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ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 18, No 4, pp 709± 728, 1997

Religion,secularisation and : a postmodernconspectus

JEFF HAYNES

Someassert thatwe are witnessinga globalresurgence of of great politicalsigni® cance. 1 Otherscontend, however, that secularisation is generally continuing,except under certain limited circumstances and conditions. 2 The continuingdebate about the political importance of religion suggests that there is alackof clarity concerning just how religiousvalues, norms and beliefs stimulateand affect sociopolitical developments and vice versa. Thispaper aims tobe acontributionto thedebate. Its mainarguments are that: (a) thepostmodern condition stimulates a turningto religion under certain circumstances; (b)secularisation continues in much of theindustrialised West but not in many partsof the Third World; (c) inthe Third World, secular political ideologiesÐ such as socialismand liberaldemocracyÐ are notnecessarily regarded as themost useful for the pursuanceof group goals; instead, religion, perhaps allied with nationalism, ethnicityor communalism, often functions as amobilisingoppositional ideology. Thepaper is infourparts. The ® rst assesses interactionsof religionand politics; inthe second, I examinethe claim that the current era isoneof globalreligious resurgence.The third focuses onpostmodernism, arguing that it is acondition conduciveto thegrowth of popularreligion. The fourth part describes two types ofpopular religion used as oppositionalideologies: fundamentalist and `cul- tural’.

Religion andpolitics Beliefis atthe core of religion. Bellah noted more than 30 years agothat it is extremelydif® cult to come up witha `briefhandy de® nition of religion’; nothing has changedsince then to makethe task any easier. He de®nes religionas `aset ofsymbolic forms andacts whichrelate man [sic] tothe ultimate conditions of hisexistence’ 3 Iuse theterm in this paper in two distinct, yet related, ways. First,in a materialsense itrefers toreligious establishments (ie institutions and of®cials), as wellas tosocial groups and movements whose raisonsd’ eÃtre are religiousconcerns. Examples include the conservative Roman Catholic organis-

Jeff Haynes is attheDepartment of Politics and Modern History, London Guildhall University, CalcuttaHouse, OldCastle Street, London E1 7NTUK .

0143-6597/97/040709-20$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 709 JEFF HAYNES ation,Opus Dei, the reformist Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria ( FIS), and the Hindu-chauvinistBharatiya Janata Party of India. Second, in a spiritualsense, religionpertains to modelsof socialand individual behaviour that help believers toorganisetheir everyday lives. Religion is todowiththe of transcendence, ieitrelatesto realities; with sacredness, ieas asystem oflanguage andpractice that organises the world in terms ofwhatis deemedholy; and with ultimacy,ie it relates people to the ultimate conditions of existence. In sum, for purposesof socialanalysis, religion may be approached a) fromthe perspective ofa bodyof and outlooks (ie as theologyand ethical ); b) as atype offormal organisation (eg the ecclesiastical Church); c) as asocialgroup (eg religiousmovements). Therbornargues that there are twobasic ways `in which can affect thisworld’ Ð bywhatthey say andby what they do. 4 Theformer is thedoctrine ortheology. The latter refers toreligion as asocialphenomenon working throughvariable modes of institutionalisatio n,including political parties and church± relations, and functioning as amarkof identity. In other words, religiondoes not simply have at the individual level. It is also,like politics,a matterof group solidarities and often of inter-group tension and con¯ict, focusing either on shared or disagreed images of the scared, or on culturaland class issues. Tocomplicatematters, `these ¼ in¯uences ¼ tendto operatedifferently and with different temporalities for the same theologically de®ned religion in different parts of the world’ . 5 Inaddition, `assessing the politicalimpact of religion depends greatly on what facet of religion is being consideredand which speci® c politicalarena is underinvestigation’ . 6 In sum, it is verydif® cult to isolate religion’ s in¯uence alone, because it will almost invariablybe part of a combinationof causal forms. Itis, however, possible to assess thepolitical importance of religion in the area ofchurch± state relations. Therborn argues that, `the more close the relationship[of the church 7]tothe state, the less resistanceto adaptation [to modernity]’. 8 Overtime, especially in the industrialised West, mainstream religiousorganisations generally develop an empathetic relation with political power,even when they oppose it. Mosttypologies of church± state relations underscore their mutual synergy. Over80 years ago,for example, Weber identi® ed three types of relations betweensecular and ecclesiastical power: hierocratic, where secular power is dominantbut cloaked in a religiouslegitimacy; theocratic, where ecclesiastical authorityis pre-eminentover secular power; and caesaro-papist, where secular powerholds sway over religion itself. 9 Recenttypologies take into account the growingseparation between church and state, a functionof Western-style modernisation,leading to increasing secularisation. Parsons, re¯ ecting the cre- ationof anti-religion states inthe USSR, Albania and elsewhere, notes that a churchmay have a symbioticrelationship with the state at one extreme or be totallyseparate from it at the other; 10 thelatter position is notin Weber’ s typology. Medhurstextends the range of types of state± church relationship from three tofour, proposing: `The Integrated ª Religio-PoliticalSystemº ( IRS)’ , `The ConfessionalPolity (or State)’ , `TheReligiously Neutral Polity (or State)’ , and 710 RELIGION, SECULARISATION AND POLITICS

`TheAnti-Religious Polity (or State)’ . 11 The IRS,atypeof virtually extinct,with Medhurst’ s onlyextant example, pertains to pre- modernpolitical systems wherereligious and spiritual power converge in one ®gure.Historical examples include pre-1945 Japan and ancient Mesopotamia. The IRS israre becauseone of themost consistent effects ofmodernisationis to separatereligious and secular power. With the demise of the Marxist states of EasternEurope, the `Anti-Religious Polity’ , wherereligion is `throttled’, isalso veryuncommon. Theremaining two categories of church± state relationship highlighted by Medhurstare, in contrast, frequently encountered. The `Confessional Polity’ emerges whenthe `traditional ª religio-politicalsystemº begins to crumble and givesway to a newsituation of religious or ideological pluralism’ . 12 In other words,this is asituationcharacterised by a (moreor less) formalseparation of stateand (dominant) religion, although in practice close links between the two endure.Examples include Ireland, Colombia and post-revolutionar yIran.The `ReligiouslyNeutral Polity’ , onthe other hand, includes constitutionally secular states likeIndia, the USA andthe Netherlands. No religion is givenof® cial predominance. Re¯ecting the demise of the Eastern European communist bloc, Mitra offers fourdifferent categories of church± state relations: a) hegemonic,where one religiondominates, but other religions are tolerated,as inBritain,corresponding closelyto Medhurst’s `ConfessionalPolity’ ; b)theocratic:eg , IsraelÐ unlike Medhurst’ s IRS category,state power is dependentupon a closerelationship with thedominant religion; c) secular: egFrance, the former USSR, USA, corre- spondingto Medhurst’ s `ReligiouslyNeutral Polity’ ; andd) neutral: eg India, wheregovernment is even-handedin its approach to all religions, including the dominant.13 ForMitra, religion provides the moral basis ofthestate’ s authority,as wellas aninstitutional and metaphysical structure for social transactions. Yet religion is affectedby thedispositions of temporalpower and by changing social norms and attitudes,especially secularisation. In the of church± state relations, accordingto Mitra, the `speci® c roleattributed to religion at a giventime and placedepends primarily upon the status of religion in the constitutional frame- workand the social meaning attached to it’ . 14 Theconstitutional position of religionis re¯ected in histypology. The social meaning, on theother hand, may alter,perhaps radically, as aresultof changing circumstances. Ithas traditionallybeen assumed thatthe connection between politics and religionis onlya problemamong nations which are notreligiously homoge- neous.Most political thinkers since Aristotle have taken it for granted that religioushomogeneity is aconditionof political stability within a polity.When, however,opposing beliefs about `ultimate values enter the political arena, they exacerbatestruggles by preventingcompromise’ . 15 Suchis clearin relationto the countryupon which Mitra focuses, India, where communal strife between Hindusand Muslims is common,and has beenfor decades. While the relation- shipbetween state and church within a countrymay well be of importance politically,the sociopolitical position of a religioncannot only be dependent on theconstitutional position. 711 JEFF HAYNES

State

Society Religion

FIGURE 1 Thetriadic relationship of state, society and religion.

Mitraviews the relationship between state, society and religion as triadic,as Figure1 shows.The role of religionin politicsin anationalsetting, he , is `in¯uenced by the speci® c kindof state and society relation that obtains in a givenhistorical conjuncture ¼ Aparticularhistorical conjuncture may be conducivetowards the growth of aparticularform of religious movement’ . 16 In India,modernisation was expectedby the postcolonial political elite to lead eventuallyto the secularisation of the country; therefore the constitution is neutraltowards it. Things turned out differently, however: democratisation and secularisationworked at cross-purposes; increasingparticipation in the political arenadrew in new social forces demandinggreater formal recognition of particularreligionsÐ especially and . This was responsiblefor makingreligion the central issue, not only in Indian politics, but also in many otherThird World countries.

Religious resurgence orcontinuing secularisation? Anybodywho had prophesied 30 years ago that the 20th century would end with aresurgenceof religion,with great new cathedrals, mosques, and temples rising up, withthe symbols and songs of everywhere apparent, would, in most circles, havebeen derided. 17 Itis beyonddispute that, during the last 30 years, religion has playedan importantpolitical role in quite a fewcountries: the overthrow of the Shah of Iran; civilcon¯ ict in many African countries, including Sudan, Nigeria and SouthAfrica; the demise of theEastern European Communist bloc; demands for politicalchange in the Islamic world; the reworking of politicsin the USA; the wars informer Yugoslavia; the troubles of South Asia; andthe dilemmas of a dividedIsrael. The question of thenature of this largely unexpected interposition ofreligion in politics is atroublingone. Does it necessitate a rethinkingof the secularisationparadigm? This is apuzzleand a problem;yet all who assess the situationbring their perceptions and prejudices. Basically, however, views can bedichotomisedthus: those who do notbelieve assign every cause butthe divine toreligious movements and effects; thosewho have faith perceive the hand of Godin what appears to many a widespreadreligious ef¯ orescence. I have sympathyfor both positions. Thedecline in the social and political importance of religion in the West is solidlygrounded in mainstream social science. As Shupenotes, `the de- mysti®cation of religion inherent in the classic secularisationparadigm posit[s] 712 RELIGION, SECULARISATION AND POLITICS agradual,persistent, unbroken erosion of religiousin¯ uence in urban industrial societies’. 18 Secularisationimplies a unidirectionalprocess, whereby societies movefrom a sacred conditionto successively areligious states; thesacred becomesincreasingly social and politically marginal. The commanding ® gures of19th century social scienceÐ Durkheim, Weber, MarxÐ argued that seculari- sationwas anintegral facet of modernisation,a globaltrend. Everywhere, so the argumentgoes, religion would become privatised, losing its grip on , becominga purelypersonal matter, no longer a collectiveforce with mobilising potentialfor social change. Inshort, secularisation is `themost fundamental structural and ideological changein theprocess ofpoliticaldevelopment’ . 19 Itis atrendwhereby societies graduallymove away from being focused around the sacred anda concernwith thedivine, leading to a diminutionof religious power and authority. A conse- quenceis agradualtransformation in the traditional relationship between religionand politics. Fivecomponents of the secularisation process are ofimportance in the relationshipbetween church and state: a) constitutionalsecularisation : religious institutionscease tobe given special constitutional recognition and support; b) policysecularisation :thestate expands its domains and service provisions intoareas previouslyreserved to the religious sphere; c) institutionalsecularisa- tion:religiousstructures lose their political saliency and in¯ uence as pressure groups,parties and movements; d) agendasecularisation :issues, needsand problemsdeemed relevant to the political process nolonger have an overtly religiouscontent e); and ideologicalsecularisation: `thebasic values and -systemsused to evaluate the political realm and to give it meaning cease tobe couched in religious terms’ . 20 Secularisationis clearestin the industrialised West, where falling income levelsfor mainstream churches, declining numbers and quality of religious professionals,and diminishing church attendance collectively point to `aprocess ofdecline in the social signi® cance of religion’ . 21 Religionin the West has by andlarge lost many of thefunctions it once ful® lled for other social institutions, inparticular providing `legitimacy for secular authority’ : endorsing,even sanc- tioning,public policy; sustaining with `a batteryof threatsand blandishments the agenciesof socialcontrol’ ; claimingto bethefont of `true’learning; socialising theyoung; and `sponsoring a rangeof recreative activities’ . 21 Inthe Third World, in contrast, religion has byand large retained a much higherlevel of socialimportance, even in many swiftly modernising societies. I wantto argue that secularisation, involving social differentiation, societalisation andrationalisation, occurs exceptwhen religion ® ndsor retainswork to doother thanrelating people to the supernatural .As Bruceputs it, `only when religion doessomething other than mediate between man and does it retain a high placein people’ s attentionsand in their politics’ . 22 Generally,religion shrinks in socialsigni® cance except in twobroad contexts. First,as acomponentof culturaldefence ,ie`whenculture, identity, and a sense ofworth are challengedby a sourcepromoting either an alien religion or rampantsecularism and that source is negativelyvalued’ ; second,in the context of culturaltransition ,iewhere `identity is threatenedin the course of major 713 JEFF HAYNES culturaltransitions’ . 23 Inbothcases, religionmay furnish the resources eitherfor dealingwith such transitions or forasserting a group’s claimto a sense ofworth. Opponentsof the secularisation thesis assert thatthe current era is character- isedby awidespreadÐeven globalÐ religious resurgence, that the secularisation trajectoryis inreverse. 24 Thomasargues that `the global resurgence of religious ideasand social movements is oneof the most unexpected events at the end of thetwentieth century ¼ takingplace at the same timeamong diverse , indifferent countries, and in states atdifferent levels of economic develop- ment’ .25 Sahliyehclaims that, over the last two decades or so, `a numberof highlypoliticized religious groups, institutions and movements, surfaced in differentparts of theworld. Although of differentfaiths and , thesegroups shareda commondesire to change their societies and even to change the internationalorder’ . Somecon® ne theiractivities to the realm of political protest, reformor change through the ballot box, others resort to violence in pursuit of theirobjectives. 26 Sahliyehargues that there are three`broad categories’ of reasons explaining thealleged global resurgence of political religion. First there is thedestabilising impactof modernisation. Rather than leading to secularisation, the social upheavaland economic dislocation associated with modernisation lead to a renewalof traditional religions. 27 Second,he perceivesreligious resurgence as a responseto ageneralised`crisis atmosphere’, stemmingfrom a rangeof factors, including:

theinconclusive modernizing efforts ofsecular elites in the Third World, growing disillusionmentwith secular nationalism, problems of legitimacy and political oppressionin many developing countries, problems of nationalidentity, widespread socioeconomicgrievances, and the erosion of traditional morality and values both inthe West and in the Third World. The coterminous existence of severalor all of thesecrises in much of the contemporary world provides a fertilemilieu for the returnto religion. 28

Sahliyeh’s ®nalfactor is thatthe political activism of contemporary religious groupsand movements is partiallyexplainable by allusion to a `resource mobilizationmodel’ . Threeelements are important:a) religiousgroups must havethe opportunity to formpolitically orientated groups; b) thepolitical vitality ofareligiousgroup depends upon adequate ® nancialresources, political leader- ship,organisational structures, networks, manpower and a mobilisingideology; c) religiousgroups need `incentives, reasons, and motives’ beforethey can organise. 29 Inshort, to be politically active, religious groups musthave a political raisond’ eÃtre ,leaders,cadres, resources andideology. Analternative viewpoint is that,rather than religious resurgence, what is happeningis thatpolitical religion is nowmore visible thanks principally to the globalcommunications ; political religion is persistent,not resurgent. Shupeargues that, throughout the world, ` is astubbornly persistentand ¼ integralfactor in ¼ politics’. 30 Smithclaims that `what has changedin the present situation ¼ is mainlythe growing awareness of [manifestationsof political religion in the Third World] by the Western world, 714 RELIGION, SECULARISATION AND POLITICS andthe perception that they might be related to our interest’ . 31 Thisis alsoa viewbroadly endorsed by Huntington. 32 Whatis happeningin the Third World, it is claimed,is merelythe latest manifestationof a cyclicalreligious resurgence highlighted by enhanced global communications.Smith points to Hinduism, andCatholicism experiencingperiods of intense political activity followed by periods of quies- cenceover the last six or seven decades. 33 Traditionally,religion in the Third Worldis theideology of opposition parexcellence ;thus,in the contemporary era,there is noreligious resurgence; instead, it never went away. Betweenthe world wars, religion was frequentlyused in the service of anti-colonialnationalism in the Third World, a majorfacet of national identity vis-aÁ -vis colonialrule. 34 Duringthe 1920s and 1930s, for example, in Algeria, Egyptand Indonesia, Islamic was thechief ideology of nationalist movements.Immediately after World War II, in1947, Pakistan was foundedas aMuslimstate, religiously and culturally distinct from India, which was 80% Hindu.A decadelater, political Buddhism was ofimportance in Burma, Sri Lankaand South Vietnam, while in Latin America in the 1960s both Christian democracyand liberation were politically consequential. Ten years later,in both Iran and Nicaragua, religion also assumed animportant role in politics.During the 1980s religion was activein anumberof contexts,including thedemise of communism in Eastern Europe, neo-Buddhist movements in SoutheastAsia, Hindu-chauvinist parties in Indiaand the FIS inAlgeria.In sum, oppositionis thetraditional forte of politicalreligious groups, and has beensince theearly years ofthe twentieth century. The current manifestations of political religionshould be seen inthis historical context, exemplifying continuity rather thanchange.

Postmodernismand political religion At® rst glance,the interconnections between the varieties of extant political religion,such as the`new political activism of American clergymen; the radicalismof Catholic priests and liberation theology in Latin America; the growthof Islamic ¼ [and]Sikh in India’ are either `weakor nonexistent. Liberation theologians and revolutionary ayatollahs may beaware of each other’ s existencebut have not in¯ uenced each other very much.’ 35 What,if anything,do these manifestations of political religion have in common,other than having all occurred over the last 30 years? Asnotedabove, secularisation makes sustainedprogress except when religion ®ndsor retains work to do other than relating individuals to the supernatural. Thosewho argue that there is conclusiveevidence of a global resurgenceof politicalreligion, many of whom are religiouspeople, are, in my opinion, indulgingin wishful thinking. On the other hand, it cannot be gainsaid that examplesof political religion abound; Smith’ s argumentthat we are justmore awareof themthan previously certainly has merit.I doubt,however, that this is thewhole story. Sahliyeh’ s allusionto `socialcrisis’ ,theimportance of commu- nicationsnetworks, and social upheaval and economic dislocation are all characteristicof the postmodern condition. 715 JEFF HAYNES

Examplesof political religion noted above relate emphatically to the mun- dane;they are rootedin perceptionsof a groupfeeling that the status quo is not conduciveto long-term well-being. In the case ofSikh separatism, cultural defenceis themobilising issue, catalysed by the re-emergence of Hindu chauvinism.In the other three examplesÐ American clergymen, radical Latin AmericanCatholic priests and Islamic fundamentalismÐ the rigours of cultural transition,where identity is threatened,underpin and galvanise the religious reaction. Theterm `’ , apparentlycoined by J-F Lyotard, 36 is de® ned by himas incredulitytowards meta-narratives, ie rejection of absolute ways of speakingtruth. Postmodernism is anenigmatic , whose very ambiguity re¯ects theconfusion and uncertainty inherent in contemporarylife. The term is appliedin and to many diverse spheres ofhuman life and activity. It is important forpolitics as itdecisivelyre¯ ects theend of beliefin theEnlightenment project, theassumption of universal progress based on reason, and in the `modern Prometheanmyth of humanity’ s masteryof its destiny and capacity for resol- utionof all its problems’ . 37 Socially,postmodernism refers to`changes in the everydaypractices and experiences of different groups, who ¼ developnew means oforientation and identity structures ¼ Postmodernism¼ directsour attentionto changes taking place in contemporary culture’ . 38 Theemergence of thepostmodern era, I wantto argue,is ofmajor signi® cance forpolitical religion. 39 Ahmedargues that postmodernism `encourages the rejectionof centres and systems, engendersthe growth of local identity, makes availableinformation and thus teaches people to demand their rights ¼ fosters ideasof freedomand eclecticism, [and] challenges the state’ . 40 Rosenauempha- sises thefragmentation and voluntarism inherent in postmodernism.

Consistentwith the decentralizing tendencies that have disrupted authority relations atall levels is the diminishing hold that all-encompassing systems of thought exerciseover their adherents. This decay can be discerned in the pockets of disaffectionwith the scienti® c rationalismof Western thoughtÐ with what is consideredto be the end of `progress’ as de® ned by the `modernity project’ Ð rep- resentedby postmodernist formulations. 41

LikeAhmed and Rosenau, De Gruchy stresses boththe opportunities and the destabilisationwhich postmodernism represents: itis `turbulent,traumatic and dislocating,yet it is alsopotentially creative’ . 42 Accordingto Simpson, `the postmodernfactor is de®ned by asociopoliticaldimension, a cultural/interpretive dimension,and a humanrights dimension’ . 43 Thefall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, followed by the sudden, unexpected demiseof communist systems inthe Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1990±91, exempli® ed the sociopolitical and human rights dimensions of the postmodernera. They marked a fundamentalhistorical change from one epoch toanother, helping to fuel widespread, albeit transitory, optimism that a benign `NewWorld Order’ would follow the ideological diviseness and malignity of the ColdWar. Optimism was premisedparticularly upon the spread of liberal democracy,pluralism and human rights to non-democratic countries. After the 716 RELIGION, SECULARISATION AND POLITICS

ColdWar, liberal democracyÐ with its implicit acceptance of religious plural- ismÐ`found itself without enemies or viable alternatives’ . 44 Itissometimesargued that religious fundamentalism is thechief manifestation ofthe cultural/ interpretivedimension of postmodernism. 45 Whilereligious fun- damentalismis undeniablypolitically and theologically important, it isnonethe- less necessary tobear in mind that it is butone religious interpretation with contemporaryresonance; moreover, it is therealm of opposition. Throughout historyworld religions have functioned as `terrainsof meaning’ , subjectto radicallydifferent interpretations and con¯ icts, often with profound social and politicalimplications. Islam, and Buddhism have long traditions of reformers,populists and `protestants’ , seekingto givethe religion contemporary meaningand social . The postmodern era, rather than being dominated byfundamentalism alone, is aperiodof wider religious reinterpretation, where popularreligion challenges mainstream religious organisations.

Popularreligion: fundamentalism,culture andopposition Popularreligiosity is animportant contemporary trend encompassing the :Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam andJudaism. 46 Thisis notto claimthat popular religion is replacingmainstream religion; rather, I wishto arguethat, for some people,popular religious forms offerviable alternatives. Globally,religion manifests itself in two broad tendencies: mainstream and popularforms. Two examples of the latter have political importance today: fundamentalist 47 andcultural groups. 48 Asalreadydiscussed, mainstream religion byde®nition has anempathetic relation with political power even when opposed toit, as wellas areadinessto try to achieve an accommodation with secular thought.In contrast, fundamentalist religious groups and movements oppose bothmainstream religion and secular power. Despite a varietyof theological positions,they have in common an understanding of religioustradition which is botharbitrary and unconcerned with any need to reconcile belief with secular views.As aresult,they commonly confront state authority with the express aim ofcapturing it. Cultural groups, on the other hand, meld ethnicity and religion inan ideology of opposition. Fundamentalistand cultural groups are vehiclesof popular religion. The formerengage in theprocess ofnegotiatingcultural transition, where the identity ofcertaingroups is, according to groupmembers, menaced during major cultural transitions;the latter, in contrast, function as organisationsof cultural defence againstchallenges from unwelcome, intrusive, alien forces. In both cases, religionprovides resources fornegotiating transitions or asserting a newclaim toa sense ofworth; both involve political responses. Popularreligions are communityexpressions of group desires toachieve a religious,social and political satisfaction not forthcoming from mainstream religions.Both Marx and Weber stress howthe `contingent nature of the relationshipbetween the content of an ideology and the social position of the groupwho are itsª carriersºis offundamental importance in understanding the socialrole of the ideology’ . 49 Whatthis suggests in relation to the mainstream religionsis thattheir leaders will often be primarilyconcerned with perpetuating 717 JEFF HAYNES andpromulgating a religiousmessage whichis alsoan ideology of domination, aimingto strengthen and bolster their own social and theological position, normallyin cahoots with secular power. Thepolitics of the secularisation of society has beenlargely unsuccessful in theaim of subjugating autonomous forms ofcollective life to state control. In manyurban settings, for example among Muslims in both the industrialised West andthe Third World, there is acleardesire to build new networks of social solidaritywhich before urbanisation were based on kinship structures, and on clanand age groups. The essence ofmodern Muslim community in urban surroundingsis tocome to terms withthe effects ofmodernisation on social structures.Muslim community organisations, rather like Christian fundamentalist churches,often appear to `rescue’ thosewho are `drifting’in the urban milieu, includingthose who come to the urban centre for economic betterment, but instead® ndthemselvescut off from family and community. For them, religious± communityorganisations offer an alternative `family’ . 50 Insum, popular re- ligiousorganisations offer ways of af® rmingthe autonomy and identity of a religiousor ethno-religious community, especially in urban centres where traditionalcommunity ties are oftensundered. Popularreligion re¯ ects thepower of ordinary people to take charge of their ownspiritual, and in some cases, material,well-being. Because itisthereligion ofthe`ordinary’ people, it isusuallyquite different in bothconception and form tothe religious orthodoxies propounded by the leaders of hegemonial religions. Tospeakof theology,Islam orChristianityin thesingular is tofailto appreciate thatsuch only have meaning in theclass contextwithin which they are viewed.Religious unity is achimera.A presumedor claimed religious `univer- sality’in fact masks wideranging diversity, the result of the strati® cation of socialclasses andgroups. Clerics’ theology is theof® cial philosophy of the religionthey propound; yet the claimed theological uniformity frequently dis- solvesinto a numberof forms pertainingto the level of life at which the recipientof the ideas exists. `Popular religion’ , iereligion as itis lived,is thus quitedifferent from that of the professional articulators of the religion’ s philosophy.

Religiousfundamentalism Attemptsto salvagethe model have interpreted evidence of burgeon- ingreligiosity in many contemporary political events to mean that we arewitness- ingmerely a fundamentalist,antimodernist backlash against science, industrialization,and liberal Western values. 51

Thepolitical lines have increasingly been drawn between those in all major religiouscommunities who remain deeply enmeshed in religious cultures and personswho wear theirreligious loyalty rather more lightly. The former inhabit subculturesthat stress moral traditionalism and encourage its application to public policywhile the latter, freed of exposure to traditional rules of conduct, are more disposedto accept a libertarianethic in what is called `lifestyle choice’ . Byvirtue oftheir encapsulation in organizations which transmit political norms, the strongly 718 RELIGION, SECULARISATION AND POLITICS

religiousexhibit greater political cohesion than the unchurched who divide accord- ingto other criteria. 52

As thequotations suggest, religious fundamentalists, feeling their way of life underthreat, aim to reformsociety in accordancewith religious tenets: to change thelaws, morality, social norms and, sometimes, the political con® gurations of theircountry. In short, they seek tocreate a tradition-orientated,less mod- ern(ised)society. Fundamentalists tend to livein population centresÐ or at least are oftenclosely linked by electronic media. They ® ghtgovernment because its jurisdictionnormally encompasses areas, includingeducation, employment pol- icyand the nature of society’ s moralclimate, which they believe are integralto thebuilding of a religiouslyappropriate society. Fundamentalists also struggle againstboth `nominal’ co-religionists, perceived as laxin their religious duties, as wellas againstmembers ofopposing religions. Examples of fundamentalist groupsare tobe found among followers of the Abrahamic `religions of the book’ÐChristianity,Islam, 53 andJudaismÐ and among and Buddhists, too. Islamists,like Jewish and Christian fundamentalists, take as theirde® ning dogmawhat are believedto beGod’swordswritten in theirHoly Book. In other words,singular scriptural are centralto fundamentalist dogma. NeitherHindus nor Buddhists have central tenets of political, social and moral importconveniently accessible; yeteach has theirfundamentalist groups, charac- terisedby a desireto recapture a nationalidentity, seriously diminished, they believe,by dint of cultural dilution or poor, corrupt government. 54 Religiousfundamentalism is alwayssocially but not necessarily politically conservative.Islamist groups seek anoverthrow of the current socio-economic andpolitical order by the use ofviolence, incremental reform or electoral victory.Christian fundamentalists in theUSA andUlster, like Jewish fundamen- talistsin Israel, on the other hand, are closelylinked to conservative political forces seekingto reverse whatthey perceive as excessiveliberalisation and relaxationof social and moral mores. Iam notsuggesting that religious fundamentalism was necessarilyunimport- antin thepast; thegrowth of Christianfundamentalism in theUSA overthe past 90years, or the emergence of successive wavesof Islamic reformists over the lasttwo centuries in West Africa, would belie that argument. What I am proposingis thatthe overtly politicised goals of thecontemporary fundamentalist movementshould be understood in relation to the insecurities of the postmod- ernistera andthe accretion of power sought by the state as afunctionof the secularisationprocess. Formany people, especially in the Third World, postmodernism is synony- mouswith poverty, leading the poor especially to bereceptiveto fundamentalist argumentswhich supply a mobilisingideology. Widespread shanty towns testify tothevast numbers of people who cling to themargins of themodern economy ina tenuousfashion in the Third World. Poverty is exacerbatedby a withering ofcommunity ties. Yet, while traditional communal ties are sundered,new and religion-orientatedones may be created.In the USA, ontheother hand, Christian fundamentalistsare predominantlyfound among the most af¯ uent, successful 719 JEFF HAYNES members ofthe society. 55 Clearly,it would be absurd to argue that alienation explainsthe existence of such people in the USA. Christianfundamentalism, after achieving social and political prominence in theearly decades of thetwentieth century, reemerged as alegitimatevehicle for politicalideas in theUSA fromthe mid-1960s 56 aperiodof political,social and economicupheaval. Currently, there are anestimated 60 million followers of fundamentalistChristianity in the USA, nearlyone-quarter of the total popu- lationof 250 million. 57 Fundamentalistsprovided the core support for Pat Robertson’s unsuccessful1988 presidential campaign, and for Pat Buchanan’ s in 1992and 1996; many are concernedwith allegedly high levels of amorality in the USA. Thethird `religion of the book’ ,,also has itsreligious fundamental- ists; oneof them, Yigal Amir, assassinated YitzhakRabin, the Israeli prime minister,in November 1995. Rabin’ s `crime’was negotiatingwith Palestine LiberationOrganization ( PLO)leader,Yassar Arafat,to allow Palestinians a measure ofself-governmentbased upon a reductionin thephysical size ofIsrael. Jewishfundamentalist groups, such as GushEmunim (Bloc of the Faithful), are characterisedby anextreme unwilingness to negotiatewith Palestinians over land.Gush was foundedafter the 1978 Camp David agreement between Israel andEgypt, resulting in the handing back of the Sinai desert to the latter. Other fundamentalistgroups, such as thelate Rabbi Meir Kahane’ s organisation,Kach (Thus),also argue against the return of territory to Egypt. The biblical entity, EretzIsrael, they argue, was signi®cantly larger than the contemporary state of Israel.To handback any territory to Arabs, nearly all non-Jews, is tantamount, itis argued,to going against God’ s willas revealedin the Bible. Simmering religiousopposition to the peace plan with the PLO,involvinggiving autonomy totheGaza Strip and to anarea aroundJericho, reached tragic levels in February 1994when a religiouszealot, Baruch Goldstein, linked with militants of both Kachand Kahane Chai (Kahane Lives), murdered about 30 people during a dawnattack on amosquein theoccupied West Bank town of Hebron. After the massacre bothKach and Kahane Chai were banned by the Israeli government, asignof its commitment to crush religious extremist groups which systemati- callyused violence to gain their ends. Hinduand Buddhist are eitherrooted in culturalchauvinism orin perceptions of poor, corrupt government. Contemporary Hindu fundamen- talismis byno means sui generis.MahatmaGandhi, the Indian nationalist, a committedHindu, was assassinated byaHinduextremist in 1948for the `crime’ ofappearing to condone the creation of a bifurcatedhomeland for India’ s Muslims,East and West Pakistan. More recently, simmering Hindu fundamen- talistsuspicion of India’ s largestreligious minorityÐ Muslims comprise about 11%of thepopulationÐ was strengthenedby the 1992 destruction of themosque atAyodhya in UttarPradesh, built, according to some Hindus,on the birthplace ofthegod of war,. As longago as 1950the mosque was closeddown by theIndian government, as militantHindus long sought to build a Hindutemple inplace of the mosque. Ina furtherexample of the fanning of communal ¯ ames, thelate prime minister,Indira Gandhi, paid with her life in 1984 by appealing to Hindu 720 RELIGION, SECULARISATION AND POLITICS chauvinismto take on Sikh militancy in the Punjab. Her son, Prime Minister RajivGandhi, was probablyassassinated bya TamilHindu in 1991 because he sentIndian troops to tryto resolvethe civil con¯ ict in SriLanka between Hindu Tamilsand Buddhist Sinhalese. InThailand, a neo-Buddhistmovement, Santi Asoke, made a unilateral declarationof independencefrom the orthodox Thai sangha (bodyof )in 1975.One of its most prominent followers, a formergovernor of Bangkok, Major-GeneralChamlong Srimaung, formed a politicalparty in the late 1980s calledPalang Tham Party: `tham’ means both`moral’ and `dhamma’ : the teachingsof Buddhism. Some perceive Palang Tham’ s ultimategoal as the creationof a radicalBuddhist state in Thailand. 58 Whatthis would entail, it appears,is acorruption-freepolitical environment with the role of the miltary downplayedand with the state ideology relating to the ideals of the Buddha. Despitesome politicalsuccesses, involvingthe winning of 14 parliamentary seats inthe 1988 elections, Palang Tham’ s Buddhistfundamentalist message failedto excite many voters. Inconclusion, religious fundamentalism may be divided into two broad categories:one pertains to the `religions of the book’ , wherescriptural revela- tionsrelating to political, moral and social issues formthe corpus of fundamen- talistdemands, often acting as aprogrammeof political action. The second comprisesHindu and Buddhist fundamentalisms, where the absence of de®nitive scripturalnorms allows religious dogma to adopt nationalist and chauvinist dimensions.Nonetheless, despite intermittent political importance, religious fundamentalistgroups usuallyÐ India is anexceptionÐ remain relatively mar- ginalto national-level politicsÐ as inthe USA.

Culturalgroups Theaggregate trend in theWest seems tobethat,under conditions of democratic pluralism,secular materialism turns attention away from traditional forms of religiosity.Institutionalised political competition gives at least partial vent to nationalistaspirations, funnelling communal con¯ ict from `potentially virulent combinationsof God and nation’ . 59 IntheThird World, in contrast, democratic pluralism is ofteneither nonexist- entor bogus,whereas both ethnicity and religion are oftenof socialand political salience.60 Theinteraction of ethnicityand religion sometimes leads to `cultural’ oppositionideologies and religio-ethnic con¯ ict because `the basic political issues ofnational sovereignty and the alignment of ethnic and national boundarieshave not been settled’ . 61 Where`different religious serve as badgesof identity for distinct ethnic constituencies there can be no ª market situationsºfor religions and no effective free choice’. 62 Politicalculture is animportant variable in analysis of cultural groups, as it suggestsunderlying beliefs, values and opinions which a peopleholds dear. It is ofteneasy todiscern close links between religion and ethnicity. Sometimes, indeed,it is practicallyimpossible to separate out de® ning characteristics of a group’s culturalcomposition when religious belief is anintegral part of ethnicity. Bothare highlyimportant components of a people’s self-identity.For example, 721 JEFF HAYNES itwouldbe verydif® cult indeed to isolatethe different cultural componentsÐ re- ligiousand non-religiousÐ of what it means tobe a Sikh,a Jew,a Tibetan,a Somali,an East Timorese or a`loyalist’(ie Protestant) or `nationalist’(ie Roman Catholic)Ulsterman or woman. Itisimportantto note, however, that not all ethnic groups are alsocollectively followersof one particular religion. For example, the Yoruba of southwest Nigeriaare dividedroughly equally between followers of Islam andadherents of variousChristianities. Yoruba group self-identity is tiedclosely to identi®cation withcertain geographically speci® c areas; religiousdifferentiation is amore recentaccretion, traceable in partto theimpact of colonialism.It doesnot de® ne `Yoruba-ness’in relation to other ethnic groups. The Ibo of eastern Nigeria, on theother hand, are predominantlyChristian; very few are Muslim.While this singularreligious orientation is largelya resultof the effects ofEuropean colonialism,Christianity became an integral facet of Ibo identity in relation to predominantlyMuslim groups, dominant in thenorth of thecountry. Many Ibos came intocontact (and con¯ ict) with northern Muslims as aresultof the former’s migrationto the north in pursuit of economicrewards. In a subsequent civilwar (1967± 70), the Ibo secessionists usedhatred of Islam as partof their rallyingpropaganda. They sought to depict the north of the country as exclu- sivelyMuslim, when the true proportion was inthe region of 60%± 70% of the population.In the civil war, Christian peoplesÐ notably, the Tiv, Idoma, Igalla andSouthern ZariaÐ from the country’ s so-calledgeographical `middle belt’ formedthe bulk of the federal infantry; Yorubas (both Muslim and Christian) tookmany posts in the federal technical services. 63 TheNigerian Civil War is butone example of awidertrend: over the past 30 years therehave been many examples of religio-ethnic civil con¯ ict in many ThirdWorld countries. Until the early 1970s scholars often argued that ethnic con¯ict would wither away as societiesmodernised. When this manifestly failed tooccur, academic theories were turned on their head to posit a radically differentinterpretation of ethnicity in national politics. Such `con¯ ictual’ mod- ernisationideas suggest that growing inter-ethnic social and economic activity, ratherthan increasing the likelihood of cooperation between ethnic groups, will makecon¯ ict more likely. 64 Inother words, modernisation is asuf® cient conditionfor the emergence of ethnic political con¯ ict. Ethno-regional parties, suchas theParti Que Âbecois,the Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru in Wales, andvarious Belgian and Spanish manifestations, indicate the continuing political salienceof cultural issues inindustrialised countries. The existence of political con¯icts between cultural groups in EasternEurope, especially the former Soviet Union(FSU) andformer Yugoslavia, further underline the potentials for con¯ ict inmulti-ethnicstates. Ethnic strife in ChristianArmenia and Muslim Azerbaijan andthe three-way struggle between (Christian) Serbs, (Christian) Croats and Muslimsin Bosnia-Herzegovina,all involve religio-ethnic issues. Eachconstitu- encyhas itsinternational supportÐ the Muslims, Middle Eastern Muslim states andIslamist groups, the Christian Armenians, Serbs andCroats, Russia, Ger- manyand Greece. Itisnotonly religious con¯ icts between actual or putativestates whichfocus internationalattention. The assassination of India’ s primeminister, Indira 722 RELIGION, SECULARISATION AND POLITICS

Gandhi,in October 1984, followed an assaultÐ `Operation Bluestar’ Ð byIndian securityagents and the army to end the occupation of the Golden Temple in Amritsarby the Sikh extremist, Jernail Singh Bhindranwale, and a largenumber ofhis followers. More than 2000 people were killed in the attack. This catastrophicevent focused attention on Sikh designs for an independent state, Khalistan.Over time, however, Sikh unity fractured, with competing groups and ideologiesranging along a spectrumfrom the `zealous’ at one extremity, using terrorismin pursuit of political aims, to the `moderate’ , usingnegotiation as a chieftactic, at the other. Although Sikhs failed in theshort term to gaina state, theirexemplary opposition to whatthey perceived as India’s creeping`Hinduisa- tion’helped stimulate other religio-ethnic separatist movements in India.Muslim radicalsin thestate of JammuÐ Kashmir also used appeals to cultural solidarity tofocus opposition to the central government. Thedefensive nature of theJammu andKashmiri Muslim and Sikh mobilising ideologiesis acommonfeature of cultural groups who perceive themselves underthreat from hostile forces. In this respect, the emergence of putative unitarystates inthe Third World as aresultof decolonisation after World War IIis closelylinked to the process ofmodernisation which implies, among otherthings, the development of strongly centralised government, often along thelines bequeathed by former colonial administrations. The development of a centralisedgovernment, often dominated by ethnic, cultural, religious, or other particularisticgroups, frequently exacerbates previously latent tensions into overt con¯ ict. Forexample, in Sudan, southern Sudanese Christian peoples, including the Dinkaand the Nuer, are ®ghtinga long-runningcivil war against northern SudaneseMuslims, aided by Iran, wishing to found an throughout thecountry. Even though northern Sudanese leaders claimed that Islamic (ie )lawwould not be introduced in non-Muslim areas ofthe country, it is clearthat their aim, involving of Christians and pagans to Islam,is eventuallyto `arabise’and Islamise theentire country. Not surprisingly, culturallyand religiously distinct southern Sudanese regard the objective as tantamountto an assault upon their way of life, perhaps their very survival. Itis notonly the case thatreligious and cultural con¯ ict arises as aresultof decolonisation;modernisation as aseries ofprocesses ofeconomic, social and culturalchange affects allcommunities in the current era toa quanti®able degree.China was ofcourse never formally colonised by European powers. Nevertheless,the development of aChineseunitary state was byno means well advancedby the time of thetriumph of the Communists in the civil war against Nationalistforces in1949. One of the foremost aims ofthe new Chinese governmentwas toextend its writ throughout all the lands claimed to beintegral partsof the countryÐ including those with distinctive cultural and religious attributes. InTibet, the westernmost outpost of the Chinese state, a Buddhisttheocracy developedover centuries while central control from China sundered. Tibet was ruledby a religio-political® gureÐthe Dalai Lama, endlessly reincarnated toensure continuity of ruleÐ until the Chinese invasion in 1952. After a period ofrelative equanimity, Buddhist monks led increasingly stiff resistance 723 JEFF HAYNES toenforcedcultural change at the hands of thedominant Han Chinese. The latter soughtto turn Tibet into a provinceof China, a process ofenforced modernis- ationwhich resulted in a seriousdiminution of Tibetan culture involving an in¯ux of settlers from outside the area. Serious outbreaks of anti-Chinese resistanceoccurred during the 1980s and early 1990s, and intermittent oppo- sitionthereafter. Tibet, home to fewer than 10 million people, contributes more politicalprisoners than the rest ofChina’ s provincescombined. More than 100 Tibetanswere arrested and detained in 1993 for political reasons relatingto culturalautonomy. Political unrest also increased in other `national minority’ areas ofthe country. What the authorities referred to as `gang® ghting’(almost certainlywith a religiousand cultural component) also broke out in 1993 in the largelyMuslim Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. 65 Attemptsforcibly to engineer mass culturaland/ orreligious change also characteriseIndonesian aggression in East Timor. Again the aim is todominate anewlyacquired portion of territory, to diminish the cultural and religious distinctivenessof an area inthe pursuit of a unitarystate. The territory was invadedin 1975, following the desultory end of Portuguese colonialism and a short-livedcivil war won by the main liberation movement, Fretilin (Frente Revolucionariode TimorLeste Independente). Indonesia spent the next 20 years tryingto crusha low-pro®le resistancemovement in orderto change East Timor froma culturallydistinct nation into a provinceof Indonesia conforming to that country’s religious(Islamic) and linguistic (Indonesian) norms. Rather than engenderingmass conversionto Islam, however, military efforts resulted in the EastTimorese moving en masse toRoman Catholicism: in 1975 there were 250000 Catholics in the country, by 1994 there were nearly 700 000, ie almost threetimes as many,with Portuguese ironically the language of revolt. Itshouldnot be assumed fromthe above examples that it isonlyin theThird Worldthat religio-ethnic solidarity takes a culturalform. Apart from the tragic exampleof Bosnia-Herzegovina, where religio-ethnic con¯ ict engendered the chilleuphemism, `ethnic cleansing’ , thereare alsoradical cultural groups among disadvantagedblack Americans and within Britain’ s culturallydistinct Muslim communities.In Britain,the endemic racism ofBritishsociety led to thegrowth ofsuch organisations as theYoung Muslims, Al Muntada al Islami, Muslim WelfareHouse, and Hizb ut Tahrir (Liberation Party), whose activists preached separationfrom British (and Western) society and hatred of Jews. Foundedin the 1930sby Elijah Muhammad, the Nation of Islam, based in Chicago and led by LouisFarrakhan, is animportant focal point for alienated African± Americans. Preachinga virulentmixture of anti-semitism, anti-corruption ,pro-community, self-helpand black separatism, Farrakhan seeks tomobilise frustrated African± Americans.Estimates of numbers of members oftheNation of Islam rangefrom 10000to 30 000,with up to 500 000 additional `sympathisers’ . 66 Farrakhan’s mainidea is forAfrican± Americans to work together in common pursuit of groupself-interest and solidarity. The Nation of Islam organiseswelfare agen- cies anda numberof successful businesses inpursuit of the goal of emanci- pation. Therelationship of Islam as aset ofreligious precepts to the rationale of the Nationof Islam is perhapsrather tenuous. The group’ s ideologyre¯ ects a 724 RELIGION, SECULARISATION AND POLITICS dissatisfactionwith mainstream US culturerather than re¯ ecting adherence to theidea of buildingan Islamic state. The choice of anameredolent of religious symbolismÐthe Nation of IslamÐmay, at least in part, re¯ ect the emergence of fundamentalistIslam inthe Third World as apotentsymbol of anti-Westernism andanti-Americanism. Tosummarise, cultural groups may, under certain circumstances, rise up againstgroups perceived as theiroppressors. Such a developmentis oftendriven bythe apparent dominance of the machinery of state by one speci® c groupÐin India,by Hindus, in Sudan, by northern Arab Muslims, in Tibet, by Han Chinese,in East Timor, by Indonesians, and so on. It is commonin the Third World,where the process ofbuildingunitary states iscontinuing,a development givenimpetus by the end of the Cold War and the accompanying explosion of nationalistdemands. Yet, as eventsin former Yugoslavia and the FSU make plain,it isnot,as itwere,the `third-worldn ess’ ofstates whichis thechief cause ofcultural friction, but rather incomplete state formation and abortive attempts atmodernisation. In centralised statesÐ such as Britainand the USAÐ groups whichperceive themselves as ignoredor threatened by the state may seek to highlightcultural and religious singularities in orderto increasesolidarity and to press politicalclaims against the centre. Inconclusion, popular religion offers communitysolidarity, especially wel- comein the postmodern period of widespread social upheaval and perceived crisis,while also helping to ful® ll people’s spiritualneeds. Popular religion is a means ofattempting to come to terms withmultifaceted change, offering hope ofspiritual well-being through community effort. What is theconnection betweenpopular religion and political protest? Moyser discovered that in Britain,a countrycharacterised by both secularisation and popular adherence to mainstreamreligion for the most part, `religious adherence generally reduced the propensityfor protest’ . 67 Elsewhere,however, religion, especially in theguise of fundamentalismand not only in the Third World, often serves toencourage activerejection of and alienation from government .

Conclusion Popularreligion is notnew: there have always been opponents of mainstream interpretations.What is novel,however, is thatin the past manifestations of popularreligion were normally bundled up within strong frameworks that held themtogether, serving to policethe most extreme tendencies, as intheChristian churches,or were at least nominally under the control of the mainstream religionÐas withpopular sects inIslam andBuddhism. In thecontemporary era, however,it is nolonger possible to keep all religious tendencies within traditionalorganising frameworks. This is aconsequenceof two developments: a) widespread,destabilising changeÐ summarised as postmodernismÐwhich causes manypeople to questionwhat were once their most unshakeable convic- tions;b) the fact that religion and morality, especially in the secular West, are increasinglypushed out of the public arena into the private domain, despite the effortsof campaigners like morality activist Mary Whitehouse in Britain or Pat 725 JEFF HAYNES

Buchanan,political spokesman of the USA’ sChristianCoalition and presidential candidate. Inthepast, popular religious groups functioned in isolation.This is nolonger thecase. Paralleling,and in some waysreinforcing, the impact of postmod- ernism,is thatof globalisation. In the context of the spread of ideas, especially religiousviews, globalisationÐ particularly the impact of the spread of commu- nicationsto all parts of theworldÐ means thatgroups are nolongerisolated. In thepast, when breaks in religious traditions came, the breakaways were either recapturedor, if they stayed independent, came intime to re¯ ect again the diversityfrom which they wished to escape. Today, in contrast, such divisions are less easilycontained, as theerosion of Catholicism in Latin America, for instance,where it is givingway to Protestant charismatic religions, seems to indicate. Generally,it isclearthat, under certain circumstances of culturaldefence and transition,religion may have considerable impact upon politics, especially in the ThirdWorld. Con® dence that the growth and spread of urbanisation, education, economicdevelopment, scienti® c rationalityand social mobility would combine todiminish signi® cantly the sociopolitical power of religion was notwell founded,with fundamentalist and cultural groups emerging as vehiclesof popularopposition. Threats emanating either from powerful outsider groups or fromunwelcome symptoms of modernisation (breakdown of moral behaviour, perceivedover-liberalisation in education and social habits) galvanise such religion-basedreactions. Religiousfundamentalism can be divided into two categories: the `religions of thebook’ and nationalist-orientat edHinduism and Buddhism. Scriptural revela- tionsrelating to political, moral and social issues formthe corpus of fundamen- talistdemands. Sometimes these are deeplyconservative (US Christian fundamentalists),sometimes they are reformistor revolutionary (some Islamist andBuddhist groups), and sometimes they are xenophobic,racist and (some Jewishgroups, such as Kachand Kahane Chai). Hindu and Buddhist fundamentalisms,on the other hand, assume nationalistdimensions when re- ligiousrevivalism pertains to the rebirth of national identity and vigour, denied inthe past, zealots consider, by unwelcome cultural dilution or poor, corrupt government. Whilesecularisation is the`normal’ Ð andcontinuingÐ state of affairs invery manyWestern societies, fundamentalist and cultural groups examined in this paperhave in common a dissaffectionand dissatisfaction with established, hierarchical,institutionalised religious bodies; a desireto ® ndGod through personalsearching rather than through the mediation of institutions;and a belief incommunities’ ability to make bene® cial changes to their lives through the applicationof group effort. This desire to `go it alone’ , notto be beholden to `superior’bodies characterises popular religious groups. For some, religion offers arationalalternative to those to whom modernisation has eitherfailed or isinsome wayunattractive. Its interactionwith political issues overthe medium termis likelyto be of especial importance, carrying a seriousand seminal message ofsocietal resurgence and regeneration in relation to both political leadersand economic elites. 726 RELIGION, SECULARISATION AND POLITICS

Notes 1 JHadden,`Towards desacralizing secularization theory’ , SocialForces ,65,1987, pp 587±611; A, Shupe `Thestubborn persistence ofreligion in the global arena’ ,inE Sahliyeh(ed), ReligiousResurgence and Politicsin the Contemporary World ,pp17±26, Albany, NY: State Universityof New YorkPress, 1990;and SThomas,`Religion and international society’ , paperprepared for the workshop: `Political Culture and Religionin the Third World’ , EuropeanConsortium for Political Research JointSessions of Workshops, Bordeaux,April± May 1995. 2 RWallis& SBruce,`Secularization: the orthodox model’ , inS Bruce (ed), Religionand Modernization , pp8± 30, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992,B Wilson,`Re¯ ections on a manysided controversy’ , inBruce, Religionand Modernization ,pp195±210; and S Bruce,`Fundamentalism, ethnicity and enclave’ ,inM Marty& RScottAppleby (eds), Fundamentalismsand the State, Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance,pp50±67, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993. 3 RBellah`Religious evolution’ , AmericanSociological Review ,29(3), 1964, pp 358±374. 4 GTherborn,`Another way oftaking religion seriously. Comment on FrancisG Castles’ , EuropeanJournal ofPolitical Research ,26(1) 1994, pp 103±110. 5 GMoyser,`Politics and religion in the modern world: an overview’ , inMoyser (ed), Politicsand Religion inthe Modern World ,pp1±27, London: Routledge, 1991. 6 KWald,`Social change and political response: the silent religious cleavage inNorth America’ inMoyser, Politicsand Religion in the Modern World ,pp239±284. 7 Inthis article theterm `church’refers to any establishedform of religion; it is notrestricted totheChristian Church. 8 Therlon,`another way oftaking religion seriously’ , p105. 9 M Weber, Economyand Society ,Berkeley:University of California Press, 1978,pp 1159± 1160. 10 T Parsons, Structuresand Process inModern Societies ,Chicago,IL: Universityof Chicago Press, 1960. 11 KMedhurst,`Religion and politics. a typology’, ScottishJournal of ,2(2),1981, pp 115±134. 12 Ibid., p 120. 13 SKMitra,`Desecularising thestate: religionand politics in India after Independence’, ComparativeStudies inSociety and History ,33(4), 1991, pp 755± 777. 14 Ibid., p 758. 15 RRAlford,`Religion and politics’ , inR Robertson(ed), Sociologyof Religion ,pp321± 330, Baltimore, MD: Penguin,1969. 16 Mitra,`Desecularising the State’ ,p757. 17 MWoollacott,`Keeping our faith in belief’ , Guardian,23December, 1995. 18 Shupe,`The stubborn persistence ofreligion in the global arena’ ,p19. 19 D E Smith, Religionand Political Development ,Boston,MA: Little, Brown, 1970, p 6. 20 Moyser,`Politics and religion in the modern world’ , p14. 21 Wilson,`Re¯ ections on a manysided controversy’ , p200. 22 Bruce,`Fundamentalism, ethnicity and enclave’ ,p51. 23 Wallis& Bruce,`Secularization’ , pp17±18. 24 Shupe,`The stubborn persistence ofreligion in the global arena’ ;ESahliyeh`Foreword’ , inSahliyeh, ReligiousResurgence andPolitics in theContemporary World ,ppvii±ix; E Sahliyeh,`Religious resurgence andpolitical modernization’ , inSahliyeh, ReligiousResurgence andPolitics in the Contemporary World , pp1± 16; Thomas, `Religion and international society’ ; andWoollacott, `Keeping our faith in belief’ . 25 Thomas,`Religion and international society’ , p1. 26 Sahliyeh,`Foreword’ , pvi. 27 Sahliyeh,`Religious resurgence andpolitical modernization’ , p15. 28 Ibid., p 6. 29 Ibid., pp 10±11. 30 Shupe,`The stubborn persistence ofreligion in the global arena’ ,p18. 31 DESmith,`Limits of religious resurgence’ ,inSahliyeh, ReligiousResurgence andPolitics in the ContemporaryWorld ,pp33± 44; Albany: State Universityof New YorkPress, 1990. 32 SHuntington, TheThird Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century ,Norman,OK: University ofOklahoma Press, 1991;and Huntington, `The clash ofcivilizations?’ , ForeignAffairs ,72(3), 1993, pp 22±49. 33 Smith,`Limits of religious resurgence’ ,p34.See alsoJ Haynes, Religionin Third World Politics , Buckingham:Open University Press, 1993;and Haynes, ThirdWorld Politics. A ConciseIntroduction , Oxford:Blackwell, 1996. 34 J Haynes, Religionand Politics in Africa ,London:Zed Books, 1996, pp 55±56. 35 Smith,`Limits of religious resergence’ ,p33. 36 J F Lyotard, ThePost-Modern Condition: a Reporton Knowledge ,Manchester:Manchester University Press, 1979. 727 JEFF HAYNES

37 MWatson,`Christianity and the green option in the new Europe’in J Fulton& PGee (eds), Religion in ContemporaryEurope ,pp148±159, Lewiston, NY: EdwinMellen, 1994. Quote at p150. 38 Featherstone,M. `Inpursuit of thepostmodern. An introduction, Theory,Culture and Society ,5(2/3),1988, pp 195±216. 39 Fora discussionof postmodernism and Christianity, see JSimpson,`Fundamentalism in America revisited: thefading of modernity as asourceof symbolic capital’ ,inB Misztal &AShupe(eds), Religionand Politicsin Comparative Perspective. Revival ofReligious Fundamentalism in East and West , pp 10±27, Westport,CT: Praeger,1992. In relation to Islam, see AAhmed, Postmodernismand Islam: Predicament and Promise,London:Routledge, 1992. 40 Ahmed, Postmodernismand Islam , p 129. 41 J Rosenau, Turbulencein World Politics: A Theoryof Change and Continuity ,Princeton:Princeton UniversityPress, 1990,p 414. 42 J De Gruchy, Christianityand Democracy. ATheoryFor a JustWorld Order ,Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress, 1995,p 5. 43 Simpson,`Fundamentalism in America revisited’, p13. 44 GHyden,`Governance and the study of politics’ in GHyden& MBratton(eds), Governanceand Politics in Africa,pp1± 26, Boulder, co: Lynne Rienner, 1992. Quote at p4.See alsoF Fukuyama, The End of History andthe Last Man ,London:Penguin, 1992. 45 Simpson,`Fundamentalism in America revisited’; andH Cox, Religionin the Secular City. Toward a PostmodernTheology ,New York:Simon and Schuster, 1984. 46 G Kepel, TheRevenge ofGod ,Cambridge:Polity, 1994. 47 Used originallyin a Christiancontext with reference toa personwho believes in theverbal inerrancy of the Bible.Currently the term is alsoapplied to avarietyof modern Buddhist, Hindu, Judaist and Muslim groups andmovements. What links such groups are forms ofdivisiveoften political activism inthename ofreligion witha readiness toresort to violence. 48 Afurthervariety of popular religion, the charismatic, is unattachedto any strong doctrinal tradition. It is awidespreadnon-denominational Christian tendency based on a beliefin the divinely inspired gifts of speakingin tongues, healing, , etc. Charismatic churchesoffer both spiritual excitement andan anchorin thecurrently unstable period. They are notdiscussed here because theygenerally eschew politics, believingthat religion and politics should be kept separate. 49 A Giddens, Capitalismand Social Theory ,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1971,pp 211±212. 50 J P Charnay, Les Contres-Orients,ou Comment Penser l’AutreSelon Soi ,Sinbad:Paris, 1980, p 241. 51 Shupe,`The stubborn persistence ofreligion in the global arena’ ,p19. 52 Wald,`Social change and political response’ , pp279±280. 53 AllMuslims believe in the verbal inerrancy of the Quran, not just the so-called fundamentalists. As aresult, Muslim`fundamentalists’ are referred toin this article as Islamists. 54 CRam-Prasad, `Hindutvaideology: extracting the fundamentals’ , ContemporarySouth Asia ,2(3),1993, p 288. 55 Wald,`Social change and political response’ , p271. 56 Less legitimate manifestationsof what purported to be religiously inspired groups, such as theKu Klux Klan,arose fromthe time ofthe American CivilWar (1861±65) but they were hardlya partof thepolitical mainstream, exceptin areas ofthe southern USA where whiteProtestant hostility to Jews, Catholicsand Black Americans surfaced after WorldWar 1. 57 AHertzke, `UnitedStates ofAmerica’ ,inS Mews (ed), Religionin Politics. A WorldGuide ,pp298±299, Harlow:Longman, 1989. 58 DMcCargo,`The political rami® cationsof the 1989 ª SantiAsokeº case inThailand’ , paperpresented at theAnnual Conference of the Association of South-East Asian Studies,School of Oriental and African Studies,University of London, 8± 10 April, 1992. 59 HJohnston,`Religio-nationalist subcultures under the communists: comparisons from the Baltics, Transcau- casia andUkraine’ , Sociologyof Religion ,54(3), 1993, p 237. 60 Haynes, ThirdWorld Politics . 61 Bruce,`Fundamentalism, ethnicity and enclave’ ,p65. 62 Wilson,`Re¯ ections on a manysided controversy’ , p206. 63 J Haynes, Religion,Fundamentalism and Identity: A GlobalPerspective ,DiscussionPaper No 65, Geneva: UnitedNations Research Institutefor Social Development, 1995. 64 SNewman `Does modernizationbreed ethnic political con¯ icts?’ , WorldPolitics ,43(2),1991 pp 451±478. 65 Asia Watch, Detainedin China and Tibet ,London:Asia Watch,1994. 66 MFletcher,`Mullah of Chicago’ s mean streets’ , Guardian,17February 1994. 67 Moyser,`Politics and religion in the modern world’ , p8.

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