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Great Britain, the Dominions and the Paris Peace Conference1 wbhr 02|2014 Great Britain, the Dominions and the Paris Peace Conference1 JAROSLAV VALKOUN Institute of World History, Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Prague Nám. J. Palacha 2, 116 38 Prague, Czech Republic [email protected] Introduction The First World War was the greatest test for the cohesion of the British Empire after the first Dominions came into being.2 The Empire entered the war as one single entity as the Dominions were still formally subordinated to their mother country. The Dominions had the right to decide about the extent of their involvement in the war effort; however, as a result of various pre-war agreements, their fleets and expeditionary forces found themselves under the command of the British Admiralty and the Supreme Military Command.3 Although the Dominions’ military deployment was below the level of their mother country, their help was everything but negligible.4 Losses and victories of these overseas countries, symbolized by the heroism of Australians and New Zealanders during the Gallipoli Operation, of Canadians at Passchendaele and Vimy Ridge, and of South Africans during the conquest of German Southwest and East Africa, deeply entered the collective memory of the Dominions. In addition, they accelerated local 1 This article has been published as a part of the research project PRVOUK „Historie v interdisciplinární perspektivě” (scientific discipline AB – history; coordinator: Prof. PhDr. Ivan Šedivý, CSc.), partial project „Evropa a (versus) svět: Interkontinentální a vnitrokontinentální politické, ekonomické, sociální, kulturní a intelektuální transfery a jejich důsledky” (leading project researcher: Prof. PhDr. Josef Opatrný, CSc.). 2 See H. E. EGERTON, The War and the British Dominions, Oxford [1914]. 3 N. MANSERGH, The Commonwealth Experience, London 1969, p. 166. 4 C. E. CARRINGTON, The Empire at War, 1914–1918, in: The Cambridge History of the British Empire: The Empire-Commonwealth 1870–1919, Vol. 3, Cambridge 1967, pp. 641–642. 145 Jaroslav Valkoun Great Britain, the Dominions and the Paris Peace Conference nationalism, weakened imperial patriotism and deepened their desire for independent policies.5 The British Government assured the Dominions that they would have the possibility to discuss the form of the postwar peace settlement already in 1915.6 Yet, the promise was not always kept. In mid-November 1918, for example, the Australian Prime Minister, William “Billy” Morris Hughes, complained that President Woodrow Wilson’s so-called Fourteen Points were adopted by the British Cabinet without consulting the Dominions about the issue.7 The Dominions felt particularly threatened by the U.S. “open door policy” and “free seas” principle and hoped these would not be enforced. This was especially the case when it came to former German colonies as they were somewhat in opposition to British imperial policy which, on its part, was introducing the imperial preference system bit by bit.8 * Shortly after declaring truce, representatives of the British Government and of the Dominions discussed the question of the Dominions’ status at the Peace Conference. From the very beginning, Leopold Amery tried to push through the idea that the Dominions together with India should have direct representation. Furthermore, he was convinced that the overseas autonomous polities should be viewed as equal partners of their mother country and, consequently, should be free to express their opinion on all issues of the peace arrangements, not only 5 A. MAY, The Round Table and Imperial Federation, 1910–17, in: The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 99, No. 410, 2010, p. 553. 6 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th Series, Vol. 71, 14th April, 1915, cc. 16–17. 7 The British Library (hereafter BL), Balfour Papers (hereafter BP), Add MS 49775, Vol. XCIII, L. S. Amery, Representation of the Dominion at the Peace Negotiations, 14th November, 1918, ff. [191–192]. 8 The National Archives (hereafter TNA), Cabinet Papers (hereafter CAB) 23/42/19, Imperial War Cabinet, [No.] 47: Minutes of a Meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet, 30th December, 1918, f. 2. 146 wbhr 02|2014 on those that directly affected them.9 The British Prime Minister David Lloyd George sympathized with the aspirations of the Dominions’ representatives. Nevertheless, he originally assumed that five seats would be sufficient for the British Empire Delegation. However, the Dominions, with regard to their war effort, openly demanded separate representation.10 As a consequence, dual representation for the Dominions and India came into being: firstly, as members of the British Empire Delegation and, secondly, as members of the warring parties that were able, because of their special interests, to send two delegates forth to the meeting.11 Nonetheless, the Dominions were subject to certain limitations. They could not vote separately for instance as the British Empire was to act, at least on the outside, as a single “political entity” with a unified view.12 The dual representation of the Dominions rose the question what the actual position of the Dominions at the Paris Peace Conference was. Compared to their European allies, representatives of the Dominions had a significant advantage. 9 University of Cambridge: Churchill College: Churchill Archives Centre (hereafter CAC), Amery Papers (further only AP)AMEL 2/1/1, Representation of the Dominions at the Peace Negotiations, 14th November, 1918, ff. [s. p.]. 10 Cf. R. L. BORDEN, Canada and the Peace: A Speech on the Treaty of Peace, Delivered in the Canadian House of Commons on Tuesday, September 2, 1919, [Ottawa 1919], p. 13; L. F. FITZHARDINGE, Hughes, Borden and Dominion Representation at the Paris Peace Conference, in: The Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1968, pp. 163–169; D. LLOYD GEORGE, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, Vol. 1, London 1938, p. 205; F. S. MARSTON, The Peace Conference of 1919: Organisation and Procedure, London 1944, pp. 37, 51; C. P. STACEY, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies: 1867–1921, Vol. 1, Toronto 1984, pp. 270–274; TNA, CAB 29/28, B. E. D. [No.] 1, Peace Conference: British Empire Delegation: Minutes of a Meeting of Members of the British Empire Delegation, Villa Majestic, Paris, 13th January, 1919, f. [1]. 11 Canada, Australia and South Africa were able to send forth two delegates, India one as a representative of British India and one as a representative of the native states, New Zealand had only one delegate and Newfoundland had no delegate at all. L. F. FITZHARDINGE, W. M. Hughes and the Treaty of Versailles 1919, in: Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. 5, Is. 2, 1967, p. 133; TNA, CAB 29/7, W. C. P. [No.] 5, British Empire Delegation: Note by the Secretary of the Imperial War Cabinet, 13th January, 1919, f. [25]. 12 Cf. A. B. KEITH, War Government of the British Dominions, Oxford 1921, p. 151; TNA, CAB 29/28, B. E. D. [No.] 1, Peace Conference: British Empire Delegation: Minutes of a Meeting of Members of the British Empire Delegation, Villa Majestic, Paris, 13th January, 1919, f. 3. 147 Jaroslav Valkoun Great Britain, the Dominions and the Paris Peace Conference As members of the British Empire Delegation they had access to confidential materials and conclusions of the Council of Ten and of the Council of Five. Therefore, they were able to express their opinion on all key issues that were being debated at the conference.13 Specific interests of the Dominions became obvious when it came to the question of dividing former German colonies in Africa and in the Pacific and of the associated creation of the Mandate System under the League of Nations. Indeed, Australia sought to annex German Pacific islands whereas South Africans were interested in German Southwest Africa.14 Already during the war, Australia continuously highlighted the need to prevent the spread of Japanese influence southwards.15 For this reason, negotiations about a mutual British-Japanese understanding concerning the future organization of German territories in the Far East and the Pacific took place in February 1917.16 Several Australian politicians initially suggested that the best thing for the future of German New Guinea and the Solomon Islands would be if the United States took over the administration of the territories in concern.17 Eventually, however, Australia’s and New Zealand’s statesmen reached the conclusion 13 Cf. J. W. DAFOE, Canada and the Peace Conference of 1919, in: The Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1943, pp. 237–240; A. I. INGLIS, Loring C. Christie and the Imperial Idea: 1919–1926, in: Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue d’études canadiennes, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1972, p. 21; MANSERGH, p. 179. 14 Cf. W. R. LOUIS, Australia and the German Colonies in the Pacific, 1914–1919, in: Journal of Modern History, Vol. 38, No. 4, 1966, pp. 407–421; TNA, CAB 29/28, B. E. D. [No.] 4, Peace Conference: British Empire Delegation: Minutes of a Meeting of Members of the British Empire Delegation, Villa Majestic, Paris, 27th January, 1919, f. [1]; ibidem, CAB 29/1, P. 34, Peace Conference: Memorandum Respecting German Colonies, January 1919, ff. [1]– 20. 15 TNA, CAB 23/43/2, Procès-verbal of the Second Meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet, 22th March, 1917, f. 3. 16 Understanding between Great Britain and Japan regarding ultimate Disposal of German Rights, February [16], 1921, in: J. V. A. MacMURRAY, (Ed.), Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894–1919: Republican Period (1912–1919), Vol. 2, New York 1921, pp. 1167–1168. 17 R. C. SNELLING, Peacemaking 1919: Australia, New Zealand and the British Empire Delegation at Versailles, in: The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1975, pp. 17–18. 148 wbhr 02|2014 that former German territories should be in the hands of Great Britain or some other friendly country.18 On 29 January 1919, the British Empire Delegation discussed the draft of the resolution on former German and Ottoman territories.
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