Understanding God's Justice Towards Those
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UNDERSTANDING GOD’S JUSTICE TOWARDS THOSE WHO SUFFER: A CRITIQUE OF ELEONORE STUMP’S DEFENSE A thesis presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts Robyn Renee Gaier November 2004 This thesis entitled UNDERSTANDING GOD’S JUSTICE TOWARDS THOSE WHO SUFFER: A CRITIQUE OF ELEONORE STUMP’S DEFENSE BY ROBYN RENEE GAIER has been approved for the Department of Philosophy and the College of Arts and Sciences by James Petrik Associate Professor of Philosophy Leslie A. Flemming Dean, College of Arts and Sciences GAIER, ROBYN RENEE. M.A. November 2004. Philosophy Understanding God’s Justice Towards Those Who Suffer: A Critique of Eleonore Stump’s Defense (88pp.) Director of Thesis: James Petrik Within philosophical discussions of the problem of evil, the issue of God’s justice towards those who suffer is of primary importance. In this thesis, I consider one aspect of this issue by analyzing and critiquing Eleonore Stump’s claim that justice requires God to compensate the human sufferer for instances of undeserved and involuntary suffering. I critique her view on the grounds that a) such moral constraints upon God exceed what distributive justice requires, b) there is a disparity between her view and its Thomistic foundation, and c) such a view fails to align with the notion of justice advocated in contemporary moral theories. Approved: James Petrik Associate Professor of Philosophy Dedication In loving memory of my grandparents, Elmer and Rose Gaier and Harold and Reva Liette, whose faith in God no amount of suffering could deter Acknowledgements I wish to extend my sincere gratitude to those whom have helped me reach the successful completion of not only a Master of Arts degree, but of a personal educational goal. Many thanks to my thesis advisor and mentor, James Petrik, whose patience and insistence upon the revisions of this thesis have greatly enhanced both its quality and presentation. I firmly believe that the shortcomings which persist herein are due to my own shortcomings in adequately addressing his comments. I wish to further thank John Bender, Donald Borchert, and Mark LeBar for agreeing to comprise my thesis committee. Finally, I thank those whom have given me encouragement and support throughout my years at Ohio University. My parents, Roger and Beverly Gaier, as well as Regina and Kevin Mann, Nikole Berling, Austin Dacey, Chris Stasa, Mike Tager, and James Taylor – all of whom inquired about my progress, and requested copies of this thesis long before its completion – I thank you! 6 Table of Contents Abstract................................................................................................................................3 Dedication............................................................................................................................4 Acknowledgements..............................................................................................................5 Chapter One: Divine Justice and the Human Sufferer.........................................................7 I. Evil, Perfect Goodness, and the Greater Good...............................................7 II. Justice and the Greater Good ......................................................................10 III. The Scope and Boundaries of this Thesis..................................................14 IV. The Structure of this Thesis.......................................................................17 Chapter Two: The Nature of Divine Justice ......................................................................18 I. The Divine Good ..........................................................................................19 II. Restrictions upon Divine Distribution: Stump’s Defense of GUS..............21 III. Avoiding Possible Pitfalls..........................................................................25 IV. GUS’s Appeal............................................................................................31 V. Conclusion ..................................................................................................33 Chapter Three: Distributive Justice and Its Role in God’s Moral Agency........................35 I. Of Divine Distribution..................................................................................36 II. A Divergence Between GUS and the Demands of Distributive Justice .....42 III. An Involuntary Altruistic Justice...............................................................47 IV. Conclusion .................................................................................................49 Chapter Four: Aquinas’s Divergence from GUS...............................................................51 I. Aquinas, GUS, and the Principle of Double Effect......................................51 II. Aquinas’s Just War Theory.........................................................................56 III. A Case from Textual Evidence..................................................................58 Chapter Five: GUS’s Failure beyond Aquinas ..................................................................63 I. On Communal Goods ...................................................................................63 II. Aggregation and GUS .................................................................................66 III. On the Preservation of Respect for Persons...............................................72 IV. Justifying God’s Ways to GUS..................................................................78 Chapter Six: GUS and the Problem of Evil .......................................................................80 I. God’s Charity and GUS................................................................................81 II. Limitations and Prospects ...........................................................................83 Bibliography ......................................................................................................................87 7 Chapter One: Divine Justice and the Human Sufferer Within philosophical discussions on the problem of evil, there are pervading concerns regarding the nature of God as characterized in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Specifically, there are important conflicts among the ways in which God’s perfect benevolence, omniscience, and omnipotence are understood, conflicts that hinder progress towards a viable resolution to this problem. Part of the task of responding to the problem of evil, consequently, is to pay careful attention to how these attributes ought to be understood. It is my aim to make a modest contribution to this endeavor by attempting to clarify one aspect of God’s benevolence. Specifically, I will be asking whether considerations of justice prohibit God from allowing one individual to suffer undeserved harm from which she derives no benefit in order to promote some good for another (or others). I. Evil, Perfect Goodness, and the Greater Good The “problem of evil” arises for theists who maintain that God is perfectly benevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent, and who further recognize that “evil” is an undeniable part of the universe this God is alleged to have created. The problem is predicated upon the notion that a perfectly good being would eliminate the evil that she is aware of and has the power to eliminate. Thus, the persistence of evil in the world calls into question the existence of such a God. For this reason, the problem of evil is also referred to as the argument from evil against God’s existence. 8 A full treatment of the problem of evil would, of course, need to discuss all three of the aforementioned attributes of God; however, progress towards a response can be served by isolating and scrutinizing these attributes individually. That is the aim with which the present inquiry will be conducted, for I will focus only upon God’s benevolence. Furthermore, I will focus only upon a particular conception of God’s benevolence, viz., that found within the Judeo-Christian tradition. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, God’s benevolence is commonly understood as moral goodness. This conception of God’s benevolence views God as a moral agent who has moral responsibilities and is morally accountable. Richard Swinburne deems this view of God’s benevolence an essential part of the Judeo-Christian tradition. If God’s goodness were supposed to be other than moral goodness, then it might be no objection to his existence that there is pain and suffering. But, … it seems to me deeply central to the whole tradition of the Christian (and other Western) religion that God is loving towards his creation and that involves his behaving in morally good ways towards it.1 Although it is possible to conceive God’s benevolence as not entailing moral goodness, (on, for example, a Spinozistic conception of God), the Judeo-Christian understanding of God’s benevolence incorporates moral goodness. Thus, attempts to respond to the 1 Swinburne, Richard. Providence and the Problem of Evil. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 7. 9 argument from evil in the Judeo-Christian tradition have the challenge of doing so in ways which preserve the moral goodness of God. One very common response among Judeo-Christian apologists is simply known as the “greater good” defense.2 This defense refers to the claim that “evils” are allowed by God because they are conditions for “goods” which are greater than the evils in question. It is noteworthy that