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Refugee Review Tribunal

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: IDN33066 Country: Date: 2 April 2008

Keywords: Indonesia – East – Waru-Sidoarjo – Christians – State protection

This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein.

Questions

1. Please provide information about the treatment of Christians in Waru-Sidoarjo, . 2. Please advise if the state is effective in providing protection if required? 3. Please provide any other relevant information.

RESPONSE

1. Please provide information about the treatment of Christians in Waru-Sidoarjo, East Java. 2. Please advise if the state is effective in providing protection if required.

Sidoarjo is a of East Java, bordered by city and to the north, by regency to the south, by regency to the west and by the to the east. It has an area of 634.89 km², making it the smallest regency in East Java. Sidoarjo city is located 23 kilometres south of Surabaya, and the town of Waru is approximately halfway between Sidoarjo and Surabaya (for information on Sidoarjo, see: ‘East Java – Sidoarjo’ (undated), Petranet website http://www.petra.ac.id/eastjava/cities/sidoarjo/sidoarjo.htm – Accessed 2 April 2008 – Attachment 21; a map of the relevant area of East Java is provided as Attachment 18)

No specific information was found regarding the treatment of Christians in Waru-Sidoarjo. Most reports regarding Sidoarjo are in relation to the disaster that befell the area, a mud volcano that continues to emit poisonous mud which has covered many villages in the area. Information on this event is provided in Question 3, as it may be of interest. This response will consider the situation of Christians in East Java in recent times, and the effectiveness of the state in providing protection, as many of the events recorded below occurred in towns and cities close to Sidoarjo, and so may be of interest.

Overview and recent developments in East Java

Several previous RRT Research Responses have addressed the issues of violence against Christians and the effectiveness of state protection in preventing such violence. RRT Research Response IDN31354, of 14 February 2007, provides information regarding state protection for Christians in Indonesia, as well as information on recent anti-Christian violence in various Indonesian provinces. RRT Research Response IDN30665, of 25 September 2006, provides information on religious based attacks on Christians, Christian churches, Christian run schools, or Christian businesses in East Java, specifically centred on the area around Jember, located 135 kilometres south-east of Sidoarjo. RRT Research Response IDN30344, of 11 August 2006, provides information on the treatment of Christians in Java and the willingness of authorities to provide protection. An overview and update follows below (RRT Country Research 2007, RRT Research Response IDN31354, 14 February – Attachment 15; RRT Country Research 2006, RRT Research Response IDN30665, 25 September – Attachment 16; RRT Country Research 2006, RRT Research Response IDN30344, 11 August – Attachment 17).

The US Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report for 2007 – Indonesia provides the following summary of the Indonesian state’s attitude to religious freedom and willingness to provide protection to those suffering religiously motivated violence. The report states that “the Government sometimes tolerated discrimination against and the abuse of religious groups by private actors and often failed to punish perpetrators”. It also provides details regarding the closing of “small, unlicensed churches” and the passing of Shari’a-based laws in several local government areas (but not East Java). Several incidents of religious violence and discrimination in East Java are mentioned, including: the arrest of 41 Christians involved in the production of a ‘blasphemous’ video recording:

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respected this right in practice. There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom by the Government during the reporting period, and government policy continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion. However, while most of the population enjoyed a high degree of religious freedom, the Government recognised only six major religions. Some legal restrictions continued on certain types of religious activity and on unrecognised religions. The Government sometimes tolerated discrimination against and the abuse of religious groups by private actors and often failed to punish perpetrators. While remained the only province authorized to implement Islamic law (Shari’a), several local governments outside of Aceh promulgated laws implementing elements of Shari’a that abrogated the rights of women and religious minorities. The Government did not use its constitutional authority over religious matters to review or overturn these local laws. Persons of minority religious groups and atheists continued to experience official discrimination, often in the context of civil registration of marriages and births or the issuance of identity cards.

The public generally respected religious freedom; however, extremist groups used violence and intimidation to force eight small, unlicensed churches and one Ahmadiyya mosque to close. In addition several churches and Ahmadiyya places of worship that were forcibly shut in previous years by mobs remained closed. Some government officials and mass Muslim organisations continued to reject the Ahmadiyya interpretation of resulting in discrimination against its followers. Many perpetrators of past abuse against religious minorities were not brought to justice. Also, instances of extremists attacking and attempting to terrorise members of other religions occurred in certain provinces during the reporting period.

…In April 2007, police arrested eight persons accused of disseminating a “prayer training” video produced by the College Student Service Organization in Batu, East Java. The video allegedly depicts 30 Christians being instructed by their leader to put Qur’ans on the floor at a December 2006 gathering. Following the initial arrests, an additional 33 persons were detained under blasphemy charges in connection with the videos. Christian church leaders denied allegations that Christians were involved in the production or distribution of the videos. At the end of the reporting period, the 41 persons detained were still awaiting trial.

…The Indonesian Christian Communication Forum claimed that eight small, unlicensed churches in were shut down during the reporting period by Muslim extremist groups despite a 2 year grace period contained in the revised regulation for houses of worship to obtain permits per the new requirements. In 2006 militant groups forcibly closed two churches without police intervention. Another 20 churches closed in 2006 under pressure from militant groups after the promulgation of the revised decree remain closed, according to the Forum. While often present, police rarely acted to prevent forced church closings and sometimes assisted militant groups in the closure. In early June 2006 the central Government announced its intentions to crack down on vigilantism by militant religious groups against places of worship as well as other targets. At the end of the reporting period, there were no specific reports of action.

In September 2005 an East Java court sentenced each of six drug and cancer treatment counselors at an East Java treatment center to 5 years in prison and an additional 3 years in prison for violating key precepts of Islam by using paranormal healing methods. A local MUI edict characterised their center’s methods as heretical. Police arrested the counselors while they tried to defend themselves from hundreds of persons who raided the center’s headquarters. The center was shut down and the six counselors began serving their sentences during the reporting period.

In August 2005, East Java’s Malang District Court sentenced Muhammad Yusman Roy to 2 years imprisonment for reciting Muslim prayers in Indonesian, which MUI declared tarnished the purity of Arabic-based Islam. Roy was released from prison on November 9, 2006, after serving 18 months of his sentence.

… On December 24, 2006, at the urging of local clerics, 500 angry villagers in Jambesari village, , East Java attacked 150 Ijabi members conducting routine prayers, destroying three houses, a small mosque and a car belonging to the local Ijabi chairman. Local Sunni residents objected to the presence of the Shi’a in their community and accused them of deviant Islamic beliefs and heresy. Local police removed and questioned 17 Ijabi members for eight hours, but made no arrests. Two of the instigators, Sumito (aka Pak Lim) and Burasim, were subsequently arrested and charged with criminal destruction of property. Their trial, which is on-going, began on May 2, 2007. Prosecutors are asking for 6- month jail sentences. Ijabi leaders report that there have been no incidents since December. (US Department of State 2007, International Religious Freedom Report for 2007 – Indonesia, September 14 – Attachment 1).

A May 2007 report from the Asianews.it website provides further detail on the blasphemy case, stating that the arrested belong to “an umbrella agency representing various Protestant groups”. The report characterises East Java as being “known as the stronghold of moderate Islam and is home to many members of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation”:

Blasphemy has become a hot issue in Indonesia after 41 people were arrested in Malang (East Java province). The local Police Chief, Muhammad Amin Saleh, officially confirmed that at least 41 members of the Indonesian Students Service Agency (Lembaga Pelayanan Mahasiswa Indonesia or LPMI), an umbrella organisation representing various Protestant groups, were arrested for their alleged involvement in blasphemy against Islam. Some other 60 members of the group are wanted for the same alleged crime.

Police are investigating the role the 41 people played in making a controversial video which has been circulating for some weeks. The one-hour tape shows a group of LPMI members, dressed in Muslim-like attire praying as Christian songs can be heard in the background. A Christian priest is seen leading the prayer, pointing a finger at a copy of the Qur’an, saying that it is the “source of all evil in Indonesia, from violence to terrorism.”

All the detainees are now being interrogated. The people on the run are believed to have fled to and Province. A spokesperson for the LPMI has confirmed the existence of the video, but shied away from justifying it. Instead, he told reporters that it was the personal initiative of the East Java branch.

…East Java is known as the stronghold of moderate Islam and is home to many members of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation (Reges, B. 2007, ‘East Java: 41 Christians arrested for blasphemy against Islam’, Asianews.it website, 2 May http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=9144 – Accessed 31 March 2008 – Attachment 5).

The Human Rights Watch World Report 2008 – Indonesia provides an update of the blasphemy case, stating that the 41 defendants have been sentenced to five years’ imprisonment:

In September in Malang, East Java, 41 people were convicted of blasphemy against Islam and each sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. The defendants had been arrested in May for making a videotape denouncing the Quran. Those convicted were all members of the Lembaga Pelayanan Mahasiswa Indonesia, a mainly student organization active in disaster relief (Human Rights Watch 2008, World Report 2008 – Indonesia, 31 January – Attachment 8).

No further reports of recent religious unrest in East Java were found.

Current assessments of religious tolerance and violence in Indonesia

Several newspaper reports in January 2008 provided assessments of the situation regarding religious tolerance in Indonesia, and forecasts for the future. A piece in The Straits Times reported on the tradition of religious tolerance in Indonesia, but expressed fears for the future in the light of rising Islamic militancy, and suggested that the government and authorities are doing little to prevent religiously-based violence. A report in The Post also suggests that “Indonesia’s government has become deeply involved in conflicts among religious groups by expressing moral support for the dominant groups and supporting action against so-called heretical minorities, or at least failing to prevent clashes”. The report cites a human rights NGO, Setara (Equal), which “blamed irresponsible political and religious leaders for doing little to prevent the clashes out of fear of opposing the fatwas and a desire to please their constituents.” In an assessment of Indonesia’s future security situation in The Jakarta Post, the International Crisis Group’s Sidney Jones states that communal tension is the most likely source of violence in the near future. Jones specifically mentions the impact of the mudflow disaster at Sidoarjo as having the potential to create “trouble” during the 2008 local elections. A report from The Economist Intelligence Unit that provides an outline of recent religious developments in Indonesia suggests that fears of Islamisation are overstated, claiming that “the majority of the Indonesian public are moderate and while devotion to Islam appears to be deepening, it is not of a politically radical nature”. Nonetheless, the report did state that “although they remain on the political fringes, conservative Islamic groups are becoming a notable threat to Indonesia’s pluralistic traditions”. The report also specifically mentions attacks on Christians, claiming that “intolerance of Christians has become manifest in recent years through sporadic blockades to prevent Christians from attending Sunday prayers, attacks on churches, and a denial of the official permits required to open and operate a house of worship” (for the Straits Times article, see: Asmarani, D. 2008, ‘Indonesia’s Fragile Harmony of Faiths’, The Straits Times, 20 January – Attachment 9; for the Jakarta Post article citing the Setara report, see: Santoso, A. 2008, ‘The fallacy of fatwas’, The Jakarta Post, 2 January – Attachment 12; for the International Crisis Group assessment, see: Jones, S. 2008, ‘Communal tension a prime security threat’, The Jakarta Post, 3 January – Attachment 11; and for the Economist Intelligence Unit analysis, see: ‘Indonesia risk: Political stability risk’ 2008, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 17 January – Attachment 10).

A January 2008 piece in The Straits Times reported on the tradition of religious tolerance in Indonesia, but expressed fears for the future in the light of rising Islamic militancy, and suggested that the government and authorities are doing little to prevent religiously-based violence. The report notes the activities of “organisations claiming to fight apostasy by attacking churches and assaulting Christian clerics” while local authorities stand by, “unwilling to stop the violence”:

Indonesians boast that, since there is no law regarding apostasy, everyone is free to convert to any religion. There will never be controversies over religious conversions such as those in , they said. However, since the 1998 democratisation process, their much praised religious harmony is being undermined by a growing group of Muslim conservatives and militants.

They are active in the local government, the legislature, neighbourhood mosques, the mass media and youth groups. The more politicised of their members aspire to formalise their religion through the adoption of Syariah-inspired legislation. The less politicised spread their beliefs through firebrand sermons to recruit followers in what they see as a battle against non- believers.

The most immediate threats, however, come from organisations claiming to fight apostasy by attacking churches and assaulting Christian clerics. In the past year, at least 70 churches have been vandalised or forced to close, with police and the local authorities standing by, unwilling to stop the violence. These groups also direct attacks at Islamic communities deemed ‘deviant’, such as the Ahmadiyah sect.

Mr Theo of IComRP believes the government is turning a blind eye to these problems for fear of being seen as antagonistic towards Islam. ‘They are very small in size and political influence, I don’t understand what the government fears,’ he said. They might be small in number, but if the silent majority continues to let them dictate the religious agenda of the country, the country’s much touted religious tolerance could soon become a thing of the past (Asmarani, D. 2008, ‘Indonesia’s Fragile Harmony of Faiths’, The Straits Times, 20 January – Attachment 9).

A January 2008 report in The Jakarta Post claims that government and local authorities are complicit, if not active, in allowing abuses against religious minorities to take place. The report cites the 2007 annual report released by Setara (Equal), “a new NGO led by human rights activists and supported by various groups of politicians, activist, and religious scholars”. According to the report, almost half of the “185 cases of violence and intimidation against Islamic, Christian and Catholic sects … were carried out or encouraged by local officials”, while “the other half were witnessed by passive state apparatuses”:

In recent years, Indonesia’s government has become deeply involved in conflicts among religious groups by expressing moral support for the dominant groups and supporting action against so-called heretical minorities, or at least failing to prevent clashes. Thus, some established religious institutions have colluded with the government or even acted as if they were state apparatuses. Not surprisingly, unrest has grown because of this increased religious intolerance. Assaults against the so-called “misguided” have happened again and again.

Some organizations, like the Wahid Institute and the Indonesian Bishops Conference, call for peace among religious groups. Others, similar in spirit but more desperate in tone, condemn a situation they liken to Medieval Europe. They blame weak state leaders and legislators, who seemed unable or unwilling to uphold the law that guarantees religious freedom in this country. Since most of these incidents occur in particular localities, however, like the ongoing conflicts over the prayer houses of some minorities, the first institutions to blame for failing to stop them are the village or neighbourhood chiefs and local police. A city major may forbid action against places of worship, but that means little if the local chief is not bold enough to impose order.

This picture comes out clearly in the 2007 annual report issued last week by Setara (Equal), a new NGO led by human rights activists and supported by various groups of politicians, activists and religious scholars. They blamed irresponsible political and religious leaders for doing little to prevent the clashes out of fear of opposing the fatwas and a desire to please their constituents. Some media outlets, too, apparently suffer from the same fear. Out of 185 cases of violence and intimidation against Islamic, Christian and Catholic sects this year, the report found, almost half of them were carried out or encouraged by local officials. The other half were witnessed by passive state apparatuses. They occurred most frequently in Jakarta, West Java and East Java, regions that have experienced rapid social changes in recent years.

State policies, in particular at the lower level, seem to be in disarray. State apparatuses are unwilling or impotent to act, concluded Setara chairman Hendardi. As a consequence, “we and our leaders, including the President, are completely being held hostage by (this) situation,” said Setara board member General Saurip Kadi, a good friend and classmate of .

As state leaders refrain from lawful actions to guard citizens’ rights, the doctrines promoted by mainstream religious leaders take precedence over state regulations. This opens the way for religious fundamentalism to prevail over the domain that should belong to the state (Santoso, A. 2008, ‘The fallacy of fatwas’, The Jakarta Post, 2 January – Attachment 12).

In a January 2008 assessment in The Jakarta Post, the International Crisis Group’s Sidney Jones states that communal tension is the most likely source of violence in Indonesia in the near future. The report claims that the failure of the authorities to protect minority rights “is undermining the national slogan, ‘unity in diversity’”, and notes that “local power struggles” often exacerbate communal tensions. Jones specifically mentions the impact of the mudflow disaster at Sidoarjo as having the potential to create “trouble” during the 2008 local elections:

The security outlook for Indonesia in 2008 is reasonably good. The biggest danger lies not in terrorism, separatism, election disputes, or any external threat, but in poorly managed communal tensions that have the potential to fray this country’s social fabric.

…As far as 2008 local elections go, one that may carry a risk of trouble is the East Java governor’s race, where the impact of the LAPINDO mudflow disaster will be an issue. But in general, outbreaks of election-related violence have been easily localised and there is no reason to believe the East Java race will be any different.

…That leaves one big unresolved issue facing the country in 2008: Communal tensions. Protecting minority rights may be the government’s biggest security challenge, and there are various ways in which its neglect of this fundamental function is undermining the national slogan, “unity in diversity”. Attacks by local Muslim vigilante groups on “illegal” churches, the beleaguered Ahmadiyah community and “deviant” sects picked up in 2007 and are likely to continue in 2008. Police have made few arrests in the face of mob action on the part of groups like the Anti-Apostasy Alliance (AGAP) in West Java. Not only did the Yudhoyono government make no serious effort to punish the attackers or stress the importance of freedom of religion, but instead it endorsed the views of the conservative Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) that such religious groups themselves are a greater threat than their attackers because they provoke community hostility.

…Once communal tensions are inflamed, they can be exacerbated by local power struggles. (That said, since direct local elections were instituted in 2005, Indonesian voters consistently have rejected extremist candidates.) The government has also failed to roll back local regulations that discriminate against non-Muslims, when it has a clear legal mandate to do so, under both the Indonesian constitution and the decentralisation laws that left religion as the responsibility of the central government. The result is a palpable sense among many non- Muslims, in North , Bali, and elsewhere, that they are becoming second-class citizens in their own country.

In Manokwari in early 2007, that sense was one factor leading the local district council to propose, in an equally reprehensible move, that the city be designated a “Christian city” with some restrictions on other faiths. The proposal was not adopted but it led to efforts by some hardline Muslim groups to scope out the possibility for stirring up communal conflict there, and the story is not over. Playing religious favourites or tacitly endorsing one version of the truth is a dangerous game in a country as diverse as Indonesia. Unless Jakarta takes a tougher stance against vigilantes and in favour of religious freedom and minority rights, internal security problems are likely to increase (Jones, S. 2008, ‘Communal tension a prime security threat’, The Jakarta Post, 3 January – Attachment 11)

A January 2008 assessment from The Economist Intelligence Unit provides an outline of recent religious developments in Indonesia. It states that “the majority of the Indonesian public are moderate Muslims” and that Indonesian Islam “is not of a politically radical nature”, and points out that “the terrorist attacks believed to be perpetrated by JI are widely condemned in the media and by the public”. Nonetheless, the report notes that “conservative Islamic groups are becoming a notable threat to Indonesia’s pluralistic traditions” and that “intolerance of Christians has become manifest in recent years”:

The Islamic parties are typically more conservative than the secular parties and recent events such as the US-led war in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq are likely to have increased their support base, as they provide a rallying point for Islamic solidarity. However, the majority of the Indonesian public are moderate Muslims and while devotion to Islam appears to be deepening, it is not of a politically radical nature. Indeed the terrorist attacks believed to be perpetrated by JI are widely condemned in the media and by the public. Indonesians also seem to prefer to separate politics from religion. In the April 2004 parliamentary election, the established Islamic parties performed poorly, but a new Islamic party, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) won about 7% of the vote. The PKS, however, played down its Islamic leanings during the election campaign and focused instead on the need to reduce unemployment and corruption. However, although they remain on the political fringes, conservative Islamic groups are becoming a notable threat to Indonesia’s pluralistic traditions. Minority Islamic sects that do not comply with orthodox teaching are being increasingly targeted by Islamic extremists, with the latest wave of attacks thought to have been inspired by a fatwa condemning heresy that was issued by the Religious Scholars Council of Indonesia (MUI) in November. Intolerance of Christians has become manifest in recent years through sporadic blockades to prevent Christians from attending Sunday prayers, attacks on churches, and a denial of the official permits required to open and operate a house of worship (‘Indonesia risk: Political stability risk’ 2008, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 17 January – Attachment 10).

History of anti-Christian violence in East Java

Sources indicate that East Java has had a history of anti-Christian violence over the past decade. A November 2005 report on the Asianews.it website claimed that Catholic and Protestant churches in Jember, East Java, had received threats of violence from sources unknown. In 2001, a church was destroyed and two others vandalised in attacks in Pasaruan, 80 kilometres east of Surabaya and Sidoarjo. Christmas 2000 saw the bombing of churches across Indonesia, including a blast in Mojokerto (East Java) that killed one person. The Fellowship of Indonesian Christians in America (FICA) website provides statistics stating that East Java had 73 churches closed between 1996 and 1998. Statistics on the icanet website claim that a further 7 churches were closed down in East Java between June 1998 and March 2000. A 1996 report sourced from Compass Direct and located on the FICA website provides detail on the deaths of five Christians in a church burning in Situbondo, East Java, and quotes members of the Christian community expressing doubt as to “whether the authorities are capable or even willing to see justice done” (for the Asianews.it report, see: ‘East Java’s Christian churches threatened again’ 2005, Asianews.it website, 29 November http://www.asianews.it/view.php?l=en&art=4747 – Accessed 31 March 2008 – Attachment 7; for the Pasaruan attacks, see: ‘East Java hit by fresh violence’ 2001, The Jakarta Post, 30 May – Attachment 19; for the Mojokerto bombing, see: ‘Sunday bloody Sunday’ 2000, The Jakarta Post, 26 December – Attachment 20; for church attacks and closures between 1996 and 1998, see: Tahalele, Dr Paul 1998, ‘Church and Human Rights Reports in Indonesia as at 30 November 1998’, Indonesia Christian Communication Forum, Fellowship of Indonesian Christians in America (FICANET) website, http://www.fica.org/hr/ChurchPersecution/nov516.pdf – Accessed 11 May 2007 – Attachment 2; for church closures between 1998 and 2000, see: ‘Data of Closing, Destruction and/ or Burning of Churches During the Habibie Presidency’, icanet website http://www.icanet.org/public/Detail/ChurchBurning.htm – Accessed 23 January 2001 – Attachment 4; for the Compass Direct report, see: Buchan, A. 1996, ‘Violence Spreads around Situbondo, East Java’, Fellowship of Indonesian Christians in America website (source: Compass direct), 16 October http://www.fica.org/persecution/10Oct96/article/compass.html – Accessed 31 March 2008 – Attachment 6).

A November 2005 report on the Asianews.it website claimed that Catholic and Protestant churches in Jember, East Java, had received threats of violence from sources unknown:

As Christmas draws near, the threats of attacks against Christian communities in Indonesia are becoming more and more concrete. Catholic and Protestant churches in Jember – in the province of east Java – yesterday received anonymous letters threatening imminent attacks. The church authorities, however, have not made any comments about what appears to be a real and proper campaign of psychological intimidation in the region (‘East Java’s Christian churches threatened again’ 2005, Asianews.it website, 29 November http://www.asianews.it/view.php?l=en&art=4747 – Accessed 31 March 2008 – Attachment 7).

The Fellowship of Indonesian Christians in America (FICA) website outlines the history of violence against Christians in East Java in the last 1990s. They claim that on June 9, 1996, 10 churches in Sidutopo, Surabaya were destroyed, an incident “followed by robbery and sexual harassment”. FICA reports that on October 10, 1996, 24 churches were destroyed and five Christians killed in mob violence:

Situbondo Incident-East Java (Black Thursday). Where 24 Churches were destroyed and burned down by a mob of 3000 people. It was a terribly tragic incident in which a clergyman of the Pentecost Church with his family and evangelist met his death in the burning fire. Five people were victimised: Rev. Ishak Chirtian, Ribka Lena Christian (wife), Elizabeth Christian (daughter), Nova Samuel (niece) and Rita (Evangelist) (Tahalele, Dr Paul ‘Church and Human Rights Reports in Indonesia as at 30 November 1998’, Indonesia Christian Communication Forum, Fellowship of Indonesian Christians in America (FICANET) website, p13 http://www.fica.org/hr/ChurchPersecution/nov516.pdf – Attachment 2).

The FICA website also carries a report listing the following anti-Christian violence in East Java in 1997 and 1998:

• March 13-April 13, 1997: 5 churches in Surabaya stoned by mobs. • May 12-15: churches in Bojonegoro and Bejaagung burned down. • May 23: 5 churches in Pasaruan destroyed, 2 churches in Surabaya destroyed. • May23-June 14: 4 churches in Madura destroyed, 1 stoned. • October 17: church in Jember closed. • October 20-November 14: 3 churches in burned down. • January 20, 1998: church in Jember destroyed. • January 28: church in destroyed. • March 1-April 6: 2 churches in Surabaya stoned. • April 28: church in destroyed. • June 15: church in Tuban destroyed. • July 15:church in Bitar destroyed. • August 23: church in Surabaya destroyed.

The FICA report claims that, in total, East Java had 73 churches closed between 1996 and 1998 (Tahalele, Dr Paul 1998, ‘Church and Human Rights Reports in Indonesia as at 30 November 1998’, Indonesia Christian Communication Forum, Fellowship of Indonesian Christians in America (FICANET) website, http://www.fica.org/hr/ChurchPersecution/nov516.pdf – Accessed 11 May 2007 – Attachment 2).

Compass Direct provides a report outlining the incident at Situbondo in October 1996 in which five Christians were killed, and quotes members of the Christian community expressing doubt as to “whether the authorities are capable or even willing to see justice done”:

Pentecostal Pastor Ishak Christian, his wife, daughter, a niece, and a church worker, were burned to death as three thousand Muslims ran amok in a church-burning spree in Situbondo, East Java, on the 10th of October, 1996. Traveling by motorcycle, rioters torched seven churches in Situbondo, as well as two Christian schools and an orphanage, then fanned out to neighboring cities. By the time police restored order, a total of twenty-five places of worship had been burned in seven cities. This incident constitutes the worst outbreak of violence perpetrated by Muslims against Christians in Indonesia in recent years, and brings to over fifty the number of churches burned in 1996 alone.

Triggering the riots was the blasphemy trial of a Muslim sect leader, named Saleh, for allegedly teaching that the prophet Mohammed was not God’s envoy to the whole of humanity. Thousands had gathered outside the courthouse in Situbondo to hear the verdict. When it was announced Saleh was to be jailed for five years, the crowd revolted, having called for the death penalty. According to a church source, the rioters “started by burning the nearby Gethsemani Protestant church,” and soon the mayhem spread. Eight churches, both Protestant and Catholic, were burned or vandalised in Situbondo; three in Penarukan, Asem Bagus, and Ranurejo; four in Wonorejo; four and a Buddhist temple in . Three schools, a monastery and an orphanage were also burned in Situbondo. One hundred and twenty arrests were made, and currently forty remain in custody.

…Privately, concern is being expressed as to whether the authorities are capable or even willing to see justice done. East Java Governor, Basofi Sudman, stressed that since the incident was so sensitive, they would clamp down on all reports and investigate quietly. He stated, “This does not mean we will hide the facts, but this issue is very complex...let us agree to hush up the problem.” The Christian community is still waiting for any charges to be brought against the rioters who destroyed ten churches on June 10th in Surabaya, 150 kilometres west of Situbondo. Even members of the Muslim community have expressed disbelief that the riots are spontaneous. Amien Rais, head of the reputedly 28 million-strong Muhammidiyah Islamic group, said, “The way it happened was so systematic, so organised -- it was inspired and directed by a certain group of people” (Buchan, A. 1996, ‘Violence Spreads around Situbondo, East Java’, Fellowship of Indonesian Christians in America website (source: Compass direct), October 16 http://www.fica.org/persecution/10Oct96/article/compass.html – Accessed 31 March 2008 – Attachment 6).

3. Please provide any other relevant information

The only recent reports concerning Sidoarjo do not relate to anti-Christian violence, but to a volcanic mud flow allegedly triggered by drilling operations. A 2006 report from the TAPOL website outlines the disaster:

A highly toxic mudflow that has been spreading unchecked in East Java since May is the latest in a series of disasters that has dogged Indonesia since the tsunami struck Aceh in December 2004. But unlike the tsunami and the earthquake that killed almost six thousand people in a few days before the mudflow started, this environmental disaster is basically manmade and blame is being laid at the door of a company part-owned by a senior member of the government.

The mudflow which has inundated land in and around the East Java capital city of Sidoardjo, spreading subsequently to the neighbouring district of Mojokerto, began gushing on 29 May and today, nearly five months on, there are no signs of an end to the disaster. In the early stages, one geologist, Andang Bachtiar, former chair of the Indonesian Geologists’ Association, said that there was little chance that it could be stopped as it exhibited what he called the ‘mud volcanoes’ phenomenon. According to geologist Soffian Hadi from the National Development University: ‘Mud volcanoes can’t be stopped. If Lapindo can stop it, it will be a blessing from God.’

It has inundated hundreds of hectares around a natural gas exploration site owned by Lapindo Brantas Inc, a company part-owned by the family of Aburizal Bakri, the coordinating minister for the economy and social welfare.

The mud is toxic, foul-smelling and gives off fumes that have made people ill and caused respiratory problems. It has smothered agricultural crops, rice fields and sugar cane plantations, submerged four villages, displaced around 10,000 people and has covered 160 hectares of land in five-metre deep mud, disrupting communications by road. The toll road connecting Surabaya, Indonesia’s second largest city, to its southern suburbs has been intermittently shut.

Lapindo is a unit of PT Energi Mega Persada, partly owned by the Bakrie Group (‘Toxic mudflow causes havoc in East Java’ 2006, TAPOL website, October http://tapol.gn.apc.org/bulletin/2006/Bull184.htm – Accessed 31 March 2008 – Attachment 3).

A 2008 report in The Jakarta Post stated that “in mid-February, hundreds of protesters in Sidoarjo, East Java, clashed with security guards” (Sukma, R. 2008, ‘Don’t let violence derail the fledgling democracy’, The Jakarta Post, 18 February – Attachment 12). A prior report from the same source stated that the violence occurred “following a ceremony for the soft launch of a housing development for Lapindo mudflow victims in the East Java town of Sidoarjo on Saturday”:

The ceremony turned violent when thousands of mudflow victims protested the plan by Lapindo Brantas, the company at the centre of the mudflow, to construct housing for them. They have demanded Lapindo be held responsible for the mudflow. They want financial compensation for their submerged land and other assets, not housing.

Witnesses said the clash occurred after protesters forced their way onto the planned location for the housing development, where thousands of riot police had been deployed. The protesters destroyed equipment belonging to PT Minarak Lapindo Jaya -a subsidiary of Lapindo which has been contracted to develop the housing – prompting security personnel to forcibly disperse the crowd.

…Meanwhile, for the fifth time the East Java Prosecutor’s Office has rejected pleas to investigate the mudflow case due to a ‘lack of evidence’. East Java Police Chief Inspector General Herman Sumawiredja said the police have experienced difficulties in investigating the Lapindo case (‘Several injured as Indonesian mudflow victims protest against housing, damages’, 2008, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific (source: The Jakarta Post), 11 February – Attachment 13).

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources:

Search Engines Alltheweb http://www.alltheweb.com/ Altavista http://www.altavista.com/ Ask.com http://www.ask.com/ Exalead http://www.exalead.com/search Google http://www.google.com.au/ Staggernation Google API Proximity Search http://www.staggernation.com/cgi-bin/gaps.cgi Yahoo http://search.yahoo.com/ Region specific links Antara News website http://www.antara.co.id/en/ TAPOL website http://tapol.gn.apc.org/ The Jakarta Post website http://www.thejakartapost.com/

Databases:

FACTIVA (news database) BACIS (DIAC Country Information database) ISYS (RRT Research & Information Services database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Reports) RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments

1. US Department of State 2007, International Religious Freedom Report for 2007 – Indonesia, 14 September.

2. Tahalele, Dr Paul 1998, ‘Church and Human Rights Reports in Indonesia as at 30 November 1998’, Indonesia Christian Communication Forum, Fellowship of Indonesian Christians in America (FICANET) website, http://www.fica.org/hr/ChurchPersecution/nov516.pdf – Accessed 11 May 2007.

3. ‘Toxic mudflow causes havoc in East Java’ 2006, TAPOL website, October http://tapol.gn.apc.org/bulletin/2006/Bull184.htm – Accessed 31 March 2008.

4. ‘Data of Closing, Destruction and/ or Burning of Churches During the Habibie Presidency’, icanet website http://www.icanet.org/public/Detail/ChurchBurning.htm – Accessed 23 January 2001.

5. Reges, B. 2007, ‘East Java: 41 Christians arrested for blasphemy against Islam’, Asianews.it website, 2 May http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=9144 – Accessed 31 March 2008.

6. Buchan, A. 1996, ‘Violence Spreads around Situbondo, East Java’, Fellowship of Indonesian Christians in America website (source: Compass direct), 16 October http://www.fica.org/persecution/10Oct96/article/compass.html – Accessed 31 March 2008.

7. ‘East Java’s Christian churches threatened again’ 2005, Asianews.it website, 29 November http://www.asianews.it/view.php?l=en&art=4747 – Accessed 31 March 2008.

8. Human Rights Watch 2008, World Report 2008 – Indonesia, 31 January. 9. Asmarani, D. 2008, ‘Indonesia’s Fragile Harmony of Faiths’, The Straits Times, 20 January. (FACTIVA)

10. ‘Indonesia risk: Political stability risk’ 2008, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 17 January. (FACTIVA)

11. Jones, S. 2008, ‘Communal tension a prime security threat’, The Jakarta Post, 3 January. (FACTIVA)

12. Santoso, A. 2008, ‘The fallacy of fatwas’, The Jakarta Post, 2 January. (FACTIVA)

13. Sukma, R. 2008, ‘Don’t let violence derail the fledgling democracy’, The Jakarta Post, 18 February. (FACTIVA)

14. ‘Several injured as Indonesian mudflow victims protest against housing, damages’, 2008, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific (source: The Jakarta Post), 11 February. (FACTIVA)

15. RRT Country Research 2007, RRT Research Response IDN31354, 14 February.

16. RRT Country Research 2006, RRT Research Response IDN30665, 25 September.

17. RRT Country Research 2006, RRT Research Response IDN30344, 11 August.

18. ‘East Java Tourist Map’ (undated), East Java.com website http://www.eastjava.com/map/ejpetab.jpg – Accessed 2 April 2008.

19. ‘East Java hit by fresh violence’ 2001, The Jakarta Post, 30 May.(FACTIVA)

20. ‘Sunday bloody Sunday’ 2000, The Jakarta Post, 26 December. (FACTIVA)

21. ‘East Java – Sidoarjo’ (undated), Petranet website http://www.petra.ac.id/eastjava/cities/sidoarjo/sidoarjo.htm – Accessed 2 April 2008.