NPR 7.1: the NPT at a Crossroads

JAYANTHA DHANAPALA Viewpoint The NPT at a Crossroads JAYANTHA DHANAPALA Jayantha Dhanapala is the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations. He served as the President of the 1995 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review and Extension Conference. He has also served as the Ambassador of Sri Lanka to the United Nations in Geneva and to the United States. From 1997-98, he was Diplomat-in-Residence at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He wishes to record his debt to Randy Rydell, who assisted in the research for this viewpoint. n April 24, 2000, representatives from the 187 the future of the “rule of law” in international society. In states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Prolif- such a climate, it becomes all the more important for Oeration of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will convene states parties to attend closely to their solemn obliga- at the United Nations to open the first five-year Review tions under major treaties like the NPT, responsibilities Conference since the Treaty was indefinitely extended that are reinforced by the periodic deliberations of Re- in 1995. It will be the first such Review Conference to view Conferences. assess the accomplishments under the “strengthened re- Though global efforts on behalf of nuclear disarma- view process” agreed upon at the 1995 Review and Ex- ment and nonproliferation have followed a long and tension Conference. It will be the Treaty’s first Review winding road, it is increasingly apparent that this road Conference in the new millennium. has led not to a dead-end, but to a crossroads. It will be It will be also be the first Review Conference in the up to the forthcoming Review Conference to survey the substantially changed international environment since terrain, consider the various available road maps, assess 1995. Much of the optimism that followed the end of the Treaty’s track record, and lay down some milestones the Cold War has been attenuated by new and occasion- for the course ahead. The stakes are large indeed, for ally deep divisions, including those that have arisen over participants will be deliberating about the gravest threat Kosovo, within the permanent members of the Security to international peace and security of our time—the Council. Such divisions, which at times provoke memo- gravest threat, indeed, to the future of humankind. ries of the Cold War, cannot help but hinder the Council’s ability to “ensure prompt and effective action” in ful- THE LEGACIES OF 1995 filling its “primary responsibility for the maintenance The last five years of the 20th century represented of international peace and security,” as defined in Ar- simultaneously the best of times and the worst of times ticle 24 of the UN Charter. With actions either blocked, for the global norms of nuclear disarmament and non- or with the Council united in inaction (as it was in the proliferation. The agreement by the states parties to the tragic case of Rwanda), concerns inevitably arise over NPT to extend the Treaty indefinitely was accomplished 138 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2000 JAYANTHA DHANAPALA in May 1995 at the NPT Review and Extension Confer- the following issue “clusters”: nuclear disarmament; ence (NPTREC) by means of a politically binding, inte- safeguards, export controls, and nuclear-weapon-free grated “package” of three decisions and a resolution.1 zones (NWFZs); and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It This package was adopted without a vote after it be- also provided that the Preparatory Committee may make came apparent that the overwhelming majority of states recommendations to the Review Conference concern- parties favored an indefinite extension. ing the establishment of “subsidiary bodies” to allow It is important to stress, however, that the NPT was for more focused consideration of particular issues. not extended unconditionally, despite some claims to the contrary.2 The indefinite extension would not have Principles and Objectives been possible without agreement on the other items found The second decision of the NPTREC registered an in the package, which was constructed around a com- agreement on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear mon theme of enhanced accountability. The states par- Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” (P&O). The re- ties to the NPT clearly wanted to ensure that all its view process would consider and assess the performance members were complying in full with all the Treaty’s of states parties relative to these standards, alongside provisions. In a sense, the Review Conference is simply those obligations found explicitly in the Treaty itself. In an opportunity for the states parties to confirm periodi- brief, the decision established seven specific principles cally that a deal is, indeed, a deal. and objectives: 1. Universality. The decision identified efforts on be- Strengthening the Review Process3 half of the “universal adherence” to the Treaty as an The first decision in 1995 concerned “Strengthening “urgent priority.” States parties are to make “every the Review Process for the Treaty.” This decision re- effort” to achieve this objective. tained the practice of holding a Review Conference ev- 2. Nonproliferation. The decision declared that the ery five years and also provided that Preparatory further proliferation of nuclear weapons “would seri- Committee meetings would occur annually in the three ously increase the danger of nuclear war” and hence years prior to the Review Conference. The decision did that all states parties should make “every effort” to not, however, just extend an old scheduling practice, but implement the Treaty fully. also expanded the scope of the substantive topics to be 3. Nuclear Disarmament. The nuclear weapon states considered during the review process. The purpose of reaffirmed their commitment under NPT Article VI Preparatory Committee sessions would henceforth be “to to pursue in good faith “negotiations on effective consider principles, objectives and ways in order to pro- measures relating to nuclear disarmament.” Three mote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as specific measures would be “important in” the imple- its universality, and to make recommendations thereon mentation of Article VI commitments: completion of to the Review Conference.” The scope of these delib- negotiations on a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban erations was to include specifically a review of progress Treaty (CTBT) no later than 1996; conclusion of ne- in implementing the “principles and objectives” found gotiations on a convention banning the production of in the second key decision of the NPTREC. fissile material for use in any nuclear explosive de- vice; and the “determined pursuit by the nuclear- The 1995 Conference also agreed that future Review weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts” Conferences “should look forward as well as back” in to reduce nuclear weapons globally, “with the ulti- evaluating the implementation of the Treaty, and should mate goal of eliminating those weapons.” The deci- identify the areas in which—and the means through sion also reaffirmed the goal of general and complete which—further progress should be sought. A specific disarmament under strict international control. focus would be on addressing what might be done to 4. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. The decision reaf- strengthen implementation of the Treaty and to achieve firmed the importance of NWFZs, stated that the es- its universality. (As of January 2000, India, Pakistan, tablishment of additional zones (in the Middle East Israel, and Cuba remain non-parties.) especially) “should be encouraged as a matter of pri- The first decision also retained the existing structure ority,” and noted that the cooperation of nuclear of three Main Committees, which focus respectively on weapon states in respecting such zones is necessary. The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2000 139 JAYANTHA DHANAPALA 5. Security Assurances. The decision urged that “fur- ing nuclear disarmament, a fissile material cut-off, se- ther steps” be taken to assure non-nuclear weapon curity assurances, and the prevention of an arms race in states party to the Treaty against the use or threat of outer space. Activities undertaken during the NPT Re- use of nuclear weapons, and suggested that these steps view Conferences or at the CD may well prove to be could take the form of “an internationally legally bind- mutually reinforcing. All of this, of course, depends upon ing document.” the willingness of member states to reach consensus. 6. Safeguards. The decision affirmed that new nuclear Without this willingness, the ability of either forum to supply agreements should require full-scope Interna- advance the cause of disarmament will be substantially tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards “as curtailed, if not rendered hopeless. It all comes down to a necessary precondition” along with binding com- the political will of states, which in turn is shaped by the mitments not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, wishes and interests of the people within those states. described the IAEA as “the competent authority” to verify compliance with NPT safeguards, urged all Middle East Resolution states parties that have not yet done so to bring into The remaining item in the 1995 package is the Reso- force their comprehensive safeguards agreements, lution on the Middle East, which endorsed progress in called for a regular assessment of safeguards, and the Middle East peace process as a factor that would urged the placement under safeguards of nuclear ma- further efforts to create a zone in the Middle East free terial recovered from military programs. from all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their 7. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. The decision delivery systems. The resolution called on all states that reaffirmed the “inalienable right” of all parties to “de- have not joined the NPT to do so and to accept IAEA velop research, production and use of nuclear energy full-scope safeguards, and noted with concern that some for peaceful purposes,” consistent with Articles I, II, unsafeguarded nuclear facilities continue to exist in the and III of the NPT.

Load more