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WHAT IF? Home Invasion: North , April 1967

By David R. Higgins

One such was the “enclave strate- gy.” The idea behind that was US forces would dig in at several coastal bases, hold them against all attacks and use those positions as bargaining chips to get communist leaders in Hanoi to negotiate. Westmoreland concluded the enclave strategy would do nothing more than cede the strategic initiative to the enemy while also negating American operational superiority in firepower and maneuverability. The strategy he eventually settled on was a compromise between military realities and political constraints: US forces would establish Search for Strategy bases throughout the country and use them to launch attacks against n March 1965, President Lyndon general communist advance during by keeping the enemy off balance in NVA and VC main force units. Johnson committed the first the “defense” stage of subsequent US the South while also building base Meanwhile the Army of the Republic I major US ground units to South operations (8 March to 24 December camps and logistical installations of Vietnam (ARVN) would be built Vietnam. That move was to counter 1965), the situation still offered no that could support operations farther up into a fully effective combat force the growing strength of the Viet Cong more than the promise of a protracted afield. Gen. William Westmoreland, while conducting increasingly larger (VC, southern communist insurgents) conflict against a resolute enemy. head of Military Assistance Command counterinsurgency operations. and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) During the following “counterof- Vietnam (MACV, the US headquarters There would be no ground incur- forces that were threatening to seize fensive” phase (25 December 1965 responsible for all operations in South sions into communist sanctuaries control of the country. While Army to 30 June 1966), American forces Vietnam), had few strategic options. in Cambodia and Laos. That would and Marine forces stopped the fought to turn around the situation keep the scope of the war geographi- Gen. Westmorland desperately searched for a strategy other than one of attrition.

28 MODERN WAR 3 | jan– feb 2013 MODERN WAR 3 | jan– feb 2013 29 cally limited and forestall the kind Early in 1967, then, the MACV staff of Chinese military intervention provided contingency plans under the that had occurred in Korea late in codenames “Frisco City” and “Durango 1950. Only American airpower and City.” Those plans called for a three special operations forces would be division joint ground, airborne and used to attack those sanctuaries. amphibious invasion to strike either Effectively that was an attrition just above the DMZ or at the towns of strategy, aiming to win by wearing Vinh and Ha Tinh, which lay 125 miles down communist strength and farther north. Divisions already in- resolve. Even so, Westmoreland theater were to be redeployed for either had misgivings about attrition operation, but additional forces from since it offered no clear or decisive the US were also to have been included victory point. Throughout 1966 and after staging through Okinawa. into 1967 he therefore directed the The region just above the DMZ MACV staff to prepare contingency was deemed optimal for an invasion. plans for cross-border operations. That area was some 45 miles across at Special attention was given to its narrowest, thereby minimizing the the Laotian panhandle, which was a frontage that would have to be held. vital nexus for communist operations Its selection was also influenced by into the South. It was through the the proximity of the 1,100-mile-long panhandle the North ran men and Truong Son Mountain Range, which supplies down the Ho Chi Minh runs along most of North Vietnam’s Trail, a network of routes leading western border. Those mountains into Cambodia and South Vietnam. minimize the monsoon weather in He also considered intervention into the coastal lowlands between early Cambodia and an amphibious flanking spring and the start of flood season move north of the DMZ (Demilitarized in July. That made April the ideal Zone, the de facto border between time for starting such a campaign, North and South Vietnam). as the weather would be dry with The Pentagon had roughed out a rainfall at its lowest. That would in plan to invade North Vietnam as early turn facilitate the deployment of President Johnson ended his political career by failing to find a workable strategy for the war. as 1956. According to that scheme, eight divisions were to land near the port of Haiphong and advance to the capital of Hanoi. By the mid-1960s, though, such an operation would’ve been fraught with military and political risks that outweighed its potential gains. The prevailing view was any invasion of North Vietnam would bring swift reaction from China and the Soviet Union. Further, until early 1967 the forces needed to attempt an operation to capture Haiphong and Hanoi were fully engaged in the defensive stabilization of the South. A more limited invasion option involved US forces, basing from just south of the DMZ, pushing west along Route 9 from Khe Sanh to seize Tchepone, a key communica- tion hub of the Ho Chi Minh Trail lying about 25 miles inside Laos. Such an operation would close the infiltration route to points south of there. That would effectively cut off communist forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia, as well as forcing the NVA to counterattack in an attempt to reopen the trail, exposing them to the full fury of American firepower.

PAVN regulars marching out of Hanoi early in 1967.

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(recon), 1st, 2nd Squadrons/ 5th Cavalry 502nd Infantry Regiment) Division 312 1st Infantry Division Regiment, 1st, 2nd, 5th Squadrons/ 7th 2nd Battalion/ 320th Artillery Regiment (105H) Regiment 209 Home HQ 1st Brigade (1st Battalion/ 16th Cavalry Regiment, 1st, 2nd Squadrons/ A Co/ 326th Engineer Battalion 3,300 personnel Infantry Regiment, 1st Battalion/ 28th 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st, 2nd Division 316 Infantry Regiment, 1st Battalion/ 5th Squadrons/ 12th Cavalry Regiment PAVN Forces Regiments 98, 176 Artillery Regiment, 1st Battalion/ 2nd Battalion/ 19th Artillery Regiment (105H) 7th Artillery Regiment (105H)) 8th Engineer Battalion Division 304B Division 320 HQ 2nd Brigade (2nd Battalion/ 16th Regiments 9B, 24B, 66B Regiment 48 Infantry Regiment, 1st Battalion/ 18th 9th Infantry Division Infantry Regiment, 2nd Battalion/ 2nd Battalion/ 60th Infantry Regiment, Division 308 (upgraded with armor, artillery, Division 324 (trained for assault- 18th Infantry Regiment) 5th Battalion/ 60th Mechanized engineers, and communications) ing fortified establishment) HQ 3rd Brigade (2nd Battalion/ 28th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Battalion/ Regiments 36, 102 Regiment 3 Infantry Regiment, 2nd Battalion/ 60th Riverine Infantry Regiment 33rd Artillery Regiment (105H)) 2nd, 3rd Battalions/ 39th Infantry Regiment Division 325C 1st Aviation Battalion (OH-6, UH-1) 1st Battalion/ 11th Artillery Regiment (105H), Regiments 18C, 95C, 101D 1st Battalion/ 2nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Battalion/ 4th Artillery Regiment (105H) b 2nd Battalion (Mechanized)/ 2nd 9th Aviation Battalion (OH-6, UH-1) Orders of Battle Air/ Ground Infantry Regiment (both substituted 3rd Battalion/ 47th Infantry Regiment, for organic armor left in the US), 1st 2nd Battalion/ 47th Mechanized US Forces 1st, 2nd, 4th Battalions/ 503rd Battalion/ 26th Infantry Regiment Infantry Regiment, 4th Battalion/ Airborne Infantry Regiment 1st Squadron/ 4th Cavalry Regiment (M113) 47th Riverine Infantry Regiment 3,300 personnel Amphibious D Co/ 16th Armor Battalion (90 mm 8th Battalion/ 6th Artillery 3rd Squadron/ 5th Cavalry Regiment (M113) M56 “Scorpion”) Regiment (155H/8”H) 1st Battalion/ 84th Artillery RCT-5 (5th Marines) E Troop/ 17th Cavalry Regiment 1st Engineer Battalion Regiment (155H/8”H) (Air) (OH-6, UH-1) 15th Engineer Battalion RCT-26 (26th Marines) 173rd Engineer Company 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) 3rd Battalion/ 34th Riverine 3rd Battalion/ 319th Artillery Regiment (105H) HQ 11th Aviation Group (227th, 229th Aviation Artillery Regiment (105H) 3rd Brigade (Separate)- from Battalions (Assault Helicopter- UH-1), 25th Infantry Division Company B, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) 228th Aviation Battalion (Assault Support Reserves 1st Battalion/ 69th Armor Regiment Helicopter- CH-47, UH-1), 2nd Battalion/ 1st Marine Regiment/ 1st Marine Division 1st Battalion/ 14th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Marine Division (3rd, 4th, 20th Artillery Regiment (Aerial Rocket)) 1st, 2nd Battalions/ 35th Infantry Regiment 9th Marine Regiments) 1st Battalion/ 21st Artillery Regiment (105H) 101st Airborne Division 2nd Battalion/ 9th Artillery Regiment (105H) 3rd Recon Battalion HQ 1st, 2nd and 3rd Brigades HQ 1st Brigade (1st, 2nd Battalions/ 327th 3rd Battalion (M-48) 1st Battalion/ 77th Artillery Regiment (105H) Infantry Regiment, 2nd Battalion/ 3rd Engineer Battalion 1st Squadron/ 9th Cavalry Regiment

American ground forces while also considerable strategic clout, stymying Korea’s (ROK) Capital and 9th Infantry Ha Tinh, there to carry out additional general softening-up just prior to that keeping the skies open for airpower. the North’s ability to continue the Divisions, the 2nd ROK Marine Brigade, reconnaissance and demolition. morning’s air, land and sea invasion. Overall, it was anticipated US strengths conflict in the South and possibly and the US 4th Infantry Division Reconnaissance planes inten- It’s also intended to confuse the in airborne and amphibious warfare changing the course of the entire war. remain in place to assist the ARVN in sively photograph the projected enemy as to US intentions, possibly would create a decisive edge in With all that in mind, we offer the the Central Highlands and maintain battle zone. To mask the increasing drawing forces away from the DMZ. terms of operational maneuver following alternative history of the war security south of the invasion zone. operational tempo across the region, In the sky, electronic warfare aircraft while also negating the communists’ in Vietnam, starting in January 1967. ARVN forces deploy so as to maximally Rolling Thunder bombing missions perform “Wild Weasel” missions to knowledge of the local terrain. secure cities, towns and bases. against transportation, logistical, air neutralize North Vietnamese radar, Of course, the operation Run Up Throughout March 1967 USMC and industrial targets around Hanoi SAM and anti-aircraft assets. With never occurred. Johnson believed patrols conduct extensive reconnais- and Haiphong continue as normal. those threats removed, American Westmoreland’s desire to invade North During the run-up to the opera- sance in force missions along the DMZ In Bangkok, senior American officials fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters Vietnam would’ve proved terminal for tion’s launch, American commanders to scout routes, acquire prisoners engage in secret negotiations with that roam freely above the battle zone. his administration’s larger strategy of redeploy several major formations: 1st and minimize enemy intelligence government to gain its participation Just prior to dawn, artillery containment and limited war, which and 9th Infantry Divisions, reinforced gathering. Teams from Company B, once the invasion begins, thereby from the US 1st and 9th Infantry he continued to pursue until the Tet with the 173rd Airborne Brigade, are 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) are neutralizing the communist threat Divisions begins a barrage against Offensive in 1968 showed it to be polit- shifted from the Saigon sector to bases inserted north of the DMZ and across in the northeast of that country. pre-selected targets inside and north ically unsustainable. We can, however, north of Hue. The 1st Brigade of the the Laotian border. They work with of the DMZ, with heavy concentra- legitimately ask: what if the president 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) operators of the MACV Studies and April 1967 tions made against enemy lines of had given Westmoreland the go ahead? is also moved up, as are regiments Observations Group (MACV SOG) communication. Tactical air strikes, An invasion limited to the region from 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions. to provide intelligence and facilitate During the night of 31 March/1 B-52 “Arc Light” missions, and just above the DMZ and southern Laos To compensate for the removal of the pre-invasion destruction of April, US Navy warships from Seventh Navy shore bombardment provide would most likely not have been suf- units from the vital Saigon region, 196th critical targets. The Navy Amphibious Fleet, including the battleship New additional support as ground task ficient to cause the Soviets or Chinese Infantry Brigade pulls back from its Command also covertly sends in Jersey, bombard enemy coastal forces move north along Highway 1. Ho Chi Minh was an excellent political to intervene directly. If such an deployment along the Cambodian bor- underwater demolition teams, SEALs positions between Vinh and the DMZ. The Americans reinforce their strategist, but his options in responding invasion then succeeded operationally, der, while 199th Infantry Brigade is also and special communications “beach That’s intended to destroy enemy units with , though there are to the kind of US operation outlined Johnson would thereby have gained shifted toward the city. The Republic of jumper” units to areas near Vinh and infrastructure and defenses as part of a some problems owing to the restrictive here would’ve been limited.

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