World Bank Document

Document of The World Bank s FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Disclosure Authorized Report No. 6105 Public Disclosure Authorized PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

BENIN

FIRST AND SECOND FEEDER ROAD PROJECTS

(CREDITS 717 AND 1090-BEN)

Public Disclosure Authorized March 21, 1986 Public Disclosure Authorized Operations Evaluation Department

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CARDER - Regional Development Agency (Centre d'Action Rggionale pour le Dgveloppement Economique Rural)

CNAERDR - Rural Road Development and Maintenance Coordinating Committee (Comit6 National d'Aminagement et d'Entretien des Routes de Desserte Rurale)

SRDR - Service ees Routes de Desserte Rurale evolved from the old Feeder Roads Division (Division des Routes de Desserte Rurale - DRDR)

DROA - Direction des Routes et Ouvrages d'Art succeeded the old Directorate of Roads and Bridges (Direction des Routes et Ponts - DRP)

ITC - Interministerial Technical Committee

MTPCH - Ministry of Public Works, Construction and Housing (Ministre des Travaux Publics, de la Construction et de 1'Habitat)

UNCDF - United Nations Capital Development Fund THE WORLD BANK Iu U111 L UaL UNLY Washnton. DC 20433 U.S A

Once no Q.ectorenweral Opseaas eakoslm

March 21, 1986

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Performance Audit Report on Benin First and Second Feeder Road Projects (Credits 717 and 1090-BEN)

Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Performance Audit Report on Benin First and Second Feeder Road Projects (Credits 717 and 1090-BEN)" prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department.

Attachment

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their of1cial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authoriation. OJ OFICILM ONLY

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

BENIN FIRST AND SECOND FEEDER ROAD PROJECTS (CREDITS 717 and 1090-BEN)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

Preface ...... ,...... Basic Data Sheet ...... s...... 1i Evaluation Summary ...... iv

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEKORANDUM

I. INTRODUCTION . 1

II. THE FIRST AND SECOND FEEDER ROAD PROJECTS ...... 3

(a) Objectives ...... 3 (b). Overview: First And Second Projects ...... 4 (c) Implementation: Planned and Actual Results ...... 5 (d) Alternative Construction Methods ...... 7

III. LESSONS ...... 40...... 10

(a) Choice of Technology ...... 11 (b) Technical Assistance ...... 15 (c) Training ...... 16

IV. CONCLUSIONS ...... 17

(a) General ...... 17 (b) Future Prospects for the Rural Roads Program ...... 19

ANNEXES:

1. Benin: Summary of Two Agricultural, One Technical Assistance and One Education Projects, 1969-1077 ...... 23

2. Benin: Summary of Three Highway Projects, 1970-1977... 29

Thyt&b domen h mrusktda didbutand may be sd by ruipients only in t puformace of their oMcal duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorition. -2-

Table of Contents (Cont'd.) Page No.

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

I* Introduction ...... 33

II. Project Identification, Preparation and Appraisal ..... 34

III. Project Implementation and Cost ...... 37

IV. Institutional Performance and Development ...... 49

V. Economic Reevaluation ...... 52

VI. Role of the Bank ...... 55

VII. Conclusion ...... 56

ANNEXES

1. Borrower's Compliance with Main Covenants...... 59 2. Actual and Expected Project Implementation ...... 61 3. Output of Feeder Road Units, Actual and Expected Physical Output ...... 62 4. Equipment Composition of Labor-Intensive, Intermediate and Equipment-Intensive Brigade ...... 63 5. Construction Brigade per km Cost ...... 64 6. Actual and Appraisal Estimates of Project Costs (First Feeder Roads) ...... 66 7. Actual and Appraisal Estimates of Project Cost (Second Feeder Roads) ...... 67 8. Details of Economic Analysis ...... 68

MAP

Second Feeder Road Project - IBRD 15160 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

BENIN FIRST AND SECOND FEEDER ROAD PROJECTS (CREDITS 717 and 1090-BEN)

PREFACE

This is the performance audit report on the First and Second Feeder Road Projects for which Credits 717 and 1090 in the amounts of US$5.5 and US$7.0 million were respectively approved on May 26, 1977 and December 23, 1980. Funds for techical assistance ran out towards the end of the First Project and additonal financing in the amount of US$889,000 was provided from the surplus of the Supplementary Credit (of March 1976) for the Second Highway Project (Credit 415-DA). The Credit Agreement for the First Feeder Road Project was amended accordingly on May 16, 1980. Both credits have been fully disbursed.

Improvement of planning, construction and maintenance of the Beninese rural road network was the essential objective of both projects. Extensive experimentation was carried out with different construction methods so as to arrive at a comacination of labor and equipment resources that would reduce expenditures in foreign exchange and increase employment in the rural areas. Lessons from the First P roject were applied on the design and execution of the Second and, for this reason, the two projects have been audited together.

This document consists of a Project Performance Audit Memorandum (PPAM) prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED), and of a Project Completion Report (PCR) prepared by the Western Africa Regional Office.

OED studied the documentation preserved in the Records Center and reviewed the projects against the Staff Appraisal (SAR) and the President's Report (PR), as well as against the legal documents and the transcripts of the Executive Directors' meetings which considered the projects. Discussions on project formulation, Implementatifn and follow up were held with Bank staff and consultants. An OED mission visited Benin in March 1985, secured Ge,ixnment views on the inception, preparation and execution of the two projects, travelled on many project roads, and discussed project organization and work methods with construction brigade staff and laborers. The assistance and courtesies extended to the mission are gratefully acknowledged. Drafts of this report were sent to the Government for their comments; however, none were received.

The PCR provides an adequate summary of the experience derived from the two projacts. The PPAX is focussed on organizational aspects related to an expanding feeder roads program and on lessons to be drawn from the experimentation with alternative construction methods. PROJECT PERPORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

BENIN FIRST AND SECOND PEEDER ROADS PROJECTS (CREDITS 717 and 100-1E)

BASIC BATA SHET

ET PRO18CT DATA

first Feeder Roads Project Second Feeder Roade Project (Credit 717-UN) (Credit 1090-88N)

Actual Actual Item Appraisal or Current Appraisal or Current Expectation Estimate Expetation Bstiate Total Project Cost (US$) 6.6 8.74 Overrun () + 16 - Credit Amounts (US$) - 5.5 - Disbursed 5. 5- 6.84/ Caneelled Repaid - - - Outstanding - 5.5 7.0 Date Physical Components Completed Dec. 1980 Jan. 1981 Dec. 1983 Dec. 1984 Proportion Completed by by Original completion (2) 100 36/b 70 98 Economic Rate of Return (M) 27 See 1cond 19 30/e

CUMULATIVE ESTMiATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSMENTS (US$ stilton)

FY77 FY78 FY79 -FTS PY81 FT81 FY82 FT83 FY84 FT85

Appraisal Estimate 0.3 2.8 4.0 5.2 5.5 d 2.5 4.5 6.5 7.0 7.0 Actual 0 1.3 2.6 4.3 5.5; 0 2.5 4.6 6.84 7.0 Actual/Estimated (2) 0 46 65 83 100 0 56 71 98 100 OTHER PROJECT DATA

Actual Actual original or Bet. Criginal or Set. Item Pla Revision Actual Plan Revisions Actual

First mention In Files - - 02/26/74 Government's Application - - - Negotiations - - 04/11/77 08/25/80 - 11/01/80 Board approval - - 05/26/77 11/11/80 - 1223/80 Credit Agreement Date - - 06103/77 12/11/80 - 01/14/81 Effectiveness Date 0901/77 11/01/77 12/06/77 05/14/81 0914/81 12/01/77 12/14/81 I11181 Closing Date 0W30/81 - 09/30/81 06/30/84 - 06/30/84 Borrower Peoples Republic of Benin Eecuting Agency Min, of Equipet Min. of Public Works & Construction Director of loads and Bridges Fiscal Year of Borrower January - December 31 Follow-up Project Second Feeder Roads Third Feeder Roads Credit Number Credit 1090-lE Credit 1485-B1N Amount (US$M) 70 12.0 (Include WON SF) Credit Agreement Dote 01/14/81 07/03/84 /a Ao of DRceebo 10, 1984. X Reminder of che project was financed under the Second Project. 7c' For both First and Second Projecta. Au of July 1981. Jn la As of October 1981. MISSION DATA

- Month/ No of No. of Man- Date of Month/ No. of No. of MHan- Date ITEM Year Weeks Persons Weeks Report Year Weeks Person Weeks Report

Identification 12/73 1.5 1 1.5 3/74 - - - - - Preparation 11/75 1.0 2 2.0 4/75 2/80 1.0 2 2.0 2/80 Preappraisal 5/76 1.0 2 2.0 5/76 3/80 1.0 2 2.0 - Appraisal 7/76 3.0 4 9.0 7/76 4/80 - 1 - - Post Appraisal 10/76 2.0 2 4.0 10/76 5/80 - 1 - - Sub-Total 18.5 18.5

Supervision I 12/77 0.5 1 0.5 12/77 5/81 0.5 1 0.5 7/81 Supervision II 3/78 1.0 1 1.0 3/78 11/81 0.5 1 0.5 11/81 Supervision III 7/78 2.0 2 2.5 8/78 2/82 2.0 2 4.0 3/82 Supervision IV 10/78 0.5 1 0.5 10/78 10/82 1.0 2 2.0 11/82 Supervision V 1/79 1.0 3 3.0 3/79 2/83 1.0 2 2.0 4/83 Supervision VI 4/79 2.0 3 5.0 6/79 - - - - - Supervision VII 7/79 1.0 2 2.0 8/79 - - - - - Supervision VIII 3/80 2.0 2 4.0 4/80 - - - - - Supervision IK 12/80 1.5 1 1.5 1/81 - - - - - Supervision X 5/81 0.5 1 0.5 7/81 - - - - - Supervision XI 11/81 0.5 1 0.5 11/81 - - - - -

Total 12.5 21.0 7.0 13.0

CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATES

Name of Currency (Abbreviation): CFAF France (CFAF)

Year Exchange Rate: Year Exchange Rate

Appraisal Year Average: 1977 US$2 - 246 1980 US$1 - 211 Intervening Years Average: 1978-80 US$1 - 217 1981-82 US$1 - 300 Completion Year Average: 1981 (Jan.) US$1 - 232 1983 US$1 - 378 1984 US$1 - 435 - IV-

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

BENIN FIRST AND SECOND FEEDER ROAD PROJECTS (CREDITS 717 AND 1090-BEN

EVALUATION SUMMARY

Introduction

In Benin, rural development offers the best hope for reducing the gap between the "modern" and the "traditional" sectors. Reliable access to the agricultural hinterland is one of the means of fostering rural development and the two IDA projects assisted the initial phases of the country's feeder road program (PPAM, paras. 37-38).

Project Objectives: Planned

(a) establish institu'tions, methods and procedures for planning, construction and maintenance of the country's rural roads network; and

(b) prepare local staff for managing an expanding volume of work (PPAM, para. 6). Project Objectives: Achieved

The First Project established a Feeder Roads Division (SRDR) within the Ministry of Public Works and experimented with different labor/capital combinations to identify construction methods appropriate for Benin (PPAM, para 7).

The Second Project continued with institutional development and carried out more road improvements (PPAM, para. 8).

The two projects improved about 1,000 km of feeder roads and created sufficient capacity to absorb further investments, including the Third Project (Credit 1485-BEN of 198A), currently under implementation (PPAM, para 8).

Implementation

Both projects encountered delays and difficulties: lower than projected productivity of the brigades, delays in equipment deliveries, low equipment availability, shortage of local staff, and cumbersome administrative procedures (PCR, paras. 3.03-3.06).

Institutional performance improved under the Second Project but labor shortages led to greater use of mechanical equipment (PPAM, paras. 8, 20, and 28). The two projects had a combined estimated cost of CFAF 3,322 million (US$15.3 million at the average 198-1980 average exchange rate of US$1.00-CFA 217) for an estimated combined output of 1,545 km of road Im- provements (PCR, paras.3,28-3.29 and PCR Annexes 6 and 7).

The corresponding actual cost and output were CFAF 3,297 million (about US$15.2 million, including funds provided from the savings of the Second Highway Project (Credit 415-DA) and 1,030 km (PPM4, para. 10 and PCR, para 3.28). In both projects 'output targets were not met, primarily because they had been set too high at appraisal. However, considering the relatively limited extent of the rural roads network, the improvement of more than 1,000 km is a significant contribution (PPAM, para. 12). Cost Increases were due to extra technical assistance, to hiring of equipment, and to the construction of a headquarters building for SRDR (PCR, para. 3.28).

Results

For the 39 roads constructed under the two projects, it is now estimated that the combined economic rate of return will be 30%, compared to appraisal estimates of 27% for the First and 19% for the Second (PCR, pares. 5.01-5.05 and Annex 8). The PCR (para. 5.05) attributes the higher than anticipated rate or return to the fact that estimates of net value added in agricultural production have been increased since 1977 and 1979. However, para. 5.07 notes that mo.t of the traffic growth is either passenger travel or transport of non-agricultural goods. The absence of reliable "before" and "after" data makes impossible an independent calculation of road improvement impact on increases of agricultural output.

Maintenance did not receive much attention during the First Project (PPAM, para. 13 and PCR, para. 3.21) and results were not particularly satisfactory under the Second (PCR, para. 4.08). Mechanized maintenance suffers from lack of spare parts and mechanics. Labor-intensive maintenance continues to experiment with the development of small contractors and with the use of direct labor gangs.

Not much formal training took place under either project. By contrast, on the job train has been extensively used with good results (PPMM, para. 14).

Planning and monitoring did not receive the attention they dezerved because attention was absorbed by construction of new roads (-?PAM, para. 15 and PCR, paras. 3.24-3.25, 5.06-5.07, 4.09-4.10).

SRDR management is aware of the importance of maintenance, training, and planning and monitoring (PPM, para. 39) and deserves assistance to cultivate a plannIng capacity (PPAM, para. 40), and to conduct a staff development program (PPAK, para. 46). - vi -

Sustainaility of Project Benefits

The two projects improved road transport infrastructure in the rural areas and thereby contributed to the integration of the "traditional" and "modern" sectors. New construction was carried out more successfully than maintenance and the time has come to reverse priorities (PPAM, para. 42). Assistance extended through the ongoing Third Project is well focussed to initiate the reversal and to consolidate the progress made so far (PPAM, para. 44).

Lessons and Conclusior.,

Much work was done to identify the best mix of labor and equipment in roadbuilding methods (PPAM, paras. 24-29). Cost comparisons were expected to suggest the most appropriate construction method and although this did not happens, SRDR has shown it possesses sufficient flexibility to choose the most cost effective combination of human and mechanical resources available (PPAM, para. 41).

The consulting firm which assisted the Government throughout the First and Second Projects has contributed much to their success (PCR, para 4.02). The long collaboration among IDA, the Government and the consultants has yielded lessons of wider applicability regarding the use of technical assistance staff (PPAM, para 32) and staff training (PPAM, para. 33-36).

Looking towards the future, successful confrontation of three major issues will contribute to greater operational efficiency of SRDR:

Decentralization of SRDR operations will be necessary to ensure that feeder road improvements will continue to focus primarily on the users in the rural areas. This will require a gradual shift from force account to conract work by small local contractors (PPAM, para. 45).

While this shift will be taking place, staff development within SRDR ought to be pursued by means of a systematic training program and by the introduction of a system of rewards for above average performance (PPAM, paras. 46-47).

Donor financing for the feeder roads program presently covers about 90% of total costs and will continue to be needed for some time. Government ought to streamline its current combersome procedures which inhibit the smooth flow of external assistance (PPAM, para. 48). PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM

BENIN FIRST AND SECOND FEEDER ROAD PROJECTS- (CREDITS 717 and 1090-BEN)

1. INTRODUCTION

1. Agriculture is the most important sector in Benin. It employs 3/4 of the labor force, accounts for more than 40% of the GDP, and generates more than 35% of all foreign exchange earnings. Since the country has little industry and limited mineral resources, the agricultural sector will continue to be the backbone of the economy.

2. The Bank Group began lending in support of Benin's development in 1969 by an IDA credit for agriculture. A series of credits for agriculture (including forestry) has followed and now represent about one fourth of Bank Group funds so far provided to Benin. The Bank Group has also lent funds for projects in other sectors such as technical assistance and education but related to agriculture. In addition, Bank Group financing was provided to Benin for transport. industry, water supply and sewerage, power and energy.

3. The generally disappointing performance of the country's econowi in recent years (discussed in Benin Country Economic Memorandum, March 1984) is also reflected in the mediocre results of Bank Group projects, particularly those focussed on agriculture. Two agricultural projects have been audited so farl/ and the first of these has been the subject of an impact evaluation study .2/ The summary conclusion was that both projects had unsatisfactory results due to political and institutional constraints. The failure of the second agricultural project led to the formulation of the Technical Assistance Project (Credit 716-BEN of 1977) which was also found to be

1/ The first, which was also the Bank Group's first operation in Benin, was the Hinvi Agriculture Development Project (redit 144-DA of 1969) and provided for an oil palm mill, oil palm plantings and food crop improvement. The OED Project Performance Audit Report (Report No. 2053) was issued on May 15, 1978.

The second was the Zou-Borgou Cotton Project (Credit 307-BEN of 1972) which was to assist in increasing cotto, production. OED has issued a Project Performance Audit Report (Report No. 2034, dated April 20, 1978) which shows that most of the project components failed and that project investments had negative returns.

2/ OED Report No. 5029 of April 5, 1984: Impact Evaluation Report: Benin - Hir-i Agricultural Project (Credit 144-BEN). The report concluded ?Para. 7) that "five years after completion, the project can now be considered a major economic and social failure". -2- unsuccessful. 3/ An education project related to agriculture was also prepared to accimodate Government wishes for strengthening an experiment cen- tered around the "4D Clubs" 4/ and produced results comparable to those of the other projects. 5/

4. The Government is now attempting to make the agricultural sector more efficient; it plans to phase out farm input subsidies; raise producer prices; stimulate production of food crops; and emphasize agricultural ex- ports. There seems to be a move to de-emphasise state control of the economq 6/ but political complications preclude rapid change. Ny of these poll- Zies reflect a stated deaire to correct difficulties which had been observed to interfere with Bank Group projects. On the other hand, Bank-assisted projects had, in addition, design and management problems upon which the revised policies would have no direct impact. The reasons ;or the mixed re- suilts of the four highway projects 7 / so far financed by the bank group in

3/ For a detailed discussion, see the Project Performance Audit Report issued by OED (Report No. 4192, dated November 24, 1982) which found that the project was designed during a difficult period when Government wanted a follow-on to a project that was not achieving its targets. Although constraints inhibiting success could not be removed, the project was approved in the interests of improving Bank Group-Government relations. The audit concluded that mediocre results were caused by too many components, unclear definition of some project activities, and overoptimistic targets. -

4/ These were Rural Youth Clubs (where D stood for Democracy, Decision, Duty and Development) which were intended to be the centerpieces for a novel approach to rural development.

5/ For more details, see PPAM Annex 1: Benin- Summary of Two Agricultural, One Technical Assistance and One Education ProJects.

6/ Benin, Country Economic Memorandum (March 1984, Volume 1, para. 1.06).

7/ The Highway Maintenance and Engineering Project (Credit 215-DA of 1978), the Second Highway Project (Cedit 415-!DA of 1973), the Third Highway PrjJect (Credit 746-BEN of 1977), and the Fourth Highway Project (Credit 1142-BEN of 1981). -3-

Benin illustrate some of the difficulties encountered,8/

5. Certain common patterns emerge from the projects evaluated so far. As will be seen in the discuesion which follows, simile themes occur in the first two feeder road projects covered in this audit. They include:

(a) Success, though with some delays and cost overruns, in the construction of physical facilities.

(b) Unfavorable results in maintenance or similar routine activities.

(c) Failure in such areas of governmental concern as policy formulation and execution and in the provision of public funds.

(d) Despite a persistent problem of underemployment in a setting of subsistence cultivation, temporary, intermittent and territorially dispersed labor shortages.

(e) Limited achievements in training due to poor design and execution of assignments for such purposes.

Successful results in the two feeder road projects reflect the pragmatic approach adopted, compared with the more preordained pattern of results in the other cases. This pragamatic approach allowed a more ready adaptation to local or changed circumstances and thus avoided a major pitfall, of the previously audited projects. I

II. THE FIRST AND SECOND FEEDER ROAD PROJECTS 9/

(a) Objectives

6. IDA's involvement in Benin's feeder roads 1 0 / program had a two-fold aim. First, to lay the foundation for proper pflanning, construction and maintenance. Second, to train local staff in managing the program. The intention was to begin on a modest scale and to expand the program as

8/ Details on the first three projects, which have been completed and audited by OED, are given in PPAM Annex 2: Benin, Summary of Three ighway Projects, 1970-1977.

9/ The.PCR prepared by the Western Africa Regional Office is an adequate account of the preparation and implementation of the First and Second Feeder Road Projects. This section of the PPAN summarizes findings of the March 1985 OED mission to Benin and points discussed in greater detail in the PCR.

10/ Feeder roads are defined in this case as roads designed to carry a low traffic volume (less than 50 vehicles per day) and generally character- ised by low standards (narrow, unpaved surface, with rather steep grades and sharp curves). Such roads are primarily intended to support agricultural growth and rural development. -4- experience was gained. By the end of the Second Project, significant lengths of feeder roads had been built and sufficient capacity was created to absorb further investments, including the Third Project currently under implementation.

(b) Overview: First and Second Projects

7. The First Project established a feeder Roads Division (SRDR) within the Directorate of Roads and Bridges in the Ministry of Public Works (PCR, para. 4.05) and created, in different parts of the country, construction bri- gadesll/ ranging from capital-intensive ("mechanized"), to "intermediate", to 1iSor-intensive ("light"). The implementation schedule laid down at appraisal was optimistic and' it took 18 months before the project could operate at the ,planned speed. During negotiations, the Government gave assurances that sufficient numbers of qualified counterpart staff would be made available for SRDR bvt this did not turn out to be possible. Actual numbers were small and qualifications left much to be desired. Consequently, technical assistance requirements were increased and the First Project ran out of funds for consulting services. 12/ Deterioration of the exchange rate betveen the US dollar and the CFA franc, plus administrative delays, plus cost increases combined to reduce physical output: only 344 km of the planned 845 were built.

8. The Second Project continued from where the first one left off. It envisaged construction of 700 km of feeder roads and maintenance of 1,250 km and continued to support institutional development through technical assistance and training. Towards the end of the project, SRDR operated a total of seven construction brigades, 1 3 / a bridge construction brigade, and two maintenance brigades. The increase from four brigades under the First Project to ten brigades under the Secon4 was perhaps too rapid. Counterpart staff continued to be in short supply. SRDR was hard pressed to provide site manage-

11/ "Brigade" is a term used in francophone Africa for a group of public works employees ranging from 50-300 individuals and organized to perform certain types of public works activities.

12/ The shortfall was made up from the surplus of US$4.1 million from the 1976 Supplementary Credit to the Second Highway Project (Credit 415- DA). The surplus was so large that it increased the reluctance to cancel it and IDA used US$889,000 out of it to finance consultants' services for the First Feeder Roads Project. For details, see the Project Performance Audit Report prepared by OED on the Second Highway Project (Report No. 3986 of June 30, 1982) which specifically notes (PPAM, para. 47) that "IDA felt that cancellation should be avoided in view of the potentially negative effects on relations with Benin", an attitude reminiscent of that which led to the approval of Ckedit 716-BEN of 1977, discussed in para. 3 above.

13/ Including two labor-intensive construction brigades in the north of the country, financed by the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), with IDA acting as Executing Agency. ment and logistic support" and, once again, this demanded extra inputs of technical assistance (PCR, para. 4.06). The three types of construction brigades continued to be used and, with the exception of the mechanized brigade, results were satisfactory. * Labor shortages became endemic, impeded further expansion of labor-based construction, and the labor-equipment mix of all brigades had to be modified. The Third Project (which became effective in February 1985 and took such modifications into account), would consolidate the gains achieved under the previous two and continue to provide financial and technical assistance to SRDR.

9. For both projects, the date of effectiveness was delayedl 4 / because Government took much too long to act. The start-up of theFirst Project was delayedl5/ by more than one year. Progress of the work was hampered throughtout 1978 and 1979 by delays in effectiveness, Government's slowness in contracting technical assistance, delays in delivery of equipment, problems in setting up adequate organizational and administrative procedures, and lack of counterpart staff (PCR, paras. 3.03-3.06).

10. The two projects had a combined estimated cost 1 6/ of CFAF 3,322 million (about US$15.3 million) for an estimated combined output of 1,545 km of road improvements. 17/ The corresponding actual cost and output were CFAF 3,297 million (US$15.7-million including funds provided from the surplus of the Second Highway Project, Credit 415-DA) and 1,030 km. IDA financing covered about 80% of the total cost of the First and 90% of the total cost of the Second Project. The reduction in output is due to overoptimistic targets set at appraisal while cost increases were due to extra technical assistance requirements, to hiring of construction equipment, and to the construction of a headquarters building for SRDR.

11. Annex 8 of the PCR shows that the reestimated economic rates of return for the 39 roads constructed under the two projects are expected to be higher than those estimated at appraisal because estimates of net value added increased to the point where the overall rate of return for the two projects will be 30%, compared to appraisal estimates of 27% for the First and 19% for

14/ First Project: from September 1, 1977 to December 6, 1977. Second Project: from May 14, 1981 to December 11, 1981.

15/ Three brigades were to be set up by January 1978 and the fourth by January 1979. In fact, the first brigade was set up in January 1979 and the fourth in December 1979.

16/ Throughout the audit the rate of US$1.00=CFAF217 is used because it represents an average of the fluctuations between 1978-1980.

17/ For a more detailed discussion, see PCR paras. 3.28-3.29 and PCR Annexes 6 and 7. -6-

the Second.J 8 / The PCR (para. 5.05) attributes the higher rates to the fact that estimates of net value added in agricultural production have been increased since -1977 and 1979. However, para. 5.07 notes that most of the traffic growth is either passenger travel or transpport df non-agricultural goods. The absence of reliable "before" and "after" data makes impossible an independent calculation of road improvement impact on increases of agricultural output.

12. When the Second Project was appraised, Benin had a road network of about 7,270 km, of which 3,500 km were rural roads. Of the 3,770 km on in- terstate, national and secondary roads, about 900 km were paved, 2,700 km were laterite-surfaced and the remainder were earthroads (SAR, Second Feeder Road Project, para. 2.01 and Table 1). Given the relatively limited length and fairly poor condition of the network, the improvement of 1,030 km of rural roads made poisible through the two projects is a significant contribution. Planned and actual road construction is summarized in the following table.19/ The audit mission visited many of the roads improved under the two pr63ects and found the quality of the finished work to be generally satisfactory. Howaver, records are not available to indicate precisely the condition of each road before construction work took place nor to record the exact standard of the improvements made. Such records, along with corresponding cost information are essential to evaluate the significance of improvement works and their benefits/ cost characteristics.

ACTUAL (km) First Second Project Project Total

Province

Atakora 114.0 39.0 - Borgou - 386.0 386 Zou 163.5 169.5 333 Mono 66.0 57.5 123 Oueme - 34.0 34

Total Actual 343.5 686.0

Total Planned 845 700

13. Maintenance did not receive much attention during the First Project (PCR, para. 3.21). The Second Project established a maintenance brigade in

18/ For more details, see PCR paras. 5.01-5.05.

19/ Source: Deuxieme Projet des Routes de Desserte Rurales: Projet du Rapport Final (in two volumes, SRDR/Consultants, January 1985, Cotonou). 7

the north and appropriate maintenance techniques were introduced in the south but results are still not satisfactory: the appraisal target was 1,225 km but by mid-1983 only about 425 km were being maintained (PCR, para. 4.08). Mechanized operations suffer from lack of spare parts and insufficient number of experienced mechanics. Labor-intensive maintenance continues to experiment with different procurement formulas ranging from the development of small contractors to the use of direct labor gangs. Entrusting the maintenance of a number of roads to the regional services of the Ministry of Public Works in 1984 has not worked well, possibly because the MPW regional services assign low priority to the upkeep of infrastructure. One example is the Cove-Pauignan Road (56 km) which, despite its poor condition, has received minimal attention.

14. A fundamental objective of both projects was training of local staff, and this should be distinguished between "formal training" and "on- the-job instruction". Formal training did not really take place during the First Project: there were virtually no counterparts and the urgency attached to the establishment of construction brigades left little time for classroom teaching. On the contrary, there was extensive on-the-job instruction and this was continued, with satisfactory results, under the Second Project. Efforts to conduct formal training under the Second Project were also unsuccessful (PCR, para. 3.23), possibly because training was erroneously seen as an activity that could be easily combined with other operational duties to be performed by technical assistance staff.

15. Planning and monitoring were activities which interested IDA but were rcgarded as not very pressing by the Government. Road selectionmethodo- logies were used (PCR, paras. 3.24-3.25) and impact studies (PCR, paras. 5.06-5.07) were carried out, largely under IDA pressure, but did not genuine- ly convert any decision makers. The need to improve rural roads is obvious and, all over the world, techniques for choosing one instead of another continue to be debated with no consensus in sight. This is perhaps the reason why the audit received the impression that the economic analyses prepared for submission to the Interministerial Technical Committee (PCR, (PCR, para. 3.25) serve ritualistic rather than substantive purposes (PCR, paras. 4.09- 4.10). Under the circumstances, IDA may wish to focus its future efforts on seeking to make the feeder roads operations in Benin as efficient as possible.

(d) Alternative Construction Methods L 16. Both projects tried to determine the cost-effectiveness of alternative combinations of labor and equipment in road construction. "Road con- structions" should be taken to mean the transformation of tracks into all- weather gravel roads designed to'accommodate traffic of up to 50 vehicles per day. Mechanized, intermediate and light brigades 2 0 / were used experimental- ly during the First Project so that experience could be accumulated and procedures established. The Second Project continued the search for the labor/

20/ The different mix of resources used by the three brigade types is shown in PCR, Annex 4. capital mix most appropriate for Beninese conditions and, as *shown below, existing brigades were redeployed while ainumber of brand-new ones were established.

BRIGADES IN OPERATION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND PROJECT

Date of Establishment

Intermediate December 1978 Mechanized March 1979 Light I May 1979 Light II December 1979

BRIGADES CREATED' DURING THE SECOND PROJECT

Maintenance (South) May 1981 Bridge October 1981 UNCDF I November 1981 UNCDF II February 1982 Light III December 1982 Light IV April 1983 Maintenance (Atakora) August 1983

17. At tha beginning of the Second Project it was asumed that output of the main types of construction.brigades would be as follows:

Km/Month Total

Dry Season Wet Season Average

Mechanized 10.0 5 8.3 Intermediate 7.5 3.75 6.25 Light 4.5 2.25 3.75

Actual performance of the three main types of construction brigades showed significant variations from assumed targets and is indicated below in the summary of their activities during the First and Second Projects. Results should be regarded as indicative only because physical performance is affected by soil conditions, length of haul for construction materials, and other factors reflected in the cost of the final output.

18. The mechanized brigade was plagued with rroblems throughout the 56 months (1979-1982) of its operation. In all that time there were only three -9-

periods when the brigade worked uninterruptedly for up to three months. 2 1/ Average monthly output was 5.7 km (as against the planned 8.3 km). At iWe end of 1982 output was stabilized around 6.9 km per month thanks to changes in the brigade's management, to the arrival of an expatriate chief mechanic, and to additional equipment from the intermediate brigade whose operations were suspended. The equipment assigned to the mechanized brigade was utilized, on the average, no more than 50% of the time due to the inexperience of drivers, operators and mechanics, to long delays in spare parts delivery, and-to the inablity of the Ministry's central mechanical workshop to perform engine repairs rapidly. The brigade was phased out in the Third Project and its equipment was used in part to form an intermediate and a maintenance brigade and in part to mechanize certain tasks of the existing light brigades so as to reduce labor requirements which were hard to fulfill.

19. The intermediate brigade was launched in December 1978 and attempted to combine labor-based and equipment-based road construction tasks. The combination is difficult because site management must resolive two problems simultaneously: keep the-machines running and ensure effective supervision of a fairly large number of unskilled laborers. Under the First Project, the brigade was assigned an annual target of 73 km but built no more than 41 in 1979. Problems continued to arise because, contrary to a basic principal in rural works construction, 2 2 / persistent efforts were made to mix, at the same site, capital-intensiveand labor-intensive methods. Even- tually it was decided that the brigade would be transformed into a mechanized maintenance brigade under the Second Project. This did not happen before mid-1982 because, starting in 1981, the brigade's output increased dramati- cally and during the first six months of the Second Project, it reached 200% of the planned targets. Improved performance was due to an exceptional expatriate supervisor, to a Dutch volunteer who acted as chief mechanic, and to the strong support of a local committee which smoothed out difficulties with labor supply.

20. The light brigades consistently produced outputs clustered around 100% of the targets.

Light Brigade I spent 35.5 months on road construction and achieved 103% of its targeted output (126.5 km as against 122 km). It operated in easy terrain, it was only relocated once, and it kept the majority of its supervisory staff. Gravel tansport distances were short, except in the case of one road where 7-8 km had to be negotiated between the quarry and the road. After its move to the north of Zou Province, the brigade experienced difficulties with labor supply and its average manpower was 220 men, or 85% of requirements.

21/ cf. Table 7, Deuxieme Projet des Routes de Desserte Rurales: Projet du Rapport Final (SRDR nsultants, Cotonou, January 1985).

22/ This and related points are discussed- in Labor-based Construction Programs: A Planning and Management Handbook (World Bank, Oxford University Press, 1983). - 10 -

Light Brigade II spent 35.5 months on road construction, two months as an intermediate bridage, and 3.5 months moving to three different loca- tions. It achieved 93% of its targeted output (116.5 km as against 125 kW). It operated for most of the time in difficult terrain which required considerable quantities of fill, and long transport distances for gravel haulage (up to 18 m between quarry and site in the case of two roads). Difficulties were experienced with labor recruitment and for about one year and a half (mid-1981 to end-1982) when the brigade worked near the Nigerian border there was virtually no local labor available. This dictated that workers be recruited about 90 km away and they had to be transported home twice a month.

Light Brigade III spent four months in mobilizing, 14 months on road construction, and one month in moving to a new location. It achieved 100% of its targeted output (50 km out of 50). Late deliveries of equipment and tools delayed the start of work but once it started productivity remained consistently high because the expatriate chief and his counterpart were on the site since the beginning, the local authorities provided continuous support, most of the site supervisory staff and drivers were experienced workers, there was strong emphasis on practical training, and there waz a well-equipped based nearby. Nevertheless, and despite the support of the local authorities, there were persistent manpower shortages and this dictated transporting workers from distant villages.

Light Bridage IV spent four months in mobilizing, nine months on road construction, and one month moving to a new location. It achieved 116% of its targeted output (35 km as against 30), its productivity increased steadily although serious problems were encountered with labor supply: d-iring the 12 months of full brigade activity, the roster contained no more than 193 men, or 77% of the requirements.

At present, all three types of brigades are permanently established and working. Thus, the two projects have accomplished a double institution-building goal: they have helped create the SRDR headquarters operation which oversees the nationwide feeder roads program, and they have also created capacity for road construction and maintenance in the provinces.

III. LESSONS

21. In Benin, economy and society are still distinguishable into "traditional" and "modern". Since the mid-1970s, Government has been trying to reduce such distinctions and to integrate a large number of tribes into a co- hesive national entity. Given that most of the people live off the land, the Government and IDA realized that only visible results of rural development can induce subsistence farmers to enter a monetized economy. The basic pre- conditions are favorable: climate and soils are by and large suitable for increased output; there is no excessive population pressure; people are prepared to work hard if they perceive that their exertions will be rewarded. Still, the transition will be difficult because people are expected to abandon traditional practices and familiar results for new ways and uncertain profits. In order to convince them that a cash economy is preferable to one based on barter, the government has to put in place agricultural extension -- 11 - services, marketing mechanisms, credit facilities and good transport. The First and Second Projects were intended to assist the Government in creating a rural roads network.

22. Rural roads in Benin do not carry more than 10-20 vehicles per day. The low traffic dictates the choice of running surface: earth or gravel. Roads must be kept open the year round because their purpose is to provide rural inhabitants with certain access to the main network, Earth and gravel roads require particularly careful maintenance because they are easily subject to closure, especially after the rainy season. What they need is a decentralized maintenance organization that can effect repairs rapidly and efficiently. Rural road building and rural road maintenance must be regarded as two parts of a single operation and IDA assistance provided through the First and Second Feeder Road Projects was aimed at precisely this type of integration.

23. So far, construction work has been done better than maintenance. The establishment of SRDR, and the experience gained, have yielded useful lessons not only for the design of further interventions (such as those extended through the Third Project) but, also, for similar attempts to assist the improvement of feeder road networks in other countries. The lessons can be grouped under three headings: (a) choice of technology; (b) use of consultants; and (c) staff training.

(a) Choice of Technology

24. In the mid-1970s, Benin needed a better network of rural roads but lacked the resources for its construction and maintenance. Fully mechanized operations were precluded because foreign exchange was scarce. IDA recommended experimentation with methods which, although relying more on casual labor and less on equipment, had been shown, in other parts of the world, to produce roadworks that were competitive in terms of cost, speed of completion and technical quality. IDA argued that, if proven applicable in Benin, these "labor-based" methods would in the long run reduce foreign exchange expenditures while, at the same time, generating income for construction workers to be recruited in the rural areas. - 12 -

25. The Bank Group had carried out extensive research on labor-based methods 2 3 / and IDA was aware of the technical, and financial obstacles for their sThcessful implementation. Although IDA was concerned that the unskilled labor pool in rural Benin might not be large enough to man labor- based construction of a sufficient magnitude to justify the fairly high preparation and mobilization expenditures, the decision was made to go ahead and experiment with these techniques which, at the very least, promised to in- ject, through the payment of wages to workers, far more income in the rural areas than would be the case with an equipment-intensive operation.

26. SRDR began in 1978 to employ a variety of labor-capital combinations for the construction to rural roads and, to this day, the debate continues as to which formula is preferable. The evaluation of any construction method depends on the weights assigned to factors such as the technical quality of the finished product, the total cost of each method, the annual volume of output, the benefits of direct investments made in the rural environment, the training benefits, the methods of confronting the increasing and decreasing labor supply, and the ease with which maintenance operations can be mounted at the end of the construction phase. Since different individuals assign different weights to each factor, it should be expected that no generally agreed solutions can be forthcoming. Nevertheless, practical experience from the First and Second Projects makes possible a better under- standing of the relative importance of each parameter and the lessons are summarized below.

27. In terms of technical quality, and specifically in terms of quality of the running surface, mechanized and intermediate brigades produced better results. Well-organized light brigades could deliver comparable results provided that soil conditions were favorable. The work of the light brigades suffered because of the uniformity of production quotas established without any reference to terrain types. 2 4 /

23/ The Bank's "Study of Labor and Capital Substitution in Civil Engineering Construction" started in 1970 and encompassed research, experimentation, physical construction and monitoring of rural infrastructure works in India, Indonesia, Kenya, Honduras, Chad, Lesotho, Malawi, the Dominican Repablic and Peru. Detailed technical findings were published between January 1975 and June 1976 in 26 Memoranda whose topics range from comparisons of alternative designs for wheelbarrows to aggregate production. The overall structure of the research and implementation work are described in The Study of Labor and Capital Substitution: Report on the Bank-Sponsored Seminars in Washington, Cologne, Copenhagen, London and Tokye" (World Bank, Washington, 1978). Operational conclusions have been summarized in "Labor-based Construction Programs: A Practical Guide for Planning and Management" (Oxford University Press, 1983).

24/ Two light brigades, one operating in rocky terrain and another in soft clays, were assigned the same target of 4.5 km per month with the result that quality of the finished product was sacrificed for the sake of volume. -13-

28. Different support conditions are necessary for the successful operation of different construction methods.

For mechanized brigades the indispensable support of the central supply organization was not consistently forthcoming. Equally indispensable was the presence of a chief mechanic (for at least 602 of the time), together with the continuous presence of experienced mechanics. Availability of chief mechanics varied from brigade to brigade but the quality of ordinary mechanics was generally inadequate. Experienced drivers and equipment operators make a great difference and were in short supply. A large percentage of the down-time was due to the indif- ferent attitude of operators concerning the state of the equipment entrusted to their care*

For light brigades, labor supply was a factor of primary importance. The theoretical model of a construction brigade which hires and fires workers as it moves along does not apply in Benin. Shortage of manpower influenced the operation of each and every light brigade and all formulas used to ensure that labor requirements were fully met were only partially successful. The commitment of local authorities to help recruit laborers was frequently the crucial factor in the satisfactory operation of the brigades but even this did not guarantee that the full manpower complement could be found. Starting in May 1983, and in order to make up the shortfalls in manpower, the decision was made to use bulldozers in the quarries but the results were limited because bulldozers too were in short supply. Punctual payment of wages is a factor that cannot be emphasized enough but, after some initial difficulties in the First Project, this was adequately taken care of. A disciplined and experienced field supervisory staff is a basic precondition and although the quality varied among the different brigades, the fact that the average rate of production ranged around 100% of the targets, proves the general success of the two projects in this domain.

29. Cost comparison among the various brigade types were first done in January 1982.4/ The conclusions were:

Construction cost per km was higher for the labor-based than for the equipment-based brigades but the differences were not substantial (between 3% without technical assistance and 13% with).

As technical assistance is phased out, the costs per km for the different brigade types would converge.26/

25/ Benin: Rural Access Roads (First Project)- Comparative Assessment of Construction Brigade Outputs and Costs (Consultants, January 1982).

26/ At the time when the Consultants' paper was being written, the direct cost of technical assistance to the labor-based brigades was halved because one Brigade Chief was responsible for two brigades instead of one as under the First Project. 14-

Equipment repair costs would increase as the machines would age. The comparative analysis used actual repair and maintenance expenditure. Average repair costs over the life of the machines would give a truer picture because the equipment was new at the start of the project.

The amount of equipment is far greater in the mechanized and intermediate brigades than in the light ones. Over time, higher equipment repair costs will cause cost increases far greater than those for the equ.pment of light brigades. 27/

In view of the above, operating costs for equpment-based brigades would increase while those for labor-based brigades would remain con- stant, or even decrease as technical assistance inputs are reduced.

Cost comparisons done at the end of the Second Project are summarized in the following table and confirm the preceding conclusions.

Cost per Kilometer Second Project 2 8 / Cost Without Cost With Technical Assistance Technical Assistance First Project 29/ ZMllions FCFA)

Brigade

Mechanized 2.7 3.1 2. Intermediate 2.0 2.2 - Light 1 2.7 3.0 3.4 Light II 3.0 3.4 2.9 Light III & IV 2.9 3.7 -

The main lesson is that cost differences are not great enough to tilt the balance decisively in favor of one or another construction method. Also, the cost comparison is based on work executed by force account units. Unfortu- nately, no work was done and no data collected on the basis of works executed by contractors. The results might well be different if the experiment were made using private contractors.

30. An argument favoring labor-based methods is income injection in the rural areas. By km of road build, the light brigades injected 1.1 million

27/ This trend was already apparent in the Second Project.

28/ Source: Deuxieme Projet des Routes de Desserte Rurales: Projet du Rapport Final (SRDR/Consultants, Cotonou, January 1985).

29! Source: Benin Rural Access Roads (First Project)- Omparative Assessment of Construction Brigade Outputs and Costs (Consultants, January 1982), Table 8. - 15 -

FCFA (US$5,000) more per km than the mechanized brigades. Thus, over the du- ration of the Second Project alone, 360 million FCFA (US$1.7 million) were spread in the rural areas where road improvements took place.30/

31. Mechanized mainitenance brigades cannot easily compete with light brigades (supported by one grader) in cost per km because of the depreciation charges upon equipment that is not fully utilized. Besides, light brigades leave behind, in the immediate vicinity of the improved road, laborers familiar with what needs to be done for the road to be kept up. 3 1 / These laborers are far better prepareA to perform a good maintenance job En a facility that they consider to be "their" road, than workers who had not taken part in the road's construction.

(b) Technical Assistance

32. As noted in the PCR (para. 4.02), much of the success of the Feeder Roads Program is due to the efforts of the consulting firm which worked in Benin throughout the First and the Second Projects. This firm, though an established general civil engineering consultancy group, had even before these projects extensive experience with labor-based construction methods. The lessons summarized below come from a review of the long collaboration among consultants, the Government and IDA and may help to facilitate future collaboration both in Benin and in other countries:

Terms of Reference

Government and IDA were too precise in their instructions and specified both the objectives to be achieved and the detailed method for achieving them. The latter should be left to the consultant's discretion.

Priorities

Government and IDA specified the planning and execution of a considerable volume of earthworks and, at the same time, a major staff training effort without spelling out which comes first. In attempting to do both, the consultant did not do full justice to either because men who can build roads well will not necessarily be good teachers, and vice versa.

Staff Qualifications

The Government cannot assess on the basis of curricula vitae prsonal qualities (such as manners and maturity) which are as important as

30/ Source: Deuxieme Projet des Routes de Desserte Rurales: Projet du Rapport Final (SRDR/ Consultants, Cotonou, January 1985), Volume 1, page 37.

31/ This finding confirms the conclusions reached regarding maintenance operations in the Kenyan Rural Access Roads Program. -16-

technical expertise. Before retaining a particular group of technical assistance staff who will work with local personnel, and will consequently need to possess congenial personalities. Government might consider conducting interviews to ensure that the right kind of person is being hired.

Government Contributions

Apart from counterpart funds, these include housing, office accommodation, transport, etc. Delays in providing resources and facilities affect adversely the performance of the technical assistance staff.

Counterpart Staff

In both projects, the tendency was to overestimate the availability of such staff. Furthermore, the poor performance of some of the counterparts had not been anticipated and no procedures were available for the replacement of non-performers.

Project Supervision

The two projects were supervised by a number of IDA staff in succession, each with different ideas concerning project priorities and areas of comparative importance. Communication would have been facilitated if minimum requirements for supervision missions had been agreed between the Government and IDA during project negotiations.

33. Although training is an essential element of technical assistance programs, it is seldom that such programs include the position of a training officer. The usual result is (and the Beninese experience is a case in point) that training becomes the responsibility of technical staff already busy with purely operational duties. Compared with the urgency attached to physical progress of the work, training will take second place. In the course of the First and Second Projects, formal training was neglected and the successful on-the-job training which did place should not mask the fact that much more could have been done if a structured training program had been prepared well in advance.

34. A properly structured training program must first identify the needs of the organization at all levels, from management (both technical and administrative), all the way down to foremen, drivers and casual laborers. This should be followed by an assessment of the available personnel to dis- cover how many possess the necessary qualifications for the positions required. Proposals would then have to be made for filling the gaps, either by training available staff with the necessary pottntial, or by recruitment outside.

35. In designing the training requirements, it is important to identify priority areas. In Benin, the first priority in the field would be training of plant operators and mechanics, and the first priority in headquarters - 17 - would be training of accountants and personnel dealing with financial management. The extent of training required will vary: single short courses with a specific aim (for example, bulldoser operators to enable site work to start): a series of related courses; refresher courses; and, perhaps, the establishment of a full-time technical facility for engineers, surveyors and technicians.

36. The speed with "which any training program can be implemented depends on the availability of training materials, or the time required for their preparation. The First and Second Projects have shown that manuals are invaluable both for day-to-day operations and for training. Three such documents were available in Benin:

(a) The procedures manual: a condensed summary of the separate administrative and technical manuals which describe, as simply as possible, all the procedures used within SRDR.

(b) The technical manual is a "live" document, continually added to, as new technical problems arise in the field, or new ideas emerge to solve old problems.

(c) The administrative manual shows the "flow" of documentation, the explanation of procedures, and the responsibility of different individuals at different stages of the process.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

(a) General

37. The essential objective of the First and Second Projects was institutional: assist the Ministry of Public Works to develop a local capacity for planning, construction and maintenance of rural roads. Full achievement will take decades but the first step was successful: SRDR has been established and performs well.

38. A principal reason for the achievements of the two projects is the flexibility which was adopted in project design and execution. In contrast to other projects in Benin which have been audited, these two projects usejd a variety of approaches which were applied in an experimental spirit and were substituted or changed as circumstances required. They therefore avoided the problems which arose in other cases where attempts were made to find a unique, workable project design. The two projects were thus able to adapt to local variations which turned out to be substantial despite Benin's relatively small size, and to adjust to changed conditions which occurred rapidly despite the relatively short span of project implementation.

39. The main functions of SRDR are planning, constructing and maintain- ing the rural roads network. All over the world, Government agencies with similar responsibilities concentrate initially on building roads and leave maintenance and planning for later. SRDR is no exception but its - 18 - managers must be given credit that, on their own, they have become concerned about planning and maintenance issues, and seem committed to do something about them.

40. Planning: Feeder roads totalling 1040 km were built under the first two and the ongoing Third Project envisages the construction of another 840 km. The combined output is not insignificant but, so far, no systematic work has been done to identify rural road needs over the medium term, say over the 1985-1990 period. One cannot say how many more roads have to be built, in what order, how much they will cost, and what would be the annual expenditure for their maintenance. The audit believes that SRDR should be given the resources to establish a small multi-disciplinary team of Beninese professionals to collect and process the necessary data (economic, engineering, sociological and agricultural).

41. Roadbuilding: When the First Project was identified foreign exchange was short and continues to be so. Much was done to find a labor and equipment mix which, without compromising the technical and economic viabi- lity of the completed road, would lead to construction methods utilizing the maximum of unskilled labor. After complicated comparisons of different construction methods (regarding cost, speed of execution and technical quality of the finished work), no clear cut formula has emerged. Equipment based techniques require machinery, fuel, and spare parts which are imported and expensive. Labor based methods suffer from an inadequate supply of workers, a fact not fully anticipated when the First Project was being designed. It therefore seems that both formulas will continue to be applied and, fortu- nately, SRDR has shown it possesses sufficient flexibility to choose the most cost effective combination of human and mechanical resources available in different parts of the country.

42. Maintenance: Both administratively and operationally, maintenance is more complex than construction of brand new rural roads. It is, also, politically less glamorous and this explains its world-wide neglect. SRDR has not resolved the problem of maintenance but is aware of its implications, especially as roads constructed under the First Project now begin to show their age and their need for repairs and regravelling. Assistance under the Third Project is addressing the problems related to the rehabilitation of equipment, an indispensable step for any attempt to reduce maintenance back- logs. But much remains to be done and some suggestions are offered below,

43. For its day-to-day operations, SRDR depends on (a) Technical assistance staff, (b) Beninese staff and (c) an adequate flow of financial resources.

Technical Assistance Staff: Earlier phases of SRDR activity required large inputs of technical assistance to fill positions, for which counterpart staff had been expected but was not forthcoming, both in the field and in headquarters. The local staffing situation has improved but expatriates will continue to be needed for a few more years, especially in the areas of cost accounting and of equipment rehabilitation and maintenance. - 19 -

Beninese Staff: They have now taken over numerous tasks (site supervision in particular) which were previouslY held by expatriates. The audit mission visited a number of work sites and was impressed with the good work done by Beninese supervisors trained under the First and Second Projects. SRDR headquarters in Cotonou are staffed almost exclusively by Beninese personnel and the performance of SRDR top management is exemplary. The issue here is how to ensure that good performance is properly recognized and rewarded.

SRDR Finances: SRDR builds low-cost, low-traffic feeder roads which, together with other improvements in the rural areas, will hopefully encourage agricultural development. Lack of ready proof that SRDR activities have an immediate and sizeable impact on the rural economy does not inspire the country's financial authorities to allocate many of their own scarce resources to SRDR and they prefer to leave such financing to donor agencies. All the same, and regardless oO the source of financing, the customary practice of protracted scrufiny by the Government is brought to bear upon any request for funds. Payment delays due to over-lengthy Government procedures have been consistent enough during the first two projects to suggest that matters need to be speeded up. In this connection too some suggestions are given below.

(b) Future Prospects for the Rural Roads Program

44. The ongoing Third Project provides fresh financial assistance to SRDR and includes technical assistance components aimed at two priority areas: equipment maintenance for field operations and the introduction at SRDR headquarters of better cost accounting and work scheduling procedures. In the short run, these are the two areas requiring attention. Looking further into the future, successful confrontation of three major issues will contribute to greater operational efficiency in SRDR: (a) Decentralization and contracting; (b) Staff development; and (c) Donor Coordination and Government procedures.

Decentralization and Contracting

45. By its very nature, a feeder roads network is geographically dispersed. Road users are rural people with concerns focussed on their immediate geographic area. Maintenance requirements are highly localized but, also, light enough not to warrant massive organizations for their support. Precisely because SRDR has performed so well up to this point it must be encouraged to reflect on its future as an agency responsible for nation wide rural road construction and maintenance. In this connection, two alter- natives seem possible:

First: SRDR remains a centralized organization and embraces a permanent commitment to force account. In that case, a bureaucratic super- structure is bound to expand and, eventually, SRDR will be in danger of becoming primarily concerned not with the condition and improvement of the feeder roads network but with the welfare of its employees. - 20 -

Second: A sharp distinction is made between what a Government agency can do well (set priorities, allocate the physical work to be done and monitor its progress, ensure that financial resources flow smoothly) and what it cannot (produce a finished piece of work at the lowest possible cost). Based on that distinction, SRDR would decentralize its operation and gradually begin to rely on small local contractors who would perform most of the physical work.

If Government decides that the second alternatie is more in the national interest, instructions ought to be given to SRDR to-begin slicing off and turning over to small contractors portions of road construction and as much as possible of the maintenance work.

Staff Development

46. A transition from an exclusively force account operation to one which relies primarily on contractors takes time. Meanwhile, work must continue and efforts have to be made to increase efficiency. Staff training is the best way to incrase efficiency but, under the first two projects, training had been unstructured and on-the-job. Even so, it provided valuable experience to site supervisors (who, in time, may be among those to become small contractors). The encouraging results of ad-hoc training permit the hope that a well-prepared program will be even more beneficial. The audit believes that staff training should be conducted by Beninese and can point at the success of the OBEMAP training program in the port of Cotonou.32/ SRDR should therefore be given the resources (including the assistan7 Qf an expatriate training specialist to help prepare the curriculum and the teaching materials) to establish a training unit focussed on two types of staff: (a) equipment operators, drivers, mechanics and site supervisors for field operations; and (b) accountants and financial controllers for headquarters.

47. Staff training is one thing. Retaining good staff is quite another. If exceptional performance is not rewarded, discouragement sets in, the good workers leave and the civil service is left with those whom nobody else wishes to employ. In mid-1985, SRDR has a core of active, competent professionals and Government must ensure, by means of promotion or other rewards, to keep them contented.

Donor Coordination and Government Procedures

48. The Feeder Roads Program will rely, for a number of years to come, on donor financing. The Government is aware of this but, so far, has not seriously attempted to smooth the flow of external assistance. The PPAR on the Cotonou Port Project has noted (para. 32.b) that Government is not equipped to handle expeditiously the paperwork involved in schemes financed by a large number of external sources and that this leads to implementation problems and delays. The problem is pervasive enough to demand drastic solutions. For example, Government may consider allowing the establishment

32/ See the Pr',ject Performance Audit Report for: Benin- Cotonou Port Project (under preparation). - 21 - of direct financial flows between SRDR and the donor agencies assisting the Feeder Roads Program. The Ministry responsible for the public debt would preserve its supervisory functions but would no longer be involved in the routine approval of individual items of expenditure. ．ーマ 1 マー

メイ ‘、／や G 圭な、ん 23 ANNEX I Pwe4 i I PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEKORANDUM

BENIN FIRST AMD SECOND FEEDER ROAD PROJECTS (CREDITS 717 and 1090-BEN) BENIN:

DETAILS OF TWO AGRICULTURALI ONE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND ONE EDUCiTTON PROJEM Hinvi Agricultural Project (Credit 144-BEN of 1969) Zou-Borgou Cotton Project (Credit 307-BEN of 1972) Technical Assistance Project (Ciredit*716-BEN of 1977) First Education Project (Oredit 583--DA of 1975) HINVI AGRICULTURAL PROJECT (Credit 144-BEN) Basic Data Board Date 02/18/69 Effectiveness 08/05/69 Closing 06/11/76 Credit Amount US$5.2 million Estimated Cost US$9.6 million Actual Cost US$9.1 million Estimated Completion Date: 12/31/7 Actual Completion Date 06/30/77 Estimated ERR 122 Actual ERR 05% OED Report No. 2053 of 1978 (Project Performance Audit Report) OED Report No* 5029 of 1984 (Impact Evaluation Report)

Pr?Aect 2bjectives and Project Components 2bjective: Develop an efficient system of agricultural production to assure participating small farmers improved incomes.

Components: Establishment of a 6,000 hectare oil palm plantation; 6,000 h7ectare expansion of the annual food crop area- planting of 1,000 hectares of timber; construction of an oil palm mill; construction of project infrastructure works.

Project Results: The Impact Evaluation Report'concluded that, five years after completion, the project was a major economic and social failure. Yields and production of oil palms reached only 252 of the appraisal estimates. due to - 24 - ANNEX I Page 2 low rainfalls, poor maintenance of trees, and considerable stealing of the fruit. For annual crops, cropping intensity and production were at a30% of appraisal estimates because the proposed technical package proved unrealistic and had an adverse effect on soil fertility. The livestock component failed and has incurred financial losses for each of the five years since project completion. Forests were partly destroyed by fire and by illicit cutting.

Lessons:

(a) Investments shoud not be made if known climatic constraints are certain to preclude successful cultivation of tree crops.

(b) Labor supply should have been studied more carefully because labor shortages led to shortfall of food crop production.

(d) The Bank Group ought to ensure durability of completed projects through its economic and sectoral dialogue with the Government.

ZOU-BORGOU COTTON PROJECT (Credit 307-BEN)

Basic Data

Board Date : 05/22/72 Effectiveness : 04/07/73 Closing : 03/31/78 Credit Amount : US$6.1 million Estimated Cost : US$12.7 million Actual Cost : US$12.3 million Estimated Completion Date: 12/74 Actual Completion Date : 12/75 Estimated ERR : 34% Actual ERR : Negative

OED Report No. 2034 of 1978 (Project Performance Audit Report)

Project Objectives and Project Components

Objectives: Expansion and improvement of cotton and rice production, processing and marketing in two major departments of Benin.

Components: To include applied research and studies for an even- tual crop diversification project.

Project Results

The proje. %chieved neither its institutional nor its production targets. When the Project Performance Audit Report was written, cotton production was below pre-project levels. Disappointing performance was due - 25 - ANNEX I Page 3

to organizational and administrative changes introduced by the Government, as well as to market forces which led farmers to abandon cotton production in favor of maize cultivation.

Lessons

(a) Government should not have curtailed the successful work of expatriate managing firms.

(b) Suspension and untimely resumption of disbursements did not contribute to improved project Implementation.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Credit 716-BEN)

Basic Data

Board Date : 06/06/77 Effectiveness : 12/07/77 Closing : 01/31/82 Credit Amount : US$1.7 million Estimated Cost : US$2.6 million Actual Cost : US$3.3 million Estimated Completion Date: N. A. Actual Completion Date : N. A. Estimated ERR * N. A. Actual ERR : N. A.

OED Report No. 4192 of 1982 (Project Performance Audit Report)

Project Objectives and Project Components

Ojectives: Remedy the more prominent weaknesses of the Zou-Borgou Project by strengthening institutions and assisting Government in planning and implementing agricultural policy.

Components: Provide technical assistance, vehicles and equipment to (a) help SONAGRI strengthen its accounting and financial management, train its staff and set up an Evaluation and Planning Directorate: (b) undertake a maize seed multiplication program; (c) prepare small pilot rural development projects; (d) carry out an applied research and training program; and (e) undertake detailed agricultural surveys in Zon and Borgou.

Project Results:

Project implementation was unsuccessful and most of the objectives were not achieved. Implementation problems arose from .n overambitious project concept, greatly aggravated by poor performance of expatriate staff and by inadequate local support. - 26 -

I ANNEX 1 Page 4 Lessons: (a) Flaws in project formulation included the attempt to Implement too many components, poor identification of some project activities, and overoptimistic targets. (b) IDA supervision concentrated on the preparation of follow-on projects and on arrangements for the postponement of some of the project activities.

(d) Government lacked commitment to the project and demonstrated poor institutional performance.

FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (Credit 583-DA) Basic Data

Board Date : 06/19/75 Effectiveness 10/21/76 Closing : 12/31/82 Credit Amount : US$4.0 million Estimated Cost : US$5.5 million tActual Cost : US$5.5 million Estimated Completion Date: 09/30/79 Actual Completion Date : 06/30/83 Estimated ERR : N.A. Actual ERR : N.A.

OED Report No. 5179 of 1984 (Project Performance Audit Report)

Project Objectives and Project Components

Objective: To support training efforts outside tAe formal system. The objective was decided upon in the following manner: "Benin's formal education system was very costly, inefficient and quantitatively limited"; it had "been reviewed by a Government appointed Education Reform Commission"; at the time of project preparation, "the Government had not reached decisions about the recommendations of the Commission". It was therefore decided that the project "should provide support for training efforts outside the formal system which would endeavor to (i) improve directly the quality and productivity of rural life, and (ii) produce a sufficient number of skilled artisans and craftsmen".

Components: (a) Construction of a skills upgrading center at Cotonou with a capacity of 190 places and a potential throughput of 2,200 workers per year, and provision of a stock of training materials; (b) at the national level, buildings and equipment for a new national planning and coordinating body and its executive arm, a National Support Center; (c) at the provincial level, buildings and equipment for Regional Support Centers to - 27 -

ANNEX 1 be located at three Provinces, and assistance for training staff for 4-D Clubs; (d) at the village and individual 4-D Club level, technical support and inputs to as many as 45 clubs in each of the three provinces; (e) twelve staff years of technical assistance at all levels; and (f) about twelve staff years of consultant services to prepare a follow-on project.

Project Results:

"Quality and productivity of rural life were enhanced through provision of water mills and medical supplies and limited growth of rural incomes". Utilization of technical assistance was difficult and incomplete. Too much attention was paid to hardware components to the neglect of actual training. Several important covenants were not adhered to. The Skills Upgrading Center was underutilized. Distribution of agricultural equipment was not realized.

Lessons:

(a) The non-formal approach to rural education is difficult.

(b) "Project design for some Western African countries should make the project as simple as possible and limit the number of its objectives."

ANNEX 2 Pagi- Y

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM

BENIN FIRST AMD SECOND FEEDER ROAD PROJECTS (CREDITS 717 and 1090-REN)

BENIN:

SUMMARY OF THREE HIGHWAY PROJECTS, 1970-1979

Highway Maintenance and Engineering Project (Credit 215-DA of 1970)

Secohd Highway Project (Credit 415-DA of 1976)

Third Highway Project (Credit 746-BEN of 1977)

HIGHWAY MAINTENANCE AND ENGINEERING PROJECT (Credit 215-DA)

Basic Data

Board' Date 09/08/70 Effectiveness 04/08/71 Closing 6/76 Credit Amount US$4,1 million Estimated Cost US$4.1 million Actual Cost US$4,3 million Estimated Completion Date: N.A. Actual Completion Date N.A. Estimated ERR 30% Actual ERR 42%+

OED Report No. 1768 of 1977 (Project Performance Audit Report)

Project Objectivesand Pr2lect Components

2jbective: Implement some of the recommendations of the 1969 UNDP-financed Land Transport Survey with primary attention on improving highway maintenance,

Components: (a) A four-year highway maintenance program; (b) detailed engin-eeringTor 318 km of roads; and (c) activation of a Directorate of Land Transport.

Project Results

The reestimated ERR exceeds the SAR forecasts because of much lar- gev than anticipated vehicle operating cost savings from improved highway maintenance. The Department of Public Works was strengthened but after 1973 shortfalls occurred in road maintenance operations and in transport coordination, Shortfalls were due to staffing constraints, shortages of local funds and inadequate project preparation. Ttaining and technical assistance re- - 30 - ANNEX 2 Page 2 suits might have been better if conditions in the country had not changed and if inducements to keep trained staff in Government service had been built in- to the project.

Lessons

(a) The "global approach" used for the formulation of the training program had serious shortcomings (PPAM, paras. 8-11).

(b) Technical assistance for transport coordination fell short (PPAM, para. 16).

(d) Government is not keen on transport coordination as shown by suc- cessive postponement of any action from the First to the Second to the Third Project (rPAM, para. 16).

SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (Credit 415-DA)

Basic Data

Board Date 4/73 and 3/76 Effectiveness : 3/74 and 10/76 Closing : 4/77 and 3/82 Credit Amount : US$11.8 + $6.4 - $2.6 million = $18.2 million Estimated Cost : US$21.1 million Actual Cost : US$32.2 million Estimated Completion Date: 11/76 Actual Completion Date : 05/77 Estimated ERR 13% Actual ERR 16%

OED Report No. 3986 of 1982 (Project Performance Audit Report)

Project Objectives and Project Components

Objective: Road rehabilitation and maintenance to reduce vehicle operating costs.

Components: Rehabilitation of the Parakou-Malanville Road (318 km) and of two road sections in'the south; technical assistance for highway maintenance; consultant services for Directorate of Land Transport.

Project Results

The Parakou-Malanville road was improved but the design was inadequate for the traffic, the curves were worn out and problems arose with routine maintenance. The institution-building objective for road maintenance operations (continued from the previous project) was largely unfulfilled. - 31

ANNEX 2 Page 3

That for transport coordination was deferred st Government request to the Third Project and this had detrimental effects for the Second Project. There was a 53% cost overrun and a supplementary credit was approved in 1976 but it was overestimated and US$2.6 million (or about 30%) had to be cancelled.

Lessons

(a) The main purpose was to strengthen the "Benin Route" (from the Port of Cotonou to Niamey, in Niger). However, IDA was also financing the "Togo Route" (from the Port of Lome to Niamey). No systematic work was done to determine the total volume of the Niger traffic on the basis of which both the Benin and the Togo Routes are justified (PPAM, pares. 53-55).

(b) Variations in estimates of vehicle operating cost savings reduce the confidence that may be placed on the calculations of project benefits (PPAM, para. 43).

(c) The attempts to use outside the Second Project the large surplus from the Supplementary Credit raise questions regarding (i) effective control and use of surplus funds in a loan and, (ii) the application of loan funds without the authorization of the Executive Directors (PPAM, paras. 47-52). IDA did not cancel the surplus from fear this would have negative effects on Bank- Government relations (PPAM, para. 47).

(d) Deferral to use technical assistance for transport coordination, and delay to establish a focal point for transport coordination decisions, have led to poor project planning in transport (PPAM, paras. 11, 36-37, 56)..

THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT (Credit 746-BEN)

Basic Data

Board Date 11/77 Effectiveness : 06/78 Closing 06/83 Credit Amount : US$10.0 million Estimated Cost US$21.3 million Actual Cost : US$22.2 million (not comparable to estimate) Estimated Completion Date: 10/80 Actual Completion Date : 10/82 (not comparable to estimate) Estimated ERR 75% Actual ERR 122%

OED Report No. 5531 of 1985 (Project Performance Audit Report) - 32 - ANNEX 2 Page 4

Project Objectives and 'Project Components Components (called "objectives" in the PCR): (a) rehabilitate the Godomey-Bohicon-Abomey road; (b) eliminate backlog of maintenance; (c) pre- investment studies; and (d) technical assistance to implement the project and to develop the institutions responsible for the sector.

Project Results

The Government's cumbersome administrative procedures delayed project implementation by about two years. This increased project costs. The project scope was reduced and items were postponed to the Fourth Project.

Lessons

(a) Delays in commencing road works resulted in further deterioration of the roads concerned (PCR, paras. 3.03 and 3.08).

(b) Discontinuity in Bank personnel led to conflicting suggestions regarding technical assistance needs (PCR, para. 3.11).

(c) The Ministry of Transport remains unconvinced about the advantages from improved transport planning (PCR, para. 3.12).

(d) Government was unresponsive concerning recommendations to preserve a balance between public and private transport (PCR, para. 3.19).

(e) Questionable mix of data and methodologies: the traffic data show inconsistencies (PCR, para. 5.07) but the analysis uses the sophis- ticated tools of the Highway Design and Maintenance Model to simu- late total t7ansport costs (PCR, para. 5.01).

(f) The full impact of the project should be assessed in combination with the Fourth Highway Project to which many components were transferred from the Third (PCR, para. 7.01). - 33 -

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

BENIN

FIRST AND SECOND FEEDER ROADS PROJECTS

CREDITS 717 AND 1090-BEN

1. INTRODUCTION

1.01 Benin's economy is based mostly on traditional farming, with about 71% of the population living in the rural areas. Agriculture con- tributes about 43% of GDP, which measures at about US$300 per capita, and provides just over half of the country's foreign exchange earnings. In the absence of major mineral resource endowments and a limited industrial base, agriculture is expected to remain the mainstay of the economy in the foreseeable future. Most of the rural population work on small family farms of 1.8 to 3 hectares: maize, yams, manioc and sorghum are the staple foods. The first three comprised 90% of the total annual food crop output of 1.77 million tons from 1979/80-1981/82. Although statistics are uncertain, indications are that Benin has maintained a positive food balance over the past few years.

1.02 In 1976 rural roads were poorly developed and were not integrated into the primary and secondary network: most of the roads were poorly maintained and only passable for part of the year. There- fore, the cost of moving agricultural goods was high. In the past, priority was given to the primary road network. The First Feeder Road Project turned attention to integrating areas of agricultural potential into the economy through improving access between the food producing and consuming centers. In addition, with encouragement from the Association, attention was focused on maintenance, not only of feeder roads, but also the road network in general.

1.03 The First Feeder Roads Project, approved in 1977, was conceived as the first phase of a longer term Feeder Roads Improvement and Mainte- nance Program. The program was continued with financing from the Second Feeder Roads Project, approved in 1980; a Third Feeder Road Project is now being implemented by IDA to continue the program at least another three years and consolidate progress made in institutional development. - 34-

II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL

Identification

2.01 The Feeder Road Improvement and Maintenance Program was identified in late 1973 when an IDA mission was sent to Benin (formerly Dahomey) to review feeder roads included in IDA-financed agricultural projects and to identify road activities that could be financed under the next highway project. The First Zou-Borgou Agricultural Production Project (Cr. 307-DAR) was financing the construction and improvement of feeder roads for cotton producing areas in the regions of Zou and Borgou and an extension of this program was under preparation as part of the Second Zou-Borgou Project. The construction works were being carried out by DROA using equipment-intensive brigades. The Government was keen to extend the program to other parts of the country as part of a nationwide rural roads program and, therefore, requested that the mission consider the preparation and implementation of a feeder road construction component for inclusion in the next IDA project. Technical assistants hired under the ongoing Highway Maintenance Project (Cr. 215-DA) were directed to add the identification of a feeder road program, including improvement and maintenance of feeder roads, to their study of road maintenance.

Preparation

2.02 The technical assistants' report on the feeder road program was finalized in July 1975. A 700 km feeder road construction program was identified along with a 600 km secondary road regravelling and a 3,300 km road maintenance program. Feeder road construction was to be carried out by equipment-intensive brigades which were to construct and improve 125 km of roads per year. No particular problems were foreseen with execution of the program given DROA's experience with construction of cotton roads: these roads had been constructed by two brigades supervised by expatriate engineers. The program recommended by the technical assistance was to be included in the Third Highway Project, together with a road strengthening and maintenance component. However, a preparation mission from the Bank Group Feeder Roads Unit (based in Abidjan), in May 1976 recommended that the feeder road component be made a separate Feeder Roads Project, based on the Regions's experience that feeder road construction and maintenance and general road maintenance components seemed to have little to do with each other. (The Region's experience showed that in the past, feeder road components, when included in highway or agricultural projects, had been neglected.) This was agreed to by the Government and IDA.

2.03 The Second Feeder Road Project was prepared under, and was a continuation of, the First Feeder Road Project: many of the roads selected for implementation under the First Project were included in the Second because of slower than anticipated progress with Phase 1 of the program (para. 3.07). -35-

Appraisal

2.04 Phase I of the program was appraised in July 1976 (at the same time as the Third Highway Project) by staff from the Feeder Roads Unit. The tentative program identified at appraisal included 1360 km of feeder roads for improvement, comprising 700 km of roads identified by the technical assistants, 360 km of roads not completed under the Zou- Borgou Cotton Project and 300 km of roads proposed by the G6nie Rural of the Ministry of Development; another 450 km of roads was included for maintenance. Given the difficult financial situation of the Government, the appraisal recommended that IDA finance up to 95% of total project costs, including financing of about 75% of local costs. The appraisal mission examined the possibility of using labor-intensive methods and other appropriate technology for the improvement and maintenance works, since these had not been considered by the technical assistants but were showing encouraging results in other parts of Africa (namely Kenya). Consequently, two equipment-intensive and two labor-intensive brigades were recommended by the appraisal team, although the use of labor- intensive techniques met with some initial resistance from the then Ministry of Equipment (now called the Ministry of Public Works, Construction and Housing (MTPCHC)), but was welcomed by the Ministry of Finance.

2.05 The Issues Paper recommended further preparatory work before negotiations for the project, particularly refinement of the methodology for economic analysis, completion of an inventory of all the roads, definition of the first year program, and identification of eqvipment needs. Since the technical assistant's economic analysis of the feeder roads was based on vehicle operating cost sayings only, a new methodology based on agricultural value added was designed by the appraisal mission and the technical assistants subsequently applied the methodology in reevaluating the roads. In order to determine the labour/equipment composition of the labor-intensive brigades, an OPS specialist in appropriate technology accompanied the post-appraisal mission in October 1976, together with a labor-intensive construction techniques expert from the Kenya Appropriate Technology Unit. Subsequent to post-appraisal, two more technical assistants were hired by the Bank to complete the inventory of the roads to be improved and to further review equipment needs.

2.06 As the project identified at appraisal required more credit funds than available in the lending program, the size of the project was reduced from 1,360 km to 845 km during post-appraisal. Given that little was known about the relative merits of different construction techniques in Benin, the post-appraisal mission decided that three methods should be evaluated as part of Phase 1 of the program: equipment-intensive, equipment-intensive but with components of casual labor (intermediate brigade), and very labor-intensive. There was to be a three year program using one equipment-intensive, one intermediate and two labor-intensive brigades (the second to be started in tte second year of the project; the technical assistance requirements were significantly increased from the 40 man-months identified at appraisal to 134 man-months, with the hope that some of this could be provided by - 36 -

volunteers. The mission recommended that a Feeder Roads Division (SRDR) be set up under the DROA, since the scope of work required different operational and administrative procedures from other types of road programs, and different construction techniques had to be tested.

2.07 During negotiations in April 1977, the Government of Benin expressed concern about the lag between the time when local expenditures would be incurred and reimbursements received from IDA. Therefore, agreement was reached on the establishment of a revolving fund to which IDA would advance US$300,000 as part of its contribution to project financing. The project was finally approved by the Board in May 1977, after the credit amount had been reduced from US$6.0 million to US$5.5 million by the Loan Committee, so as to decrease IDA financing from 95% to 90% of total project costs (net of taxes).

2.,08 The Second Feeder Road Project appraisal in April 1980, with a follow-up mission in May 1980, focused on Phase 2 of the program. About 230 km were included from Phase 1 and another 470 km were identified by the Feeder Roads Unit and the Borgou II Rural Development Project. The objective of the Second Project was not only to extend geographic coverage, but also to develop institutional coordination of feeder road construction activities (financed by different external agencies), develop a feeder road maintenance capacity, and train more Beninois to take over the staffing of the program. Initially, Phase 2 was to be included in a Highway Maintenance and Feeder Road Project, but at appraisal it was decided to process Phase 2 as a separate project because the maintenance component was going to be delayed. It was not possible to delay Phase 2 because funds for the program were running out under the First Feeder Road Project. The Second Feeder Road Project was presented to the Board in December 1980. Retroactive financing of US$0.70 million was provided in order to cover expenditures incurred during the period between exhaustion of the funds under Phase 1 and the start of Phase 2.

Program Description

2.09 The primary objective of the Feeder Road Program was to improve the rural road network in Benin and develop institutional capacity within DROA to plan, construct and maintain the rural road network. Phase 1 focused on two regions in Benin while Phase 2 extended the program to four other regions. Major components of the two projects, as defined at appraisal, are given below. - 37 -

Phase 1 Phase 2 First Feeder Second Feeder Component Road Project Road Project Total

Improvement of rural roads and subsequent maintenance (km) 845 700 1,545 a/

Maintenance of other rural roads not included for improvement (km) 425 800 b/ 1,225

Technical Assistance (man-months) 134 108 228 a/ 231 km of roads were included under both the First and Second Feeder Road Projects. b/ Includes 300 km of roads improved under the First Feeder Road Project.

2.1f- Major covenants and side letters to the Credit Agreements are discussed in Chapter IV and Annex 1.

III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST

Effectiveness

3.01 There were two conditions of effectiveness for the First Feeder Road Project. The first required the Government to open a Special Project Account, so that a revolving fund could be established (para. 2.07). The second required the Government to set up a Feeder Roads Division for the planning, construction, and maintenance of feeder roads within the DROA (para. 2.06). Because these conditions were met after a three month delay, the date of effectiveness was postponed from September 1, 1977 to December 6, 1977.

3.02 The Second Feeuer Roads Project had no conditions of effectiveness, but credit effectiveness was still delayed by seven months because the Government was slow in submitting the required legal documents. Some documents had to be redrafted because they contained errors. The credit was eventually declared effective.on December 11, 1981, instead of May 14, 1981, as originally scheduled. In view of these delays, during negotiations of the Third Feeder Roads Project, Government agreed to accelerate procedures for credit effectiveness.

Start-up of the Feeder Road Program.

3.03 The appraisal of the First Feeder Road Project projected that three brigades would be set up by January 1978 and the remaining one by January 1979. But the first brigade (intermediate) was not set up until January 1979, followed by the equipment-intensive brigade in April and the two labor-intensive brigades in June and December of - 38 -

1679 (Annex 2). During much of 1979, the brigades were not operating at full strength. The reasons for this and the one year delay in start-up of the program are:

(a) delays in credit effectiveness and Gavernment's slowness in contracting technical assistants to supervise the program;

(b) delays in delivery of equipment;

(c) poor performance of some of the equipment received e.g. water pumps, front loader tractor attachments and tractor/trailer hook-ups;

(d) abnormally hign rains in 1979;

(e) problems with setting up adequate organizational and administrative procedures for the program; and

(f) lack of counterpart staff. This meant that the technical assistants had to carry out routine administrative tasks instead of concentrating on problems in the field.

3.04 The years 1978-79 proved to be the most difficult for the program: the technical assistants selected for the program did not arrive in Benin until May 1978, eight months later than estimated, because of delays in credit effectiveness. Government was slow in approving the technical assistance contract; and there was a two month delay between signing of the contract and the project leader taking up his position in Benin. The SRDR established as a condition of credit effectiveness, was not staffed. A Beninois Division Chief was appointed in June, but only on a half-time basis; other counterpart headquarters staff were not provided until January 1979 and even then their limited qualifications and lack of experience were such that headquarters was effectively operating at half strength during the first year of the prograr. Training of staff was also hampered by continuing changes in Government personnel because of the political state of the country at the time.

3.05 Additional problems were encountered during the first eighteen months with the organizational and administrative structure of the program. The amount of work required was far greater than anticipated at appraisal (same experience had been encountered in other parts of. Africa with similar types of programs, for example, Kenya Rural Access Roads Program). The slow and cumbersome Government administrative procedures and centralization of managerial control sloved implementation of the program. In particular, payment of wages te laborers working for the road construction brigades was tardy since author- izationk had to come from Cotonou based on montly labor returns from the field offices. The significant delays were continued until the payroll was computerized and a certain measure of decentralization was -39-

aqhieved. Also due to shortage of counterpart staff, another engineer had to be added to the technical assistance team at headquarters.

3.06 Lack of vehicles and equipment severely restricted progress of the project during the first eighteen months of the program. Vehicles for the technical assistance were not delivered until August 1978, which obviously restricted their capacity to operate. Though much of the equipment for the brigades arrived during the first part of 1978, there were substantial delays in delivering the most critical items for effective operation of the brigades. Of particular importance were six tippers and seven tankers which had been ordered from a company that subsequently failed to deliver. The Government took a long time to cancel the contract and ask the next lowest bidder to supply the equipment. These items were finally delivered in aid-1980. Equipment delays were not only due to suppliers, but also to the time it took the Government to process custows clearance and the Ministry to inspect, accept and allocate the equipment to SRDR. In the meantime, some equipment was hired at costs amounting to five to six times the amortization cost of the program's own equipment. Finally, construction activities were also affected by the poor performance of some water pumps, front loader tractor attachments and tractor/trailer hook-ups.

Performance of the Construction Brigades - Phases 1 and 2

3.07 The first phase of the program was meant to determine which construction technique was the most cost-effective for improvement of rural roads in Benin. An equipment-intensive brigade carried out construction works in the northern region of Atacora where labor availability was low. An intermediate brigade employing a mix of labor and equipment-intensive methods was used in the south, together with two labor-intensive brigades. Altogether, over 1,000 km of roads had been, improved as of December 1984-318 km during Phase 1 compared to the 845 km projected at appraisal; and 690 km during Phase 2 compared to 700 km as projected at appraisal of the Second Feeder Road Project. As of December 1984, about 98% of construction work under Phase 2 has been completed. Output in Phase 1 was lower than appraisal estimates not only because of the late start-up and problems mentioned in paras. 3.03-3.06, but also because funds ran out sooner than expected due to increased costs (para. 3.19). More significantly, the appraisal targets themselves were not very realistic in view of the organizational and administrative problems that had to be overcome before the program could function effectively. Annual output of the units is given in Annex 3. Productivity of the equipment-intensive brigade was particularly overestimated at 125 km per year; the Second Feeder Road appraisal reduced the target to 100 km, but this has still proved to be too high.

3.08 'The appraisal mission for Phase 2 of the program decided that intermediate methods were not viable as implemented in Phase 1 (based on the performance of the intermediate brigade in 1979 9nd the first - 40 -

hal of 1980). It therefore decided to phase out the brigade during Phase 2 and instead set up two additional labor-intensive brigades. The number of brigade-years in Phase 1 and 2 is given below:

Type of Brigade 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Total

Equipment 0.75 1 1 1 1 4.75 Intermediate 1 1 1 0.5 0 3.50 Labor 1 0.50 1 1 1 1 4.50 2 0.08 1 1 1 1 4.08 3 - - - - 1 1.00 4 - - - - 0.75 0.75 Total 2k3 ~5±& 72

3.09 Design standards of the roads are similar to the First Feeder Road Project appraisal standards. The only change has been gravelling of nearly 100% of the roads constructed, compared to 50% estimated at appraisal. The other change during Phase 2 was a reduction of platform width from 6m to 5m where soil conditions and light traffic levels permitted this.

3.10 Continuing problems have been encountered with the equipment-intensive brigade. The first year's output of 31 km (April-Dec. 1979) was not only low due to lack of equipment and administrative problems, etc. (paras. 3.03-06), but also because of communication difficulties with the brigade in the north (the subsequent acquisition of two-way radios alleviated some of these problems) and excessive design standards on the first road constructed. Thp highest annual output achieved was 87 km in 1980, when the equipment was still fairly new and many of the initial start-up problems had been resolved; this compares to a Phase 2 appraisal target of 100 km. Thereafter, output of the brigade declined because of continuing communication problems with the north, erratic fuel supply, uncoordinated logistic support, frequent mechanital breakdowns, poorly trained mechanics and operators, and lack of spare parts. In addition, the brigade was working in generil1y difficult terrain; production was also disrupted for as much as twd months each time the brigade was moved from one site to another. By the beginning of 1982 the situation had deteriorated to the point where production was brought to a standstill because every item of heavy equipment needed repairing: only 45 km of road were improved during the year. The brigade's problems were exacerbated by the departure of the expatriate brigade chief and the poor performance of his counterpart. Since the brigade continued to suffer from problems of low vehicle and equipment availability, it was phased out in Phase 3 of the program and the remaining equipment was used to form an intermediate and a mechanized maintenance brigade, as well as to mechanize some tasks (mainly quarry operations) of the labor-intensive brigades. - 41 -

3.11 Output of the intermediate brigade gradually increased from 41 km of roads in 1979 to 91 km in 1981, compared to an appraisal target of 73 km. During the first year there appears to have been some problems with deciding on the machine/labor mix, and only a little labor was used for much of the year because excavation of heavy clay soil was thought more suitable for machines. Problems encountered during 1979-80 were due to incompatibility of mixing equipment and labor-intensive methods; e.g., all activities were carried out by mechanized methods except for loading in the quarries, but labor proved reluctant to load by hand in these circumstances. No such problams were encountered with the labor-intensive brigades where no major mechanical plant was used. Consequently, during appraisal of the Second Feeder Road Project in Spring 1980 it was decided to turn the intermediate brigade into a maintenance brigade. However, output rapidly improved from mid-1980, to the extent that disbandment of the brigade was delayed by ten months for the program to benefit from the improved performance of the brigade. By 1981. the brigade was practically mechanized since a mechanical loader was used in the quarries. The only difference between the intermediate and equipment-intensive brigade was that the intermediate brigade had slightly less equipment (Annex 4)-one grader as opposed to two, three tipper trucks as opposed to four, and no workshop truck or self- propelled roller as opposed to one for the equipment-intensive brigade: however, it did have one D6 bulldozer which the equipment-intensive brigade did not have. The success of the brigade was attributed to good management by the expatriate brigade chief, excellent mechanical support from a Dutch volunteer, the relatively easy terrain, and the participation of a highly motivated local Committee for the Defence of the Revolution. Food was also provided by the World Food Program. When the brigade was moved to another area productivity fell. It is difficult to evaluate to what extent this * was due to winding down operations from April-June 1982 and overhaul- ing of equipment.

3.12 The labor-intensive brigades gave the most consistent per- formalce, with an output of around 40 km p .ryear after 1979 (with the exception of one brigade in 1982). Output compares favorably with other labor-intensive rural road programs in Africa, although it is still not up to the Phase 2 appraisal target of 45 km per year. In general, site management has been good, with effective administrative procedures that ensured tho'timely payment of wages to labor, etc. The success of the two labor-intensive brigades in 1980 led to the inclusion of two more in Phase 2 of the program, although establishment of the brigades was delayed by over a year because of the lengthy time it took the Government to procure equipment and the delay in phasing out the intermediate brigade. Labor availability was adequate up to 1982, except for seasonal fluctuations. Labor then became more difficult to recruit because of the low casual labor wage rate, which had not been increased for some time, even though inflation was high. This made agricultural work more attractive than working on the feeder road program. The situation was somewhat alleviated by a 17% increase in the wage rate in late 1982; the availability of labor has steadily Improved throughout 1983, but continues to be below needs. Under Phase -42-

3 of the program some of the labor-intensive brigades' tasks. such As quarry excavation, will be mechanized in order to reduce the total labor requirements from 275 to 175 laborers per brigade. The low 1982 output of 29 km for the brigade based in Ou6m6 (labor 2) was'mainly due to the unavailability of labor; this was the result of labor seeking work over the border in Nigeria at far higher wage rates.

3.13 In 1981, the intermediate brigade with two thirds more labor than needed for the equipment-intensive but different composition produced 30% more output compared with the equipment-intensive brigade. This makes it difficult to conclude which of these brigades was more effective.

3.14 Staffing. By mid-1983 the total staff of SRDR amounted to 2,000, including permanent and temporary labor. Counterpart staffing of the program continued to be a problem throughout Phases 1 and 2. Government found it difficult to recruit staff because of the low civil service wages and competition from other West African countries where large numbers of qualified Beninois worked. In 1980, the situation was so acute that IDA insisted that if preparation of Phase 2 of the program was to continue four counterparts for brigade chiefs and an additional engineer for headquarters should be recruited. The Government subsequently found brigade chief counterparts by mid-1980, but there was still an engineering vacancy at the end of the year, as well as vacant positions for an accountant and deputy for the Beninois head of SRDR. The situation improved in 1981, but all key positions i were not filled until mid-1983. Consequently, substantial technical assistance is still needed, since there have not been the counterpart staff to train. More technical assistance than projected at both appraisals had to be provided because of the lack of counterpart staff, especially as IDA had made unrealistic assumptions about the phasing out of technical assistance in Phase 1 of the program. The graph on the next page shows that an additional 101 man-months of technical assistance services were required from 1979 to 1983.

3.15 As well as the continuing staff shortages at headquarters, the working conditions were made difficult by the shortage of office accommodation. Although not originally foreseen at appraisal, SRDR decided to have its own offices constructed instead of renting office space which proved not to be feasible in view of the general shortage of office rental space in Cotonou. IDA agreed to finance the construction of a new office building, which began in 1978. The building was meant to be completed by April 1979, but because of problems with the contractor and Government's decision to add additional floors, the building was not actually completed until June 1981. Meanwhile, the headquarters staff expanded and working conditions remained cramped throughout the first half of 1981. - 43 -

Benin - Planned vs. Actual Technical Assistance

LEGENDs A- Flaned 1804 a Acual

160j Brigade Chief# 9 140. A

120 ce

f to o Accountant O

60. n HQ "Baser ; '

Chies 20 Ti th Mission 0

-fiat Feeder SeeTohadar Roads Project Roads Project

SAt end of Decemher 1983.

Cost Effectiveness of Different Conscruction Methods.

3.16 The graphic on the following page shows the per km direct construction costs of different brigades: direct costs include all costs directly attributable to a particular site, including labor, materials, equipment depreciation, hire charges, equipment spare parts and maintenance costs, and site overheads. Details are shown in Annex 5. Construction costs including indirect costs are also shown: Indirect costs comprise all expenditure not directly attributable to specific construction brigades. These include salaries of technical and administrative staff, headquarters equipment depreciation and operation charges, office building construction and maintenance costs, and training costs. Indirect costs have been allocated on the basis of the tecNnical assistance estimates - 40% for the equipment- intensive brigade, 30% for the intermediate, and 15% each for the labor-intensive brigades from 1979 to 1981. Indirect coaLs for 1982 were more difficult to estimate since three additional construction brigades (including UNCDF-financed ones) were established in addition to a bridges and a maintenance brigade. Therefore, indirect costs have been allocated to each brigade according to the direct proportion of brigade salary expenditure to total direct salary expenditure. Technical assistance costs have not been included in the analysis since these should be spread over the length of the program, given the institution-building nature of technical assistance. Even if the technical assistance costs of field staff are regarded as part of -44-

indirect costs this would mae very little difference to the comparative advantage of each construction brigade. The periods for which the analysis was carried out have been determined by the availability of data that could be extracted from technical assistatke reports.

Benin - Construction Costs per km by Type of Brigade ,Current Prices CFAF ('000)

4000

LEGEND: 3000 Indirect

2000 - Direct

1000

App Av A Avg Ag"Sp Ap An pp Avg Wquitge ltesmfiete Later Labor Avte tacteve ateie I tatastwo 3

NI, App te o bke ppretesI t . Avg water to ab. avpeg tuv 1919*83.

3.17 Apart from the different formula for allocating indirect costs in 1982 as compared with the previous years, other factors make costs in different years difficult to compare. During the first two years, 1979- 80, equipment depreciation costs were based on a capital recovery factor of 14% per annum, whereas the 1981-82 figures are based on a linear depreciation with no residual value: no interest on the equipment is included. This change effectively reduced the depreciation element of equipment costing by 36% relative to 1980. The high direct costs for the equipment-intensive brigade in 1981 are partly due to the inclusion of bridge construction costs which do not appear in other years' costs. Also, some indirect costs were recorded as direct costs before 1982. Comparison with appraisal estimates are complicated by the fact that appraisal costs are based on gravelling 50% of roads cbnstructed while actual costs include almost 100% of -45-

gravelling. Many of the fluctuations in cost components from one year to another cannot be readily explained. However, the intermediate brigade's high costs in 1982 can be partly accounted for by the winding up of the brigade in mid-year, while the labor-intensive 2 brigade's high costs in 1982 were the result of difficulty in recruiting casual labor.

3.18 Average costs for the intermediate brigade are the lowest over 1979-82, with or without indirect expenditures. The decision to phase out the intermediate brigade was made in mid-1980, after about eighteen months of operation* when the cost advantage was not so apparent. However, the extent to which low 1981 c-sts reflect exceptional circumstances (para. 3.11) is not clear, so whether intermediate technology costs are really lower than other costs is not certain. It is very difficult to come to any conclusions about the' comparative cost advantage of equipment-intensive and labor-intensive costs of construction, even though average monetary costs appear similar, for from one year to another there has been no consistent trend in cost advantage of one method over another.

3.19 Overall, Phase 1 direct costs (Annex 6) are about 15% higher (in real terms) than estimated at appraisal because of the implementation problems mentioned earlier (paras. 3.03-12). Indirect costs were not fully estimated at appraisal, since only headquarters equipment costs were included. Average costs for Phase 2, including direct and indirect costs (Annex 7), are about the same (in real terms) as the appraisal estimates of CFF 1.9 million per km in 1980 prices. Average direct costs for the program as a whole increased by 122 a year from 1979-1982; costs including indirect costs increased by 20% a year. This compares to an average annual increase in the consumer price index of about 20%.

3.20 Development of a cost accounting system has taken some time because of the lack of experienced accounting staff. There still are accounting problems that need to be clarified. For example, three methods of allocating indirect costs appear in a 1983 technical assistant's yport on the comparative cost of different construction techniques. - One of the most serious shortcomings has been the failure to integrate cost accounting data with the physical progress of the program, which means that the reasons for the considerable fluctuations in costs from one period to another are not altogether apparent. The Third Feeder Roads Project provides resources to integrate the cost accounting data with the physical progress of the works.

1/ Consultants: Evaluation of Labor Based Construction Programs, 1983. - 46 -

Maintenance of the Roads

3.21 Very little maintenance took place during Phase 1 of the program, despite an appraisal target of 425 km, because the emphasis was on establishing the construction brigades and getting them to run efficiently. During the first three years, construction brigades in the area carried out any maintenance that was necessary on those roads improved under the program. During appraisal of the Second Feeder Road Project, it was recognized that all of rural road maintenance would have to be reorganized under the DROA since local authorities, under whose responsibility rural road maintenance fell,-had neither the funds nor capacity to carry out the work. The proposed Fourth Highway Project was to address the problem, but in the meantime the Second Feeder Road Project included the establishment of a maintenance brigade in the north and the development of appropriate maintenance techniques in the south. The maintenance brigade in the north was eventually set up in 1983 with equipment from the intermediate construction brigade, which had been phased out in 1982. The development of labor-intensive maintenance methous in the south started in 1982: experiments were carried out with the lengthman system, but this proved unsuccessful because former construction brigade laborers hired to do the work did not seem to adjust to working on their own. Ongoing experiments are trying to turn former employees of the construction brigades into contractors by making them responsible for hiring laborers to maintain a certain kilometrage of road: this seems to be meeting with more success. Small direct labor gangs are another alternative method under study. Per km costs are CFAF 55,000-the same cost as for mechanized maintenance carried out in the north.

3.22 By mid-1983 about 425 km of roads were being maintained, compared to an appraisal target of 1,225 km. As part of Phase 3, a temporary feeder road maintenance brigade is being set up in SRDR to maintain 2000 km of priority feeder roads, since the Fourth Highway Project did not include a maintenance component for feeder roads. Rural road maintenance is eventually to fall under the responsibility of DROA, but its capacity is still limited: this problem will be addressed under the proposed Transport Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project which is being prepared under a Government requested PPF.

Training

3.23 Very little training of Beninois staff was carried out during Phase 1 of the program because of the lack of counterparts and time to conduct formal training sessions. The only training that did take place was on-the-job (mostly in the field). During Phase 2 of the program an engineer was meant to have responsibility for training, but he was of limited effectiveness because of the shortage of counterparts during the first year and his diversion to other operational activities. The main areas of need are the training of equipment operators, mechanics, and administrative staff; these problems will be addressed under Phase 3 of* he program. On-the-job training that has taken place so far appears,-to have been successful in developing a -47- good cadre of brigade chiefs and supervisors, with one or two excep- tions.

Road Planning and Monitori 3.24 Technical assistance provided under the project sub- contracted an economist in 1978 for ten months (on an intermittent basis) to develop a methodology for the selection of feeder roads, draw up annual feeder road programs, monitor the socio-economic aspects of feeder road improvements and train a local counterpart economist. Training of the counterpart economist was not possible because a local economist was not appointed until later in the program.' Since program implementation was delayed, monitoring of improved feeder roads was only partial. During the first year, the economist was left to develop the economic methodology and collect data, but in August 1979 IDA supervision missions found that his work was not acceptable. A Senior Economist from the sub-contracting company agreed to complete the work and a first acceptable draft of the Economic Report was completed in December 1979.

3.25 Roads tentatively considered for improvement during late 1980 and 1981 were evaluated using the new methodology. Subsequent annual programs have been draim up by SRDR's Project Planning and Evaluation Unit and submitted to the Interministerial Technical Committee (ITC) for approval. This committee was formed in 1979 by representatives of all technical ministries involved in feeder roads, including Finance, Rural Development, Planning and NTPCH. SRDR has developed a good data base for rural road planning, including data on agricultural production, rural population and social infrastructure. The involvement of a Dutch volunteer contributed greatly to the data collection process. The Second Feeder Road Project also provided funds for the first phase of a socio-economic Impact study of feeder roads in Benin; the study was completed in May 1983 and is discussed in paras. 5.06-5.07.

Reporting

3.26 During Phase 1 the technical assistants submitted monthly progress reports on implementation of the program, but it was agreed that this was too excessive a reporting requirement and the progress reports were submitted on a quarterly basis from the beginning of Phase 2 (Feb 1981). This change in reporting procedures was reason- able, but IDA should have insisted on more in-depth analysis of unit costs on a monthly basis, as is -being done under the Third Feeder Roads Project. During the first year, progress reports were intermittent because scarce manpower resources were being used to get the program established. However, from September 1979 the reporting situation improved. Progress reports have always been brief and factual, with little analysis of problems encountered with each brigade. Information on the man-months nf technical assistance, numbers of counterpart staff, man-days per equipment-intensive and intermediate brigades, and other aspects of the program has not been included in many progress reports, particularly the later ones. Costs - 48 -

for the program have always been presented separately from any details on physical implementation (para. 3.20), which makes it difficult to relate the two. However, the integration of the two is slowly improving. Many progress reports did not even contain information on costs because costs were submitted later. No doubt the problems of implementation and lack of capable staff have meant that progress reports have received low priority. Improved reporting procedures have been included under the Third Feeder Roads Project.

Procurement

3.27 There were no major procurement problems apart from the supply of tippers and tankers at the beginning of the program (para. 3.06). Government procrastination and slow procedures seriously delayed the reordering of this equipment from another supplier.

Costs or Phase 1 and 2 of the Program

3.28 The total project cost for both phases amounted to CFAF 3,322 million with a reditced output of 1,050 km, as compared to the appraisal estimate of CFAF 3,297 million for an output of 1,545 km. The devaluation of CFAF from CFAF 245 Per US dollar at appraisal to 211 in 1980 resulted in a loss of nearly CFAF 200 million which was financed by-the Second Highway Project (Cr. 415-DA). While the project cost remained virtually the same in CFAF terms, the project cost for Phase 1 increased by about 16% in US dollar terms. The main reasons for cost increases are increas4d technical assistance services by 57 man-months (increase of 88% in dollar terms, para. 3.14) and unforeseen (at appraisal) h4ring of construction equipment (CFAF 63 million) and construction of an office building for SRDR Headquarters (CFAF 19 million). The cost overrun was somewhat offset by substantially lower than estimated operation of the brigades (80 brigade-months, compared with 120 brigade-months estimated at appraisal).

3.29 The only significant cost increase under Phase 2 was an increase of 44 man-months of additional technical assistance services due to shortage of counterpart staff (para. 3.14).

Financing

3.30 IDA financed 90% of the costs of the First Feeder Road Project but only 80% of the Second, since it wanted the Government to start gradually assuming full responsibility for financing of the Feeder Road Program. Funds for technical assistance ran out in late 1980, toward the end of Phase 1, but financing was provided with cost savings from the Second Highway Project. Altogether, about US$1.0 million of techical assistance services were financed with savings from the Second Highway Project until the Second Feeder Road Project for Phase 2 was approved. The Government financed the operational expenses of the program between the end of Phase 1 and effectiveness of the credit for Phase 2. These expenditures were later reimbursed by IDA with US$0.7 million of retroactive financing from the Second - 49 -

Project. An IDA revolving fund of US$300,000 was established under the First Project to provide interim financing, given the lag of several months between the time when expenditures were incurred and reimbursed. This arrangement proved most successful and was continued under-the Second Project.

Disbursements

3.31 One of the major problems for the technical assistants during the first half of Phase I was to be reimbursed for their services. The cumbersome administrative procedures of the Government meant that it took more than five months to reimburse the technical assistants. The claims procedures grad"ally improved, but to safeguard against such eventualities again the technical assistants insisted on an interest penalty clause for late payment (after 60 days) in the extension of their contract for the Second Feeder Road Project. The technical assistant's situation was made even worse during the first year of the program by the delay in the payment of their advance (20Z) because of a technical problem with their contract. They did not receive their advance until March 1979, ten months after starting the program. The lengthy time it took the Government to file claims for reimbursement with IDA and the delay in effectiveness of the Second Feeder Road Project meant that the first disbursements for that project did not start until mid-1982.

IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

Covenants and Borrowers Performance

4.01 Annex 1 gives details of covenants included in the Credit Agreements for the First and Second Feeder Road Projects and corresponding Side Letters. All but two of the covenants for the two projects were complied with. The first exception was a covenant requiring adequate maintenance of the road network (Section 4.02 of the Credit Agreement for the First Project). Further details of maintenance requirements were featured in a Side Letter to the Credit Agreement. Maintenance of the road network was inadequate during Phase 1 of the program because of shortage of maintenance equipment, poor equipment maintenance, and insufficient local funds. Roads included in the First Feeder Road Project for maintenance only (as opposed to those constructed under the project) received no maintenance because of the problems of establishing the program and shortage of funds. The other covenant which was not complied with was adequate staffing of SRDR. A list of the local counterpart staff required was included in a Side Letter to Credit Agreement 717, and a covenant requiring the assignment of qualified Beninois to work with the technical assistants was included in Credit Agreement 1090. However, the provision of counterparts has been one of the most difficult problems of the program (para. 3.14). - 50 -

Technical Assistants Perfoimance

4.02 Undoubtedly, a great deal of the success of the Feeder Road Program can be attributed to the efforts of the technical assistants. Despite very difficult conditions they were able to successfully establish the Feeder Road Improvement and Maintenance Program within two years, albeit a longer time frame than projected at appraisal. The technical assistants had not taken part at the design stage of the program which was unfortunate, because with their experience of other programs in Africa they quickly realized that the program targets were quite unrealistic. The technical assistant's success In establishing the program during the first two years is to be commended, given the amount of work involved in adapting the program to Government's administrative procedures, the shortage of staff and equipment, and the experimental nature of the program. Relations with Government personnel were very good and leadership of the team was excellent; continuity of the technical assistance staff and the level of motivation they provided was of great value to the development of the program. The technical assistants were supported by USAID and Dutch volunteers whose assistance proved to be invaluable in running the brigades and carrying out economic analysis and data collection.

4.03 The economist assigned by the consulting firm which was sub- contracted for the economic analysis of Phase 1 of the program proved to be unsuitable for the assignment but this was only discovered one year after he began the work. This was due to lack of supervision by both the Project Leader of the technical assistance team and IDA. In the circumstances, it is not too surprising that his poor performance was overlooked, since his activities did not have immediate bearing on the implementation problems of the program, which were such that crisis management was the order of the day. However, once his fail- ings were brought to the attention of the firm providing technical assistance by IDA staff, he was quickly replaced and a satisfactory report finally produced.

4.04 The one area where the performance of the technical assistance was weak was development of a cost accounting system to adequately monitor costs and make effective cost comparisons of different construction techniques (paras 3.20 and 3.26). This problem is being addressed under the Third Feeder Roads Project.

Institutional Performance

4.05 SRDR was established within the MTPCH and has developed into one of the most effective agencies within the Government. The division has been able to gradually develop since it has not been through fundamental reorganizations (which are all too frequent in some countries): it has benefited not only from continuity of technical assistance services, but also from the continuity of the very capable Beninois Division Chief, who has been with the division almost from its inception. Despite the administrative and other problems, the division has developed an effective feeder road program, including the development of labor-intensive construction techniques-the only - 51 -

agency to do so in Benin. It has proved that labor-intensive techniques are economically viable, and can be implemented with fever problems than equipment-intensive construction techniques. SRDR has developed to the point where it to now responsible for seven feeder roads and one bridge construction brigades, and two feeder roads maintenance brigades. Effective labor-intensive methods are now being used by six construction brigades. In addition, the program as a whole has received good Government support; one measure of Govern- ment's commitment to.the program was their financing of the program's operations, at a time of economic hardship, for several months between the time funds ran out in January 1981 and effectiveness of the Second Feeder Road Project in December 1981 (although these expenditures were later reimbursed through retroactive financing). SRDR is still developing as an institution as the dependence on technical assistance indicates: areas of weak performance are administration of the program, equipment maintenance and maintenance of feeder roads.

4.06 When SIDR was established in 1978 there were two expatriate engineers, one economist and a few local support staff. By mid-1983, there were nearly 2000 staff, including 1500 laborers. At the higher levels there were three expatriate engineers, ten local heads of sections and sub-sections, nine local accountants and assistants, one expatriate accountant, three expatriate highway technicians, one volunteer economist, two volunteer mechanics, one local chief mechanic, and nine local brigade chiefs. Many of the existing staff only have a limited formal education (up to primary level) and technical training. Administration and accounting personnel are particularly weak, which has contributed to SRDR's administrative problems. Formal training is also required for mechanical staff but Phase 3 of the program includes annual training courses for these two groups of staff. The most successful counterpart training to date has been with brigade chiefs and supervisors, who are now running the improvement and maintenance brigades with limited assistance from three expatriates.

4.07 If counterparts had been provided at the beginning of the program SRDR would probably be a stronger institution today, since there would have been several years of training by technical assistants. Even now, there are still positions not filled, including the Chief of the Administrative and Financial Division and Chief of the Financial Section. Therefore, there remains a heavy dependence on technical assistance to provide further training and supervision of day-to-day activities. For Phase 3 there will be a total of 123 man-months of consulting services, including 30 man-months for a volunteer economist to carry out the socio-economic impact study. Admittedly, the program has expanded to ten construction and maintenance brigades, but there remains the problem of the dependence of SRDR on technical assistance and the failure to develop Beninois capability fast enough.

4.08 As is common with Feeder Road Programs in Africa and elsewhere, SIDR has been much slower to develop a road maintenance capacity than a road construction capacity. Not until 1982 were various - 52 -

maintenance techniques tested (paras 3.21-22) and only 425 km of roads were being maintained by 1983. Phase 3 is giving far more priority to road maintenance, with emphasis on developing maintenance capacity at the local level with SRDR's support. There are plans to continue developing labor-intensive maintenance methods, given the problems encountered with equipment-intensive operations; SRDR is the only agency that has the experience to develop these methods.

4.09 Planning and Coordination of Feeder Roads has gradually improved and now depends on the effectiveness of the regional development agencies (CARDERs). These authorities are responsible for agricultural research and extension, support for co-operatives, distribution of inputs, infrastructure development, and primary marketing in their region. CARDERs suggest road improvement priorities to SRDR, which uses its provincial level data base to evaluate the local priorities and develop annual work programs. This program !a then submitted for approval to the National Rural Road Construction and Maintenance Coordinating Committee (CNAERDR), which replaced the former ITC in December 1981. The Chairman is the Minister of MTPCH, the ministry responsible for the budgeting and implementation of the program, and the committee comprises representatives of the technical, finance, olanning and rural development ministries and directors of CARDERs. The committee's function is to coordinate construction and complementary investments and determine maintenance priorities for feeder roads. Such an institutional set-up provides ample opportunity for coordinating other rural development programs with SRDR activities, but obviously much depends on the efforts of the regional development staff employed. However, the involvement of such representatives as the directors of CARDERs means that the committee has more relevance than the former ITC, which did not have such a vested interest in making sure that the program was effective.

4.10 The CARDERs consult with local communities to identify roads requirements. itowever, this does not appear to be very effective, since local officials are often unaware of a proposed road project until they are asked to help recruit labor by the SRDR brigade chief. Sometimes concerns of local communities may be expressed to CARDER field agents and their comments may be passed along to planning staff, but there obviously is still room for improving channels of communication between the CARDERa and local communities.

V. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION

Benefits

5.01 The economic methodology developed for the selection of feeder roads was based on the producer surplus approach for the estimation of benefits. The First Feeder Road Project appraisal also included an estimate of savings in transport costs, but these were dropped from the analysis of roads selected for improvement after 1979 and in the Second Feeder Road appraisal. The assumption behind the producer surplus approach is that transport investment and associated ~ 53 -

agricultural investments in rural areas will stimulate increased ptoductivity of farm households. The methodology developed during the first two years of the program has been consistently applied, with minor modifications.

5.02 Initially, agricultural and population data for the economic analysis was collected at the provincial level, but later in the program some of this data was established at the subregion level. Standardized farm models were established for homogeneous subregions reflecting crop, pedologic and agronomic characteristics; the net value of production per capita for each subregion was then estimated together with the volume and value of potentially marketable surpluses and the percentage unmarketed due to transport constraints. For the economic reevaluation such detailed data is not available, therefore provincial averages have been used, as in the First and Second Feeder Road appraisals.

5.03 The economic reevaluation includes the net incremental value added from increased yields and increased production marketed as a result of the improved road. For about one quarter of the roads there is no information on the initial condition of the roads and, therefore, the effect this had on the percentage of production marketed. Consequently, the ERRs for these roads only include increased yields as the benefits of road improvements. Population growth in the area of influence of the roads is 2.59% per year (the national average) with the project, as assumed for the roads improved in the latter part of Phase 2 and for Phase 3. The Second Feeder Road appraisal assumed lower provincial growth rates for population densities of more than 350 per km of road, but subsequent findings favor the national average. Population is not projected to increase after 700 per km of road, in line with Second Feeder Road appraisal assumptions. The transport savings estimated in the First project have not been included in the economic reevaluation, since robust traffic data is not available: given that many of the roads initially included in Phase 1 were either not constructed or included in Phase 2, very few roads actually improved were evaluated using transport cost savings.

Costs

5.04 Data on construction costs of individual roads is not available, therefore, average costs for 1979-1982 for the different types of brigades have been used. Direct and indirect costs have been included and updated to 1983 prices (in line with benefits). The First Feeder Road appraisal used a 50% shadow wage rate, but this wrs dropped in the Second appraisal becauge there were no indications of serious distortions in the rural labor market: therefore, no shadow wage rate has been used in the economic reevaluation. All the incremental capital and operating costs and input subsidies have been accounted for in deriving the net value added. Following the appraisal methodology, no technical assistance costs have been included. In theory, a portion of institution building technical assistance costs should be allocated to each km constructed, but in practice it -54-

is difficult to avoid making such an allocation in a very arbitrary way*

Economic Rate of Return

5.05 Economic rates of return were estimated for the 39 roads constructed under-Phases 1 and 2 of the program; these are given in Annex 8. In general, the ERRs are expected to be higher than estimated at appraisal because estimates of net value added have been increased since 1977 and 1979; the most recent estimates for many crops project higher increases in yields. The overall rate of return for both Phase 1 and Phase 2 is 30%, compared to an appraisal estimate of 27% for Phase 1 and 19% for Phase 2. The roads with very low or negative ERRs generally have a population density of below 100 inhabitants/km. Those few roads with ERRs over 50% are in regions where the potential marketable production has been estimated to be very high.

Socioeconomic Impact

5.06 A small study to determine the socioeconomic impact of the feeder roads was undertaken as part of Phase 2 by the Centre d'Appui au Dfveloppement (University of Benin) and SRDR. The study was completed in May 1983. It included quarterly one-week surveys of all traffic on 11 sample roads, as well as limited secondary data collection for rainfall, population, and production patterns in each road influence area. However, the validity of the data for roads where field surveys supervision was provided by the University of Benin rather than SRDR staff has been questioned by SRDR; therefore, the results have to be treated with some care.

5.07 The findings of the study showed that traffic growth on recently improved roads far exceeded appraisal estimates, particularly in areas of high population density and border zones. However, a relatively small proportion of this traffic appears to have been for the transport of agricultural inputs and outputs; most of the traffic is either passenger travel or transport of non-agricultural products. Many questions remain unanswered by the study, for example, whether traffic was diverted from other routes or was generated by the road. Therefore, a continuation of the study has been included in Phase 3 of the program. The indications of the study so far are that agricultural surplus appear be overestimated when considering the total volume of traffic on the roads, but the value of user cost savings in connection with non-agricultural goods and passenger travel appear to have been greatly underestimated. Such benefits are difficult to estimate because the improved roads may well be stimulating a demand for goods from outside which is not met by an increase in agricultural production in the road influence area. -55 -

VI. ROLE OF TRE BANK

6.01 The Feeder Road Improvement and Maintenance Program has proved successful from the point of view of developing labor-intensive techniques, establishing a Feeder Roads Division which is now responsible for ten feeder road construction and maintenance brigades. and institutionalizing the coordination of rural development investments. The Association encouraged the Government to try out labor-intensive techniques because of the apparent availability of labr and the prevailing wage rate. Phase 1 came at a time when the Bank Group was seriously considering labor-intensive methods of road construction for the first time and were tinancing a similar program in Kenya. It meant, therefore, that labor-Intensive methods were at an experimental stage, and this somewhat accounts for over-optimistic production targets. In Benin, as elsewhere, the Bank Group underestimated the time it would take to establish labor-intensive types,of organization. During program preparation, much time was spent on the selection criteria for the roads to be improved and equipment/labor composition of brigades, but not so much time was allocated to the administrative aspects of the program. Ideally, either during program preparation or as part of Phase 1, technical assistance should have studied the Government administrative structure, identified potential program organizational and administrative problems, and designed an appropriate organization and administrative set-up. This should have been done before trying to start up brigades in the field. As it was, insufficient attention was given to this problem by all involved in the preparation of the program, for all preparation reports project that the brigades would be fully operational and meeting the full production target in the very first year of the program.

6.02 Details of the cost accounting system that would be used to evaluate different construction techniques should have been clarified and agreed on by all concerned either during program preparation or the first six months of the program. In practice, the objective of establishing the most cost-effective construction method was somewhat lost sight of in trying to overcome the implementation problems during the first 18 months of the program. Consequently, the costs of different techniques are difficult to evaluate precisely because of the problems referred to in para. 3.20. The confusion over costs meant that by the time of appraisal of Phase 2 in Spring 1980, there was not a readily available set of costs on which to make decisions about the next phase. Considerable time had to be spent to analyze the raw cost data to support the appraisal mission's judgements on operating costs. Also, because of the late start-up of Phase 1, there was not enough time to establish the performance of the brigades, especially since the labor-intensive brigades had only been operating less than a year and there had been equipment shortages throughout 1979. The Association appraised Phase 2 when it did, because funds for the program were rapidly running out and construction activities would have ceased altogether if Phase 2 had not begun in 1981. - 56 -

6.03 The probiem of continual shortage of counterpart staff up to mid-1983 was not an easy one for the Association to tackle, since it was essentially one of the overall availability of qualified personnel and the administrative and compensation policies in Benin. There also does not appear to have been a concerted Bank Group effort to advise the Government on how to vetain more of its trained manpower. A covenant requiring appointment of counterpart staff was included in the Second Feeder Road Credit Agreement, following the critical shortage of counterparts in Phase 1 of the program. This may have helped to have more counterparts appointed to the program during Phase 2, but it is significant that not until appraisal of the Third Feeder Road Project were all key staff appointed.

6.04 The Association's attempt to get Phase 2 to focus more on road maintenance was only partially successful, because of SRDR's concentration on the development of an effective construction capability. In late-1981, a supervision mission which drew up a plan of action for SRDR to start to develop labor-intensive maintenance techniques in a systematic way. Supervision of the program was adequate, although it could have been improved if changes had been made to the reporting system in Phase 2. The changes to the reporting system should have been designed to permit a clearer explanation of monthly production and cost fluctuations.

VII. CONCLUSION

7.01 The Feeder Road Program was clearly successful compared to similar programs in other parts of Africa, even though not all the institution building objectives were fully realized. Success appears to have been due to good leadership provided by both the technical assistance and Beninois Division Chief. The generally high quality of technical assistance and the level of support from DROA and Government in general are noteworthy. Once labor-intensive methods of construction proved effective, there was even more Government support for the program.

7.02 The program faced problems common to similar rural road programs in other parts of Africa, namely, lack of counterpart staff, delays in procuring equipment and subsequent low equipment availability and utilization, arduous administrative procedures which made project implementation difficult and hindered progress of the program. The main lesson to be drawn is that institutions to carry out feeder roads programs cannot be developed within the period of one project, for institution building is a much long,r process. Therefore, technical assistance needs are going to be substantial, unless Government decides that more incentives should be given to attract and retain good local administrators and engineers for the programs. The training of competent mechanics, equipment operators, storekeepers, and other equipment-related personnel and logistic support systems is obviously going to take even longer, given the program's experience to date with the equipment-intensive brigade. - 57 -

7.03 Unfortunately, there is still some confusion over: (a) the extent to which equipment-inteneive methods of construction of feeder roads can work in Benin; and (b) the cost-effectiveness of equipment and labor-intensive methods. Explanations for the success of the "intermediate" brigade in 1981 (really another type of equipment-intensive brigade), and the failure of the equipment-intensive brigade over Phases I and 2 of the program cannot be verified. Likewise, reasons for the fluctuating costs of each cqpstruction brigade are also not clear, for they range from leadership effectiveness to differing quantities of earthworks in different types of terrain. Clearer accounting for differences in performance and costs of the different brigades is among the objectives of the Third Feeder Roads Project.

7.04 More emphasis now needs to be put on feeder road maintenance, given the rather limited development of a maintenance capacity under Phase 1 and 2. Maintenance of the roads may well turn out to be far more difficult to achieve than improvement of the roads, since there is usually a far higher level of motivation for construction projects at the local level than for road maintenance. The Third Feeder Roads Project puts greater emphasis on maintenance aspects in line with the manifest needs, with the objective of developing further maintenance capacity at SRDR.

WAPT2 October 1985 ・一うて 7 一

メざ、ノいづF メみ 4 今

参 ANNEX 59 Page I of 2

MIN

FIRST AND SICOND FEEDER ROAD MJZCTS

CREDITS 717 AND 1090-ENS,

BORROWER'S COMPLIANCE WITH h:T14 COnqQAKS

Credit 9ment Description of Covenant Comments

Section Establishment of a Special Account Complied with* 2-02 in a bank on terms and conditions dr. 717/1090 satisfactory to the Usociation, Section Employment of consultants acceptablo Complied with* 3.02 (a) to the Association* Cr. 717/1090 section Assignment of"qualified Beninois Only )omrlied 3.02 (b) to work with consultants. with in mid 1983# Cr. 1090 Section Selection of roads to be improved Complied with. 3.03 (a),(b) and maintenance and standards Cr. 717/1090 applicable thereto to be agreed by the Association*

Section Establish Interministerial Technical Complied with. .3.04 (a),(b) Committee (ITC). Cr*717 Cr. 1090 Maintain the ITC* Changed to CNAERDR, with IDA's approval.

Section Carry out a pilot study not later Complied withe 3.08 than May 31, 1983 to monitor socio- Cre 1090 economic impact of selected feeder roads* Section Maintenance of road network Inadequately 4.02 complied with. Cro 717 Sid letter Preparation and implementation of Inadequately Cro 717 five year road maintenance program complied with* and maintenance agreed feeder roads* -60- ANN Page 2 of 2

Section Maintenance of feeder roads included Inadequately 4.02 in the project and of equipment complied with. Cr. 1090 financed out of credit.

Setction Review possibilities of ensuring Complied with. 4.03 participation of local communities. Cr 717 Cr 1090 Collect technical, economic and Mostly financial data. complied with.

Side letter Agree selection criteria for roads Complied with. Cr. 717 to be improved.

Side letter Adequate staffing of DRDR. Inadequately complied Cr. 717 with.

Side letter Plan of action. Complied with.

WAPT2 Mar. 1984 61-

ULwr D E gE mouk~D (3. ?f? D1r)

lT«net4g of Ud: alee hi of iapii bttant ______iate casttt ha ljxut P*nt ascen Peet Pr rat Pmoaect 1 rst p~isot S

A. Tasti tion uidg 6/ 6M btmaa Sub.diviin HUR 9m 5M bU>hn* Intrj Ottte 9m 9179

. fou~an of DpDIt (i)1 gtio.n~ d S/fM 9W 6n 9M aime sEM 6/M 30t 9M 30 30 4 L Ontts 9/m 681 10lo 5AM 5M Dal4 egopmyat th*7 918 1th8-7M 10om C. Tbc~aa ~sitmn S~lCion r~ tat 9M 12m ~mtta in Fuild 9?rM S8 0maleten rk12,t0 i/el

D. hmpe &temu= Star~-p to 0alte

- waedni 2~*d 1/8-12/8 1/Bi-12M 4h9~-0 Zfe2/14 35 70 - ua rl ihe-12m 1/81-9/81 1 t9j1 201-7M 51 215 - T~hour IrPa8e ¶the-12/60 11-1213 6h9-181 20-4^t 7 97 - taou gate n I9-12/8D I/t-12/c 129-1/1 2M1-4M 47 et - Iabour feigate HI 9/BI-125 11/2-4/84 - 18 - tIbom1ra IV 1 212/62-4184 - 4 min=~ee .ese1 2s 1/t1M 7024/84 o 5

LVPoue i bo tatb~ee.

Source: Bank Appraisal and Supervision Reports and Consultant's progress reports.

KAP." aEIr

FIRST AND SECOND FREDER ROAD PROJECT (CR. 717 AND 1090)

OUTPUT OF FEDER ROAD UNTIS

ACTUAL AND EXPECTED PHYSICAL OUTPUT (ka)

Appraisal Estimate Average Output/PA First Second Oct. BrMsde Project Project 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1964 1976-Dec. 1984 Equipment Intensive 124.8 99.6 0 30.8 af 87.0 70.4 44.7 b/ 72 * 304.9 Intermediate 73.2 73.2 0 41.3 62.9 91.2 26.8 - - 222.2

Labor Intensive I 50.4 45.0 0 15.3 d 37.7 40.5 39.3 42 35 209.6 II 50.4 45.0 0 - 43.0 46.7 29.2 35 35 188.9 Ill 45.0 0 - - - -- 3 8 5 43 IV 45.0 0 - - -- - 20 47 67 Total I~ &~L~U LZW LiL

Appraisal Estimate 245.0 300.0 300.0 338.0 262.0 100 1,545 a/ 9 menths only, start-up April. Closed down 3 months due to unavailability of equipment and senior staff problems. Unit disbanded after 7 months. 7/ 7 months only, start-up June 1979. ./ First six months of start-up. /l First three months of start-up. Source: Consultants: Benin First Feeder Road Project - Comparative Assessment of Construction. Brigade Output and Costs. January 1982. Evaluation of Labor-Based Construction Program. January 1983. Project Progress Reports - 1983.

cAPT2 Dec. 1984 -63 - AlEf 4

amiTn 717.em--=

=.114v:.? -guI1 - 1 - - - -

tam gt & ^Caen

Groest: 120mesta=== pt 11iP 2 2112* i ------

sia= lae 1 I - i I - - - .gSeeltse1Teter 5 2 1 5 1 2 5 7 p raSil - i - 10 1 2 5 10 10 Deep Trmebe 6 4 4 l 3 4 - - VuaIEamk?tre~k - - . - - - - - ~ Tauk ~Taseh Ta u 3 2 2 2 2 2 Vaesb.ey c 1 i 1. 1 - - - - - matTaak?Tets - - - . - - 1 2 PCafom.Track - - i - - i - - - Self-p peldU.U.r - 1 1 - - I - - - TmedRh 2 1 1 1 i - 1 1 ~ Sb at.a. - - - - i - 1 i Sobie C rtaFeede ------Cnile store Prq/tmailer I n.. D i T e.. - R.o. P Cset a.g 2 i i 1 1 1 1 i .Comsate T16ragor i a.a. 2 1 sa.. i i a.a. i Vatr Eu 2 s.a. 2 ,i .a. 2 i a.a. i Ptpe Epi - - 2 - - - -- • LAULammVa.&Lci 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Teesd heal sowser ------1 - -

.af To be disamuled under 96a.. 3.

Source: First Feeder Road AppraThal ReDart: Consultant: Evaluation of Labor Based Construction Proram in Benin; Draft Appraisal Third Feeder Road Project.

* Apr. 1984 AMNEX 5 - 64 - TeIerof 2

sanza

FIRST AnD SECOND FEEDER ROAD ftOJECT

CREDITS 717 AND 1090-8

CONSTRUCTION BRIGADE PER EN COST (Current Prices CIAP'000)

Equipment Labor Labor Year Intensive Intermediate Intensive I Intensive 2 Average

Appraisal Estimate (1976) Direct 853 977 1,031 1,031 954 + Indirect 9219 11000 1 052 1,052 991 Total iui a2N Appraisal Estimate In 1982 Prices Direct 1,621 1,857 1,960 1.960 1,850 + Indirect 1,751 1,901 2.000 2,000 1,913 Total Id WS7 im603.~ Jan 79-Feb 80 Direct 1,619 1,284 1,825 1,430 1,540 + Indirect 1693 1#356 10945 1,507 1.625 Total I&M1 LM W223 3A.WA Jan-Dec 80 Direct 1,636 1,667 1,992 1,779 1,768 + Indirect 1,893 1,3 2.213 1.954 1,999 Total L 201 L.767

Feb-Oct 81 Direct 2,728 1,041 2,137 2,073 1,995 + Indirect 31546 1.378 2,555 2.442 2,8 Total 6A74 LJ2L Z 1 i Nov 81-Dec 82 Direct 1,661 2,441 1.855 2,680 2,159 + Indirect 2,383 3 478 3&267 2P-3 Total - . iiI2 h111

Average 1979-82 Direct 1.911 1,608 1,952 1,990 1,865 + Indirect 2,379 2,036 2 24 22 Total UM hift Lai W67 4.22

a/ Excludes program headquarters staff and administrative costs. hl Only the intermediate brigade was operational for the whole year.

WAPT2 Dec. 1984 Pr?-AS - 65 - ANNEX 5 Page 2 of 2 BENIN First and Second Feeder Roads Construction egade Cost per km (in current prices CFAF 000)

CFAF WO 7.000

6.500 -

6.000

5,500 -

5.000

4500

4,000

3.500

3.000

2.500

2,000

1.500-

1,000 APR. EST. APR. EST. IN JAN, 79 - JAN. - DEC. FEB. - OCT NOV. 81 - 1979 - 82 (1976) 1982 PRICES FEB. 80 (1980) (1981) DEC 82 AVERAGES Legend = Averag @-.. = Labor Intensve I = Equipment Intensive =-6Labor Intense 2

=ftermediate WOr Bank-26998 I-N

FIRST FEDn R~A4S n0JECT (Ca. 717-BE)

ACTUAL ANMAPPRAISAL ESTINATE Or PRWJ= CTOS0TS

Actual Coat Actul C s as Percentago a FrcntAe Actual Coat Apratal te Cot* e/ of Appratsal Aetual Coat appra aEtimSto Costa of &pprais Froject Component Local orelas oreiTotal n tatieo L~1 Foreiås o c !Ml Forel t i etlst ------.. (CPArI llen)(S M iica) vekietes. Fquipunt 93 and Spare rotte -- 608 49 630 679 90 - - 2.57 0.20 2.57 2.77 120 Poel &Imbricnte -- -- 103 12 86 98 105 - - 0.48 0.05 0.35 0.40 63 V.gs - -- 186 339 -- 339 55 - - 0.87 1.3W - 1.38 0,16 44 triale -- - 14 35 4 39 36 - - 0.77 0.14 0.02 ffie & Other 100 Ktse. Cota -- -- 71 31 St 82 87 - - 0.33 0.13 0.20 0.33 0.05 760 cmptract',rk - -82 4 9 13 630 - - 0.38 0.02 0.06 Iechnicl Assistance 102 322 424 45 209 254 167 0.47 1.49 1.961/ 0.58 085 1.0 In Total Il lam 22 .- .w*&M *M8åtU 4U £28 ai Appraleal total# dif fer fr=. totale given belov bcae the appraigel prie* contknacles d1d not Include price icre#ass for phsica* contiøashi". Il b. data available en the breakdomn of foretgn and local cooto. el lnelude CFAP 63 millioa for bire of equp~et. / At øn-auge rate o' *is$ .årCAP 245. /l I~clue CPAF 63 *illiur for birt of equiog m . Imclud~a finamcing res Sacond uiga Project (Cr. 415 DA>.

0 -4.1964 KMl-4-~i -67 MEE7

BERIN

SECOND 7EDER OADS PROJECT (CR. 1090-E1

ACTUAL AID APPRAISAL ESTIMATES OF PROJECT COSTS SECOND FEEDER ROADS PROJECT

Actual Cost as Percentage Actual Cost Appralsal Estimate Costs of Appraisal Project Component Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Estimate

Vehicles. Equipment 35 370 405 114 and Spare Parts - * 460 Repair Charges 06 so 56 121 13 134 42 Fuel & Lubricants 30 158 188 28 197 225 84 Wages 44 593 637 551 - 551 116 Materials 08 34 42 86 10 96 44

Office 6 Other Misc. Costs 04 113 117 50 50 100 117 Equipment Repair Facilities - - - 3 7 10 -

Contract Works - * 24 11 0 0 0 -

Technical Assistance - - 310 41 231 272 114 Total -l

.1/Actual and Appraisal estimates of project costs in US $ are not comparable due to currency fluctuations. b/ No data available on breakdown of foreign and local costs. Z/ For equipment hire charges. WAPT2 Dec. 1984 PCR2-A7:BEN1 ANNEX 8 -68-&Page 1 of 2 -68-

BENIN

FIRST AND SECOND FEEDER ROADS PROJECTS

CREDITS 717 AND 190-SEN

DETAILS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Inhab/ T"e ERR Roads Mn km aUt Costa Benefits AM Nov

Boukomb6-Nanta 21 679 8 110,712 425,438 26* 36 Boukomb6-Kouroutiere 13 608 a 68.536 272,041 21* 35 Bohicon-Dan 26 560(E) I 120,666 364,272 280 40 Kana-Kpokissa 28 388 L 143,164 271,803 17* 21 Aplahou-Agondogui 47 500 L 240,311 1,005,656 17 35 Bopa-Ferei-Sonagri 6 436(t) E 31,632 79,826 NA 18 Natitingou-Boukomb6 34 930 E 179,248 912,016 22 45 Cov6-Koussin 8 100 I 37,128 49,147 20 10 Cov6-Paouignan 55 85 I 255,255 290,945 31 5 Peperkou-Toukountouna 17 173 E 89,624 154,302 10 14 Natitingou-Kouarfa 25 214 E 131,800 276,229 11 20 Kouarfa-Kotapounga 25 214 E 131,800 2eR,257 13 21 Wanokou-Dikiboumi 9 375 E 47,448 162,>75 22 35 Baribonsifa-Tehakalon 8 300 E 42,176 118,938 21 29 Bori-Sonoumou 17 117 E 89,624 82,466 B NEG Bori-Serou 34 151 E 179,248 209,216 B 5 Konkosi-Doum6-Ottola 26 142 L 132,938 413,990 19 45 Tchetti-Dou 22 245 L 112,486 185,449 34 10 Keboua-RNIE 2 5 420 I 23,205 67,168 21 35 Ouess6-Djebi 47 141 I 218,127 743,294 25 50 Kpinnou-Ferme- Risicole 4 250 L 20,452 33,437 10 10 Dogbo-Klouekanee 18 525 L 92,034 288,363 16 23 Dogbo-Devi 13 592 L 66,469 234,841 12 25 Zogbodomey-Aboymey 15 536 L 76,695 201,150 25 33 Kiassamey-Ouakpe 35 514 L 178,955 450,086 18 31 Abomey-Sinhoue-Zoume 19 700 L 97,147 288,131 28 40 Dan Mountchi-Oufm& 14 479 I 64,974 167,775 22 35 Gogonou-Bouly 29 112 L 148,277 128,765 B NEG Gando-Toum6 30 59 E 158,160 78,873 B NEG Yossa-RNIE 2 26 224 I 120,666 644,048 28 83 Ketou-Atakpaa6 12 450 I 61,356 335,653 21 83 Kpedekpo-Gbegon 8 214 L 40,904 109,334 16 35 Bagou-Sonsero 32 238 L 163,616 274,667 24 11 Angara-Saa Kandi 33 206 I 153,153 248,527 16 11 Angara-Fouay 18 94 L 92,034 69,269 10 NEG Guene-Kargua-Karimaa 42 144 E 221,424 230,681 B 1 ANNEX 8 -69 - Page 2 of 2

Inhab/ e ERR Roads Km km unit Costs Benefits g Now

Irokogni-Adekambi 10 450(t) L 51,130 279,711 NA 83 Ndali-Bori 8 117(') K 42,176 61,099 NA 12 Zame-Gougan 5 700(g) L 25,565 75,824 NA 40

U - equipment intensive brigade I - intermediate brigade L - labor intensive brigade R - roads evaluated under the Borgou Rural Development II Project NA - not available (N) - estimated NERG - negative ERR * - roads not evaluated at appraisal, therefore, ERR taken from Consultant: Evaluation Report of the Proposed Roads Projects for the Construction Program of 1980. Dec. 1979.

VAPT2 Dec. 1984 ALI NGE R N I G E R

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