The Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Rapprochement

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The Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Rapprochement Julio C. Carasales THE ARGENTINE-BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT by Julio C. Carasales1 Ambassador Carasales is a career Ambassador of the Argentine Foreign Service and has held numerous positions, including Deputy Permanent Delegate to the United Nations and the Security Council (1971-73), Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs (1973-74), Permanent Delegate of Argentina to the Organization of American States (1975-79) and to the Conference on Disarmament (1981-85), and Head of the Foreign Service Institute (1979-81). He has also taught at several universities in Argentina. The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Argentine Foreign Ministry. n the nuclear field, Argentina portant to analysts elsewhere in the among which must be included: and Brazil are the most advanced world attempting to develop work- favorable national political circum- Icountries not only of South able techniques for settling bilateral stances, economic difficulties, simi- America but of the whole of Latin nuclear rivalries. While the Argen- larity of positions regarding the America. This fact, combined with tine-Brazilian “model” is not likely global nonproliferation regime, the the overall influence of the two na- to be directly applicable elsewhere, advent of civilian governments, posi- tions in this region, explains why the process of its negotiation teaches tive presidential leadership, the their nuclear policies are of such im- some valuable lessons regarding the active role of the foreign ministries, portance to the international com- settlement of contentious bilateral as well as forceful international pres- munity. Their nuclear rivalry was nuclear and technical disputes. sure. not an isolated episode, but rather This article examines the troubled The Argentine-Brazilian nuclear must be understood as the modern Argentine-Brazilian nuclear rela- rapprochement began around 1980, technological manifestation of a long tionship from an historical perspec- but it did not gain adequate momen- historical competition and emulation tive. It begins with a brief over- tum until around 1985, when this that characterized their bilateral re- view of its root causes in the struggle process developed in earnest. From lations for almost two centuries. for influence on the South Ameri- 1985 to 1995, two stages can be Their current nuclear rapproche- can continent, traces the reasons for distinguished. The first period, last- ment—in their formation of the Bra- its turning point around 1980, and ing from 1985 to 1988, was charac- zilian-Argentine Agency for Ac- follows it through to its recent rap- terized by a purely bilateral ap- counting and Control of Nuclear prochement. proach. The second phase developed Materials (in Spanish, ABACC) in The reasons the two countries between 1989 and the present, and 1990 and their recent full accession moved radically away from the com- had a double objective: 1) to give a to the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1994— petitive nuclear policies that they had legally-binding character to the marks a significant turning point in followed for several decades are not pledges already undertaken by both this relationship. An examination simple. A combination of elements countries; and 2) to take these obli- of the route to its formation from played a part in the birth and the gations to the international field, 1985 to the present is therefore im- development of the whole process, making the two nations part of the The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1995 39 Julio C. Carasales regional and global nonproliferation connotations as the political and the former antagonism and compe- regimes. economic circumstances changed. tition. While there were no new This study examines each phase Finally, in the late 1940s, Argen- important efforts at the official level, and the specific means employed for tine President General Juan D. Perón in the nongovernmental field new breaking the nuclear deadlock. It initiated an effort to restructure re- links were established and devel- focuses on the diplomatic front, lations with Brazil, but the endeavor oped. rather than on technical issues re- did not make much progress. In the 1970s, however, a new ele- lated to the nuclear programs of the By this point, it was only natural ment of discord appeared: a dispute two sides, which have been covered that one way the traditional rivalry regarding the administration of a by other authors. The article con- would express itself was in nuclear shared natural resource, the waters cludes with some observations on technology and development. Ar- of the great Paraná River, which has the significance of this rapproche- gentina entered the race first in the its source in Brazil and flows into ment and what aspects of the even- 1950s, and Brazil followed imme- Argentina. Until that problem was tual settlement might be relevant to diately, trying hard to catch up. Es- satisfactorily resolved, it was impos- bilateral nuclear rivalries in other sentially, the reasons for the nuclear sible to even contemplate a serious parts of the world. rivalry derived not so much from attempt to place Argentine-Brazil- the national security concerns but ian relations on a new basis.6 Agree- HISTORICAL BACKGROUND from the need to keep up with a ment on the water issue was reached competitor. At the International in 1979, but attempts by Argentina’s Argentine-Brazilian relations have Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), military rulers and Brazil’s military- always been complex, beginning as both countries vied for the right to influenced government to move be- early as the sixteenth century, when occupy the seat on the Board of yond this issue bore only limited their territories were part of the Governors assigned to the country fruit. Spanish and Portuguese colonial most advanced in nuclear technol- At a meeting on May 17, 1980, empires. In the period of colonial ogy in each region (under Article during the visit of Brazilian Presi- rule, these two European powers VI.A.1 of the IAEA Statute). Un- dent General Joao Figuereido to expanded their own rivalry through able to decide which country was Buenos Aires, he and Argentine territorial conquests in South the most advanced, the Agency de- President General Videla signed an America. The conquistadors fought termined, by a gentlemen’s agree- “Agreement on Cooperation for the to acquire new lands, leading to ment, that Argentina and Brazil Development and Application of the clashes, particularly in the regions would rotate representation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.” of the Plata River and present-day Board of Governors.4 While the agreement was similar to Paraguay. Around 1960, another Argentine arrangements concluded between Even after Argentina and Brazil president, Arturo Frondizi (1958- other nations on this same issue,7 it gained their independence in the 62), made a new overture to ease was significant because it demon- early 1800s, their rivalry continued tensions with Brazil, whose heads strated that the nuclear competition to reflect their colonial past. Com- of state, Juscelino Kubitschek (1955- of nearly three decades was being petition for the leadership of South 60) and Janio Quadros (1960-61), restrained. Policy-makers in both America, with elements of antago- shared a similar ideology. At the be- nations realized that nuclear devel- nism, rivalry, and mistrust, was al- ginning, the new approach was fairly opment was a field in which it was 2 ways present. In 1825, the two successful. Its aim was to establish proper and promising to cooperate. nations went to war when the Bra- reciprocal consultations and coor- But this process faltered as the zilian Empire tried to get a foothold dination of the foreign policies of attention of both governments was in the Plata River. This was the last both countries. Unfortunately, the concentrated on internal political direct armed conflict between Ar- exercise did not last. Frondizi and and economic problems and on the gentina and Brazil. The resulting Quadros were politically weak and coming transfer of power to civilian peace treaty in 1828 established were in the end overthrown.5 But hands. In addition, the 1982 South 3 Uruguay as a new buffer state. the failure of these initial embryonic Atlantic War diverted concern from Nevertheless, the rivalry persisted, efforts did not result in a return to bilateral relations.8 with different characteristics and 40 Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1995 Julio C. Carasales THE BEGINNING OF THE milestone because of the sweeping ing of similar IAEA conventions. NUCLEAR character of the treaty and the fact Protocol No. 17 on “Nuclear Coop- RAPPROCHEMENT (1985-89) that it was ratified by the Argentine eration,” signed in December 1986, Congress with the support of all defined several areas for mutual co- The political climate to undertake political parties. This support sug- operation and development, includ- the building of a new and vastly gested that the rapprochement with ing high density fuels for research improved relationship between Ar- Brazil enjoyed wide approval, un- reactors, detectors, electronics, and gentina and Brazil became propi- thinkable 10 years earlier.9 nuclear instrumentation. Three years tious when civilians assumed the Another bilateral process that later in an annex to Protocol No. leadership of the two nations: Presi- dealt specifically with nuclear issues 17, the foreign ministers of both dents Raúl Alfonsín of Argentina was going on simultaneously. It was countries concluded an agreement (December 1983) and José Sarney an integral but distinct part of the “to promote complementary indus- of Brazil (March 1985). It must be whole new Argentine-Brazilian re- trial activities in the nuclear sector.” emphasized that nuclear affairs were lationship. These bilateral agreements have not envisaged as isolated from the At the November 1985 Foz de to be seen in the context of the broader context of Argentine-Bra- Iguazú presidential meeting men- broader process of economic inte- zilian relations in general.
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