Vargas v. Rilloraza, 80 Phil 297 F: Pet. Vargas filed a motion assailing the constitutionality of People's Court Act w/c provides that any justice of the SC who held any office or position under the Phil Exec. Commission or under the govt called Phil. Republic, may not sit and vote in any case brought to that court under sec. 13 hereof in w/c the accused is a person who held any office or position under either both the Phil. Exec. Commission and the Phil. Republic or any branch, instrumentality or agency thereof. If on account of such disqualification, or bec. of any of the grounds of disqualification of judges, in R 126, sec. 1 of the ROC, or on account of illness, absence of temporary disability, the requisite number of justices necessary to constitute a quorom in any case is not present, the Pres. may designate such no. of judges of the CFI, judges at large of CFI, cadastral judges, having none of the disqualification set forth in the above law, as may be necessary to sit temporarily as justice of the SC in order to form a quorom. HELD: (1) Congress does not have the power to add to the existing grounds for disqualification of a justice of the SC. To disqualify any of these constitutional component member of the court- especially as in this case, a majority of them-- in a treason case, is nothing short of depriving the court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. It would seem evident that if Congress could disqualify members of SC in taking part in the hearing and determination of certain "collaboration" cases, it could extend the disqualification to other cases. (2) The designation provided (a CFI-judge to sit as a SC justice if the SC does not have the required quorum) is repugnant to the constitutional requirement that members be appointed by the Pres. w/ the consent of the CA. (This was under the 1935 Constitution w/c required confirmation from the Commission on Appointments.) It will result in a situation wherein 6 members sitting will not be appointed and confirmed in accordance w/ the Consti. (3) However brief or temporary may be the action or participation of a judge designated, there is no escaping the fact that he would be participating in the deliberations and acts of the SC and if allowed to do so, his vote would count as much as any regular justice. Perfecto v Meer, 85 Phil 552 (1950) In Perfecto v Meer, 85 Phil 552 (1950), the SC ruled that salaries of judges were not subject to income tax, for such would be a diminution of their salary, in contravention of the Constitution. This happened after Justice Perfecto refused to pay the assessment of income tax made upon him by the Collector. In April 1947, the Collector of the Internal Revenue required Perfecto to pay the income tax upon his salary as member of the Supreme Court during the year 1946. Perfecto paid the amount, worth P 802.00, and instituted action in the Manila Court of First Instance after, contending that the assessment was illegal and that his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution. The Manila judge upheld Perfecto’s contention and required the refund of the amount collected. The defendant (Meer) appealed. The Constitution provides in Article VIII, Section 9 that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts “shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.” Furthermore, it provides that “until Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of P 16,000.00.” Congress had not fixed a different salary for associate justices when Perfecto assumed office in 1945. He received salary at the rate provided by the Constitution, which is P 15,000.00 a year. Issue: Imposition of an income tax in 1946 amounted to a diminution of Perfecto’s salary According to a note found at page 534 of Volume 11 of the American Law Reports, which answers the issue in the affirmative: “Where the Constitution of a State provides that the salaries of its judicial officers shall not be dismissed during their continuance in office, it had been held that the state legislature cannot impose a tax upon the compensation paid to the judges of its court. The respondent argued that by executive order the President has subjected his salary to the income tax law. Without such voluntary act of the President, his salary would not be taxable because of constitutional protection against diminution. To argue from this executive gesture that the judiciary could, and should act in like manner is to assume that, in the matter of compensation and power and need of security, the judiciary is on a par with the Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of affairs. According to the majority, the independence of judges may be imperilled thru the imposition of a tax on their salaries. Decision: AFFIRMED decision of the Manila Court of First Instance Endencia v David, 93 Phil 696 Responding to this, Congress passed a law providing that the constitutional provision against the diminution of salaries of members of the judiciary should not be interpreted to mean an exemption from income tax. (Sec. 13, RA 590.) But the Court struck this statute down as unconstitutional when as in the previous case, Judge Endencia refused to pay his taxes; thereby giving the SC an opportunity to make the pronouncement in the case of Endencia v David, 93 Phil 696 (1953). The SC ruling invalidating the statute was based on the reason that the legislature had no power to interpret the Constitution, such power being lodged in the judicial branch, and so when it did, it violated the separation of powers under the Constitution. The joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila as unconstitutional, and ordering David to refund to Endencia the sum of P 1,744.45 representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P 2,345.46 representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1, 1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31, 1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special pronouncement as to cost. Saturnino David, then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencia’s and Justice Fernando Jugo’s salary pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 which provides that: “No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.” According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, the SC’s decision in the case of Perfecto v Meer was not received favourably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. Issue: Can the Legislature proceed to declare, after the Supreme Court has found and decided already on similar matters, that the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary? Ruling: Fundamental principles regarding separation of powers. The authority to interpret and apply said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department, whose function of judicial review extends to the Constitution. A final court determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department. Decision: AFFIRMED Nitafan v CIR In Nitafan v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (July 1987), the Court ruled that under the 1987 Constitution, the salaries of members of the Judiciary are not exempt from taxes. It anchored its decision on the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, that is, on the legislative history of the present Art. VIII, Sec. 10. A draft of the present Art. VIII, Sec. 10 when originally presented to the body, expressly exempted the salary of judges from taxation. But when this draft was discussed on second reading, the sentiment was against the exemption, the reason being that like any other citizen, judges and justices must pay their share in the burden of maintaining the government. So this express exemption was deleted from Art. VIII, Sec. 10 and so it was when the draft was adopted by the body. There was a plan to insert a similar provision as that found in Art. XV, Sec. 6 of 1973, but through oversight, the constitutional commission failed to insert one. Yet, the intent was clear to have one, and so it must be read into the Constitution, the SC concluded. Facts 1. Petitioners David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano Jr., were duly appointed and qualified Judges of the RTC National Capital Judicial Region. 2. Petitioners seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents (Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court) from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. 3. Petitioners submit that “any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decreased or diminution of their salaries, contrary to Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution.