Fyodorov's Meontology
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III. NON-STANDARD TRAITS OF 20TH CENTURY AND RECENT PHILOSOPHY 157 Fyodorov’s Meontology Myroslav Feodosijevič Hryschko (University of Ljubljana) Abstract The text treats the philosophy of Nikolai Fyodorovich Fyodorov as a meontology; that is, as a metaphysics irreducible to ontology. This treatment starts from a certain non-ontological symptom within Fyodorov’s texts and develops two philosophemes found in The Philosophy of the Common Task: The Task qua immortality and resurrection, and Fyodorov’s shift of ontol- ogy from the question “Why does the existing exist?” to “Why do the living die?” Resurrection and immortality are not developed as some ethical re- joinder to the latter question but rather, both philosophemes are posited to- gether as constitutive of a prospective Fyodorovian meontology. Using the contemporary speculative anti-humanism of Badiou, Brassier, Grant, Meil- lassoux, etc., and the anthropic-transcendental lineage of Kant and Heideg- ger as points of both accession and tension, the possibility of resurrection and immortality coupled with the death of being suggests the excision of any constancy or necessity to ontology, to both Being or beings, thus entail- ing the rudiments of such a meontology. 1. Introduction The metabasis eis allo genos that is Fyodorov’s transposition of the ontological question “Why does the existing exist?” to “Why do the living die?”1 is not a vitalism; it is not an appropriation of ontology in terms of a theoretical concern accorded to what may be provisionally formulated as a problem of the organic. This misprision is coextensive to the misprision concerning the decisive status of resurrection and immortality in The Phi- losophy of the Common Task. The former interpretations belie the acuity of this status, as immortality necessarily entails the resurrection of all those 1 Nikolai F. Fyodorov What Was Man Created For? The Philosophy of the Common Task: Selected Works. Ed. E. Koutiassov and M. Minto (Lausanne, Switzerland: Honeyglen/L’Age d’Homme, 1990), Part I, § 11 158 SOFIA PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW who have ever died. “Our task is to make nature, the forces of nature, into an instrument of universal resuscitation and to become a union of immortal beings.”2 “Only hard and prolonged labour will purify us in the fulfillment of our duty, bring us to resurrection and the communion with the Triune Being, while we remain, like Him, independent, immortal persons, capable of feel- ing and conscious of our oneness.”3 The necessity of immortality with resurrection effectuates an asymmetry with any reduction towards the vitalist or the organic, as, in congruency with a certain degree of dialectical formalism, the strict difference that subtends these notions is displaced, if not entirely excised. Immortality effaces the vitalist and the organic of their qualitative distinction, insofar as any presumed anagogic of life is rendered mundane; resurrection further precludes the trace of - or lapse into - the vitalist or organic, as what becomes necessary is the elision of the dif- ference between those who are immortal and those who have died. Resurrection and immortality will denote the practice of the Task itself; moreover, resurrection and immortality are to be considered as rigorously theo- retical concepts. This practico-theoretical identity, made licit in Fyodorov’s im- peratives against their separation, ascribes the consonance of resurrection and immortality with the most basic theoretical logic of Fyodorov’s programme: since the syntagm resurrection and immortality is an analogue for the Task it- self, from the former may be drawn out a theoretical concept, an entire meta- physics, as opposed to the appearance of mere anthropic teleology. This is not to omit that in Fyodorov there is certainly a “labour” for man, largely determined by the synthesis of a certain hesychastic Orthodoxy and a technological scien- tism; yet there is concomitantly the material within Fyodorov for a disparate type of metaphysics, as educed from the series of oppositions Fyodorov had posited in regards to the matrix of a classical philosophical tradition and its se- ries of proper names, alongside the irregularity of the Task itself. This is a mate- rial that nevertheless remains cursory and requires its own form of anagogic, al- though one lacking any mysticism: this anagogic is rather the ligature of two motifs in Fyodorov - the necessity of resurrection with immortality and the in- 2 Ibid., Part I, § 4. 3 Ibid., Part II, § 24. III. NON-STANDARD TRAITS OF 20TH CENTURY AND RECENT PHILOSOPHY 159 tercalation of death - with the intent to preclude any metaphysical primacy of existence. In this non-ontological anagogic, resurrection and immortality is not a “moral positivistic” (Fyodorov) response to the question of “Why do the living die?”, but rather it is the equiprimordiality of both motifs to Fyodorov’s project that engender the rudiments of a metaphysics irreducible to ontology, the latter elided in a consonant elision to that which exposits vitalism and the organic as insufficient syntagms to nominate the Task. 2. Meontological eliminativism There is a heteroclite sequence endemic to any prospective non- ontological Fyodorovian metaphysics. Resurrection and immortality will deline- ate the terms of this break with ontology according to what may be provisionally termed the materialism of Fyodorov’s metaphysics, although a materialism that nevertheless contains the irregularity that is the petitioning of death to avert on- tology. (A) Immediate in the necessity of resurrection to immortality is the lack of a non-materialist transcendence, a distancing therefore from both finitude and idealism (i.e., immortality and resurrection are precisely necessary because of the absence of a “soul”); that the dead can be made living infers that there is no concession to what the phenomenologically influenced ontology would be apt to denote, in its variations of the germ that is Husserl’s gap of the adumbration (and which Meillassoux has already compellingly identified as coinciding with fideism4), an obtuse “gift of being.”5 What appears as a prima facie ethical im- perative - resurrection as the conjoining of “the fathers and the sons” - is the as- 4 Cf. Quentin Meillassoux After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency (New York: Continuum, 2008). 5 As S.N. Bulgakov summarizes this “materialism” in Fyodorov, the project of immortality and resurrection entails that “integral humankind is replaced by a nightmarish collection of robots” (S.N. Bulgakov The Bride of the Lamb p.354) and thus the “tendency of de-godded Fyodorivism (humanistic resurrection) is to eliminate eschatology, to make superfluous and unnecessary the second coming of Christ and the final transfiguration of the world.” (S.N. Bulgakov The Bride of the Lamb p.345). Materialism is certainly present in Fyodorov’s ac- count, however our argument is that there is an also an eschatology extant, insofar as the “transfiguration of the world” in Fyodorov is that of the death of the world - the traditional reading of Fyodorov is thus, as noted, to read immortality and resurrection as rejoinder to death, rather than reading immortality and resurrection alongside each other as the funda- mental ordination of Fyodorov’s thought as re-capitulated in a non-ontological light. 160 SOFIA PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW cription of a non-ontologicality to resurrection and immortality, a certain aban- donment, in phenomenological terms, of the “world” as first concept. (B) Yet resurrection and immortality must maintain, paradoxically, the status of a con- ceptual analogue to the notion of death that obviates ontology. The transition from “why does the existing exist?” to “Why do the living die?” intimates a transience to being that diminishes the latter’s significance within a Fyodorovian metaphysics according to a primacy ascribed to death. In a transformation of the Leibnizian formula, to be a being is to be a being, it can be stated that for Fyo- dorov, to be a being is to be, in the last instance, nothing; however, in contradis- tinction to, e.g., Hegel’s the Science of Logic, insofar as being cedes to death, what inflects Fyodorov’s thought is a certain thanatology, or in consistency with Fyodorov’s Orthodoxy, an eschatology, which intervenes into any ontology, as accomplished by the minimum of his thought as death. The particular opposition the thanatology and eschatology entail (immediately anticipatory of Heidegger’s critique of the onto-theological) is that if the ontological status of a given being cedes to nothing, it is a mis-designation to consider the most radical sense of this “nothing” in terms of an ontological, relational or dialectical status. Ontological statuses will only concede the symptom of the putative invariants from which Fyodorov sought to abjure in the very identification of the priority of death. It is rather the petitioning of the minimum of such an “anterior posterity”6 (Brassier) that suggests Fyodorov’s attempt to rigorously think the necessity of this death 6 It is this treatment of death that suggests for Fyodorov the patina of being – certainly, a Christian motif – an inflection that actuates a recapitulation of philosophy, in the terms of Ray Brassier, as “an organon of extinction”; this “extinction” despite its temporal ulteriority to thought, is suggestive of thought’s radical genetic: “Both life and mind will have to reckon with the disintegration of the ultimate horizon, when roughly one trillion, trillion, trillion (10 1728) years