VIF TASK FORCE REPORT
Make In India Through Indigenous Research and Development by DRDO/Industry
Vivekananda International Foundation
Make In India Through Indigenous Research and Development by DRDO/Industry
Vivekananda International Foundation Published in February 2019 by Vivekananda International Foundation 3, San Martin Marg, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi - 110021 Tel: +91-(0)11-24121764, +91-(0)11-24106698 Fax: +91-(0)11-43115450 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.vifindia.org Follow us on twitter@vifindia
Copyright © Vivekananda International Foundation
Design and production: Magnum Custom Publishing, New Delhi Table of Contents
Task Force Members 5
Foreword 7
Acknowledgements 9
List of Abbreviations 11
Chapter 1: Introduction – Achieving Indigenisation Goals 13 1.1 Felt Necessity 13
1.2 Study Perspective 14
1.3 Terms of Reference 16
1.4 Research Tools Used 17
1.5 Study Layout 17
Chapter 2: Setting the Requirements for the Armed Forces 18 SECTION 1 18
2.1 ‘Make In India’ and the DRDO 18
SECTION 2 19
2.2 Models Adopted by Some Foreign Countries 19
Chapter 3: Lessons From Case Studies – Programmes and Projects, ISRO, IGMDP, AKASH, LCA and Strategic Sub-surface Platform 28 3.1 Programmes and Projects 28
3.2 ISRO 29
3.3 Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) 31
3.4 AKASH 33
3.5 Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) 36
3.6 Strategic Sub-surface Platform 39
3 Chapter 4: Arriving at the Capability Needs – Evolving LTIPP and Beyond 42 4.1 Evolving LTIPP through Strategic Guidance 42
4.2 Material Acquisition: Analysis and Decision Mechanism (Defence Production and Procurement System) 44
4.3 Defence Procurement Policy/Procedure 44
4.4 TPCR 45
4.5 Requirement Specifications 45
4.6 Modelling and Simulation 46
4.7 Current Status 47
Chapter 5: Gap Areas and Interim Recommendations 48 5.1 Gap Areas 48
5.2 Recommendations 49
5.3 Programme Management in Strategic Sphere vs. Conventional Sphere 49
5.4 Programmes and Technologies as part of LTIPP 49
5.5 Evolving Requirement Specifications 50
5.6 Modelling and Simulation 50
5.7 Model of Space Commission 50
5.8 e-Procurement 51
5.9 Conclusion 51
4 Task Force Members
1. Vice Admiral Raman Puri, PVSM, AVSM, NM, VSM (Retired) – Chairman
2. Brigadier (Dr.) Anil Sharma (Retired)
3. Lt. Gen. A.V. Subramanian (Retired)
4. Amit Cowshish (ex- FA Acquisition)
5. Rear Admiral Sanatan Kulshreshtha (Retired)
6. Commander Dinesh Singh (Retired)
7. Dr. Kota Harinarayana
5 6 Foreword
India is one of the largest importers of defence equipment in the world. Compelled by the need of modernise its armed forces, India will be importing billions of dollars worth of equipment in the next ten years. The growing dependence on imported defence equipment and technologies not only places heavy burden on financial resources, it also impacts national security adversely. There is an urgent need for accelerating the tempo of indigenisation of defence production.
India has several remarkable achievements in the indigenisation of critical systems such as guided missiles, light combat aircraft, and strategic sub-surface platforms etc. Yet, given the huge requirements of the armed forces, a lot more needs to be done to make an appreciable impact on defence imports. The government has taken several steps in recent past to encourage indigenous defence production and launched the “Make in India” programme. The results of these efforts will bear fruits in the coming years.
In order to examine the reasons as to why India’s efforts at indigenisation of defence production have not met with the expected success and what needs to be done to accelerate indigenisation, the Vivekananda International Foundation set up a Task Force of experts under the stewardship of Vice Admiral (retired) Raman Puri. The Task Force critically examined the prevailing situation and the lessons from the successful programmes and projects of Indian Space Research Organisation, Defence Research and Development Organisation and tried to understand how they can be applied in all areas of defence production.
The Task Force has gone into the details of the indigenisation process and identified the gap areas. It recommends a thorough reform of defence planning process and suggests restructuring of higher defence organisation. The key recommendations is that there is a need to evolve a meaningful Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) which would help the future programmes and projects to build indigenous defence capability. The Task Force also identifies certain critical programmes in which indigenous capacities need to be built such as conventional submarine and nuclear attack submarine, hypersonic missile systems, integrated ballistic and cruise missile system, a series of aviation programme, AI enabled autonomous system, cyber security system and the raw material required for production for critical materials.
It is hoped that the Task Force report and its recommendations would be found useful by the government in promoting indigenous defence production in the country.
New Delhi Dr Arvind Gupta 15 February 2019 Director, VIF
7 8 Acknowledgements
This project would not have been possible without the kind support and help of many individuals and organisations. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to all of them.
I am highly indebted to Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) for this initiative and constant supervision as well as for providing the necessary platform to bring together all the expertise regarding this project and also for their support in completing the project.
I would like to express my gratitude to Brigadier (Dr.) Anil Sharma (Retired), Lt. Gen. A.V. Subramanian (Retired), Shri Amit Cowshish (ex-FA Acquisition), Rear Admiral Sanatan Kulshreshtha (Retired), Commander Dinesh Singh (Retired) and Dr. Kota Harinarayana who were members of this Task Force, for their kind cooperation and encouragement which helped the team in completing this project successfully.
I would like to express my special gratitude and thanks to various retired service and DRDO officers and those from industry for giving very useful suggestions to achieve the objective of Make in India through indigenous research and development.
My thanks and appreciation also goes to the research team of VIF, and Mr. Ankit Singh, Young Professional, VIF, for assistance in the project.
Vice Admiral Raman Puri (Retd.) New Delhi PVSM, AVSM, VSM 15 February 2019 Distinguished Fellow, VIF
9
List of Abbreviations
AAP Annual Acquisition Plan
AI Artificial Intelligence
ASR Air Staff Requirements
ATV Advanced Technology Vehicle
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
CCS Cabinet Committee on Security
DCPP Defence cum Production Partner
DPP Defence Procurement Procedure
DPPS Defence Procurement and Production Strategy
DPSU Defence Public Sector Undertaking
DRDL Defence Research & Development Laboratory
DRDO Defence Research and Development Organisation
EW Electronic Warfare
FYP Five Year Plan
HAL Hindustan Aeronautics Limited
HQ IDS Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff
IDDM Indigenous Designed, Developed and Manufactured
ICT Information and Communication Technology
IAF Indian Air Force
IFDG Integrated Force Development Guidelines
ISRO Indian Space Research Organisation
IGDMP Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme
LCA Light Combat aircraft
11 LTIPP Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan
LTTPP Long Term Technology Perspective Planning
MBT Main Battle Tank
MBRLS Multi Barrel Rocket Launched Silo
MoD Ministry of Defence
OEM Original Equipment Manufacture
OFB Ordnance Factories Board
PNC Price Negotiation Committee
PoC Proof of Concept
RFI Request for Information
RFP Request for Proposal
QR Qualitative Requirement
ToT Transfer of Technology
TPCR Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap
TRL Technology Readiness Level
UAV Unmanned Ariel Vehicle
12 Chapter 1: Introduction – Achieving Indigenisation Goals
1.1 Felt Necessity they invariably use during geo-political crisis situations where our vital interests India is gradually metamorphosing from a are perceived to be clashing with theirs. In regional player to a country with global clout. the past, our strategic choices had to be As its geo-political and economic ambitions diluted and even rolled back due to such grow, it needs to develop robust indigenous dependencies. Furthermore, it is extremely manufacturing capabilities and an ecosystem puzzling that a nation that suffered colonial to secure its ambition for self-reliance in the rule for long and projected independence of aerospace and defence industry. foreign policy as a badge of honour, never The current picture, however, is quite the rectified or nullified this ‘dependence’ and opposite. India is ranked among the top 10 restrictions imposed by arms imports. countries in the world in terms of military In FY 2018-19, the government has expenditure. Between 1995-2000, India allocated about 1.58 percent of its GDP for was the sixth largest arms importer, the bill defence spending, which is being termed as being USD 7 billion which was around 50 inadequate by experts. Owing to a dynamic percent (in terms of value) of what Taiwan, security environment and the toxicity of our the largest importer had spent. As per reports neighbourhood, India’s defence requirements published by the Stockholm International are likely to surge in the foreseeable future. Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in the last five years (2013-2017) India has spent USD The government has declared its 18 billion which is more than 12 percent of intention of procuring defence products Saudi Arabia, the second largest importer, worth billions of dollars annually over the making India the largest arms importer today. next five to ten years. Even though India has That is not all, if we add life cycle costs of moved into the world’s top defence spenders spare parts, upgrades etc., seller nations club (accounting for 13 percent of global finally end up earning many times the cost arms imports), nearly 70 percent of its capital of platforms and systems that they export. expenditure is on imports. That we are the only importer of arms Following this trend, nearly USD 7 billion amongst the global powers, must act as a worth of procurement would be through dampener and reality check for our leaders, as imports. This would make our defence historically, no nation has ever earned respect, budget unsustainable due to life cycle costs safeguarded its freedom and followed an of capital acquisition as also the concern independent foreign policy on the strength of an ever rising revenue budget disrupting of imported arms and ammunition. Exporter the fine balance needed between the two. countries have leverage over us which
13 VIF Task Force Report
In contrast, China’s share of global Tapping its globally recognised scientific defence imports has dropped to 4.5 percent and engineering talent, and harnessing between 2012 and 2016, from 5.5 percent it for indigenisation-led modernisation of between 2007 and 2011. the armed forces needs to be made a top Russia continues to be India’s biggest priority of the government. We should not defence supplier, even though both the US limit ourselves to 70:30 ratios, etc., but and France are competing hard to emerge aim for total self-reliance. It is important to as alternative top and strong suppliers. It flag here that ‘Make in India’ should imply is quite apparent that major arms exporting conceptualisation of an indigenous system countries have realised that with a weak that meets our capability needs in terms defence industrial base and a continuing of design, development and production. It two-front conventional threat, besides nuclear should not be defined by the percentage of and hybrid war threat perceptions, India’s indigenous components fitted which leads appetite for imported defence equipment to subjective interpretations most of the is going to be virtually insatiable. Thus, it time. The issue of indigenising electronic greatly serves their business and geopolitical components in our system also needs to interests to ensure status quo by adopting be examined separately. various measures to prevent the emergence of a robust indigenous defence capability. 1.2 Study Perspective Further, such imports often bind us to their Efforts for indigenisation date back to domestic laws, for them to derive long-term the early nineties when a committee chaired advantages. by the late Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, made The rapidly changing regional and global specific recommendations with regard to the security challenges have forced countries import/export ratio of defence equipment. across the world to rethink their defence Finally, limited private sector participation strategies and plans. This is certainly the was allowed in 2001. In order to usher in case in South and Southeast Asia. The rapid meaningful participation, another committee proliferation of dual-use technologies, blurring led by Mr. Vijay Kelkar was appointed 13 years of external and internal security challenges ago. It recommended the opening up of the and the shrinking of the design cycle with the hitherto closed defence production sector to production cycle has synergised the military domestic and foreign private players. At the and civilian industry to the extent that leading time, some 50 percent of the Indian military players in defence capability localisation also inventory was rated as obsolete and some lead in industrialisation. 70 percent of new equipment was imported, with minimal or no technology transfer. The It is clear from ongoing arguments that understandable intent was to reverse this India has to pull out all stops to attain its to just 30 percent imports within a decade. stated but not successfully pursued goal of However, despite the Indian government’s developing indigenous defence capability. repeated policy assertions to reverse the import to domestic defence production ratio
14 Chapter 1: Introduction – Achieving Indigenisation Goals
from 70:30 to 30:70, this has not been possible The Buy and Make route where manufacture till now. This aspect seriously impacts the is sought to be undertaken through TOT country’s defence preparedness. Be it Kargil (Transfer of Technology) studies, clearly or the Doklam episode, our dependence on shows that ‘technology’ is far from imports showed starkly when our Services transferred and what we achieve is just had to go abroad on buying sprees at very licensed production with some value crucial junctures. addition but dependence remains on critical The defence capability accretion process components, software, and so on. The ill in India has been vacillating between effects of Outright Buy, to a large extent modernisation and indigenisation. In general, apply to this route also. The country’s defence capability is sought to be built economy also suffers because of such through Buy/Buy and Make/Make Processes. purchases as the industry hardly gets any The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) technology infusion that can be horizontally 2006 had for the first time included a ‘Make’ diffused due to end user certification and procedure. The DPP has subsequently other restrictions imposed, and export undergone several revisions right down potential thus cannot be possibly exploited. to the last one in 2016. The new term to Further, R&D (Research and Development) enhance indigenous production is now and technology development in the country called Indigenous Design, Development suffer as we land up paying extremely high and Manufacture (IDDM). The DPP 2016, R&D costs to other countries. In this, very except for the new IDDM feature, fails to little benchmarking is feasible anyway as boost indigenous design, development and many Price Negotiating Committees (PNCs) production, and bring about much needed and service negotiations end up without transformation. Even in the IDDM we can showing any gains of ‘technology’ infusion. have a system with 60 percent of indigenous The net result is that despite numerous content where in essence it still leads to revisions and policies, private industry licensed production. remains pushed to the sidelines and imports From data available in the public domain, it dominate unabated. Unfortunately all DPPs can be clearly inferred that building capability tend to reinforce the policy paradigm – the through the Buy route is clearly unsatisfactory more things change, the more they remain on grounds of low effectiveness of many the same, and ultimately, we continue of the procured systems in performing in the situation of BUY whatever we can to our ‘Mission Needs’ especially in the and build only that which we must. This environmental extremes peculiar to our areas is clearly unsustainable. Ultimately, not of operation, vulnerability to supply chain only will the budgeted capital account not breakdowns and high costs both on capital suffice, but also, revenue budgets will fall and revenue accounts, often leading to sub- short of requirements, greatly affecting optimal investment in ammunition (including combat readiness. Also, the large diversity missiles) and other lines of development that in platforms and systems arising out of make a system effective. our current procurement processes makes
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logistical management an uphill task, leading 1.3 Terms of Reference to deficiencies in combat readiness. This phenomenon has already set in. Keeping the foregoing voids in perspective, the Task Force investigated as to why we Considering the above situation, the continue to be at around 70 percent import Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) level. During the discussions with multiple had organised a Round Table in 2018 with stakeholders, many issues that stultify concerned stakeholders from the HQIDS indigenous defence R&D and production (Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff), were identified. These were coalesced Services, DRDO (Defence Research and together into the following key areas for Development Organisation) and industry proposed examination: to consider fundamental reasons for our inability to reverse the domestic armament 1. Consider the adequacy of currently content. It emerged that ‘BUY’ or ‘BUY available planning documents for and MAKE’ are largely modes adopted formulating meaningful technology for our defence requirements today. and development plans (i.e., Long Despite written commitments in contracts, Term Integrated Perspective Plan transfer of technology does not take place (LTIPP), Five Year Plans (FYP), Annual and dependency on Original Equipment Acquisition Plans (AAP), and Qualitative Manufacturers (OEMs) continues for critical Requirements (QR), based on which, spares, deep repairs and upgradation. R&D and industries are currently Offsets have failed to bring in any meaningful required to plan their technology and technology, nor is ToT in the commercial or product realisation plans. strategic interests of OEMs. They have not 2. Development of Technologies and only got away by citing lack of local expertise Proof of Concept (PoC) by Academia/ to absorb technology, the accountancy R&D organisations/industries focused approach of MoD further tends and identify challenges and the to reduce defence offsets to Excel sheets concomitant way forward. and meaningless numbers. This obviously 3. Major road blocks and suggested imposes penalties on the state of our defence improvements at the stage of preparedness at huge financial costs. Also, prototype development (Financial and the very procedures involved as per the nomination issues, user and industrial DPP and DPM result in large time and cost interaction required and conduct of overruns faced by the armed forces. trials, leading to user acceptance, issue of timelines in various trials, etc.). 4. Impediments in limited series production and protracted post- production acceptance. 5. Entry into service, obsolescence management and mid-life upgradation
16 Chapter 1: Introduction – Achieving Indigenisation Goals
(attendant role of industry, DRDO 1.5 Study Layout and users). Consequent to discussions and analysis 6. Inability of procurement procedure thereof, the essential issues for study were to encapsulate costing uncertainties grouped under two basic factors. of participating industries associated during R&D. 1. How do we set the requirements of the armed forces to achieve our 7. Methodology goal of realising their needs through 8. The case study and further analysis to indigenous research, development cover the scope indicated has been and production? undertaken based upon: 2. The process to be adopted thereafter 9. Data from the authentic stakeholders to meet these requirements efficiently and sources as far as feasible. through indigenous research, 10. Analysis of global trends and open development, trials, evaluation and source information. production. 11. Models of foreign countries like Israel This report covers the first aspect and USA will also be examined. The study has been laid out as follows: 12. The project will be evolved by 1. Chapter 1 – Introduction: Defining undertaking case study of Project Conceptual Framework. AKASH, LCA, and ATV in the backdrop of the provisions of DPP as modified 2. Chapter 2 – Setting the Requirements from time to time till DPP 2016. for the Armed Forces. i. Make in India and the DRDO. 1.4 Research tools used ii. Models adopted by some foreign 1. DRDO data as available in the public countries. domain. iii. Lessons from case studies/ 2. Focus group interaction with industry programmes and projects, ISRO, and DRDO retired scientists. IGMDP, AKASH, LCA and Strategic 3. Discussions with HQ IDS, Service Subsurface Platform. HQs on user perceptions. iv. Evaluation of TPCR and DPP 4. Interaction with MoD (Acquisition 2016. Wing, Defence Production and 3. Chapter 3 – Arriving at Capability Finance). Needs: Evolving LTIPP and Beyond. 5. Literature review of global trends and 4. Chapter 4 – Gap areas and open source information. recommendations.
Implementation also needs detailed study and will be examined as a separate aspect.
17 Chapter 2: Setting the Requirements for the Armed Forces
SECTION 1 for military and non-military applications, and for commercial exploitation by industry. 2.1 ‘Make In India’ and the DRDO The DRDO has played an important role in In September 2015, the government creating critical indigenous capacity in the launched its flagship programme ‘Make in defence sector. There are several examples of India’, to focus on 25 sectors of the economy successful cases. Platforms like MBT ARJUN, for job creation and skill development. The LCA TEJAS, AKASH weapon system, strategic government set a target of increasing missile systems – whether AGNI or PRITHVI manufacturing output to 25 percent of and their variants, Radars, PINAKA MBRLS, national GDP from 16 percent currently. EW Systems, Sonar and underwater systems The Aerospace and Defence sector was – all of these and more are indigenously designated as a promising and targeted designed, developed and inducted/under sector with the objective of increasing induction after successful trial evaluation, local manufacturing, reducing imports though with some time delays. and dependence on foreign OEMs and With the emphasis on ‘Make in India’ in the improving the self-reliance quotient. defence sector, the DRDO needs to take a ‘Make in India’ initiatives of the government lead in altering the contours of the Indian have driven a number of policy changes defence production industry. Even in ICT, in FDI, Defence Industrial Licensing, as the context, data as also the protocols Defence Exports, and above all, the Defence are unique to security requirements and the Procurement Procedure (DPP). These call private sector is unlikely to find a business for major efforts towards capability and model to support these needs. DRDO capacity buildup in the acquisition setup has thus a significant role to play both for to address and manage private industry development of strategic technology items, partnerships which are expected to emerge enhancing domestic capacity through in the defence sector. ‘Make’ procedure by handholding as well as partnering with industry and provide Significant indigenous development of design and development support to the weapon systems primarily rests with the Services, making available the lab and DRDO as it is the only organisation mandated trial infrastructure to industry, transfer of for weapons and systems with IPs, designs technology and productionisation. and know-how in defence technologies. Once development is complete, the DRDO It is, therefore, imperative that case studies transfers technology to Indian industries and lessons emerging from Foreign Service
18 Chapter 2: Setting the Requirements for the Armed Forces
models and own successful programmes developments with corporations in foreign and projects, be analysed for arriving at countries, especially the US and European meaningful deduction. giants. The intent is to promote exports of the entire defence industry – government SECTION 2 institutions, public companies, or private companies – in support to the overall policy 2.2 Models Adopted by Some of the Israeli government, which perceives Foreign Countries defence exports as a ‘central objective’. Exports are intended to further R&D in All advanced nations have evolved and Israel and also strengthen Israel’s defence instituted robust structures, systems industrial base capabilities to provide and processes for building their defence armaments to the IDF. Israel’s privately- industrial base while continuously meeting owned defence companies have been the demands of their Armed Forces, somewhat successful in downsizing and aligned with their enlightened self-interest. reworking their export strategies to focus The succeeding paragraphs highlight key on specific customer needs. features of a few countries, with deductions Israel has moved towards a niche strategy from Israel and USA amplified. Details of in which they domestically produce Israel and US models are given in a separate armaments for those areas where they reading package. have global competitive advantage and import, using military assistance funds, 2.2.1 Israel platforms that can be modified to meet their own needs and those of their export Israel’s armament strategy flows out of customers in view of the geopolitical its national security and military strategies alignments available to them (which is not as guiding documents. It is shaped by the so in our case). When the Israeli defence constant threat to national survival, frequent budget began to shrink, private defence history of warfare and the robust technical companies reoriented and concentrated skill base of its emigrated personnel. These on building customised export products have been major factors in the growth and tailored to meet the requirements of specific quality of her defence industrial base. Israel customers, rather than developing so-called has traditionally viewed arms exports to state-of-the-art equipment all the time (quite be an important component of its foreign unlike the Indian model). Israel follows policy and military strategy, and not simply a very fine economically motivated and as a complementary source of revenue for balanced approach, between the need to her defence industrial base. continue arms exports to new markets such A deliberate component of Israel’s as China and India, and the parallel need to armament strategy is the requirement for receive US aid and armaments in the face its defence industry to seek funds from the of US objections to Israeli arms exports to export market. This includes cooperative those countries.
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Comparative Evaluation objectives. Allocation to R&D has 1. Israel-India. Israel’s defence varied from 8 to 20 percent of the industry received a fillip after the defence budget. 1967 war, initially to supplement 6. Despite major differences in terms French imports and subsequently of a possible security concept India with a French embargo, as an can adopt, huge socio-economic indigenous enterprise. challenges and its large size, there 2. After 1971, a similar relationship was are considerable lessons to be learnt developed with the US. The Israel in terms of creating a sustainable defence industry has developed ecosystem for research, development as a collective security partner of and production infrastructure to the US. Even now most ventures flourish. Above all, there is a need are cooperative or joint with the for a change in mindset for achieving US or other western countries. In the required goal of self-reliance order to survive, the Israelis have in defence. found defence self-reliance to be the only solution. 2.2.2 USA-India 3. Their four pillars of defence (MoD, 1. The US has evolved an elaborate armed forces, R&D and industry) and multi-tiered system to arrive are seamlessly integrated through at acquisition decisions as also defence planning guidelines and the export of technologies. In QDR defence exports are used as a very 2005, in addition to the countries of effective foreign policy instrument security concern viz., Russia, Iran, (this synergy does not exist in the North Korea, and Cuba; China and Indian defence enterprise except in India were labelled as countries at the strategic arena to some extent). strategic crossroads. These countries 4. National security strategy, theory of were sought to be engaged to align war, military capabilities for present them with US policies. Yet, at the and future wars are unambiguously same time, capabilities were to be translated into a national armament developed against them, including strategy, armament requirements, more robust nuclear ones. Can there import and export strategy, military be a bigger cause for India to develop industrial cooperation and continuous defence self-reliance rather than restructuring of the defence industry. rushing in for straight buy decisions 5. In glaring contrast to the Indian with all and sundry? system, the Israeli government 2. Americans have many allies. This works to promote close cooperation alliance dominates the global between the Israeli Armed Forces, technology base with the Americans R&D and defence industry in leading it. The much hyped up free the pursuit of common security market as far as defence equipment,
20 Chapter 2: Setting the Requirements for the Armed Forces
systems and ammunition impacting 3. Their defence planning, technology national security goes, is in practice creation, defence finance oversight confined to the allies and strategic and acquisition systems were partners. It is inconceivable that they organised strictly according to their would share technology with their security/strategic needs, emanating competitors or potential strategic in an institutionalised manner from adversaries. Hence, it is export of the political system in the form of technology which is of concern. All strategic guidance documents. For free trade and buy favouring factors example, within 150 days of taking are relevant for geopolitical/geo- over, the President of the United strategic alliances or partnerships States has to get the NSS of his which have matured over the years. administration approved by Congress. India is still not anywhere near the Within the next 30 days, National inner circle as national interest Defense/National Military Strategy driven geopolitical compulsions (NDS/NMS) has to be ready. Work necessarily follows a standalone/ on the Quadrennial Defense Review regional security concept rather than (QDR) commences concurrently which an intercontinental collective security has to be approved and promulgated alliance/partnership with the USA. within a year to facilitate a review of the defence acquisition system as per latest political directives. Emphasis Deductions – Strategic and Defence Planning remains on the terminal state, that 1. Common deductions drawn have is, fielding and employment of taken into account models being capabilities created in the strategic/ followed by other major powers, operationally pertinent time frame. besides the USA and Israel, as they 4. These countries realise that military merit comparison with India. These capabilities (often only in being) are are Russia, France, Britain and China. not only essential for war fighting, but 2. All these countries have become major their availability/perceptions deters military and political powers by first and dissuades as also enhances the developing an indigenous defence strategic configuration of power, thus capability for their security needs getting leverages in geo-strategic with or without cooperation from their tussles amongst competing players. allies. Later on, defence capacities 5. Accountability for timely creation of created were used for export to earn desired capability is very specific in revenues as also attain foreign policy their systems. India, on the contrary, is objectives. India, perforce, has to be in aspiring to meet its colossal security this league to meet its stated/implied needs not by a solid and reliable National Policy Goals. indigenous capacity through the Make process, but also through the
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Buy/Buy and Make capability from becoming India’s biggest defence almost all arms exporting countries in supplier, Israel has a hard-nosed the world, without any thought given strategy that our policymakers must to integrated architectures, promoting grasp and emulate. interoperability across a family of 8. Since Israel does not market aircraft systems and system of systems or ships, its defence companies have and compatibility among related focused on the lucrative market for architectures. Artillery gun acquisition upgrading India’s predominantly for example has been delayed so much Russian weaponry, including MiG- despite capabilities being available 21 fighters, ship-borne missiles and that it has affected our dissuasive T-72 tanks. Their first step was to posture against major adversaries understand Russian technology for and they have been exploiting our which Israeli defence companies weak strategic configuration of power accepted initial contracts at cost price through their increased intransigence. to build their engineers’ capabilities. The list can go on endlessly and to a With that experience gained – at India’s great extent this is also due to the fact cost one must note – Israeli systems that with a huge inventory, affordability designers progressively graduated up continues to be a challenge. the complexity scale. Today, Israel’s 6. In India’s case, the system of defence industry is with capabilities pinpointing accountability is so honed across a generation of systems. diffused amongst all stakeholders Even in systems developed with Indian that the buck only stops at systemic finance, there is practically no transfer deficiencies rather than on any of technology. Production too is largely particular stakeholder/decision garnered by the Israeli industry. maker. Yet efforts to overhaul the 9. The opportunities for Israeli defence system seldom bear fruit. industry in respect of Russian 7. Another dimension of long-term platforms are vast. Some 30,000 Competition Dynamics played out by T-72 tanks are in service worldwide foreign arms exporting countries is including 2,500 in India. But Israel, very often overlooked by us. Foreign not India or Russia, will feed off that arms exporting countries strategise upgrade market. India provided Israel to thwart India’s indigenisation with the tanks, the opportunity and efforts/policies, which needs to be the money for creating that capability. countered through unambiguous Ironically, the Ministry of Defence policies and implementation to (MoD) ignored India’s own defence achieve self-reliance. Israel has for industry – its undeniable competence example, a well-considered plan for could have been as easily translated building its defence industry, with into capability. The Israeli industry India paying hundreds of millions of garnered another windfall from its dollars annually for this purpose. In offer to build the Phalcon Airborne
22 Chapter 2: Setting the Requirements for the Armed Forces
Warning and Control System (AWACS interests as stated in this paper. This mounted on a Russian IL-76 aircraft. effects our foreign policy options No Israeli company had ever designed also and applies to all other arms such an AWACS before, but India exporters – European or Russian handed over USD1.1 billion (Rs. 5,000 who would have similar goals while crores) to Israel Aerospace Industries trading with a country that lacks (IAI) and Elta. Hundreds of Israeli adequate self-reliance in defence designers learned on the job, building production capabilities. In the end, AWACS capability on Indian money and the benefits of modernisation of operational know-how. Israel will now our armed forces through imports build another three AWACS for India, must be weighed against hazards of several for the Israeli Air Force and foreign dependency, high life-cycle export more to Chile and Singapore. costs, limited production technology transfers and diminished domestic 10. The essence of some of the country’s R&D and production capabilities as defence export strategy appears to be also affordability. that a financial loss would be acceptable in the near term, in order to curb Indian 13. India’s defence planning procurement defence industrial capability. process needs to function in a synergetic manner and transform itself 11. The US gains and dominance of accordingly. Information operations technology regime is due to a large to garner support from the public and tight network of global allies that should be aggressively pursued. it maintains to safeguard its national As the defence industry privatises interests. International defence and globalises further, increased cooperation comes with risks which information is necessary to monitor the US allies with their own advanced industrial base. The MoD should take a defence industries may be able to deeper interest in data collection and withstand, but not India. Our capability brief the Parliamentary Committee on can very easily be held to ransom. By Defence on trends and findings. The glancing at the policies and objectives MoD must study the entire defence of US foreign military sales, it becomes R&D and industrial base and look at it very clear that by opting for larger-scale like a target analyst. The department buy decisions without viable self-reliant needs to understand centres of gravity capacity, India runs a huge risk of and critical vulnerabilities to ensure compromising national security. a secure supply and manufacturing 12. Further imported capital purchases of chain for the military and key Indian arms results in continued dependency industries. The Ministry of Defence, for critical spares, deep repairs and Department of Defence Production upgradation on OEMs which are and DRDO need to accelerate the governed by their national export vision for self-reliance in defence like control laws, and their commercial other countries. Dual use production
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facilities need to be created under the equipment which meets the basic sovereign Indian Public/Private performance criterion is inducted as Mark I Sector controls. Privatisation in and further variants are inducted in batches these areas must mean creating with improved performance and other capable Indian domestic R&D and features. A highly successful aircraft such as an industrial base under sovereign the F-16 of USA has gone through 40 batches control. India needs to learn beneficial of production where each batch has had some lessons from American industrial and incremental changes. defence export policies and enact A spiral development approach should legislations necessary for the purpose. also be followed in India to enable the FDI and security related policies have early induction of indigenous equipment necessarily to be restrictive in areas and weapon systems. India lacks matured concerning defence and high-tech/ military-industry synergy, and the models of dual use technologies. What applies both USA and France are relevant for India, to sugar, steel, cement, and consumer with the French model having great learning durables etc., does not quite apply in value for India. areas of national security. 14. It would be clear from the above, In respect of the above, it is pertinent to that the essence of defence highlight the following with regard to decisions indigenisation is to build domestic of investment in R&D and production: design development and production 1. Technology matures with time and capability. There is a need to stop production volume. these multi-vendor situations with 2. Technology is dynamic and evolutionary global tendering. The concept of joint in nature and this evolution can ventures between capable Indian R&D only take place with production and and Indian companies who then take volumes. Technology if not used on the global competition is the way withers away and is lost. This is an forward and this needs support. It is important issue, as technology alone time that the MoD lays out a clear cannot survive if systems do not implementation and monitoring plan reach the production stage, as has for a policy that would allow Indian happened in many cases in India. companies (private and public) to build their capabilities with a credible 3. Indigenous technology if not financially assurance of business. viable in the near term, needs to be pursued with resolve through spiral Deductions – Acquisition and Production Stage development as long-term benefits, including those of life-cycle cost, Key Deduction build up of industrial infrastructure It may be noted that the concept of specially in dual use domains will far ‘spiral development’ is followed in countries outweigh seeming disadvantages in like USA and France. The first variant of most cases.
24 Chapter 2: Setting the Requirements for the Armed Forces
2.2.3 USA 5. Separate senior positions have been created in the AT&L set up to It is a very comprehensive, though complex address small business, industry, and ‘system of systems’, in which every acquisition international cooperation. function – the roles, responsibilities, authority and accountability of each key functionary – is 6. The system is supported with strong clearly defined under the statute (Title 10 of legislations in respect of contracting, United States Code). and single source procurements. It may be noted that in a report of the 1. It entails extensive scientific and United States Department of Defense quantitative analysis at each stage, (DoD) in 2016, it was stated that 60 from the selection of material solution percent of their procurements were to the induction of equipment for on a single tender basis despite large decision making. inventories, industrial capabilities and 2. Comprehensive reports are required many attempts to have multi-vendor to be generated at each milestone for situations. seeking acceptance of the Milestone 7. The Senate Armed Services Committee Decision Authority (MDA) and approval (SASC), and House Armed Services to proceed with the next phase of the Committee (HASC), in addition to project. The MDA is required to issue Defense Acquisition Board, provides a written Memorandum of Acceptance comprehensive oversight to the whole or otherwise, with due justification for acquisition system. the decision, at each stage. 8. The Acquisition System is manned by 3. Defense Acquisition Executive USD a professional workforce called the AT&L (acquisition, technology and Defense Acquisition Corp. Experts logistics) and Component Acquisition from all relevant disciplines, including Executives (Assistant Secretaries in Cost Estimation, Audit, Financial the Offices of Secretary of Army, Navy, Management, System Engineering, and Air Force) are entrusted with full Test and Evaluation, and Quality financial powers and authority. Assurance etc., are integral to the 4. The system has a well-designed system. Components of the system structure to harness and synergise are embedded in the DoD as well as research, design, development and in the Departments of Army, Navy and engineering capability from all avenues Air Force. – integral laboratories, academic 9. Personnel who perform activities institutions, private R&D and industry. of Requirements Development and There is DARPA to focus on cutting Budgeting are not part of the Defense edge technologies of the future. Spiral Acquisition Corp. Initial capability development is the preferred approach requirement documents are generated to speedy deployment of systems and by Combatant Commands, which are weapons to the ‘war fighter’. subsequently validated by the Joint
25 VIF Task Force Report
Chiefs of Staff. Budget decisions are 2. Coherent system requirements made separately – Director of Cost were evolved by the acquisition Assessment and Program Evaluation setup in which service personnel of and Under Secretary (Comptroller) at the appropriate seniority are embedded DoD level and similar positions at the after special training. The financial Component (Individual Service) level. and cost estimates are integrated in 10. There is a strong focus on continuous all stages, and hence, most decisions training and skill upgradation of are evidence based. personnel, to ensure their ‘in date’ 3. As development of military systems professional knowledge as also to is fraught with uncertainty, models create opportunities for their career include the risk sharing aspect of the development. acquisition. Single sourcing regulation 11. The DAU (Defense Acquisition has matured after the Defence Reform University) delivers the complete Act 2014. content for education, training and 4. The integration of acquisition with development of the acquisition through life cycle management has workforce for military personnel, civil given rise to an integrated view, servants and industry personnel. Both whereby, issues of upgradation and classroom and online courses are obsolescence management are being conducted by the university. addressed systematically now. 5. Many modelling tools are being used 2.2.4 United Kingdom (UK) to enhance learning and support for 1. The UK MOD has embarked on major the tractability of the process. reform to shape its acquisition process. 6. Integrated Project Teams are deployed The change has come about after appropriately with adequate oversight. considerable evolutionary learning and critical thinking. Immediately after 2.2.5 France World War II, there was some similarity between the UK System and what was 1. Direction Generale de I’Armement followed in India, but subsequently, it (DGA) is the body under the French rapidly diverged because of changed Ministry of Defence that is tasked with system needs. The knowledge and procuring equipment for the French skill of the acquisition workforce in armed forces. The DGA’s missions heterogeneous areas was synergised include preparing for the future and under an organisation for achieving promoting defence exports. best value for money. The interim 2. The DGA is involved from the initial period of privatisation of state-owned planning stage till the withdrawal companies during the 1980s had its from the service stage, covering telling influence on the shape of the a whole programme lifecycle of UK’s defence industrial base. equipment. The DGA functions as
26 Chapter 2: Setting the Requirements for the Armed Forces
an R&D coordination and project 4. Every armament programme originates management organisation; while on the basis of a need expressed by the production is done by the industry. armed forces. There are six clearly defined The DGA does very little in-house R&D. stages in the armament programme Product design and development is process. First two, Initialisation and done by the industry and research Orientation, are under the leadership on future technologies is done by of the armed forces. The next two, academic institutions or specialised Elaboration and Realisation, are under labs, as tasked by DGA. The DGA is the leadership of the DGA. For the last not an independent or autonomous two, In-Service and Withdrawal, the organisation. It is a part of the leadership is shared. Spiral development French MoD. is the most preferred strategy. 3. The DGA is manned mainly by France had a strong industrial and engineers and technical personnel. educational ecosystem in place much before Its engineers do compulsory military the DGA was formed. Hence, the military service at the start of their careers. and industry have matured over the years to The integration of the DGA with their synergise well for meeting the needs of the armed forces is of a fairly high degree. armed forces.
27 Chapter 3: Lessons From Case Studies – Programmes and Projects, ISRO, IGMDP, AKASH, LCA and Strategic Sub-surface Platform
3.1 Programmes and Projects missiles, tactical short-range missiles etc. Depending on requests projected by the There are a few successful indigenous services and other users, individual projects efforts which have enabled our Armed have been launched, while the programme Forces to acquire and modernise relevant elements are yet to be launched, reasons weapon systems. The IGMDP (Integrated being – overall threat perception, state of Guided Missile Development Programme), available infrastructure in the country and development and induction of the AKASH technology forecast. system, induction of LCA and the Advanced Technology Vessel programmes are sterling Programme element and project examples. The salient lessons gleaned from element: In many organisations, including these programmes give us the guideline ISRO, development has two elements viz., the for the design and development of future programme element and the project element. indigenous systems. For example, in ISRO they have a Launch Vehicle programme and various launch vehicle There are distinct programmes that have to projects such as SLV (Satellite Launch Vehicle), be taken up to meet threats in areas such as: ASLV (Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle), 1. Missiles PSLV (Polar SLV), GSLV (Geosynchronous SLV), RLV (Reusable Launch Vehicle) etc. The launch 2. Manned Aircraft vehicle programme would need technologies 3. Unmanned Air Vehicles to be developed, infrastructure to be created, 4. Underwater Sensors and Systems manpower to be recruited and trained, and test facilities to be established. These tasks 5. EW Systems are taken up as a programme element ahead 6. Propulsion Systems of various projects. Funds are provided for 7. Sensors the programme before any specific project is taken up. Such an approach is followed by 8. PGMs many international organisations. In the MoD/ 9. High temperature materials and DRDO, for conventional programmes, such an functional materials approach is largely not followed. As a result, considerable time delays occur, leading to Each one of these programmes would costly imports. consist of various specific projects. For example, in the case of missiles, we have Funding must be provided for the programme surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air element ahead of the project element, thereby missiles, cruise missiles, long-range ballistic enhancing the maturity of technologies,
28 Chapter 3: Lessons From Case Studies enabling recruitment and training of manpower 1. Around the mid-70s, ISRO took major and creation of critical infrastructure in the initiatives to define organisational MoD/DRDO. This will lead to early induction mechanisms to promote technology of indigenous systems. transfers from its centres to industry with the aim of encouraging industry 3.2 ISRO to produce and deliver items needed for space projects and users outside. The Indian Space Research Organisation Drawing experts from different (ISRO) was set up in 1969 and its mandate centres, the ISRO Technology Transfer is to harness space technology for the Group was formed to help implement socio-economic benefit of the country, policy. The group facilitated a highly while pursuing space science research and successful decentralised system planetary exploration. ISRO is closely linked for know-how transfer that met the with the Department of Space, which works diverse needs of ISRO from industry. directly under the Prime Minister of India. It Directly involving developmental is a long-standing tradition that the Chairman teams to interface with industry was of ISRO has a career background within the one of the success factors in the know- agency and concurrently chairs the Space how transfer and in overcoming the Commission. The same person also sits problems of absorption of technology. as Secretary of the Space Department and Multi-pronged initiatives resulted in Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the awareness building, quality assurance, Antrix Corporation. This point of common selection criteria for industries, know- leadership, directly reporting to the Prime how pricing principles and innovative Minister, permits bureaucratic input while contract systems, and so on. ISRO promoting a clear sense of purpose for provided buy-back commitments achieving the aims of the agency. The ISRO in cases where such technologies initially had no intention to undertake any form mainly catered to the needs of of space exploration, wanting instead to focus ISRO’s projects. A very high level of on benefitting the common person. They motivation, dedication and orientation have since been able to change their vision to to succeed was witnessed among include ‘planetary exploration’. Consequently, numerous personnel in various ISRO without this degree of autonomy, the otherwise centres. bureaucratic deliberation and inherent delays 2. Cooperative arrangements were would adversely affect the efficacy of the evolved with prominent public agency and they would have been unable to enterprises such as Bharat Electronics change their vision. and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited India has positioned its space agency to to set up dedicated divisions (Aero treat the military as a stakeholder and client, Space Division at HAL, Bengaluru) with no direct influence over the policies, or production lines for space and governance or operations of ISRO. ground systems that were hailed as a milestone in ISRO industry
29 VIF Task Force Report
collaboration. In time, Indian industry for peaceful, developmental applications of from both private and public sectors space and a strong recognition that harmony had become a partner for production of government and industry endeavours are of many complex sub-systems such crucial for both. It also emphasised the value as satellite structures and other of long-term commitments that make space components, control systems of and industry partnership viable. This does not rockets, intricate fuel tanks and seem to have happened in the defence sector. associated components, liquid rocket In order to manage the expanding industry engines and stages, propellants, and interface tasks of ISRO and help evolve the a host of special purpose equipment fragmented space industry in India to the and test facilities. next level of integration, as well as to position The Indian Space Research Organisation Indian space capabilities on a global platform, spearheaded numerous innovations in the the Antrix Corporation was established in field of materials and special chemicals and 1992 as a corporate commercial arm of ISRO. successfully produced them for industry. This ISRO’s anchor for such a commercial entity involved collaborative efforts between ISRO, was initially necessary in order to meet the DRDO, other national research laboratories market’s demands and also to mitigate high and industry. ISRO made a substantial risks. Antrix relied maximally on infrastructure, investment in Mishra Dhatu Nigam (Midhani), facilities and expertise created in ISRO as which resulted in the development and well as in Indian industry. It made significant use of Indian Maraging Steel, the Titanium progress by forging collaborative relationships alloy used for tanks and gas bottles and a with global industries and is trying to create variety of Maraging alloys. The collaborative synergies to serve both the domestic and funding and technology transfer to Tata international market. Advanced Materials Ltd (TAML) resulted in the production of high temperature resistant The Industrial Policy of the Space composites. Similar efforts with Godrej & Commission is a visionary policy that has Boyce lead to the creation of special magnetic been supported by focused execution. Similar materials, insulators and materials compatible attempts have been lacking in the defence for cryogenic engines and spurred indigenous segment. The following needs to get addressed: developments. The collaborative environment Buy-back Commitments: The DRDO brought about by ISRO in development, scale- procurement policies could not incorporate up and ultimately realising the processes in this provision as the Services are operating industry for application in space systems, the DPP which starts treating the DRDO is a notable offshoot of a pragmatic developed products afresh for acquisition. This self-reliance policy. affords limited commitments to development A distinct characteristic of the space partners. While provision exists in Para 72 of industry policy nurtured by ISRO during the DPP for the grant of AON (Acceptance the initial decades of space programmes of Necessity) for design and development in India was strong public investments for by DRDO, its production vide industry would developing a total range of technologies be as development-cum-production partner
30 Chapter 3: Lessons From Case Studies
(DCPP), identified during the design and 4. Trishul short-range SAM development phase by a transparent process. 5. Nag fire and forget ATM This option, however, has to necessarily be exercised by the MoD and the Service The programme with a target of five years Headquarters in time. The fact is that this for development, was meticulously planned option has not been exercised. with all necessary empowerment to the DRDO to execute projects in an integrated way with Technology Transfer: The ISRO industrial multiple DRDO labs, other institutions and policy execution has resulted in the existence industries, public and private sector. The rest of Technology Transfer Groups that ensure is history. Agni and Prithvi were successfully effective transfer of technology. Such intense developed more or less on time, while other systems and processes are yet to take root projects were dogged by delays, technical in the DRDO. problems, failures, partial solutions, user ISRO-funded private industry technology criticisms and cost over-runs. The Trishul centres should be replicated in the defence was closed. The AKASH, blessed with an sector as many of their technology outstanding project leader, succeeded after requirements are unique and are unlikely to more than 20 years and went into large-scale find a business model to support these needs production. The Nag went through repeated without government funding. success and failure cycles, and currently after 35 years is in the final stages of user trials.
3.3 Integrated Guided Missile The lessons/observations gleaned from Development Programme (IGMDP) IGMDP are: 1. AGNI and Prithvi, though larger missiles, 3.3.1 Initial Projects were technologically less complex The Defence Research and Development while the other three smaller tactical Laboratory (DRDL) as the only missile-centric missiles with high maneuverability laboratory suffered from an existential crisis were technologically complex. between 1979 and 1982 after the closure of 2. Higher priority is being given to the successful Devil Project (indigenisation of the first two, being more strategic, SAM 2 surface-to-air missile for the Air Force). rewarding and visible. Services also The government decided to give it a new had no import options for them. lease of life under the leadership of Dr. A.P.J. 3. Failure of the DRDO to develop some Abdul Kalam. After he took over in 1982, it was crucial sub-systems on time like the decided to make it a composite programme RF (Radio Frequency) seeker for the of five missiles, each of a different class. AKASH and IIR (Imaging Infrared 1. Agni long-range ballistic missile Seeker) seeker for the Nag. An RF 2. Prithvi short-range surface to surface seeker has finally been developed the missile last couple of years. Luckily, the AKASH has acquired alternate command 3. AKASH medium-range SAM guidance with some good work on
31 VIF Task Force Report
phased array radar from the LRDE and This led to divided leadership and other institutions. The Nag IIR seeker divided responsibilities. The tactical saw light of day after 20 years of the missiles left with DRDL suffered project start and guided flight trials from inadequate crucial support from could start only in the early 2000s. other labs. 4. Trishul probably made wrong 2. There was no single programme guidance and radar choices, maybe leader with all resources under his due to non-availability of better ones. command and capable of deciding The technology gains, however, in priorities. many areas of the short-range SAM’s 3. To make matters worse, while older development have been substantial projects continue with production and are paying dividends today in and support responsibilities which other projects. rightly the production agency should 5. The complex sub-systems of the have taken over as it did not establish tactical missiles faced quality and strong engineering capabilities to inadequate qualified hardware absorb the technologies transferred. problems. One of the reasons was Further in the last few years, at least frequent design changes necessitated five to ten missile projects have by failures. been added with very ambitious 6. The time frame required for timelines. Though new projects development and production of are also sanctioned with a similar complex systems which need management structure like IGMDP, development of multiple material and the ease and effectiveness has come other technologies as seen in other down over the years. Many board and countries also should be planned in a individual powers of projects and labs, time frame of 15 years or more. though they exist on paper, have been curtailed leading to avoidable delays. 7. The time frames in which systems were actually realised is not abnormal, The effectiveness of the Technical Review considering that even globally the first System that Dr. Kalam introduced has type of combat systems development drastically come down over a period of time. has taken 20 to 25 years or more. Mitigating factors Subsequent upgrades as Mark II and so on are developed in much lesser time. 1. Though the above points have adversely affected the system, many 3.3.2 Subsequent Missile Projects positive factors have reduced their impact. 1. In the 1990s, the single missile lab DRDL was split into two labs initially, 2. Much more intelligent and better DRDL and RCI and later into three, trained engineers with far better including ASL for just the AGNI series. engineering tools are now available.
32 Chapter 3: Lessons From Case Studies
3. Capability and willingness of (Advanced Systems Laboratory), Defence industries, large and small, to share Research and Development Laboratory the development load and take up (DRDL), Research Centre Imarat (RCI), production responsibilities with Research and Development Establishment investments. Engineers (R&DE), and Vehicle Research 4. Much better basic technologies in and Development Establishment (VRDE) avionics, materials, manufacturing, were involved with the project. The quest NDT, software tools and test facilities. for indigenous SAM technology was carried out in the face of international sanctions that 5. Above all, a rich heritage of knowledge stemmed from the Missile Technology Control and experience from our own Regime (MTCR). Denied even commercially programmes, online published available dual-use components, DRDO knowledge and availability of capable scientists had to literally reinvent the wheel. and willing consultants and joint development partners. Trials in 2004 commenced after lot of prodding by HQ DS. The Air Force participated 6. Willingness of Services to commit in the trials. All modes as asked for by the certain limited production numbers user were proven except for very low level conditionally especially in joint coverage. Later, these could not be tested due projects. This should become a to non-availability of the target. Trials on the standard criterion for future projects. improvised target were accepted and were proven. HQ IDS wanted the LOI (Letter of 3.4 AKASH Intent) to be issued, but this was not agreed Earlier called SAM-X, the all-weather, to by the user. multi-target missile AKASH was an ambitious After a long and challenging development Medium Range Surface-to-Air Missile cycle, the missile system was finally ready (MRSAM) system made to specifications for user trials in 2007 and the same process which were nothing less than revolutionary of trials had to be gone through before the in the 1980s. With an envisaged range of issue of LOI. 25 km, the system was built around an indigenously developed advanced phased Thus, it took over 20 years for array radar, a technology available only development as against the envisaged to a handful of nations. The AKASH was 12 years when the project began. The Air designed to engage aircraft, helicopters Force trials were successfully completed and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). in December 2007 and two squadrons of Two versions were planned, one for the the missile system have been inducted Army and the other for the Air Force. While into service. However, the Army refused the DRDO was the main DA (Development to accept AKASH and carried out its own Agency), Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) trials from which it subsequently pulled out was identified as the main production agency. stating that the missile does not meet some Many DRDO labs such as LRDE (Electronics of the requirements. Rather oddly, the Army & Radar Development Establishment), ASL did not participate in the Air Force trials even
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though the only major difference between the 3.4.1 Lessons Learnt from Project AKASH Army and Air Force configurations was that of mobility. The Army only accepted to induct On evaluation of the case study, the the system in 2012 after a prolonged delay. lessons learnt from the AKASH project are as follows: On one hand, the DRDO has claimed 1. To ensure that focus on indigenisation the missile system to be a success with is maintained by all stakeholders, capabilities almost matching the Patriot the DRDO should project the need PAC-3 system. So confident has the DRDO for strategic value systems, have been about the success of the missile successful game changing projects system that it has worked out a unique at regular intervals and strive for public-private partnership to produce and appropriate changes in the defence market the system. On the other hand, the acquisition and procurement system. Service HQs, especially the Army, does There is a need to maintain much not seem to share this perception. While closer interaction between the DRDO the Indian Air Force (IAF) has decided to and users through all stages of induct two squadrons, it is no secret that it project development and exploitation. required a fair amount of ‘prodding’ before Without this continuous interaction, it doing so. The same has been the case with either dies or at best remains static. the Army. Meanwhile, many other countries have expressed their interest in the system. 2. Promote success of projects once In order to draw meaningful lessons, the they are productionised to show case progress of the project was mapped onto advantage over former import systems. the classical ‘Technology Development Life In this projection, DPSUs and private Cycle’ which raised some pertinent, and at industry, together with the user, need times, uncomfortable questions. The project to play a leading role. This is necessary development has been as follows: to develop our export potential. 3. Project definition document needs Stage 1 Requirement Analysis and Definition to be more comprehensive. It should Stage 2 Concept Design and Realisation also bring out likely bottlenecks in the development path, depending Stage 3 Concept Testing and Validation upon the complexity and technology Stage 4 Production availability as also the user operational needs in view. Stage 5 Logistics and Service Support 4. There is a need for a more flexible time Stage 6 New Idea (Concept Improvement) frame and cost estimates for projects involving new and critical technologies. Lessons learnt along with graphic model are 5. Project development phases should summarised in succeeding paragraphs. follow a spiral and incremental technology development cycle as
34 Chapter 3: Lessons From Case Studies
is being done in other major arms user. This was evident in all trials producing countries. User should like EW, functionality, mobility etc. be sensitised at the beginning that The user has to physically operate Mark-I may have only key features. the equipment and attain optimal The desirable parameters will get performance out of it. He cannot incorporated in the follow up versions, be expected to be satisfied with similar to the US Patriot Missile versions. simulation results, wherever field trials are feasible and affordable they should 6. Bureaucratic and ponderous decision be conducted making organisations and processes need to be done away with. There is 10. In order to ensure the success of the a clear requirement of organisational Bring into Being Strategic Projects restructuring with greater devolution like AKASH, the Arjun Tank or Project of financial and functional autonomy AD, prior hype and overstating the for the DRDO. The Rama Rao success of various sub-systems/ Committee’s recommendations phases needs to be curbed until field should be implemented at the earliest. trials have demonstrably succeeded. In addition, where a composite team Premature publicity also activates is formed involving scientists from inimical interest groups (competing different labs and later on from DPSUs commercial, hostile adversaries etc.) and private industry, clear lines of to delay/abort the projects through authority and accountability need to various stratagems/intrigues ranging be drawn up. Had decision making from technology denial, diplomatic been swift, Trailer Mounted version of pressure, financial complications or AKASH for the Air Force would have media manipulation. These aspects preempted subsequent difficulties. have to be part of a policy jointly evolved with HQ IDS and MEA. Users 7. Decision to mount the system initially on too need to be sensitised and made BMP and then onto T-72 tank, brings out to realise the fact that a strategic the need for a more in-depth technology capability when successfully fielded study and forecasting to avoid mid- and fully matured, will not only meet course corrections. Greater user their current operational requirement, involvement too, becomes essential. but also provide an indigenous 8. In long drawn out projects like AKASH, continuum for future transformation. changes in the GSQR need to be 11. Collaborations like ‘Brahmos’ anticipated to address user concerns following a consortium approach are regarding technological obsolescence models for enhancing indigenous in a fast changing technology regime. capacity provided technology transfer 9. Preparation of equipment and encompasses IPR, material, design execution of trials need to be planned and complete production technology in far greater detail, jointly with the as also the processes.
35 VIF Task Force Report
12. A final say on success or rejection of in 1993, wherein only 60 percent of the strategic value systems should not be amount requested was given with a mandate solely determined by the user. There is to develop only two non-weaponised a need for an independent authority like technology demonstrators. The balance the Defence Technology Commission amount was sanctioned only in 2001 after to recommend the best course of the first Technology Demonstrator was flown action to the COSC/DAC/Government. successfully. The Air Force and the MoD were 13. Overall model is at figure I. major players in these approvals. 1. At USD 1.2 billion, the costs incurred 3.5 Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) are of an order of magnitude lower than what has been incurred elsewhere. Time The Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), unlike overrun is marginal and compares what is reported in the press, is a success favorably with complex aircraft or story with several lessons for our defence systems developed the world over. planning. Project management and production 2. Performance-wise, even with the GE 404 systems have emerged out of it. engine, the LCA has shown itself to be In 1983, a Project Definition Study was superior to the MIG-21 BIS and in many ordered and project sanction came for it critical parameters even to the Mirage 2000.
STAGE - 3 STAGE - 4 CONCEPT DESIGN CONCEPT TESTING Figure 1: Case Study Model – AKASH & REALISATION & VALIDATION •Close interface DA & •In house devp/flt trials end user •56 test flts STAGE - 1 STAGE - 2 •3 tier review mech - Propulsion GENERAL REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS worked well - Guidance - Control & DEFINITION •Comb & lgs elements - Warhead planned - Grnd sys etc. Backdrop •Delays Felt need •EW trials Milestones •Fin–foreign exch overruns •Mobility trial Op envt changing Current status •TOT problem from •Gp testing etc. TD cycle Reqmt increase DRDO to PSUs •User trials Public-private Techno envt •Tier II/III vendors changing Indigenous policy participation •Addl tasks; 95-99, STAGE - 5 time penalty PRODUCTION •Guidance/ramjet/ MFPAR/svl rdr •Pub-pvt partnership •BMP–T72–99-07, •Bring into being project •Coded guidance; 99-01 •Chinese Beidou satl •Israeli Iron Dome •Fin powers inadequate •Planned sys life reduce STAGE - 12 STAGE - 11 STAGE - 10 •Ready for tests–07 LESSONS LESSONS LESSONS •Prodn agency to retain same vendors •Bring into Being •Spiral,incremental & •DRDO – continue projects; encourage CTDC to develop strategic STAGE - 8 •Need to prevent •Restructure dynamic value sys EXTRANEOUS FACTORS STAGE - 6 LGS SERVICE SP sabotage; caliberated decision making •Promote projects •HQ IDS positive, helpful publicity when production •(Ramarao & Kelkar •CDS missed •DRDO to improve •Brmhos like Committees) maturity attained mobility & ergonomics consortium approach •Comprehensive PDD, •Rama Rao committee •BEL to setup nodal
•Fin and decision reorg will help with TOT making delegation better technology wksp in N.India
•Conduct and prep of forecasting •Indian mil industrial •Design to production base will improve things user trial; thorough maturity imperatives •Flexible time and cost STAGE - 7 estimate •Indep authority like NEW IDEAS DTC needed •Long projects harmonize changes STAGE - 9 •Work on ver 2/3 to start in SQR QUESTIONS/ISSUES AND •Increased involvement of academia/industry RESPONSES •Consider foreign collaboration like Bramhos •DRDO to avoid overstating success before user says so
36 Chapter 3: Lessons From Case Studies
3. The LCA is a fourth generation documented, the following aspects clearly plus aircraft with full networking emerge in respect of the LCA: capabilities. It is most suitable for 1. The start time of the LCA project network-centric warfare, where sanction is 1993 and not 1983 when indigenous systems for secrecy, essentially only a Project Definition security and interoperability are a must Study was ordered. In considering the for mission success. Imported systems development time further, we must take cannot meet these requirements. note of the nature of project sanction in 1993, wherein only 60 percent of the 3.5.1 Current Status amount requested was given with a mandate to develop only two technology Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has demonstrators (weaponisation and handed over 10 indigenously produced Tejas operational clearance was to be aircraft to the Indian Air Force and has firm subsequently initiated). orders to produce 40 aircraft. In addition 83 more LCA Mark 1-A have been committed 2. The balance amount was sanctioned by the Indian Air Force (IAF) for production only in 2001 after the first technology by HAL. Production is being scaled up to 16 demonstrator was flown successfully. aircraft per annum through a wide range of The Air Force and MoD were major measures now initiated. players in these approvals and it seemed there was a need for 3.5.2 Evaluation better technical appreciation of the development programme and risks There have been several articles in the enunciated in the project development press and notes from the Services which document by all stakeholders. are critical of DRDO projects in general, 3. When considering aspects of and specifically, the programme related to performance achieved, it would be the LCA now named Tejas and IGDMP. It necessary to compare it with the figures is important to put the real facts relating in the Project Definition Document to these programmes in perspective on and not the initial ASR figures in the crucial issues of time and cost overruns and 1983 CCPA paper, as these were to performance shortfalls. It may be mentioned be refined with the Project Definition that what is most relevant today is an Studies and discussions with the Air assessment of the capability developed in Force. This aspect was also noted in relation to the requirements of the mission the CCPA sanction. need, and not just staff requirements based on which projects are initiated, as these 4. Keeping the above in mind, it can are quite often just the best of ‘Brochure be inferred that there has been no Claims’ not achievable either domestically cost overrun. As a matter of fact, or through imports. Based on well-known there have been cost savings, as facts and performance parameters, now well- two additional prototypes were built
37 VIF Task Force Report
within the sanctioned cost. At USD and aerodynamic performance. 1.2 billion, the costs incurred are an When the GTRE’s proposed JV order of magnitude lower than what with a leading foreign engine has been incurred elsewhere. Also manufacturer is completed in the time overrun is marginal – at best about four years, the Kaveri will a year or two and compares favorably be brought to a performance level with complex aircraft or systems superior to the GE404. Fitted with development times the world over. it, the LCA will be truly comparable 5. Engine development, it is true, requires to the Mirage 2000, and in many further effort, and the GE404 engine, respects, even superior. And, all which also powers the F18 fighter this in an aircraft that is much bomber, has been used to power the lighter and has technology far LCA. The costs incurred to date are superior to the Mirage 2000 again much lower than what has been ii. In generational terms, the LCA is expended elsewhere. For example, a fourth generation-plus aircraft even SNECMA, the sole fighter aircraft with full networking capabilities, engine manufacturer in France, despite and with the R73, which is the decades of experience in developing most potent air-to-air missile in and manufacturing engines for Mirage our region, the LCA has better III, V and F1, took about a decade and technology (digital fly by wire USD 2.2 billion to develop the M88 system, advanced composites, engine. Kaveri, which is GTREs and fully digital cockpit etc.) than any the nation’s maiden effort, is unlikely other aircraft in the IAF inventory. to exceed USD 1 billion even after iii. Further, considering that warfare the joint venture development effort has shifted to a Network Centric now proposed. dimension from a Platform Centric 6. As regards performance, the following one, these capabilities in the emerges: LCA makes it truly formidable. i. The LCA with GE404 engine has Network Centric Capabilities done over 3,000 hours of flight require intrinsically indigenous testing remarkably smoothly. Even systems for secrecy, security and with that engine, the performance interoperability. It is a fallacy to has been not only vastly superior to think that we can continue with that of even the recently upgraded our importing spree and still have a MIG 21 BIS (the IAF is operating secure and interoperable network 400 of the series), but it has centric capability. This aspect shown itself to be comparable on applies practically to the entire ICT many critical parameters to the infrastructure of the armed forces Mirage 2000. Modifications to the and the introduction of technologies aircraft structure are underway to like the Software Defined Radio reduce weight, improve the engine makes the issue even more critical.
38 Chapter 3: Lessons From Case Studies
7. Finally, as recently as in 2004/2005, It is clear from the above, that there the IAF’s requirements before the are issues that need to be examined at the Defence Procurement Board for 126 highest level before negotiating any more new aircraft was essentially for only multi-billion dollar aircraft purchases and an upgraded Mirage 2000 (whose upgrades. Of importance is the necessity to upgrade is again sought). It was build capability that meets our Mission Needs argued that as far as aerodynamic in relation to our threat perceptions and not performance was concerned, just detailed technical specification embodied the Mirage 2000 represented the in our ASR. Importing capability off the shelf or achievable limits for the class and through TOT (which in fact is ONLY LICENSE met the threat perception. This aircraft MANUFACTURE) for the Armed Forces across was sought to be purchased as a the board (even where indigenous capability cost-effective option on a single is viable especially in the context of our threat tender basis. The RFP (Request for perception (like Chinese JF17/J10) is unlikely proposal) now issued seems to be to be economically feasible, and would only very broad-based and emphasises increase our dependence and constrict our more on 4th generation technologies foreign policy choices while giving us a capability so that the full spectrum of fighters that will be highly vulnerable in a network centric from the light weight GRIPEN to the and information warfare environment. heavier twin engine F-18 and MIG The LCA is in a strong position to meet the 35 are all in the race and the Mirage requirements of the Indian Air Force and also 2000 would be separately upgraded has substantial potential for export. to these technologies. The fact is that all of these technologies are available in the LCA (avionics package, 3.6 Strategic Sub-surface Platform digital quadruple FBW, Elta (and later developed AESA radar [under active 3.6.1 Programme trials today]), which are equivalent/ The Strategic Submarine project is a three better than the Gripen. The current decade pursuit of a survivable nuclear launch MIG 35 is nothing more than a single option. It owes its genesis to events of the 1971 demonstrator, not even close to a war that proved the efficacy of submarines as possible production version. It is a great deterrent to adversaries far exceeding clear that the LCA is a highly cost- one’s own defence capability. Post the peaceful effective fighter for volume induction nuclear tests of 1974, the political leadership in the IAF. The lexicon of the LCA, accorded a go ahead for feasibility studies. It MMRCA etc., seems unrealistic – of brought together nuclear scientists of BARC, relevance is capability needed to meet weapon and system engineering experts of Mission Needs in relation to our threat DRDO and the Navy as also their ship designers, perceptions taking note of the assets to lay the foundation of a fruitful partnership that available (SU30 etc.). culminated in this successful programme. A robust programme management organisation
39 VIF Task Force Report
and steering at the top most echelons of of tendering (most are limited government (regardless of regime changes, tenders with absolutely nothing on sanctions or budget constraints) allowed the open tender/e-procurement route), flexibility in awarding advance and programme to operate under the radar for a control on waivers/extensions and considerable period. When the cover of secrecy contract management. However, the was finally blown, the programme was well on above was considerably facilitated its way to realisation. In a country that swears by the fact that this was a top secret by the ‘no first use’ nuclear doctrine, it could project and the processing of cases, not have come a day sooner. This should financial and otherwise, essentially be the standard practice for all system-level happened at the joint secretary level programmes in the country. and above. 2. The programme invested significant What they got right efforts in qualifications of vendors The programme got a few things right though, and building a supplier base. for example: Once a bidder was selected for award of contract, the programme 1. Top leadership support that made for team managed the relationship in continuous flow of funds. ‘development partner’ mode rather 2. Bringing together the departments of than in ‘buyer-supplier/vendor’ mode. Defence and Atomic Energy in a robust A development partner could rely on programme management organisation tapping the programmes considerable that allowed for smooth coordination, internal expertise, documentation, pooling of resources and result-orientation organisational knowledge-base and without undue acrimony. testing/integration infrastructure. 3. Secrecy that saved it from too much In fact the programme made the scrutiny/pressure from media, interim success of their development and milestones, and if one may dare say, production partners as their own financial audits. business, as the failure of any partner would ultimately be a setback to the 4. The biggest success of this programme programme itself. would undoubtedly be encouraging a host of private sector big players (L&T, 3. For a few critical projects, they also Tata, and Godrej etc.) to wholeheartedly went beyond the call of strict contract support this endeavor despite by way of expanding scope and restrictions of government secrecy, funds, especially if these delivered lack of clarity on future business better results in quicker time. The potential and technical risks. Programme leadership fully utilised institutes of national repute through 3.6.2 Indigenous Eco-system academic/research engagements. 1. Surprisingly, they did so with minimal/ These gainful engagements were negligible deviations from standard also available to their development DRDO procurement manuals. partners on need basis, without delays Only deviations were in the area in the approval of their proposals.
40 Chapter 3: Lessons From Case Studies
3.6.3 HR Practices 3.6.5 Areas of Improvement
As the apex organisation is led by naval 1. Due to the secretive nature of the officers, staffing of adequate naval officers programme and constraints of foreign has been well handled. One surprising assistance, the programme has many phenomenon is that the programme team imported systems in the first boat. generally comprised of ‘passed over’ officers. Obviously, they must have been taken Though this lot is treated with trepidation by as a ‘cost’ of foreign assistance and as the armed forces hierarchy, the programme internal expertise has built up, one can has made use of their technical expertise, see considerable improvements in the professional ego, locational immobility and indigenous content. It is understood willingness to give to the nation, in a most that the team is aiming for near 100 positive way. This can be a role model for a percent indigenisation in the next set variety of R&D organisations that keep citing of submarines on order. ‘lack of user involvement’ as a major constraint. 2. Strategic boats being relatively ‘noisy’ Further a considerable continuity of personnel programme could have done with involved in the project was ensured. widespread use of CAE (computer aided engineering) for reduction 3.6.4 Sanctions Regime as a positive in noise levels by improvements force-multiplier in vibration analysis, multibody dynamics, CFD (computational fluid One of the biggest advantages of the dynamics), thermal management, programme (shared with the IGMDP), was that space optimisation etc. It may be the project had no competition as users could noted that CAE and High Performance not opt for acquisition by import route, nor could Computing has been a key applied foreign entities strategise to interfere with their engineering area in strategic submarine programmes. Second, this being a first of a kind design the world over. Given the work, failures could be condoned and they did world leading expertise of Indian IT/ not have to fear the Damocles Sword of go/ engineering services companies in no go decision at every milestone. Third, the this space, minimal exploitation of sanctions regime ensured that the indigenous CAE and HPC is surprising. route was almost always the first and only 3. The programme developed a host of option. The team was well-imbibed with the suppliers by spending public money. spirit of pioneers and could enthuse its vast These projects delivered successful array of industry partners (both from the private products that are qualified and used and public sector), advisors from academia onboard strategic platforms. However, and foreign collaborators (there were a few, the navy continues to maintain a especially at the start). It should be clear to the hands-off approach to this vendor list nation that if sovereignty as a pillar of foreign and regrettably imports a lot of items policy is to be preserved and affordability where equivalent indigenous products of systems ensured, Make in India, through have been developed. indigenous R&D, will be a necessary condition.
41 Chapter 4: Arriving at the Capability Needs – Evolving LTIPP and Beyond
4.1 Evolving LTIPP through the lack of integrated guidance documents Strategic Guidance which would enable evolution of the LTIPP as a capability and security investment programme As stated earlier, the development of for the next 15-20 years from which each of indigenous systems requires time for realising the services could draw their schemes/project the technologies required, establishing programmes on long-term basis. adequate critical facilities and integrating the same into systems. Thereafter, time is required The starting point in the process of for various trials and evaluations and its formulating an LTIPP is the articulation of production and induction into service. This time strategic guidance. The salience is flagged frame could be anything between 10-15 years in succeeding paragraphs. and beyond, depending upon the complexity In the increasingly complex and of the system and the nation’s technology interdependent imperatives of a modern nation readiness to develop a particular system. state, defence/security planning dimensions are The DPP 2016 enunciates (Paragraph 16 required to be processed through an integrated of Chapter II) that proposals for acquisition system comprising of security concept, national of capital assets flow from the defence security strategy (NSS), defence/military strategy, procurement planning process, which will cover strategic defence review, Raksha Mantri’s (RM) the long, medium and short-term perspective defence planning guidelines, defence capability (LTIPP, FYAP and AAP). Under Design and strategy, technology development strategy/ Development Cases, SHQs will initiate SoCs plan. It may be mentioned that the RM’s for Design and Development cases from LTIPP/ operational guidance document is inefficient FYAP/AAP in consultation with DRDO/DPSUs/ for the purpose. OFB (Para 72(a) of Chapter II). However, it From LTIPP, each of the services will draw will be clear that the FYAP and AAP does not their schemes/programmes and projects on provide the required time for development and a long-term basis and submit the same for production of indigenous systems. The LTIPP, approval. Such a plan will lead to Integrated therefore, is the fountainhead from which Force Development Guidelines (IFDG). the military weapon systems requirements In parallel and in sync, the Long Term emanate, and hence, is the basic document for Technology and System Development Plan the development of technologies and systems (LTTP) needs to be evolved. The scientific indigenously. establishment needs to be deeply involved In the sphere of defence planning, the in this process and their inputs could even in study observes that the main lacunae lies in some cases alter the contours of the LTIPP.
42 Chapter 4: Arriving at the Capability Needs – Evolving LTIPP and Beyond
The IFDG needs to be prepared and should system. As this is of crucial importance, it serve as an integrated guidance document will be analysed in detail as a separate paper for capability, technology and budgetary wherein following aspects relevant to creation estimates. Its components are as follows: of technology and system capability will 1. Strategic Posture Guidance (SPG). be considered. Strategic and operational scenarios should 1. Material technology creation system, be developed from the strategic guidance (where material is used as a generic documents, SPG, interests, goals and term for equipment, weapon or objectives and their impact and likely information system and technology responses from adversaries/competitors. creation implies translating capabilities 2. Joint Concepts/Doctrines. Related set out by the planning process to the strategic futures, these should into technologies, their successful visualise future operations and application to produce systems/ describe how forces might employ weapon platforms at affordable cost capabilities necessary to meet future and in given time frame). military challenges for a period from 2. Technology research needs and 10 to 15 years. opportunities exploration. (It will 3. Science and Technology Strategy. define the technology availability as Technology Development Strategy relevant to the LTIPP and the gap areas needs to cover basic, applied for further exploring the opportunities and advanced fields of research, to plug the gap). The framework for development and production. leveraging the technology readiness available is flagged as given below: 4. Evolving Costing Mechanism. Defence Financial Forecast Plan will require i. Technology development is drafts of the LTIPP and LTTP to be co- the process of developing and developed in an integrated manner. demonstrating new or unproven technology as also the application These two documents (IFDG and LTTP) of existing technology to new or will encompass joint capabilities as also different uses, or the combination service-wise capabilities of the individual of existing and proven technology to services. The latter will be developed by each achieve a specific goal. Technology service and coordinated by the HQ IDS in sync development associated with with joint capabilities strategy. a specific acquisition project must be identified early in the The system of generating strategic project life cycle and its maturity guidance in the form of national security/ level should have evolved to a defence/military strategies, strategic defence confidence level that allows the review (SDR) and RM’s planning guidelines project to establish a credible is not institutionalised in India. While in all technical scope, schedule and the major foreign countries, it forms the cost baseline. foundation of future force development
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ii. Projects that perform concurrent the technology is home grown, technology development and then the production agency has design implementation run the opportunities to get involved in risk of proceeding with a poorly earlier TRL stages, taking the defined project baseline. In the knowledge accrual from know- USA, considerable research how to know-why. This know-why has been done on various is essential for bringing about the aspects of management of inevitable upgradation and hedging technology. Particularly, NASA against any supply chain risks (National Aeronautics and during the lifetime of the system. Space Administration) and DoD (Department of Defense, USA) 4.2 Material Acquisition: Analysis have adapted models that will and Decision Mechanism (Defence assist in identifying elements Production and Procurement System) and processes of technology development which are required At this stage approved user needs to reach proven maturity levels to should have been listed out as also the ensure project success. The nine long-term technology perspective/strategy stages Technology Readiness provided, listing the technology resources Levels (TRL) has been an effective and opportunities available within the country tool for adaption of this model. and outside. This will lead to decisions on programmes and projects to be taken up iii. Rational measurement of to fulfill the requirements of the LTIPP and indigenisation is a much needed the Defence Procurement and Production input for the decision makers Strategy (DPPS) evolved. involved with acquisition. TRL clearly illustrates that the ToT is 4.3 Defence Procurement confined to TRL-9 and partly at Policy/Procedure best to TRL-8. Consequently, the earlier TRLs remain opaque to the Relevant to this study, it is assessed that recipient forever. The technology with the capabilities built up in the country maturity process in India is beset as a result of projects that have been taken with many other dimensions that up (successful or otherwise), it should be the USA does not suffer from. possible to meet many of our requirements Technology enablement through through the Make process. And the intent Transfer of Technology (ToT) is must be to maximise our inductions through highly prevalent in many segments IDDM route. Where Buy/Buy and Make is and particularly with defence and still resorted to, it should be our objective other advanced technologies. to procure minimum numbers necessary to The technology obtained through meet our short-term requirements, allowing ToT needs to be indigenised time to enable IDDM route to be plugged in. progressively in critical areas. If
44 Chapter 4: Arriving at the Capability Needs – Evolving LTIPP and Beyond
Figure 2: Framework for technology development
Stages of Design and Technology Readiness Technology Time Period Readiness Design Stages (Years) “MADE IN INDIA” “MAKE IN INDIA” Level Know How 9 Sealed design particulars (Limited to Tooling 3 & Manufacturing 8 Manufacturing & tooling design Drawings/Specifications) (Production Know How Stage) May or may not be 7 Qualification design made available by Foreign Company 6 Final prototype design
5 Early prototype design 12 Know Why Remains with 4 Detailed engineering design Remains in India & Foreign Company (R,D&T Adds Value to Hence a Vulnerability Stage) National Security to National Security 3 Preliminary engineering design
2 Concept design 1 Sketch design
**Made in India indicates Make in India through IDDM route while Make in India is indicative of acquisition through Buy and Make category.
4.4 TPCR the form of concept of operations (con- ops) in which the system will be employed. With the process now explained TPCR may not be necessary to issue as the projects 2. Functional Requirement: Military and and programmes that emanate from the System Design community. LTTP will serve as specific requirements 3. Engineering Specifications: Evolved for capability development to the industry by System Engineering community on a long-term basis. Confidentiality where with awareness of Technology relevant can be tackled as has been done in Readiness Levels and Manufacturing ATV, LCA and other projects. Readiness Levels. 4. Material Specifications: Specialists 4.5 Requirement Specifications domain. In the present acquisition process, we 5. Requirement Specifications: An use the term Qualitative Requirement to all-encompassing document that describe the end-to-end process of identifying will emerge in its totality with the the military requirement and finalising the culmination of the project definition document that is included in RFP. However, phase. However, these need to be the sub-steps involved are: kept flexible in the case of indigenous 1. Operational Requirement: Purely that design and development falling under of the domain of military. At the time of the scope of IDDM, whereas in the formulation of programmes /projects, Buy and Buy and Make case these these requirements would essentially take requirements must be rigid as the
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acquisition of a fully developed and EMC, computing power, memory capacity operational system. etc.) to accretion of key features by way of 6. As we do not use this vocabulary/ embedded engineering firmware and pure terminology in our acquisition play software. Tools of military designers have documents, the QR that is evolved is undergone a sea change in the last decade entirely managed by the Services. It is or two with product life cycles (including recommended that: development and testing) shortening significantly. The rise of algorithmic content, i. Operational Requirement be complex software and data-based decision- evolved by the Services. making is leading to the growing use of ii. All the other steps leading to total simulation and modelling in military systems requirement specifications must engineering. A few of the biggest gains of this be evolved by experts from DRDO approach are listed in succeeding paragraphs. and Industry for IDDM projects. 1. Mathematical modelling allows for iii. This document must establish formal notification of equipment/ all essential linkages with the system behaviour under different Operational Requirement to the scenarios. It is especially useful in entire satisfaction of the Services. visualisation of user requirements and can help in formulation of realistic 4.6 Modelling and Simulation QRs. Modelling and simulations need to be 2. It improves testability by defining used in different forms for different levels of operational boundary conditions at decision making, for example at the national the very start and allows a designer security strategy level, these tools will be to validate many engineering options used to develop different scenarios and at pre-production stage itself. make a judgement to enable determining 3. Models are easier and cheaper to the preferred option. At another level, that of test in lab, thereby reducing need military and operational strategy, modelling for tooling and production of many and simulation tools would be useful for ‘design samples’. It shortens the evaluating and defining strategic options. At development cycle. the force and technology development levels 4. Powerful computers and new too, the tools of modelling and simulation generation visualisation tools allow have matured over the years. It is possible to for fast simulations and computations. virtually build systems which are near to the Simulations can also be extended real system and to subject them to virtual to imponderables such as troop tests and analysis. With ICT hardware and behaviour and probable enemy action. electronics industry maturing in terms of Such capability exists in the country. reliability and ‘performance specifications’, military systems design engineering is moving 5. Simulation and modelling tools have away from pre-eminence of hardware design been used by leading aerospace and (issues like environment specifications, EMI/ defence LSIs for gaming of threat
46 Chapter 4: Arriving at the Capability Needs – Evolving LTIPP and Beyond
perceptions, assessing optimum 4.7 Current Status deployment of weapons and general solution of CEC scenarios. Considerable capacity and capability has been created in the country over the last The NCO simulation setup can form five decades to indigenously develop major a good visualisation centre for all such complex systems required by the armed projects where users could test NCW forces. This capability and capacity must doctrines, efficacy of CEC procedures, inter- now be put to full use urgently to ensure that operability of communication protocols, gains painstakingly made against numerous training of crews in tactical symbology etc. odds are not frittered away due to their non- NCO simulation centre can also act as an utilisation. For this and other reasons brought effective strategic war gaming centre where out above, Make in India programmes and its integrated situational awareness picture projects executed through the process of and virtual reality/augmented reality tools indigenous research and development are could be used for briefing/debriefing higher an urgent need. national leadership not very well versed with military lexicon. The conceptual framework model is at figure 3.
Figure 3: Conceptual Framework
STAGE - 3 STAGE - 4 STAGE - 5 INTEGRATION VETTING ILTIPP INTEGRATIONL TTP FINAL INTEGRATION LTTP FINAL & ILTTP
•FEG/CDG •Recommend •Basic/applied/advanced •IFDG - Make-Indian research/strat-mil tech - SPG - Buy-Indian •MTRL/design/product/ STAGE - 1 STAGE - 2 processes/nfrastructure - Concepts/doc/org - Make-Buy; Indian CAPABILITY NEEDS MTRL TECHNO CREATION SYS •Avail/under devp/gaps - Bdgt estimates - Make-Buy; Global •Relate to LTIPP; long/ - Review ILTTP - Buy-Global •Integrated system •ILTTS/P mid/short/IMDT •MOE – LTIPP/LTTP - Export Potential •SGD - Capability inputs - New platforms/sys/ integration & final - Time/Agencies •Def coop - TRNOE – time frame upgrade •Monetary system - Bdgt Estimates •Def plg guidelines - Capability matrix •LTIPP/SCAPP/AAP •Capability plan - TR index •ILTIPP - TGL - Funding sys
STAGE - 10 STAGE - 9 STAGE - 8 STAGE - 7 STAGE - 6 CURRENT REALITIES OTHER COUNTRIES MODELS DEF INDUSTRIAL BASE PROJECT/PGME MGT DPP SYSTEM-MTRL SOLN ANALYSIS/DECISIONS
•Others – in house •All follow TD cycle •Pvt sect participation •Design – production •DPP 08/09 priority but not in India •SGD •Interaction maturity imperatives •Def Prod Proc Strat •Diffused acountability •IFDG - DRDO •PM composn-3 tiered •Categorisation •No SGD/DPG •TD database - DPSUS •Decisions – multi tiered •Time Frame •No LTIPP – services PP •Emphasise on - Indian industry •Complex PM org •SQRS •No LTTP/data base indigenization & - Global industry •PM in navy – sample – •Techno Devp/ CTDC/ •No IFDG/DPPD collaboration remedial measures Milestones/ Incremental •Flawed DPP •Competition dynamics •Procurement – life cycle •Devpht & Complex Sys – strategy support •Offset Policy – Techno •US, Israel,UK, China, Acqn Russia
47 Chapter 5: Gap Areas and Interim Recommendations
5.1 Gap Areas 4. Major gap areas in our present procurement process including those The gap areas that have emerged in the stated below will be addressed current process are as follows: in a separate report: Issues in 1. The entire chain of guidance documents development of technologies through governing the indigenous technology fundamental and applied research as development and production process applicable. Prototype development and provisions in the defence cannot currently commence unless procurement procedures and PSQRs are released well in advance. procurement manual ultimately leads to Much of the delay occurs due to our resorting to Request for Information the absence of PSQRs/QRs, which (RFI) and Request for Proposal (RFPs) for are generally finalised by the time foreign procurement. AONs are accepted. Therefore, AONs must be released well in time for 2. Strategic documents needed the development, production and to arrive at the LTIPP need to be processes to bear the fruit. There are institutionalised. This would also also other issues at this stage such require substantial changes in the as financial and nomination issues, existing defence planning process. conduct of trials leading to user 3. The 15 year LTIPP in its present form acceptance and so on. provides inadequate guidance for the i. The industry has failed to purpose of planning for indigenous productionise domestically design, development and production. developed prototypes to the scale At present, it is merely a collation of and quality required in many cases. wish lists of procurements planned As a result domestically developed by the Armed Forces. Based on equipment that has qualified after our discussions on the essential intense user trials often fails to meet process required to arrive at the required standards post-production. LTIPP, R&D/industry/organisations can Thus, scaling up of production to formulate meaningful Technology and meet the armed forces requirement Production Capability Development becomes difficult. Plans and follow it up with effectual development process. ii. Lack of a system to encapsulate the positive lessons learnt from successful projects.
48 Chapter 5: Gap Areas and Interim Recommendations
iii. The relationship between the programmes and constituent users and the developers in the technologies that need to be system is more that of buyer-seller. developed and owned by the country. The need to treat the developer as Development of these technologies a partner in capacity development and infrastructure creation must be is acutely felt. funded as a Programme element ahead of the project sanctioned as is 5.2 Recommendations now practiced by ISRO.
Reform the Defence Planning Process, 2. Developing the LTIPP and the restructure the higher defence organisation concomitant LTTPP as discussed and institutionalise the system of generating in this report will necessarily take strategic guidance documents to evolve time to implement. The study group a meaningful LTIPP and LTTP which alone is therefore of the opinion that the can form the basis for developing the following programmes be launched required programmes and projects resulting in view of their criticality and the R&D in indigenous defence capability. capabilities built up in the country over the last three to four decades. 5.3 Programme Management i. Conventional submarine and in Strategic Sphere vs. Conventional nuclear attack submarine. Sphere ii. Hypersonic missile systems. 1. It is seen that sensitive programmes iii. Integrated Ballistic and Cruise managed in the strategic sphere are Missile System. executed with synergy to focus on the indigenous effort. The technical and iv. Aviation programmes: financial decision-making processes a. Fifth generation manned are effective and timely. fighter technology. 2. In the conventional sphere, procedures b. Development of gas turbines are cumbersome and decision-making for various platforms under is slow. Conventional programmes development. also have high strategic value to create c. Development of transport the required deterrence. There is, aircraft to meet civil and therefore, an urgent need to bring the military requirements. intensity of focus practiced in strategic programmes to be applied to key d. Development of surveillance indigenous defence programmes. systems. v. AI enabled autonomous systems (Land, 5.4 Programmes and Technologies Air and Sea) to include platforms like as part of LTIPP unmanned combat aircraft, unmanned 1. LTTPP (Long Term Technology ASW surface vessels. Perspective Plan) must include
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vi. Cyber security systems for the Armed flexible for Indigenous Design, Forces (Preference only to indigenous Development Class of categorisation. solutions, as notified on 2 Jul 2018 Public Procurement [Preference to 5.6 Modelling and Simulation Make in India] Order 2018 for Cyber Security Products issued by Ministry of Modelling and simulation should be Electronics and Information Technology). deployed at all levels of decision making and for system specification and development. vii. Programmes to establish electronic and photonic components industry. 5.7 Model of Space Commission viii. Development of sensors and seekers for multiple users. The Industrial Policy of the Space Commission is a visionary policy that has ix The raw materials required for been supported by focused execution. production of critical materials both Similar attempts have been lacking in the metallic and non-metallic, composites defence segment. The following needs to and functional materials need to be addressed: be harnessed and developed. The present efforts are totally inadequate 1. Buy-back Commitments: The and a national effort is required DRDO procurement policies could in this direction. In case of rare not incorporate this provision as earth, a national implementation plan the Defence Forces are operating covering minerals, metals, alloys and the DPP which starts treating the downstream products is the urgent DRDO developed products afresh need for our self-reliance goals. for acquisition and affords limited commitments to development 5.5 Evolving Requirement Specifications partners. Provisions in Para 72(a) of the DPP which could remedy the It is recommended; situation have not been used for 1. Operational requirement be evolved various reasons. by the Services. 2. The ISRO industrial policy execution 2. All other steps leading to Total created fervent Technology Transfer Requirement Specifications must Groups that functioned in the premises be evolved by experts from DRDO of industries to ensure effective and industry. This document must transfer of technology. Such intense establish all the essential linkages with systems are yet to take root in DRDO. the Operational Requirement for the 3. ISRO funded many private industry complete satisfaction of the Services. technology centres which model 3. Total Requirement Specifications must needs to be replicated in the defence be reasonably rigid for Buy Class of sector as well. categorisation, but also reasonably
50 Chapter 5: Gap Areas and Interim Recommendations
5.8 e-Procurement could draw their schemes/programmes/ projects on long-term basis. The issues in The Manual for Procurement of Goods the procurement system in meeting the 2017 issued by Government of India Ministry requirements set, will be addressed in a of Finance, Department of Expenditure separate report. states in Para 4.15 pertaining to Electronic Procurement (e-Procurement) as follows: As creation of such a system for developing “It is mandatory for Ministries/Departments the LTIPP and concomitant LTTPP – as to receive all bids through e-Procurement discussed in this report – will necessarily take portals in respect of all procurements. ……... time to implement, the study group therefore In individual cases where national security recommends that the Programmes and and strategic considerations demands Technologies as stated above be launched in confidentiality, Ministries/Departments may view of their criticality, and existence of good exempt such cases from e-Procurement after R&D capabilities that have been built up in the seeking approval of concerned Secretary and country over the last three to four decades. with concurrence of Financial Advisers. …….. (Rule 160 of GFR 2017)”. This exemption must be invoked for procurements done by DRDO to enable them to maintain the required secrecy.
This exemption must also be applied to all the DPSUs and Ordnance Factories, and other public sector entities involved in procuring sensitive items.
5.9 Conclusion
This report highlights the very critical need of increasing our quotient of self-reliance for defence systems to achieve both defence preparedness and national security goals. The report hypothesises that this requires overhauling the manner in which armed forces needs are projected to domestic R&D and industry and the manner in which the procurement system thereafter meets the requirements set. The current report analyses and recommends a model for developing a long-term integrated perspective plan as a security investment programme for the next 15-20 years from which each of the services
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