Julio C. Carasales

THE ARGENTINE-BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT

by Julio C. Carasales1

Ambassador Carasales is a career Ambassador of the Argentine Foreign Service and has held numerous positions, including Deputy Permanent Delegate to the United Nations and the Security Council (1971-73), Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs (1973-74), Permanent Delegate of to the Organization of American States (1975-79) and to the Conference on Disarmament (1981-85), and Head of the Foreign Service Institute (1979-81). He has also taught at several universities in Argentina. The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Argentine Foreign Ministry.

n the nuclear field, Argentina portant to analysts elsewhere in the among which must be included: and are the most advanced world attempting to develop work- favorable national political circum- Icountries not only of South able techniques for settling bilateral stances, economic difficulties, simi- America but of the whole of Latin nuclear rivalries. While the Argen- larity of positions regarding the America. This fact, combined with tine-Brazilian “model” is not likely global nonproliferation regime, the the overall influence of the two na- to be directly applicable elsewhere, advent of civilian governments, posi- tions in this region, explains why the process of its negotiation teaches tive presidential leadership, the their nuclear policies are of such im- some valuable lessons regarding the active role of the foreign ministries, portance to the international com- settlement of contentious bilateral as well as forceful international pres- munity. Their nuclear rivalry was nuclear and technical disputes. sure. not an isolated episode, but rather This article examines the troubled The Argentine-Brazilian nuclear must be understood as the modern Argentine-Brazilian nuclear rela- rapprochement began around 1980, technological manifestation of a long tionship from an historical perspec- but it did not gain adequate momen- historical competition and emulation tive. It begins with a brief over- tum until around 1985, when this that characterized their bilateral re- view of its root causes in the struggle process developed in earnest. From lations for almost two centuries. for influence on the South Ameri- 1985 to 1995, two stages can be Their current nuclear rapproche- can continent, traces the reasons for distinguished. The first period, last- ment—in their formation of the Bra- its turning point around 1980, and ing from 1985 to 1988, was charac- zilian-Argentine Agency for Ac- follows it through to its recent rap- terized by a purely bilateral ap- counting and Control of Nuclear prochement. proach. The second phase developed Materials (in Spanish, ABACC) in The reasons the two countries between 1989 and the present, and 1990 and their recent full accession moved radically away from the com- had a double objective: 1) to give a to the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1994— petitive nuclear policies that they had legally-binding character to the marks a significant turning point in followed for several decades are not pledges already undertaken by both this relationship. An examination simple. A combination of elements countries; and 2) to take these obli- of the route to its formation from played a part in the birth and the gations to the international field, 1985 to the present is therefore im- development of the whole process, making the two nations part of the

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1995 39 Julio C. Carasales

regional and global nonproliferation connotations as the political and the former antagonism and compe- regimes. economic circumstances changed. tition. While there were no new This study examines each phase Finally, in the late 1940s, Argen- important efforts at the official level, and the specific means employed for tine President General Juan D. Perón in the nongovernmental field new breaking the nuclear deadlock. It initiated an effort to restructure re- links were established and devel- focuses on the diplomatic front, lations with Brazil, but the endeavor oped. rather than on technical issues re- did not make much progress. In the 1970s, however, a new ele- lated to the nuclear programs of the By this point, it was only natural ment of discord appeared: a dispute two sides, which have been covered that one way the traditional rivalry regarding the administration of a by other authors. The article con- would express itself was in nuclear shared natural resource, the waters cludes with some observations on technology and development. Ar- of the great Paraná River, which has the significance of this rapproche- gentina entered the race first in the its source in Brazil and flows into ment and what aspects of the even- 1950s, and Brazil followed imme- Argentina. Until that problem was tual settlement might be relevant to diately, trying hard to catch up. Es- satisfactorily resolved, it was impos- bilateral nuclear rivalries in other sentially, the reasons for the nuclear sible to even contemplate a serious parts of the world. rivalry derived not so much from attempt to place Argentine-Brazil- the national security concerns but ian relations on a new basis.6 Agree- HISTORICAL BACKGROUND from the need to keep up with a ment on the water issue was reached competitor. At the International in 1979, but attempts by Argentina’s Argentine-Brazilian relations have Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), military rulers and Brazil’s military- always been complex, beginning as both countries vied for the right to influenced government to move be- early as the sixteenth century, when occupy the seat on the Board of yond this issue bore only limited their territories were part of the Governors assigned to the country fruit. Spanish and Portuguese colonial most advanced in nuclear technol- At a meeting on May 17, 1980, empires. In the period of colonial ogy in each region (under Article during the visit of Brazilian Presi- rule, these two European powers VI.A.1 of the IAEA Statute). Un- dent General Joao Figuereido to expanded their own rivalry through able to decide which country was , he and Argentine territorial conquests in South the most advanced, the Agency de- President General Videla signed an America. The conquistadors fought termined, by a gentlemen’s agree- “Agreement on Cooperation for the to acquire new lands, leading to ment, that Argentina and Brazil Development and Application of the clashes, particularly in the regions would rotate representation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.” of the Plata River and present-day Board of Governors.4 While the agreement was similar to Paraguay. Around 1960, another Argentine arrangements concluded between Even after Argentina and Brazil president, Arturo Frondizi (1958- other nations on this same issue,7 it gained their independence in the 62), made a new overture to ease was significant because it demon- early 1800s, their rivalry continued tensions with Brazil, whose heads strated that the nuclear competition to reflect their colonial past. Com- of state, (1955- of nearly three decades was being petition for the leadership of South 60) and Janio Quadros (1960-61), restrained. Policy-makers in both America, with elements of antago- shared a similar ideology. At the be- nations realized that nuclear devel- nism, rivalry, and mistrust, was al- ginning, the new approach was fairly opment was a field in which it was 2 ways present. In 1825, the two successful. Its aim was to establish proper and promising to cooperate. nations went to war when the Bra- reciprocal consultations and coor- But this process faltered as the zilian Empire tried to get a foothold dination of the foreign policies of attention of both governments was in the Plata River. This was the last both countries. Unfortunately, the concentrated on internal political direct armed conflict between Ar- exercise did not last. Frondizi and and economic problems and on the gentina and Brazil. The resulting Quadros were politically weak and coming transfer of power to civilian peace treaty in 1828 established were in the end overthrown.5 But hands. In addition, the 1982 South 3 as a new buffer state. the failure of these initial embryonic Atlantic War diverted concern from Nevertheless, the rivalry persisted, efforts did not result in a return to bilateral relations.8 with different characteristics and

40 Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1995 Julio C. Carasales

THE BEGINNING OF THE milestone because of the sweeping ing of similar IAEA conventions. NUCLEAR character of the treaty and the fact Protocol No. 17 on “Nuclear Coop- RAPPROCHEMENT (1985-89) that it was ratified by the Argentine eration,” signed in December 1986, Congress with the support of all defined several areas for mutual co- The political climate to undertake political parties. This support sug- operation and development, includ- the building of a new and vastly gested that the rapprochement with ing high density fuels for research improved relationship between Ar- Brazil enjoyed wide approval, un- reactors, detectors, electronics, and gentina and Brazil became propi- thinkable 10 years earlier.9 nuclear instrumentation. Three years tious when civilians assumed the Another bilateral process that later in an annex to Protocol No. leadership of the two nations: Presi- dealt specifically with nuclear issues 17, the foreign ministers of both dents Raúl Alfonsín of Argentina was going on simultaneously. It was countries concluded an agreement (December 1983) and José Sarney an integral but distinct part of the “to promote complementary indus- of Brazil (March 1985). It must be whole new Argentine-Brazilian re- trial activities in the nuclear sector.” emphasized that nuclear affairs were lationship. These bilateral agreements have not envisaged as isolated from the At the November 1985 Foz de to be seen in the context of the broader context of Argentine-Bra- Iguazú presidential meeting men- broader process of economic inte- zilian relations in general. On the tioned above, a “Joint Declaration gration being pursued during that contrary, the political leadership of on Nuclear Policy” was issued that period. both countries began to view the stressed the exclusively peaceful In the years following 1985, sub- nuclear issue as one important part purposes of the nuclear programs stantial progress on nuclear coop- of the whole process. of both countries and the intent to eration proceeded on the commer- The two civilian presidents met cooperate very closely in this area. cial and technical level, with the in Foz de Iguazú in late November The declaration also established “a establishment of closer trade links 1985 and initiated a process of eco- joint working group under the re- between nuclear enterprises, and on nomic integration and close politi- sponsibility of the Argentine and the official level as a result of the cal cooperation. Economic coordi- Brazilian Foreign Ministries, with work of the permanent committee nation accelerated with the signing the participation of the respective (the former joint working group) and on July 29, 1986, of an “Act for nuclear commissions and enterprises of increasingly frequent head of state Argentine-Brazilian Integration,” to study and propose concrete mea- visits. with additional protocols on nearly sures to implement the declared bi- Presidents Alfonsín and Sarney 30 different issues. The act estab- lateral nuclear policy. The group met four times between December lished a so-called “Program for In- became a permanent committee in 1986 and November 1988. Accom- tegration and Economic Coopera- 1988. The fact that the working panied by political and technical tion,” defined a set of principles to group was put under the authority advisors, they visited sensitive guide the effort (among them the of the ministries of foreign affairs, unsafeguarded nuclear installations. progressive harmonization of eco- the governmental departments most Following each visit, a specific dec- nomic policies), and created an ex- convinced of the need to advance laration on common nuclear policy ecutive committee. The members rapidly and forcefully toward the was signed. of this committee included the min- proclaimed goals, has been a sig- Usually presidential visits tend to isters of foreign affairs and economy nificant factor contributing to the be seen as just social gestures, ex- of both countries, who were given success of the bilateral nuclear non- pressing a political good will be- the task of supervising the perfor- proliferation effort. tween two nations. In this case, the mance of the program and of pro- These broad bilateral agreements high-level visits to sensitive nuclear posing new actions. were supplemented by several tech- establishments, like the Argentine Two years later, a comprehensive nical protocols. Protocol No. 11 on enrichment plant at Pilcaniyeu and bilateral Treaty on Integration, Co- “Immediate Information and Recip- the Brazilian enrichment plant at operation, and Development was rocal Assistance in Case of Nuclear Iperó, acted as confidence-building concluded on November 29, 1988. Accident and Radiological Emergen- measures. Well before announcing This was considered a significant cies” was signed prior to the sign- publicly the success of the uranium

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1995 41 Julio C. Carasales

enrichment process, the government prochement.11 President Sarney. The new Brazil- of each country communicated the However, analysis of the bilateral ian President Fernando Collor de accomplishment to the other; this experience soon showed that inter- Mello had the same sentiments and also served as a source of confi- national concerns had not been dis- expressed them when he visited dence-building. pelled. By 1990, it was clear to both Menem in July 1990. The end of the terms of Presidents Argentine and Brazilian policy-mak- On November 28, 1990, the two Alfonsín (1989) and Sarney (1990) ers that, notwithstanding the value heads of state met again in the town concluded what could be considered of the bilateral effort, the interna- of Foz de Iguazú and issued another the first phase of the new Argen- tional community would not be sat- significant “Joint Declaration on tine-Brazilian nuclear relationship. isfied without some form of concrete Nuclear Policy.” They decided to This phase was mainly, if not ex- verification system integrated into take the following actions: a) to es- clusively, of a bilateral character, the global nonproliferation regime. tablish a Common System of Ac- concerned only with putting nuclear It seemed necessary to take the pro- counting and Control (SCCC) which relations between the two nations on cess beyond a purely bilateral non- would apply to all nuclear activities a new basis. The purpose was to binding arrangement and to consider of both countries, and to create a inspire mutual confidence and trust the possibility of concluding legally- bilateral unit, the Brazilian-Argen- and not, at that stage, to address in- binding agreements for mutual in- tine Agency for Accounting and ternational worries and uncertain- spection and control, and of accept- Control of Nuclear Materials ties. Moreover, mutual confidence ing international verification of the (ABACC), to control its application; was established by a combination of entire nuclear programs of both b) to start negotiations with the visits, exchanges of technicians and countries. IAEA with a view to reaching a joint students, commercial relations, This new phase of the process was safeguards agreement on the basis complementary activities of nuclear carried out by the new heads-of- of the SCCC; and c) after signing industries, and similar actions, but state of Argentina and Brazil, Presi- the safeguards agreement, to adopt not—it must be stressed—by a system dents and Fernando the measures necessary for the full of mutual nuclear controls and safe- Collor. entry into force of the Treaty for the guards. Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Until 1989, the words “inspec- THE NEW NUCLEAR (Treaty of tion,” “control,” and “safeguarding” RELATIONSHIP (1990-95) Tlatelolco), including actions aimed were not incorporated in any of the at updating and improving its text.12 documents signed by Argentina and Presidents Alfonsín and Sarney During a meeting of all Latin Brazil. However, “trustworthiness” were so personally connected with American states plus and Por- and “confidence” were mentioned the evolving nuclear relationship that tugal held in Guadalajara, , repeatedly. when both leaders finished their on July 18, 1991, Argentina and Foreign observers were inclined terms almost simultaneously, many Brazil concluded a bilateral treaty to view Argentine-Brazilian nuclear observers asked whether the process incorporating all the nuclear com- cooperation as a means of distract- would continue upon their retire- mitments already made, and adopt- ing international suspicions from the ments. Fortunately, the new heads- ing important additional measures. ultimately non-peaceful intentions of of-state not only kept the effort go- The treaty, called the “Agreement the nuclear programs of both coun- ing but intensified it, soon showing for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of tries.10 Instead, the actual goal for that the new vision had solid roots Nuclear Energy” (also known as the Argentina and Brazil was to protect and was not based on the political Guadalajara Treaty), was later rati- their individual security and pro- will of a few individuals. fied by the parliaments of both coun- mote reciprocal trust. International President Carlos Menem, who tries.13 security might follow as a natural took office in July 1989, made his Article 1 of the treaty pledges and desirable corollary, but it was first visit of state to Brazil in Au- both parties “to use the nuclear ma- not the determining factor, nor was gust. He declared his firm support terial and facilities under their ju- it ever publicly stated as one of the for nuclear cooperation in the dis- risdiction or control exclusively for elements that influenced the rap- cussions that he held with then- peaceful purposes.” The testing,

42 Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1995 Julio C. Carasales manufacture, acquisition, posses- both countries.14 ernment. Mexico held consultations sion, and deployment of nuclear A third step envisaged in Foz de with the other parties, and an weapons are expressly prohibited. Iguazú was the full accession of both amendment conference took place in In addition, peaceful nuclear explo- nations to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Mexico City on August 26, 1992. sions—in which Argentina and Bra- While the treaty had been signed and The modifications proposed by Ar- zil were always strongly interested ratified by the majority of the Latin gentina, Brazil, , and Mexico and which, according to their inter- American states, its effectiveness were unanimously approved, and the pretation, were permitted under the was incomplete. Approximately half three nations pledged to undertake Tlatelolco Treaty—are renounced. of the territory and population of the the activities required to permit the The treaty states “that at present no region remained outside of the treaty treaty to enter into force. technical distinction can be made because four important countries Argentina ratified the Tlatelolco between nuclear explosive devices were not parties: Argentina, Brazil, Treaty and its amendments on Janu- for peaceful purposes and those for Chile, and . Brazil and Chile ary 18, 1994. Chile ratified the military purposes.” Finally, the previously had signed and ratified amendments also on January 18, treaty formally establishes the the treaty, but without waiving the 1990, and Brazil followed on May SCCC and ABACC, the bilateral conditions required for the treaty to 30. The three countries also waived monitoring agency provided for in enter into force for their territories. the requirements of Article 28 of the the Foz de Iguazú Joint Declaration Argentina had signed but not rati- treaty,15 and so the treaty is now in of six months before. fied, and Cuba had taken no action force for them. For the treaty to While the Guadalajara Treaty was on the treaty. become fully operative among states being negotiated, Argentina and Bra- Argentina and Brazil were joined of concern, it only needs the ratifi- zil initiated discussions first between by Chile in discussing and propos- cation of Cuba, which recently themselves and later with the IAEA ing a series of amendments designed signed the treaty.16 The complete in order to reach a full-scope safe- to update and improve—to use the implementation of the Treaty of guards agreement. The matter was words of the Foz de Iguazú Joint Tlatelolco will be another benefi- complex and difficult, because full- Declaration—the text of Tlatelolco, cial consequence of the Argentine- scope IAEA safeguards previously but not to alter its substantive Brazilian nuclear rapprochement. had been opposed by Argentina and clauses. The suggested changes dealt The development of the relation- Brazil, and because four parties were mainly with the control procedures, ship between Argentina and Brazil involved: both nations, the IAEA, which were viewed as too intrusive in the nuclear field, begun some- and ABACC. An additional compli- and detrimental to the preservation what tentatively in 1980, was reju- cating factor was the unspoken un- of commercial and technical secrets. venated in the mid-1980s with the derstanding that the resulting agree- Moreover, the three nations objected election of civilian presidents, and ment with the IAEA would incor- to the treaty’s procedures for spe- has moved beyond the expectations porate obligations virtually identi- cial inspections, an element of the of its most optimistic supporters. cal to those mandated by the Non- agreement that had never been Declarations of good intentions have Proliferation Treaty (NPT); Argen- implemented. It was believed that been converted into formal treaties tina and Brazil strongly opposed the the organization charged with en- that embody obligations designed to NPT. Despite these difficulties, the suring compliance with the provide reassurance about the ex- Quadripartite Agreement was con- Tlatelolco Treaty—the Agency for the clusively peaceful nature of the cluded, approved by the Board of Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in nuclear activities of the two coun- Governors of the IAEA, and signed Latin America (OPANAL)—lacked tries. The closeness of the relation- in Vienna on December 13, 1991, the technical means and personnel ship is demonstrated by the frequent in the presence of Presidents Menem to carry out such inspections and use of one representative who speaks and Collor. Only six months had that the IAEA was far more quali- for both states in disarmament and lapsed since the signing of the fied to perform in this field. nuclear fora, such as the Geneva Guadalajara Treaty. The The changes favored by the three Conference on Disarmament and the Quadripartite Agreement has also countries were negotiated with First Committee of the U.N. Gen- been ratified by the parliaments of Mexico, Tlatelolco’s depository gov- eral Assembly. Moreover, in some

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1995 43 Julio C. Carasales

technical meetings of the IAEA, one does not seem to be as strong in dustries are reluctant to embark individual has represented the two Brazil. In general, during the de- upon new ventures. Argentina has countries. velopment of this extraordinary pro- no plans to develop a nuclear-pro- cess, Argentina was often the leader pelled submarine, and Brazil is pur- THE PRESENT SITUATION and Brazil the follower, even while suing the endeavor at a very slow sharing the same objectives. pace. On November 2-3, 1994, Presi- At present, Brazil is not consid- An eloquent symbol of the present dent-elect of Brazil Fernando ering ratification of the NPT.18 Bra- situation is the decision of the Ar- Cardoso, who assumed power in zil believes that the nonproliferation gentine government to dismantle the January 1995, made his first visit agreements already accepted are powerful National Atomic Energy to Argentina. In a press conference, more than enough to prove its cre- Commission (CNEA), the body re- he mentioned some areas where his dentials and that further agreements sponsible for the nation’s spectacu- views corresponded with those of are totally unnecessary. The obliga- lar nuclear development. The power- Menem; he included “the nonpro- tions that Argentina and Brazil al- generating plants are to be trans- liferation of weapons-of-mass-de- ready have are in fact greater than ferred to private hands, and a much 17 struction.” Statements of this kind the ones embodied in the NPT. Cu- reduced institution will remain to bode well for the future. riously, Argentina has reached the conduct research and produce medi- The latest development is the rati- opposite conclusion. Argentina cal and agricultural products. The fication of the NPT by Argentina. thought that if it had already ac- move has met with some strong re- Taking into account the 25 years of cepted the commitments, why not sistance but is well received in other energetic opposition, passage in accede to the NPT? circles, where the Commission has Congress was surprisingly rapid and Except for Brazil’s attitude regard- always been considered a white el- easy. Argentina approved the NPT ing the NPT, it seems that there is ephant. on December 23, 1994, with only not much more to be done in the A realistic appraisal of the present token resistance by the Radical Party, nuclear political and legal fields. state of nuclear affairs in the two and the instrument of accession was There is a general appreciation in nations reveals that: 1) extraordinary deposited in Washington on Febru- both countries that for now the prin- accomplishments already have been ary 10, 1995. It seems that the na- cipal objective should be to consoli- achieved and have been generally tionalistic sentiments of the past have date the bilateral arrangements and welcomed; 2) there is no danger that been put aside definitively, and that the IAEA safeguards agreement. the process will be reversed or un- there is strong support for the inter- The two nations will continue coor- dermined; 3) the time has come to national nonproliferation regime. dination of their nuclear policies and consolidate the bilateral arrange- The situation is different in Bra- will become more integrated into the ments; 4) the nuclear control agency zil. In Brazil arguments similar to international nonproliferation re- ABACC is performing in a satisfac- those made in Argentina against the gime. tory manner; 5) new substantial successive nonproliferation agree- At the same time, as perhaps it agreements are not to be expected; ments have been made in a much should be expected, there are areas and 6) some policy divergence is more forceful way. In contrast to where nuclear cooperation may not possible, as in the case of the NPT, Argentina, there was an active Bra- be as successful as was hoped. For although there are reasons to pre- zilian lobby that opposed the four- example, despite the conclusion of dict that in the long run Brazil will party IAEA safeguards agreement relevant protocols and the creation also join that treaty. This is an opti- and the Tlatelolco Treaty. Brazil of the Committee of Argentine and mistic, but I think realistic, assess- took a much longer time to approve Brazilian Businessmen in the ment of the state of the present Ar- the agreements than Argentina did. Nuclear Area (CEABAN), integra- gentine-Brazilian relationship. There is no doubt that Brazilian tion and cooperation of the two pri- authorities continue to have the same vate nuclear industries have not pro- CONCLUSION AND LESSONS commitment to nonproliferation ceeded as expected. The nuclear policy, but the broad support that programs of both countries are in What general points might be such a policy enjoys in Argentina stagnation, and private nuclear in- drawn from this history for applica-

44 Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1995 Julio C. Carasales tion to other regions? To begin with, the most developed nuclear coun- certainly beneficial. we must examine the reasons for the tries of the region, they were the In tandem with civilian leader- dramatic changes in policy in Ar- primary aim of its control system. ship, the decreased role of the mili- gentina and Brazil. Both were opposed to full-scope tary in the two nations also helped. It must be remembered that the safeguards by the IAEA, however, Specifically, in Argentina, the mili- states’ progress in nuclear affairs was as required by the NPT. Neverthe- tary failed to effectively administer not an isolated phenomenon but part less, they had been willing to ac- the country, and the defeat in the of a broader process that encom- cept international safeguards on South Atlantic War of 1982 reduced passed a whole range of foreign nuclear facilities built or developed its prestige to an all-time low. In both policy issues. In nuclear affairs, in with foreign assistance. Common countries, the civilian governments fact, the two rivals shared several positions and points of view were a had more authority over the mili- features. Both nations had devoted sound basis on which to build co- tary. Thus, they were able to take significant resources to developing operation and mutual trust. actions related to national security a considerable nuclear industry and In the economic realm, the allo- that would normally have been re- autonomous control over the full cation of resources to nuclear ac- sisted or criticized by the armed nuclear fuel cycle. Both had devel- tivities became increasingly difficult forces. This does not mean that the oped uranium enrichment capabil- as their economies deteriorated. militaries were interested in devel- ity, the ultimate symbol of nuclear Moreover, the somewhat generous oping a nuclear weapon program; independence. But neither Argentina financial support that the nuclear in- however, on matters of national se- nor Brazil had ever started a nuclear dustry had received became the ob- curity, their views rarely coincided weapon program. The reasons may ject of frequent questioning and criti- with those of the civilians.20 It must have been related to their location, cism, but often new expenses were be recognized that assurances that a far from the main conflict regions justified by the need to “keep up” potential rival would not develop a of the world, as well as their lack of with a neighbor. nuclear weapon were of tremendous immediate military disputes. Since The advent of civilian govern- importance for the national security the civilian nuclear development of ments in both countries could not of both countries. the two countries had advanced to a have been more propitious. Deci- Presidential leadership was a criti- roughly similar level, the time was sions in the nuclear area, always cal factor, along with the active par- ripe to try to make progress in a delicate, certainly were easier to ticipation of key advisers and coordinated and cooperative way, make when the influence of mili- decisionmakers, in breaking with rather than in a competitive one. tary thinking was less prominent. In long-standing policies and starting In addition, the general interna- the case of Argentina, the Radical on a new road. The heads of state tional nuclear policies of Argentina Party in power had a negative atti- were ultimately responsible for the and Brazil were broadly the same. tude towards nuclear development. many decisions, but the activities Both refused to join the NPT. They In its view, nuclear power presented and determination of the foreign resented what they perceived as a many risks and was not really nec- ministries were fundamental to the discriminatory and unfair treaty that essary in Argentina. Also, it be- success of the whole enterprise. The legitimized nuclear weapons in the lieved that the CNEA had been given activist role of the foreign ministries hands of a few and imposed on the privileged treatment by the preced- can be explained, at least in part, others a rigorous international con- ing governments, to the detriment by their increasing awareness of the trol system tailored by the nuclear of other more deserving national international costs, both political and weapons states, themselves ex- priorities. Consequently, under the technical, of an absolutely indepen- empted from any restrictions. Nei- Radical government, the resources dent nuclear program and the rejec- ther was a party to the Treaty of allotted to the CNEA were substan- tion of any form of outside control. Tlatelolco, not because they objected tially diminished and the nuclear In that context, the creation of even to its purpose and main obligations, program was considerably slowed, a bilateral situation of mutual but because they considered some and, in some areas, stopped.19 nuclear trust would nevertheless of its control clauses inadequate and Given these circumstances, cessation provide additional benefit from the even prejudicial to their interests. As of the competition with Brazil was global point of view.

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1995 45 Julio C. Carasales

The new presidents of Argentina obtaining foreign technology might over, the aim was not simply an in- and Brazil, Menem and Collor, were have had some weight in the crease in mutual security. not only receptive to the new ideas decisionmaking process, but there One conclusion, therefore, with but were active in putting them into is no evidence that it was a major implications for other regions is that practice. In particular, the contribu- ingredient. an attempt to foster mutual confi- tion of Menem must be emphasized, dence-building measures based ex- because he introduced a substantial A Model for Other Regions? clusively on the nuclear field will change in Argentina’s foreign policy. prove rather difficult. To expect re- After a century of coolness, if not Policy-makers and experts have ciprocal nuclear confidence when confrontation, in relations with the raised the question of whether the all, or almost all, other factors point , the Argentine govern- success of the Argentine-Brazilian to conflict and enmity seems highly ment decided to align itself closely exercise could serve as a model for improbable. At the same time, it is with the United States. other regions. While the idea is reasonable to hope that a gradual Because strengthening of the in- tempting, it should be explored with improvement in the security situa- ternational nuclear nonproliferation caution, since there are tremendous tion, resulting from modest progress regime is one of the pillars of Ameri- difficulties in fully transferring a in nuclear cooperation, could gen- can foreign policy, it is not surpris- successful process from one region erate a better climate for coopera- ing that Menem easily approved and to another. tion in other areas. promoted policies that he knew North and South Korea (or Ja- In this sense, the Argentine-Bra- would be received with utmost sat- pan), and Pakistan, the Middle zilian experience does contribute a isfaction by the United States. This East, and even Russia and Ukraine useful precedent. It demonstrates does not mean that the intensifica- have been mentioned as areas in that a rapprochement between rivals tion of the Argentine-Brazilian rap- which the South American experi- in the sensitive nuclear area is pos- prochement, which developed since ence could be valuable. However, sible. The nature of the bilateral 1989, was due entirely to Ameri- important differences must be men- agreements, including the ABACC can pressure. However, it would be tioned. While Argentina and Brazil machinery, and their relationship to wrong to ignore the fact that some were competitors and rivals for the the IAEA system deserve special difficult steps were easier to take leadership of South America, they attention. with the knowledge that they would were not enemies. The only war There are also lessons that can be welcomed in Washington. between them took place in the mid- be derived from the process in- Undoubtedly, international pres- 1820s, more than a century-and-a- volved. First and foremost, to be sure had something to do with the half ago. Since that time, their rela- successful, an exercise of this kind changes in the nuclear policies of tions have alternated between coop- must be based on a sincere purpose Argentina and Brazil, but it was not eration and competition, but not a of reaching agreements that will end a deciding factor. Both countries had single shot has ever been fired. A a nuclear race and establish a cli- to face export restrictions from the bitter border dispute was solved by mate of mutual confidence. No United States as a consequence of arbitration, not war. In 1985 the mo- moves in this field can have the its 1980 Nuclear Non-Proliferation ment came when it was decided to slightest chance of success if they Act, but were able to surmount the put an end once and for all to the are taken with the ulterior motive difficulties, at some cost, by find- rivalry and mistrust that had per- of cheating the other party or gull- ing other suppliers or by develop- vaded bilateral relations for too long, ing it into a false sense of security. ing the restricted elements locally.21 especially by focusing on social and As a first step, a country should open The possibility of using these alter- economic relations. That effort was itself to the other party, on the un- native sources diminished with the comprehensive, encompassing a derstanding that this policy will be decrease in funds available for whole range of issues. The nuclear reciprocated. Each nation’s nuclear nuclear projects and with the field was one highly sensitive part activities, installations, and pro- strengthening of the Nuclear Sup- of a broad spectrum of cooperative grams should be made transparent pliers Group Guidelines. This fac- actions, but it was not an isolated to the other. Information should tor suggests that the difficulty of area worked upon singularly. More- flow fully and freely from one coun-

46 Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1995 Julio C. Carasales try to the other, and political au- nation organization, with its own benefit of both nations, their neigh- thorities and technical officials staff of inspectors, properly man- bors, and the international commu- should be given the opportunity to aged and performing its tasks effi- nity. Their experience may provide visit (but not inspect) the nuclear ciently and independently, should be important lessons for other areas of facilities of the other. Such ex- enough to guarantee each party that the world. changes of qualified technicians, the other is not diverting nuclear information, and students, should material to forbidden purposes or create and foster confidence in the undertaking any form of warlike ac- truthfulness of the information re- tivities. 1 The author collaborated with Professors John Redick, from the University of Virginia, and ciprocally provided. Also, any weap- In the end, the main beneficia- Paulo Wrobel, from the Pontificia Universidade ons activity must be completely ries of such a bilateral process are of , in a joint project to study the ended to the satisfaction of the other the two countries directly con- Argentine-Brazilian nuclear arrangements, fi- nanced with a grant from the Rockefeller Foun- nation. If these actions encounter cerned. Other neighbors and the in- dation. Part of the present paper is derived from difficulties or if a country is reluc- ternational community at large might this common endeavor, and the author is very tant to open particular installations, obtain a measure of reassurance. But grateful for their help. Because he is a member of the Argentine Foreign Service, the author had it is probable that the exercise will because they have no way of verify- the chance to hold lengthy talks with colleagues not succeed. ing that the situation is exactly as it and friends who participated in the negotiation of the different bilateral documents. For that rea- Of course, the climate of mutual has been described by the agency or son, this article is based more on the personal trust thus attained is temporary; it the interested states, some uncertain- experiences and perceptions of the author than will not last if additional measures ties will remain. The inspections and on published materials. 2 Isidoro Ruiz Moreno, Historia de las relaciones do not follow to give it a permanent controls of the two-nation body exteriores (Buenos Aires: Editorial character. A country must be sure could be superficial or unsatisfac- Perrot, 1961), pp. 23-91. that the other is not carrying out tory or, even worse, form a cover 3 This period of Argentine-Brazilian history is well-documented in Carlos Alberto Silva, La dangerous activities and does not for collusion between the two par- política internacional de la Nación Argentina. plan to do so in the future. Visits ties against a third country. (Buenos Aires: Ministerio del Interior, 1946), pp. 94-104. and exchanges of information are not Therefore, the history of the Ar- 4 P. Szasz, The Law and Practice of the IAEA enough. A system of control and gentine-Brazilian operation reveals (Vienna: IAEA Legal Series Number 7), pp. 144- verification becomes necessary. But that, while full confidence can be 145. 5 Juan Archibaldo Lanus, De Chapultepec al while such controls are essential, created between two countries, it Beagle-política exterior Argentina 1945-1980 they can also become a major stum- cannot be established in the inter- (Buenos Aires: Emecé Editores, 1983), pp. 285- bling block. It is always difficult to national community without moni- 296. 6 Ibid., pp. 302-312. accept foreign inspections, and the toring and controls being carried out 7 Argentina has signed approximately 20 agree- reluctance is much greater if the in- by an international body indepen- ments on nuclear cooperation, including agree- ments with , Cuba, , , , spectors come only from one other dent from the two parties. Argen- Romania, Colombia, and other countries. country, the former rival. For Ar- tina and Brazil, whatever their origi- 8 Wayne A. Selcher, “Brazilian-Argentine Rela- gentina to accept inspections by Bra- nal intentions, felt compelled to have tions in the 1980s: From Wary Rivalry to Friendly Competition,” Journal of Interamerican Studies zil or vice versa was too much. Ex- recourse not only to ABACC but to and World Affairs 27 (Summer 1985), p. 46. perience shows that an international a multilateral agency, the IAEA. The 9 The bilateral process was expanded to a subre- inspection team, or at least one com- four-party safeguards agreement gional effort with the signing of a treaty on March 26, 1991, to establish a common market among posed of two countries, is much took care of the particular aspects Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay by more acceptable. If the countries of the bilateral arrangements and December 31, 1994. To the surprise of many, the target date was achieved. At the present time, concerned wish to keep the whole ABACC, but the commitments in- negotiations continue on associating Chile to the matter under their own authority, cluded in it were the full-scope safe- Common Market or MERCOSUR, as it is called. they could—as Argentina and Brazil guards prevailing all over the world. 10 This view prevailed among the non-Latin American participants in a seminar organized by did—establish a two-nation body like Each region has its own problems, the Nuclear Control Institute of Washington D.C., ABACC, to monitor the compliance difficulties, and even favorable ele- held in , Uruguay, on October 11- of a solemnly undertaken engage- ments. The road taken by Argentina 13, 1989. It was attended mainly by Argentine, Brazilian, and American experts and constituted ment to use nuclear energy exclu- and Brazil created a satisfactory state an adequate survey of the principal issues raised sively for peaceful purposes. A two- of affairs in South America, to the in relation to what the author now calls “the first

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1995 47 Julio C. Carasales phase” of the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear rela- Rubén Pering, eds., Argentina en el mundo 1973- tionship. The papers of the seminar were pub- 1987 (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor lished in 1992. See Paul Leventhal and Sharon Latinoamericano, 1988), pp. 236-237. Tanzer, eds., Averting a Latin American Nuclear 20 Contrary to what is generally believed abroad, Arms Race: New Prospects and Challenges for in Argentina, the role of the military in nuclear Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Cooperation (New development has always been very minor. West- York: Macmillan, 1992.) ern comments such as “There has been signifi- 11 Julio Carasales, “Goals for the Argentine-Bra- cant military involvement in nuclear programs zilian Nuclear Cooperation,” in Leventhal and in both Argentina and Brazil” or “President Raúl Tanzer, op. cit., pp. 47-62. Alfonsín has had some success in curtailing the 12 The text of the Joint Declaration is reproduced role of the military in nuclear research and de- in Disarmament-A Periodic Review by the United velopment,” do not have any basis at all in rela- Nations, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (New York: United tion to Argentina. (See Barbara Black and War- Nations, 1991), pp. 225-226. On July 3, 1990, ren Donnelly, Argentina, Brazil, and Nuclear the parties agreed to change the official name of Proliferation, CRS Issue Brief (Washington, D.C.: the Treaty of Tlatelolco to include both Latin U.S. Government Printing Office, October 4, American "and the Caribbean." See "Status del 1991.) The armed forces never had nuclear pro- Tratado, sus protocolos a dicionales y sus grams or participated in nuclear research and de- enmiendas," OPANAL document S/Inf. 546 Rev. velopment. The only reason usually given to 3, April 20, 1995, p. 3. substantiate such repeated assertions is that, for 13 The main articles of the Guadalajara Treaty many years, the heads of the Argentine National are reproduced in the Newsbrief 15 (Programme Atomic Energy Commission were retired navy for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Au- officers. But the Commission was never under tumn 1991), pp. 15-16. the authority of the navy. It was always subject 14 The safeguards agreement is analyzed in John directly to the control of the executive and its Redick, “Argentina and Brazil’s New Arrange- personnel were overwhelmingly civilian, as were ment for Mutual Inspections and IAEA Safe- the Commission’s board of directors. However, guards,” (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Control it is recognized that the situation in Brazil was Institute, February 1992). different; the armed forces had their so-called 15 Article 28 of the Tlatelolco Treaty requires the “parallel programs,” but the importance and seri- fulfillment of all the following conditions for the ousness of these activities tend to be exagger- treaty to enter into force: a) ratification by all ated. Latin American states; b) ratification of Protocol 21 Leonard Spector, “The Silence Spread,” For- I by all countries with possessions in Latin eign Policy 58 (Spring 1985), pp. 53-78. America; c) ratification of Protocol II by all nuclear weapon powers; and d) conclusion of safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Paragraph 2 of Article 28 allows for the waiving of those requirements by any state when ratifying the treaty. All Tlatelolco parties did so initially, ex- cept Brazil and Chile. 16 Cuba signed the treaty on March 25, 1995, as reported in OPANAL document, loc. cit. Cuba’s promise to do so was originally mentioned in a personal letter dated August 17, 1994, addressed by to Itamar Franco, President of Brazil. See La Nación (Buenos Aires), August 30, 1994. 17 Clarín (Buenos Aires), November 4, 1994. 18 Statement made by an official of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, Antonio Guerreiro, in a semi- nar “Issues for Latin American and the Carib- bean at the 1995 NPT Conference,” sponsored by the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non- proliferation (PPNN), held in , Venezu- ela, on May 3-6, 1994. 19 Since its first issue in 1986, the bimonthly magazine Argentina Nuclear has discussed re- peatedly the deteriorating situation of the Argen- tine nuclear industry and the financial difficul- ties that affected the National Atomic Energy Commission. It attributed these difficulties mainly to the policies followed by the Ministry of Economy. This state of affairs is also described in an article by Luis Fernando Calviño, “La Ar- gentina y el régimen internacional de la no proliferación,” included in Roberto Russell and

48 Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1995