Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward

Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward The state under Mao

Being an absolute ruler of a one party state has it’s issues, every problem and every mistake being made is being magnified as there is no one to keep the ruler on track.

It was taught that Mao never made mistakes and that he was beyond criticism, so the truth was either completely ignored or suppressed.

The land and industrial policies that were put in place were highly unrealistic, and therefore led to the greatest famine in Chinese history; the government’s reaction was to ignore it and pretend that nothing was happening to the nation. Key Dates

1956 Beginning of Collectivization 1958-62 Second Five Year Plan Widespread famine 1958 Mao gave up presidency of PRC 1959 Lushan Conference Tibetan Rising 1962 Panchen Lama’s Report Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping appointed tackle famine Mao’s Goals BIG TWO OBJECTIVES 1. to create an Describes the second FYP (1958-62) industrialised economy Goals: in order to ‘catch up’ ● To turn the PRC into a modern industrial state in the with the West; shortest length of time 2. to transform China into ● Revolutionizing the agriculture and industry ● To catch up to the economy of other major powers a collectivized society: ● Future of china: responsibility of workers and industry where socialist principles NOT peasants and agriculture defined work, ● Belief that chinna can surpass the industrialized world production, and people’s by following communist russia’s footsteps lives ● “Leap”

Rural, agricultural economy Urban, industrial economy Mao talking about the GLF

“china will overtake all capitalist countries in a fairly short time and become one of the richest, most advanced and powerful countries of the world”

“More, faster, better, cheaper” While the First Five Year Plan had succeeded in stimulating rapid industrialisation and increased production, Mao was suspicious of Soviet models of economic development. Instead, Mao favoured an ideological shift in economic policy that would continue industrialisation but also move China towards agricultural collectivisation. Mao’s Inspiration

● Inspired by Soviet Union but didn’t want to follow them ● China had no experience in economic growth

According to The 60 Articles on Working Methods, the targets of the plan have often been decided without a grounded knowledge of the Chinese economic reality

● So they were forced to follow USSR’s steps ● Especially in heavy industry ● Recognizes that as a weakness Comparison: Mao and Stalin’s Ambitions

1. Initially, Stalin was against rapid 2. Mao was in for rapid industrialization industrialization. When Stalin accepted from the start. He did not need convincing the need for collectivization he also from anyone whereas Stalin reconsidered had to reconsider industrialization. His the opinions of Trotsky, Zinoviev and goals of collectivisation required many Kamenev. Industrialization was stressed more tractors than the state owned. As much more than collectivization. Where in well as tractors, there was also a need the Soviet Union collectivization was strictly to develop the oil fields to provide the implemented as of the start of the first FYP, necessary petrol to drive the machines. it was only halfway during the first FYP in Power stations also had to be built to China that Mao realized that China was supply the farms with electricity. lacking labour force. It was in the beginning of the second FYP that Mao made collectivization mandatory. INDUSTRIAL REFORM Industrial “LIFT OFF” Using China’s greatest strength: it's massive population Each individual would have a role to fulfill

● The COLLECTIVIZED peasants would create a surplus of food that would be sold abroad to raise money for industrial expansion ● The INDUSTRIAL workers would create a modern industrial economy, powerful enough to compete with the West and the USSR Upgrade from First FYP to the Second

● Mao believed it was a matter of pure will ● Emphasis on heavy industry and large projects ● Industrial colossus ● Similarly to Stalin: the leader himself impressed by big plans ● Scale of construction rather than economic revenue that was appealing ● MANPOWER = SUCCESS The Sixty Articles on Working Methods

● The articles in which the goals and ideas of the GLF were expressed for the first time ● January 21st 1958 ● Outlines the purposes and goals of the second FYP (aka the GLF) ● The points were determined at Nanning and Hangzhou Conferences (both happened in early January 1958)

“Our main purpose is to seek to obtain a progress on working methods so as to adapt to the needs of the changed political conditions” - Mao Zedong, Article 9 “The next ten years will be determined by the following three years. Efforts should be made to bring about the basic transformation of the look of most areas in the next three years.”

- Mao Zedong, The 60 Articles on Working Methods “The emperor of the blue ants”

● Visible proof of china’s growth under communism ○ Bridges, dams, canals constructed ○ Just like in the Soviet Union ● Blue uniforms for everyone ● The simplest tools ● The people of china became working ants ● Propaganda ○ Joyful, singing people at work ● Addition to thousands of prisoner workers ● Mao = emperor of those working ants in blue uniforms Tiananmen Square

● Building of Tiananmen Square ● 1957-59 ● Clearing of 100 acre site from homes, shops, markets ● Open to the south, with two new buildings to the east and west, and the Forbidden City to the north ● One of the largest public spaces to this day ● Mao’s goal: to make it larger than Moscow’s Red Square ● Visited major construction sites himself Not only did Mao use his visits of major working sites as propaganda, he was also genuinely curious to see how the workers were doing.

But similarly to Stalin, he would try to incorporate himself into the “process of industrializing the state” for propaganda purposes.

Ming Tombs

(burial ground for emperors of Ming Dynasty) Mao joined in the digging for half an hour (and heavily publicized this action). His doctor stated that was the first time he had seen Mao physically exert himself over 20 years. Development of his cult of personality. The Second FYP 1958-62

● Centre piece of GLF ● Big ceremonies: 1958 ● Targets & quotas set and reset but were not based on sound economic analysis ● Was it really a plan? ● Projected figures changed frequently ● Li Hsien-nien ○ Minister of finance ○ Admitted that it was a disorganized fiasco Steel Production

● The doubling of steel production was other of Mao’s initial goals of the Great Leap Forward ● Steel targets further escalated during the period ● 1957: annual steel production target was 5.35 million tonnes ● May 1958: target raised to 10.7 million tonnes ● An often stated goal was that China’s steel production should catch up to the Soviet Union by 1960 and eventually overtake that of Britain “General steel” and “General grain”

Figurative speaking to outline the “two great soldiers” that lead China to economic victory

General Grain: triumphing battle to increase food supplies General Steel: wins struggle to turn china into a successful industrial economy Backyard Furnaces Campaign

● Mao’s belief: by mass producing steel China’s problems would all be solved ● Communal activity where everyone participated ● Enthusiasm, not skill required ● “Learning by doing” ● Everyone rushed to build little kilns (family furnaces) ○ Out of dirt, soil, plants, etc. ● Large areas of china would be flooded in smoke during the day ● Home made steel “The Steel ○ Scraps of iron melted to form steel Fever” ● Everyone joined in, including ministers and their families ● Officials reported back to Mao: how faithfully and successfully the people of china were responding Historiography

“The sky at night was reddened by the flames of millions of kilns” - Michael Lynch

“Seething, clattering frenzy” - Roderick MacFarquar (celebrated foreign writer residing in Beijing at the time)

“China was dipped into a sea of fire” - Frank Dikötter Weaknesses of Campaign

● Goodwill did not produce good steel ● There was a high demand for wood as fuel ● At first authorities pretended they didn’t notice unproductiveness of policy ● Steel collected from eager peasants & dumped into deep pits to bury it then and there ● Policy abandoned once it was realized how unproductive it was ● One tonne of iron from a backyard furnace cost twice the amount of that produced in a modern furnace ● The backyard furnaces campaign can symbolize the GLF: lots of energy, noise, and endeavour, but little substance State Owned Enterprises

● Attempt to bring Failures Worker Benefits industry under total ● Fulfilled “centrally ● Destroyed sense of controlled industry” but government control endeavour but in practice they workers had an “iron ● Existing companies performed worse than rice bowl” could no longer operate expected ● Aka they were as private firms ● Destroyed motives for guaranteed a job and ● Worked for the state as managers or workers to protected their wages show initiative designated SOEs ● SOEs provided ● (like in a Kolkhoz: no workers with ● Workers could no longer work was getting done) accommodations, bargain for pay and ● Worker: conscious or medical care and work conditions idle, still received same education for families pay Weaknesses of Second FYP

● There were impressive increases in output ● Serious decrease in production in 1960s ● Data only shows PRODUCTION of material not HOW MUCH IS USED ● No plan for taking care of manufactured goods that were being produced ● China lacking essentials: ○ Technical skill ○ Managerial know-how ○ Efficiently run factories and plants ○ Adequate transport system Production Statistics Limitations of GLF

● The endeavours thrilled the locals and impressed foreigners ● Plan as a whole did not reach objective of creating a modern industrial economy ○ Quality of finished products did not meet industrial needs ○ Political interference made it impossible to manage as a purely economic matter ○ Officials were threatening and demanding but no specific instructions given to workers ○ Even with SOEs a lot was left to local initiative (no integrated national plan) ○ Effective organization and quality control were hard to sustain ○ USSR stopped providing technical assistance in 1960 ○ Because of that 300 industrial plants were shut down (that the Soviet Union was sponsoring) Role of Women

● 1958: CCP initiated a women’s liberation so that women could contribute to the socialist construction ● Women were mobilized to assume responsibility for much of the agricultural production and to participate in steel construction projects ● Scholars know very little on the role of women in the GLF to this day ● Because of the sudden increase of man power during the GLF, the women who had children were to stay at home and be of use in the fields ● Factory work was mostly for women who did not have children Mao’s Weaknesses as an Economist

[belief in the CCP] Applied communism: would always produce effective system of production and fair shares for all.

Mao refused to accept the failure of his policies: interpreted lack of economic achievement as a result of bourgeois sabotage. His reaction to news of failure: blame the messenger. Mao’s Economic Backwardness and Reliance on Intuition

● Aims were unachievable, ambition was not enough ● Mao believed in China’s sole manpower ● Lacked knowledge of agricultural science to even understand reports he received from the countryside ● Very limited in understanding of industrial process

“I only understand social sciences but not natural sciences” -Mao

● He was a revolutionary who reacted to the situation all his life ● As a military strategist he never prepared to control a nation’s economy ● Approach: a series of intuitive leaps Historiography

The millet is scattered over the ground. The leaves of the sweet potato are withered. The young and old have gone to smelt iron. To harvest the grain there are only children and old women. How shall we get through the next year? Peng Dehuai AGRICULTURAL REFORM Collectivization Zhou Enlai ● An addition to Mao’s industrial plans: agricultural Became premier and foreign minister of the PRC in 1949. He supported Mao reforms Zedong’s policies during the 1950s, including the Great Leap Forward. Some ● Known as the leader of the peasants; left that name historians hold Zhou partly responsible for the disasters of the late 1950s, as he played behind when it came to his industrial colossus an important role in implementing Mao’s economic reforms. While Mao attempted ● Cooperatives and collectivisation had been to reconfigure China’s economy and encouraged during the mid 1950s but it was not society, Zhou handled matters of foreign policy. until the GLF that the ‘people’s communes’ became official government policy ● Initially, peasant families were organised into Liu Shaoqi President of PRC. When Mao floated the cooperatives of around 20 to 40 households GLF in 1958, Liu gave it his full support. But by the CCP’s August 1959 plenum in ● 1955: Mao called for the enlargement of Lushan, Liu had become more sceptical. After hearing stories of peasant famines cooperatives, into communes of 100-300 households from his sister, Liu became more critical of Mao within party ranks. Disenchantment ● The policy of collectivization sparked debate within with economic conditions eventually led to Mao’s discrediting and his 1959 resignation the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with moderates as president of the People’s Republic. like Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi urging caution ● Yes more food was produced by the peasants, but the food was not finding its way to the INDUSTRIAL WORKERS ● Economic planners’ perspective: fault of the peasants ○ “Peasants purposefully overate and created larger families, hance having more mouths to feed” ○ Strict control was necessary

“Educate peasants to eat less, and have more thin gruel. The state should try it's hardest to prevent peasants from eating too much” -Mao

● Initial land reforms introduced in 1950, following the 1949 révolution. The land was taken from the landlords and given to the peasants ● Peasants urged to join collectives. This was not strictly enforced back then ● 1956-58: 750 000 existing communes were to join into large communes

Collectives: areas where Communes: organized Gruel: Thin watery peasants farmed collectively regions where collectives porridge (very simple and instead of individually were joined together cheap food) Collectivization was made essential in 1958

1. 750 000 collectives were merged into 26 000 communes 2. Communes collectively contained 120 million households (avg household was made up of five members) 3. System was under direct control of the PRC’s central government 4. Private farming ceased to exist 5. Peasants needed internal passports to travel between communes According to a CCP propaganda jingle from the late 1950s, “communism is paradise [and] the people’s communes are the way to get there”. In reality, the transition to communal living far from easy and created considerable misery. Most private property was confiscated, while land plots, farm buildings, tools and livestock were relinquished to the government. As targets were increased, even private homes were confiscated. The leadership of the people’s communes became fanatical about implementing government policy, increasing production, meeting targets and outdoing other communes. They demanded a regimented, almost militarised lifestyle; they also had overzealous expectations about work and production.

Mao proclaimed that “communism means eating for free” and the communal dining halls allowed the government to control all aspects of food distribution and consumption. Most did not like the public dining halls, however, and there were issues with food supply – for example, food allocations intended to last for a week sometimes disappeared in a day.As the targets for industrial and agricultural output increased, so too did the pressure on the people’s communes. This led to cadres and commune leaders inflating production figures, simply to keep pace with other communes. Some communes were referred to as ‘good news reporting stations’ while reaching a new high number was called ‘launching a sputnik’ (a reference to the Soviet Union’s recent launch of an artificial satellite into space). The communes, with Mao’s blessing, also experimented with radical agricultural practices, like the concentrated sowing of seeds, deep ploughing of the soil, close cropping and other ineffectual farming techniques. Most of these changes proved disastrous. Move towards collectivization, happiness forever 1954

Go all out and aim high. The East leaps forward, the West is worried 1958 Chinese Collectivization Propaganda “Agricultural collectivization is the socialist course that makes everybody prosperous”

USSR Collectivization Propaganda “If you work hard, you will be well fed all year long” Quite similar Mao’s Attitude Towards Peasants

● Just like Stalin, Mao believed that peasants on their own were selfish and grasping by nature [inherently capitalistic]

“the revolutionary state, having established legitimacy by freeing peasants from landlordism, now had him boxed in as never before. The state had become the ultimate landlord.” -John King Fairbank

● In public Mao continued to state that collectivization was the result of their wishes ● Declaration made by CCP in the name of Mao, summer 1958:

“The people have been working with militancy, living a collective life, and this has raised political consciousness of 500 million peasants further. Community dining rooms, kindergartens, nurseries, sewing rooms, “red and expert schools”, etc., are all leading peasants towards a happier collective life and further fostering ideas of collectivism among the peasant masses” Why Collectivization was a Disappointment

● Previous claim by the CCP was a huge lie ● Collectivization had been imposed on peasantry as a part of a social experiment where wishes of the peasants were fully ignored ● Mao was a peasant himself growing up, he even led a great peasant revolution, yet he had a very low opinion of the class he emerged out of

“Peasants are hiding food and are very bad. There is no Communist spirit in them! Peasants are after all peasants. That’s the only way they can behave.” - Mao

● Disregard for ordinary people of china that made up most of the population equalled extreme conséquences later on Historiography

“Officially, everyone was supposed to have at least six hours’ sleep every two days, but some brigades boasted of working up to four or five days without stopping … the Great Leap Forward ended in an apocalyptic failure.” - Philip Short

“Mao’s visits to the countryside were carefully stage-managed. Farmers, for example, were told to transplant rice along Mao’s route to give the impression of a big harvest.” - Frank Dikötter

“The impetus for the GLF came from the CCP’s shocking recognition in late 1957 that Stalinist models of industrial growth were not suited to Chinese conditions. China’s population in 1950 was four times as big as that of the Soviet Union in the 1920s, while the Chinese standard of living was only half as high. In spite of universal collectivisation, farm production had not noticeably increased. From 1952 to 1957 the rural population had increased by about 9 per cent, while the city population had grown by about 30 per cent… The First Five-Year Plan had got results as expected, but to go ahead with more of the same would invite disaster.” - John K. Fairbank “The People’s Commune represents a much higher degree of socialist development and collectivisation… Its massive scale of production requires more efficient organisation with great labour flexibility, as well as women’s’ production participation. So people are setting up more and more community canteens, nurseries, sewing groups…” The People’s Daily, 1958

“Wage a bitter struggle for three years and transform the look of a greater part of the country… The industrial output of local industries should exceed local agricultural output in five to ten years.” Mao Zedong, 1958 THE GREAT FAMINE ● By 1959 the harvests were insufficient for feeding the population, and the resulting famine devastated the peasant population ● According to the government and the CCP, the Great Famine was caused by a string of natural disasters ● With its large population, China was no stranger to famine ● More than 6 million Chinese peasants starved during the upheaval of the warlord period (1916-27) ● Another 8 million starved during the Nationalist period (1927-49) ● The Great Chinese Famine, was deadlier than both combined ● Lasted from 1958-61 ● The causes and outcomes of the Great Famine are unknown and subject to considerable debate ● Though mostly caused by drought and weather conditions, the Great Famine was undoubtedly worsened by the communist policies (such as the establishment of collectivization and industrialization policies) ● The disruption caused by killing off private farming was one of the big causes for hunger ● Throughout collectivization, many new agrarian techniques were adopted in the hopes of revolutionizing food production but those stratégies ended up being fatal to the agriculture Trofim Lysenko

● Trofim Lysenko (1898-1976), Soviet Russian scientist and researcher ● Theories promised greater production ● challenged the findings of Western scientists ● Lysenko supported by Stalin ● Chinese peasant farmers were ordered to embrace ‘Lysenkoism’ ● Farmers were ordered to ‘close plant’ seeds and seedlings ● Chemical fertilisers and pesticides were also banned, the latter replaced by Mao’s disastrous Four Pests campaign (1958) ● Disastrous effect on Chinese agricultural production in the late 1950s ● They were a contributing factor to the Great Chinese Famine (1959-61) ● Lysenko himself was stripped of his government and academic roles and consigned to a small experimental farm Lysenkoism During the Famine ● Chinese scientists influenced by Trofim Lysenko ● Claims of results: crops such as rice, barley and wheat could be produced in quantities 16 times more than the usual ● Of course this was appealing to Mao ● Theories were fake and ridiculously off ● His influence was so strong on the USSR that the Chinese regarded Lysenko as infallible ● Generation of chinese researchers brainwashed that Lysenko could not possibly be wrong ● Lysenkoism was made into an official policy in 1958 ● Mao personally drafted an 8 point “agricultural constitution” 1. Popularization of new breeds and seeds 2. Close planting 3. Deep ploughing Lysenkoism as an 4. Increased fertilization official policy in 1958. 5. Innovation of farm tools Personally drafted 8 6. Improved field management point “agricultural 7. Pest control constitution” by Mao. 8. Increased irrigation Sparrowcide

● No attention was paid to the conditions in which crops were planted and grown ● Pest control caused lots of tragic results ○ China’s crops were menaced by sparrows ○ At prescribed times of the day: chinese came out of the house and made as much noise as they could with anything they could find to scare birds away ○ Eventually birds dropped dead from the sky because they were too exhausted from not being able to land ○ The thousands of dead birds were displayed as trophies ○ Villages and regions competed to see who could kill off the most birds… ● No birds = huge amount of insects = catastrophe ● No more larger birds to even kill off the rats because those all died as well since they had no small birds to eat ● Vermin multiplied and destroyed stocks of grain ● Even through the hunger it caused, no one dared say a word publicly to challenge “Mao’s wisdom” Starvation ● Collectivization had already dislocated most peasants’ lives and so the people had no means to prevent the famine ahead ● The peasants who attempted to ignore the Similar to orders and go back to their old way of farming dekulakization in the Soviet were rounded up and imprisoned as Union? “rightists” ● GAOLS and forced labour camps were expanded to take in the large number of starving peasants who fell foul of authorities (similar to Gulag camps in the USSR) ● Millions starved to death Agricultural Statistics 1952-62 ● Reduction in food production from 1958 onward: the years of the famine ● Decline does not look dramatic but these are statistics addressing china overall ● Food shortages were much more severe in central china ● Greatest suffering in eastern china ● Out of 50 million deaths, the worst swept through the rural provinces from Shandong in the east to Tibet in the west ● Deaths ○ Shandong: 7.5 million ○ Anhui: 8 million ○ Henan: 7.8 million ○ Sichuan: 9 million ○ Qinghai: 1 million ○ Tibet: 1 million ● Hebei and Xinjiang were other areas experiencing terrible suffering: parents sold their children and husbands sold their wives for food ● Women prostituted themselves to obtain food for their families ● Cannibalism also became an issue throughout the provinces Conspiracy of Silence

● Government advisors were aware of the famine and the issues amongst the people ● They knew that Lysenkoism was nonsense ● They didn't dare speak out ● Instead, officials reported back to Beijing saying that the production targets were being met and that the GLF was well on course Global Opinions

“Sycophantic provincial leaders cooked the books; immense increases, two or three fold were reported; and, in obedience to bogus figures, an impoverished province such as Anhui delivered grain it desperately needed itself to the state, or even for export abroad as surplus. On his inspection tours Mao saw the close-planted fields that he wanted to see; the local officials moved in extra shoots from other fields and moved them back when he was gone”

- Percy Craddock, British Ambassador in China, 1960s Farmer Testimonial: Dai Wang

Dai Wang, loyal Communist, wanted to move his family to another province where he heard there was more food available. He describes his experience:

“At the very last minute I discovered our biscuits -- the only food we had for the four day journey -- were stolen. I went to the headquarters to beg for more. The leaders were enjoying a meal with various fish, meat dishes and of bread rolls made with flour. Party Secretary Xu, chewing a large mouthful of pork replied: “right now grain is a big issue in our country and each individual must take responsibility for his food rations.” I left empty handed, even capitalists would not have been as hard-hearted as these cadres of a communist country.” Areas Worst Hit by Famine

“The Arc of Misery” Lushan Conference: 1959

● Refusal of officials to admit the truth was a huge betrayal of the chinese people ● At the Lushan conference, Peng Dehuai fearlessly spoke the truth, that as he traveled through his province he saw his people lying dead in the fields and by the roadside ● Nobody backed him on the truth although everyone had an opportunity to do so ● Conference was intended at first to do something about the famine ● Yet the party members did nothing to try and alleviate the suffering as nobody was willing to offend Mao ● Speeches were instead made; praising Mao and the GLF ● Jiang Qing at Lushan ● Irony of the Lushan conference: Mao was expecting trouble as an outcome ● Worried that party members would use this occasion to criticize him ● Mao brought his wife, Jiang Qing specially for that reason: he believed that she would be of use due to her toughness and attitude if there came a fight within the party ● It was the first time he directly involved her in political affairs Suppression of Criticism

● In the end, Jiang’s help was unnecessary as the members of the congress did not find the bravery to critique Mao ● Mao ridiculed Peng Dehuai and stated that he was willing to use the PLA against anyone who dared help the peasants construct a revolution ● Mao’s statements were taken as a way of saying that the famine was all fiction constructed by peasants unhappy with collectivization ● Talk about famine = indirect revolt against Mao ● As the Hundred Flowers Campaign was fresh in everyone’s minds, the officials were too scared to oppose the leader ● Mao’s official verdict: the famine did not exist Martial Law

● Ordinary people lead demonstrations against the existence of the communes ● 1962: Liu Shaoqi (president of PRC) worried that a civil war would break out in China ● PLA was asked to control the population and martial law was imposed ○ That meant that the civilian population of china was under military and authoritary control at all times ● Two factors prevented civil war break out: ○ Famine was at its worst in rural China: people lacked skill and knowledge to revolt ○ Policies introduced by Liu and Deng Xiaoping introduced in 1962 started to ease the famine Famine in TIBET

● Famine was worst in Tibet than in all of China ● Wiped out a quarter of the population (one million) ● The death toll was intended; it was a man made famine, a genocide organized by the chinese government itself Destruction of Tibetan Identity

● Mao had a particular hatred for Tibet ● Once the PLA defeated Tibetan resistance, the systematic destruction of their cultural, social and religious identity began ● Renamed XIZANG and forcibly incorporated into the PRC ● Public practice of Lama (Tibetan form of buddhism) was prohibited ● Political meetings, tibetan language and teaching of history prohibited ● Consequences: arrest and imprisonment ● Over the 1950s a mass importation was sponsored into tibet and Mandarin Chinese was imposed Tibetan Rising: 1959

● Tibetan resistance movement was still not destroyed ● After defeat in 1950 it went underground. Re-emerged in 1959 ● Revolted in 1959 and the response from the CCP was to send in PLA units to suppress the demonstrations ● The tension had been building up over the years but the event that triggered the revolt of March 1959 was the fear of a Chinese plan to kidnap Dalai Lama and bring him to Beijing ● Thousands were arrested ● Chinese forces specifically attacked religion ○ Nuns and priests dragged out of Tibetan monasteries ○ Publicly humiliated and beaten ● It became arrestable offense to even mention Dalai Lama in public Flight of Dalai Lama

● Dalai Lama was the spiritual leader of Tibet ● He chose to leave to country in 1959 out of fear of being taken by force by China’s PLA ● The Dalai Lama became a symbol of Tibetan resistance while in exile ● He established a base in Sikkim, India; where the indian government vowed to keep him safe despite the PLA’s angry protests 1959 The Tibet uprising happened at the same time as the development of famine in China. The PRC chose to deliberately extend the famine over to Tibet. Naturally, the famine in Tibet would not have occurred at all. Destruction of Tibetan Farming

● Two main forms of tibetan farming: ○ Rearing of yaks and sheep by nomadic herders ○ Growing of barley and oats by farmers

“Famine was unknown in Tibet” -Dalai Lama

● Demand by chinese occupiers was to abandon traditional ways of farming and to implement Mao’s ways, this resulted in the destruction of Tibet’s food production ● Insistence that farmers switch to barley to maize or wheat ● New crops grew very poorly in the Tibetan climate ● The wheat and maize that survived the environment was impossible to eat ● The people were not used to those crops: their digestive systems could not cope ● Result: incredibly severe diarrhea that caused many to die of dehydration Persecution of Khampas

● Destruction of ways of life of Khampas (nomadic yak herdsmen) ● They were forbidden to roam the pasture lands with their yaks ● Forced to live with their herds in communes ● Even chinese officials who released the order realized the extent to which this was idiotic ● The regular supply of milk, cheese and meat dried up as the yaks could not survive in the communes properly ● Hence thousands more started dying from malnutrition and cold Panchen Lama’s Report: 1962

● The Panchen Lama was the second in spiritual authority next to Dalai Lama ● He went on a secret tour of Tibet to see what was really going on between 1959 and 1962 ● The communist false statements concerning the situation in Tibet triggered his alert as to how the truth was suppressed ● In each region he recorded the number of people who were imprisoned, executed or starved to death ● He published results in 1962 ○ 20% of the population had been imprisoned (avg of 80-100 per village) ○ Half had died while in jail Report Authenticity

● The report raised questions about it's accuracy because it was so sudden and so contradictory to what has been released in the media ● But the report had credibility because: ○ Originally, Panchen Lama was welcoming towards the Chinese and the PLA in Tibet, it was the violence and ruthlessness shown by them that turned Panchen Lama against ○ Zhou Enlai later admitted that the report was fair and accurate portrayal of Chinese actions in Tibet ● Of the other three million tibetans that survived, their lifestyle was ruined under humiliations and destruction of ancient way of life Mao’s Response to Report

● Panchen Lama sent a report copy directly to Mao ● As it was blaming the CCP of genocide, Mao threw it in the “lies” pile ● Described Panchen Lama as “big class enemy” and ordered for him to be arrested ● Sent the propaganda officials to work and ordered them to rebut claims against the chinese in Tibet ● Officials’ verdict: ○ Stories of famine and misery were without foundation ○ Truth was that Tibet had experienced the same bad harvests as the provinces in China that had embraced collectivization ● Those were all made up statements Mao’s Responsibility for Famine in China

● Eventually Mao came to accept the existence of the famines across his territory because of the gravity of the situation ● Refused to accept that the famine was a result of his collectivization ● Instead of taking blame on himself, Mao put down the factors: ○ Hoarding of grain by selfish, greedy peasants ○ Mistakes by local officials who either misunderstood instructions or were incompetent in carrying them out ○ Exceptionally bad weather: droughts and floods were the reason of harvest destruction ● No truth in Mao’s first explanation, some truth in the second and a little in the third ● The famine was NOT a misfortune of nature, it was a result of his decisions ● Mao felt that his reputation within the party had been damaged: in 1962 he withdrew from the political front line (after instructing Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping to restore adequate food supplies and bring an end to the rural crisis) At a congress in 1962, Liu Shaoqi declared that the famine was 30% caused by natural disasters and 70% man made Land Policies Under Liu and Deng ● Liu and Deng went to get help from Chen Yun (man who was regarded as the leading economist of the CCP) ● They concluded that the only solution was to reopen private farming ● This would give farmers the motivation to produce surplus stocks Collectivist ● It was an unspoken agreement across the officials that Principle the communes system had been a failure Marxist notion that ● The collectivist principle had been challenged through social advance can only be achieved the new reforms by proletarian class acting ● When Mao will return to his post 4 years later, he will together as a body make Liu and Deng pay for what they had done GREAT FAMINE: SUMMARY

1. The Great Famine or Great Chinese Famine was a period of low agricultural production, food shortages and mass starvation in China, from 1959 to 1961.

2. The CCP government attributes the famine to natural disasters such as droughts, floods, typhoons and pests. While these undoubtedly contributed, human error and the flawed policies of the Great Leap Forward worsened the effects of the famine.

3. Some of the other causes mentioned by historians include the failed agronomic methods of Trofim Lysenko, over-reporting by both local officials and the national government, and the excessive procurement of grain by the state.

4. By late 1959 food shortages of critical and signs of famine were visible in many provinces. The peasants tried to survive by seeking alternative food sources and even resorting to acts of cannibalism.

5. The CCP government suppressed information and statistics about the famine so the total death toll has never been accurately calculated. The consensus is that around 30 million people died, though some historians have suggested as many as 45 million perished. Historiography

“Mao received numerous reports about hunger, disease and abuse from every corner of the country: personal letters mailed by courageous individuals, unsolicited complaints from local cadres, or investigations undertaken on his behalf by security personnel or private secretaries… By the end of 1958, Mao did make a few gestures to appease concern about widespread abuse on the ground… Mao did slow down the pace of the Great Leap Forward between November 1958 and June 1959, but he was unwavering in his pursuit of utopia.” Frank Dikötter, historian

“It was fun to wipe out the ‘Four Pests’. The whole school went to kill sparrows. We made ladders to knock down their nests and beat gongs in the evenings when they were coming home to roost. It was many years before we knew that sparrows are good birds. At that time, we only thought that they ate grain.” A Sichuan schoolboy on the Four Pests campaign