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Economic and Social Council Resolution 1996/31

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Economic and Social Council Resolution 1996/31 UNITED NATIONS E Economic and Social Distr. Council GENERAL E/CN.4/2005/NGO/343 10 March 2005 ENGLISH ONLY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS Sixty-first session Items 9 and 11 (a) of the provisional agenda QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING THE QUESTIONS OF: TORTURE AND DETENTION Written statement* submitted by the Movement against Racism and for Friendship among Peoples (MRAP), a non-governmental organization on the Roster The Secretary-General has received the following written statement which is circulated in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1996/31. [11 February 2005] * This written statement is issued, unedited, in the language(s) received from the submitting non-governmental organization(s). GE.05-11875 E/CN.4/2005/NGO/343 page 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN TIBET China is a signatory member of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) since 5 October 1998 and has not ratified so far Article 18(1) of the ICCPR states. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. This freedom is limited in 18(3) only where “necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals…” Article 36 of the PRC’s constitution stipulates, Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No State organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The State protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the State… There is no sign of improvement on the situation of human rights in Tibet in particular religious freedom during the year 2004. The study of Buddhism is exactly what the Chinese authorities continue to discourage. They want to misrepresent Tibetan religion as practices in superstition and blind faith. Monastic colleges were not allowed to continue in the traditional way, and a ceiling was placed on the number of monks allowed in each monastery. Before the Chinese invasion, Sera had about 8,000 monks, Drepung 10,000 and Gaden 5,600 monks. The Chinese government directive of 1997 stated that Sera is allowed to have a maximum of 300 monks, Drepung 400 and Gaden 200. An independent survey conducted by Melvyn C. Goldstein and his associates in "TAR" pointed out that "Chinese government policy considers Tibetan Buddhism in a negative light and constrains/controls it in various ways. For example, limits on the size of existing monasteries or nunneries are enforced and there are prohibitions against the creation of new religious institutions. Moreover, in the 1990s, many monasteries and nunneries that had unilaterally exceeded their limits were forced to send the "excess" monks and nuns back to their families. At the same time, the government also began to enforce more strictly a rule that prohibits males under 18 years of age from becoming monks, despite the Tibetan tradition of boys becoming monks before they reach their teens. Similarly, the government strictly prohibits the exhibition of the Dalai Lama's photo. There is also an official culture that criticizes traditional religious practices like divination, disparages expenditures on religious rites, and invokes tight regulations on other folk practitioners like shamanic mediums."1 The official Chinese directives laid down the following criteria for admission to a monastery: The candidate should be at least 18 years old; should love the country and the Communist Party; should have parental consent and obtain formal approval from the monastery’s Democratic Management Committee; should have the consent of the county or provincial authorities and the Public Security Bureau; the candidate and his/her parents should have a good political background. 1 Development and Change in rural Tibet, Melvyn Goldstein E/CN.4/2005/NGO/343 page 3 In addition, the daily functions of monasteries were regimented through a maze of state bureaucracies, such as the Religious Affairs Bureau, the Chinese Buddhist Association, Democratic Management Committee, Political Education Work Teams, security organs, etc. The presence of such control mechanisms in monasteries and nunneries became all too palpable in the wake of Tibetan protest demonstrations, beginning in September 1987. Members of Work Teams camped in the monasteries for months to re-educate the monks to foster a large number of fervent patriots in every religion who accept the leadership of the Party and government, firmly support the Socialist path, and safeguard national and ethnic unity. According to the latest of USA State Department report on International Religious Freedom released on 15 September 2004 stated, “Overall, the level of repression in Tibetan Areas remained high and the Government's record of respect for religious freedom remained poor.” It further mentioned “the Government officials have stated that the “patriotic education” campaign which began in 1996 and often consisted of intensive, weeks-long sessions conducted by outside work teams, ended in 2000. However, officials state openly that monks and nuns continue to undergo political education likewise known as “patriotic education,” on a regular basis (i.e. classes held four times per year) at their religious sites.” Monks and nuns were forced to renounce the Dalai Lama and to accept Tibet as a part of China during the course of patriotic education. Hundreds of monks and nuns and the lay populace have been expelled and sentenced to lengthy terms in jail for failing to comply with the official political line.2 Since 1996, the campaign such as “Patriotic Education ”, “ Strike Hard ”and “ Spiritual Civilization ” that had been imposed on Tibet are tailored to undermine Tibetan religion, culture and language. Anti Dalai Lama Campaign On July 23, 1996, Chen Kuiyuan, the then Communist Party Secretary of the TAR, addressed a mobilization rally in Lhasa to launch the Spiritual Civilization campaign and declare its main thrust in Tibet. Chen said, one of the important tasks in facilitating the Spiritual Civilization drive is to screen and eliminate Dalai’s influence in the spiritual field. If we fail to accomplish this task, we cannot claim to have attained any great results in facilitating the Spiritual Civilization drive.3 Monasteries and nunneries became the primary targets of the Patriotic Education campaign. The authorities argued that monks and nuns had become the vanguard of disturbances and that monasteries and nunneries had become the breeding ground and hotbed for the Dalai Clique’s splittist activities in Tibet.4 To counter this, on July 20, 1997 a 10-point disciplinary code for monks and nuns was issued to all religious institutions in order to tighten government control over it through the establishment of a Democratic Management Committee and Patriotic Education Work Unit in every monastery and nunnery. The disciplinary code, amongst others, forbids the possession and propagation of splittist publications and calls for protection of the stability and unity of the Motherland. The code also forbids spiritual teachings outside the confines of monastic institutions. Identity cards are issued to government-approved monks and nuns to facilitate control over their activities. Those without identity cards are ousted from monasteries and nunneries. Wu Jilie, Deputy Chairman of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR)'s government, has denied any ban on pictures of the Dalai Lama exists in Tibet today according to an interview in Reuters on 18 August 2004. 2 International Religious Freedom Report 2004, issued by U.S. Department of State on 16 September 2004 3 BBC Monitoring, September 9, 1996 4 July 19, 1996 speech of the Vice-Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region, Phagbalha Geleg Namgyal E/CN.4/2005/NGO/343 page 4 Over the years, the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) has documented numerous arrests in Tibet in connection with possession of pictures and audio-video materials of the Dalai Lama. In November 2003, authorities in Kardze and Lithang County threatened the local populace with confiscation of their land if they fail to hand over portraits of the Dalai Lama displayed in their homes. Popular religious figures like Trulku Tenzin Delek (commuted to life imprisonment on 26 January 2004 as per court verdict of the Higher People's Court in Sichuan province, in Southwestern China), Geshe Sonam Phuntsok (released on 26 October 2004 upon completion of five years of imprisonment terms) and late Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok(his institute destroyed and he was detained incommunicado for a year) have all been targeted by the Chinese authorities for their allegiance to the Dalai Lama. The 14- year old Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the 11th Panchen Lama recognized by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, has been held under house arrest at an undisclosed location since 1995. His whereabouts is still a mystery. Human rights monitoring agencies like the Amnesty International describe him to be the world's youngest political prisoner. According to Tibetan Center for
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