TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY

5 SEPTEMBER 1940

he morning of 5 September saw the squadron called to arms once more: Tsix aircraft of ‘A’ Flight departed at 0945, followed fifteen minutes later by an equal number of Hurricanes from ‘B’ Flight, both flights being committed to aerodrome defence patrols. With neither formation making contact with the enemy, ‘B’ Flight landed back at 1040 and ‘A’ Flight 1045, the fitters immediately refuelling the Hurricanes as the squadron remained on readiness. It was not until just after 1430 that the second scramble order came through: nine Hurricanes under the command of S/Ldr Kellett getting airborne between 1440 and 1445. Following various course directions, the squadron was patrolling over Gillingham at 22,000ft when Kellett spotted anti-aircraft shells exploding across the Thames Estuary. Leading the squadron over to investigate, he identified approximately thirty-five Junkers Ju88 bombers escorted by Me109 fighters. Kellett, flying V7284/A, was manoeuvring his formation for an attack on the bombers when the escort tried to intervene; Kellett’s combat report: About a dozen Me109s came down and attacked us. I had manoeuvred up sun of the Me109s, so my section, Red, took on the Me109s, leaving the others to attack the bombers. I singled out one Me. and did a number of short deflection

303 Squadron Hurricanes dispersed at the north-west93 corner of RAF Northolt, September 1940. shots, followed by a long burst from below and astern. E/A caught fire and spun down, covering me with oil. I was looking about for the rest of my section when I saw another Me109. I was able to give it several deflection shots, and saw the de Wild ammunition bursting in the engine, which began to smoke and E/A dived straight down. I had used up all my ammunition and could not find my section, so I came home. Sgt Wünsche, Red 3 flying V7289/S, intercepted another Me109 that, unseen by his leader, was diving to attack S/Ldr Kellett: I came round on his tail as he fired at S/L Kellett, we were all only 100yds apart. The Me. was not straight on to Red 1 and he missed him, as he used no deflection. I was at 60-70yds and I fired all my ammunition at it, as I was afraid it would hit the other Hurricane. It turned on to its back, and the cockpit was a mass of flames. It fell slowly into the sea. As I had no more ammunition I dived to the ground and came home. Sgt Wünsche’s combat report was to be corroborated by no less a person than Northolt’s Station Commander. Stanley Vincent was a former World War One fighter pilot and despite being well into his forties, took to regularly tagging along on an interception in either a Station Flight Hurricane or an aircraft borrowed from one of the Northolt-based squadrons. Despite the inherent dangers of flying on his own, Vincent continued this practice throughout the , officially to monitor the fighting and performance of his squadrons, but really to engage the enemy. He was by no means the only fighter station CO to engage in such activity. The remaining member of Red Section, Red 2, Sgt Karubin in P3975/U, had dogfights with two more Me109s and recorded the following in the Squadron Chronicles: ….This moment I spotted a bomber formation with Messerschmitt escort. I jumped forward, giving a sign to the commander. We engaged in a combat. I attacked a Me109 with two short bursts. It went down, burning, I escaped upwards as I was attacked by a Me109. It was run over by Hurricanes and went down smoking badly – me behind him. We descended to tree top height. Chase. I hit the boost again, got very close to him and ran a razor over him. The Jerry’s scared mug flashed before my eyes. This very moment he hit the ground, squirting smoke with lumps of soil. I pulled up, circled him and took a look at the remnants of the burning machine. I opened the throttle, going at altitude towards the aerodrome.

94 Sgt Karubin pictured here with LAC Rosochacki, a member of his loyal groundcrew. Note the blown gunport covers, evidence the guns have been recently fired.

Having run out of ammunition, the ‘razor’ move referred to by Sgt Karubin was a highly dangerous manoeuvre. With the two adversaries almost at ground level, Karubin manoeuvred his aircraft slightly above and alongside his opponent before turning and flying straight at him. Responding to his natural instincts the 109 pilot took the only avoiding action he could to avoid a collision, descend, but with insufficient height the 109 hit the ground and disintegrated. As Red Section engaged the escort, Yellow Section was bounced by another strong force of enemy fighters from above and out of the sun. Taking desperate evasive action, all three Hurricanes broke and dived away but in doing so lost contact with the enemy and so returned to base. Meanwhile the remaining three Hurricanes, Blue Section led by F/Lt Forbes in R4217/V, broke through the escort

95 to attack the Ju88s. Choosing the left aircraft in the last section, Forbes initially attacked from astern before breaking away and re-engaging from the front starboard quarter. Returning to attack again from the rear, he set alight one engine but then had to evade an Me109 before he could deliver the coup de grȃce. F/O Łapkowski flying P2985/Z as Forbes’ No2 attacked the Ju88 leading the same section as Forbes had just engaged. Closing in to only 150yds, Łapkowski made two passes from astern setting fire to both engines. Watching the bomber fall away, Łapkowski was surprised by an Me109, cannon and machine gun fire fatally hitting his Hurricane’s Merlin engine and setting it alight. He was to later record: ….I was shot by cannon from behind. My engine caught fire. I turned over on to my back, opened the cockpit cover and on getting out I broke my left arm near the shoulder. I was also burnt in the face and left leg. Łapkowski’s matter-of-fact wording hid the life or death struggle faced by the experienced twenty-six year old to escape his burning Hurricane before it became his funeral pyre. Landing at Rectory Road, Hawkwell, Łapkowski was admitted to Rochford Hospital; his aircraft, P2985, crashing at Benvills Farm, North Benfleet. F/Lt Forbes in his combat report stated that Sgt František, Blue 3, in R4175/R, initially broke away from Blue Section to attack an Me109 he witnessed firing at a Spitfire pilot who had just baled out. Normally such an event was guaranteed to excite comment and inflame feelings, so it is strange that in his combat report, František makes no mention of this incident, stating that the Me109 had attacked his own aircraft from above and to port, before overshooting the Hurricane. František had then reversed their rôles and, getting on the Me109’s tail, had fired a two second burst from 150-100yds, sending the Me109 down vertically in flames. He then rejoined Forbes to attack the Ju88s, setting the starboard engine of one bomber on fire before seeing it hit the water. The surviving eight Hurricanes landed back at Northolt in ones and twos between 1530 and 1600. Confusion regarding František’s Me109 persists to this day. Squadron victory listings certainly award František a confirmed kill, but Hadwen’s Intelligence Patrol Report quite clearly only credited František with a probable. The initial typed combat report adds further confusion by only claiming an Me109 damaged. Confusing the picture still further, František’s combat report narrative states the Me109 ‘went down vertically in flames’, whilst the Patrol Report details the Me109 breaking away ‘with the engine emitting clouds of smoke, diving towards the sea’. The combat report would allow at least a probable claim to be made and more likely a destroyed

96 claim, whilst the contradictory wording contained in the Patrol Report could only support a damaged categorisation. Could this just be a simple mistake? Was it perhaps a reflection of the mounting official suspicion of the squadron’s number of claims, or possibly the Poles’ own doubts regarding the veracity of František’s own claims? Ironically given their own reputation for poor discipline, there was reputedly growing resentment on behalf of the Poles to their Czech ‘guest’ Sgt František and his propensity for disappearing to fight his own battles. Not unlike some of the First World War aces who would wait above the whirling dogfights to pick-off a straggler, František saw similar opportunities over the Channel coast, as single Luftwaffe aircraft, sometimes already damaged, tried to reach France. Lengthy squadron patrols criss-crossing the Kent countryside were not his style, so František would frequently break formation and make his own way to his favourite hunting grounds. In this way his score was already accumulating but, so the Poles felt, only by weakening the squadron formation and thereby risking their lives. With regards to this particular combat, ultimately František was awarded a confirmed victory with his combat report being amended, somewhat confusingly, to show the Me109 as being claimed as destroyed. F/O Łapkowski was subsequently able to confirm from hospital that the Ju88 attacked by F/Lt Forbes had fallen out of the formation enveloped in thick clouds of smoke. On that basis Forbes’ claim of a Ju88 probably destroyed was also revised to confirmed, providing 303 with a final claim listing: - S/Ldr Kellett 1 Me109 destroyed and 1 Me109 probably destroyed F/Lt Forbes 1 Ju88 destroyed Sgt Karubin 2 Me109s destroyed F/O Łapkowski 1 Ju88 destroyed Sgt Wünsche 1 Me109 destroyed Sgt František 1 Ju88 and 1 Me109 destroyed The tally amounting to five Me109s and three Ju88s destroyed with one more Me109 probably destroyed set against F/O Łapkowski wounded, one Hurricane lost and one slightly damaged (Sgt František’s aircraft). The bombers were a mixed force of Heinkel He111s, belonging to KG26 and KG53, and Junkers Ju88s of unidentified units, their objective being the Thameshaven oil storage farm. Whilst 303 Squadron’s Me109 claims have been matched to some of the losses sustained by JG3, these occurred earlier in the day. Covering the bombers on this occasion was JG53 - engaged in a free-lance sweep - and JG54, tasked as the close

97 escort. Given the location and timings of the combats, 303 Squadron’s opponents were elements of JG54. Aside from 303, the Hurricanes of 17, 43, 46, 73 and 501 Squadrons were also in action along with Spitfires from 41, 222 and 234, leading to the usual confusion and duplication of claims. Kellett’s victim was probably the Me109E-4, Wn.1098, which crashed into the sea, the II/JG54 pilot being rescued by the Seenotdienst. The fighter caught by Sgt Wünsche trying to shoot down his CO was another E-4 model, Wn5353; the pilot Uffz Behse of 5./JG54 not surviving. Sgt Karubin’s victim, also attributed to F/L Bayne of 17 Squadron, was the Me109E-4, Wn.5291, which crashed and burned out near Pitsea, the pilot, Hptmn Ultsch being killed. JG54 suffered a further loss when Me109E-4, Wn.5284, came down at South Benfleet, its pilot, Fw Dettler, had baled out but his parachute failed and he fell to his death; his body came down on Pitsea Marshes and would not be discovered until 17 September. Whilst claimed by F/O Count Czernin of 17 Squadron, it is probable this aircraft was also attacked by Sgt František. Luftwaffe returns for the day, whilst detailing He111 and Me109 losses, do not include any combat losses for the Ju88 units, although it is recognised that these records are by no means complete. Circumstantial evidence suggests the Ju88s attacked by 303 Squadron were in all probability An RAF fighter’s camera gun still of a Heinkel 111 under attack Heinkel He111s from during the Battle of Britain. From this angle it appears very similar to the Ju88 and was frequently mis-identifed as such. KG53’s III Gruppe, which lost two He111s and had a third damaged. He111H-2, Wn.2632 A1+GR, came down just off Margate Hook; gunner Fw Bohn’s body was later washed up but the remaining four crewmembers, Uffz Bolz, Uffz Rosenberger, Uffz Bickl and Gefr Haack, were never found despite searches by local boats. 7th Staffel lost He111H-3, Wn.3338, A1+CR, which ditched off the Nore around 1530, not early evening as sometimes quoted. Two crewmembers, Fw Maier and Uffz Lenger, were captured by a Royal Navy patrol

98 boat, the remaining three, Fw Agner, Uffz Armbruster and Gefr Nowotny were never seen again and were presumed drowned. The damaged He111 struggled back to base damaged with one crewmember dead and two others wounded. With pilots from 17, 41 and 73 Squadrons claiming He111s and Ju88s in addition to pilots from 303 Squadron, KG53’s losses must be credited across all four squadrons. Of particular interest are the differing versions of how the squadron came to intercept the enemy formation. Whilst Kellett ascribes the telltale bursts of anti- aircraft fire as revealing the enemy formation, Sgt Karubin’s report clearly states how he first saw the bombers with their fighter escort, bringing both to Kellett’s attention. Not for the first time, and by no means the last, it was the Poles’ phenomenal eyesight that gave the squadron a critical edge. F/O Hadwen’s report fittingly makes the final commentary on the above action: …… The tactics employed by S/L Kellett did allow Blue Section to get in amongst the Bombers, but the six Hurricanes were too small a force to make any sustained attack on the enemy bombers with so many ME 109s all round and above them. S/L Kellett went into action from a very good position out of the sun, but the numbers of enemy fighters were soon able to reverse the advantage, and the squadron was lucky only to lose one machine. Despite having only been fully operational for six days, 303 Squadron’s fame was already spreading outside the with considerable media coverage of their victories. Whilst officially frowning upon any citing of individual pilots or units, the propaganda value of covering the squadron’s exploits was immeasurable in respect of those left behind in the occupied territories. Although much was made of 303, ‘The Polish Squadron’, pseudonyms had to be used for the pilots themselves due to fears of retribution against relatives suffering Nazi occupation. However, the Poles were to benefit from their new- found fame closer to home. Their burgeoning reputation allied to their very attractive continental manners made for a devastating combination as far as the opposite sex was concerned. In the war-time environment of liberated attitudes, the Poles were not short of offers to the point where certain of their female admirers were nick-named Messerschmitts for their ‘assertive’ tendencies and enthusiasm for ‘escorting’ Polish pilots to bed. Reflecting the increasingly desperate position Fighter Command was finding itself in, until this day no replacement aircraft had been delivered to cover the four aircraft written off or badly damaged in the last four days. That position was now

99 only marginally improved by the arrival of a solitary replacement, a relatively rare Canadian-built Hurricane P5180, transferred to 303 Squadron from one of their neighbours at Northolt, 1(RCAF) Squadron. P5180’s brief stay at 303 Squadron is shrouded in mystery. With the aircraft not recorded in the ORB at any time, the majority of sources allege this aircraft was borrowed by 303 Squadron for a solitary patrol the following day, 6 September, however the aircraft’s movement card clearly states the aircraft was transferred to 303 Squadron on the fifth. This is further supported by the weekly maintenance return filed this day, which quotes P5180 as being on the squadron strength. By the end of flying on the fifth, 303 Squadron was down to just eleven serviceable aircraft out of the eighteen on strength. The ground staff were in for a long night’s arduous work, it would not be their last.

JOHNNY KENT’S DIARY THURSDAY 5 SEPTEMBER On patrol this morning for an hour but with no luck. Got the day off and went into London and met Janet at the Club. We had tea & danced at the Piccadilly with P/O Orski (Flt Lt Tadeusz Opulski?) & his wife. After, we went to see a film – ‘the Boys from Syracuse’ – it was darned good. After the film we had something to eat at the Brasserie Universal & then went back to the Club. There were of course the inevitable Air Raid warnings & quite a lot of bombing fairly close but it didn’t bother us very much. Janet is worrying like Hell about joining the W.A.A.F.s tomorrow, I don’t go much on the idea myself, I must admit.

6 SEPTEMBER 1940

Łapkowski’s hospitalisation the previous day left ‘B’ Flight without a Flight Commander; S/Ldr Kellett and Acting S/Ldr Krasnodębski appointing the veteran F/O Paszkiewicz acting Flight Commander pending Łapkowski’s return. The call to combat came relatively early for 303 Squadron. Despite the incredible efforts of the mechanics, it was a depleted squadron formation of just nine Hurricanes that took off at 0840, once more led by S/Ldr Kellett. Following ground control course and altitude instructions, along with 601 Squadron, they intercepted over western Kent what Kellett described as the largest German formation he had ever seen, estimating the raid to cover an area in the region of 20 miles by 5 miles, moving up from the

100 coast above and to the east of the squadron. Unfortunately, whilst ground control had steered the squadron to intercept the inbound raid, for whatever reason they had 303 Squadron far too low. The subsequent pilot combat reports and the squadron’s Operational Record Book left no doubt as to the desperate position the squadron now found itself in: heavily outnumbered, critically lacking the important element of altitude, forced to sacrifice speed to climb under and, thanks to the complete absence of any cloud cover, in full view of the German fighter escort. Caught in the worst possible tactical position, 303 Squadron was about to pay a heavy price. As ‘A’ Flight’s Red and Yellow Sections climbed to make a quarter frontal attack on a sub-formation of Dornier Do17Z bombers, F/Lt Forbes, R4179/Q, leading ‘B’ Flight, saw an avalanche of top-cover Me109s diving down on the forward elements of the squadron. Unable to warn them because of heavy interference on his radio, Forbes aborted his attack on the Dorniers and led his section against the Me109s hoping to deflect their attack. Selecting an Me109, Forbes opened fire from 200yds. Observing smoke and flames coming from the engine, Forbes closed in for a second attack but then spotted another Me109 on his tail. Quickly breaking away he evaded his attacker but in doing so lost sight of the original Me109. With the Me109s exploiting their superior climb performance, Forbes had great difficulty in engaging another Me109 until he found a Hurricane being attacked. Closing in on the Me109 he fired Athol Forbes and Johnny Kent dressed for ceremonial a short burst hitting the cockpit purposes, both are carrying the obligatory gas mask holders over their shoulders. area. Watching the Me109 flick

101 on to its back and fall earthwards, apparently out-of-control, almost cost Forbes his life. The next second his own cockpit came under devastating fire: shells penetrated his canopy hitting the armoured windscreen and puncturing the fuselage fuel tank. As the attacking Me109 broke away, Forbes dived and lost it. With fuel leaking in to the cockpit from the damaged tank, Forbes found both his vision and judgement being impaired by the fumes filling his cockpit. Feeling faint, he donned his oxygen mask and, electing to crash-land, opened his canopy to avoid being trapped should the aircraft overturn on landing. However, this appeared to increase the amount of fuel flooding in to the cockpit so he closed the canopy again and risked the consequences. By now barely conscious, Forbes selected a likely landing area clear of obstacles, but overshot the approach and crashed in to a bank adjoining the field, wrecking the Hurricane but fortunately escaping with minor injuries. As Forbes fought for his life, the remaining two Blue Section Hurricanes were also fighting a battle of survival with the Me109s. Sgt František flying R4175/R as Blue 3, damaged one Me109, setting light to the engine, before coming under sustained attack from two more Me109s. He subsequently evaded his attackers and returned to Northolt, but only after incurring damage to his tail unit. Despite the desperate efforts of Blue Section to protect their friends, Yellow Section, sandwiched between Kellett’s Red Section and Forbes’ Blue, took the full brunt of the Me109 attack seen by Forbes. S/Ldr Krasnodębski had been shot down during the Battle of Poland almost exactly a year before; taking to his parachute he had been fortunate to survive the experience as he was subsequently shot at by a German fighter as he drifted helplessly down. This day however, the popular Zdzislaw Krasnodębski was to experience every pilot’s worst nightmare: Looking up the sun is difficult, but I can see no enemy machines, so full throttle and on to the Jerries. My whole attention has moved forward now, to go as quickly as possible and aim as accurate as possible. The will of victory is so great that you forget everything that happens around you – you can only see the enemy. Suddenly the glass of the instruments shatters, the tank riddled with bullets – burning petrol pouring out. The whole cockpit is filled with fire. I want to bale out as quickly as possible, but cannot unfasten my harness. A short moment of surrender. But the will to live wins. Finally I unfasten the belts, open the cockpit, the door and bale out. Remembering the sad experience from Poland, I do not open my parachute to leave the combat area as fast as possible and not to be a target. After a while I decide to open the parachute, but here is another problem. When abandoning the machine, my

102 Zdzislaw Krasnodębski catches up on some sleep between sorties, his Battle of Britain would soon be over. parachute has shifted and I cannot find the ripcord, and the ground is coming fast. At last I find the ripcord and pull. Strong jolt – sudden peace and quiet, only the sounds of battle coming from above. After a moment I heard a machine approaching, and thought of history repeating itself. Fortunately it was a Hurricane which protected me down to the ground. I later learned it was Witek Urbanowicz, who at first took me for a German and intended to reverse the direction of my journey. Coming to the ground I thought that would be the end of my adventures, but it was not, as silhouettes of the Home Guard, with their guns ready to fire, started to emerge out of houses and bushes, looking to have some sport with a German paratrooper, but the calm Englishmen kept their nerves and did not fire. Despite his severe burns, Krasnodębski incredibly remained sufficiently conscious to delay opening his parachute, to avoid ‘history repeating itself’, as he describes it.

103 But his voluntary free-fall also had the effect of creating a draught sufficient to put out the flames licking at his clothing; flames that would otherwise have spread to his parachute rigging, resulting in his certain death. With clothes still smouldering and barely conscious, Krasnodębski could not appreciate the irony that the actions of an unknown Luftwaffe pilot a year ago had now saved his life. His burning aircraft, P3974/J, came down between Hextable and Wilmington, with the hapless Krasnodębski being admitted to Farnborough Hospital suffering from severe burns and shock, having landed in the hospital’s grounds. He was not to fly again for over a year, becoming a patient of the pioneering plastic surgeon, Dr Archie McIndoe. While Krasnodębski was living through his own private hell, his wingman Yellow 2, F/O Urbanowicz in V7242/B, had to evade an attack from an Me109 coming in from his right. Following a short dogfight, he got on the tail of his attacker and opened fire from 200yds, his three to four second burst sending the Me109 down vertically with the engine on fire. Many fighter pilots from 1940 expressed astonishment how one moment the sky was full of wheeling aircraft and the next, empty. Eager to return to the fray, Urbanowicz now found himself in such a position with no other aircraft, friend or foe, in sight. Circling whilst he quartered the sky, Urbanowicz eventually spotted anti-aircraft fire pin-pointing a bomber formation. Attempting to break through to the bombers he was attacked by three Me109s. With no chance to fire he eventually escaped by flying over some balloons near the sea. He then heard a squadron order to return to base, which he did. P/O Ferić, Yellow 3 (P3700/E), also became embroiled with the escort, joining some Spitfires in a whirling dogfight. The speed and ferocity of the fighting meant he could not claim anything conclusive until a white-nosed Me109 broke away upwards from the fight. Ferić quickly positioned his aircraft for a head-on attack, his fire hitting the Me109. He last saw it falling to earth in flames. S/Ldr Kellett, Red 1, oblivious to the events unfolding behind him, managed to penetrate the escort to attack the bombers, accompanied by Red 2: There were many big planes, Dorniers, He111 and some 4 engined. There were the usual Me110s among them, and formations of Me109s up to 25000 feet – fully 300 to 400 E/A. I manoeuvred to do a quarter head on attack on the bombers. I put a long burst into the port engine of a Do.215 and saw it commence to smoke. Then I did a ¼ astern attack and the engine caught fire. Just as I was about to break away, a series of explosions took place in my aircraft. After diving, I realised that it was very difficult to control the aircraft, as there

104 Zdzislaw Krasnodębski in hospital with severe burns after being shot down in flames on 6th September, it would take a year for him to return to operational flying.

was a big hole in the starboard wing, and the aircraft was very right wing low. There was no elevator control and not much rudder control. I managed to get the aircraft down to 140 mph, and keep it under control with the stick hard back and over to port. Finding Biggin Hill close, I made a landing with the undercarriage down, but without flaps. I returned to Northolt in the evening. The hole in the wing, large enough for a man to fit through, had been caused by the ammunition boxes exploding; the loss of rudder and elevator control Kellett experienced was due to virtually all the tailplane fabric being shot off, leaving just the skeleton structure. With a badly damaged and almost uncontrollable aircraft, Kellett’s first thoughts had been to bale out as he would later recall: …… I received a blow on the left knee and the cockpit was covered with smoke and red liquid. I swore and yelled ‘I’m getting to hell out of here’. I put the Hurricane into a spin and thought I would get out of it at 8,000 feet.

105 But the cockpit canopy rails had also been damaged preventing the canopy from sliding open. Kellett’s repeated attempts to operate the canopy’s quick release mechanism, designed just for this eventuality, also proved futile. Trapped in the aircraft, he now knew his only hope was to successfully crash land his barely controllable aircraft. Unsure of the state of his undercarriage, Kellett wanted to belly-in rather than risk only getting one of the main gear legs down or having the gear collapse on landing. However, any attempt to reduce speed below 140 mph made the aircraft uncontrollable and at that speed, the Hurricane would simply be travelling too fast to execute a safe belly landing. With no alternative, he lowered the undercarriage, anxiously hoping both gear legs would extend and lock. His Hurricane did not let him down. The undercarriage functioned perfectly, allowing him to execute a long approach for a high speed, flapless landing, only to find as he touched down his left main wheel had been punctured. Travelling fast down the runway with his left wing low as a consequence of the blown tyre, Kellett was relieved to find his brakes still working. Managing to slow the Hurricane sufficiently to swerve right at the very end of the runway, rather than left into the punctured tyre thereby risking a ground loop, he just avoided crashing through the airfield boundary. Having got down, however, he was still by no means safe as Biggin Hill was in the process of being attacked, a matter of out of the frying pan and into the fire. Despite bombs exploding all over the airfield, including on the runway Kellett had just used, airmen left the comparative safety of their slit trenches to rush to free the trapped Kellett. Armed with axes, they managed to rip off the jammed canopy and drag Kellett out before unceremoniously bundling him into the nearest dugout. Red 2, Sgt Karubin in V7290/H, claimed an He111 destroyed, his fifth victory, before he too was badly shot up by the escort, crashing at Fletcher’s Farm, Pembury and being admitted with slight wounds to Pembury Hospital. A rather laconic report was subsequently filed on behalf of the hapless Karubin: Sgt Karubin is in Pembury hospital. He claims to have shot down one He111 (N.B. He was behind S/L Kellett and probably used the same tactics and suffered much the same fate). It would be the last day of September before Karubin would fly on operations again. The sole surviving Hurricane of Red Section, V7289/S, Sgt Wünsche Red 3, broke off his planned attack on a Do17Z when he saw two Me109s attacking a Hurricane. As the first Me109 broke away, Wünsche hit the second with a four-

106 second burst, setting the Me109 on fire. At that point Wünsche temporarily lost control of his Hurricane. Believing he was under attack from the first Me109, he banked sharply to the right and checked behind him to find his tail clear. In all probability, whilst watching the second Me109 go down, Wünsche had come perilously close to colliding with another aircraft and it was the resulting turbulence that caused the temporary loss of control. Having survived that encounter Wünsche then came under attack from another Me109 from head-on. As the two fighters passed, they each turned sharply, desperately trying to get on the other’s tail. The Hurricane’s smaller turning circle soon had Wünsche in control, allowing him to exhaust his remaining ammunition in two lengthy bursts. He last saw the Me109 breaking away trailing smoke with its engine hit. Despite being defenceless, Wünsche then stayed to watch over an RAF pilot who had baled out, circling the parachute until the pilot was safely down. The RAF pilot transpired to be a fellow Northolt resident; P/O G E Goodman from 1 Squadron having baled out of his stricken Hurricane near Penhurst, another victim of the Me109 escort. Back at Northolt, gloom descended over 303 Squadron as it quickly became evident that no less than five out of the nine Hurricanes were missing. Whilst we have already seen what became of four of the missing pilots, namely Kellett, Krasnodębski, Forbes and Karubin, the fate of the fifth has been frequently overlooked. Published listings of Fighter Command’s aircraft losses for the day detail the loss of four Hurricanes from 303 Squadron, however the squadron ORB Form 540 narrative confirms the loss of five Hurricanes written-off, but without further detail. So what was the identity of the fifth aircraft and, more importantly, what was the fate of the pilot? The daily record of sorties flown, Form 541, lists Sgt Rogowski departing Northolt at 0840 flying V7243/P as Blue 2 with Forbes and František, but then having crashed, wounded. Reference to ‘Battle Over Britain’ and ‘Battle of Britain Then & Now’, the two bibles on the subject, reveal no mention of Rogowski being injured on this or any other date. All recorded pilot injuries and aircraft losses involving 303 Squadron match Fighter Command’s listings. Kenneth Wynn, in his unparalleled book ‘Men of the Battle of Britain’, quotes Rogowski being ‘slightly wounded in the legs in an engagement north-east of London’, on 6 September. In cross checking the individual aircraft histories, the ’s Form 78, the equivalent of a car logbook, confirms the aircraft identity. A Hawker-built Hurricane Mk1, V7243, of 303 Squadron quoted as

107 Mystery solved! An 11 Group intelligence report for the morning of 6th September confirms the identity and fate of the fifth loss, Sgt Rogowski. being written off due enemy action on 6 September, matching the Form 541 entry. The Kent Aviation Historical Research Society’s ‘Aircraft Casualties in Kent, Part 1: 1939 to 1940’ quotes the loss of V7243, 6 September, as having been shot down, bursting into flames and crashing at Langley Park Golf Course, the pilot, Sgt Rogowski baling out. Intriguingly, Kellett’s DFM commendation for Rogowski’s actions four days earlier, 2 September, actually quotes details from this combat despite the commendation being dated the third!! …… In addition on the 5th September (Author’s Note – date should be the sixth!) while the squadron was about to attack a formation of bombers Blue Section was attacked by a number of Me 109s. Seeing that his Flight Commander, F/Lt. Forbes was being attacked by Me 109s he got on the tail of the nearest E/A and proceeded to fire, but was in turn attacked and hit by fire from Me 109s. He force landed and hit high tension cables, his aircraft catching fire. Far from baling out, Rogowski had actually tried to get his aircraft down but had collided with some HT cables and been injured in the ensuing crash. On returning

108 to the squadron, Sgt Rogowski claimed he was fully fit for flying duty and tried to make light of his injuries, but a subsequent medical examination discovered two deep gashes in his leg requiring extensive stitching. It would be the New Year before this courageous pilot returned to combat duty. For the Poles there was an anxious wait for news of their missing colleagues, summarised by P/O Ferić’s sombre journal entry: No Forbes and Rogowski, of which we know that one has baled out, and the other force-landed. Also Krasnodębski, Kellett and Karubin are missing, and there is not a trace of them, while František has a shot-up machine. As already recounted, both Forbes and Rogowski had in fact force-landed, as did Kellett and Karubin with only Krasnodębski taking to his parachute. In the space of less than ten minutes, 303 Squadron had lost five Hurricanes destroyed (although one would be later reclassified Category 2) and a sixth badly damaged out of a formation of nine. More seriously four pilots - including three Squadron and Flight Commanders – were wounded, one, S/Ldr Krasnodębski, seriously. The initial claim of five Me109s, an He111 and a Do215 destroyed with two Me109s probably destroyed was nevertheless an amazing return for a squadron caught cold by overwhelming numbers. Once again, the value of height was forcibly brought home. Further contributing to the squadron’s problems was the significant radio interference, reported by F/Lt Forbes but experienced by all 303’s pilots. The Poles prided themselves on their teamwork, especially on their collective ability to lookout for each other; the serious radio problems experienced during this particular combat rendered not only air-to-ground communications impossible, but also communications between squadron aircraft. The enemy formation consisted of Ju88s of II./KG76 and KG26’s Heinkel He111s escorted by elements of JG2 (undertaking the rôle of advanced sweep), JG26 and JG27 with Me110s from Erprgr.210 and ZG26 (previously identified as Dornier Do17s from an unidentified unit). The initial bounce of 303 Squadron was executed to great effect by JG27 with this unit’s third staffel responsible for most of the squadron’s losses. Aside from the Hawker factory at Brooklands - producing Hurricanes - the bombers hit the oil tanks at Thameshaven, still burning from the previous day’s raid. Sgt Karubin’s claim for an He111 was the Cormeilles-en- Vexin based Junkers Ju88A, Wn.8104 F1+HP which crash-landed and burnt out on Tanyards Farm, near Tonbridge, after sustaining damage from anti-aircraft fire over Hastings inbound to its target and then the Hurricanes of Karubin and 1

109 Pilots and ground crew crowd around Josef František’s damaged R4175 RF-R, which was shot up by a 5/JG27 Me109 during the disastrous combat of 6th September. The same aircraft/pilot combination would claim 8 victories.

Squadron’s F/L Brown and P/O Stavert. Of the 6./KG76 crew, Uffz Angel baled out safely whilst Lt Kernbach, Oberfw Schumacher and Gefr Riesel survived the crash without injury, all four being immediately captured. In respect of the squadron’s Me109 claims, 5./ JG27 lost two aircraft, Wn.2762 6+, an E-4 variant, the pilot Fw Braun baled out over Tonbridge and was captured whilst Lt Halbach, despite being wounded, managed to get his badly damaged E- 1, Wn.3894, back to France where it was written off. Around the same time and location, 7./JG26 lost three more Me109s: E-1 Wn.3578 of Gefr Bieker (killed); E-4 Wn.2781, Oblt Christinnecke (captured); and E-1 Wn.3877, Gefr Holzapfel (missing). These losses were increased when the wounded Lt Himmelheber baled out of his Stab/JG2 Me109E-4, Wn.5044. Whilst the two JG27 Me109s lost were almost certainly engaged by 303 Squadron, there is insufficient evidence to link JG26’s losses to any of the squadron’s combat claims. Three further Me109 losses have been variously attributed to 303 Squadron from this combat: an E-4 Wn.1138 of 3/JG52, an E-1, Wn.3225, of 3/JG27 and an Emil, Wn.1380, of III/JG27. All three pilots, Oblt Waller, Oblt Schueller and Hptmn Schlichting respectively, captured. Oblt Waller’s aircraft reportedly crashed near Seal at 1130, effectively

110 ruling this out as 303 Squadron went into combat over two hours earlier. Both Wn.3225 and 1380 are of more interest due to JG27’s involvement in the morning combat. Whilst the ‘where’ is not in dispute, both crashing into the Thames, the ‘when’ is! Sources quote both aircraft as being lost at either around 0915 or during the early evening. The time of 0915 would tie-in with 303 Squadron’s combat, however without resolution to the timing conflict, neither can be attributed to 303 Squadron with any confidence. F/O Hadwen’s report neatly summarised the main reasons for the squadron’s disaster: Their lack of height forced them to attack climbing, and at only 140 m.p.h. and contributed very largely to our heavy casualties. ….. Interference on the R/T had been bad and intercommunication in the squadron was impossible……

After the raid on Biggin Hill had finished, Kellett was able to take stock of his narrow escape: aside from the extensive damage to his aircraft, Kellett found the German incendiary shells had ruined his helmet, goggles, uniform and, most importantly, had burned holes through his parachute. If the Hurricane’s canopy had not been jammed and he had been able to bale out as he wanted, Kellett would have certainly fallen to his death. Ironically, the failure of the canopy quick release mechanism had ultimately saved his life. Having passed a message through to Northolt that he was safe, Biggin’s Station Doctor insisted on Kellett going to Farnborough Hospital for a check-up. Here he saw the badly burned Krasnodębski, who had been operated on, but was not conscious. An x-ray on Kellett’s injured leg revealed a bullet which after due consideration was deemed safe to leave in. He was duly discharged back to Biggin Hill and then on to Northolt that evening in an ambulance. Kellett’s brilliant airmanship in getting his aircraft, V7284/A, down, reputedly the most badly damaged Hurricane to be landed during the Battle of Britain, ultimately was not enough to save it. Biggin Hill had been hit repeatedly during the last few days, and this latest raid was the final straw for the Station Commander. The hangars still standing looked untouched from the air despite them being nothing but burnt out shells. Wishing to avoid further bombing, the Station Commander gave orders for the hangar shells to be blown up, with, much to Kellett’s disgust, V7284 inside one of them. For many of the British fighter pilots in 1940, the enemy was not the German fighter pilot or bomber crew, but the aeroplanes they flew. This neatly sanitised the

111 act of killing and to some, retained the ‘clean’ war and chivalry of the air fighting of the First World War; not for them the face to face combat of the infantryman. The Poles, who had experienced the real meaning of all-out war at close quarters, had no such idiosyncrasies. They had seen what German airmen had done to defenceless women and children and had no qualms about killing their hated enemy, for revenge and their ultimate goal – their homeland’s freedom. Their hatred was of a frightening intensity; for some of their new British colleagues it was overwhelming, others expressed a relief they were on the same side as the Poles. Ronald Kellett would recall having been discharged from hospital, he was offered the opportunity to visit the nearby wreckage of the bomber his driver was convinced Kellett had brought down. For Kellett, unaware until he arrived the wreckage still contained the shattered and dismembered body of one of the crew, the experience was a profound one and was to affect him deeply for the rest of his life. With Biggin Hill ground crews adamant the crashed ‘bomber’ was Kellett’s victim, his original telephoned claim of a Dornier probably destroyed was subsequently

Another shot of the activity surrounding František’s R4175 RF-R on 6th September, even the Army are interested! Despite the damage, the armourers are still re-arming the Hurricane’s 112 Browning machine guns. upgraded to confirmed destroyed on both his combat report and the Intelligence Patrol Report. The squadron’s own list of victories would continue to erroneously record the Dornier as probably destroyed. Kellett’s claim for a Dornier 215 was actually an Messerschmitt 110D/O, Wn.3373 S9+BH, fighter-bomber from the elite Erprobungsgruppe 210. Possibly also engaged by Hurricanes from 1 Squadron, the aircraft eventually came down and exploded on Foyle Farm, Crowhurst; Uffz Rueger was killed whilst the wounded Uffz Ernst baled out into captivity. Ronald Kellett was adamant he had been shot down by an Me110 believing only the heavy nose armament of the Me110 could have inflicted the type of damage his Hurricane had sustained. By misidentifying the formation he was attacking, he had unintentionally exposed himself to the fire of one his victim’s colleagues, a mistake that nearly cost him his life. Had he been flying a Spitfire under the same circumstances, he had no doubt whatsoever neither he nor his aircraft would have survived the onslaught his Hurricane absorbed. The aircraft wreckage he saw was probably that of ZG26’s Me110C-4, U8+CL Wn.2146, which crashed on Cannons Hill Golf Course outside Coulsdon. Variously attributed to 1 and 111 Squadrons, the pilot, Uffz Kiehn, was killed whilst his colleague, Uffz Neusz, was captured. ______FOCKE-WULF FW200 ‘CONDOR’ Kellett’s combat report reference to the German bomber formation containing ‘4 engined’ aircraft is intriguing. The only possible candidate to fit the description is the Focke-Wulf Fw 200. An aircraft used mainly for long-range reconnaissance and bombing of shipping convoys, it was thought not to have been used over mainland Britain during the summer of 1940, despite sighting reports by RAF fighter pilots to the contrary. Only recently have documents come to light suggesting sporadic use of the FW200 during the Battle of Britain, this raid possibly being one of their rare incursions. ______

It was a very depleted squadron formation that was ordered off on an airfield defensive patrol later that same day at 1310. F/Lt Kent leading just the three Hurricanes of F/O Henneberg, P/O Zumbach and P/O Łokuciewski, in the company of six more Hurricanes from 1 RAF and 1 (Canadian) Squadrons. Whilst not making contact with the enemy the patrol was by no means uneventful, as Johnny Kent was to recount in his book ‘One of the Few’:

113 …. The Northolt ‘Wing’ was scrambled with myself leading all three squadrons with a grand total of nine aeroplanes, all that were left on the airfield! We took off, my section being followed by one from No.1 Canadian and another from No.1 bringing up the rear. We climbed to about 11,000 feet and then, without any warning, there was a loud bang as my engine blew up and caught fire. Flames were licking around the canopy and sparks darted around inside the cockpit. I switched off the ignition, turned off the fuel, turned up the oxygen supply and started side-slipping in an effort to keep the flames from reaching the reserve petrol tank situated just behind the firewall bulkhead. My aircraft rapidly lost speed and the other aircraft shot past me, or all except one which came into tight formation - it was Hilly Brown who called me on the R/T saying: ‘Haw, bloody haw! You getting’ hot in there Bud?’ This was a reprisal for a lot of ribbing I had been giving him for having been shot down and burnt a few days before, but I thought he could at least have waited until I got down! I called the Controller and told him what had happened and what I was trying to do. Nothing much was said for some minutes and then the Station Commander, Stanley Vincent, came on to the radio and asked if I was going to bale out. By this time it was too late and I was already starting the final approach and had pumped down both wheels and flaps. Although the smoke had died away quite a bit I was far from happy, but it was good to see two beautifully sited fire engines converging on me as I touched down. They started to throw foam at me as I was completing my landing roll but the operators had not been given instructions at deflecting shooting - while they were aiming at the engine, they managed to hit me, so after stopping ten yards from the spot where I had started my take-off, I got out looking rather like a snowman. Hilly Brown, a veteran of the Battle of France, was a fellow Canadian and friend of Kent’s, at the time being ‘A’ Flight Commander in 1 Squadron RAF. Although the ORB quotes Kent’s aircraft as R2685 this aircraft was not actually delivered until the following day! Kent’s logbook actually states his aircraft as being P5180, the Canadian-built aircraft transferred from 1(Canadian) just twenty-four hours earlier. With so many aircraft either lost or unserviceable, 303 Squadron’s final sorties of the day were flown as a mixed force with their fellow residents at Northolt. Three Hurricanes from ‘B’ flight, F/O Paszkiewicz P3975/U, P/O Daszewski in V7289/S and Sgt Wojciechowski, R4173/T, joined 1 Squadron on patrol at 1720 returning at 1910. Meanwhile, F/O Januszewicz joined a 1 (Canadian) Squadron patrol

114 scrambled at 1745, subsequently going into action against Me110s and Me109s. Single-handedly tackling four Me110s, Januszewicz probably destroyed one of their number before falling victim to what he identified as a Heinkel He113, but was in fact an Me109 probably of either LG2 or JG2. Crash landing near Lenham at 1820, the Hurricane was initially assessed as a write-off but Januszewicz survived, returning to Northolt the following day. There remains, however, considerable confusion over the identity of Januszewicz’s Hurricane: the squadron ORB quotes P3089 as does the ‘Battle of Britain Then & Now’, but this aircraft continued to appear in both the ORB and 303’s maintenance returns until early October! Having already taken such heavy losses that day and with other aircraft damaged, it is difficult to see 303 Squadron having the ability or resources to loan an airframe to another unit. ‘Battle of Britain Then & Now’ quotes 1 Squadron RAF as losing one aircraft this day, P2686 in the morning, P/O Goodman (already with five victories to his credit in the Battle) baling out injured. More detailed inspection of Hurricane losses reveals that 1 Squadron also lost a second Hurricane, P5197, that day, and Johnny Kent in his book refers to Januszewicz borrowing an aircraft from 1 Squadron in order to undertake the evening patrol with the Canadians. The evidence remains circumstantial but it is almost certain Januszewicz was flying P5197, coincidentally another of the Canadian-built Hurricanes. Despite the initial assessment as a write- off, thanks to the repair organisation, P5197 would fly again. With administration not the highest priority, Januszewicz returned to 303 Squadron without apparently filing a combat report so his claim for a probable Me110 cannot be substantiated. The morning patrol was to have one more impact on 303’s immediate operations. With Kellett and Forbes both wounded, only Kent of the seconded RAF officers was fit for duty and he had just experienced a potentially fatal mid-air engine fire. There was a very real concern if all three RAF pilots became non-combatant simultaneously the squadron would be grounded. Consequently it was immediately decreed henceforth only one of the RAF pilots would fly with the Poles on any individual sortie. It should be noted this was very much a local instruction, probably brokered by Group Captain Vincent, as 302 Squadron for example continued to routinely fly two RAF officers on the same sortie. The reading out of a signal from the Chief of the Air Staff complimenting the squadron once again for their endeavours 24 hours earlier did nothing to lift the sombre mood. Despite his fatigue and sadness, Mika Ferić carefully copied the CAS’s signal by hand into his diary and added his own postscript to the day’s events :

115 The raid was enormous, and we were few, as apart from us I saw a Squadron of Spitfires, so in this large battle we had to avoid the enemy, numbering some 100 aeroplanes, and think more of our own safety than attacking. I am certain that the Englishmen are overly cautious in not sending more Squadrons to completely annihilate the enemy, and even more so to create chaos in his lines. I noticed new tactics by the Jerries. From the Channel into England, along the path of the bombers, the fighters form a sort of path, or rather a bridge or lucky chain, up to the target and under this cover of circling squadrons, bombers fly in peace and quiet and it is really difficult to get at them. ______

THE BIG WING CONTROVERSY Ferić’s criticism regarding Park’s reluctance to deploy greater numbers against the German raids is at the core of the whole ‘Big Wing’ controversy. Some of 11 Group’s pilots, having lost close friends battling huge odds, queried the tactics that frequently saw formations of six or nine aircraft pitted against hundreds of enemy aircraft. S/Ldr Douglas Bader, supported by AVM Leigh-Mallory, AOC 12 Group, was advocating the use of three and even five squadron wing formations for this very reason plus the ability to destroy German aircraft in greater numbers. The issue, however, was not that simple. Operating in the frontline of the battle, 11 Group simply did not have the time available to scramble and form up a wing formation and still intercept an inbound raid before they bombed. With limited resources, not knowing the target of an inbound raid, and worse whether the raid was even genuine or a feint, meant the use of big wings by 11 Group would have left many vital targets undefended. Additional squadrons could not be moved in to 11 Group’s area either for two reasons: (i) it would leave other parts of the UK unprotected; and (ii) 11 Group’s infrastructure (i.e. airfields and facilities) simply could not at that time support any more squadrons. 11 Group’s objective was quite simply one of survival. Park’s tactics had to be matched accordingly, and were to prove entirely correct. Despite allegations to the contrary, Park was not averse to employing wing formations as he proved later in the Battle of Britain and during his superb marshalling of Malta’s defences. However, he would only use them as and when he felt conditions allowed. ______

116 With just seven serviceable aircraft by the day’s end, the arrival of a solitary replacement Hurricane, R2685, plus the return of P3890 following nearly four weeks of repairs at Hawkers, meant another long night for the engineering staff if the squadron was to be operational again in the morning. So ended 303 Squadron’s first week of operations. Combat claims to date were 25 confirmed victories, of which 19 were the deadly Me109s, four probably destroyed and one damaged (all Me109s) for the loss of four Hurricanes totally destroyed, and a further six out-of-action with severe damage. Of more importance, seven pilots had been wounded or injured, three of who, Wacław Łapkowski, Zdzisław Krasnodębski and Jan Rogowski, would take no further part in the Battle of Britain.

With the heavy casualties suffered on 6th September, the pressure was on the groundcrews to keep the remaining Hurricanes serviceable. Ludwig Paszkiewicz’s favoured mount, RF-M V7235 would survive the Battle of Britain with seven victories to her credit. 117 JOHNNY KENT’S DIARY FRIDAY 6 SEPTEMBER Took Janet to Victory House to join up today, poor kid was terribly upset, but she’ll be allright (sic). When I arrived back at Northolt I found that Krasnodębski, Rogowski, Kellett, Forbes and Karubin had all been shot down but got 3 Me109s, 2 Do215s and 1 He111. ‘B’ Flight also shot down several. All we had left of the squadron was a section so I led them off at 1300 hrs on an interception. When I got to 11,000 feet my engine threw two con. rods thru’ the side of the crankcase & caught fire. It got very hot inside but managed to land it back on the aerodrome with a completely dead engine. In the evening Januszewicz went off with N°1Can. Sqdn & saw some Jaguars & He113s so he attacked but got shot down. Everyone turned up O.K. Kellett has a bit in his leg & Forbes has perspex in his neck the others are burned. ______

FIGHTER COMMAND CRISIS 303 Squadron’s fighter / bomber kill ratio underlined the intensive fighter-to- fighter combat RAF Fighter Command found itself increasingly involved in. Whilst the RAF’s tactics were to take on the bombers and avoid where possible fighter- versus-fighter combats, the dense fighter screen being employed by the Luftwaffe was frequently frustrating them, whilst taking an increasingly heavy toll of the defenders. In two weeks Fighter Command had lost 103 pilots killed and another 128 wounded, one quarter of its effective strength. On the back of these losses Dowding’s predicament with his squadron rotation system came to a head. Despite the unintentional slur on the combat prowess of certain squadrons, Dowding was forced to re-organise his units to reflect the critical need to keep his experienced, combat proven squadrons in the front-line for as long as possible. Squadrons in 11 Group along with key units in the neighbouring 10 and 12 Groups, which could be called upon to assist 11 Group, were classified as ‘A’ squadrons. ‘B’ class units were the remaining squadrons of 10, 12 and 13 Groups which were up to strength and could be posted into the front-line. Class ‘C’ squadrons were generally units recently withdrawn who were exhausted or had suffered severe losses, or both. It would be these squadrons which would henceforth provide a pool of trained, and in some cases, rested combat-experienced, pilots to cover future losses in class ‘A’ and ‘B’ Squadrons. All of the ‘C’ class squadrons would retain a small core of pilots who were combat veterans able to train and pass on their hard-fought knowledge

118 to new recruits. By re-classifying his squadrons, Dowding hoped to provide his battle-proven units with sufficient pilot reserves to allow them to continue, but the critical question was, for how long? ______

BATTLE OF BRITAIN UPDATE Adolf Hitler had vowed that the decision to bomb London was his and his alone. During a night raid, however, a lost German bomber crew dumped their bombs unwittingly on a London suburb, prompting the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, to order a retaliatory strike against Berlin. The British strike, despite the pinprick nature of the attack, so infuriated Hitler many historians believe he then intervened in the Battle of Britain to order the Luftwaffe to attack London in full strength. Whilst this may well be true, there is sufficient evidence from contemporary Luftwaffe documents to suggest that the majority of the Luftwaffe senior command, including Reichsmarschall Goering, already favoured switching the focus of their attack to London. Dowding’s tactics of conserving his fighter force was proving a major source of frustration to the Luftwaffe High Command, who felt final victory would be theirs if they could just force one final all out confrontation with Fighter Command. To attack not only the nation’s capital but the heart of the British Empire, would, the Luftwaffe reasoned, force Dowding to commit all his squadrons, thereby creating the opportunity the Luftwaffe fighter generals so badly craved. There was also a strong belief the attacks on 11 Group’s airfields and command structure were a waste of time and resources. They reasoned if these were put out of action, Dowding and Park would simply withdraw their fighters to airfields north of London, outside the range of the Me109. Air superiority could only be gained by defeating the British fighters; driving them outside the range of the Me109 by attacking the southerly airfields, they argued, would be counter-productive to their objective. It was typical of the leadership problems within the Luftwaffe High Command and the lack of a properly co-ordinated plan that, with victory within its grasp, the Luftwaffe should now completely change their tactics.

119 Saturday, 7 September 1940: British Intelligence assessments of the current situation were as bleak as the German was optimistic. The RAF’s fighter airfields and defences were under desperate pressure to the point where Fighter Command’s continued operations from bases in Kent and Sussex were genuinely under serious threat. Whilst the Luftwaffe had failed to grasp the importance of the south-east airfields, Churchill, Dowding and Park had not. To force Fighter Command to abandon the forward airfields would, because of the limited range of both the Spitfire and Hurricane, concede air superiority over the Channel and possibly the invasion beaches. Meantime, across the Channel, reconnaissance photos of the French ports showed the number of invasion barges at an all time high despite concentrated daily bombing. With the Channel tides and weather favouring conditions for a German attack, Invasion Alert No. 1 (i.e. attack imminent - within 24 hours) was flashed to the British Armed Forces. Crucially, the day was to prove to be a major turning point in the Luftwaffe’s battle for air supremacy and the German invasion plan, but not in the way either side expected.

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