Euromaidan Newsletter No. 64
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Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine 16 May to 15 August 2018
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 May to 15 August 2018 Contents Page I. Executive summary .......................................................................................................................... 1 II. OHCHR methodology ...................................................................................................................... 3 III. Impact of hostilities .......................................................................................................................... 3 A. Conduct of hostilities and civilian casualties ............................................................................. 3 B. Situation at the contact line and rights of conflict-affected persons ............................................ 7 1. Right to restitution and compensation for use or damage of private property ..................... 7 2. Right to social security and social protection .................................................................... 9 3. Freedom of movement, isolated communities and access to basic services ...................... 10 IV. Right to physical integrity ............................................................................................................... 11 A. Access to detainees and places of detention ............................................................................ 11 B. Arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance and abduction, torture and ill-treatment ............... 12 C. Situation -
Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine at the 777-Th FSC Plenary Meeting (28 January 2015 at 10.00, Hofburg)
FSC.DEL/11/15 28 January 2015 ENGLISH only Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine at the 777-th FSC Plenary Meeting (28 January 2015 at 10.00, Hofburg) Mr. Chairman, The Russian aggression against Ukraine, which resulted in illegal occupation and annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as well as escalation in Ukraine’s east, continues and produces a sharply growing number of casualties among civilians and servicemen in Ukraine. On 24 January, Russian‐backed terrorists committed another heinous crime. The deliberate shelling by Grad missiles of the residential areas of the city of Mariupol, followed a number of earlier terrorist attacks, among them the shellings of the civilian bus near Volnovakha, of the trolleybus stop in Donetsk, of residential areas in many towns and villages. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission’s assessment concluded that the attack had been carried out through the use of Grad and Uragan rockets fired from areas controlled by the “Donetsk People’s Republic”. On January 25, the Ukrainian government reported that the toll from the attack had reached 30 dead and 102 wounded. The Ukrainian Security Service collected evidence, including telephone intercepts and the account of the accomplice of this murderous act, that the artillery attack on peaceful Mariupol was committed by the Russian artillery battery commanded by a Russian officer with a call sign "Pepel". Mr. Chairman, Distinguished colleagues, The cold‐blooded murder of 30 civilians and wounding of more than a hundred people by pro‐Russian terrorists in Mariupol is a crime against humanity. The Ukrainian authorities will do all in their power to make sure that the perpetrators of this heinous crime are brought to justice. -
Ukraine Humanitarian Situation Report # 28
Ukraine Humanitarian Situation Report # 28 SITUATION IN NUMBERS Highlights 20 February 2015 Recent insecurity triggered additional movement 134,290 of people with 1,042,066 people now internally # of registered internally displaced children displaced in Ukraine, of whom 134,290 are (Ministry of Social Policy, 16 February 2015) children (Source: Ministry of Social Policy). 1,042,066 # of registered internally displaced people A ceasefire agreement was reached in Minsk on (Ministry of Social Policy, 16 February 2015) 12 February to halt the spike of violence that flared up in eastern Ukraine over the past few 5 million weeks, causing multiple civilian casualties, # of affected people including children. (OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview, February 2015) The Strategic Response Plan (SRP) for Ukraine is 1.7 million currently being revised by the Humanitarian approx. # of affected children Country Team (HCT), following the deterioration (UNICEF Humanitarian Action for Children 2015) of the humanitarian situation in the country. 3.2 million On 19 February, the UNICEF, UNHCR and WHO # of people targeted for humanitarian aid (OCHA, Strategic Response Plan, February 2015) organized humanitarian convoy reached Donetsk city providing life-saving supplies to an estimated 13,000 people in dire needs including 5,000 63 children children. # of child casualties since March 2014 (WHO, 19 February 2015) As of 16 February, the Ministry of Education and 169 children Science (MoES) reported that the number of IDP # of children wounded since March 2014 children registered in schools and kindergartens (WHO, 19 February 2015) is increasing in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv regions. UKRAINE SITUATION REPORT 20 FEBRUARY 2015 Situation Overview & Humanitarian Needs A ceasefire agreement was reached in Minsk on 12 February to halt the spike of violence that flared up in eastern Ukraine over the past few weeks, causing multiple civilian casualties, including children. -
Ukrainian Civil Society from the Orange Revolution to Euromaidan: Striving for a New Social Contract
In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2014, Baden-Baden 2015, pp. 219-235. Iryna Solonenko Ukrainian Civil Society from the Orange Revolution to Euromaidan: Striving for a New Social Contract This is the Maidan generation: too young to be burdened by the experi- ence of the Soviet Union, old enough to remember the failure of the Orange Revolution, they don’t want their children to be standing again on the Maidan 15 years from now. Sylvie Kauffmann, The New York Times, April 20141 Introduction Ukrainian civil society became a topic of major interest with the start of the Euromaidan protests in November 2013. It has acquired an additional dimen- sion since then, as civil society has pushed for reforms following the ap- pointment of the new government in February 2014, while also providing as- sistance to the army and voluntary battalions fighting in the east of the coun- try and to civilian victims of the war. In the face of the weakness of the Ukrainian state, which is still suffering from a lack of political will, poor governance, corruption, military weakness, and dysfunctional law enforce- ment – many of those being in part Viktor Yanukovych’s legacies – civil so- ciety and voluntary activism have become a driver of reform and an import- ant mobilization factor in the face of external aggression. This contribution examines the transformation of Ukrainian civil society during the period between the 2004 Orange Revolution and the present day. Why this period? The Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan protests are landmarks in Ukraine’s post-independence state-building and democratiza- tion process, and analysis of the transformation of Ukrainian civil society during this period offers interesting findings.2 Following a brief portrait of Ukrainian civil society and its evolution, the contribution examines the rela- tionships between civil society and three other actors: the state, the broader society, and external actors involved in supporting and developing civil soci- ety in Ukraine. -
National Bank of Ukraine Inflation Report | October 2020 1
National Bank of Ukraine Inflation Report | October 2020 1 National Bank of Ukraine The Inflation Report reflects the opinion of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) regarding the current and future economic state of Ukraine with a focus on inflationary developments that form the basis for monetary policy decision-making. The NBU publishes the Inflation Report quarterly in accordance with the forecast cycle. The primary objective of monetary policy is to achieve and maintain price stability in the country. Price stability implies a moderate increase in prices rather than their unchanged level. Low and stable inflation helps preserve the real value of income and savings of Ukrainian households, and enables entrepreneurs to make long-term investments in the domestic economy, fostering job creation. The NBU also promotes financial stability and sustainable economic growth unless it compromises the price stability objective. To ensure price stability, the NBU applies the inflation targeting regime. This framework has the following features: . A publicly declared inflation target and commitment to achieve it. Monetary policy aims to bring inflation to the medium- term inflation target of 5%. The NBU seeks to ensure that actual inflation does not deviate from this target by more than one percentage point in either direction. The main instrument through which the NBU influences inflation is the key policy rate. Reliance on the inflation forecast. In Ukraine, it takes between 9 and 18 months for a change in the NBU’s key policy rate to have a major effect on inflation. Therefore, the NBU pursues a forward-looking policy that takes into account not so much the current inflation rate as the most likely future inflation developments. -
Civil Society in Ukraine
STUDY In Search of Sustainability Civil Society in Ukraine MRIDULA GHOSH June 2014 n In terms of number and variety of organizations, as well as levels and range of activi- ties, civil society and free media in Ukraine are the richest in the former Soviet Union, despite difficult institutional conditions and irregular funding. n The strength of civil society in Ukraine has been tested by time. Confronting his- torical socio-political challenges, ranging from political impasse, internal civil war- like conditions to external threats and aggression, from the Orange revolution in 2004 – 2005 to the Euro-Maidan uprising that started at the end of 2013, civil society in Ukraine is marked by spontaneous unity, commitment, and speedy mobilization of resources, logistics and social capital. It benefits from a confluence of grassroots activism, social networks and formalized institutions. n Despite its resilience in crisis, however, Ukraine’s civil society is yet to develop sus- tainable interaction in policy dialogue and to have the desired impact on changing people’s quality of life. State institutions lay down the terms of cooperation with civil society and not vice versa. In the current economic crisis, political turmoil and corruption, civil society has yet to become a systemic tool in policymaking, relying on outreach through grassroots communication, social and new media networks. n Ukraine’s civil society has campaigned mainly with non-violent means. Now, after the Euro-Maidan experience it is well placed to face the post-crisis development challenges; namely more transparency, overcoming social and political polarization and establishing a human rights-based approach to heal the broken social fabric. -
Annual Report
NATIONAL BANK OF UKRAINE ANNUAL REPORT 2005 Dear Sirs, We would like to offer for your attention the Annual Report of the National Bank of Ukraine for 2005 prepared in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "On the National Bank of Ukraine". The major achievements of Ukraine's macroeconomic development in 2005 primarily were the households' real income growth, unemployment decrease, inflation rate lowering and acceleration in the rates of foreign capi- tal attraction to Ukraine. Ukrainian banks essentially increased crediting of the economy, and the individuals' deposits unprecedentedly grew. International reserves of the National Bank of Ukraine almost doubled. The National Bank of Ukraine's monetary policy in 2005 was aimed at sup- porting the hryvnia stability as a monetary prerequisite for the economic growth, at reaching the long-term social, structural and institutional goals. We consider that the publication of the information of the results of the National Bank of Ukraine activity for the reporting year will promote trans- parency of its work and retaining of confidence in the national monetary unit. I would like to assure you that the National Bank of Ukraine will continue the weighed monetary policy directed towards restraining the inflation rate, ensuring the economic recovery and raising the people's welfare. Sincerely, Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine Volodymyr Stelmakh Council of the National Bank of Ukraine (as at 1 January 2006) Valerii Heiets Valerii Alioshyn Serhii Buriak Anatolii Danylenko Olexander Dubrov Chairman -
A Rapid WASH and Infrastructure Assessment in Non-Government Controlled Areas of Eastern Ukraine
` A Rapid WASH and Infrastructure Assessment in Non-Government Controlled Areas of Eastern Ukraine August, 2015 1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This assessment was commissioned by UNICEF, with data collected remotely by REACH in July 2015 from key informants at water, health, and education facilities as well as from affected communities. Thanks go to all those individuals and organisations who contributed towards this assessment, including the Global WASH Cluster who contributed to the final analysis and drafting. REACH is a joint initiative of IMPACT, its sister organisation ACTED, and the United Nations Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT). REACH facilitates the development of information tools and products that enhance the capacity of aid actors to make evidence-based decisions. For more information, write to [email protected], visit www.reach-intiative.org and follow us @REACH_info. Cover photo: Delivery of drinking water to Debaltseve, Donetsk Oblast, March 2015, ©UNICEF i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Conflict has been ongoing in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts since May 2014, with spikes of violence in June 2014 and again in January-February and in July 2015. Attempts to negotiate a political solution to the conflict led to the ‘Minsk’ ceasefire signed between the Governments of Ukraine, Russian Federation and the non-state actors in September 2014. However, the truce collapsed within days, similar to a new ceasefire agreement signed in February 2015. Relative calm around the Contact Line (CL) has ensued since September 2015, however, the situation remains fragile given lack of trust between the parties to the conflict. From the end of 2014, Ukrainian legislation has restricted freedom of moment of both people and goods, in addition to the cessation of salary and pension payments in the non-governmental controlled areas (NGCAs), increasing hardship for local populations. -
Ukraine Handbook
KIEV, UKRAINE HANDBOOK Military Family Services Europe / MFS(E) Riga-Remote Team [email protected] www.cafconnection.ca / www.connexionfac.ca Date published: 20 June 2017 Date revised: 17 Feb 2020 TABLE OF CONTENTS GREETINGS FROM YOUR MFS(E) RIGA-REMOTE TEAM 1 EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMITTEE ............................ 3 USING THIS GUIDE .................................................... 4 SOME HELPFUL RESOURCES ....................................... 1 OVERVIEW OF KIEV ................................................... 2 Maps ............................................................................................................. 2 Geography/Politics .......................................................................................... 4 Climate ......................................................................................................... 4 Languages ..................................................................................................... 4 Religion ......................................................................................................... 5 Cost of Living ................................................................................................. 5 Canadian/Expat Community ............................................................................. 6 Cultural Nuances, Etiquette and Traditions ......................................................... 6 Public Holidays ............................................................................................... 9 News .......................................................................................................... -
National Bank of Ukraine Inflation Report | July 2020 1
National bank of Ukraine Inflation Report | July 2020 1 National bank of Ukraine The Inflation Report reflects the opinion of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) regarding the current and future economic state of Ukraine with a focus on inflationary developments that form the basis for monetary policy decision-making. The NBU publishes the Inflation Report quarterly in accordance with the forecast cycle. The primary objective of monetary policy is to achieve and maintain price stability in the country. Price stability implies a moderate increase in prices rather than their unchanged level. Low and stable inflation helps preserve the real value of income and savings of Ukrainian households, and enables entrepreneurs to make long-term investments in the domestic economy, fostering job creation. The NBU also promotes financial stability and sustainable economic growth unless it compromises the price stability objective. To ensure price stability, the NBU applies the inflation targeting regime. This framework has the following features: . A publicly declared inflation target and commitment to achieve it. Monetary policy aims to bring inflation to the medium- term inflation target of 5%. The NBU seeks to ensure that actual inflation does not deviate from this target by more than one percentage point in either direction. The main instrument through which the NBU influences inflation is the key policy rate. Reliance on the inflation forecast. In Ukraine, it takes between 9 and 18 months for a change in the NBU’s key policy rate to have a major effect on inflation. Therefore, the NBU pursues a forward-looking policy that takes into account not so much the current inflation rate as the most likely future inflation developments. -
National Bank of Ukraine Inflation Report | January 2021 1
National Bank of Ukraine Inflation Report | January 2021 1 National Bank of Ukraine The Inflation Report reflects the opinion of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) regarding the current and future economic state of Ukraine with a focus on inflationary developments that form the basis for monetary policy decision-making. The NBU publishes the Inflation Report quarterly in accordance with the forecast cycle. The primary objective of monetary policy is to achieve and maintain price stability in the country. Price stability implies a moderate increase in prices rather than their unchanged level. Low and stable inflation helps preserve the real value of income and savings of Ukrainian households, and enables entrepreneurs to make long-term investments in the domestic economy, fostering job creation. The NBU also promotes financial stability and sustainable economic growth unless it compromises the price stability objective. To ensure price stability, the NBU applies the inflation targeting regime. This framework has the following features: . A publicly declared inflation target and commitment to achieve it. Monetary policy aims to bring inflation to the medium- term inflation target of 5%. The NBU seeks to ensure that actual inflation does not deviate from this target by more than one percentage point in either direction. The main instrument through which the NBU influences inflation is the key policy rate. Reliance on the inflation forecast. In Ukraine, it takes between 9 and 18 months for a change in the NBU’s key policy rate to have a major effect on inflation. Therefore, the NBU pursues a forward-looking policy that takes into account not so much the current inflation rate as the most likely future inflation developments. -
Peace in Ukraine II
Peace in Ukraine (II): A New Approach to Disengagement Europe Report N°260 | 3 August 2020 Headquarters International Crisis Group Avenue Louise 235 • 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 • Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Preventing War. Shaping Peace. Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Minsk Disagreements ....................................................................................................... 4 A. The View from Moscow ............................................................................................. 4 B. Three Ukrainian Perspectives .................................................................................... 4 C. Separatist Detractors ................................................................................................. 5 D. Mixed Minds among Ukraine’s Western Backers ..................................................... 6 III. A New Push for Disengagement ....................................................................................... 8 A. A Big Push .................................................................................................................. 8 B. Dimming Prospects .................................................................................................... 10 IV. More Reasons for