REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SUPREME COURT MANILA EN BANC REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA, Petitioner, – versus – CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P.A. G.R. No. SERENO, 237428 For: Quo Warranto Respondent. Senators LEILA M. DE LIMA and ANTONIO “SONNY” F. TRILLANES IV, Movant-Intervenors. x-------------------------------------------------------------------x MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Movant-intervenors, Senators LEILA M. DE LIMA and ANTONIO “SONNY” F. TRILLANES IV, through undersigned counsel, respectfully state that: 1. On 29 May 2018, Movant-intervenors, in such capacity, requested and obtained a copy of the Decision of the Supreme Court dated 11 May 2018, by which eight members of the Court voted to grant the Petition for Quo Warranto, resulting in the ouster of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno. 2. The Supreme Court’s majority decision, penned by Justice Tijam, ruled that: 2.1. There are no grounds to grant the motion for inhibition filed by respondent Chief Justice Sereno; 2.2. Impeachment is not an exclusive means for the removal of an impeachable public official; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno G.R. No. 237428 Page 2 of 25 2.3. The instant Petition for Quo Warranto could proceed independently and simultaneously with an impeachment; 2.4. The Supreme Court’s taking cognizance of the Petition for Quo Warranto is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers; 2.5. The Petition is not dismissable on the Ground of Prescription, as “[p]rescription does not lie against the State”; and 2.6. The Petitioner sufficiently proved that Respondent violated the SALN Law, and such failure amounts to proof of lack of integrity of the Respondent to be considered, much less nominated appointed, as Chief Justice by the Judicial and Bar Council and the President of Republic, respectively. 3. Movant-intervenors, respectfully disagreeing with the findings and conclusions of the Supreme Court, hereby file the instant Motion for Reconsideration. 4. The majority decision likewise denied the Motion for Intervention filed by herein Movant-Intervenors, stating that their claimed interest as Senator-judges in impeachment proceedings is merely contingent or expectant, as it “is still contingent on the filing of the articles of impeachment before the Senate”. 5. Movant-Intervenors likewise seek reconsideration of this ruling, on the grounds that, as will be further discussed below, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the present Petition clearly show that the interest they invoke and seek to protect through their Motion for Intervention is actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, such that an adverse ruling by the Supreme Court will result in an actual injury to the constitutional rights, duties and prerogatives of herein Movant-Intervenors and their fellow members of Congress, particularly in the Senate. In fact, this view is supported by Proposed Senate Resolution No. 738, which was signed by fourteen (14) members of the Senate, including eight (8) majority members, namely, then Senate President Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III, Senate President Pro Tempore Ralph Recto, Senators Joel Villanueva, Loren Legarda, Sherwin Gatchalian, Francis Escudero, Sonny Angara, and Grace Poe, and all six (6) members of the Senate minority, namely, Minority Leader Franklin Drilon, Francis “Kiko” Pangilinan, Bam Aquino, Risa, Hontiveros, and herein Movant-Intervenors, Antonio Trillanes IV and Leila de Lima. A. IMPEACHMENT IS AN EXCLUSIVE MEANS FOR THE REMOVAL OF AN 2 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno G.R. No. 237428 Page 3 of 25 IMPEACHABLE PUBLIC OFFICIAL 6. The subject of the said proceeding, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, is, by express provision of the Constitution, removal from office exclusively by impeachment, as is every other member of the Supreme Court, the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman.1 7. Under the same Article of the Constitution, the exclusive power to try and decide all cases of impeachment is vested upon the Senate,2 whose judgment in such cases “shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.”3 8. In other words, under the Constitution, it is the exclusive domain of the Philippine Senate, acting on a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment, or Articles of Impeachment, filed by at least one-third of all Members of the House of Representatives, to remove the Chief Justice (or any other impeachable officer for that matter) from office. 9. Thus, the filing of the quo warranto petition seeking the removal of Chief Justice Sereno violates the legal interest and duty vested by the Constitution on the Senate, of which movant-intervenors are members, and is, thus, repugnant to the Constitution and destructive of the system of checks and balances established therein. 10. Hence, this opposition-in-intervention, seeking the outright dismissal of the quo warranto petition, it being without basis and, in fact, contrary to the Constitution. Chief Justice is an impeachable officer 11. The constitutional qualifications under Art.8, Sec. 7(1) for appointment to the Supreme Court are limited to: (1) natural born citizenship, (2) age, (3) and experience, i.e., at least fifteen years of practice of law. These are legally enforceable objective qualifications in the sense that the Supreme Court can nullify the appointment of someone who does not possess any of these three qualifications. The President, for example, cannot appoint someone who is a foreigner, or 30 years of age, or is not even a lawyer. These 1 Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution. 2 Section 3(6), Article XI. 3 Section 3(7), Article XI. 3 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno G.R. No. 237428 Page 4 of 25 are qualifications for which there are judicially discoverable and manageable standards, and can thus be passed upon by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its power of judicial review. 12. On the other hand, Art. 8, Sec.7(3) states that “[a] Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.” These are not objective constitutional qualifications, but subjective characteristics of a judge. 13. These subjective characteristics are addressed for consideration of the Judicial and Bar Council and the President. Questions of competence, integrity, probity, and independence are not susceptible to analysis with the tools of legal doctrine; instead, they require political discernment on the part of the JBC and the President. They are “soft variables” for which there are no judicially manageable standards. 14. Thus, a person possessing such objective qualifications, who is also determined as possessing the subjective qualifications by the fact that he or she has been nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council and appointed by the President, and who then takes the oath of office, as in the case of Chief Justice Sereno, is already an impeachable public officer and can no longer be removed, except through the process of impeachment. The Removal from Office of Members of the Class of “Impeachable Officials” Can Only Be Obtained Exclusively Through Impeachment 15. The quo warranto petition filed by the OSG seeks the removal or ouster of the Chief Justice via a means other than impeachment. 16. This is contrary to the language, spirit and design of the Constitution. The language of the Constitution provides for the manner by which “impeachable officers”, including members of the Supreme Court, may be removed from office. 17. Article XI of the Constitution, on “Accountability of Public Officers”, Section 2 states that the Chief Justice, as a member of the Supreme Court, “may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” 4 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno G.R. No. 237428 Page 5 of 25 18. That the said constitutional provision uses the word “may” does not take away from the exclusive character of removing impeachable officials solely by impeachment. 18.1. First of all, the word “may” applies to the phrase “be removed from office”. It is meant to emphasize that these officials – who are among those who hold the highest positions in their respective spheres and who are, thus, the most powerful officials in the land – nonetheless remain accountable to the public because there remains a mechanism that “may” be resorted to in order to remove them from office. 18.2. In other words, the word “may” indicates that, though the sensitivity of their positions necessitate that they be free from the threat of being charged and removed from office by less stringent means that could affect the effective discharge of their powers and responsibilities, they are nevertheless still subject to public scrutiny and “may” still penalized for their actions, albeit through the mechanism outlined in Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. 18.3. In fact, it is precisely the use of the word “may” in this provision, in this particular Article of the Constitution, and in the context of the special character of this class of officials that emphasizes both the possibility of removal of these officials from office, as well as the intent to make the process of removal be exclusive. 18.4. Secondly, it is deceptively simplistic to argue that the word “may” means that resort to impeachment is directory, in the sense that other means of removing this class of officials from office is still available. As far back as 1913 (and reiterated thereafter4), the Honorable Court has unequivocally rejected such simplistic interpretation, holding that: …[I]t is well settled that in statutory interpretation the word "may" should be read "shall" where such construction is necessary to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator.