WHEN THE LEARNING CURVE FALLS When the Learning Curve Falls: The Ordeal of the 44th Battalion, 25 October 1916 WILLIAM STEWART Independent Scholar Email:
[email protected] ABSTRACT On 25 October 1916, a battalion of the 4th Canadian Division suffered a stinging repulse in a poorly planned operation. This paper examines how, sixteen weeks into the Somme campaign, senior commanders could launch such a poorly conceived operation that violated current operating principles. The attack ran counter to the overarching notion that the British Army experienced a ‘learning curve’. The paper describes the reasons for the failure and argues the learning curve was not a simple monolithic process but multiple curves contingent on circumstances, commander competence, and the pressures from superiors. During the night of 25 October 1916, a meagre number of exhausted, wet, cold, and angry survivors of the 44th Battalion of the 4th Canadian Division trudged to the rear after yet another abortive attack on Regina Trench during the Somme campaign.1 Their confidence in the high command was seriously impaired by the incompetently planned and executed attack, and the battalion took months to recover its edge. This was the fourth Canadian attempt to capture Regina Trench, and only one operation—on 21 October—captured and held even a portion of the objective. This paper examines how, sixteen weeks into the Somme campaign, the senior commanders at the corps, division, and brigade levels could launch such a poorly conceived operation that violated current operating principles. The attack ran counter to the overarching notion that the British Army, and by extension the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF), experienced a ‘learning curve’ over the course of the war and during the Somme campaign.