THE BUSH DOCTRINE: SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST By Kenneth W. Stein*
This article’s thesis is that the Bush Doctrine is part of a broader bipartisan American foreign policy, “Selective Engagement,” emerging since the Cold War’s end. U.S. willingness to be involved abroad are based on whether such an effort is in the national interest, can be shared with a coalition, costs acceptable amounts of money and potential casualties, and will leave the region better off. It discusses the Bush administration’s Middle East policy in this context, especially regarding the move toward higher degrees of apparent involvement in coping with the Israel-Palestinian conflict.
During the 2000 American presidential cooperation...that he had appointed a host of election campaign, George W. Bush gave one officials who reject multilateralism.” It foreign policy address. Not unexpectedly, concluded, however, that even without a domestic priorities prevailed at his common Soviet enemy, Europe and America Administration’s outset: education reform, the had “common values and a common interest in environment, private school vouchers, faith- upholding them.”(1) based initiatives, energy sources and The aftermath of the September 11, 2001, production, creation of prescription drug assault on America changed the benefits, tax relief, an economic stimulus administration’s agenda. Europeans voiced package, health care, values, ethics, and their strong support for the United States to a propounding a philosophy of “compassion in far greater extent than they had backed the 1990 government.” coalition to counter Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Domestic issues which contained foreign The military attack on the Taliban and al-Qaeda policy components--such as illegal drugs, trade in Afghanistan was endorsed by 40 countries questions, terrorism prevention, immigration compared to 28 in the earlier case. And that concerns, energy matters, and currency response came only 26 days after the stability-- also had some priority, but only if September 11 attack, not the 165 days it took to they affected the lives and immediate economic act after the initial invasion of Kuwait. Unlike or physical well-being of Americans. in 1990 also, there was no partisan debate in the Consequently, during his first months in office, U.S. Senate about whether force should be Bush was chided not for his lack of interest in used. foreign affairs but lack of knowledge about the The President and the American people who world. In a tongue-in-cheek humor, the had little interest in foreign affairs were Economist magazine showed a picture of an suddenly thrust into an international crisis. But American astronaut on the moon with the the longer-term question was the extent to caption, “Mr. Bush goes to Europe.” An which this development changed the style and editorial within noted that “many Europeans substance of America’s selective engagement believe that he is uninterested in policy in foreign affairs? Would unilateralism 52 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2002) The Bush Doctrine: Selective Engagement in the Middle East or multilateralism play a greater role in competition on the horizon, and living in a American preferences? Was it unilateral policy relatively peaceful Western hemisphere. Being for the president of the United States to declare the sole superpower did not automatically make on dozens of occasions that “either you are with Americans or their presidents accept the us or against us in the war against terrorism” responsibility as world leader, as others would What change, if any, did articulation of this have wanted or feared. Under the Clinton and doctrine have on American foreign policy first Bush Administrations, the United States toward the Middle East in general and toward did not flaunt its power by pushing around less Arab-Israeli conflict in particular? powerful countries; it remained content to The Bush Doctrine was not an advocacy of a manage world affairs and become involved on clash of civilizations or a Western crusade the limited occasions when that was deemed against Islam. It articulated specific goals. necessary or desired. America was being International terrorism would be isolated; the choosy about where and when to become Taliban and al-Qaeda networks were to be involved abroad.(2) But what was meant by destroyed. This doctrine’s duration and choosy? effectiveness remained open-ended but it had In a broader perspective, since the late specific goals and set limitations. The goal was 1980s, four criteria emerged in defining not to change the Middle East or to launch a America’s selective engagement abroad: major economic development program. There 1. Are there sufficient moral imperatives or was no stated intention to continue intervention strategic needs that require protection of the or maintain additional forces in the region national interest? longer than was absolutely necessary. The 2. What are the costs in American lives and United States checked, evaluated, tested, and will American physical engagement be for a when possible improved bilateral relations with limited period of time? those willing to help in this effort. 3. Are there potential allies elsewhere, and Since the Cold War’s end and Soviet especially in the region of possible engagement, Union’s demise, and during the terms of which would form a working coalition with presidents Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, the Washington to share the human, financial, and United States developed an over-arching physical burdens? bipartisan foreign policy best described as 4. Is there a viable exit strategy from the selective engagement. It was neither unilateral area which would leave the local political nor multilateral in definition or application. It environment more stable than prior to was a concept applied with differing degrees of engagement? Can that strategy include intensity depending on the issue, moment, and building, revamping, or expanding bilateral the president’s personal preferences. While U.S. strategic relationships with coalition holding the precepts of defending democratic partners? freedoms, protecting human rights, and Richard Haass, head of the Policy Planning encouraging free enterprise, there remained Staff in the Bush State Department, defined historical American reluctance to be engaged selective engagement in July 2001, as “a la abroad, unless an international situation carte multilateralism.”(3) After the September challenged American national interests. 11, 2001, terrorist assault on America, On entering office, though, the Bush Secretary of State Colin Powell refused Administration found the United States with categorization of American foreign policy as unchallenged military and economic strength “unilateralist,” though Washington did dominant in a unipolar world. America was the disassociate itself unilaterally (but after sole superpower, without any foreseeable consultations with the Russians) from the anti-
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ballistic missile treaty. The charge of acting time to dive personally into the complexities of unilaterally had begun well before September foreign affairs than do presidents whose 11, as the Bush administration had unilaterally political skills are honed with prior military, pulled out of the Kyoto Treaty and had refused Washington, or congressional career to ratify the convention to establish a backgrounds. As former governors, presidents permanent war crimes tribunal. Roosevelt, Carter, Reagan, and Clinton were Powell, in December 2001, explained that less schooled in international affairs prior to the United States was “interested in pulling their swearing-in than were presidents together coalition [but] where [U.S.] national Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, interests are not served by being multilateral or and George Bush Sr., all of whom had foreign participating in something that we know is not policy experience.(5) in our national interest and we don't think Second, the composition of an almost evenly serves the purpose that others think it serves, divided Congress elected in November 2000 we have to speak out.” In short, the United meant that any political currency remaining States would prefer to find allies but would go from the hard-fought presidential victory it alone when necessary.(4) should be translated into momentum for And that is what the United States did after pushing the domestic agenda forward. With an September 11. Unlike ten years earlier, when almost even split between Democrats and the U.S. prepared its action against Saddam Republicans in the House of Representatives Hussein with UN resolutions as mandates for and the razor-thin Republican majority in the action, this time, against the Taliban and al- Senate, the Administration had to move Qaeda network, Washington made no effort to forward on its domestic priorities hoping to look for international justification for action. keep its majorities from eroding in the 2002 The United States was confident that, pressed to Congressional elections. make a choice, countries would be more likely The change of one seat through the defection and faster to take its side. Thus, Bush repeated of Senator James Jefford from the Republican over and over again, “Either you are with us, or Party in May 2001 altered the Senatorial you are with the terrorists.” committee structure and the priorities of the Senate agenda. Historically, the party that wins FACTORS MILITATING AGAINST U.S. the White House usually loses seats in the INTERVENTION ABROAD AND IN THE subsequent congressional election two years MIDDLE EAST IN PARTICULAR later. One could have argued before September Acting as the world’s policeman or 11 that only after the Bush Administration dealt intervening abroad were not the immediate with domestic legislation would it find foreign priorities for the Bush Administration. When it affairs issues less contentious and more looked at the Middle East on September 10, palatable than doing battle with a Democratic- 2001, there were at least five reasons not to be dominated Congress. The more the overly engaged in diplomacy there. Administration was frustrated on domestic First, there was the president’s own issues, the greater the likelihood it might focus predisposition to remain distant from foreign on foreign affairs. With the economy still affairs. The presidents’ coolness to engagement sagging after the December 2000 tax cuts, in foreign affairs stemmed from his immediate Democratic majority leader Senator Tom political experience and background. Former Daschle fiercely challenged the wisdom of governors who become presidents take a longer Bush’s economic stimulus package as
54 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2002) The Bush Doctrine: Selective Engagement in the Middle East unemployment levels did not diminish. The theatre, included elements of both constructive Democrats seemed poised to make the state of and preventive diplomacy. U.S. assets included economy the major issue in the 2002 campaign. economic assistance to Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Third, the Middle East remained in a and the Palestinian Authority (PA); military relatively permanent state of flux but did not assistance and security arrangements with Israel seem to pose an overt threat to the national and many Arab states; information-sharing on interest that demanded engagement. There was international terrorism, narcotics, and weapons little, if any, potential for interruption in the of mass destruction activity. Without flow of Middle Eastern oil to the United States abandoning the U.S. position that human rights, or its European and Asian allies. Oil was selling a free press, and democratic institutions were at bargain prices. There was no indication from preferable, the United States did not pressure moderate Arab states in North Africa or the states to an extent that would create bilateral Middle East that they wanted American or antagonisms. Nor did the United States act to Western assistance in changing their prevent or pressure states that criticized U.S. governmental systems. Moderate Arab states policy on Iraq and other issues. As Middle were relatively stable, though their economies Eastern leaders had done for centuries, were in sad shape. rightfully or wrongfully, they felt free to heap Saddam Hussein continued to be a nuisance blame on a foreign power, in this case the but no more than he was during the last months United States. of the Clinton Administration. During its early Fourth, on the field of Arab-Israeli days, the Bush Administration shared its diplomacy, the Bush Administration could not predecessor’s reluctance to wage a large attack have inherited a negotiating process more to topple the Iraqi leader. A wait-and-see unlikely to succeed. There seemed no reason to attitude was also applied to Iran. believe that January 2001 was a good time to The Middle East remained a region where become actively involved in this issue. weapons of mass destruction were produced Judiciously, the Bush Administration chose and stockpiled, delivery systems acquired, and caution. It faced an enormous headwind of nefarious war technology was imported or opposition to diplomatic progress. The level of domestically developed. Other international violence, distrust, and political disagreement issues involving the Middle East included seemed to unravel the previous American terrorism, drug production and smuggling, and diplomatic advances. Even so, the Bush radical Islamism as a basis for revolutionary Administration still put forward the Mitchell movements. Terrorism was a threat to Report, Tenet cease-fire proposals, and Americans and U.S. installations abroad but Anthony Zinni’s negotiating mission. Even bureaucratic hesitancy in the American military during massive Palestinian suicide attacks and government discouraged pre-emptive against Israelis in December 2001 and the assaults against al-Qaeda or other terrorist revelation in January 2002 of a 50-ton arms networks.(6) The complexity and risks involved shipment smuggled by the PA on a boat, the in handling these issues discouraged a new U.S. United States stayed engaged. In April 2002, president from bold action or deep Powell made an 11-day visit to Europe, North involvement. Any possible success would Africa, and the Middle East to investigate the require an enormous amount of ingenuity, vast chances for linking up a ceasefire, Israeli financial investments, good luck, and most withdrawal from urban PA areas, and progress importantly willing regional actors. on negotiations. The U.S. government also put Nonetheless, Clinton’s legacy to Bush in the forward the idea of an international conference. Middle East, especially outside the Arab-Israeli But it could not bridge the gap between the
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local parties which had become substantially border security along the Jordan Valley and to wider than at any time during the Clinton monitor implementation of the final agreement, Administration. and an end to the culture of violence and The Bush Administration looked back at the incitement.(11) With uncharacteristic praise, a personal, political, and professional capital United Arab Emirates (UAE) editorial writer expended by the Clinton administration which characterized these last-ditch Clinton efforts as had ended in diplomatic stalemate and bloody evidence of a “fighter who never gives violence. When it took office, there was little up...resilient, stubborn and strong-willed...even hope to justify an Oval Office leap into either when all the odds are against him.”(12) Syrian-Israeli or Palestinian-Israeli The Palestinians rejected Clinton’s far- negotiations. Clinton was fully engaged and reaching proposals, which had gone dedicated to working on Arab-Israeli issues in a significantly beyond those proposed at Camp way equaled only by Jimmy Carter’s David the previous summer in outlining a presidency.(7) Personally, Clinton set new possible two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli records in the time he spent in meetings and conflict. Even Prime Minister Sharon visits, including the first presidential trip to the eventually expressed willingness for the PA. He presided over more summits and made establishment of a Palestinian state. On this more phone calls to Middle Eastern leaders, and basis, the Bush Administration, no matter how spent far more time on Syria-Israel negotiations reluctant to become engaged in active than any other president. Clinton stayed diplomacy, during its first year in office actively engaged until his very last day in advocated the establishment of a Palestinian office. state as part of a peace deal ending Israel’s After Clinton failed to achieve a control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. breakthrough in high-level Syrian-Israeli talks Compared to Carter’s call for a “Palestinian in Washington in late 1999 and Shepherdstown homeland” in March 1977, which was met with in early 2000, he had tried again in a meeting incredulity and anger from virtually every with Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad in Geneva quarter supporting Israel, (13) the Bush in March 2000. In the end, all these efforts Administration’s declaration at his address to failed. He then turned to Israeli-Palestinian the UN on November 10, 2001 advocating a talks, culminating with the July 2000 Camp Palestinian state alongside Israel barely David summit.(8) The failure there was received any domestic criticism even from pro- followed by the outbreak of violence in late Israel quarters. September, the October 2000 Sharm al-Shaykh What is astonishing is that the Bush summit (which laid the basis for the Mitchell administration advocated a Palestinian state at Commission), and the December 23, 2000 precisely the time when much of the Arab press Clinton plan.(9) was stinging the United States with angry and Even on January 7, 2001, just two weeks inciteful language while American public before leaving office, Clinton was still opinion toward Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the campaigning for his framework.(10) Clinton Palestinians showed incredibly sharp declines proposed a Palestinian state alongside Israel, in approval. In the Zogby International poll land swaps, refugee resettlement in the taken in October 2001, only 38 percent of Palestinian state, security guarantees for Israel, Americans indicated a favorable view towards the removal of the vast majority of settlements, Egypt, while 34 percent held a negative view; an international presence in Palestine to provide only 24 percent shared a favorable view toward
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Saudi Arabia and 58 percent had a negative Mitchell Report recommended an end to the view of the kingdom. The numbers on Saudi violence and rebuilding confidence, all with the Arabia were a complete reversal of American objective of resuming negotiations. Powell attitudes held in January 2001, when 56 percent subsequently adopted the report as the U.S.’s viewed the kingdom positively and only 24 road map for traveling from an end of the percent negatively. Israel came out with a violence to reaching an agreement. favorable rating of 59 percent; the PA was seen The administration attempted to use the favorably by only 10 percent of the U.S. public momentum created by the Mitchell Report by and negatively by 72 percent.(14) sending CIA Director George Tenet to broker a In the meantime, public opinion on both cease-fire in June 2001, followed by Powell’s sides had shown major shifts and mechanisms second trip to the Middle East. Yet while it did built up during the peace process collapsed. not get the ceasefire, the Mitchell Report About 500,000 Israelis who had voted for remained the Administration’s blueprint. In Barak in 1999 switched to support Sharon only appointing Zinni as his special adviser, Powell 18 months later.(15) While in June 2000, was testing to see if Arafat was willing to rein Palestinian public support for the Oslo in the violence and put a cease-fire in place, and agreements was at 57.6 percent, by April 2001, whether Sharon would freeze settlement it had dropped to 40.4 percent. Further, 80 activity once that had occurred. percent supported continuation of the Zinni needed to learn of long-term intifada.(16) Palestinian and Israeli intentions, but his first Fully aware of the difficulties of the trip to the region in December 2001 was situation and the high likelihood of failure of punctuated and truncated by Palestinian suicide any diplomatic initiative, the Administration, bombings in Jerusalem, Haifa, and in the West despite constant prodding by European and Bank. Zinni returned to the region at the end of Arab leaders alike, said it would wait for the March and negotiated the outlines of a new but violence to subside before sending another unrealized cease-fire, per the Tenet plan. The group of mediators. However, this stance would Israeli seizure of the Palestinian arms ship in change quickly. January 2002 and documents in Arafat’s Having inherited the Mitchell Committee headquarters in Ramallah in four months later from the last months of the Clinton (in addition to those discovered in the PLO’s Administration, Bush Administration officials Orient House in Jerusalem) which reportedly attempted to use that committee’s report as a included Arafat’s signature for payments of the springboard for America’s re-engaging in the ship’s cargo and for support of Palestinian Arab-Israeli negotiations. Emerging from the suicide bombers gave the Bush administration agreement reached at Sharm al-Shaykh in strong reason to believe that Arafat was not a October 2000, the Mitchell Report investigated viable interlocutor for negotiations leading to a the underlying causes of the intifada, suggested peaceful resolution of the conflict. ways to prevent violence from recurring, and Still, urged on by Arab leaders, especially offered ways to reduce tensions and build King Abdullah of Jordan, Egypt’s President confidence between Palestinians and Israelis. Mubarak, and Crown Prince Abdallah of Saudi The report, issued in April 2001, noted that “the Arabia, Powell saw Arafat in April on the heels only one way to bring peace, justice and of a massive Israeli military effort to destroy security in the Middle East [was] through the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank. negotiation.” Though the report investigated the Powell’s intervention was unilateral, but his causes for the outbreak, it carefully avoided efforts to find diplomatic solutions to the assigning responsibility. Concluding, the impasse were multilateral. A diplomatic
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coalition was in creation. Before, during and unable to absorb many talented and eligible after this visit, the Bush Administration workers. While development remained slow, willingly accepted the active diplomatic indigenous bureaucracies remained large and intervention of Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Their growing and countries did not make changes to support of the March 2002 Beirut Arab summit adjust to globalizing markets. Western declaration which among other things called for investment capital focused on eastern European Israeli withdrawal and resolution of the refugee market economies where once they had rushed problem, also spoke about recognizing Israel’s into the Middle East. If populations throughout existence. the region clamored for change, they also were Abdallah took the lead in the diplomatic constrained by custom and the existing regimes. campaign to end as promptly as possible Israel’s siege of West Bank cities, prevent THE BUSH DOCTRINE, SELECTIVE Arafat from being side-stepped by the ENGAGEMENT, AND MIDDLE Americans, and support renewed negotiations. EASTERN REALITIES Middle Eastern Arab partners were sought to When President Harry S. Truman addressed support these diplomatic efforts. In his April a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, visit to the Middle East, Powell carried with he asked for $400 million in military and him the support of a U.S.-Russian-UN-EU economic assistance for Greece and Turkey to declaration (17) Back in the United States, help them resist an expansion of Soviet Powell again met in early May with influence and Communism. Known as the representatives of these three partners “on ways Truman Doctrine, this approach guided to end the violence and move towards peace in American diplomacy for the next 40 years. the Middle East.” (18) Adopting a multilateral Declared Truman, “It must be the policy of the rather than unilateral approach would avoid United States to support free peoples who are accusations of Washington acting alone, ensure resisting attempted subjugation by armed cooperation with other key forces, and bring in minorities or by outside pressures.” That local Arab partners whose interests were served doctrine signaled America's post-war embrace by reducing the violence. of global leadership and ended its previous The U.S. reluctance to become engaged in peacetime policy of isolationism. Arab-Israeli diplomacy were also caused and Was something so dramatic ready to grip the reinforced by other regional problems which United States after September 11, 2001? Would seemed too great to be cured by any foreign the Bush Doctrine emerge to dominate the power. Thus, while such issues as oil, stability, definition of American foreign policy for a and concern over Iran and Iraq kept the United sustained period of time? Or would it be just States engaged in the region, other factors another soon-forgotten presidential statement pulled in the opposite direction. Washington about American interests in the Middle East policymakers understood that while the region like the Eisenhower or Carter Doctrines? was crisis-prone, its states always seemed to Would change in the international status quo muddle through these problems.(19) Economic and consequent implementation of the Bush problems were very serious but there were no Doctrine witness a concerted American easy solutions the United States could bring. mediation of bilateral disputes elsewhere, like Currencies tended to remain weak, under- the long Indian-Pakistani conflict over employment and unemployment stayed high, Kashmir? Or perhaps the United States would populations increased, and economies were once again upgrade mediation efforts in the
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Arab-Israeli conflict? Would areas of South voices were heard in the halls of Congress.(20) Asia and the former republics of the Soviet As the Bush Doctrine became operative, Union slowly become sites for American coalition-building and multilateral cooperation military presence as occurred in Arab Gulf were encouraged by a combination of need and countries during the decade after the end of the justification. Among those actively 1991 Gulf War? participating in the war against terrorism were Save for some incidental exceptions, this Pakistani, Turkish, Jordanian, Italian, German, was the first time the mainland of America was British, French and other European and Middle attacked by a foreign power since the War of Eastern leaders. A coalition had come into 1812. In declaring the War on Terrorism, being in large part because countries recognized President Bush said on September 27, 2001, to a common threat and common interest. Each a joint session of Congress: state defined its own relationship to the coalition in conjunction with the United States, We will direct every resource at our taking into account the degree of closeness command--every means of desired with the United States, domestic public diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, opinion, and what it could contribute. Some every instrument of law enforcement, provided personnel, material, and information; every financial influence, and every others provided logistics, over flight rights, necessary weapon of war--to the port-of-call privileges, stationing of troops, or destruction and to the defeat of the money. Similarly, countries wanted or global terror network...We will starve demanded different things from the United terrorists of funding, turn them one States, ranging from better trade relations, against another, drive them from financial assistance, debt reduction, or place to place until there is no refuge concessions on other issues. or no rest. And we will pursue For the second time in a decade, then, the nations that provide aid or safe haven United States became the leader of a complex to terrorism. Every nation in every international coalition. As always in that region now has a decision to make: decade, the United States remained deeply Either you are with us or you are with engaged in the Middle East. The degree and the terrorists. From this day forward, direction of involvement would be determined any nation that continues to harbor or by the intersection between the Bush Doctrine support terrorism will be regarded by and the doctrine of Selective Engagement. the United States as a hostile regime. Our nation has been put on notice. *Professor Kenneth W. Stein is the William E. We're not immune from attack. We Schatten Professor of Contemporary Middle will take defensive measures against Eastern History, Political Science and Israeli terrorism to protect Americans. Studies at Emory University. He is author of Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, By the time he made the speech, Congress Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace had earmarked, not $400 million but $40 billion (1999) and The Land Question in Palestine, dollars to offset the attack on America and 1917-1939 (1984) and co-author of Making launch the war against terrorism. In 1947, the Peace Between Arabs and Israelis-Lessons American people were reluctant to take on From Fifty Years of Negotiating Experience European Communism alone. Then-Senator (1991). Different versions of this article Vandenburg zealously demanded a leadership appeared in German in International Politik, role for the UN; in September 2001, no such 2002; and in French in Politique Etrangere,
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January-March 2002, pp. 149-171. and a solution to the refugee problem; UN Resolution 338 of October 1973 called for NOTES negotiations between the parties. 1. The Economist, June 9-16, 2001, p. 9. 11. See John Lancaster, “Clinton Still Harbors a 2. Thomas Shanker, “White House Says the Grain of Hope, Ross Begins Last Mideast Peace U.S. is Not a Loner, Just Choosy,” The New Bid,” The Washington Post, January 10, 2001, York Times, July 31, 2001, p. 1. p. A14 at
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High Representative for Common Foreign and
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