DOCSLIB.ORG

Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward The state under Mao Being an absolute ruler of a one party state has it’s issues, every problem and every mistake being made is being magnified as there is no one to keep the ruler on track. It was taught that Mao never made mistakes and that he was beyond criticism, so the truth was either completely ignored or suppressed. The land and industrial policies that were put in place were highly unrealistic, and therefore led to the greatest famine in Chinese history; the government’s reaction was to ignore it and pretend that nothing was happening to the nation. Key Dates 1956 Beginning of Collectivization 1958-62 Second Five Year Plan Widespread famine 1958 Mao gave up presidency of PRC 1959 Lushan Conference Tibetan Rising 1962 Panchen Lama’s Report Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping appointed tackle famine Mao’s Goals BIG TWO OBJECTIVES 1. to create an Describes the second FYP (1958-62) industrialised economy Goals: in order to ‘catch up’ ● To turn the PRC into a modern industrial state in the with the West; shortest length of time 2. to transform China into ● Revolutionizing the agriculture and industry ● To catch up to the economy of other major powers a collectivized society: ● Future of china: responsibility of workers and industry where socialist principles NOT peasants and agriculture defined work, ● Belief that chinna can surpass the industrialized world production, and people’s by following communist russia’s footsteps lives ● “Leap” Rural, agricultural economy Urban, industrial economy Mao talking about the GLF “china will overtake all capitalist countries in a fairly short time and become one of the richest, most advanced and powerful countries of the world” “More, faster, better, cheaper” While the First Five Year Plan had succeeded in stimulating rapid industrialisation and increased production, Mao was suspicious of Soviet models of economic development. Instead, Mao favoured an ideological shift in economic policy that would continue industrialisation but also move China towards agricultural collectivisation. Mao’s Inspiration ● Inspired by Soviet Union but didn’t want to follow them ● China had no experience in economic growth According to The 60 Articles on Working Methods, the targets of the plan have often been decided without a grounded knowledge of the Chinese economic reality ● So they were forced to follow USSR’s steps ● Especially in heavy industry ● Recognizes that as a weakness Comparison: Mao and Stalin’s Ambitions 1. Initially, Stalin was against rapid 2. Mao was in for rapid industrialization industrialization. When Stalin accepted from the start. He did not need convincing the need for collectivization he also from anyone whereas Stalin reconsidered had to reconsider industrialization. His the opinions of Trotsky, Zinoviev and goals of collectivisation required many Kamenev. Industrialization was stressed more tractors than the state owned. As much more than collectivization. Where in well as tractors, there was also a need the Soviet Union collectivization was strictly to develop the oil fields to provide the implemented as of the start of the first FYP, necessary petrol to drive the machines. it was only halfway during the first FYP in Power stations also had to be built to China that Mao realized that China was supply the farms with electricity. lacking labour force. It was in the beginning of the second FYP that Mao made collectivization mandatory. INDUSTRIAL REFORM Industrial “LIFT OFF” Using China’s greatest strength: it's massive population Each individual would have a role to fulfill ● The COLLECTIVIZED peasants would create a surplus of food that would be sold abroad to raise money for industrial expansion ● The INDUSTRIAL workers would create a modern industrial economy, powerful enough to compete with the West and the USSR Upgrade from First FYP to the Second ● Mao believed it was a matter of pure will ● Emphasis on heavy industry and large projects ● Industrial colossus ● Similarly to Stalin: the leader himself impressed by big plans ● Scale of construction rather than economic revenue that was appealing ● MANPOWER = SUCCESS The Sixty Articles on Working Methods ● The articles in which the goals and ideas of the GLF were expressed for the first time ● January 21st 1958 ● Outlines the purposes and goals of the second FYP (aka the GLF) ● The points were determined at Nanning and Hangzhou Conferences (both happened in early January 1958) “Our main purpose is to seek to obtain a progress on working methods so as to adapt to the needs of the changed political conditions” - Mao Zedong, Article 9 “The next ten years will be determined by the following three years. Efforts should be made to bring about the basic transformation of the look of most areas in the next three years.” - Mao Zedong, The 60 Articles on Working Methods “The emperor of the blue ants” ● Visible proof of china’s growth under communism ○ Bridges, dams, canals constructed ○ Just like in the Soviet Union ● Blue uniforms for everyone ● The simplest tools ● The people of china became working ants ● Propaganda ○ Joyful, singing people at work ● Addition to thousands of prisoner workers ● Mao = emperor of those working ants in blue uniforms Tiananmen Square ● Building of Tiananmen Square ● 1957-59 ● Clearing of 100 acre site from homes, shops, markets ● Open to the south, with two new buildings to the east and west, and the Forbidden City to the north ● One of the largest public spaces to this day ● Mao’s goal: to make it larger than Moscow’s Red Square ● Visited major construction sites himself Not only did Mao use his visits of major working sites as propaganda, he was also genuinely curious to see how the workers were doing. But similarly to Stalin, he would try to incorporate himself into the “process of industrializing the state” for propaganda purposes. Ming Tombs (burial ground for emperors of Ming Dynasty) Mao joined in the digging for half an hour (and heavily publicized this action). His doctor stated that was the first time he had seen Mao physically exert himself over 20 years. Development of his cult of personality. The Second FYP 1958-62 ● Centre piece of GLF ● Big ceremonies: 1958 ● Targets & quotas set and reset but were not based on sound economic analysis ● Was it really a plan? ● Projected figures changed frequently ● Li Hsien-nien ○ Minister of finance ○ Admitted that it was a disorganized fiasco Steel Production ● The doubling of steel production was other of Mao’s initial goals of the Great Leap Forward ● Steel targets further escalated during the period ● 1957: annual steel production target was 5.35 million tonnes ● May 1958: target raised to 10.7 million tonnes ● An often stated goal was that China’s steel production should catch up to the Soviet Union by 1960 and eventually overtake that of Britain “General steel” and “General grain” Figurative speaking to outline the “two great soldiers” that lead China to economic victory General Grain: triumphing battle to increase food supplies General Steel: wins struggle to turn china into a successful industrial economy Backyard Furnaces Campaign ● Mao’s belief: by mass producing steel China’s problems would all be solved ● Communal activity where everyone participated ● Enthusiasm, not skill required ● “Learning by doing” ● Everyone rushed to build little kilns (family furnaces) ○ Out of dirt, soil, plants, etc. ● Large areas of china would be flooded in smoke during the day ● Home made steel “The Steel ○ Scraps of iron melted to form steel Fever” ● Everyone joined in, including ministers and their families ● Officials reported back to Mao: how faithfully and successfully the people of china were responding Historiography “The sky at night was reddened by the flames of millions of kilns” - Michael Lynch “Seething, clattering frenzy” - Roderick MacFarquar (celebrated foreign writer residing in Beijing at the time) “China was dipped into a sea of fire” - Frank Dikötter Weaknesses of Campaign ● Goodwill did not produce good steel ● There was a high demand for wood as fuel ● At first authorities pretended they didn’t notice unproductiveness of policy ● Steel collected from eager peasants & dumped into deep pits to bury it then and there ● Policy abandoned once it was realized how unproductive it was ● One tonne of iron from a backyard furnace cost twice the amount of that produced in a modern furnace ● The backyard furnaces campaign can symbolize the GLF: lots of energy, noise, and endeavour, but little substance State Owned Enterprises ● Attempt to bring Failures Worker Benefits industry under total ● Fulfilled “centrally ● Destroyed sense of controlled industry” but government control endeavour but in practice they workers had an “iron ● Existing companies performed worse than rice bowl” could no longer operate expected ● Aka they were as private firms ● Destroyed motives for guaranteed a job and ● Worked for the state as managers or workers to protected their wages show initiative designated SOEs ● SOEs provided ● (like in a Kolkhoz: no workers with ● Workers could no longer work was getting done) accommodations, bargain for pay and ● Worker: conscious or medical care and work conditions idle, still received same education for families pay Weaknesses of Second FYP ● There were impressive increases in output ● Serious decrease in production in 1960s ● Data only shows PRODUCTION of material not HOW MUCH IS USED ● No plan for taking care of manufactured goods that were being produced ● China lacking essentials: ○ Technical skill ○ Managerial
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Course Handbook
    SL12 Page 1 of 29 UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE DEPARTMENT OF SLAVONIC STUDIES PAPER SL12: SOCIALIST RUSSIA 1917-1991 HANDBOOK Daria Mattingly [email protected] SL12 Page 2 of 29 INTRODUCTION COURSE AIMS The course is designed to provide you with a thorough grounding in and advanced understanding of Russia’s social, political and economic history in the period under review and to prepare you for the exam, all the while fostering in you deep interest in Soviet history. BEFORE THE COURSE BEGINS Familiarise yourself with the general progression of Soviet history by reading through one or more of the following: Applebaum, A. Red Famine. Stalin's War on Ukraine (2017) Figes, Orlando Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991 (2014) Hobsbawm, E. J. The Age of Extremes 1914-1991 (1994) Kenez, Peter A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End (2006) Lovell, Stephen The Soviet Union: A Very Short Introduction (2009) Suny, Ronald Grigor The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States (2010) Briefing meeting: There’ll be a meeting on the Wednesday before the first teaching day of Michaelmas. Check with the departmental secretary for time and venue. It’s essential that you attend and bring this handbook with you. COURSE STRUCTURE The course comprises four elements: lectures, seminars, supervisions and reading. Lectures: you’ll have sixteen lectures, eight in Michaelmas and eight in Lent. The lectures provide an introduction to and overview of the course, but no more. It’s important to understand that the lectures alone won’t enable you to cover the course, nor will they by themselves prepare you for the exam.
    [Show full text]
  • Peasant Rebels Under Stalin This Page Intentionally Left Blank Peasant Rebels Under Stalin
    Peasant Rebels under Stalin This page intentionally left blank Peasant Rebels Under Stalin Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance Lynne Viola OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS New York Oxford Oxford University Press Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogota Buenos Aires Calcutta Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Paris Sao Paulo Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Copyright © 1996 by Oxford University Press, Inc. First published in 1996 by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 First issued as an Oxford University Press paperback, 1999 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Viola, Lynne. Peasant rebels under Stalin : collectivization and the culture of peasant resistance / Lynne Viola. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-19-510197-9 ISBN 0-19-513104-5 (pbk.) 1. Collectivization of agriculture—Soviet Union—History. 2. Peasant uprisings—Soviet Union—History. 3. Government, Resistance to—Soviet Union—History. 4. Soviet Union—Economic policy—1928-1932. 5. Soviet Union—Rural conditions. I. Title. HD1492.5.S65V56 1996 338.7'63'0947—dc20 95-49340 135798642 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper You have shot many people You have driven many to jail You have sent many into exile To certain death in the taiga.
    [Show full text]
  • Lysenkoism: the Danger of Political Correctness Emily G. Badger
    Badger !0 Lysenkoism: The Danger of Political Correctness Emily G. Badger Senior Division Historical Paper Paper Length: 2,334 words Badger !1 What is truth? A simple definition of truth would be anything that can be tested and proven in a universal process, for example, the scientific method. What happens in an environment where truth is not allowed to be tested? What would the consequences be? Unfortunately, there was a time in history when this was true, and it was strikingly recent. In the late 1920’s Mendelian genetics were replaced by Lysenkoism in Soviet Russia, just before the start of World War II. Though the conflict started as a dispute of truth within scientific circles, it quickly became evident that Lysenko’s underlying motive was not to make scientific discoveries, but to gain political power. The tragic result of politically correct truth replacing scientific truth was mass starvation and ultimately the crippling of a world superpower. To understand how such a catastrophic event could occur, it is necessary to understand the political climate of the Soviet Union at the time. First, it is important to note that Russia was a communist state, which meant there was an intense hatred of anyone who was considered bourgeois, a member of the middle class who upheld the interests of capitalism rather than communism (Collins English Dictionary). Bourgeois members of Russian society were hated because they were property owners; they were not considered to be working for a living and thus were the enemy of Communism. Being called bourgeois in Russia at this time was essentially a death sentence, as those who disagreed with Communist values were “removed” by the government.
    [Show full text]
  • State-Sponsored Violence in the Soviet Union: Skeletal Trauma and Burial Organization in a Post-World War Ii Lithuanian Sample
    STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION: SKELETAL TRAUMA AND BURIAL ORGANIZATION IN A POST-WORLD WAR II LITHUANIAN SAMPLE By Catherine Elizabeth Bird A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Anthropology- Doctor of Philosophy 2013 ABSTRACT STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION: SKELETAL TRAUMA AND BURIAL ORGANIZATION IN A POST WORLD WAR II LITHUANIAN SAMPLE By Catherine Elizabeth Bird The Stalinist period represented one of the worst eras of human rights abuse in the Soviet Union. This dissertation investigates both the victims and perpetrators of violence in the Soviet Union during the Stalinist period through a site specific and regional evaluation of burial treatment and perimortem trauma. Specifically, it compares burial treatment and perimortem trauma in a sample (n = 155) of prisoners executed in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic (L.S.S.R.) by the Soviet security apparatus from 1944 to 1947, known as the Tuskulenai case. Skeletal and mortuary variables are compared both over time and between security personnel in the Tuskulenai case. However, the Tuskulenai case does not represent an isolated event. Numerous other sites of state-sponsored violence are well known. In order to understand the temporal and geographical distribution of Soviet violence, this study subsequently compares burial treatment and perimortem trauma observed in the Tuskulenai case to data published in site reports for three other cases of Soviet state-sponsored violence (Vinnytsia, Katyn, and Rainiai). This dissertation discusses state-sponsored violence in the Soviet Union in the context of social and political theory advocated by Max Weber and within a principal-agent framework.
    [Show full text]
  • Discussion Paper Series
    DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES No. 6014 DICTATORS, REPRESSION AND THE MEDIAN CITIZEN: AN “ELIMINATIONS MODEL” OF STALIN’S TERROR (DATA FROM THE NKVD ARCHIVES) Paul Gregory, Philipp Schröder and Konstantin Sonin PUBLIC POLICY and ECONOMIC HISTORY ABCD www.cepr.org Available online at: www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP6014.asp www.ssrn.com/xxx/xxx/xxx ISSN 0265-8003 DICTATORS, REPRESSION AND THE MEDIAN CITIZEN: AN “ELIMINATIONS MODEL” OF STALIN’S TERROR (DATA FROM THE NKVD ARCHIVES) Paul Gregory, University of Houston and Hoover Institute, Stanford University Philipp Schröder, Aarhus School of Business Konstantin Sonin, New Economic School, Moscow and CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6014 December 2006 Centre for Economic Policy Research 90–98 Goswell Rd, London EC1V 7RR, UK Tel: (44 20) 7878 2900, Fax: (44 20) 7878 2999 Email: [email protected], Website: www.cepr.org This Discussion Paper is issued under the auspices of the Centre’s research programme in PUBLIC POLICY and the Economic History Initiative. Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the Centre for Economic Policy Research. Research disseminated by CEPR may include views on policy, but the Centre itself takes no institutional policy positions. The Centre for Economic Policy Research was established in 1983 as a private educational charity, to promote independent analysis and public discussion of open economies and the relations among them. It is pluralist and non-partisan, bringing economic research to bear on the analysis of medium- and long-run policy questions. Institutional (core) finance for the Centre has been provided through major grants from the Economic and Social Research Council, under which an ESRC Resource Centre operates within CEPR; the Esmée Fairbairn Charitable Trust; and the Bank of England.
    [Show full text]
  • The Lysenko Controversy As a Global Phenomenon, Volume 2
    EDITEDEDITED BY BY WILLIAMWILLIAM DEJONG-LAMBERT DEJONG-LAMBERT AND AND NIKOLAINIKOLAI KREMENTSOV KREMENTSOV PALGRAVE STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PALGRAVE STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE HISTORY STUDIES PALGRAVE THETHE LYSENKOLYSENKO CONTROVERSYCONTROVERSY ASAS AA GLOBALGLOBAL PHENOMENON,PHENOMENON, VOLUMEVOLUME 22 GeneticsGenetics andand AgricultureAgriculture inin thethe SovietSoviet UnionUnion andand BeyondBeyond Palgrave Studies in the History of Science and Technology Series Editors James Rodger Fleming Colby College Waterville, Maine, USA Roger D. Launius Smithsonian Institution National Air and Space Museum Washington, D.C., USA Aims of the Series Designed to bridge the gap between the history of science and the history of technology, this series publishes the best new work by promising and accomplished authors in both areas. In particular, it offers historical per- spectives on issues of current and ongoing concern, provides international and global perspectives on scientific issues, and encourages productive communication between historians and practicing scientists. More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/14581 William deJong-Lambert • Nikolai Krementsov Editors The Lysenko Controversy as a Global Phenomenon, Volume 2 Genetics and Agriculture in the Soviet Union and Beyond Editors William deJong-Lambert Nikolai Krementsov Bronx Community College University of Toronto City University of New York Toronto, Ontario, Canada Bronx, New York, USA Palgrave Studies in the History of Science and Technology ISBN 978-3-319-39178-6 ISBN 978-3-319-39179-3 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-39179-3 Library of Congress Control Number: 2016947063 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017 This work is subject to copyright.
    [Show full text]
  • Was Stalin Necessary for Russia's Economic Development?
    NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES WAS STALIN NECESSARY FOR RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT? Anton Cheremukhin Mikhail Golosov Sergei Guriev Aleh Tsyvinski Working Paper 19425 http://www.nber.org/papers/w19425 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 September 2013 The authors thank Mark Aguiar, Bob Allen, Paco Buera, V.V. Chari, Hal Cole, Andrei Markevich, Joel Mokyr, Lee Ohanian, Richard Rogerson for useful comments. We also thank participants at the EIEF, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Harvard, NBER EFJK Growth, Development Economics, and Income Distribution and Macroeconomics, New Economic School, Northwestern, Ohio State, Princeton. Financial support from NSF is gratefully acknowledged. Golosov and Tsyvinski also thank Einaudi Institute of Economics and Finance for hospitality. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of their colleagues, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, the Federal Reserve System, or the National Bureau of Economic Research. At least one co-author has disclosed a financial relationship of potential relevance for this research. Further information is available online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19425.ack NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer- reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2013 by Anton Cheremukhin, Mikhail Golosov, Sergei Guriev, and Aleh Tsyvinski. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.
    [Show full text]
  • Lysenkoism and Antinuclear1 Movement
    Fifth Yugoslav Nuclear Society Conference YUNSC - 2004 ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ HAVE WE BEEN WISE ENOUGH IN THE PAST? LYSENKOISM AND ANTINUCLEAR1 MOVEMENT JOVAN V. JOVANOVICH Physics Department, University of Manitoba Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3T 2N2, Canada E-mail: [email protected] ABSTRACT Why is the anti-nuclear movement so strong? How come that it exists at all? It is easy to ask these questions but it is difficult to give an answer. In the Western World not many people are familiar with the development and demise of a pseudo-scientific teaching, commonly called Lysenkoism, that flourished in the Soviet Union from about 1929 up to 1966. During this period Lysenkoism did an enormous harm to the development of Biological Sciences in the Soviet Union and even to the overall national economy. In 1967, Zhores A. Medvedev wrote a historical account of that sad period. The book The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko (MEDV 67) was published two years later in the United States (Columbia University Press, 1969), and in 1993 in Moscow (MEDV 93). On page 244 (MEDV 67), when discussing impact of Lysenkoism on the Soviet society, science and economy, Medvedev wrote: “No single answer can be given to explain how an obvious pseudoscience could maintain a monopoly for so long, nor how clearly harmful and absurd recommendations could be adopted into the national economy.” In the Western industrialized world , in the second half of the twentieth century, a very strong antinuclear movement developed that has almost terminated any further developments and applications of nuclear power for the production of electricity.
    [Show full text]
  • “Eliminations Model” of Stalin's Terror (Data from the NKVD Archives)
    Centre for Economic and Financial Research at New Economic School November 2006 Dictators, Repression and the Median Citizen: An “Eliminations Model” of Stalin’s Terror (Data from the NKVD Archives) Paul R. Gregory Philipp J.H. Schroder Konstantin Sonin Working Paper No 91 CEFIR / NES Working Paper series Dictators, Repression and the Median Citizen: An “Eliminations Model” of Stalin’s Terror (Data from the NKVD Archives) Paul R. Gregory Philipp J.H. Schr¨oder University of Houston and Aarhus School of Business Hoover Institution, Stanford University Denmark Konstantin Sonin∗ New Economic School Moscow November, 2006 Abstract This paper sheds light on dictatorial behavior as exemplified by the mass terror campaigns of Stalin. Dictatorships – unlike democracies where politicians choose platforms in view of voter preferences – may attempt to trim their constituency and thus ensure regime survival via the large scale elimination of citizens. We formalize this idea in a simple model and use it to examine Stalin’s three large scale terror campaigns with data from the NKVD state archives that are accessible after more than 60 years of secrecy. Our model traces the stylized facts of Stalin’s terror and identifies parameters such as the ability to correctly identify regime enemies, the actual or perceived number of enemies in the population, and how secure the dictators power base is, as crucial for the patterns and scale of repression. Keywords: Dictatorial systems, Stalinism, Soviet State and Party archives, NKVD, OPGU, Repression. JEL: P00,
    [Show full text]
  • The Great Famine in Soviet Ukraine: Toward New Avenues Of
    THE GREAT FAMINE IN SOVIET UKRAINE: TOWARD NEW AVENUES OF INQUIRY INTO THE HOLODOMOR A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the North Dakota State University of Agriculture and Applied Science By Troy Philip Reisenauer In Partial Fulfillment for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS Major Department: History, Philosophy, and Religious Studies June 2014 Fargo, North Dakota North Dakota State University Graduate School Title THE GREAT FAMINE IN SOVIET UKRAINE: TOWARD NEW AVENUES OF INQUIRY INTO THE HOLODOMOR By Troy Philip Reisenauer The Supervisory Committee certifies that this disquisition complies with North Dakota State University’s regulations and meets the accepted standards for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE: Dr. John K. Cox Chair Dr. Tracy Barrett Dr. Dragan Miljkovic Approved: July 10, 2014 Dr. John K. Cox Date Department Chair ABSTRACT Famine spread across the Union of Social Soviet Republics in 1932 and 1933, a deadly though unanticipated consequence of Joseph Stalin’s attempt in 1928 to build socialism in one country through massive industrialization and forced collectivization of agriculture known as the first Five-Year Plan. This study uses published documents, collections, correspondence, memoirs, secondary sources and new insight to analyze the famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine and other Soviet republics. It presents the major scholarly works on the famine, research that often mirrors the diverse views and bitter public disagreement over the issue of intentionality and the ultimate culpability of Soviet leadership. The original contribution of this study is in the analysis of newly published primary documents of the 1920s and 1930s from the Russian Presidential Archives, especially vis-à-vis the role of Stalin and his chief lieutenants at the center of power and the various representatives at the republic-level periphery.
    [Show full text]
  • Not Even Past." William Faulkner NOT EVEN PAST
    "The past is never dead. It's not even past." William Faulkner NOT EVEN PAST Search the site ... Stalin’s Genocides by Like 0 Norman Naimark (2011) Tweet by Travis Gray Stalin’s Genocides provides an in-depth analysis of the horrendous atrocities — forced deportations, collectivization, the Ukrainian famine, and the Great Terror — perpetrated by Joseph Stalin’s tyrannical regime. Norman Naimark argues that these crimes should be considered genocide and that Joseph Stalin should therefore be labeled a “genocidaire.” He presents four major arguments to support this claim. First, the previous United Nations denition of genocide has recently been expanded to include murder on a social and political basis. Second, dekulakization—the arrest, deportation, and execution of kulaks or allegedly well-off peasants—was a form of genocide that dehumanized and eliminated an imagined social enemy. Third, during the Ukrainian famine in 1932-1933, victims were deliberately starved by the Soviet state. Fourth, The Great Terror was designed to eliminate potential enemies of the Soviet Union. Overall, Naimark’s arguments are persuasive, presenting a chilling portrait of Joseph Stalin as a sociopath bent on destroying his own people. Naimark begins with a brief consideration of “genocide” as a legal term in international law. Although the UN’s Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide does not apply to political or social groups, he shows—rather successfully— that the original UN denition of genocide had included these groups, but that the Soviet delegation had prevented this language from being adopted. This denition, however, has been challenged since the fall of the Soviet Union.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 4) Survivor Testimonies, Memoirs, Diaries, And
    4) SURVIVOR TESTIMONIES, MEMOIRS, DIARIES, AND LETTERS Introduction The fourth section of the Reader consists of testimonies, memoirs, and letters by famine victims. Most are by ordinary folk and are usually of a personal nature. At the same time, they provide a plethora of oftentimes painful and gut-wrenching details about the fate of family members and particular villages. Interestingly, several testimonies emphasize the limitation of the famine to Ukraine, noting that conditions just across the border in Russia were significantly better. A letter from German settlers in southern Ukraine to their relatives in North Dakota illustrates the fate of the German minority in Ukraine during the famine. Some testimonies were given before U.S. government-sponsored investigative bodies. Some, such as those published in The Black Deeds of the Kremlin, were collected and published by Ukrainian émigrés and Holodomor survivors at the height of the Cold War. This made it easy for those holding pro-Soviet views to dismiss them as anticommunist propaganda. A noteworthy personal account is that of Maria Zuk, who emigrated from southern Ukraine to western Canada to join her husband in the late summer of 1933, when she gave her interview to journalists working for a Ukrainian- language newspaper in Winnipeg. Another is Miron Dolot’s Execution by Hunger, published by a major American press in 1985. This section also contains materials from non-peasants: Fedir Pigido- Pravoberezhny, who worked as an engineer in Ukraine; Yurij Lawrynenko and Mykola Prychodko, both literary scholars; and Vladimir Keis, an urban worker at the time of the famine who retained strong ties with the Ukrainian village.
    [Show full text]