UNDERSTANDING GOD’S JUSTICE TOWARDS THOSE WHO SUFFER:

A CRITIQUE OF ELEONORE STUMP’S DEFENSE

A thesis presented to

the faculty of

the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Master of Arts

Robyn Renee Gaier

November 2004

This thesis entitled

UNDERSTANDING GOD’S JUSTICE TOWARDS THOSE WHO SUFFER:

A CRITIQUE OF ELEONORE STUMP’S DEFENSE

BY

ROBYN RENEE GAIER

has been approved for the Department of Philosophy

and the College of Arts and Sciences by

James Petrik

Associate Professor of Philosophy

Leslie A. Flemming

Dean, College of Arts and Sciences

GAIER, ROBYN RENEE. M.A. November 2004. Philosophy

Understanding God’s Justice Towards Those Who Suffer: A Critique of Eleonore

Stump’s Defense (88pp.)

Director of Thesis: James Petrik

Within philosophical discussions of the problem of evil, the issue of God’s justice

towards those who suffer is of primary importance. In this thesis, I consider one aspect

of this issue by analyzing and critiquing Eleonore Stump’s claim that justice requires God

to compensate the human sufferer for instances of undeserved and involuntary suffering.

I critique her view on the grounds that a) such moral constraints upon God exceed what

distributive justice requires, b) there is a disparity between her view and its Thomistic

foundation, and c) such a view fails to align with the notion of justice advocated in

contemporary moral theories.

Approved: James Petrik

Associate Professor of Philosophy

Dedication

In loving memory of my grandparents,

Elmer and Rose Gaier and Harold and Reva Liette, whose faith in God no amount of suffering could deter

Acknowledgements

I wish to extend my sincere gratitude to those whom have helped me reach the successful

completion of not only a Master of Arts degree, but of a personal educational goal. Many

thanks to my thesis advisor and mentor, James Petrik, whose patience and insistence

upon the revisions of this thesis have greatly enhanced both its quality and presentation. I

firmly believe that the shortcomings which persist herein are due to my own shortcomings in adequately addressing his comments. I wish to further thank John

Bender, Donald Borchert, and Mark LeBar for agreeing to comprise my thesis committee. Finally, I thank those whom have given me encouragement and support throughout my years at Ohio University. My parents, Roger and Beverly Gaier, as well as Regina and Kevin Mann, Nikole Berling, Austin Dacey, Chris Stasa, Mike Tager, and

James Taylor – all of whom inquired about my progress, and requested copies of this

thesis long before its completion – I thank you! 6

Table of Contents

Abstract...... 3

Dedication...... 4

Acknowledgements...... 5

Chapter One: Divine Justice and the Human Sufferer...... 7 I. Evil, Perfect Goodness, and the Greater Good...... 7 II. Justice and the Greater Good ...... 10 III. The Scope and Boundaries of this Thesis...... 14 IV. The Structure of this Thesis...... 17

Chapter Two: The Nature of Divine Justice ...... 18 I. The Divine Good ...... 19 II. Restrictions upon Divine Distribution: Stump’s Defense of GUS...... 21 III. Avoiding Possible Pitfalls...... 25 IV. GUS’s Appeal...... 31 V. Conclusion ...... 33

Chapter Three: Distributive Justice and Its Role in God’s Moral Agency...... 35 I. Of Divine Distribution...... 36 II. A Divergence Between GUS and the Demands of Distributive Justice .....42 III. An Involuntary Altruistic Justice...... 47 IV. Conclusion ...... 49

Chapter Four: Aquinas’s Divergence from GUS...... 51 I. Aquinas, GUS, and the Principle of Double Effect...... 51 II. Aquinas’s Just War Theory...... 56 III. A Case from Textual Evidence...... 58

Chapter Five: GUS’s Failure beyond Aquinas ...... 63 I. On Communal Goods ...... 63 II. Aggregation and GUS ...... 66 III. On the Preservation of Respect for Persons...... 72 IV. Justifying God’s Ways to GUS...... 78

Chapter Six: GUS and the Problem of Evil ...... 80 I. God’s Charity and GUS...... 81 II. Limitations and Prospects ...... 83

Bibliography ...... 87

7

Chapter One: Divine Justice and the Human Sufferer

Within philosophical discussions on the problem of evil, there are pervading concerns regarding the nature of God as characterized in the Judeo-Christian tradition.

Specifically, there are important conflicts among the ways in which God’s perfect benevolence, omniscience, and omnipotence are understood, conflicts that hinder progress towards a viable resolution to this problem. Part of the task of responding to the problem of evil, consequently, is to pay careful attention to how these attributes ought to

be understood. It is my aim to make a modest contribution to this endeavor by

attempting to clarify one aspect of God’s benevolence. Specifically, I will be asking

whether considerations of justice prohibit God from allowing one individual to suffer

undeserved harm from which she derives no benefit in order to promote some good for

another (or others).

I. Evil, Perfect Goodness, and the Greater Good

The “problem of evil” arises for theists who maintain that God is perfectly benevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent, and who further recognize that “evil” is an undeniable part of the universe this God is alleged to have created. The problem is predicated upon the notion that a perfectly good being would eliminate the evil that she is

aware of and has the power to eliminate. Thus, the persistence of evil in the world calls

into question the existence of such a God. For this reason, the problem of evil is also

referred to as the argument from evil against God’s existence.

8

A full treatment of the problem of evil would, of course, need to discuss all three of the aforementioned attributes of God; however, progress towards a response can be served by isolating and scrutinizing these attributes individually. That is the aim with which the present inquiry will be conducted, for I will focus only upon God’s benevolence. Furthermore, I will focus only upon a particular conception of God’s benevolence, viz., that found within the Judeo-Christian tradition.

In the Judeo-Christian tradition, God’s benevolence is commonly understood as moral goodness. This conception of God’s benevolence views God as a moral agent who has moral responsibilities and is morally accountable. Richard Swinburne deems this view of God’s benevolence an essential part of the Judeo-Christian tradition.

If God’s goodness were supposed to be other than moral

goodness, then it might be no objection to his existence that

there is pain and suffering. But, … it seems to me deeply

central to the whole tradition of the Christian (and other

Western) religion that God is loving towards his creation

and that involves his behaving in morally good ways

towards it.1

Although it is possible to conceive God’s benevolence as not entailing moral goodness,

(on, for example, a Spinozistic conception of God), the Judeo-Christian understanding of

God’s benevolence incorporates moral goodness. Thus, attempts to respond to the

1 Swinburne, Richard. Providence and the Problem of Evil. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 7.

9

argument from evil in the Judeo-Christian tradition have the challenge of doing so in ways which preserve the moral goodness of God.

One very common response among Judeo-Christian apologists is simply known as the “greater good” defense.2 This defense refers to the claim that “evils” are allowed by

God because they are conditions for “goods” which are greater than the evils in question.

It is noteworthy that some versions of this defense allow for a large range of greater

goods, including instances of human suffering where the “greater good” befalls someone

other than the actual sufferer, including, sometimes, humanity taken collectively. The

best known such defense employing a communal good is that which appeals to the value

of human freedom. This, the free will defense,3 suggests that the possibility of moral evil is allowed by God because it is a condition for the greater good of significant human freedom.4 Alvin Plantinga is the best known contemporary defender of this line of thought; however, the view goes back at least as far as Saint Augustine.5 Yet, although

2 A “defense” is distinguished from a “theodicy” in the sense that a defense simply provides a possible reason why an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly benevolent God would allow evil. A theodicy, on the other hand, attempts to make the stronger assertion that God allowing evil in the world is morally justifiable. (Stump, Eleonore. “Providence and the Problem of Evil” As found in Christian Philosophy. Ed. Thomas P. Flint. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990. 51 – 91. 82, hereafter PPE).

3 For more on the free will defense, please refer to Alvin Plantinga’s article “The Free Will Defense”, in Philosophy in America, ed. Max Black. London: Allen and Unwin. 1965. 204 – 220, or his book God and Other Minds. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967. 131-155.

4 “Moral evil” is typically distinguished from what is called “natural evil”, where the former refers to evils caused by human actions and the latter refers to evils resulting from natural forces. The former would include such occurrences as theft, murder, and rape, while instances of the latter would include tornadoes, floods, and earthquakes.

5 Augustine, Saint. City of God. Bk. XIV. Trans. Marcus Dods. New York: Modern Library, 1993. 441 – 477.

10

human freedom is not the only “communal” good employed in greater good defenses, it is deserving of attention due to its widespread influence and popularity.

Prima facie it might seem as though the free will defense only suggests why God might allow moral evils to occur, but not further indicate what the “greater good” might

be in cases of natural evil.6 Nonetheless, the idea that there might be other “greater goods” in such evils cannot be so easily dismissed. For instance, Peter Van Inwagen has

suggested that the orderliness of nature might be such a greater good in cases of natural

evil.7 The order of nature itself, which is the cause of events such as tornadoes and earthquakes, could be the “good” that God may wish to preserve even at the cost of some suffering to sentient beings.

II. Justice and the Greater Good

While the greater good defense has an intuitive plausibility, there are

philosophers, both theistic and atheistic, who have argued that God’s perfect goodness

places moral constraints upon the legitimacy of His allowing one to suffer for the benefit

of another or others. Among those philosophers who advocate such constraints are

William Alston, Marilyn McCord Adams, Michael Tooley, and Eleonore Stump. Alston

and Adams place a weaker constraint upon the extent to which God may allow one to

6 I acknowledge that there may be philosophers who advocate that an ordered nature is necessary to have meaningful freedom. In this way, natural evils, like moral evils, are equally a condition for significant human freedom.

7 Van Inwagen, Peter. “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence” as found in The Evidential Argument from Evil. Ed. Daniel Howard-Synder. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996. 151 – 174.

11

suffer in cases where the sufferer does not derive a benefit. Alston claims that it would be incompatible with God’s goodness to “wholly sacrifice the welfare of one of His intelligent creatures simply in order to achieve a good for others, or for Himself,” but grants that God might allow some suffering for “goods” which benefit persons apart from the sufferer.8 For her part, Adams asserts that God’s goodness only requires that the

goodness of one’s life on the whole is not outweighed, or balanced-off, by the evils one

experiences.

Divine goodness to created persons involves the

distribution of harms and benefits, not merely globally, but

also within the context of the individual person’s life. At a

minimum, God’s goodness to human individuals would

require that God guarantee each a life that was a great good

to him/her on the whole by balancing off serious evils.9

Adams claims that God would not wholly “use” the life of one human being, or allow an

individual to experience suffering greater than the good of her life on the whole.

Though Michael Tooley and Eleonore Stump would accept the points made by

Alston and Adams, they would both argue that neither Alston nor Adams go far enough

in identifying the constraints that justice imposes upon God’s action. Michael Tooley

8 Alston, William. “The Inductive Argument from Evil and Human Cognitive Condition” as found in The Evidential Argument from Evil. 97 – 125. 111.

9 Adams, Marilyn McCord. Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999. 31.

12

claims “it is unjust to impose evils upon some in order to provide goods for others”.10

Clearly, Tooley dissents from Alston in claiming that the suffering one endures cannot be justly allowed by God if its purpose is to benefit another or others, even if the sufferer’s life on the whole is still good. Eleonore Stump also dissents from the weaker constraints postulated by Alston and Adams.

The doctrine of God’s providence gives us the nature and

purpose of God’s rule, and the account of God’s goodness

shows us constraints on the way he can achieve his

purpose. In particular, the notion of God’s justice

requires that undeserved suffering permitted by God be

somehow compensated. Undeserved suffering which is

uncompensated seems clearly unjust; but so does suffering

compensated only by benefits to someone other than the

sufferer.11

Stump’s position asserts that the sufferer must be compensated for each instance

of undeserved suffering. It is insufficient, according to Stump, that the goodness in one’s

life on the whole “balances out” instances of undeserved suffering. What justice requires

on her view is that every instance of undeserved suffering an individual experiences must be a source of some greater good for that individual.

10 Tooley, Michael. “The Argument from Evil” Philosophical Perspectives. 5. Philosophy of Religion, 1991. 89 – 134. 112.

11 Stump, Eleonore. PPE 65 – 66.

13

While I am sympathetic with the view of Alston and Adams, I believe that Tooley and Stump place an unwarranted constraint upon God’s morality.12 In this thesis, I intend

to show that this is so, especially with respect to Stump’s version of this constraint, which

I will henceforth refer to as GUS, (for God’s permission of undeserved suffering). The

following will serve as my canonical formulation of GUS.

GUS: it is unjust for God to allow one individual to suffer undeservedly

unless God’s doing so is the best available means to promote some good

for the sufferer.

I wish to focus upon and critique Stump’s position for two main reasons. First,

Stump’s account is the most fully articulated position of those who share similar views.13

This is largely due to the fact that Stump considers her project as an exegesis of Aquinas, who wrote extensively on morality and natural theology. Second, Stump’s position has not been analyzed among contemporary philosophers. For instance, although Alston

12 My sympathy with the views of Alston and Adams, but divergence from those of Stump and Tooley is, perhaps, best illustrated by my further sympathy with the following passage as found in James Petrik’s book Evil Beyond Belief. “It is, it seems to me, not true that loving an individual or having goodwill with respect to an individual entails that one accord the individual’s welfare absolute priority in one’s scheme of values. And this seems right even if we stipulate that the love is perfect. A perfect love ought to be commensurate with the value of the beloved, and if the value of the beloved does not trump all other values, a perfect love would not treat it as if it did.” (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, Inc. 2000. 129 – 130). In this context, Petrik is criticizing Adams’s view. However, I maintain some sympathy with both views in the following way. I believe that placing an individual’s welfare as “absolute priority” over other values is not necessary in order for the goodness of one’s life on the whole to outweigh the evil she experiences. For instance, there may be cases where an individual may undeservedly suffer, and who cannot be compensated for such suffering. If such suffering is allowed, then clearly the individual’s welfare is not treated as an “absolute priority”, at least not in that instance. Still, the suffering may be allowed in promotion of another value (say, another’s opportunity for salvation), because it does not compromise the overall good of the sufferer’s life.

13 Tooley, by contrast, makes the point in the course of his argument against theism, but does not go to any great lengths to defend it. Nonetheless, it is my contention that if my case against Stump succeeds, it would apply, mutatis mutandis, against Tooley and any other advocate of GUS.

14

dissents from Stump, he does not defend his disagreement.14 William Hasker also criticizes Stump in his article “The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil”, but only in regard to how morality seems to be undermined in Stump’s position.15 I, however, will be critiquing Stump’s position differently in my effort to show that an adequate account of

God’s moral goodness does not entail that God is bound by a general moral obligation to compensate individuals who experience undeserved suffering.

III. The Scope and Boundaries of this Thesis

My strategy in showing the inadequacy of Stump’s position will be to sketch

scenarios in which we would not deem a human agent unjust were she to allow an

individual to suffer undeservedly in order to promote some benefit for another or others.

These scenarios will, however, involve circumstances in which human beings are

constrained concerning the degree to which they can promote the good; thus, it might be

thought that the points they establish cannot be applied to God, since an omnipotent and

omniscient being is not constrained to the same degree or in the same respects as finite

human agents. While these worries are understandable and care in the use of analogies

with the human case is certainly called for, there are two reasons that I believe such

analogies are legitimate in the context of this thesis.

The first reason is that God, as the “Creator” of the universe, may actually be

constrained in certain respects which surpass our understanding. Even Stump assumes

14 Alston, William. “The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition” 111.

15 Hasker, William. “The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil”. Faith and Philosophy. Ja 92; 9(1): 23 – 44.

15

that there are some constraints upon God that are beyond our understanding. She claims that, although it is God’s aim for human beings to grow closer to God as a result of suffering, it is ultimately human freedom which dictates whether one’s will is actually changed through suffering. Stump explains this important consequence of human freedom in the following.

… even if it could be shown that the suffering never

eventuated in any spiritual improvement, it would not have

been demonstrated that the suffering was pointless. As

long as … human beings have free will (where free will is

understood in the incompatibilist sense), nothing God does

or permits can guarantee that a person becomes spiritually

better, because his betterment depends on his changing his

will. All that is required for the suffering to count

nonetheless as serving God’s purpose is that it be the best

available means for turning a person to God, and it is hard

to see how we would ever be in a position to know that

some suffering did not meet this condition.16

Stump not only claims that it is the individual who ultimately determines whether her will

is changed, but she further claims that the benefit deriving from suffering may even be “a

16 Stump, Eleonore. PPE 71 – 72. In this passage, the first emphasis is the author’s, while the emphasis upon the last phrase is my own.

16

hidden part of the inner life of a person and not ever apparent in behavior”.17 That there

might be a “best available means” that is beyond our ken, suggests that God’s pursuit of

soteriological aims may be constrained in ways that are, likewise, beyond our ken.

The second reason why I have chosen to incorporate analogies concerning human

moral agents is in regard to my aim. These analogies help to further my position that

God’s justice does not impose the specific obligation upon God that is expressed in GUS.

In this regard, I only wish to clarify the nature of the constraints upon God’s agency that

are entailed only by God’s justice. Determining whether God is bound by GUS is an

issue that has significant implications for the contours of contemporary responses to the

problem of evil. As noted above, whether it is morally permissible to allow an individual

to suffer for the welfare of another or others plays a significant role in many

contemporary theodicies and defenses, including what is arguably the most prominent of

these, the free will defense. If this thesis succeeds, it will have removed at least one

obstacle that God’s perfect benevolence is sometimes alleged to pose for such lines of

response to the problem of evil. Though it is my hope that these apologetic strategies do

not founder due to considerations deriving from God’s omnipotence or omniscience, it is

not part of this thesis to show that this is so.18

17 Stump, Eleonore. PPE, 71.

18 More generally, one might worry whether analogical reasoning about morality is legitimate in drawing conclusions about God’s moral obligations. It is not my intent in this thesis to embark upon a detailed defense of such analogical reasoning; however, it bears noting that ensuing discussion is within the context of the problem of evil and the charge behind the problem of evil is partly driven by a willingness to use human moral intuitions to challenge God’s perfect goodness. Thus, in drawing upon human moral intuitions in understanding God’s goodness, I am following the lead of the atheist. Moreover, it is hard to see what one would use other than human moral intuitions in drawing conclusions about God’s morality within a philosophical discussion.

17

IV. The Structure of this Thesis

This thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter two provides a detailed

account of Stump’s position and her defense of GUS. The alleged Thomistic foundation of Stump’s view is presented and a case is made for the prima facie attractiveness of

GUS. In chapter three, I begin my critique of Stump’s position by focusing upon her

contention that GUS flows out of considerations of distributive justice. I argue that there is a disparity between what GUS imposes and what distributive justice mandates. Having articulated this disparity, I argue in chapter four that Stump’s position further appears to diverge from its Thomistic foundation. In short, it is not evident that Aquinas would have accepted GUS. In chapter five, I attempt to broaden my case against GUS by showing that a diverse range of contemporary moral theories are committed to legitimate violations of it. There I will also return to the attractive features of GUS sketched in chapter two in order to show that the intuitive appeal of these features does not withstand critical scrutiny. My concluding chapter will assess the place of such a critique within the larger framework of the problem of evil. Principally, I will argue that even rephrasing the constraints of GUS in terms of God’s charity as opposed to God’s justice does not trump the central arguments of this thesis.

18

Chapter Two: The Nature of Divine Justice

In Stump’s account of God’s goodness, she recognizes both similarities and differences between divine and human morality. This convergence and divergence is best conveyed in Stump’s adoption of Aquinas’s distinction between distributive and commutative justice. Aquinas explains this difference in the following:

There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in mutual

giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other

kinds of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher

(Ethic v. 4) calls commutative justice, that directs exchange

and the intercourse of business. This does not belong to

God… The other consists in distribution, and is called

distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to

each what his rank deserves. As then the proper order

displayed ruling a family or any kind of multitude evinces

justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of the universe,

which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will,

shows forth the justice of God.19

Commutative justice, according to Aquinas, “does not belong to God” since it

pertains to relationships among equals. For instance, suppose you agree to paint

someone’s house for five hundred dollars. If you paint the house according to the

owner’s specifications but do not receive this amount, or received less, then you have a

19 Aquinas, Saint Thomas. ST I. q. 21, a.1. Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Notre Dame: Ave Maria Press, 1981.

19

justified claim upon the owner for the agreed upon compensation. This claim upon the owner arises not only because of the existing contract, but because you have completed your portion of the contract. This is distinguished from distributive justice, which does not involve a relationship among equals. Rather, distributive justice concerns a relationship where one party has authority over others. It is not a relationship of mutual standing. In his explanation, Aquinas notes that human beings are subject to these types of relationships as well, and the family model provides a good illustration of this. A parent has authority over a child and the means to distribute “goods” such as food and clothes to the child. Monarchs and other political leaders also share this power to distribute to those under their authority. Similarly, distributive justice applies to God, since God has authority over humanity and the means to “distribute goods” to humanity.

I. The Divine Good

The good that God is ultimately concerned to distribute, however, is neither some

particular finite good nor any combination of finite goods. Rather, the “good” that God

distributes is the good of salvation, as noted by Stump.20 Stump not only claims that “in his dealings with human beings, … God’s ultimate aim …[is] to unite them to himself in heaven”, but she also claims that this union with God is the ultimate good for mankind.21

She expounds upon this latter claim by comparing one’s salvation, (as achieved by turning one’s will towards God’s), to the finite good of human health.

20 Stump, Eleonore. PPE 58.

21 Ibid. 58, 73.

20

…the spiritual disease includes an unending loss of union

with God and the perpetual torment of being left to one’s

sinful self; and the benefits of curing the will’s disease are

not a few more years of this life, with its painsand miseries,

but an enduring life of fulfillment and joy. If we are

willing to accept pain and degradation as a means to the

benefits of physical health, we are in no position to rule out

suffering as a means to the good of redemption.22

That is not to say that finite goods play no role in turning the sufferer’s will towards

God’s. In fact, Stump recognizes the possibility that, in particular circumstances, finite goods can serve this purpose. What must be emphasized, however, is that the distribution

of finite goods cannot be one’s exclusive or fundamental focus in deciding whether God

distributes goods justly.

Like Aquinas, Stump adopts these two notions of justice to help elucidate the

moral agency of God. Stump follows Aquinas in claiming that distributive justice applies

to both God and humanity; whereas, commutative justice applies to only humanity.

God cannot enter into the sort of exchanges with his creatures on which

notions of commutative justice are founded, because he is

the creator of everything and therefore cannot be

considered as equal to any of his creatures. Distributive

justice, however, can be attributed to God. There are

22 Ibid. 73.

21

certain things due every creature in virtue of its condition

and nature... That a creature has a certain nature or is in a

certain condition may itself be a result of God’s mercy; but

once the creature is in a particular state, considerations of

justice will require that it be dealt with in certain ways.23

Thus, God’s moral obligations, according to Stump, are not involved in the initial creation of human beings, since creation was a matter of “God’s mercy”. Rather, God’s moral obligations are consequent upon the creation of human beings.

II. Restrictions Upon Divine Distribution: Stump’s Defense of GUS

According to Stump, there are three restrictions which the demands of justice impose upon God’s promotion of human welfare. The first of these restrictions is that it would be unjust for God to directly and intentionally produce some evil as a means to a greater good.

God permits an evil to occur just when he knows that he

can providently direct things in such a way that allowing

the evil to occur will be a greater good for the sufferer than

preventing that evil. In this way, although God does not do

evil in order to bring about good, Aquinas says, he does

permit evils from which he can draw good.24

23 Ibid. 57.

24 Ibid. 64.

22

This is one of the reasons, Stump notes, that Aquinas’s theory of morality cannot be reduced to mere consequentialism. To further support this claim, Stump advances the

Thomistic view that, for an action to be morally good, both its object and end must be good.

On Aquinas’s view every action has an object, an end, and

certain circumstances in which it is done. The object of an

agent’s action is the state of affairs the agent intends to

bring about as a direct effect of the action. … The object of

an action is to be distinguished from the action’s end. We

might think of an action’s object as what the agent intends

to accomplish as a direct result of his action, and the end of

the action as why he intends to accomplish it.25

Thus, Stump claims that it is unjust for God to produce or allow some evil unless the

object of the action is the prevention of greater suffering.

… when suffering is inflicted (or allowed) just for the sake

of preventing some greater harm to the unwilling sufferer,

the object of the action is not causing (or concurring in)

some evil but rather causing (or concurring in) the lesser of

two evils for the sufferer, when the greater will occur if the

25 Ibid. 53 – 54.

23

lesser does not. In such circumstances the object of the

action is good even if the action involves inflicting (or

allowing) suffering.26

The degrees that Stump refers to in the above passage reflect her deep concern to respond to the problem of evil within the Judeo-Christian tradition. According to Stump, the primary purpose of human suffering is to help the sufferer return to God and eventually achieve salvation. If such suffering were not allowed, then the sufferer would be at risk of the much more severe harm of permanent alienation from God. Thus, the temporal suffering that one may endure on Earth is of little comparison to eternal punishment. The suffering on Earth would then be the lesser of these two evils. In this way, the suffering that God “allows” is compatible with God’s moral goodness insofar as what is intended as the object of the action is maximizing the individual’s opportunity for salvation.

Yet, in order for the action to be good, both the action’s object and end must be good, where the end of the action is the long-range goal the agent is pursuing. In the case of God’s allowing some individual to endure suffering, the intended end of the action is

to work for the ultimate salvation of the individual. Thus, for Stump, the object of God’s

action is giving the individual the best opportunity possible to transform her will and the

end of the action is the individual’s eventual salvation.

I will now turn to Stump’s second restriction regarding God’s promotion of

distributive justice; viz., the good which is drawn out of evil must benefit the individual

26 Ibid. 67.

24

who has experienced the undeserved suffering. This is the case even when the individual does not change his or her will as a result of the suffering. The opportunity to do so is itself a benefit to the sufferer, according to Stump, and satisfies God’s moral obligation to the sufferer.

… since on Christian doctrine the ultimate good for persons

is union with God, the suffering of any person will be

justified if it brings that person nearer to the ultimate good

in a way he could not have been without the suffering.27

This restriction specifies that the sufferer must receive the “good” that is to be drawn from the suffering, when the “good” is thought to be one’s opportunity for salvation.

The third restriction that Stump believes is binding upon God specifies the nature of the relationship between the suffering and the good that is to come to the sufferer.

Stump claims that the harm itself must be a “necessary means or the best possible means in the circumstances to keep the sufferer from incurring even greater harm”.28 So, even if harm to a particular individual would decrease her likelihood of experiencing an even greater harm, if experiencing a certain amount of goodness would also accomplish this, then the harm in question is neither a necessary means nor the best possible means to this end.

27 Stump, Eleonore. “The Problem of Evil” 411, emphasis mine.

28 Stump, Eleonore. PPE 66.

25

Stump believes that distributive justice, as applied to God, entails these three restrictions which are binding upon God in cases of undeserved suffering.29 Together, these three restrictions comprise what I will refer to as GUS. A general formulation of

GUS may be found in Stump’s following assertion.

[O]ther things being equal, it seems morally permissible to

allow someone to suffer involuntarily only in case doing so

is a necessary means or the best possible means in the

circumstances to keep the sufferer from incurring even

greater harm.30

III. Avoiding Possible Pitfalls

In order to appreciate what Stump’s defense has in its favor, it is important to consider and respond to several objections that might occur naturally upon first encountering her view. The first of these worries has to do with whether one’s will is actually changed as a result of suffering. Particularly, one might wonder whether suffering is really an effective means to redemption given that there is no obvious correlation between an individual’s suffering and her subsequent spiritual state. For all we can tell, there is as much reason to think that suffering drives individuals further from

God as there is to believe it leads others to return to God. There are two possible

29 There are at least two different ways that suffering may be “undeserved”. It may be undeserved in the sense of moral desert, or it may be undeserved in terms of the care by which one engages in an activity.

30 Stump, Eleonore. PPE 66. The ceteris paribus clause which precedes the formulation will be discussed at greater length in chapter five.

26

responses to this contention. First, Stump acknowledges that such a change may be outwardly concealed, since “the beneficial effects of any suffering may be a hidden part of the inner life of a person and not ever apparent in behavior”.31 Indeed, the spiritual life of an individual is a very private and personal matter, such that one ought to abstain from passing judgment of this sort on another. Secondly, Stump makes the much stronger claim that a change of one’s will need not be even a necessary consequence of one’s suffering.32 This reinforces the notion that it is the good of the opportunity for salvation

which is being “distributed”. Whether one’s will is actually changed is ultimately a

matter of human freedom. Thus, God might be justified in allowing one to suffer even if

God’s end is frustrated. This would be the case if allowing the lesser harm were God’s

best chance for leading a human being back to Him.

Another possible pitfall to Stump’s position is that, given her view of human

freedom, it appears that the amount of evil in the world is a direct product of human

freedom and not God’s will. That is, suppose someone’s will was not changed “for the

better” as a result of that person’s suffering. Suppose, rather, that what the sufferer wills

becomes even more distant from God’s will or, more specifically, that the sufferer inflicts

suffering on others as a result of his or her own suffering. It would seem as though the

amount of suffering in the world would then be significantly determined by human free

will. But this, in turn, seems to be at odds with other aspects of Stump’s view. To adopt

it would mean that there is suffering that God does not will, as it is determined by human

31 Stump, Eleonore. PPE 71.

32 Ibid. 59.

27

moral agency. When this idea is applied to Stump’s view, it not only allows for instances of suffering that are contrary to God’s will, but it also commits the fatal error of suggesting that there are instances of undeserved suffering that lack the purpose of benefiting the sufferer.

Stump addresses this concern by again appealing to Aquinas’s philosophy. This time she draws upon his distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent will.33

Stump claims that the antecedent will is what God wills without the constraints of human will and action. What God consequently wills, on the other hand, is what God wills given certain conditions arising from human choices.34 God’s antecedent will and consequent

will, however, do not conflict with each other. Both “wills” are directed towards drawing

individuals closer to God.

… what God has ordained for his creatures insofar as it lies

just in God himself to determine is what God is said to will

in his antecedent will. But when a created person, because

of some defect he introduces into himself, hinders himself

from coming to the end God ordained for him, then God’s

willing nonetheless to bring that person to as much

goodness as he is capable of (given the state of his will) is

God’s consequent will.35

33 For Aquinas’s distinction, see ST I. q. 19, a. 6.

34 Stump, Eleonore. PPE 60 – 61.

35 Ibid.

28

So, if one should freely choose to inflict undeserved suffering upon another, the individual’s choice is a product of human will. However, the extent to which the individual is successful in inflicting the suffering, or the degree to which the victim suffers, comprises God’s consequent will and plays a role in God’s divine plan. If the undeserved suffering fails to draw the sufferer closer to God, it must be, at least, the best possible means of doing so.

Another worry one might have with Stump’s contention that all undeserved suffering is salutary is the following: what are we to say of the suffering experienced by those who are already making an effort to align their wills to God’s. On Stump’s view,

God is justified in allowing one to experience undeserved suffering only if it is the lesser

of two evils. But the suffering would be the lesser of two evils only if the individual’s will was such that eternal damnation is a live possibility, and it is hard to see how some devout theists would be in such a position.36

There are two responses that Stump offers to this concern. The first response is

one mentioned earlier: one could never be in position to know the spiritual health of

another. The second is to suggest that the suffering experienced by the devout theist is a

different experience than the suffering experienced by someone whose will is contrary to

36 Michael Tooley presents a more serious challenge along these lines in regard to animal suffering. It seems clear that an animal’s suffering, (such as William Rowe’s famous case of a fawn perishing in a forest fire), cannot be because the animal’s will is to be drawn closer to God’s will as in the human case. So, although Tooley grants that suffering must be compensated in order for God to be just he, unlike Stump, claims that suffering is not compensated and, thus, the morally good God of Christianity does not exist. See Tooley, Michael. “An Argument from Evil”. Philosophical Perspectives. 5. Philosophy of Religion. 1991. 111. Stump, or a supporter of GUS, might respond to this criticism by appealing along the Thomistic lines that God’s justice towards human beings is significantly different than His justice towards non-human creatures (Summa Contra Gentiles (SCG) Bk. III. Chpt. 111-112. Trans. James F. Anderson. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975).

29

God’s will.37 This is because of the possibility that even a deeply religious person’s faith and trust in God will strengthen in the course of his or her suffering. In such cases, the suffering does not throw God’s benevolence into question for the sufferer; rather, it provides an instance in which the sufferer is able to exemplify that her faith and trust in

God will not be so easily shaken. In the extreme case of martyrs, Stump notes, “…what is glorious about martyrs is not something extrinsic to them, conferred on them by God like a medal for valor, but something intrinsic in their nature itself…”.38 In this way,

suffering is just another avenue by which the martyr may uphold his or her strong

personal convictions.

Another important criticism that Stump addresses is the question of whether

morality is, in any way, undermined by the assertion that all suffering is of benefit to the

sufferer. If all instances of suffering must be of benefit to the sufferer, then it seems that there would be no moral obligation to help another who is suffering, when one has the means to provide such help.39 Stump claims that this view is mistaken. Assuming that one is inclined to help alleviate the suffering of another, then not doing so because she believes that there must be some greater good in that instance of suffering is discredited for two reasons. First, such a view fails to appreciate the fact that God may will that one help alleviate the suffering of another. In fact, it may be God’s will that one is witnessing this suffering and has the inclination and the means to alleviate such suffering. Secondly,

37 Stump, Eleonore. PPE. 80.

38 Ibid. 78.

39 William Hasker mentions this objection to Stump’s view in his article “The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil” as found in Faith and Philosophy. 9 (1). Jan. 1992. 23-44.

30

this kind of reasoning also fails to appreciate the distinction between what an individual intends and what actually occurs. As noted earlier, Stump claims that God’s plan is not discounted when we try to alleviate suffering since God ultimately determines the degree to which we are successful.40 Our lack of knowledge regarding specific instances of

suffering and their possible benefits is insufficient to justify us in allowing such suffering

to continue.

… although God might be justified in allowing an evil to

occur or to continue when he could stop it, we generally

would not be, not because God has rights with respect to

his creatures which we as fellow creatures do not have, but

rather because God in his omniscience has the information

necessary for being justified in permitting evil, and we do

not. … it is clear that in trying to alleviate suffering we do

not interfere with God’s plan of redemption since whether

we are successful in alleviating that suffering is up to

God.41

40 Stump, Eleonore. PPE 71.

41 Ibid.

31

IV. GUS’s Appeal

While Stump does not argue for GUS at length, leaving her case for it on a largely

intuitive basis, in this section I would like to push the argument further than she by

speculating as to the foundation of the intuitive appeal of GUS. Specifically, I will

suggest that GUS is prima facie appealing because the three restrictions it advances give content to the belief that God respects the dignity of each individual. Because the sufferer must derive a benefit from undeserved suffering, respect for the individual is

secured by the suggestion that God is somehow “wronging” the individual should God

use her suffering as a means to help another or for some other greater good that has no

benefit to her. In the history of moral philosophy, this idea is most closely associated

with Immanuel Kant who claimed, “rational beings are called persons inasmuch as their

nature already marks them out as ends in themselves, i.e., as something which is not to be

used merely as means”.42 Kant’s reason for this was that persons are objects of respect by virtue of their rational wills. While the notion of respect for personhood is commonly associated with Kantian morality, a similar view can be found in the thought of Aquinas.

Aquinas explicitly notes that rational creatures have a unique standing in the following passage from his Summa Contra Gentiles.

[T]he very way in which the intellectual creature was made,

according as it is master of its acts, demands providential

care whereby this creature may provide for itself, on its

own behalf; while the way in which other things were

42 Kant, Immanuel. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. James W. Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. 1981. II 428. 35 – 36.

32

created, things which have no dominion over their acts,

shows this fact, that they are cared for, not for their own

sake, but as subordinated to others. That which is moved

only by another being has the formal character of an

instrument, but that which acts of itself has the essential

character of a principal agent. Now, an instrument is not

valued for its own sake, but as useful to a principal agent.

Hence it must be that all the careful work that is devoted to

instruments is actually done for the sake of the agent, as for

an end, but what is done for the principal agent, either by

himself or by another, is for his own sake, because he is the

principal agent. Therefore, intellectual creatures are so

controlled by God, as objects of care for their own sakes;

while other creatures are subordinated, as it were, to the

rational creatures.43

Because Stump’s position is inspired by Aquinas’s philosophy, it is thus no stretch that it

is the intrinsic importance of rational creatures that is the motivation behind the three

restrictions found in GUS. Indeed, the idea that Stump confines God’s distributive justice to His relationship with humanity, rather than to sentient beings in general,

43 Aquinas, Saint Thomas. SCG Bk. III, Chap. 112.

33

assumes the priority that Aquinas advocated.44 I will return to this intuitive force behind

GUS in chapter five, indicating why I believe God’s respect for the dignity of each

human being does not (contrary to initial impressions) commit God to upholding GUS.

V. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented Stump’s view that a satisfactory response to the problem of evil must recognize that God is bound by the demands of distributive justice in his treatment of human beings. We have also seen that Stump argues for certain constraints upon how God may promote the good of His creatures. Specifically, Stump contends that there are three restrictions upon God’s moral responsibility in regard to undeserved human suffering. First, she claims that it would be unjust for God to intentionally inflict evil as a means to a greater good. Second, she argues that it would be unjust to allow undeserved evil to befall one individual when the entire justification for doing so is the promotion of another’s welfare. Third, she claims that the suffering allowed must be the “best possible means” to keep the sufferer from experiencing even greater harm.

In the next two chapters, I will present my critique of GUS. More specifically, in the following chapter, I argue that there is a disparity between the requirements of distributive justice, the kind of justice applicable to God as an authoritative agent, and the moral constraints imposed upon God by GUS. The significance of this disparity will be

44 This is made explicit in Stump’s assertion that the “good” which is distributed by God is the opportunity for salvation. Acknowledging that this “opportunity” relies upon one’s will, it becomes clear that Stump believes that only human beings may engage in this type of relationship with God.

34

illustrated through the use of analogies which suggest that God’s distributive justice may be maintained in cases where there are clear violations of GUS. In chapter four, I extend my critique beyond analogies, and argue that even Aquinas’s own natural law theory is open to violations of GUS.

35

Chapter Three: Distributive Justice and Its Role in God’s Moral Agency

It was noted in chapter two that Stump takes God’s moral agency to entail distributive, but not commutative justice. This is because God, as a moral agent, has a degree of moral responsibility in virtue of His unique relationship to humanity. Since

God is the “Creator” of humanity, His power over human beings is subject to principles of justice applicable to authoritative moral agents. This kind of justice, distributive, concerns the responsibility authoritative agents have towards those under their jurisdiction. In this chapter, I will further analyze distributive justice in order to show that there is a disparity between what is required by GUS and what is required by distributive justice.

To help elucidate this disparity, I will focus upon two claims. First, I will argue that distributive justice does not require the authoritative agent to compensate individuals for all undeserved harms. Second, I contend that making the demands of distributive justice applicable to God provides positive grounds for concluding that it is morally permissible to allow a person to suffer for the sake of others.45 The third and fourth sections of this chapter will address these two concerns, respectively. The case to be made in these sections depends, however, on having in place a more detailed account of the nature of divine distributive justice. Providing such an account is the task to which I now turn.

45 I do not wish to be advocating that God does, indeed, do this. In fact, I hope that God’s omnipotence and omniscience enables Him to bring it about that human beings are always compensated for undeserved suffering. Rather, I am only claiming that God’s doing so is not a requirement of justice.

36

I. Of Divine Distribution

Divine distributive justice is neither a matter of consistent restorative

compensation nor a matter of the equal distribution of finite goods. By consistent

“restorative” compensation, I have in mind the restoration of the specific good that has

been lost by the sufferer. Illness, for instance, deprives one of health; theft of property,

isolation of companionship, and restorative compensation for each of these harms would

restore the good – health, property and companionship, respectively – of which one has been deprived. By further denying that divine distributive justice implies an “equal distribution” of finite goods, I am denying that distributive justice requires God to ensure that there is an equal quantity of finite goods distributed to each human being. So, if

Jones receives a good that Jones’s neighbor, Smith, lacks, then, I argue, distributive

justice would not require God to bestow this good upon Smith.46 I will refer to these two characterizations of divine distributive justice as the restorative view and the equality view, respectively.

There are two main reasons why the restorative view and the equality view are ill-

suited to serve as models for divine distributive justice. The first reason is that the

ultimate human good – and the good that God is most concerned to distribute – is neither

46 This needs to be distinguished from the view that there is a standard amount of the “good” which God owes to each human being. One might agree that there is a baseline amount of goodness that God owes to each human being, without further contending that there needs to be equality among human beings with respect to the amount of goodness. Thus, it might be just for one individual to receive more than another provided that both of them fall at least at the minimum level required by justice. For instance, Marilyn McCord Adams suggests that the goodness of one’s life on the whole ought to outweigh the evils which befall the individual (Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1999. 26 – 27).

37

health nor pleasure nor any other finite good; rather, it is union with God.47 Although the recovery of someone who is suffering from cancer, for instance, is an important human good, and although we think it is just, ceteris paribus, for finite goods to be distributed equally, such considerations are of less significance than salvation and enjoying the beatific vision with God for eternity.

On Christian doctrine … the loss caused by the disease of

the will is infinitely greater than the loss caused by uncured

terminal cancer, because the spiritual disease includes an

unending loss of union with God and the perpetual torment

of being left to one’s sinful self; and the benefits of curing

the will’s disease are not a few more years of this life, with

its pains and miseries, but an enduring life of fulfillment

and joy.48

Thus, the “good” by which the sufferer is compensated may be a good other than (and

vastly superior to) that good of which an individual has been deprived undeservedly.

This, of course, leaves open the possibility that, if God’s distribution of finite goods

conforms with the demands of the restorative and equality views, then compensation from God may take the form of restorative compensation provided that such compensation does not impede the salvation of the individual.

47 Stump, Eleonore. PPE 58.

48 Ibid. 73.

38

A second consideration that calls into question both the restorative and equality models has to do with what is involved in a human being receiving the ultimate good of salvation. While it is true that God seeks to promote the salvation of all human beings, it is important to recognize that salvation relies upon the free responses of human beings. It is ultimately the individual who must decide whether his or her will is more in accord

with God’s will. Moreover, human beings experience harm differently.49 How one handles harm is due, in part, to one’s nature and social environment, but it is also largely dependent upon one’s will and one’s freedom to change her will. If salvation is God’s

ultimate aim for human beings, and if salvation relies upon the free responses of human

individuals, and if individuals respond to harms (and benefits) differently, then the

distribution of finite goods and compensation for harms are significant only to the extent

that they promote one’s salvation. Stump contends, “all that is required for the suffering

to count…as serving God’s purpose is that it be the best available means for turning a

person to God…”.50

One might summarize these two considerations against the equality and

restorative accounts by noting that the good that God “distributes” is the opportunity for

salvation and that God’s doing so may well involve significant violations of the

restorative and equality accounts of what counts as a just distribution.

Of course, God is effective in promoting the opportunity for salvation by virtue of

His omniscience and omnipotence.

49 This is evident in Stump’s discussion of the suffering experienced by martyrs. (See Stump, Eleonore. PPE 77-82).

50 Ibid. 66, 72.

39

In general … though it may be true that God does not play

dice with the universe, it is perhaps possible that he plays

chess with his creatures in it. A chess master achieves his

aim on the board not by magically determining the will of

his opponent but by being smarter and better at chess than

his opponent, by anticipating what the opponent will do and

having several strategies, interwoven in intricate ways, for

getting what he wants no matter which of the options open

to him his opponent takes at any stage.51

Still, if we extend the chess metaphor, there is no reason to think that maximizing the chances of winning each game involves sacrificing the same pieces.52

Interestingly, there is evidence that Aquinas would not be comfortable with either

the restorative or the equality accounts of divine distributive justice. This is particularly

evident in the condition of proportionality he includes in his account of distributive

51 Ibid. 74 – 75.

52 There are also Scriptural passages which support the view of divine distributive justice here being defended. Most notably, the parable of the prodigal son may serve as an illustration (Luke 15: 11 – 32). In this parable, a father divides his estate between his two sons. The younger son squanders his portion of the estate, and soon finds himself in need. He decides to return to his father, ask for forgiveness, and request to be one of his father’s hired hands. When the younger son returns home asking for forgiveness, the father is pleased and begins a celebration feast to the dissatisfaction of the obedient, elder son. The older son complains to his father, and asks why his brother is rewarded for squandering the father’s property, while his obedience was never “rewarded”. The father explains that the younger son was once lost, and is now found. Thus, if the “good” that is sought is the good of the opportunity for salvation, there is reason to celebrate the return of the prodigal son, where this celebration is not unjust to the elder son, whose salvation was never in jeopardy. Furthermore, the fact that the elder son is already with the Father (i.e., is saved) apparently trumps any worries about the injustices of the younger son being supplied with finite goods that have not been given to the elder brother.

40

justice. According to Aquinas, goods are to be distributed proportionately among individuals, according to their desert within the community.

… in distributive justice a person receives all the more of

the common goods according as he holds a more prominent

position in the community. This prominence in an

aristocratic community is gauged according to virtue, in an

oligarchy according to wealth, in a democracy according to

liberty, and in various ways according to various forms of

community. Hence, in distributive justice the mean is

observed, not according to equality between thing and thing

but according to proportion between things and persons, in

such a way that even as one person surpasses another, so

also that which is given to one person surpasses that which

is allotted to another.53

It is clear in this passage that Aquinas understood “proportionality” as referring to the varying significance of individuals within a community. From this passage, we may conclude that there could be differences among individuals which influence how the good of the opportunity for salvation ought to be distributed. It might be the case, for instance, that the salvation of certain individuals within a community is more important than

53 Aquinas, Saint Thomas. ST II-II q. 61, a. 2 my emphasis.

41

others, even though the criteria for this determination may be unclear to us.54 Perhaps a more promising way to think of what Aquinas might have meant by “proportionately” with respect to distributing the opportunity for salvation is that he would have had in mind the sorts of factors mentioned above, viz., the fact that individuals respond to finite harms and benefits in very different ways. Either way, it seems clear that Aquinas’ notion of proportionality opens up the possibility that divine distributive justice deviates

from both the restorative and equality models. It is noteworthy, moreover, that Stump

does not address the issue of proportionality in her exposition of Aquinas’s account of

distributive justice, for it may be this omission that is at least partly responsible for her

failure to acknowledge that there could be significant differences among individuals

which would justify God’s allowing instances of undeserved suffering that were

compensated entirely with benefits accruing to a person or persons other than the

sufferer.

54 These differences among individuals which, in turn, legitimate differences in opportunities for salvation may also be construed in terms of differences in personal factors and not necessarily one’s significance within a society. For instance, a mother may be subjected to moral criticism should she fail to distribute goods among her children equally. If she more than adequately supplied food to two of her three children, but left the third to starve (when there is sufficient food for all three), it would be appropriate to say that she acted unjustly, from the standpoint of distributive justice. Assuming, however, that the mother hopes to secure the physical well-being of her children, consider the following scenario. Suppose that the mother distributed candy to only two of her three children. Yet, the child that did not receive candy is diabetic, and would have been made ill by the candy. In this case, it seems that the mother is not acting “unjustly” in denying the third child candy. In fact, it seems that her knowledge of the child’s medical condition obligates her to treat the child accordingly. Personal factors or characteristics may influence one’s spiritual health as well as one’s physical health. And, just as the mother in this illustration is primarily concerned about the physical health of her children, so too, is God primarily concerned about the spiritual health of humanity.

42

II. A Divergence Between GUS and the Demands of Distributive Justice

In this section, I argue that the constraints on distributive justice imposed by GUS

are unfounded. I will first address two possible situations in which compensation would

not be “owed” to one who suffers undeservedly. I argue that such situations occur when

either the suffering does not significantly impact one’s salvation for better or ill, or when the individual has already achieved salvation, as might be the case with respect to the suffering of martyrs. These two special circumstances regarding the sufferer will be our present focus. In each of these scenarios, I will be assuming that God need not forfeit some equal or greater good in order to compensate the sufferer. Thus, compensation is not justly warranted in these cases not because God lacks a sufficient supply of the

“good” but, rather, because the sufferer’s circumstance makes compensation unnecessary.

The first scenario in which instances of undeserved and uncompensated suffering

may be permitted by a just God is when the suffering insufficiently impacts one’s overall

possibility for salvation. Granted that it would be difficult, at best, to predict whether

another person would change her will as a result of suffering, it seems less difficult to

determine the approximate extent to which the person’s will might change. That is to

say, it seems as though banal instances of undeserved human suffering, such as

headaches and sore muscles, would not be the types of suffering likely to result in a

spiritual transformation for the sufferer. If this much is granted, then it is at least possible

for an individual to experience an instance of undeserved suffering such that

compensation, in the form of the possibility of salvation, is so trivial with respect to the

43

individual’s life on the whole that it does not sufficiently impact one’s salvation.55 I would argue that such compensation in these cases is unnecessary in order to preserve

God’s distributive justice, where salvation is the ultimate good.

Secondly, undeserved and uncompensated suffering may be justly allowed in cases where the salvation of the individual is already “guaranteed”. I recognize that it might be the case that one’s salvation is only guaranteed when it is achieved; however, I claim that it is at least possible to think of cases where one’s current life on the whole merits salvation, (regardless of whether this would be evident to human observers). In such cases, any other “good” that could possibly derive from the individual’s suffering would be a lesser good than what the individual already has. Again, it would seem that

“compensation” for such an individual’s suffering would be unnecessary, where the ultimate good is one’s salvation. Since the good of salvation may be secured without complete restorative compensation or an equal share of all finite goods and harms, it follows that distributive justice may be satisfied when restoration and equality are not.

In cases where either the suffering does not significantly impact one’s salvation or when the individual has already achieved salvation, one may contend that distributive justice might require God to justly distribute the opportunity for salvation and all finite goods which the individual is deprived of, provided that this latter distribution does not interfere with the first. To this objection, I offer the following response. Strictly

55 One might argue, however, that something like a conglomerate theory might be applicable here with respect to the claim that some instances of suffering would insignificantly impact one’s salvation. That is to say, perhaps several instances of banal suffering would not, taken separately, be enough to turn one’s will to God but that, together, these instances may achieve such a result. Yet, even the adoption of such a theory would not in itself show that there could not be instances of suffering that fail to contribute to one’s possibility for salvation, or that the amount of their contribution towards this aim is negligible.

44

speaking, justice is a matter of giving “each one his due”.56 The restoration of all finite goods oversteps what is required by distributive justice in two ways. First, it is not the

case that God simply distributes commodities and natural resources. Rather, God’s

“distribution” is to be understood metaphorically, in the sense that what is distributed is

the intangible good for all to have the best possible means available for turning their wills

towards God. Finite goods may be “distributed” by God, but only insofar as these

promote the opportunity for salvation. Secondly, if justice is giving “each one his due”, it

does not seem as though finite goods are due from God. On the contrary, it seems that

what would be reasonably due from God is the opportunity for salvation, and enjoying

with Him the beatific vision. Indeed, if this is the ultimate good for mankind, then justice

could not require anything further. This is primarily because authoritative agents are

morally accountable for the fundamental welfare of those under their authority, just as a

parent is to ensure the fundamental welfare of her child, or a monarch of his subjects.

Beyond this realm, there may be additional concerns regarding the charity or compassion

of the authoritative agent, yet these are not concerns of justice. This latter claim will be

addressed in greater detail in chapter six.

Thus far in this section, I have shown that the idea of undeserved and uncompensated suffering is compatible with God’s justice. Insofar as God maintains distributive justice, and insofar as the good that God distributes is the opportunity for salvation, it is possible that particular instances of suffering would not need

“compensation” in order for God to be just, in the distributive sense. The two possible

56 Aquinas, Saint Thomas. ST II-II. q. 58, a. 1.

45

scenarios that highlight this notion are instances where either the suffering in question would be insufficient with respect to the course of one’s life to result in a change of one’s will or where the sufferer’s salvation is already assured. As previously noted, these scenarios concern the sufferer’s circumstances, where God is assumed to have an adequate “supply” of the good. Now, I wish to turn to situations in which God may lack a sufficient supply of the goods to “distribute”.

Situations where authoritative agents may lack a sufficient supply of the good are of interest since such a lack necessarily impedes the agent’s ability to distribute the good, considerations of justice aside. An authoritative agent would lack a sufficient supply of the good if she is unable to justly distribute the good. For example, consider the case of a mother distributing food among her two children where one child accidentally spills his dinner. His loss is unintentional, and the mother is faced with the decision as to whether his food is to be replaced; however, the mother does not possess adequate resources to replace the food. When an authoritative agent lacks a sufficient supply of the good, she is

unable to distribute or re-distribute the good in cases where justice would otherwise

demand it. Even so, the mother’s failure to replace the dinner does not merit the claim

that the mother has acted unjustly. While the mother might take all or a portion of the

food given to her other child, she does not do so because that child’s health is very fragile

and would be seriously compromised by losing even a portion of her/his evening meal.

In such a case, the mother could replace the first child’s loss only at the price of a greater

loss to her other child. Since the mother has distributed the food appropriately, and the

resources necessary for a harmless redistribution are not available, it would be incorrect

46

to suggest that the mother acted unjustly even though she allowed one child to suffer a harm that she had the power to alleviate. It is unfortunate that the mother lacks the resources to engage in restorative compensation, but this does not imply that the mother is unjust.

Let’s now return to the case of God as the authoritative agent. Prima facie it

might seem odd to consider circumstances where the authoritative agent lacks a sufficient supply of the “good” when the authoritative agent in question is God. That is, presumably, God would never have an insufficient supply of the good to be distributed.

With respect to a specific finite commodity, like food, it certainly seems to be the case that concern regarding the legitimacy of the notion of God lacking a sufficient supply would be warranted. He could simply create what is needed.

Earlier in this chapter, however, it was acknowledged that the good that God distributes is the good of the opportunity for salvation. This is relevant for discerning what distributive justice would mandate of God in regard to this unique good because reaching this good may involve persons apart from the actual sufferer. More specifically,

I contend that opportunities for one’s salvation may be interwoven in the lives of others such that the “best available means for turning a person to God” may involve the suffering of other persons.57 God, therefore, may be said to lack a sufficient supply of the good in cases where the “best available means for turning a person to God” necessarily involves undeserved and uncompensated suffering of another or others. Just as the mother in our earlier analogy who simply cannot replace the one child’s food without

57 The quoted phrase is found in Stump, (PPE 72).

47

seriously compromising the health of the other is not unjust; so too, in instances where

God cannot pursue restorative compensation or equal distribution without seriously compromising the opportunity for salvation of another, it cannot be said that He is unjust.

And it is here worth noting that this might be so even in cases where the undeserved and

uncompensated suffering might adversely impact even the sufferer’s opportunity for

salvation. Provided that the threat to the other’s opportunity for salvation is greater, there

is no obvious violation of the demands of distributive justice.

Thus it is the case that God would not be violating the demands of distributive

justice were He to fail to engage in restorative compensation or equal distribution in cases

where this could only be pursued by significantly compromising the opportunity for

salvation of another. In fact, even this does not seem strong enough. In the next section,

I argue that if God did not allow such undeserved suffering for the spiritual welfare of

another, then God would not be distributing justly the opportunity for salvation. Put

positively, in the next section I argue that someone suffering for the sole benefit of others

may be what God’s distributive justice, in fact, requires.

III. An Involuntary Altruistic Justice

Suppose that it is the case that the only way to improve an individual’s prospects

for salvation is if God allows another to experience undeserved and uncompensated

suffering. In such cases, the distributive justice that I am ascribing to God takes the form

of involuntary altruism in the sense that justice may require one to suffer undeservedly

when doing so is the best available means of improving another’s spiritual welfare and

48

when the suffering does not significantly compromise the sufferer’s own chances for salvation.

For instance, suppose that someone named Ralph has a “good” life overall but is fatally injured in a single-car accident. Further suppose that, before his accident, Ralph had a spotless driving record and always obeyed speed limits and other traffic laws. In short, Ralph was not driving recklessly, but simply hit a patch of “black ice” and slid off

the road. Fortunately, however, Ralph is an organ donor, and his heart was able to save

the life of another man, Larry. For Larry, this transplant at such a critical time enabled

him to spend several more happy years with his family and friends, and afforded him the

opportunity to change his will to be more in accord with God’s. So, even if it is projected

that the suffering that Ralph had experienced did not in any way, (spiritual or otherwise),

benefit Ralph himself, his misfortune may be justified in the following way. If Larry’s

chance for salvation can only be increased to what is “due to him” according to

distributive justice by a heart transplant, then it seems that the allowance of Larry’s

suffering and his passing would have been “unjust” to Larry.58 In this way, another’s suffering seems to be a requirement in order for the demands of distributive justice to be met.

To further show that another’s suffering may, in fact, be a moral requirement, again consider our earlier example of a mother who distributed candy to two of her three children on the true belief that the diabetic child would be made ill by the candy.

58 Supposing that the heart transplant is necessary in order to preserve Larry’s life, (and that this preservation would endow Larry with the sufficient opportunity to change his will to be closer to God’s), then it seems that, indeed, anything less than a heart transplant would have resulted in injustice for Larry.

49

Suppose that this scenario is slightly changed, such that the mother decides not to distribute candy to any of her children. The mother may simply believe that, if she

distributes candy to only two of her three children, the third child may feel bad about

himself and his medical condition. She may further recognize that this “deprivation” to

her other two children is worth this greater feeling of acceptance and inclusion to the

diabetic child.

It is noteworthy that, in the scenario just described, it would be difficult for the

mother to both openly distribute the candy to two of her children and avoid making the

third child feel excluded. It seems that the mother is faced with either depriving two of

her children of some “good”, or allowing one child to undeservedly suffer. Situations

such as this, where a single action may have more than one effect, are significant in this

context. I will be principally concerned with more fully explicating the moral principle

of double effect in the next chapter, where I argue that this moral principle has important

implications for GUS which are largely ignored by Stump’s account of divine justice.

IV. Conclusion

I have argued that God’s distributive justice is not reducible to either consistent

restorative compensation or the equal distribution of finite goods; rather, it is opportunity

for salvation that God is intent on distributing among human beings. With this in mind, I

have argued that there are at least two possible circumstances that would not justly merit

compensation to the sufferer even though they would be violations of GUS. These two

circumstances are when the suffering allowed would insignificantly affect one’s

50

opportunity for salvation, and when the sufferer has either already achieved, or is already deserving of, salvation. I further argued against GUS by noting that God could actually

lack the “good” that He is thought to distribute, and this lack would allow for just

violations of GUS. That is, in circumstances in which the only way for one to receive

her just allotment of the opportunity for salvation is through the undeserved and

uncompensated suffering of another, then it does not violate the requirements of divine

justice to allow such suffering. If such suffering would significantly decrease the

sufferer’s chances at salvation, it may be the case that this “cost” is not worth the aim of increasing another’s opportunity for salvation. On the other hand, if one is in need of her proportionate chance for salvation and this chance would involve the suffering of another such that the sufferer’s opportunity for salvation would not be significantly decreased, then it seems reasonable to conclude that God’s distributive justice would require the occurrence of this undeserved and uncompensated suffering. In the following chapter, I will extend my examination of situations which constitute violations of GUS. More specifically, I will analyze Aquinas’s moral theory with attention to the principle of double effect, in particular.

51

Chapter Four: Aquinas’s Divergence from GUS

The conclusions of chapter three relied upon moral intuitions about specific scenarios. In this chapter, I extend the argument beyond these specific cases and simple appeal to intuitions. I begin by arguing that this diverse range of moral theories includes

Aquinas’s natural law theory, the moral system that is the alleged foundation of GUS.

I. Aquinas, GUS, and the Principle of Double Effect

A significant hint that GUS fits uneasily with its alleged Thomistic foundation is

found in the fact that the natural law tradition typically traced to Aquinas allows for violations of GUS. This is most evident with respect to the natural law tradition’s acceptance of the principle of double effect. This principle specifies the conditions for an

action to be morally permissible even though it has foreseeable, negative side-effects. A

standard formulation of the principle is J.P. Gury’s.

It is lawful to actuate a morally good or indifferent cause

from which will follow two effects, one good and the other

evil, if there is a proportionately serious reason, and the

ultimate end of the agent is good,and the evil effect is not

the means to the good effect.59

Hence, the negative side-effect of an action does not, in itself, make that action morally impermissible insofar as the agent intends only the greater good by the action and the bad side-effect is both necessary to accomplish the good intended and does not outweigh such

59 J.P. Gury, S.J., Compendium Theologiae Moralis, 5th ed. As found in Alan Donagan’s The Theory of Morality. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977. 158.

52

goodness. When these conditions are met, the principle of double-effect suggests that it is morally permissible to engage in actions where the negative side-effect entails harm to a person who could not be compensated.

For instance, consider a case in wartime. Suppose that it is the case that a war will reach an early end only if strategic bombing is executed. For the purposes of double effect, strategic bombing is morally permissible since the good that is intended (i.e., to end the war) is a good that outweighs the casualties and other collateral damage resulting from the strategic bombing. However, from the standpoint of GUS, strategic bombing would not be morally permissible precisely because it allows harm to persons who cannot be compensated.

While it is, thus, clear that traditional formulations of double effect stand in opposition to GUS, it is not quite as clear that a fully articulated version of the principle would have been embraced by Aquinas. Still, though I acknowledge that the principle is not directly stated in Aquinas, there is good reason to believe that Aquinas would have accepted a principle that resembles the one outlined above. Aquinas’s allowance of killing another human being in self-defense is commonly cited as implicitly containing the principle of double effect.60 In fact, Alan Donagan claims that the principle of double

effect may be “reasonably interpreted” from this passage in Aquinas.61

Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one

of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention.

60 Aquinas, Saint Thomas. ST II – II, q. 64, a. 7.

61 Donagan, Alan. The Theory of Morality. 159.

53

Now moral acts take their species according to what is

intended, and not according to what is beside their

intention, …. Accordingly, the act of self-defense may

have two effects, one is the saving of one’s life, the other is

the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one’s

intention is to save one’s own life, is not unlawful, seeing

that it is natural to everything to keep itself in “being”, as

far as possible. And yet, though proceeding from a good

intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of

proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense,

uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful:

whereas if he repel force with moderation his defense will

be lawful….62

There are several important elements of the principle of double effect as

expressed in this passage. Namely, the act of killing in self-defense contains two aspects

that Paul Ramsey identified as the primary and secondary aspects of the principle of

double effect.63 The primary aspect is subjective to the agent, as it regards the agent’s

intention. The intention must be for the good effect alone. In order for the principle to make killing in self-defense morally permissible, the killing of the aggressor must be

62 Aquinas, Saint Thomas. ST II – II q. 64, a. 7.

63 Ramsey, Paul. War and the Christian Conscience: How Shall Modern War Be Conducted Justly?. Durham: Duke University Press, 1961. 42. Although Ramsey offers descriptions of different versions of the principle of double effect, the primary and secondary aspects are a general description that is in keeping with the interpretation of double effect commonly attributed to Aquinas.

54

simply a foreseen side-effect of the attempt to save one’s own life. The secondary aspect is objective. The evil done must not be out of proportion to the good effect one intends.

That is, the goodness of the good outcome must be at least as great as the evil of the foreseen side-effect, and there must not be an alternative action which accomplishes the good while avoiding or minimizing this negative side-effect.64

Though it is plausible to take Aquinas’s treatment of killing in self-defense as

exemplifying one version of the principle of double effect, Aquinas’s discussion

concerning self-defense does not pose a problem for GUS. Stump may simply reply that

the unjust aggressor’s suffering is deserved and, thus, that the self-defense example has not yet shown that undeserved suffering may be inflicted upon one in the course of pursuing some good which only benefits another. Although it is not clear that Aquinas would extend his justification for killing in self defense to those cases where the suffering inflicted is undeserved but still “lawful”, neither is it clear that he would not. In his political treatise, On Princely Government, Aquinas wrote the following.

If virtue is that quality which makes a man’s actions good it

would seem that greater virtue is required for a greater act

of goodness. But the good of the community is greater and

more divine than the good of the individual. Thus the hurt

of some individual is sometimes to be tolerated, if it makes

64 The unjust aggressor, in using force sufficient to threaten another’s life, is seen not only as a personal threat but also as a threat to society at-large. Such force against the aggressor is lawful because it is regarded as an act of public defense and instrumental in furthering the public good (Ramsey 40 – 41). For this reason, killing in self-defense (as interpreted in Aquinas) is not thought to be reducible to the mere weighing of one life as more worthy of preservation than another. There will be further discussion regarding this interesting priority that Aquinas places upon public or common goods later in this chapter.

55

for the good of the community; as, for instance, when a

thief is put to death for the peace of the community. God

Himself would not permit evil in the world if good did not

come of it, for the benefit and harmony of the universe.65

Though this passage might initially seem to provide conclusive evidence that Aquinas is committed to violations of GUS, the case that Aquinas selects to illustrate the point weakens its force. The example he uses is that a thief being put to death “for the peace of the community”66; thus, Stump might suggest that Aquinas is here only committed to allowing deserved suffering much like the case of self-defense. One may contend, however, that, although the thief deserves punishment, the thief does not deserve the taking of his life. Or, rather, it seems that this punishment is only just in virtue of the

common good.67 If this is what Aquinas is suggesting then, in some sense, Aquinas is

allowing for the lawful infliction of undeserved, uncompensated suffering.

Moreover, what is striking about this passage is Aquinas’s assertion that the good

of the individual is subordinate to the “good of the community”. If this “common good”

is the reason why God might allow evil to befall certain individuals, then it seems at least

possible that there be circumstances in which undeserved and uncompensated suffering

65 Aquinas, Saint Thomas. On Princely Government. As found in Aquinas: Selected Political Writings. Trans. J. G. Dawson. Ed. A. P. D’Entreves. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965. 3 – 79. Bk. I Chap. IX 49, 51, my emphasis.

66 Ibid.

67 This may serve the common good in two ways. The common good is furthered as a strong form of deterrence for stealing in the community and, ultimately, to free the community of those who steal.

56

would be needed to achieve this end.68 In other words, it seems that the promotion of common goods would be inhibited if undeserved and uncompensated suffering were not morally permissible.

II. Aquinas’s Just War Theory

Perhaps the strongest evidence that Aquinas is committed to legitimate violations

of GUS is found in his just war theory. Aquinas identifies three conditions that would

constitute a “just war”.69 These three conditions are that the war must be declared by the legitimate sovereign authority, that this authority must possess a “rightful intention”, and, finally, that those who are attacked must be attacked “because they deserve it on account of some fault”.70 Acknowledging such requirements, I believe that it is still possible for

Aquinas’s view of a just war to entail the moral permissibility of actions which result in undeserved and uncompensated suffering.

Initially, it might not be thought that this is so, for Aquinas notes that a war is just

only if the enemy “deserves” it. Here, however, it is likely that the referent of the “they”

who deserve it is the particular nation or state under attack, and this certainly allows for

the possibility that one may undeservedly suffer for simply residing in the nation “justly”

attacked. Thus, undeserved, involuntary and uncompensated suffering persists in

wartime due to unavoidable collateral damage. In her article, “Justifications for Killing

68 I will be referring to common goods throughout this chapter. By “common goods”, I intend to refer to those goods which benefit the community as a whole.

69 Aquinas, Saint Thomas. ST II – II. q. 40, a. 1.

70 Ibid.

57

Noncombatants in War”, Francis Kamm notes that the principle of double effect is used to grant the moral permissibility of bombing military targets in wartime, even though it is foreseen with certainty that civilians will be killed by the bombing.71 Although modern warfare highlights more dramatically the potential for collateral damage, it is clear that collateral damage would have been a byproduct of medieval warfare as well. While one might argue that combatants deserve the harms inflicted on them, it strains credulity to suggest the same of all the family and friends of the combatants; yet, many of these innocent noncombatants would have experienced the deep emotional suffering involved in the loss of a loved one. Moreover, the practice of laying siege to a city was a common medieval tactic; however, the loss of resources imposed by a siege would have had an indiscriminate effect on combatant and noncombatant alike. For these reasons, it is clear

that even a just war in medieval times would inevitably inflict suffering on innocent

noncombatants without compensation.

Moreover, the rejoinder fails to consider the possibility of coerced combatants.

That is to say, there may be combatants on the unjust side who do not agree with the

particular actions of their government which prompted the onset of hostilities. There

could also be combatants on the just side who do not voluntarily wish to fight.

Nonetheless, these “combatants” may take up arms anyway out of fear of threats to their

own welfare or the welfare of loved ones.72 Thus, given the nature of warfare and

71 Kamm, Francis. “Justifications for Killing Noncombatants in War”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXIV 2000. 219-228. 219.

72 Notice that this resembles Aquinas’s notion of the moral permissibility of killing in self-defense. That is to say, while one may contend that such “combatants” ought not to do anything (or, at least, ought not to

58

Aquinas’s commitment that certain wars are just, it follows that there may be instances of undeserved and involuntary suffering inflicted in times of war which do not mandate compensation in order to be regarded as morally permissible.

III. A Case from Textual Evidence

In fairness to Stump, it must be conceded that the textual case presented thus far

does not include a passage in which Aquinas explicitly endorses the permissibility of

clear violations of GUS. Even more importantly, nothing has been said about a text that

Stump points to as an explicit endorsement by Aquinas of GUS or, at least, something

very much like it. The text that I have in mind comes from Aquinas’s commentary on

Romans.

Whatever happens on earth, even if it is evil, turns out for

the good of the whole world. … But the evil does not

always turn out for the good of the thing in connection with

which the evil occurs, because although the corruption of

one animal turns out for the good of the whole world –

insofar as one animal is generated from the corruption of

another – nonetheless it doesn’t turn out for the good of the

animal which is corrupted. The reason for this is that the

good of the whole world is willed by God for its own sake,

and all the parts of the world are ordered to this [end]. The

take up arms); it is within Aquinas’s own moral theory to suggest the moral permissibility of doing so when their lives are threatened.

59

same reasoning appears to apply with regard to the order of

the noblest parts [of the world] with respect to the other

parts, because the evil of the other parts is ordered to the

good of the noblest parts. But whatever happens with

regard to the noblest parts is ordered only to the good of

those parts themselves, because care is taken of them for

their own sake, and for their sake care is taken of other

things. … But among the best of all the parts of the world

are God’s saints. … He takes care of them in such a way

that he doesn’t allow any evil for them which he doesn’t

turn into their good.73

The notion that the only evil which God allows to befall saints is to “turn into their good” may seem to provide textual support for GUS. Yet, the fact that Aquinas claims that no evil befalls the saints that God does not turn into a good for them may simply reflect his confidence in God’s omniscience and omnipotence. It need not further suggest that justice requires God to compensate the saints in this way. For this reason, I do not believe that the passage unequivocally supports GUS.

What is, perhaps, even more interesting is Aquinas’s commentary on Job. Stump cites this as a way to illustrate Aquinas’s acknowledgement that suffering may help one’s spiritual health.

73 The quote of Aquinas comes from Super ad Romanos, chap. 8, lec. 6. Stump’s quote of Aquinas is found in “Aquinas on the Sufferings of Job” as found in The Evidential Argument from Evil. Ed. Daniel Howard-Synder. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996. 51 – 52.

60

…someone’s suffering adversity would not be pleasing to

God except for the sake of some good coming from the

adversity. And so although adversity is in itself bitter and

gives rise to sadness, it should nonetheless be agreeable [to

us] when we consider its usefulness, on account of which it

is pleasing to God….For in his reason a person rejoices

over the taking of bitter medicine because of the hope of

health, even though in his senses he is troubled.74

Yet, again, nothing in this passage explicitly states that compensation is required by

God’s justice. More importantly, Aquinas follows the passage that Stump cites with the

following exposition concerning three reasons why the sadness that accompanied the

suffering Job experienced ought not to have engulfed him.

These three reasons, then, are posited in due order, for in

the first reason it is posited that temporal goods are

extraneous to a man; in the second, that they are given to a

man and taken away by God; in the third, that this happens

according to the good pleasure of divine will. Hence, from

the first reason it is concluded that a man ought not to be

engrossed by sadness because of the loss of temporal

74 Ibid. 55.

61

goods; from the second that he cannot even complain; from

the third that he ought even to rejoice.75

This suggests that God is not required by justice to turn one’s undeserved evil into a

good. In fact, the idea that no one has a complaint against God for taking away temporal

goods precisely because they “are given to a man…by God” implies that God is not

bound by the demands of justice to restore such goods. Aquinas does not say that no one

has a complaint against God for the reason that a person’s undeserved suffering will be

compensated. If compensation were a requirement of God’s justice in these cases, then

there would be grounds for complaint should the loss of temporal goods result in

undeserved suffering. However, Aquinas does not specify such a condition.

This does not suggest that, according to Aquinas, the lives of human beings are

insignificant to God. On the contrary, Aquinas believed that the lives of human beings

are more significant than other, nonhuman creatures, at least in regard to the intellectual

power given to mankind from God.76

[O]nly the intellectual creature reaches the very ultimate

end of the whole of things through his own operation,

which is the knowing and loving of God; whereas other

75 Aquinas, Saint Thomas. Commentary on Job. As found in Thomas Aquinas The Literal Exposition on Job A Scriptural Commentary Concerning Providence. Trans. Anthony Damico. Atlanta: American Academy of Religion, 1989. 89, my emphasis.

76 Aquinas, Saint Thomas. Summa Contra Gentiles Bk. III Chap. 111. 114-115.

62

creatures cannot attain the ultimate end except by a

participation in its likeness.77

Therefore, perhaps it is more fitting to regard Aquinas’s affirmation that human beings have no grounds for complaint to God at the loss of temporal goods not as belittling humanity’s significance but, rather, as belittling the significance of such goods.

77 Ibid. 114.

63

Chapter Five: GUS’s Failure Beyond Aquinas

Although I do not defend a full moral theory in this chapter, I argue that a diverse range of moral theories – from consequentialist to deontological – are committed to there being legitimate violations of GUS. I’ll begin by examining problematic scenarios for a supporter of GUS.

I. On Communal Goods

Scenarios where the allowance of involuntary suffering only benefits persons

apart from the sufferer clearly conflict with GUS. These are problematic since Stump explains,

…other things being equal, it seems morally permissible to

allow someone to suffer involuntarily only in case doing so

is a necessary means or the best possible means in the

circumstances to keep the sufferer from incurring even

greater harm.78

However, Peter Van Inwagen argues that, in circumstances where “[t]he agent is in a

position of lawful authority over both X and…“others” and is responsible for their

welfare” it may be morally permissible for the agent to allow the evil to happen to X

when “the good to be gained by the “others” is considerably greater than the evil suffered

78 Stump, Eleonore. PPE, 66.

64

by X”.79 He proceeds to illustrate this principle with the following cases: a) the state quarantining someone with a contagious disease, and b) the state’s removals of one’s house in order to build a much needed canal.80 For my purposes, I’ll focus upon the quarantine case.81 In it Van Inwagen has us suppose that an individual innocently contracts a contagious disease such as small pox. It is, he argues, in the best interest of the community at-large to limit that individual’s exposure to others and thus the state may

legitimately impose an order of quarantine; yet, the confinement itself is an added form

of suffering that the individual must face not for himself, but for the benefit of the

community at-large.

Stump claims, however, that this case is not a counterexample to her view. In doing so, she explains that the suffering is deserved in the case of the quarantined

individual.

If a person knows he has a serious disease which he can

easily pass on to others by moving around and if he does

not voluntarily limit his movements in the way required to

keep from spreading the disease, he will be guilty of an act

violating commutative justice, because he will be taking

something from others (namely, their health) without

79 Van Inwagen, Peter. “The Magnitude, Duration, and Distribution of Evil: A Theodicy”. As found in God, Knowledge, and Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995. 96 - 122. 121.

80 Ibid. 121-122

81 In cases of eminent domain, the state is to give the property owner compensation for the property. As such, these cases are more complex than the quarantine example, and will not be addressed here.

65

giving anything commensurate in return … So this

apparent counterexample to my principle is not a real

counterexample because the suffering in the example does

not meet one of the conditions in my principle, namely that

the suffering in question be undeserved.82

First, it is important to recognize that Stump accepts the moral permissibility of quarantining someone who does not take appropriate measures to prevent the spread of disease. Secondly, however, I contend that this response is inadequate to Van Inwagen’s concern. I also argue that, even if it is granted as a successful response to Van Inwagen’s objection, then GUS wins a battle only at the cost of losing the war.

The reason I believe Stump’s response is inadequate is due to the fact that she stacks the particular example with a condition that need not be the case. She claims that the ill person would not take the necessary precautions to prevent the spread of the disease and, in this way; the suffering which directly results from being quarantined is deserved. It might be the case, however, that the individual takes all necessary precautions, but that the state nevertheless quarantines the individual as a matter of standard procedure for such illnesses. Now, it becomes harder to say that the suffering is deserved in the sense of the term Stump employs.83 In the revised version, the sufferer

82 Stump, Eleonore. PPE. 88 – 89.

83 “Deserved” here seems to be referring to what one might deserve as a result of reckless behavior as opposed to one’s moral deserts, although I recognize that there are cases where these two notions of “desert” are more tightly intertwined than in others. In the above quote, Stump seems to imply that notion of desert which is only concerned with the reckless behavior of the individual.

66

neither morally “deserves” the illness nor otherwise “deserves” to be quarantined by the state.

Let us grant Stump’s initial response to Van Inwagen. In doing so, we are claiming that the suffering in the quarantined case is deserved and, for this reason, the sufferer need not be compensated in order for this action to be morally permissible. Yet, suppose that the individual who has contracted the contagious disease is mentally impaired such that the individual cannot reasonably assess the harm caused by his being in contact with others.84 Certainly, if he is quarantined, we would not say that he

“deserves” it in the same sense as one who malevolently wishes to spread the illness would “deserve” it. This illustration aims to show that there may be instances where the individual does not voluntarily limit his movements, yet neither does he intend the harm of another or others. In such cases, we might say that the suffering which results from being quarantined is “justified” for the welfare of the community at-large, but this need not imply that the sufferer deserves it.

II. Aggregation and GUS

At the heart of Van Inwagen’s counterexample, or the notion that even the

quarantining of a mentally impaired individual would be justified even though the

individual does not “deserve” such suffering, is the notion that the welfare of the

community at-large can surpass that of an individual. This notion of aggregation, though

84 In this context, the individual could also be a young child, who is too young to understand the consequences of her actions. Or, the individual might be an elderly, senile person who, likewise, cannot comprehend the consequences of his actions.

67

certainly prevalent in Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, also enjoys much influence in several contemporary moral theories. Even supporters of deontological theories which try to avoid weighing the number of lives affected by a moral decision, recognize the challenge of excluding this consideration in moral dilemmas. For example, T. M.

Scanlon accepts a version of this aggregation claim as a legitimate criticism of his contractualist account of morality.

The problem is…that contractualism appears to go too

far…disallowing any appeal to aggregative benefits even in

cases in which the right thing to do does seem to depend

not only on the impact that various actions would have on

particular individuals but also on the number of individuals

who would be so affected.85

In order to remain consistent in her view, however, Stump cannot allow such instances where the innocent suffering of one is justified by the aim of helping others, or even the community at-large.

…it is impossible that a perfectly good God would permit,

much less perform, any action whose object involves a

victim who is treated unjustly and left uncompensated, no

matter how much other evil might be prevented thereby.86

85 Scanlon, Thomas. What We Owe To Each Other Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1998. 230.

86 Stump, Eleonore. “Being and Goodness”. As found in Divine and Human Action. Co-author with Norman Kretzmann. Ed. Thomas Morris. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. 281 – 312. 308.

68

But it is precisely in this that GUS has Stump at odds with a wide range of contemporary moral theories, including non-consequentialists. To see this, we can consider the trolley

case.

A common example used in moral philosophy is known as the trolley case.87 In the trolley case, a runaway trolley is headed towards a fork in the track. On one of the branching tracks there are five people who would be unable to reach safety in time, and who would be inevitably killed by the trolley should it head in their direction. On the other track there is only one person who would be inevitably killed should the trolley be diverted to that track. A bystander has the option of diverting the trolley. If the bystander does nothing, the trolley will proceed to the track with five people. The bystander must quickly make a decision whether he will divert the trolley and, thereby,

kill one but save five.88

Though the decision the bystander must make is not obvious, it is interesting to note that even non-consequentialists may claim that it is morally permissible to save the five people, even though it results in foreseeable and undeserved suffering.89 That is, many moral theorists would agree that it is morally permissible to divert the trolley in an effort to save the lives of more people. On the other hand, John Taurek argues that not

87 Kamm, Francis. “Justifications for Killing Noncombatants” 221.

88 Ibid.

89 Even if the lone individual’s death is immediate and, therefore, the individual does not encounter significant “suffering”, his family and friends may suffer from the loss as well as the bystander who made the decision. Thus, this action would likely cause undeserved suffering of some sort. For the purposes of simplification, I will simply suggest that the individual himself experiences this instance of undeserved suffering.

69

only is it permissible to divert the trolley, but that one is not morally required to divert the trolley.90 Taurek explains that, when the situation is set-up where there is a one to

one ratio of the amount of human life that will be saved and lost, then either choice is

morally permissible and is deserving of equal consideration.91 When the situation changes so that the lives of more people create an imbalance between the two alternatives, Taurek notes that the alternatives ought to still lend equal consideration.92

So, for instance, if the bystander was a friend or relative of the single individual on one of the tracks, the bystander would have reason a fortiori to save the life of that individual as opposed to five others. To claim that it is no longer an equal comparison and that one should save the greater number ceteris paribus is to suggest that the greater good is found by simply adding the goodness of the lives of each of the five people. Yet, this aggregation presupposes that the lives of the five people, though independent of each other, somehow comprise a further good.93

The idea that Taurek’s view may seem counterintuitive to the notion that one

ought to save the greater number of people suggests that most contemporary moral

theorists would accept violations of GUS. The important element in the trolley case is

simply that, regardless of the bystander’s decision, foreseeable, undeserved suffering

results in which the sufferer cannot be compensated. Furthermore, the significance of the

90 Taurek, John. “Should the Numbers Count?”. Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 6, No.4. 1977. 293- 316.

91 Ibid. 300.

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.

70

trolley case is that it is representative of situations in which a decision must be made, and where all possible states of affairs result in undeserved suffering such that the sufferer cannot be compensated.

Thus, both Stump and Taurek would agree that the bystander could do nothing and, thereby, act in such a way that one life is saved while five are lost. Where Stump and Taurek’s view diverge, however, is significant. Simply stated, Taurek’s view allows for the moral permissibility of allowing undeserved and involuntary suffering for which the sufferer cannot be compensated. In this way, Taurek’s view is committed to permissible violations of GUS. Stump’s view, however, is simply faced with a paradox.

The only promising resolution Stump could have to the paradox that her view creates with respect to the trolley case is to simply suggest that it is inappropriate to apply the notion of compensation to this scenario; although it, likewise, seems inappropriate to claim that the suffering of any victims on the track is either deserved or voluntary unless further details are known. But, clearly, the bystander is not in the position to compensate even one person’s life. So, Stump may argue that, if it was neither the bystander’s action nor intention for the trolley to be out of control, then the bystander does not “owe” anything to the victims of this unfortunate circumstance.

I argue, however, that this response further backs GUS into a corner. This is because Stump would be allowing an exception to GUS that would have significant implications for possible divine reasons for allowing suffering. On Stump’s account, if the bystander does not “owe” the five victims anything because the bystander did not directly cause the trolley to be significantly out of control, then it seems the same may be

71

said of God allowing instances of moral evil, (i.e., evils resulting from human free will).

That is, if God allows moral evil for the greater good of human freedom, then God does not directly cause particular instances of moral evil. These are simply a product of

human freedom. But, if God does not directly cause such suffering, then God would not

“owe” compensation to those who suffer, since the very notion of compensation would be inapplicable to God, just as it is inapplicable to the bystander in the trolley case. Stump, however, firmly rejects the notion that God allows suffering for common goods such as human free will. She notes, “I am trying to avoid constructing the sort of explanation for evil which requires telling the sufferer that God lets him suffer for the sake of some abstract general good for mankind”.94 If this is to be avoided, then human freedom cannot be the good sufficient to warrant moral evil, even though Stump’s own view allows for a degree of human freedom.95 This would, in turn, imply that God, as well as the bystander in our trolley case, would “owe” compensation in situations brought about by other moral agents. While this incorporation would guarantee that undeserved and involuntary suffering would always be compensated, it is hard for me to label this

practice “just”.

Thus far, I have argued that GUS is at odds with a range of contemporary moral theories. However, acknowledging that the source of GUS’s intuitive appeal seems to be the promotion of respect for the dignity of each human being, what remains to be shown is that the rejection of GUS does not translate into the rejection of the fundamental worth

94 Stump, Eleonore. “The Problem of Evil” (hereafter, PE) 411.

95 Recall that Stump maintains that it is the individual’s free choice as to whether his will is changed for the better as a result of suffering.

72

of a human individual, or into God’s use of a person as a mere means. Showing that this

is so is the task to which I now turn.

III. On the Preservation of Respect for Persons

It was noted in chapter two that part of the appeal of GUS seems to stem from the priority it places upon the individual. This is clear in the claim that the sufferer needs to

derive a benefit from undeserved and involuntary suffering, lest God is unjust. I argue,

however, that not only is God’s respect for the individual maintained without GUS, but

also that GUS, when practically applied, frustrates the Kantian mandate to respect each

human being. These two claims will be addressed, respectively.

My rejection of GUS only entails that it need not be the case that the sufferer is

compensated by God in every instance of undeserved and involuntary suffering in order

for God to be just. Respect for the individual is maintained, I argue, by employing the

Kantian notion that the individual is not being treated as a mere means to some end in

situations where she is not compensated for her undeserved and involuntary suffering.96

This is because many instances of undeserved and involuntary suffering do not significantly undermine the agent’s autonomy. One may experience such suffering, but still freely choose how to handle it.97 Moreover, this degree of autonomy that I am

granting need not be as significant as the agent deciding whether to change her will such

96 This is assuming that the agent’s suffering is of some benefit to another or others.

97 I do not intend to be making a claim here regarding either the scope or limits of a person’s “free” will. Rather, I only wish to assume some degree of human freedom, as Stump herself assumes in claiming that one may freely decide not to change her will as a result of suffering.

73

that it is more in accord with God’s. If this were the case, then Stump may simply respond that the individual is deriving a benefit, namely the benefit of the opportunity of salvation. Rather, I argue that, in experiencing less severe forms of suffering, if the agent is able to make choices such as whether to stay home or go to the doctor’s office, to rest or to resume normal activities, to inform others or to suffer in silence, then her autonomy is not significantly undermined. She is not being treated by God as a mere means for a good to another, even though she did not consent to such suffering.98

Unfortunately, not all cases of undeserved and involuntary suffering provide such

clear illustrations that the agent’s autonomy has not been significantly undermined.99

Indeed, possible states of affairs which may challenge this suggestion are the cases where

there is an insufficient supply of the good. The Ralph and Larry example previously

mentioned may serve as an illustration. That is, the loss of one’s life for another seems to

present a stronger challenge to the claim that the individual is not being used as a mere means. For this reason, I will focus on the Ralph and Larry example to affirm that respect for the individual, (in my example, Ralph), is maintained.

98 The choices that an agent may make as a result of suffering do not need to be immediate choices (like the examples I gave) to illustrate the point I wish to make. Suppose, for instance, that a person suffers undeservedly and involuntarily from a coma. In such cases, the choices that the agent makes in response to her suffering may be in the distant future, (i.e., when the agent recovers). Should the agent not recover, then the situation becomes analogous to the Ralph and Larry example in the proceeding paragraphs.

99 Contrary to Stump, I believe that instances such as rape and murder are situations where the exercise of one person’s autonomy necessarily involves the disregard of another’s autonomy, such that the moral criticism of the act belongs to humanity and not to God. Since Stump would deny this, and claim that God can (and presumably does) interfere with human actions, I will instead try to focus upon possible scenarios of suffering which derive some benefit in accordance with the divine plan.

74

Of course, one possible resolution to this problem involving Ralph and Larry would be to suggest that Ralph’s death only implies that his earthly life no longer exists and that Ralph, as a moral agent, would now simply enjoy the merits of his autonomy in the afterlife, such that even his physical death does not undermine his autonomy. I will not, however, pursue this line here due to its reliance upon mere speculation regarding both the existence and nature of life after death.

There are at least two other reasons why Ralph’s passing for Larry’s benefit does not amount to using Ralph as a mere means. The first is simply that our lives are a temporal gift from God. Though our lives are perhaps of primary importance to us, life itself is not the fundamental gift from God. Aquinas, for instance, posited all temporal goods as “extraneous to a man”.100 This was alluded to earlier in explicating Aquinas’s view that one ought not to complain and should even “rejoice” at the loss of temporal goods “for it would not be pleasing to God that anyone suffer adversity except for the sake of some good coming from it”.101 Thus, in the Ralph and Larry example, Ralph’s

suffering and the suffering experienced by his family and friends is not worthy of

complaint since the loss was a temporal good and since a further good arose from it.

In the Ralph and Larry example, however, it is assumed that Ralph is an adult.

And, one may contend that it is somewhat easier to suggest that life is a temporal gift,

such that its loss is not worthy of complaint and does not undermine one’s personhood

100 Aquinas, Saint Thomas. Commentary on Job 1: 20-21. As found in Thomas Aquinas The Literal Exposition on Job A Scriptural Commentary Concerning Providence. Trans. Anthony Damico. Atlanta: American Academy of Religion, 1989. 89.

101 Ibid.

75

insofar as the individual has experienced a sufficient number of years. The loss of a child or infant, however, presents a harder case. That is, one may agree that God would not owe Ralph for his suffering but disagree if the life of an infant, say, was taken in an effort to promote some further good. Without appealing to the notion of an afterlife, I claim that even the taking of an infant’s life does not belittle God’s respect for that child. This may be seen by evoking Stump’s own view regarding the gift of life. Stump claims that the particular nature, or condition, that a creature is in may itself be a result of “God’s mercy”, and that “considerations of justice” become applicable once that creature is in its particular state.102 So, in regard to the loss of an infant, it would be consistent with

Stump’s view to claim that the infant’s life is a result of “God’s mercy”, such that God does not owe the child a specific duration of years in order to be just. More importantly, if the infant’s life is a matter of “God’s mercy”, then respect for that life is conveyed by

God through bringing about that life which God was not obligated to create.

Yet, not only may respect for Ralph, and persons in similar cases, be maintained

without GUS but, I argue, GUS actually frustrates this Kantian call to respect the dignity

of each individual. A supporter of GUS would claim that if Ralph does not receive a

benefit from his clearly undeserved and involuntary suffering, then God is unjust in

allowing his suffering to occur. So, a supporter of GUS would say that, in this example,

God ought not to allow Ralph to suffer even if this implies the end of Larry’s life.103

102 Stump, Eleonore. PPE. 57.

103 I am assuming here that, although another (apart from Ralph) may pass away “for the sake of Larry”, his or her suffering would also be both undeserved and involuntary.

76

There is a further problem, however, with this scenario in regard to upholding respect for

the individual. The problem is the way in which this avenue attempts to maintain this

respect.

According to Kant, “[p]ersons are…objects of respect…which are not to be used

merely as means” to some end.104 This, of course, allows for the moral permissibility of one treating another as a means, (just never as a “mere” means). The intrinsic value that persons have stems from the notion that persons are rational beings. When a person is used as a mere means, or tool, the person’s rationality is being undermined. Respect for persons is, thus, a respect for the rational, autonomous nature of human beings.

Consider the following scenario, however. Suppose that a slave owner supplies

all the necessities of life to his slaves including food, clothing, and shelter. The slave

owner also makes sure that his slaves are never physically harmed to the extent of

requiring medical treatment, and that his slaves are to visit a medical doctor should any of

them suffer an injury or illness that prevents them from working. However, the slave

owner does not otherwise take the complaints of his slaves seriously. He does not accept

their recommendations or their ideas of alternative strategies for accomplishing their

tasks. He does not care about the psychological problems that any of his slaves may

experience or the learning difficulties that they may have. He neither communicates nor

associates himself with them apart from assigning orders. So, although the slave owner

makes an effort to preserve the lives of his slaves, one could not say that the slave owner

respects his slaves, at least not according to the Kantian notion of respect. The slave

104 Kant, Immanuel. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, II 428. 35 – 36. my emphasis.

77

owner is not respecting his slaves as rational, autonomous human beings. Thus, caring for a person’s physical welfare and respecting her dignity need not be as tightly intertwined as a supporter of GUS might presume. And this is so even to the extent to which a person’s physical welfare may be compromised while her dignity is not, and vice versa.

A supporter of GUS would likely argue that, in the Ralph and Larry example,

Ralph’s life ought to be preserved since Ralph does not personally benefit from his suffering and that, in preserving his life, respect for Ralph is maintained. Let’s suppose, however, that if Ralph’s life is preserved, Larry’s death is inevitable as Ralph is the only suitable donor for Larry. This means that Larry does not have the opportunity for salvation, or a possible change in his will that he might have otherwise had. Clearly, regardless of whether Ralph’s life is preserved, undesirable consequences result. But, if respect for the individual is truly to be maintained, allowing Ralph’s passing for Larry’s benefit better promotes this endeavor. This is because, as has been shown, Ralph’s passing is the loss of a temporal good that need not undermine Ralph’s dignity or opportunity for salvation. Larry’s passing, however, would prevent him from the chance to decide whether to change his will – a significant autonomous decision. It is true that

Larry’s passing and the preservation of Ralph’s life would imply that Larry loses a temporal good and, perhaps, that Ralph continues to be a rational, autonomous agent.

But, I argue, Larry would ultimately lose more than a temporal good; namely, he would lose the chance to change his will. Moreover, (assuming that Ralph’s salvation is already assured), the further changes of Ralph’s will would be of less significance than Larry’s.

78

This is not to suggest that if Ralph was not involved in a fatal accident and otherwise healthy that his life be taken for the benefit of Larry. Rather, it is to suggest that if God does not allow Ralph’s passing for Larry’s benefit, then God’s respect for human beings becomes questionable. As we saw in the slave owner analogy, what is significant to personal respect is not merely the preservation of life, but the preservation of one’s will and autonomy. And the latter is more clearly demonstrated when God allows Ralph’s suffering for Larry’s benefit.

In sum, endorsing GUS because it seems to best promote God’s respect for the individual is misguided. The individual need not receive compensation for underserved and involuntary suffering in order to be respected. Furthermore, GUS would seem to give rise to situations in which the physical life of one would take priority over the spiritual health of another. Yet, if what is most fundamental to human beings is rational, autonomous agency rather than duration of years, then respect for human beings by God is better promoted by abandoning GUS.

IV. Justifying God’s Ways to GUS

Earlier it was mentioned that Stump sees herself as “trying to avoid constructing the sort of explanation for evil which requires telling the sufferer that God lets him suffer just for the sake of some abstract general good for mankind”.105 Perhaps this aim of trying to answer to the sufferer directly is really the source of the initial attractiveness of

GUS, which is subtly different from promoting respect for an individual. That is to say, a

105 Stump, PE 411.

79

supporter of GUS may believe that God’s respect for human beings may be intact without

GUS, but still support GUS in the belief that it provides a more adequate explanation for suffering to the sufferer. In this, it is important to note that it is not the case that GUS enables the sufferer to discern why a particular instance of suffering has befallen her, or how she is to personally benefit from it. As Stump explains, it

is not reasonable to request…a particular reason which

justifies an individual instance of evil. Unless we know all

that God knows about [one’s] life and character, we are in

no position to give such a reason. …It does not follow,

however, that we cannot give an argument for a general

reason justifying [one’s] suffering.106

So, even if a sufferer accepts GUS, she would still be left with only an abstract reason to explain her suffering. If the sufferer believes that this “abstract reason” must include

some direct benefit to her rather than accepting the notion that her suffering may be

explained by “some abstract general good for mankind”, then the sufferer must also be

prepared to accept the idea that her personal opportunity for salvation would be diminished should it require the undeserved and involuntary suffering of another which could not be directly benefited.

106 Stump, PPE 77.

80

Chapter Six: GUS and the Problem of Evil

The foregoing critique of GUS aimed to establish two conclusions, one historical and one philosophical. The historical conclusion was that Aquinas would likely not have been a supporter of GUS. It was noted that his emphasis upon the good of the community, the presence of something like the principle of double effect within his writings, and his just war theory all render highly dubious Stump’s contention that

Aquinas held GUS. In fact, these factors help lend support for the opposite conclusion; viz., Aquinas would have recognized cases in which God might justly allow one’s undeserved and involuntary suffering to go uncompensated. The philosophical conclusion was that GUS is not a plausible moral principle. Here I rested my case on the fact that GUS violates deeply held intuitions concerning specific moral scenarios and that it is opposed by a wide range of very different moral theories, including ones from both the consequentialist and deontological traditions.

As I have already noted, I do not wish to claim that there are, in fact, circumstances where God allows undeserved suffering that does not benefit the sufferer.

Nor does my refutation of GUS imply that compensation to the sufferer by God is never justly mandated. Rather, I contend that justice does not require that God compensate the sufferer for all instances of undeserved suffering. One might wonder, however, whether allowing such suffering might compromise God’s perfect goodness nonetheless.

Particularly, one might worry that such suffering poses a threat to God’s charity. And this, in turn, might suggest the possibility of resuscitating GUS, but reformulated in terms of charity. In this final chapter, I consider this possibility, arguing that rephrasing

81

Stump’s argument in terms of God’s charity does not resolve my central concerns.

Having done so, I conclude by considering some implications that this thesis has for the wider problem of evil.

I. God’s Charity and GUS

Consider the following reformulation of GUS: God is uncharitable if God allows

undeserved, involuntary suffering which is not compensated to the sufferer. This

reformulation seems more promising for the survival of GUS since a charitable moral

agent ought to respond to the needs of another whom she is capable of aiding. There are,

however, still cases which show that this alteration of Stump’s view does not succeed, and in which God’s charity imposes no obligation that God compensate an individual who undergoes undeserved suffering.

One kind of case that I have in mind is where there is an insufficient supply of the

good. Consider, again, the mother who distributes food to her children. If one of the

children accidentally spills his food, then it is left for the mother to decide whether the food is replaced. Supposing that the mother does not have the means to replace the food, however, she would not be morally culpable for not replacing the child’s meal. She may desire to do so, but simply lack the ability. Alternatively, if it is very important that the child eat, perhaps for reasons of health, she may decide to give the other child’s food to the child who spilled hers. In doing so, she is imposing a night of hunger on one child in order to protect the health of the other. As previously noted, the mother would not be unjust in either of these cases. Likewise, I argue, should the mother lack the means to

82

replace the food, she is not being uncharitable to the child for her failure to replace his food. Thus, in cases where the authoritative agent does not have the means to compensate her subjects, the criticism of being uncharitable fares no better than the criticism of being unjust.

The Ralph and Larry example is illustrative of this type of case. In it, God was supposed to lack the resources to compensate Ralph, since Larry will die without a heart transplant, and since the continuation of Larry’s earthly life will have more of an impact upon Larry’s salvation than the continuation of Ralph’s life would have upon his. If we accept Stump’s claim that God’s “ultimate aim” is uniting ourselves with Him, then certainly we would recognize that there may be cases where the pursuit of this ultimate aim frustrates God’s ability to compensate the sufferer.107

There is, moreover, a more basic problem with using charity, rather than justice, to formulate GUS. The problem is simply that “charity” is arguably already exemplified in the creation of life and the world itself. Consider the case of Job. Job had lost his

family and his possessions, yet still it could be argued that his family and possessions

were gifts from God for whatever duration they existed. This seems to be Job’s own

understanding in the following passage.

Naked I came from my mother’s womb, and naked I will

depart. The Lord gave and the Lord has taken away;

may the name of the Lord be praised.108

107 Again, I wish to avoid addressing concerns regarding the afterlife. (Stump, PPE 58).

108 Job 1:21.

83

In short, it seems that there is a problem with doubting God’s charity over the loss of things which first required God’s charity.

II. Limitations and Prospects

There are two main limitations of my critique that I wish to acknowledge and

address. The first is simply that there are other ways in which God may be unjust, apart from not compensating the sufferer for undeserved, involuntary suffering. For instance,

God may view one person’s salvation as more important than another’s. This idea is even hinted at by Aquinas.109 So, even if we grant that God need not compensate the sufferer in every instance of undeserved, involuntary suffering in order to be just, we may find that there are other grounds for leveling the charge of being unjust against God. The second limitation of this critique concerns its focus upon God’s benevolence. God’s omniscience and omnipotence received little attention here, and, for this reason, my critique of GUS is not a full response to the problem of evil in its own right.

While this critique leaves open the possibility that the criticism of being unjust may be pursued along other avenues which do not concern the sufferer’s compensation, it has not been my objective to bridge this divide. Rather, in refuting GUS, I only wish to claim that the constraint it imposes upon God is not required by considerations of justice.

This implies, however, that when determining whether God has acted “justly” in a given situation, we ought not to rest our judgment upon whether the sufferer is, or may be,

109 See ST II-II. q. 61 a. 2. (This is also cited in chapter three, page 40).

84

compensated by God. To this extent, the effort of analyzing any particular claim as to whether God is just may be advanced.

Furthermore, by focusing upon God’s omnibenevolence, and justice in particular, we increase the logical space for upholding God’s omniscience and omnipotence in the face of evil. More specifically, if we recognize that the sufferer need not be compensated in order for God to be just (and for God’s will to be fulfilled), then we would be less likely to claim that God’s failure to compensate the sufferer is illustrative of His lack of power, or ability to do so. For instance, if I am not morally obligated to supply food to a needy person in Amsterdam and, in actuality, I do not do so, one ought not conclude from this that I cannot do so. It may or may not be within my capacity to supply the necessary food and, thus, my failure to do so does not reflect my ability to do so. On the other hand, suppose I made a pledge to help that needy person in Amsterdam.

Now that I have made a promise, I am morally obligated to keep it. Drawing upon the notion that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, if I now fail to assist the needy individual, then I have either acted immorally or do not have the ability to assist, or both. The option of my having both the ability to do so and acting with moral rectitude is not available to me in the case in which I break my promise.

My contention is that, when Stump postulates that God is unjust unless the sufferer is compensated for her undeserved and involuntary suffering, she is placing an unwarranted moral constraint upon God. Since Stump believes that God is just, the upshot is that cases where it may seem as though the sufferer is not compensated, then

God’s power now becomes questionable. The line of reasoning would be something like

85

the following: (1) God is just (2) a just God would compensate the sufferer in cases of undeserved, involuntary suffering (3) there are cases which give good reason to believe that the sufferer is not compensated; therefore, (4) God lacks the power to compensate.110

This conclusion need not arise, however, if (2) above is abandoned, and replaced with (2)*, which states that justice does not require God to compensate the sufferer in instances of undeserved and involuntary suffering. As illustrated by the Amsterdam example, if God is morally required to provide such compensation, then His failure to do

so would constitute either His immorality or His lack of power, or both. Conversely, if

God is not morally required to provide such compensation, then His failure to do so would compromise neither His morality nor His power. As we have seen from cases of insufficient supply, by imposing such moral constraints upon God, Stump, perhaps inadvertently, is allowing for possible constraints upon God’s power which need not be accepted. If God does not provide such compensation, then it must be the case that God’s justice, or God’s power, (or both) is in question.

Nor should it be thought that I am here maximizing God’s power by simply diminishing God’s moral perfection. In this, it is worth recalling my earlier arguments to show that the main respects in which GUS might be thought attractive lose much of their force upon closer analysis. If one supports GUS because she believes that it is the best description of God’s respect for each human being, then one must believe that failure to

110 The focus here is on God’s power rather than His knowledge. The reason for this is simply that “compensation” implies that something is owed for an action that is either presently occurring or has already taken place. Presumably, even a supporter of GUS would claim that God has that type of knowledge. It is not a question of God’s foreknowledge as to whether suffering will occur but, rather it is a question regarding God’s ability to compensate past and present suffering.

86

compensate the sufferer is equivalent to using the sufferer as a mere means to a greater good. This, however, need not be the case. Moreover, supporting GUS would further entail that a human being’s opportunity for salvation would be lost should it require the suffering of another who could not be compensated for such suffering. If we accept salvation as the greatest human good – a good which is not only eternal, but constitutes the ultimate fulfillment of human life – then disallowing such suffering certainly seems to frustrate, rather than promote, respect for the individual. Far from diminishing God’s goodness, emphasizing His interest in promoting human salvation may be the best way to do justice to God’s moral perfection.

87

Bibliography

Adams, Marilyn McCord. Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999. Alston, William P.. “The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition”. As found in The Evidential Argument from Evil. Ed. Daniel Howard-Synder. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996. 97-125. Aquinas, Saint Thomas. Commentary on Job As found in Thomas Aquinas The Literal Exposition on Job A Scriptural Commentary Concerning Providence. Trans. Anthony Damico. Atlanta: American Academy of Religion, 1989. _____. On Princely Government. As found in Aquinas: Selected Political Writings. Trans. J. G. Dawson. Ed. A. P. D’Entreves. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965. 3 – 79. _____. Summa Contra Gentiles. Trans. James F. Anderson. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975. _____. Summa Theologiae. Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Notre Dame: Ave Maria Press, 1981. Augustine, Saint. City of God. Trans. Marcus Dods. New York: Modern Library, 1993. Donagan, Alan. The Theory of Morality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. Finnis, John. Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Gury, J. P., S. J., Compendium Theologiae Moralis, 5th ed. As found in Donagan, Alan. The Theory of Morality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. Hasker, John. “The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil”. Faith and Philosophy. Ja 1992; 9(1). 23-44. Kamm, Francis. . “Justifications for Killing Noncombatants in War”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXIV 2000. 219-228. Kant, Immanuel. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. James W. Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1981. II 428. Petrik, James. Evil Beyond Belief. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2000. Plantinga, Alvin. “The Free Will Defense”, in Philosophy in America, ed. Max Black. London: Allen and Unwin, 1965. 204 – 220. _____. God and Other Minds. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967. 131-155. Ramsey, Paul. War and the Christian Conscience: How Shall Modern War Be Conducted Justly?. Durham: Duke University Press, 1961. Scanlon, T.M.. What We Owe To Each Other Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1998. Stump, Eleonore. “Aquinas on the Sufferings of Job” as found in The Evidential Argument from Evil. Ed. Daniel Howard-Synder. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996. 49 – 68. _____. “Being and Goodness”. As found in Divine and Human Action. Co-author with Norman Kretzmann. Ed. Thomas Morris. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. 281 – 312.

88

_____. “Providence and the Problem of Evil” As found in Christian Philosophy. Ed. Thomas P. Flint. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990. 51 – 91. _____. “The Problem of Evil”. Faith and Philosophy. Vol. 2. No. 4, Oct. 1985. 392 – 423. Swinburne, Richard. Providence and the Problem of Evil. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998 7. Taurek, John. “Should the Numbers Count?”. Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 6, No.4, 1977. 293-316. The Holy Bible. New International Version. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1984. Tooley, Michael. “The Argument from Evil” Philosophical Perspectives. 5. Philosophy of Religion, 1991. 89 – 134. Van Inwagen, Peter. “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence” as found in The Evidential Argument from Evil. Ed. Daniel Howard- Synder. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996. 151 – 174. _____. “The Magnitude, Duration, and Distribution of Evil: A Theodicy”. As found in God, Knowledge, and Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995. 96 -122.