The Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand Understanding the Conflict’S Evolving Dynamic

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All RAND occasional papers undergo rigorous peer review to ensure that they meet high standards for research quality and objectivity. 3"/%$06/5&3*/463(&/$:456%:t PAPER 5 The Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand Understanding the Conflict’s Evolving Dynamic Peter Chalk Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data TO COME The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2008 RAND Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2008 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface This paper is part of the RAND Corporation’s research project for the U.S. Department of Defense on how to improve U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities. It should be of inter- est to those concerned with issues arising from COIN and to scholars working in this field. It is one in a series of papers focusing on particular subjects. The project will culminate in a report that builds on these earlier efforts. The RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intel- ligence Community. For more information on RAND’s International Security and Defense Policy Center, contact the Director, James Dobbins. He can be reached by email at James_Dobbins@rand. org; by phone at 703-413-1100, extension 5134; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, Virginia 22202-5050. More information about RAND is available at www.rand.org. iii Contents Preface ........................................................................................................... iii Summary ........................................................................................................vii Abbreviations ................................................................................................... ix CHAPTER ONE Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 Background ....................................................................................................... 2 CHAPTER TWO The Insurgency .................................................................................................. 5 1960–1998 ........................................................................................................ 5 Barisan Revolusi Nasional .................................................................................... 5 Patani United Liberation Organization ..................................................................... 6 New PULO ..................................................................................................... 7 Bersatu .......................................................................................................... 8 1998–2004 ........................................................................................................ 8 2004–2006 ......................................................................................................10 CHAPTER THREE A New Front in the Global Jihad? ...........................................................................13 Government Response: The Thaksin Administration ......................................................17 Assessment .......................................................................................................19 CHAPTER FOUR Conclusion: Future Prospects ...............................................................................21 Bibliography ................................................................................................... 23 v Summary Current unrest in the Malay-Muslim provinces of southern Thailand has captured growing national, regional, and international attention due to the heightened tempo and scale of rebel attacks, the increasingly jihadist undertone that has come to characterize insurgent actions, and the central government’s often brutal handling of the situation on the ground. Of particular note are growing concerns that the conflict is no longer purely local in nature but has been systematically hijacked by outside extremists to avail wider transnational Islamist designs in Southeast Asia. There is (as yet) no concrete evidence to suggest that the region has been decisively trans- formed into a new beachhead for panregional jihadism. Although there is a definite religious element to many of the attacks that are currently being perpetrated in the three Malay provinces, it is not apparent that this has altered the essential localized and nationalistic aspect of the conflict. Equally, while it is true that the scale and sophistication of violence have increased, there is nothing to link this change in tempo to the input of punitive, absolutist external jihadist imperatives. Perhaps the clearest reason to believe that the southern Thai conflict has not metastasized into a broader jihadist struggle, however, is the fact that there has been neither a migration of violence north (much less to other parts of Southeast Asia) nor directed attacks against foreigners, tourist resort areas (such as Phuket), or overt symbols of U.S. “cultural capitalism.” vii Abbreviations AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines ASG Abu Sayyaf Group BRN Barisan Revolusi Nasional COIN counterinsurgency GMIP Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani IED improvised explosive device JI Jemaah Islamiyah MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front MITGT Malaysia-Indonesia-Thailand Growth Triangle MoI Ministry of the Interior MPRMP Majelis Permesyuaratan Rakyat Melayu Patani PPP People’s Power Party PULO Patani United Liberation Organization RTA Royal Thai Army RTP Royal Thai Police SBPAC Southern Borders Provinces Administrative Centre ix CHAPTER ONE Introduction Separatist violence in the Malay-Muslim provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani is not new, with a history that goes back nearly half a century. However, unrest in this part of Thailand has captured growing national, regional, and international attention during the past several years due to the heightened tempo and scale of rebel attacks, the increasingly jihadist undertone that has come to characterize insurgent actions, and

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