- 20 The Global Islamic Resistance Call, pp. 844-45. nication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media 21 Due to his conflict with Bin Ladin, he could obviously (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), p. 9. not afford to also be on bad terms with the Afghan gov- 2 For a more detailed analysis of historical terrorist com- ernment, but there was clearly a strong ideological com- him in 1997 or 1998 saying that he had stopped working munications strategies and their contemporary use of the ponent behind his decision. Abdel Bari Atwan, the Arab for al-Qaìda, and that instead he now served as media internet and other electronic and digital communications news editor who met with al-Suri several times during adviser for the Taliban. Personal interview, Abdel Bari means, see Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: the mid- and late-1990s, recalls that al-Suri telephoned Atwan, London, April 28, 2006. Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 173-228.

4 DECEMBER 2007 . Vol 1 . Issue 1 the number had grown to over 4,300—“a The changing face of terrorism in the 21st that the movement itself could exert total proliferation rate,” he explains, “of about century is perhaps best exemplified by the control over. Identical arguments—claiming 4,500 percent per year.”3 And, by the time items recovered by Saudi security forces in distortion and censorship by Western and the book was published the following year, a raid on an al-Qaìda safe house in Riyadh other mainstream media—have also been the number had jumped to more than 5,000 in late spring 2004. In addition to the voiced by sites either created by the Iraqi terrorist websites.4 Today, the number of traditional terrorist arsenal of AK-47 assault insurgent groups themselves or entities terrorist and insurgent sites is believed to have rifles, explosives, rocket-propelled grenades, sympathetic to them.8 In addition, the increased to some 7,000. hand grenades and thousands of rounds of internet has become for terrorists a “virtual” ammunition that the authorities expected sanctuary to compensate for the loss of their Thus, virtually every terrorist group in the to find, they also discovered an array of physical sanctuaries and continue to provide world today has its own internet website and, electronic consumer goods including: video information on training and instruction in the in many instances, maintains multiple sites in cameras, laptop computers, CD burners, and means and methods of planning and executing the requisite high-speed internet connection. terrorist attacks. Finally, the internet’s power “Al-Qaìda may be According to 60 Minutes investigative to radicalize—to motivate, inspire, animate journalist Henry Schuster, the videos and impel radicals to violence—has been compared to the archetypal repeatedly demonstrated in the United States, shark in the water that had been part of an al-Qaìda media Europe and elsewhere. blitz on the web that also included two must keep moving online magazines full of editorials and In these respects, al-Qaìda’s capacity to forward.” news digests, along with advice on how continue to prosecute its war against the to handle a kidnapping or field-strip an United States and the movement’s other AK-47 assault rifle. The videos mixed assorted enemies is a direct reflection of both old appearances by bin Laden with the movement’s resiliency and the continued different languages with different messages slick graphics and suicide bombers’ on- resonance of its ideology and effectiveness tailored to specific audiences. The ability to camera last wills and testaments. They of its communications. Al-Qaìda may be communicate in real time via the internet, using premiered on the internet, one after compared to the archetypal shark in the a variety of compelling electronic media— the other, and were aimed at recruiting water that must keep moving forward—no including dramatic video footage, digital Saudi youth.5 matter how slowly or incrementally—or photographs and audio clips accompanied die. In al-Qaìda’s context, this means by visually arresting along with savvy and As Tina Brown, the doyenne of post-modern adapting and adjusting to even our most visually appealing web design—has enabled media, has pointed out: the “conjunction of consequential counter-measures while terrorists to reach a potentially vast audience 21st-century internet speed and 12th-century simultaneously searching to identify new faster, more pervasively and more effectively fanaticism has turned our world into a targets and vulnerabilities and continuing to than ever before. tinderbox.”6 replenish its ranks with new recruits as well as sympathizers and supporters. The weapons of terrorism today, accordingly, The implications of this development have are no longer simply the guns and bombs that been enormous. The internet, once seen as an In sum, defeating al-Qaìda requires a they always have been, but now include the engine of education and enlightenment, has strategy that relies on effectively combining mini-cam and videotape, editing suite and instead become an immensely useful vehicle for the tactical elements of systematically attendant production facilities; professionally terrorists with which to peddle their baseless destroying and weakening its capabilities produced and mass-marketed CD-ROMs and propaganda and manifold conspiracy theories alongside the equally critical, broader DVDs; and, most critically, the laptop and and summon their followers to violence.7 strategic imperatives of countering the desktop computers, CD burners and e-mail These sites alarmingly present an increasingly continued resonance of the movement’s accounts, and internet and worldwide web. compelling and indeed accepted alternative message and breaking the cycle of terrorist Indeed, largely because of the internet—and point of view to the terrorists’ variegated recruitment and replenishment that has the almost unlimited array of communications audiences. This was of course precisely al- both sustained and replenished al-Qaìda. opportunities that it offers—the art of Qaìda’s purpose in creating its first website, But, today, Washington has no such strategy terrorist communication has now evolved to www.alneda.com, and maintaining a variety in the war on terrorism. America’s counter- a point where terrorists can effortlessly and of successor sites ever since: to provide an terrorism campaign continues to assume effectively control the communication of their alternative source for news and information that America’s contemporary enemies—be ideology of hate, intolerance and violence: they al-Qaìda or the insurgents in Iraq— determining the content, context and medium 5 Henry Shuster, “Studios of Terror: Al-Qaìda’s Media over which their message is projected; and Strategy,” CNN, February 16, 2005. 8 “Western Propaganda Media try to shut down albas- toward precisely the audience (or multiple 6 Tina Brown, “Death by Error,” Washington Post, May rah.net! [sic],” the banner on one such site, www.albas- audiences) they seek to reach. 19, 2005. rah.net, asserted in 2005. “Once again,” it argued, “the 7 See, for instance, the “Iraq” tab at www.kavkazcenter. propaganda media have begun to spew stupid accusa- 3 Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Are- com and the “Iraqi Resistance Report” tab at www.jiha- tions against al-Basrah, the true aim of which is to smoth- na, the New Challenges (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute dunspun.com as well as sites such as www.islammemo. er the voice of Iraqi people and smother one of the few of Peace Press, 2006), p. 105. cc/taqrer/one_news.asp?Idnew=292; www.la7odood. sources of information on the unprecedented massacres 4 Remarks by Professor Gabriel Weimann, book launch com; www.balagh.com/thaqafa/0604ggpz.htm; and that are taking place inside occupied Iraq in the name of event held at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, www.albasrah.net. All of the preceding sites were ac- ‘international law,’” www.albasrah.net, accessed on July D.C. on April 17, 2006. cessed on July 6, 2005. 6, 2005.

5 DECEMBER 2007 . Vol 1 . Issue 1 have a traditional center of gravity. It also University of St. Andrews in Scotland. Dr. black from head to toe.1 assumes that these enemies simply need to be Hoffman has been awarded the United States killed or imprisoned so that global terrorism Intelligence Community Seal Medallion, Iraqi tribes also resented AQI’s infringement or the Iraqi insurgency will both end. the highest level of commendation given to a on their livelihood. A good example is AQI’s Accordingly, the attention of the U.S. military non-government employee, which recognizes conflict with the Albu Risha tribe in Anbar and intelligence community is directed almost sustained superior performance of high value Province. This tribe has long benefited from uniformly toward hunting down militant that distinctly benefits the interests and national its proximity to the international road leading leaders or protecting U.S. forces—not toward security of the United States. He has served as from Baghdad to Amman, passing through understanding the enemy we now face. This a member of the U.S. Department of Defense Anbar. The road is used by travelers, traders is a monumental failing not only because Counter-Terrorism Advisory Board and has and transporters. During the sanctions years decapitation strategies have rarely worked been a consultant to the National Academy of (1991-2003), Albu Risha tribesmen provided in countering mass mobilization terrorist Sciences, the U.S. Department of Energy, the many of the smugglers and transporters who or insurgent campaigns, but also because UK Ministry of Defence, the World Cup USA94 used the road. They also engaged in extortion al-Qaìda’s ability to continue this struggle Security Planning and Management Staff, the and outright thievery against businessmen is ineluctably predicated on its capacity U.S. General Accounting Office, the American and transport drivers.2 The presence of to attract new recruits and replenish its Academy of Arts and Science’s Religious many insurgent groups, including AQI, on resources. Fundamentalism Project and the New York State important portions of the international road Emergency Management Office. He is also Editor- had cut into the business and profits of the The success of U.S. strategy will therefore in-Chief of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Albu Risha tribe. Insurgents used this vital ultimately depend on Washington’s ability the leading scholarly journal in the field. He holds road to extract fees from transporters, kidnap to counter al-Qaìda’s ideological appeal a doctorate in International Relations at Oxford individuals for ransom and even kill people and thus effectively address the three key University. based on their identity. The Albu Risha tribe elements of al-Qaìda’s strategy: had much to lose if AQI remained in control. * * * • The continued resonance of their message. In addition to being affected financially, • Their continued ability to attract recruits to Al-Qaìda Losing Ground AQI prevented the Albu Risha tribe from replenish their ranks. receiving contracts and bidding for local • Their stubborn capacity for continual in Iraq development projects from coalition forces. It regeneration and renewal. also challenged the decision of tribes to send By Mohammed M. Hafez their sons into the local police forces. AQI To do so, we first need to better understand guaranteed a death sentence to anyone who the mindset and minutia of the al-Qaìda al-qaìda in iraq (aqi) has snatched defeat cooperated with the occupiers. Whereas some movement, the animosity and arguments from the jaws of victory by turning nationalist insurgents would allow individuals to contract that underpin it and indeed the regions of insurgents and tribes against it. AQI made with Americans in exchange for a share of the the world from which its struggle emanated two mistakes that might prove fatal. The first revenues, or allowed some to enter the police and upon which its hungry gaze still rests. was its encroachment on tribal interests, and to provide local security and possibly spy Without knowing our enemy we cannot the second was its attempt to monopolize for the insurgents, AQI rejected any forms of successfully penetrate their cells; we cannot leadership in the insurgency by declaring collaboration with the occupation and harshly knowledgeably sow discord and dissension an Islamic state in Iraq. The first mistake treated tribesmen seeking to make a living in their ranks and thus weaken them from compelled the tribes to terminate their welcome through such cooperation.3 within; we cannot effectively counter their of foreign jihadists and violently expel the propaganda and messages of hate and clarion extremists, while the second turned nationalist In 2004, AQI killed Albu Risha tribesmen calls to violence; and, we cannot fulfill the insurgents into fierce critics of AQI’s “alien” that took contracts from coalition forces, most basic requirements of an effective agenda. including Shaykh Bazià al-Rishawi, the counter-terrorist strategy: preempting and father of Shaykh Àbd al-Sattar Abu Risha, preventing terrorist operations and deterring Al-Qaìda vs. Iraqi Tribes the future founder of the Anbar Salvation their attacks. Until we recognize the Tribes in Iraq, generally speaking, are known Council (ASC). It also killed Àbd al-Sattar’s importance of this vital prerequisite, America for being socially conservative, but they are younger brother, Muhammad, and kidnapped will remain perennially on the defensive: not given to ideological projects promoted by radical Islamists. AQI alienated the inherently reactive rather than proactive, 1 Karl Vick, “Insurgent Alliance is Fraying in Fallujah; tribes of western Iraq by imposing on them deprived of the capacity to recognize, much Locals, Fearing Invasion, Turn Against Foreign Arabs,” an oppressive fundamentalism, infringing less anticipate, important changes in our Washington Post, October 13, 2004; Ellen Knickmeyer, on their economic turf, preventing them enemy’s modus operandi, recruitment and “Zarqawi Followers Clash with Local Sunnis,” Washing- from establishing their own police forces targeting. ton Post, May 29, 2005. and engaging in coercive extraction of “war 2 Mushriq Abbas, “Mutual Political and Tribal Interests taxes.” As early as 2004, foreign jihadists— Bruce Hoffman is the Combating Terrorism Coincided with His Struggle with al-Qaìda and al-Ma- mainly from Saudi Arabia—began to impose Center’s Senior Fellow for Counter-Terrorism, a liki: A Short and Murky Journey Led [Àbd al-Sattar] puritanical rules on already religiously professor at Georgetown University’s School of Abu Risha to George Bush...and Few Days Later to His conservative tribes. These edicts, for example, Foreign Service and is one of the world’s leading Death” (Arabic), al-Hayat, September 16, 2007. outlawed music and satellite dishes, and experts on terrorism and counter-terrorism. He 3 Hamam Hassan, “Saddam was the First to Attract Is- demanded that women in public be covered in was the founding Director of the Centre for the lamic Organizations and Later Regretted it” (Arabic), al- Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the Hayat, February 25, 2006.

6 DECEMBER 2007 . Vol 1 . Issue 1 two of his brothers, Abdullah and Ali. These AQI vs. Nationalist Insurgents uniting several insurgent groups, including transgressions required vengeance in the Arab In many ways, AQI’s agenda was always in AQI, into one organization. Later that year, as tribal code.4 conflict with the nationalist-leaning insurgents tensions with the tribes intensified, it declared represented by groups like the Islamic Army the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and demanded Shaykh Àbd al-Sattar formed the ASC with in Iraq and the 1920 Revolution Brigades. that all other insurgent groups and Sunni tribes approximately 100 men and started detaining While these nationalists use Islam as the pledge allegiance to its leader, Abu Ùmar al- and killing several AQI commanders and vocabulary of resistance to the occupation, Baghdadi.8 cadres. The ASC attracted money from U.S. they are, generally speaking, not interested forces in order to build up a local police force Iraq’s nationalists rejected this state on to combat AQI. It was easy for the ASC to several grounds. First, no one had heard of hunt down AQI because the latter operated “The errors of AQI are Abu Ùmar al-Baghdadi or had seen his face. in the open. It was equally easy, however, for not incidental; they are There is even speculation that he is a fictional AQI to identify members of the ASC to carry character masking the foreign leadership out assassinations and bombings against hardwired in the genetic behind ISI. Second, the Sunni nationalists them.5 AQI assassinated key figures such as code of global jihadists.” reject the idea of federalism in Iraq, which Shaykh Hikmat Mumtaz al-Bazi, head of the would deprive them of oil wealth and, they Samarra tribal council, and Shaykh Kamal believe, would be a step toward the break- al-Nazzal, head of the local council in Falluja, up of Iraq into three separate states. ISI as a for brokering dialogue with the government.6 in establishing an Islamic state or pursuing state for Sunnis in western and central Iraq Ultimately, AQI succeeded in killing Shaykh a global jihad. They want to remove the plays directly into the hands of the federalists Àbd al-Sattar himself. By sealing his fate, AQI predominantly Shià government that has and paves the way for the Kurds to declare may have sealed its own as well. deprived them of power and privilege. They their state in the north and the Shià in the cooperated with AQI because it was in their south. Third, Iraqi nationalists constitute the Killing these individuals, and the escalating interests to sustain attacks on the new Iraqi majority in the insurgency and they carry out fight with the ASC, had three effects. First, government and its emerging security forces. the most attacks. It is they who should be in tribal heads had to seek revenge against the Keeping the existing government and the the lead because they give shelter to AQI and killers in accordance with their tribal customs. coalition forces preoccupied with extremists allow it to thrive. Second, it gave the United States an opening takes the military pressure off the nationalist to reach out to the tribes against a common insurgents. Criticism of the newly formed Islamic state enemy. The United States was willing to give may not have amounted to much had ISI not money and material support to anyone who AQI was aware of this marriage of proceeded with killing several commanders fought AQI. The tribes, in turn, were looking convenience and sought to benefit from it. of the insurgent groups that refused to for a pretext to benefit from coalition money By 2006, however, AQI began to pose as the pledge loyalty to Abu Ùmar al-Baghdadi. In without appearing as illegitimate collaborators leader of the Iraqi jihad, no longer satisfied March 2007, Harith Dhahir Khamis al-Dari, with the occupation. Today, there are with the role of an equal partner. AQI had commander of the 1920 Revolution Brigades “awakening councils” in nearly all provinces two concerns in mind: one ideological and in the Abu Ghurayb sector, was killed along and cities in which AQI operates.7 the other practical. The ideological related with three family members by two car bombs to AQI’s ambition to reap the benefits of near his home. His father, Thahir Khamis al- The third, and perhaps most important, its struggle by establishing a permanent Dari, blamed the bombings on AQI. Al-Dari effect of AQI’s war on the tribes is that it has presence in Iraq and fulfilling its desire to previously criticized ISI and claimed that its forced nationalist insurgents to choose sides. establish “true” Islam even within a small objective is to break Iraq into separate states.9 Many of the nationalist insurgents are from territory. This emirate would be the launching In April 2007, the Islamic Army in Iraq the tribes and depend on them for protection, point for future jihads just as the Prophet dropped a bombshell when it accused AQI of shelter and political support. While they may Muhammad and his companions used their killing 30 of its members. have wished to stay neutral, AQI’s brutal tiny state in Medina to conquer the rest of the treatment of tribal dissenters meant that the Arabian Peninsula and, eventually, expand Since then, many of the Iraqi nationalists have Iraqi nationalists had to protect their base of the Islamic empire from Spain to China. AQI taken a more or less hostile position to AQI. mass support. recognized that the history of Islamic activism is replete with episodes in which alliances 8 Video message by unknown representative of the with non-Islamist forces ended up with the Media Commission of the Mujahidin Shura Council dis- 4 Abbas, “Mutual Political and Tribal Interests.” latter marginalizing the jihadists. It does not tributed through the al-Tajdeed Forum of the Islamic 5 Ibid.; Khloud al-Aamiri, “The [al-Qaìda] Organization want to lose the opportunity that was denied Renewal Organization (www.tajdeed.org.uk/forums), is Declining and Armed Men are Joining Us to Avenge to Islamist movements in the past. October 15, 2006; Audio message entitled “I Am Aware their Relatives: Interview with Abu Risha” (Arabic), al- of My Lord,” by Abu Ùmar al-Baghdadi, leader of the Hayat, March 19, 2007. As for the practical concern, AQI feared any ISI, distributed through the World News Network 6 “American Officials Hold Secret Talks with Tribal side deals between nationalist insurgents (www.w-n-n.com), March 13, 2007. Leaders” (Arabic), al-Hayat, February 10, 2006; “Killing and the Iraqi government that might sell it 9 Communiqué by the 1920 Revolution Brigades an- of [Tribal Head Hikmat] Mumtaz Precipitated Open War out in exchange for a share of political power. nouncing the “martyrdom” of its leader distributed on al-Qaìda” (Arabic), al-Hayat, February 18, 2006. To prevent such a possibility, AQI sought to through the al-Firdaws online forums (www.alfirdaws. 7 “Awakening councils” have formed in al-Azamiyah encourage—and later compel—other groups org/vb), March 28, 2007; Karin Brulliard, “Dozens Die in Baghdad, Diyala, Samarra, Ninawa, Salah al-Din and to follow its lead. In January 2006, it declared In 2 Truck Bombings in the North,” Washington Post, southern Baghdad. the formation of the Mujahidin Shura Council, March 28, 2007.

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Some have openly cooperated with the United Their outrageous tactics may inspire fear, Al-Qaìda’s Resurgence in States and formed Sunni militias to clear but not admiration. When communities have neighborhoods and cities of AQI fighters.10 an opportunity to turn their back on these Pakistan The war against the tribes, conflict with the extremists without fear of reprisals, they nationalist insurgents and the surge of U.S. seize it. By Bruce Riedel forces has driven AQI northward toward Mosul—and it is not clear if it will survive there Yet, despite these vulnerabilities, AQI could al-qaìda has made a spectacular either. still survive in Iraq if: resurrection in Pakistan during the last five years. In 2002, the terrorist group had been Exploiting the Errors of their Ways • Sectarian killings against Sunnis by Shià driven from its base in Afghanistan, their In a recent audiotape recording entitled militias and government death squads re- Taliban ally was discredited and defeated and “A Message to Our People in Iraq,” Usama escalate in the near future. their key operatives were being hunted down bin Ladin urged all the insurgents and and arrested. Today, however, al-Qaìda has tribes to reconcile their differences, and he • Sunni insurgents see the United States as a secure operating base in the country, its acknowledged that “errors” had been made.11 abandoning their goal of pressing the current leadership is issuing constant guidance to its He advised followers to avoid “fanatical government to compromise on including global supporters, it is threatening NATO’s loyalty to men” and reminded them that what Sunnis in the security forces and fostering an position in Afghanistan through its Taliban unites Muslims is their adherence to Islam, inclusive political process. allies and it is now a growing force in Pakistan not their “belonging to a tribe, homeland, or itself. The current political crisis in Pakistan organization.” • Coalition forces begin to dismantle Sunni is endangering the secular democratic forces militias and awakening councils out of fear in the country, polarizing the debate about The errors of AQI are not incidental; they that they will attack the central government the country’s future and strengthening al- are hardwired in the genetic code of global in the future. Such a move must be preceded Qaìda’s Islamist partners. Al-Qaìda’s room jihadists. This type of movement attracts by national reconciliation that guarantees the to operate in the country is expanding, not security and reintegration of Sunnis in the contracting. “What is happening in Iraqi polity. The conventional wisdom is that al-Qaìda Iraq might be replicable What is happening in Iraq might be leaders Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al- elsewhere.” replicable elsewhere. U.S. strategists have Zawahiri are operating in the border lands to recognize the enduring vulnerabilities along the Afghan border in the Federally of global jihadism, exploit the rifts between Administered Tribal Areas (FATA); however, nationalists, tribes and global jihadists, there are many more areas of the country militants from around the world by inspiring magnify the mistakes of the extremists that are now increasingly out of the control of them with a virulent ideology that demonizes toward their own host societies, and avoid the central government and are essentially enemies, venerates self-sacrifice and conjures making political and military blunders that lawless. From Balochistan to Kashmir, much up illusions of a utopian world. rescue the extremists from their own. of western Pakistan is sympathetic to al- Qaìda’s message and remains an open field Such a movement finds it exceedingly difficult Mohammed M. Hafez, Ph.D., is the author of where they can operate. Even in the urban to balance pragmatic considerations with the Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and areas, al-Qaìda operatives have been able to fanatical doctrine that brings it to the land of Ideology of Martyrdom. Previously, he authored attack key targets, including military posts, 1 jihad in the first place. The focus on jihad and Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making with increasingly deadly results. martyrdom carries with it an impatience for of Palestinian Suicide Bombers and Why gradual political and social work necessary Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance Most concerning is that the resurgence of to build up a mass base that can sustain a in the Islamic World. He regularly consults the the al-Qaìda-Taliban alliance in Pakistan movement over time. As a result, global U.S. government and military on issues relating to has created a safe operating base for the jihadists rely on coercive extraction to meet radical Islamist movements and political violence, global jihadist movement to train and recruit the needs of their jihad; therefore, they become and he has appeared on National Public Radio, Jim operatives from Western Europe (especially a heavy burden on their host communities. Lehrer News Hour, MSNBC and C-Span. from the United Kingdom) to strike in London and other major European cities. There is The extreme jihadists make too many little doubt that they are also hoping to strike enemies, kill more Muslims than they kill American targets. alleged enemies of Islam and coerce local populations into complying with their Factors Behind al-Qaìda’s Ability to Regroup interpretation of orthodoxy. They emphasize Before September 11, 2001, Pakistan and al- an all-or-nothing politics that conflicts with Qaìda were in practice de facto allies. Both the needs of building effective coalitions. supported the Taliban and Kashmiri terrorist groups in a complex nexus of terror with

10 Michael R. Gordon, “The Former-Insurgent Coun- terinsurgency,” New York Times, September 2, 2007. 1 As long ago as July 1, 2005, Ahmed Rashid pointed out 11 The audiotape was released on the Ana al-Muslim that Bin Ladin could be anywhere from the Karakoram website (www.muslm.net) by al-Sahab Media Produc- Mountains near China to the Balochi desert among Kash- tion, October 23, 2007. miris, Pashtuns and Balochs angry with Musharraf.

8 DECEMBER 2007 . Vol 1 . Issue 1 which the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence that Pakistani troops that were needed in the to the United States, have had a Pakistani (ISI) was intimately familiar but did not fully west were turned to the east. For the next connection back to al-Qaìda. The head of control. After General Pervez Musharraf took year, almost one million soldiers faced each Britain’s domestic security service, the MI5, power in a coup in October 1999, he promised other in a nervous showdown. recently noted that “the command, control to crack down on al-Qaìda, but in actuality he and inspiration for attack planning in the UK did little. To the contrary, in December 1999 It is not clear if diverting forces from the (for the last five years) have derived from the Kashmiri terrorists working closely with the hunt for Bin Ladin was one of the intentions al-Qaìda leadership in Pakistan.”6 Taliban, ISI and al-Qaìda hijacked an Indian of the planners of the attack on the Indian airliner to Kandahar to free prisoners in India parliament, nor is it clear who was the real Within Pakistan, al-Qaìda has become an in an operation that underscored the intimate mastermind behind the attack—the Kashmiris increasingly powerful force. It has tried to connections between Pakistan and the terrorist on their own, the ISI which had created them, assassinate Musharraf several times and is network inside Afghanistan.2 Musharraf and the generals, or al-Qaìda. stepping up efforts to remove him from power. Yet, the impact was critical. At its moment of In September, after the Pakistani army stormed Al-Qaìda and the Taliban were stunned by greatest peril, al-Qaìda was free to recover the Islamist Red Mosque in Islamabad, Bin the speed of the collapse of their forces in late due to U.S. and Pakistani resources diverted Ladin and Zawahiri each issued statements 2001 when the U.S.-led coalition moved into away from the hunt. Some important al- calling for his ouster. Bin Ladin said that “it is Afghanistan. They had expected the Northern Qaìda figures—Musharraf claims more obligatory for Muslims in Pakistan to carry out Alliance to disintegrate after assassinating its than 6004—were apprehended in Pakistan, jihad to remove Pervez, his government, his leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud, and thought including Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and army and all those who help him.”7 that Pakistan would stand by its Taliban Abu Zubayda, yet the top leadership eluded protégé. Instead, by the end of the year capture. Yet, Musharraf is not al-Qaìda’s only target Pakistan had withdrawn its logistical support in Pakistan. It seeks to destroy the secular and pulled out the thousands of advisers and These leaders lurked behind the resurgence political leadership and civil society that offers experts that kept the Taliban war machine of the Taliban, which came roaring back. an alternative to its extremist Salafist Islamic running. Bin Ladin, Zawahiri and their Operating with at least the tacit acquiescence preaching. Former Prime Minister Benazir followers fled into Pakistan. An American- of the ISI, the Taliban quickly recovered Bhutto has been a target of al-Qaìda for more Afghan hammer was poised to crush them and rebuilt. By 2005, it was again in control than a decade as she notes in her memoirs, and against a Pakistani anvil. of much of southern Afghanistan at night. al-Qaìda may have been responsible for her Taliban leaders have consistently said that Bin assassination attempt when she returned to In what amounted to a costly diversion, Ladin has assisted them with their military Pakistan this fall.8 however, the United States concentrated its recovery and, indeed, the Taliban rapidly operations on Iraq, and key Special Forces adopted al-Qaìda-style tactics. Martyrdom Al-Qaìda’s goal in Pakistan is to polarize the units and CIA operatives were taken off the operations were not typical in Afghanistan; country into warring factions, break the back Afghan battlefield and were prepared for in 2002, there were only two in the whole of civil and secular society and ultimately see engagement in the Middle East. The new country. Today, however, a suicide attack its allies in the Pakistani Islamist movement Afghan government was left with only the occurs approximately every three days.5 seize power. It wants a broken state, a broken leanest of forces to pursue its enemies and NATO casualties are up sharply, and more army and broken political parties. From stabilize the country. Pakistan’s ambassador Americans have died in Afghanistan this year the ashes it dreams of an Islamic emirate to the United States, Mahmud Durrani, has than any previous one. emerging, which could unite with the Taliban noted that “we had almost licked al-Qaìda in Afghanistan, free Kashmir and be the after 9/11 because of the U.S. invasion of In addition to helping the Taliban recover, al- center of a revived caliphate. Afghanistan…But what happened? The focus Qaìda in Pakistan also began reaching out shifted to Iraq big time. This was a rebirth of to Pakistani diaspora communities around This dream, however, is still far from al- al-Qaìda.”3 the world to provide an effective means to Qaìda’s reach. Pakistan’s political meltdown recruit, indoctrinate and train operatives to has not progressed far enough for the extreme In addition, the situation in Pakistan changed. strike in Europe and ultimately in the United Islamic groups—such as the Taliban, al- On December 13, 2001, five Kashmiri terrorists States. The 800,000-strong Pakistani Qaìda, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and others—to from groups long associated with Bin Ladin communities in the United Kingdom (1.3% take power. Yet, the trends are in their attacked the Indian parliament in New Delhi. of the UK’s population, 500,000 of whom direction and time seems to be on their side India blamed Pakistan for harboring the are Kashmiris) are the favorite targets, but as long as the democratic center in Pakistan terrorist leadership that ordered the attack, communities in Germany, Denmark, Austria, is suppressed by a military dictatorship. The which followed dozens of others. India Italy and elsewhere have also been infiltrated. best antidote to al-Qaìda in Pakistan would mobilized along the border, causing Pakistan Every major terrorist operation in the United be a legitimately elected government that could to mobilize in turn; this development meant Kingdom since 9/11, including the July 7, pursue the war against al-Qaìda with the 2005 underground attacks and the foiled 2 Jaswant Singh, A Call to Honour: In Service of Emergent 2006 plot to blow up 10 jumbo jets en route 6 Jonathan Evans, “Intelligence, Counter Terrorism and India (New Delhi: Rupa & Co, 2007), p. 238. Trust,” November 5, 2007, available at www.mi5.gov. 3 Durrani interview in “Pakistan: Fall Guy or Failure,” 4 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New uk. The Washington Diplomat 14:11 (2007); See also the ac- York: Free Press, 2006). 7 “Bin Laden Wants Musharraf Removed,” al-Jazira, count by Gary Schroen, First In: An Insider’s Account of 5 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “Losing Af- September 20, 2007. How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan ghanistan, One Civilian at a Time,” Washington Post, No- 8 Benazir Bhutto, Daughter of the East: An Autobiography (New York: Ballantine, 2005). vember 18, 2007. (London: Simon and Schuster, 2007).

9 DECEMBER 2007 . Vol 1 . Issue 1 backing of the Pakistani people. Pentagon and a senior advisor at the North Atlantic 2007. It is expected that more Saudis will Treaty Organization in Brussels. Mr. Riedel is a eventually be released; however, it appears Instead, polls today show that Bin Ladin graduate of Brown and Harvard Universities and extremely likely that U.S. authorities will is more popular than Musharraf among the Royal College of Defense Studies in London. He refuse to release every Saudi national detained Pakistanis and that the United States has an all teaches at Georgetown University on security issues at Guantanamo. Nonetheless, it is the Saudi time low popularity rating.9 Rather than being in South Asia and the Middle East. government’s position to work for the release a bulwark against al-Qaìda, Musharraf’s of all its nationals held as enemy combatants. regime has become a recruiting cry for it. By * * * As early as January 2002, Saudi Arabia began backing Musharraf, the United States may be losing the battle for the hearts and minds of 170 to publicly press for the repatriation of Saudi million Pakistanis. The Saudi Process nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay.2 of Repatriating According to reports published at the time, For its part, the Pakistani military is extremely and Reintegrating Prince Nayef, the minister of interior, stated suspicious of the United States and believes that 100 of the 158 detainees in Guantanamo it has been betrayed by Washington many Guantanamo Returnees were Saudi, and that 240 Saudis were times in the past. It is unlikely to cooperate apprehended by joint U.S.-Pakistani teams seriously with American programs designed By Christopher Boucek on the Afghan border.3 The number of Saudi to increase the U.S. military presence on the prisoners at Guantanamo rose to 125 by the ground in FATA, or to “secure” Pakistan’s the plight of Saudi nationals interned at summer of 2002.4 The Saudis offered to nuclear arsenal. As tensions inevitably mount Guantanamo Bay has been a major domestic interrogate and try them in Saudi Arabia and between the U.S. Congress and Musharraf issue in Saudi Arabia since the detention also offered to assist in the interrogation of over his continued rule, pressure will build to facility first opened in January 2002. For suspected al-Qaìda operatives in American constrain further military ties, and suspicions nearly six years, the Saudi government detention at the U.S. base in Cuba.5 In February will grow within the army about American has sought to secure the repatriation of its 2002, Prince Nayef stated that he wanted to reliability. nationals. From the outset, Saudi authorities see all the Saudis in Guantanamo returned have maintained that when the Saudi to the kingdom after the investigations were Conclusion nationals detained at Guantanamo do return concluded.6 It is disturbing enough that Pakistan is the to the kingdom, that they “will be subject real front line in the war against al-Qaìda. to Saudi laws and justice.”1 This article will In June 2002, a Saudi team of experts drawn The most frightening concern, however, is al- outline the repatriation procedure for Saudi from the Interior and Foreign Ministries Qaìda’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Pakistan returnees from Guantanamo and detail their made the first publicly acknowledged visit is the world’s only Muslim state with nuclear reintegration process. These programs are part to Saudi nationals interned at Guantanamo.7 weapons. According to the International of a much larger Saudi security and counter- According to published reports, no Saudi Institute for Strategic Studies, Pakistan has terrorism strategy designed to undermine officials had been allowed to meet with any an estimated 50-90 nuclear weapons.10 The the support for terrorism in the kingdom of the Guantanamo detainees prior to this. former director of the Central Intelligence through the rehabilitation and demobilization According to press reports from the time, Agency, George Tenet, in his memoirs laid of its supporters and activists. Unique in Deputy Interior Minister Prince Ahmed out in great detail al-Qaìda’s efforts during their size, scope and content, Saudi Arabia’s bin Abdel Aziz was forced to meet with the last decade to get its hands on a Pakistani rehabilitation programs are generating positive representative of the International Committee nuclear device.11 If Pakistan becomes more results that demonstrate alternative ways of of the Red Cross to learn about the status of destabilized, it is likely that al-Qaìda will dealing with the many dilemmas posed by Saudi prisoners.8 make every effort to get one. indefinite incarceration. By August 2002 it was revealed that the Saudi Bruce Riedel is Senior Fellow for Political There have been a number of releases government was in negotiations for the return Transitions in the Middle East and South Asia and repatriations of Saudi nationals from of Saudi nationals detained at Guantanamo.9 in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Guantanamo. About 117 of the 139 Saudis While negotiations were acknowledged Brookings Institution. He retired in 2006 after 30 held at Guantanamo have been returned to to have started, it was also acknowledged years service at the Central Intelligence Agency their home country. Detainees are usually that they would need much more time. In including postings overseas. He was a senior released in groups from Guantanamo and May 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell advisor on South Asia and the Middle East to the the Saudi government then brings them back announced that the United States and Saudi last three Presidents of the United States in the to the kingdom. This is all part of a carefully Arabia had reached an agreement to repatriate staff of the National Security Council at the White choreographed reintegration procedure House. He was also Deputy Assistant Secretary of designed to facilitate dialogue and reinforce Defense for the Near East and South Asia at the the message that the Saudi government is 2 Al-Watan, January 28, 2002; Arab News, January 29, striving to help individuals corrupted by 2002. 9 “Poll: Bin Laden Tops Musharraf in Pakistan,” CNN, extremist beliefs return to proper Islam. 3 Ibid. September 11, 2007. 4 Okaz, August 26, 2002; Arab News, August 31, 2002. 10 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nu- The first repatriation occurred in May 2003, 5 Arab News, February 11, 2002. clear Black Markets: Pakistan, AQ Khan and the Rise of Pro- and the most recent took place in November 6 Okaz, February 27, 2002. liferation Networks (London: Hastings Print, 2007). 7 Al-Watan, June 29, 2002; Arab News, June 30, 2002. 11 George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at 1 Tarek Tershishy, “Naif Refutes Jail Torture Allega- 8 Arab News, June 30, 2002; Okaz, June 13, 2002. the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007). tions,” Arab News, January 31, 2002. 9 Arab News, August 27, 2002; Okaz, August 26, 2002.

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Saudi nationals interned at Guantanamo.10 returnees are transferred to jail, usually to al- and one that generates positive results in large During that month, the first Saudis were Ha’ir prison outside Riyadh. part due to traditional Saudi cultural factors. released. In fact, often when Guantanamo returnees Reunions are furloughed for religious observances or Repatriation Once they have arrived, the Ministry of family celebrations such as weddings, the Strict secrecy surrounds the return of each Interior formally contacts the families of family members of those still remaining at group of detainees and there is no advance returnees and informs them that their loved Guantanamo provide such strict surveillance announcement of when a group will return to ones have returned. Assistant Minister that security personnel often can step back and the kingdom. An official plane is dispatched of Interior for Security Affairs Prince observe from a distance.14 with representatives of the Ministry Mohammed bin Nayef personally contacts of Interior and the ministry’s Advisory families, and others are notified directly by Reintegration Committee, including medical doctors provincial governors. The ministry then After going through questioning, returnees are and other assorted medical personnel, brings the families to Riyadh where they are brought into the Saudi judicial system. They are psychologists, psychiatrists and security checked into one hotel at the government’s usually charged from among several offenses, officers. The plane departs from Riyadh in expense. After the families have been notified, most frequently leaving the kingdom without the early morning before dawn, and makes the ministry releases the names of all the permission and carrying a weapon. Their cases only one stop en route for several hours in Saudis that have returned to the kingdom and Morocco. In Cuba, the Saudis meet with provides a telephone number to the media for the Americans to receive the Saudis that friends and extended family to contact. No “A vital part of this process are to be repatriated. When the Saudis take announcements are made before their arrival is that the returnee has custody of their nationals, they request that in order to reduce media sensationalism, keep they be un-handcuffed before boarding. the focus on family reunifications and also incriminated his actions, This is important as it sets the stage for all because it can never be known with certainty and recognized his guilt.” subsequent interactions with the returnees. who the U.S. military will release. Saudi medical personnel collect medical records and, if needed, supplies of any For the first week the returnees just visit with medications that they may be taking. After their families. The ministry brings families are tried before a special court arranged by the this short transfer process, the Saudi plane out to al-Ha’ir prison and coordinates the Justice Ministry. It is important to note that then departs for the return flight to Riyadh. visits for all the detainees. Meanwhile, this is not a “special court” similar to a security counselors and shaykhs from the Advisory court as in other Arab countries, but simply According to personnel involved in the flights, Committee are also at the hotel to speak a special arrangement to handle the cases of returnees are often silent and expressionless with returnees’ families. This is done not Guantanamo returnees whose cases are too at first, unsure at what is happening to them. only to provide counseling services for the sensitive to appear in the regular court system. After years of internment, it takes some time emotionally exhausting experience that they The returnees are not transferred to the court for the reality that they are on their way are undergoing, but also to start the process like other defendants, and the judge visits them back home to fully process. Doctors tend to of interacting with the returnees’ families in this special arrangement. the returnees, performing routine exams and larger social network. The involvement and diagnostic tests onboard the aircraft.11 of an individual’s family and larger social After typically being found guilty of these After completing the medical screening, network is a critical aspect of all Saudi charges,15 returnees are usually sentenced for psychological evaluations begin. The rehabilitation and reintegration programs, up to two years. While serving their sentence, questioning, interrogation and counseling and it is essential to the program’s success. Guantanamo returnees go through the process also begin on the flight back from Engaging the families of returnees has been Counseling Program, the Ministry of Interior’s Guantanamo. The entire process lasts about a priority from the outset. One of the earliest rehabilitation program designed to counter 38 hours, with the plane touching down in moves was the creation of a special liaison takfiri (excommunication) extremism through Riyadh in the early morning darkness. office in the ministry to work exclusively a combination of intensive religious study with the families of Guantanamo detainees and dialogue and psychological counseling.16 A number of dignitaries often greet their to facilitate information sharing about After serving between six months to one year arrival, including members of the royal family kin and the delivery of letters.13 in custody, it is not uncommon for a returnee family. The plane is met at the airport by to receive a royal pardon, at which point they more officials from the Advisory Committee After being reunited with their own families, are transferred to the Ministry of Interior’s and the ministry’s rehabilitation program. the returnees meet with the families of other rehabilitation care facility. It is understood Shaykh Ahmed Hamid Jelani, director of the Saudi nationals still held at Guantanamo. that this occurs after sufficient progress Care Rehabilitation Center, boards the plane This is important for a number of reasons, has been made in the counseling process and personally welcomes all of the returnees most of all to impress upon the returnees that and the Advisory Committee has made back to their country.12 From the airport, should they run afoul of the authorities, their comrades who they left at Guantanamo will 14 Personal interview, HRH Prince Muhammed bin 10 Okaz, May 25, 2003. not return. It is therefore critical that they not Nayef, assistant minister of interior for security affairs, 11 Personal interview, Dr. Abdel Aziz al-Ghamdi, Ri- fall in with the wrong crowd. This aspect of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, October 2007. yadh, Saudi Arabia, November 2007. collective responsibility is a common thread in 15 This is not always the case. 12 Personal interviews, Shaykh Ahmed Hamid Jelani Saudi rehabilitation and after-care programs, 16 Christopher Boucek, “Extremist Reeducation and and Care Rehabilitation Center staff, Riyadh, Saudi Ara- Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia,” Terrorism Monitor 5:16 bia, November 2007. 13 Arab News, January 13, 2003. (2007).

11 DECEMBER 2007 . Vol 1 . Issue 1 a recommendation that the returnee has intangible factors offered by the program. the global jihadist movement.1 Two of his adequately proven himself to be ready to move It is here where the Saudi effort has made books, Risalat al-Umdah Fi I’dad al-Uddah to the next stage in the rehabilitation process. remarkable progress in only several years. (Foundations in Preparing for Jihad) and al-Jami A vital part of this process is that the returnee fi Talab al-I’lim al-Sharif (The Comprehensive has incriminated his actions, and recognized To date, none of the released Saudi Book about the Pursuit of Glorious Knowledge) his guilt.17 Guantanamo returnees have reoffended.22 The are core jihadist texts: over the past decade, results generated by the Saudi reintegration they have been found in the hands of terrorist At this point, returnees are transferred from program have lead to considerable interest in cells worldwide. Sharif’s other writings, such confined custody in a correctional facility exploring alternatives to traditional “hard” as The Five Ground Rules for the Achievement to a residential rehabilitation center. The security measures. Admittedly, the Saudi of the Tradition of Victory or its Absence, The environment at the Care Rehabilitation Center program utilizes many unique cultural Manhaj of Ahl As-Sunnah Wal-Jama’ah and The is in marked contrast to that inside prison.18 features, many of which are distinctive to the Refutation of the Doubts Concerning Bay’ah and While residents at the rehabilitation center kingdom. Imarah are actively shared in their original are still confined to the center, there is much Arabic and in English translation online.2 greater latitude in activities and living style.19 What the Saudi program demonstrates, Dorms replace cells, and there are numerous however, is that there is a solution to the Countering Jihadist Ideology activities, including sports and other massive populations in security prisons, Sayyid Imam’s current book is an attempt recreational pastimes. and with a reported 25,000 prisoners in to counter those earlier works by way of a U.S. custody in Iraq alone, it is clear why the fiqh-based (legal) series of clarifications and Most importantly, every resident at the American military has expressed an interest. reconsiderations. The jihadist use of violence center knows exactly how long he will be As such, the Saudi reintegration programs in trying to overthrow Islamic governments there, and this contributes to the atmosphere not only warrant further detailed study, is both counter-productive and religiously of non-confrontation. At the rehabilitation but examination of how they can be applied unlawful, Sayyid Imam now argues. Da`wa, center, returnees spend time with the doctors elsewhere. or the practice of publicly calling others to and shaykhs from the Advisory Committee Islam, is a much safer, effective and religiously who will evaluate the progress and make Christopher Boucek is a Postdoctoral Researcher justifiable way to channel one’s grievances recommendations for each detainee’s release. at Princeton University and a Lecturer at the against a regime. Sayyid Imam prompts Through classes, therapy, dialogue, discussion Woodrow Wilson School. He recently returned Muslims to try non-violent attempts to reform and interaction, the staff of the rehabilitation from further research in Saudi Arabia. This article (al-islah) laws that are not in accordance with center seek to add in good behavior after bad is part of a larger ongoing research project on Saudi Sharià. He advises that Muslims flee state behavior has been removed in prison.20 While rehabilitation and reintegration programs. persecution (al-hijra) when necessary instead at the rehabilitation center, returnees are of fighting, or isolate al-ùzla( ) themselves from permitted to leave for short periods when in * * * corruption that cannot be escaped. Muslims the custody of their family, and their families should pardon (al-àfw) the harmful actions of can visit them at the center. Through these Leading Egyptian Jihadist others, forgive (al-safh) one’s enemies, shun (al- activities, trust is built, and slowly they are i’rad) those who advocate un-Islamic behavior reintegrated into society.21 Sayyid Imam Renounces and maintain patience (al-aabr) in the face of Violence seemingly insurmountable challenges. Upon release, the government has helped returnees secure employment and housing, By Jarret Brachman According to Sayyid Imam, in judging has paid for wedding dowries and automobiles, whether or not to employ violence, and even provides additional stipends. Much in november 2007, Sayyid Imam Àbd al- particularly against an Islamic government has been made in the Western press of the Àziz Imam al-Sharif, the former mufti of or foreign tourists, one must always consider financial incentives offered to returnees; Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and mentor whether the potential damage of such an however, this focus is disproportionate to to Ayman al-Zawahiri, released his much act outweighs the potential benefits that the vast amount of work that goes unseen anticipated book, Tarshid al-Jihad fi Misr wa could be gained. Since violence only leads by the program workers. While the financial al-Aalam (Rationalizations on Jihad in Egypt to death, destruction and further violence, support should not be discounted since it is a and the World). Published in serialized format Sayyid Imam concludes that it can never crucial part of the Saudi strategy, it needs to by the Egyptian daily al-Masry al-Youm, the be justified within Islamic law and must, be put into proper perspective alongside the book is already being hailed within official therefore, never be applied on religious Egyptian circles as the definitive renunciation grounds. On practical grounds, he suggests, 17 Personal interview, HRH Prince Muhammed bin of violence by one of the most influential armed action against an entrenched power Nayef, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, October 2007. jihadist thinkers alive today. does not make historical sense; after 18 Based on site visits to al-Ha’ir prison and the Care Re- decades of violence in Egypt, for instance, habilitation Center, November 2007. Sayyid Imam, better known by his nom de jihadists have yet to overthrow the ruling 19 For a good overview of the rehabilitation center, see plume Abd al-Qadir ibn Abd al-Aziz or his regime. Sayyid Imam’s approach, therefore, the online Time magazine photo essay at www.time.com. moniker Dr. Fadl, is a living legend within 20 Personal interview, Dr. Turki al-Atyan, psycholo- 1 Militant Ideology Atlas (West Point, NY: Combating gist, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, November 2007. Terrorism Center, 2006), available at www.ctc.usma. 21 Personal interview, Dr. Abdulrahman al-Hadlaq, ad- edu/atlas/atlas.asp. viser to HRH assistant minister of interior for security 22 Personal interviews, Ministry of Interior officials, Ri- 2 A comprehensive collection of Sayyid Imam’s early affairs, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, November 2007. yadh, Saudi Arabia, October and November 2007. books can be found in Arabic at www.tawhed.ws.

12 DECEMBER 2007 . Vol 1 . Issue 1 is to maintain his ideological commitment to By 2006, Sayyid Imam had been extradited to In it, he said that Sayyid Imam tarnished his applying Sharià on Earth, but to reject the Egypt by the Yemenis, and with the support of religious credentials the moment he broke use of violence against governments who the Egyptian government he began lecturing from Zawahiri in 1993. He accused Sayyid fail to apply it. He can, therefore, maintain with his longtime colleague, Àbd al-Àziz Imam of misrepresenting the reality of jihadist his Salafist credentials while also appeasing al-Jamal, to imprisoned members of various armed action in his book and implied that his Egyptian overseers. jihadist groups in the al-Fayyum Prison on Sayyid Imam was little more than an armchair the legal limitations of armed action. As the ideologue even when he was aligned with Sayyid Imam’s Rationalizations is one in a highest-ranking Islamic scholar in Egyptian the movement. Now in prison, Sayyid Imam series of recantations emerging out of the prison, Sayyid Imam commanded the has shown just how weak he is to Egyptian Egyptian government’s initiative to quash respect across jihadist subsets that neither government pressure, al-Hakaymah chided, radicalism within its borders. The historic Ayyub nor Naìm could. Sayyid Imam’s particularly when compared to the dedication leadership of Egypt’s other major terrorist book has also caused a stir among his former of another imprisoned Egyptian jihadist organization, al-Gamaà al-Islamiyya (The colleagues who have since launched their ideologue, Shaykh Ùmar Àbd al-Rahman. Islamic Group), led the charge in 1997 by own coordinated response. announcing a formal cease-fire, which they Conclusion followed in 2003 with a renunciation of Jihadists Respond Sayyid Imam’s book will continue to cause violence altogether in the form of two books: After submitting Rationalizations to the al- al-Qaìda headaches, particularly because it al-Riyadh Bombing: Rulings and Repercussions Azhar scholars for their review, Sayyid condemns men like Zawahiri not simply on and River of Memories.3 As reward for their Imam faxed a statement to al-Sharq al-Awsat strategic grounds but on religious and legal moves toward reconciliation, Egyptian announcing the impending release of his grounds, something few hard line scholars authorities released more than 900 retractions. Ayman al-Zawahiri took the first have been able to do with any real credence to imprisoned members of al-Gamaà. shot in his July 5, 2007 video, observing, date. Sayyid Imam traces Zawahiri’s record of Sharià violations back to November 1993 One of EIJ’s first retractions came in March I read a ridiculous bit of humor in when the Vanguards of Conquest terrorist 2000 from the Egyptian Islamist now living as al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper, which group, an offshoot of EIJ with which he and a political refugee in Germany, Osama Ayyub. claimed that it received a communiqué Zawahiri were both intimately involved, tried Ayyub’s attempt to reform Islamic Jihad’s from one of the backtrackers, who to assassinate Egyptian Prime Minister Àtif ideology generated only limited support, most faxed it from prison…I laughed inside Siddiqi. notably from Shaykh Ahmad Yusuf, the amir and asked myself, “Do the prison cells of the Bani Suwayf group, and Shaykh Nabil al- of Egypt now have fax machines? When the bomb exploded, the prime minister Mughrabi, who was serving two life sentences And I wonder, are these fax machines escaped with minor wounds. A 12-year-old girl in Egyptian prison.4 connected to the same line as the named Shayma, however, was inadvertently electric shock machines, or do they killed by flying shrapnel from the car bomb, During the summer of 2004, two more have a separate line?”6 which the Egyptian government seized as an senior EIJ figures, Nabil Naìm, a senior opportunity to turn public sentiment against leader of Islamic Jihad in Egypt since Ayman Al-Qaìda’s ideological hitman, Abu Yahya Zawahiri, Sayyid Imam and the EIJ.9 Nearly al-Zawahiri left him in charge in the mid- al-Libi, followed Zawahiri’s comments in a 1,000 members and supporters of the group 1980s, and his colleague Ismail Nasr, drew speech where, rather than interpreting Sayyid were subsequently arrested and the group up a “draft document” entitled Visualization, Imam’s abandonment of jihadist principles plummeted in popularity. in which they rejected violent attempts to as an ideological defeat for the jihadist overthrow Islamic governments and urged movement, he characterized it as just another It is possible that Sayyid Imam will be able the al-Azhar University scholars to publicly weapon being wielded in the Crusader’s “war to harness this newfound attention and use readdress the issue. Like Ayyub, Naìm and of ideas.”7 Muslims, he suggested, should it to create a self-sustaining counter-jihadist Nasr could only generate limited support from dismiss the news as a result of torture, movement. According to Nu`man bin within the imprisoned Islamic Jihad ranks: brainwashing and blackmail. Ùthman, the former leader of the Libyan Shaykh Ahmad Yusuf Hamdallah, Dr. Ahmad Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Sayyid Ujayzah and Shaykh Amal Àbd al-Wahhab Muhammad Khalil al-Hakaymah, the former Imam’s revisions could turn out to be a were the only major figures to support the al-Gama’a member who has since pledged major ideological defeat for the global jihadist move. The competing al-Marj group, led by allegiance to al-Qaìda’s senior leadership, movement because it offers real “preventive Majdi Salim and the Abu Za’bal group, led by followed Zawahiri and Abu Yahya with a therapy” to at-risk youth.10 For Ùthman, Ahmad Salamah Mabruk, rejected Naìm’s six-point response to Sayyid Imam’s book.8 Rationalizations demonstrates a compelling initiative on grounds that he lacked the middle way for Egyptian Muslims between religious qualifications to authorize such a Jihad Joins Initiative for Halting Violence in Egypt,” al- being a religious lackey and a jihadist revision. Sayyid Imam, however, changed the Hayah, March 22, 2007. terrorist. By rejecting the doctrine of takfir 5 picture. 6 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Advice of One Concerned,” July (excommunication) and the jihadists’ reliance 5, 2007. on violence to deal with political grievances, 3 Jailan Halawi, al-Ahram Weekly, October 9-15, 2003. 7 Abu Yahya al-Libi, 93-minute video release, Septem- 4 Muhammad Shafey, Asharq Alawsat, December 6, ber 10, 2007. 9 See Ayman al-Zawahiri’s discussion of this incident in 2007. 8 Muhammad Khalil al-Hakaymah, “Statement About Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet, which was serial- 5 Camille al-Tawil, “The Two Leaders, Dr. Fadl And What Has Been Published of the Document Entitled ‘Ra- ized in al-Sharq al-Awsat in December 2001. Abd-al-Aziz al-Jamal, Appear For First Time Since They tionalization of Jihad Operations,’” al-Fajr Media Center, 10 Nu`man bin Ùthman, “Egyptian al-Jihad Domi- Were Handed Over By Yemen 2002 Former Amir of November 26, 2007. nates al-Qaìda,” Djazair News, November 17, 2007.

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Sayyid Imam seems to believe that he can September 2006. officers who were pushed into retirement in spark a reformation within Salafist thinking the aftermath of the 1994 Civil War.3 This move both in Egypt and across the Islamic world. The delay in prosecuting these suspects, has sparked protests and demonstrations, As long as the Egyptian government keeps many of whom have been in custody since some of which have turned violent across the its distance from Sayyid Imam’s efforts, it just early 2007, is indicative of Yemen’s approach south. Similarly, the government has also been might work. to the second phase of the war on al-Qaìda. making cuts in subsidies on oil, gas and diesel, In the first phase, which lasted from October which has affected the price of all commodities, Dr. Jarret Brachman is a specialist on terrorism, 2000 to November 2003, Yemen achieved while at the same time government salaries Islamist movements and counter-terrorism policy. success in utilizing U.S. support to dismantle have failed to keep pace with inflation.4 He currently serves as the Director of Research the leadership of al-Qaìda in Yemen. This has provoked demonstrations and in the Combating Terrorism Center at the United Àli Qa’id al-Harithi, the then head of al- protests attacking the government for poor States Military Academy and is also an Adjunct Qaìda in Yemen, was eliminated through a management. As these protests become more Professor at New York University’s Center for targeted assassination carried out by a CIA widespread during the coming years and as Global Affairs. Dr. Brachman conducts research drone in November 2002. His replacement, the government continues to lose money due on al-Qaìda strategy, Salafist thought and Muhammad Hamdi al-Ahdal, was also to falling oil production, there is a danger that jihadist use of new media technologies. He has removed from the scene in November 2003 these different movements will coalesce into a testified before the U.S. Congress, spoken before the when he was arrested at a wedding in single strand of anti-regime hostility.5 British House of Lords and routinely advises senior Sanaà. Following a series of attacks in the al- government officials on counter-terrorism strategy. Qadisiyah district of Sanaà in 2002, Yemen As a result, in the future Yemen will be less His work has been profiled on 60 Minutes, CNN, carried out a number of security sweeps and able to combat al-Qaìda than in the past. As A&E and a variety of international media outlets arrested a significant amount of al-Qaìda the government continues to grow weaker and including al-Jazira and Sharq al-Awsat. He operatives. has less money to distribute, it will find that its served as a Fellow with the Central Intelligence tradition of financial persuasion and playing Agency’s Counter-Terrorist Center before coming Government Focuses Less on al-Qaìda different groups off against one another will to West Point. His new book, Global Jihadism: Since then, however, al-Qaìda has become no longer be feasible. The government will Theory and Practice, is forthcoming with much less of a priority for the Yemeni increasingly lack the resources—both military Routledge Press. government. Part of this is a result of the and financial—to compel different tribes to success Yemen enjoyed during the first phase; act in accordance with policy determined in * * * with al-Qaìda in Yemen largely destroyed Sanaà. Out of necessity, it will also seek to or its operatives in jail, there seemed little avoid direct confrontations with its enemies Securing Yemen’s urgency in continuing to fight an enemy that as it attempts to ensure its own survival. could not strike back. Those Yemenis that Instead, it will be forced to pursue its policy Cooperation in the Second were still free and eager to continue the fight of persuasion through other channels. Yemen Phase of the War on were drawn more to the war in Iraq against has already given the United States an example al-Qaìda U.S. and coalition forces than they were to a of how this will work with regard to al-Qaìda leaderless jihad at home. Yemen also began to in the case of Jamal al-Badawi. By Gregory Johnsen divert its limited resources, which had been devoted to keeping al-Qaìda in check, to The Case of Jamal al-Badawi in early november, Yemen concluded an other more pressing issues such as a revolt in In mid-October, Yemen announced that Jamal eight-month trial of 36 suspected al-Qaìda the northern highlands, growing public unrest al-Badawi, one of the masterminds of the militants. The trial, which was plagued by over inflation and unemployment as well as USS Cole attack, had surrendered to Yemeni lengthy delays and allegations of torture, was rising regional tensions along pre-unification authorities after months of negotiation between the first legal action to address the country’s lines. All of these issues have increasingly the government and tribal intermediaries. resurgent al-Qaìda threat.1 At the center of occupied the government’s attention since Within weeks, media reports out of Yemen the trial was the role of the accused in two 2004 and will continue to do so for the were stating that al-Badawi was free and 2 operations that marked the emergence of the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, as Yemen receiving visitors at his home in Aden. The second generation of al-Qaìda in Yemen has been forced to deal with a number of United States reacted immediately to the militants in 2006. The first was the February different threats to its government, it has also reports by postponing payment of more than 2006 prison break of 23 al-Qaìda militants been faced with a decline in oil production. $20 million in aid that was to be paid to Yemen 6 from a Political Security Prison in Sanaà, This has corresponded to a similar fall off through its Millennium Challenge Account. which provided a core group of experienced in oil revenue, upon which Yemen is almost Threatened with a reduction in aid on which it leaders around whom Yemen’s young and completely dependent. The government has largely directionless jihadists could rally. long used oil revenue to co-opt enemies and 3 Ahmad al-Hajj, “Retired Soldiers Protest in Yemen,” The second operation, which demonstrated potential enemies. Significant declines in oil Associated Press, September 1, 2007. the new generation’s tactical goals, was the revenue make the traditional approach to 4 Mohammed bin Sallam, “Protests Continue, Clerics failure of coordinated suicide attacks on oil governing Yemen untenable. Advise Government to Reform Situations,” Yemen Times, and gas facilities in Hadramawt and Mar’ib in November 11, 2007. Already the government has been forced to 5 For more on the future of Yemen, see Gregory D. Johns- withdraw pensions from former southern en, Reforming Yemen: Foreign Aid and the Push For Democ- 1 For more information on the trial, see Brian O’Neill, racy (London: Foreign Policy Centre, Forthcoming). “New Generation of al-Qaeda on Trial in Yemen,” Terror- 2 Gregory D. Johnsen, “Well Gone Dry: A Letter from 6 “US aid for Yemen Linked to al-Qaeda Suspect,” ism Focus 4:39 (2007). San‘a,” The American Interest 2:2 (2006): pp. 131-139. Agence France-Presse, October 29, 2007.

14 DECEMBER 2007 . Vol 1 . Issue 1 was depending, Yemen scrambled to prove to caravan in Mar’ib made clear, is determined Southern Thailand Washington that al-Badawi was still in prison. to strike whenever and wherever it can, while U.S. officials were taken on a prison tour to the old guard continues to call for caution and Insurgency Fails to visit al-Badawi in his cell. More recently, the patience. Achieve Popular Support independent weekly al-Wasat reported that al-Badawi has once again been released from U.S. Policy Toward Yemen By Peter Chalk prison.7 This report was immediately denied The United States will only be successful in by the Ministry of the Interior.8 the second phase of the war against al-Qaìda the security situation in southern Thailand if it can convince Yemen that the interests of has elicited growing concern during the past Whether or not al-Badawi is currently free both countries converge when it comes to the four years as a wave of militant attacks have is largely irrelevant. If he is not free he terrorist group. This will not be accomplished swept across the Malay Muslim provinces of eventually will be, unless the United States easily. There are two critical points that the Yala, Pattani1 and Narathiwat.2 Despite the continues to threaten Yemen with drastic United States must recognize. First, what it growing violence, there is little indication that cuts in aid money. As part of the deal that led wants Yemen to be capable of and what the the region is on the verge of a mass uprising, to his surrender, Yemen promised al-Badawi Yemeni government is actually capable of not least because the current generation of his freedom in exchange for his commitment are not the same. Second, despite its global insurgents has yet to gain a strong foothold not to engage in violent activities within the standing, the United States is not the most of support among the local population. The borders of the state. This deal is similar to influential country to Yemen. Saudi Arabia is militants’ lack of popular traction provides other agreements that Yemen has reached much more important to Yemen’s economic Bangkok with an unprecedented opportunity with some of the other escapees, as well future and long-term stability than is the to garner greater trust and legitimacy in the so- as with imprisoned jihadists.9 Yemen will United States. Riyadh injects more money called “deep south” (and thereby marginalize appease the United States when it is forced to, into Yemen both officially and unofficially— extremist separatist sentiment), but only if but it is more worried about its reputation as through payoffs to tribal leaders—than does indigenous Malay Muslims are allowed to an honest negotiator and its future ability to any other country. There is also a feeling integrate into the wider Thai polity on their deter jihadists; it is not concerned with past within Yemen that the United States and its own terms. attacks, but rather is determined to head off aid may disappear when its security interests future attacks, such as the one in Mar’ib this are no longer threatened. This is not the case A Catalogue of Violence past summer, which could further destabilize for Saudi Arabia. Just as the United States uses In the 43 months from January 2004 to the its economy. regional neighbors in other parts of the world end of August 2007, a total of 7,473 acts as intermediaries, so too must it utilize Saudi of violence were recorded in the Malay- Yemen’s strategy seems clear. It will negotiate Arabia to help stabilize Yemen as well as assist dominated provinces of Yala, Pattani and and release individuals who promise not it in combating al-Qaìda. Narathiwat, leaving 2,566 dead (which equates to carry out operations within Yemen. to an average of roughly 60 fatalities a month) Intentionally or not, this policy has had the Washington should make clear to Yemen that and 4,187 injured. Civilians have been hardest effect of driving a wedge between al-Qaìda’s it will not allow it to become a failed state. hit, accounting for nearly three-quarters old guard and its younger, more radicalized Not only will this ensure greater Yemeni of all casualties, with respective tallies for members. The old guard, which experienced cooperation against al-Qaìda, but it is also the Buddhist and Muslim communities the crackdown and dismantling of its in the best long-term interests of the United amounting to 1,124 and 1,330 killed and leadership in the first phase of the war, has States. It should also pressure Saudi Arabia 2,483 and 1,238 injured.3 For a population largely embraced the government’s offer, while to funnel all money into Yemen through the the new generation has steadfastly refused to government, which will not only further 1 Malays spell Pattani with only one “t” in reference to 10 budge from its militarized stance. During the stabilize the economy but also allow the the historical Kingdom of Patani Darussalam. “Pattani,” past few months, the two sides have engaged central government greater control over its which is used throughout this paper, is the official trans- in an increasingly acrimonious debate over hinterlands. Only by guaranteeing the regime’s literation employed by the Thai state. the future of al-Qaìda in Yemen. Fragments survival will Sanaà be free to pursue the war 2 Overviews of the roots of Malay Muslim separatism in of this debate have emerged in public forums against al-Qaìda in Yemen in concert with the southern Thailand can be found in Surin Pitsuwan, Islam such as chat rooms and media outlets, but most United States. Otherwise, it will be forced to and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay Muslims of this discussion has remained private. What rely on a haphazard policy of half-measures. of Southern Thailand (Bangkok: The Khadi Research In- does seem clear, however, is that the two sides stitute, 1985); Thanet Aphornsuvan, Origins of Malay- have broken with each other over the issue Gregory D. Johnsen is the author of the forthcoming Muslim ‘Separatism’ in Southern Thailand, Asia Research of carrying out attacks in Yemen. The new monograph Reforming Yemen: Foreign Institute Working Paper No. 32 (Singapore: Singapore generation, as the July 2 attack on a tourist Aid and the Push for Democracy (Foreign National University, 2005); R.J. May, “The Religious Policy Centre). He has written for a variety of Factor in Three Religious Minority Movements,” Con- 7 “Al-Sulta tafarij al-Badawi lil-murrah al-thaniyyah,” publications, including The American Interest, temporary Southeast Asia 13:4 (1992); and Omar Farouk, al-Wasat, December 5, 2007. The Christian Science Monitor and The Boston “The Historical and Transnational Dimensions of Ma- 8 “Al-dakhaliyyah nafit itlaq al-Badawi lil-murrah al- Globe. Mr. Johnsen has also consulted for various lay-Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand,” in Lim thaniyyah,” News Yemen, December 5, 2007. organizations on security and political issues Joo Jock and S. Vani eds., Armed Separatism in Southern 9 Gregory D. Johnsen, “Tracking Yemen’s 23 Escaped Ji- in Yemen and the Gulf. He is currently a Ph.D. Thailand (Singapore: ISEAS, 1984). hadi Operatives – Part 2,” Terrorism Monitor 5:19 (2007). candidate in Near Eastern Studies at Princeton 3 Personal interview, Pattani, Thailand, September 10 See, for example, the insightful article on the split be- University. 2007. These statistics are based on figures maintained tween the two generations published by al-Ghad, July 4, by Professor Srisompob at Pattani Songkhla Univer- 2007. sity (PSU), which are generally recognized to be the most

15 DECEMBER 2007 . Vol 1 . Issue 1 that numbers only 1.8 million,4 these figures full, mass-based conflict.6 While such a operational efforts.10 As one Pattani-based represent a considerable toll. scenario cannot be ruled out—the bulk of the Muslim scholar explained to this author: local population clearly rejects the explicit Besides the higher intensity of attacks, the assimilationist orientation that underlies For the insurgents, there is no perceived nature of the current bout of instability in the Thai concept of nation-building7—the need to win over the population, as the the south has been marked by an explicit possibility of an open-ended separatist people tend to lack trust in the security religious undertone of a sort not apparent war breaking out is being mitigated by the forces; [the assumption is that] they will in past years. Reflective of this have been insurgency’s general failure to achieve any real therefore gravitate to [the insurgents] by frequent attacks against drinking dens, degree of popular support. default. [Militant] propaganda strategy gambling halls, karaoke bars and other has, as a result, largely taken the form establishments associated with Western Insurgent Traction Among the Local Malay of capitalizing on the mistakes of the “decadence” and secularism; the distribution Muslim Population authorities.11 of leaflets (allegedly printed in the northern In contrast to past manifestations of the southern Thai conflict, there does not appear Although clearly motivated by fear, the bulk to be a concerted effort by the current militant of Malays living in the border provinces have “Despite its seriousness, generation to win over the hearts and minds yet to be cowed into demanding outright there is no indication of the indigenous populations across Yala, independence. While palpable resentment Pattani and Narathiwat. Indeed, other than over Bangkok’s mismanagement of the south yet that the insurgency repeatedly highlighting the presumed threat definitely exists, separatist militants have not is on the verge of going posed to Malay Muslim culture by a foreign been able to effectively translate this to their and repressive Buddhist state, there has been advantage precisely because their strategy ‘critical.’” little, if any, attempt by extremist entities has relied on brutality and scaremongering. to solicit widespread civic support through Perhaps the best indication of this is that overt positive political propaganda or messaging.8 symbols of the Thai polity (such as the national By contrast, the emphasis has revolved around flag and posters of the royal family) not Malaysian state of Kelantan) declaring that intimidating the population through threats only remain in evidence, but are also largely the Thai state is engaged in a systematic and directed acts of violence. Certainly, there accepted, while graffiti calling for a “Free campaign to eradicate the Islamic faith and has been no attempt to isolate local Malays Pattani” is noticeably absent.12 This is not the warning local Malays of severe reprisals if from the effects of bombings and shootings— type of environment that one would typically they do not adhere to traditional Muslim reflected in the number of Muslims that have associate with a seething hotbed of regional ways; and the increased targeting of monks been killed or injured in insurgent attacks— secessionist sentiment. and other Buddhist civilians—often through with resultant casualties either casually brutal means such as live burnings and dismissed as collateral damage or weakly The Future beheadings—in an apparent effort to destroy justified as the inevitable repercussions for Despite its seriousness, there is no indication the societal fabric by fostering communal fear, failing to adhere to a “true” Islamic path.9 yet that the insurgency is on the verge of conflict and hatred.5 going “critical.” Most Malay Muslims do not Critically, the army and police have largely seem to want an independent state and reject The heightened scale of unrest plaguing failed to offset these coercive tactics by the extreme and arbitrary nature of militant Bangkok’s southern border provinces has providing an adequate security environment attacks. The one factor that could change this prompted growing concern that the Malay on the ground. This has inevitably led to a dynamic would be a major crackdown by Muslim struggle is rapidly approaching situation whereby the local populace neither the security forces that results in large-scale a “tipping point” that could morph into a trusts the security forces nor believes it casualties, or an attempt to forcibly institute a has any choice other than to comply with non-Islamic credo in the region. rebel orders and assist in their logistical and comprehensive and accurate data set currently avail- It remains to be seen how the new political able. 6 Views of this sort have been expressed in numerous environment that has been brought about in 4 Of the 1.8 million people in Yala, Pattani and Narathi- regional conferences on terrorism and security in South- Thailand as a result of the September 2006 wat, 79 percent are Malay Muslim. east Asia attended by the author and have also featured army coup will impact Bangkok’s overall 5 Personal interviews, Bangkok, Thailand, November in country assessments distributed by various think- response to the insurgency. Encouragingly, 2005 and April 2006, and Bangkok and Pattani, Thai- tanks based in the region. General Sonthi Boonyaratkalin, who land, September 2007. At the time of writing, there were 7 Three pillars underscore the Thai concept of nation- orchestrated the military takeover and who has already signs that the insurgent sectarian-focused strat- building: Monarchy, Religion (Buddhism) and (central- egy was beginning to “work.” According to one Western ized) State. 10 Personal interviews, Bangkok, Thailand, September official, indications of a far more radical stance within the 8 According to one Western official based in Thailand, 2007. Such perceptions are particularly strong given Buddhist population had become apparent—especially anecdotal reports began to surface in 2007 that Malay that most insurgent cells are located in urban areas (un- in Yala—and were on the verge of spilling over into re- militants were engaging in mass round-ups of entire vil- like the situation in the past when guerrilla groups oper- prisal tit-for-tat killings. More seriously, allegations of lages to forcibly impress the sanctity and legitimacy of ated from jungle hideouts), meaning that villagers have the existence of an anti-Muslim vigilante force have sur- their actions. Personal interview, Bangkok, Thailand, to interact with militants on a 24/7 basis. faced. According to one Pattani-based academic, it is this September 2007. 11 Personal interview, Pattani, Thailand, September militia that is primarily responsible for the spate of emer- 9 Personal interviews, Pattani, Thailand, September 2007. gent attacks that have been directed at Islamic schools 2006, and Bangkok and Pattani, Thailand, September 12 Author observations during field research in Pattani and mosques during the last several months. 2007. and Yala, Thailand, September 2007.

16 december 2007 . Vol 1 . Issue 1 been instrumental in appointing new members December 3, 2007: Six people were killed the apostates…wearing uniforms and all those of an interim administration, has signaled in Pakistan’s Balochistan Province as a who fight alongside the occupiers,” the report that he is ready to negotiate with rebels in the bomb ripped through the Imdadul Uloom read. “Every soldier is to detonate at least three south. Just as significant, his designated prime madrasa, which is located 15 kilometers away bombs by the end of the campaign,” which is minister, Surayud Chulanont, has issued a from the Qilla Saifullah bazaar. According supposed to continue through January. public apology for past hard line government to authorities, the bomb was concealed in a policies. Furthermore, in November 2006 he bundle of clothing and left in the school by December 4, 2007: A group calling itself the specifically affirmed that Islamic law should be an Afghan student. The motive for the attack Islamic Shiite Resistance in Iraq posted a given a bigger role in the south.13 was unknown. – AFP, December 3 videotape of a British national held captive. It demanded that British forces pull their troops These various gestures represent an abrupt December 3, 2007: According to an article out of Iraq, yet did not specify what would change in tact from the non-compromising by the London-based al-Quds Press, an happen to the hostage if the demands were not policies of the previous Thaksin Shinawatra intelligence official in Iraq’s Anbar Province met. Hostage videos posted by Shià groups are administration.14 If these gestures were police force told the news agency that more less common than those posted by al-Qaìda followed up with a vigorous policy agenda that than 150 Arab volunteers arrived in the and other Sunni militant groups. allows Malay Muslims to integrate into the country two weeks ago to join al-Qaìda in wider Thai polity on their own terms—rather Iraq. The fighters, who were mostly from December 4, 2007: Kyodo News agency than one which merely presses a Bangkok- Yemen, allegedly entered the country from the released a report revealing that in late 2001 dictated process of forced assimilation—a Syrian border, using false passports under the Usama bin Ladin considered damaging Japan’s viable foundation for genuine ethno-religious cover of returning refugees. – al-Quds Press, economy by attacking tankers en route to the reconciliation could still emerge in the south. December 3 island. The report quoted a former guard of Bin Ladin, who said that the al-Qaìda leader was Dr. Peter Chalk is a Senior Policy Analyst with the December 4, 2007: A female suicide bomber frustrated over Japan’s support of the war on RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. In detonated herself at an army checkpoint in terrorism. - Bloomberg, December 6 addition to this position he serves as an Adjunct Peshawar, marking Pakistan’s first recorded Professor with the Postgraduate Naval School suicide attack by a woman. Other than the life December 4, 2007: British police arrested in Monterey, California and the Asia Pacific of the bomber, there were no casualties from two men on suspicion of the “commission, Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii. the incident. - AP, December 4 preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism,” Apart from his professional affiliations, he acts part of the UK’s Terrorism Act. The men were as Associate Editor of Studies in Conflict and December 4, 2007: Islamist fighters kidnapped arrested at their homes in northwest and west Terrorism, one of the foremost journals in the six tribal policemen and destroyed a security London. – BBC, December 5 international security field. checkpoint near the Bajaur Agency city of Khar. The policemen belonged to Pakistan’s December 4, 2007: The U.S. Treasury * * * tribesmen Levies force. - AP, December 4 Department imposed financial sanctions on Abdelmalek Droukdel, the leader of al-Qaìda Recent Highlights in December 4, 2007: A suicide car bomber in the Islamic Maghreb, which was formerly attacked a NATO convoy near the Kabul known as the Salafist Group for Preaching Terrorist Activity airport. There were no NATO casualties in the and Combat (GSPC). Any of Droukdel’s assets attack, although at least 10 Afghan civilians under U.S. jurisdiction will be frozen. – Reuters, December 1-2, 2007: Twelve members of al- were wounded. The Taliban claimed credit for December 4 Qaìda in Iraq were apprehended by police in the operation and said that it was a “welcome” the al-Tash area in southern Ramadi, Anbar message for U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert December 5, 2007: The Taliban claimed Province. During the arrests, two car bombs Gates, who arrived in Kabul on December 3. responsibility for a suicide car bomb attack on and multiple explosive belts were discovered – Reuters, December 4 a minibus filled with Afghan soldiers, which and confiscated. – al-Iraqiyah Television, resulted in 13 fatalities, including civilians. December 2 December 4, 2007: The U.S. military The attack occurred in the Chihulsutoon area, announced that a key leader of al-Qaìda in south of Kabul. – AP, December 5 December 3, 2007: A suicide bomber targeted Iraq, Abu Maysara, was killed in Iraq last an Indian road construction company in Khash month. The Syrian leader was identified December 5, 2007: A state court in Germany Rod district of the western Afghan province through DNA evidence after he was killed sentenced three Middle Eastern men to prison of Nimroz. Four Afghans were killed in the during a raid near Samarra. Abu Maysara for providing assistance to al-Qaìda. Evidence attack, including two police officers. – Reuters, was allegedly a senior adviser to Abu Ayyub presented in the trial showed that the men did December 4 al-Masri, the head of al-Qaìda in Iraq, and not plan on conducting attacks in Germany, was believed to have had an important role in but instead wanted to use the country as a the terrorist group’s media campaign. – BBC, safe haven to plan attacks and raise funds 13 Personal interviews, Bangkok, Thailand, September December 4 for al-Qaìda operations. The leader of the 2007; “Thai Advocates Islamic Law for Far South,” New cell, Ibrahim Mohamed Khalil, had received York Times, November 8, 2006. December 4, 2007: Abu Ùmar al-Baghdadi training in an al-Qaìda camp in Afghanistan. 14 Thaksin consistently refused to engage in talks released a statement on an Islamist website – AP, December 5 aimed at granting the Malay Muslim provinces greater calling for a renewed bombing campaign autonomy, opting instead to deal with the situation in against security forces. “The campaign should the south via a purely military-oriented approach. be based on explosives and its target should be

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December 6, 2007: The U.S. Treasury are unclear as to whether the attack was CTC Sentinel Staff Department placed seven “former (Iraqi) executed by al-Qaìda or by Shià militias. regime elements and others supporting – The Christian Science Monitor, December 10 Editor-in-Chief the Iraqi insurgency out of Syria” on a list Erich Marquardt that prohibits U.S. citizens from having December 9, 2007: A roadside bomb Senior Editor, CTC any business dealings with them. The detonated on an Algerian highway, with the individuals were identified as Fawzi Mutlaq intended target a bus filled with employees of Editorial Board al-Rawi, Hasan Hashim Khalaf al-Dulaymi, the Russian energy company Stroitransgaz. LTC(P) Joseph Felter, Ph.D. Ahmed Watban Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti, There were no reported injuries. The attack Director, CTC Ahmad Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmad, Sa’ad took place west of Algiers, near the town of Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmad, Thabet al- Bavaiche. – Itar-Tass, December 10 Jarret Brachman, Ph.D. Duri and Hatem Hamdan al-Azawi. – Reuters, Director of Research, CTC December 6 December 10, 2007: NATO and Afghan government forces retook Musa Qala in Assaf Moghadam, Ph.D. December 6, 2007: The Iraqi army announced Afghanistan, which had been controlled by the Senior Research Fellow, CTC the capture of Hatim Sultan al-Hadidi, who Taliban since February. – The Times [London], they identified as a key member of al-Qaìda December 10 Brian Fishman in Iraq and the operative who was responsible Senior Associate, CTC for the killings of 23 Yazidi workers in April. December 11, 2007: Two car bombs Al-Hadidi was captured in Mosul. – Xinhua, ripped through downtown Algiers, killing December 6 approximately 60 people. The attacks Contact targeted the constitutional court in the Algiers Combating Terrorism Center December 6, 2007: A Philippine court neighborhood of Ben Aknoun, in addition to U.S. Military Academy convicted 14 members of the Abu Sayyaf the city’s UN headquarters—at least 11 UN 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall Group to life in prison for their involvement workers were killed. Al-Qaìda in the Islamic West Point, NY 10996 in the 2001 kidnapping of 20 people on Maghreb claimed responsibility. - CNN, Phone: (202) 425-8578 the western resort island of Palawan. Two December 11; Bloomberg, December 12 Email: [email protected] Americans were killed during the ordeal, one Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ of which was beheaded by his captors. - Voice December 11, 2007: Four Islamic militants of America, December 6 were sentenced to prison in Indonesia for committing terrorist acts. The attacks include December 7, 2007: A female suicide bomber bombing a market and beheading three killed at least 16 people in Muqdadiya, 60 Christian schoolgirls. - AP, December 12 miles north of Baghdad, in an attack that targeted an “awakening council” office. The December 11, 2007: At least five people were local police force identified the bomber as killed, including three Ethiopian soldiers, Suhaila Ali, a local woman who was formerly during an attack in Mogadishu. The casualties a member of the Ba’ath Party. The woman’s occurred during a 30-minute gunbattle that three sons were all members of al-Qaìda erupted after a roadside bomb targeted an who had been killed by U.S. forces. - CNN, Ethiopian convoy. - AP, December 11 December 7; Guardian Unlimited, December 8 December 12, 2007: Three car bombs exploded December 8, 2007: According to the U.S. in the southern Iraqi city of Amara, killing at military, 12 suspected al-Qaìda in Iraq least 27 people. - CNN, December 12 militants were killed, and 13 more detained, in central and northern Iraq. December 13, 2007: Pakistani authorities announced that they had foiled an al-Qaìda December 8, 2007: Al-Quds al-Arabi reported plot to assassinate President Pervez Musharraf. that Palestinian sources revealed to the Reports state that the assassination was newspaper that al-Qaìda militants were now planned for Musharraf’s next visit to Karachi, operating extensively in certain areas of the where a bridge connecting the airport to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The unidentified city was to be destroyed while Musharraf’s sources claimed that some members of Hamas’ convoy traveled over. - Bloomberg, December 13 military wing were working with al-Qaìda. - al-Quds al-Arabi, December 8; Jerusalem Post, December 8

December 9, 2007: An important U.S. ally The views expressed in this report are those of in Iraq, Babil Province Police Chief Qais the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, al-Mamouri, was assassinated when five the Department of the Army, or any other agency successive roadside bombs exploded near his of the U.S. Government. vehicle at the entrance of Hilla. Investigators