On Pillowing One's Skull: Zhuangzi and Heidegger on Death

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On Pillowing One's Skull: Zhuangzi and Heidegger on Death Front. Philos. China 2016, 11(3): 483–500 DOI 10.3868/s030-005-016-0034-6 SPECIAL THEME David Chai On Pillowing One’s Skull: Zhuangzi and Heidegger on Death Abstract Martin Heidegger famously declares that Dasein does not perish but experiences its demise, and that death stands before us as something to be anticipated. This idea of being-towards-death is an anticipation of possibility, of becoming authentically free for one’s death. If we take Heidegger’s view of death and compare it to that of the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi, we notice that the latter also holds death in an unusual light. For Zhuangzi, death is possibility not because it symbolizes the perfection of being but insofar as it reveals its entanglements. This paper will thus argue in support of the Daoist notion that death is neither to be feared nor does it serve as the end of one’s contribution to the world. It will also take the stance that death qua nothingness is both a corporeal and metaphorical embodiment of Dao in that death and nothingness reflect the natural praxis of Dao to be still, empty, and quiet. In order to facilitate our analysis, we will focus on the story of Zhuangzi and the roadside skull, a story that has Zhuangzi pillowing said skull from which he realizes that life is but a pillowing of death. Keywords Zhuangzi, death, Heidegger, meontology Nothing is more vital to a philosophy of life than death; indeed, our entire conceptualization of existence is predicated upon holding back the nihilistic forces of non-existence. Many of the world’s religions and philosophical traditions have sought to elucidate the nature of death. Indeed, many of the world’s moral systems are colored by a dichotomist vision of death and life. What is more, when we are not engaged in ethical debates over the nature of death, we happily psychologize it, hoping to justify our deep-seated resentment at being deprived of life’s gift. Occasionally, however, a figure arises whose conceptualization of death is so unique that the world is forced to pause and re-evaluate its normative sensibilities. David Chai ( ) Department of Philosophy, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China E-mail: [email protected] 484 David Chai One of the greatest intellectual figures of the modern era is without doubt Martin Heidegger. Heidegger is one of the few Western philosophers to see death as contributing to the perfection of being. Writing that Dasein does not simply perish but experiences its own demise, death stands before humanity as an event of anticipation. That man is being-towards-death is to anticipate the possibility of becoming free for one’s death. Heidegger believes that authentic living should not be impeded in the face of one’s own mortality; indeed, one can live a fuller life knowing that one’s time is finite and that the exhaustion of said time can occur at any moment. As for what Heidegger means by death, it is an indefinite something, inevitable, non-relational, and cannot be overtaken. If we take Heidegger’s view of death and compare it to that of the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi, we notice that the latter also holds death in an unusual light. For Zhuangzi, death is possibility not because it symbolizes the perfection of human being; rather, it reveals the entanglements of life. As humanity can learn as much from death as it can from life, to cherish the latter while despising the former is both unnatural and self-defeating. What the world gets out of death is an intimate familiarity with its rhythmic, cyclical patterning. To look at death from the Daoist perspective is to subscribe to the belief that death and life are mutually dependent, co-arising modalities of Dao. This is not to say that death and life are relative, even meaningless; rather, what is meant is that Dao equalizes both in its meontological oneness such that humanity no longer feels compelled to elevate one whilst demoting the other. In this way, death is more than a partner to life; it manifests itself in and through all that is alive. Bearing the above in mind, this paper will argue in support of the Daoist notion that death is not something to be feared and that it does not mark the end of one’s contribution to the world. The paper will additionally take the stance that death qua nothingness is both a corporeal and metaphorical embodiment of Dao in that death and nothingness reflect the natural praxis of Dao to be still, empty, and quiet. In order to facilitate our analysis, we will focus on the story of Zhuangzi’s encounter with a roadside skull, a story that has Zhuangzi pillowing said skull from which he realizes that life is but a pillowing of death. In this way, the skull is transformed from an image of man’s extinction to a source of life as the skull of the world. 1 Introduction We begin our analysis with a brief overview of four major streams of inquiry into Zhuangzi’s notion of death, starting with Wu Kuang-ming who sees the story of the roadside skull as emblematic of an over-arching concern with the processes of change taking place in the world: “A thing’s change involves both growth into On Pillowing One’s Skull: Zhuangzi and Heidegger on Death 485 itself and death into species-transformation…death and life are two aspects in the rounds of species-changes among things” (Wu 1990, 70). This theme, that death and life are the natural reversal of one another, is picked up by many others, and rightly so. Daniel Coyle, for example, holds that “[the sage] discloses the continuity between nature and man in all their processions, and thus reveals the culmination of the Zhuangzian attitude(s) toward death…as one of the ‘natural’ transformations of heaven and earth” (Coyle 1998, 204). Brian Lundberg essentially says the same thing: “Death is looked upon as a natural part of the process of birth, growth, decay, and transformation” (Lundberg 1998, 216). Roger Ames argues that, for Zhuangzi, “death is the indeterminate aspect that makes process, change, complexity, and novelty possible. It can be understood as a positive, enabling presence rather than a negative, disabling absence. Death does not inhibit or subvert life, but stimulates and drives it, making it more intense and poignant” (Ames 1998, 54). Hans-Georg Moeller refines Ames’ argument by dividing change qua process into an ontology of process and an ontology of substance whereby, “on the basis of an ontology of process, death does not bring about any substantial loss—since there is nothing substantial in the first place. Nothing of the person who is now alive will be dead; one will rather turn into something else. Therefore, one does not really die, because when one is dead, it is something else that is dead” (Moeller 2004, 84). The above views can be said to constitute one interpretive mode of reading Zhuangzi’s notion of death. A second methodological reading approaches death from a psychological orientation. Chad Hansen, for example, cites the role of the mind. Since the mind is naturally skeptically about what death entails, or what follows it, Hansen thus argues that “Zhuangzi’s conversation with the skull illustrates the possibility that something we do not ‘see’ could make our common-sense judgment seem foolish” (Hansen 2003, 144). Paul Goldin notes that when the skull appears to Zhuangzi in a dream, “the interlocutor [i.e., the skull] looks suspiciously like an immaterial soul” (Goldin 2003, 231). Knowing whether one survives death in the form of the soul is an impossible task according to Mark Berkson: “Zhuangzi’s skepticism reminds us that we simply do not, and cannot, know what happens after death” (Berkson 2011, 193). What is more, “by deconstructing the temporal distinctions that underlie our conceptions of an absolute beginning (birth) and an absolute ending (death), Zhuangzi points to a realm of no birth and no death; instead, he suggests that there is simply an ongoing series of transformations” (Berkson 2011, 200). Going one step further, Chris Fraser argues that death terminates one’s ability to act as an ethical agent: “The Zhuangist stance rests ultimately on the appeal of a certain ethical or aesthetic attitude toward life, death, and the world, rather than on a rationally compelling argument, and thus it cannot claim to be the uniquely ‘right’ way of approaching death” (Fraser 2013, 486 David Chai 411). Out of this, the result is that “our death is the extinction of our capacity for agency—our de 德 [moral virtue]” (Fraser 2013, 425). An alternative psychological apparatus is built around the emotions and how one’s grief shapes the relationship humans have with death. Amy Olberding is a proponent of this approach: “The core problem attaching to Zhuangzi’s grief is that, however brief and spontaneous it may be, it requires the judgment that death is a disvalue…such judgments may be tacitly made, never rising to the level of conscious understanding, but there can be no grief where death is not negatively valued” (Olberding 2007, 343). Olberding’s reading is supported by Jung Lee, who holds that our reaction to death is both skeptical and emotional: “For Zhuangzi, the appropriate emotional and behavioral response to death is not dread, anxiety, or fear but equanimity and acceptance—equanimity based on skepticism of the value of life and acceptance based on the view that death represents a mere episode in the larger narrative of the cosmos” (Lee 2014, 100).
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