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Accountability of Civil Servants Oral and Written Evidence

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Accountability of Civil Servants Oral and Written Evidence SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION Accountability of civil servants Oral and written evidence Contents Dr. Andrew Blick, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies, King’s College London – Written evidence .......................................................................................... 2 Cabinet Office – Written evidence ......................................................................................................... 9 Civil Service Commission – Written evidence.................................................................................. 13 Simon Cramp – written evidence ......................................................................................................... 16 Professor Matthew Flinders, Professor of Parliamentary Government & Governance and Dr Felicity Matthews, Lecturer in Governance and Public Policy, Department of Politics, University of Sheffield – Written evidence ........................................................................................ 19 Dr Felicity Matthews, Lecturer in Governance and Public Policy and Professor Matthew Flinders, Professor of Parliamentary Government & Governance, Department of Politics, University of Sheffield – Written evidence ........................................................................................ 22 Dame Julie Mellor DBE, UK Parliamentary Ombudsman and Health Service Ombudsman for England – Written evidence .................................................................................................................. 23 Rt Hon Peter Riddell, Director, Institute for Government – Written evidence ...................... 26 Colin Talbot, Professor of Government and Public Administration, University of Manchester – Written evidence .................................................................................................................................. 30 Unlock Democracy’s – Written evidence .......................................................................................... 36 Dr. Andrew Blick, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies, King’s College London – Written evidence Dr. Andrew Blick, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies, King’s College London – Written evidence Summary The passing of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (CRAG) creates potential for changing the role of Parliament in the oversight of the Civil Service. Amongst other measures, CRAG places on a statutory basis the Civil Service Commission, the power to manage the Civil Service, the publication of Civil Service, Diplomatic Service and special adviser codes, Civil Service appointments and the definition of a special adviser. Since Parliament, rather than – as previously – the Royal Prerogative, is now the source of the legal basis for the Civil Service, there is an implied role for Parliament in overseeing the exercise of the powers that it created through CRAG. This function should cover the general operation of the system established by CRAG, more than a focus on individual civil servants and their activities, though such issues may arise. To enable Parliament to develop and perform this new role, it might be appropriate for Parliament to establish a Civil Service committee, possibly a joint committee of both Houses. Special advisers, through personal closeness to their appointing ministers, can achieve an importance greater than their formal roles might suggest. The special adviser code of conduct should not create the impression that special advisers are required in no way to be impartial or objective in the course of their duties. The special adviser code of conduct both includes – as it is required to by CRAG – a prohibition on special advisers performing management functions, but also expressly permits activities on their part which could easily take on a management character. This possible contradiction should be addressed in a future text of the code. The introduction of pre-appointment hearings by parliamentary committees for special advisers should be considered, as a means of discouraging abuse of the patronage system and misconduct in office. It is neither practical nor appropriate to regard civil servants as a constitutional check on ministers. However, consideration might be given to the idea of extending the accounting officer principle into areas beyond public accounting. Individual ministerial responsibility is a key component of the UK constitution. A major movement away from individual ministerial responsibility would entail a substantial reconfiguration of the UK constitution. While there may be a case for such a change, it could only be exercised as part of a major constitution-building exercise, which is wider than the immediate scope of the present Committee inquiry. Overview 1. Does the convention of individual ministerial responsibility remain the most appropriate and effective means of holding the government to account? 1. Individual ministerial responsibility is a key component of the UK constitution, combining with collective Cabinet responsibility for the overall policy of government to comprise the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. 2 of 44 Dr. Andrew Blick, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies, King’s College London – Written evidence 2. Individual ministerial responsibility involves ministers being held responsible by Parliament for particular actions, such as the exercise of statutory powers vested in them, and the conduct of officials within their departments. Within this model, civil servants answer to the minister in charge of their department and through them to Parliament, but not directly to Parliament. 3. The main argument that this doctrine has been and continues to be appropriate is that, since ministers are by constitutional convention drawn from Parliament, it offers a means of ensuring that the activities of central government are held to account by a representative institution, one component of which, the House of Commons, is directly elected. 4. A major movement away from individual ministerial responsibility would entail a substantial reconfiguration of the UK constitution. While there may be a case for such a change, it could only be exercised as part of a major constitution-building exercise, which is wider than the immediate scope of the present Committee inquiry. Such a change should not be recommended lightly or regarded as a self-sealing exercise without broad consequences beyond the present issue of Civil Service accountability. For instance, it would raise issues about whether functions for which ministers were no longer held individually responsible to Parliament would need to derive a different kind of democratic mandate, for instance through directly elected post-holders. While the present inquiry probably cannot fully address these issues, the Committee could recommend or itself go on to conduct an inquiry along these lines in future. 5. A key limitation on the effectiveness of individual ministerial responsibility is that it is clearly unrealistic to hold secretaries of state responsible for everything that takes place within their departments. One of the sources of this problem is the overcentralisation of UK – and particularly English – government, when placed in international perspective. Again, altering this characteristic of the UK constitution is beyond the terms of reference of the present inquiry. 6. While it is generally accepted that there are limits on how far individual ministerial responsibility should be expected to extend, there is no precise consensus and how it should apply in each particular case is unclear. As a consequence processes for ensuring the accountability of central government can suffer from a lack of clarity. 7. Another way in which individual ministerial responsibility is not absolute involves the accounting officer principle, whereby the accounting officer in a department can answer individually to the Public Accounts Committee in the Commons. Accounting officers are able to require ministers to issue them with written instructions regarding a use of public funds about which they are not content. 2. If the current model of individual ministerial responsibility is no longer appropriate, what should replace it? 8. While, as suggested above, replacing individual ministerial responsibility altogether is an issue which cannot be considered purely as part of an inquiry into Civil Service accountability, there is scope for changing the role of Parliament within the existing model. 3 of 44 Dr. Andrew Blick, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies, King’s College London – Written evidence 9. Potential for development in this regard has been created through the passing of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (CRAG). 10. Amongst other measures, CRAG places on a statutory basis the Civil Service Commission, the power to manage the Civil Service, the publication of Civil Service, Diplomatic Service and special adviser codes, Civil Service appointments and the definition of a special adviser. 11. The introduction of a statutory basis for the Civil Service in 2010 was an event of historic and legal significance. It entailed the enactment of a measure proposed as long ago as 1854 by the so-called ‘Northcote-Trevelyan’ report; and it meant that for the first time the Civil Service was founded in authority created by Parliament rather than the Royal Prerogative. 12.
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